@blamejs/pki 0.6.14 → 0.6.15

package/lib/schema-cms.js

@@ -56,65 +56,42 @@ var schemaCrl = require("./schema-crl");
 var CmsError = frameworkError.CmsError;
 var PemError = frameworkError.PemError;
 
-// The cms error namespace the schema engine walks under.
 var NS = pkix.makeNS("cms", CmsError, oid);
 
 var ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER = pkix.algorithmIdentifier(NS);
 var ATTRIBUTE = pkix.attribute(NS);
 var NAME = pkix.name(NS);
 
-// CMSVersion ::= INTEGER, where the SignedData version is {1,3,4,5} and the SignerInfo
-// version is {1,3} (RFC 5652 sec. 5.1, sec. 5.3). Wider accept maps than any other format.
 var SIGNED_DATA_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "1": 1, "3": 3, "4": 4, "5": 5 });
 var SIGNER_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "1": 1, "3": 3 });
-// EnvelopedData sec. 6.1 (0/2/3/4), EncryptedData sec. 8 (0/2), and the per-RecipientInfo
-// versions (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.1-sec. 6.2.4): ktri {0,2}, kari {3}, kekri {4}, pwri {0}.
 var ENVELOPED_DATA_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0, "2": 2, "3": 3, "4": 4 });
 var ENCRYPTED_DATA_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0, "2": 2 });
 var KTRI_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0, "2": 2 });
 var KARI_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "3": 3 });
 var KEKRI_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "4": 4 });
 var PWRI_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0 });
-// AuthenticatedData sec. 9.1: computed {0,1,3} (see _expectedAuthDataVersion). The
-// AuthEnvelopedData version (RFC 5083 sec. 2.1) and the KEMRecipientInfo version
-// (RFC 9629 sec. 3) are both a fixed 0.
 var AUTHDATA_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0, "1": 1, "3": 3 });
-var COMPRESSED_DATA_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0 });   // RFC 3274 sec. 1.1 -- version MUST be 0
+var COMPRESSED_DATA_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0 });
 var AUTHENV_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0 });
 var KEMRI_VERSION = pkix.versionReader(NS, { "0": 0 });
 
-// id-signedData / id-envelopedData / id-encryptedData are the content types this
-// build structurally decodes; the rest are recognized-and-deferred (a precise
-// diagnostic, not a silent unknown-format). OIDs resolve from the registry (pkcs7 /
-// smimeCt families), never dotted literals.
 var OID_SIGNED_DATA = oid.byName("signedData");
 var OID_ENVELOPED_DATA = oid.byName("envelopedData");
 var OID_ENCRYPTED_DATA = oid.byName("encryptedData");
-var OID_AUTH_DATA = oid.byName("authData");                         // RFC 5652 sec. 9
-var OID_AUTH_ENVELOPED_DATA = oid.byName("authEnvelopedData");      // RFC 5083
-var OID_COMPRESSED_DATA = oid.byName("compressedData");             // RFC 3274
+var OID_AUTH_DATA = oid.byName("authData");
+var OID_AUTH_ENVELOPED_DATA = oid.byName("authEnvelopedData");
+var OID_COMPRESSED_DATA = oid.byName("compressedData");
 var OID_DATA = oid.byName("data");
-var OID_ORI_KEM = oid.byName("kem");                                // id-ori-kem (RFC 9629)
+var OID_ORI_KEM = oid.byName("kem");
 
-// AES key-wrap OID -> the KEK length in octets it wraps (RFC 3565). RFC 9629 sec. 3:
-// a KEMRecipientInfo kekLength MUST be consistent with the wrap algorithm, so a
-// recognized wrap pins the exact length; an unrecognized wrap carries no rule.
 var WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS = {};
 WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS[oid.byName("aes128-wrap")] = 16;
 WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS[oid.byName("aes192-wrap")] = 24;
 WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS[oid.byName("aes256-wrap")] = 32;
 
-// ML-KEM OID -> the exact ciphertext (kemct) length in octets (FIPS 203). A
-// recognized ML-KEM kem carries a fixed-size ciphertext; any other length can
-// never decapsulate. (The params-absent rule rides the shared oid registry.)
-// Ciphertext lengths come from the shared ML-KEM parameter registry (FIPS 203 Table 3) rather
-// than a local copy, so this codec and the crypto engine cannot disagree about a parameter set.
 var KEM_CT_LENGTHS = {};
 ["id-ml-kem-512", "id-ml-kem-768", "id-ml-kem-1024"].forEach(function (n) { KEM_CT_LENGTHS[oid.byName(n)] = oid.kemParams(n).ct; });
 
-// Recognized AEAD content-encryption OIDs -> the AES-GCM/CCM parameter shape + the
-// legal ICVlen set (RFC 5084). An unrecognized content-encryption OID surfaces its
-// parameters raw with no AEAD validation (registry, not switch).
 var AEAD_GCM_ICVLENS = new Set([12, 13, 14, 15, 16]);
 var AEAD_CCM_ICVLENS = new Set([4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16]);
 var AEAD_ALGS = {};
@@ -125,16 +102,11 @@ var DEFERRED = new Set([
   oid.byName("data"), oid.byName("signedAndEnvelopedData"),
   oid.byName("digestedData"),
 ]);
-// The RFC 5652 sec. 11 attribute types with per-context placement + value rules.
 var OID_CONTENT_TYPE = oid.byName("contentType");
 var OID_MESSAGE_DIGEST = oid.byName("messageDigest");
 var OID_SIGNING_TIME = oid.byName("signingTime");
 var OID_COUNTERSIGNATURE = oid.byName("countersignature");
 
-// RFC 5652 sec. 11.1-sec. 11.4 -- where each sec. 11 attribute type may appear. Keyed by
-// attribute OID; each row names the attribute-set contexts the type MUST NOT
-// appear in: content-type / message-digest / signing-time are signed-or-
-// authenticated only; countersignature is unsigned only.
 var ATTR_FORBIDDEN_IN = {};
 ATTR_FORBIDDEN_IN[OID_CONTENT_TYPE] = { unsigned: true, unauth: true, unprotected: true };
 ATTR_FORBIDDEN_IN[OID_MESSAGE_DIGEST] = { unsigned: true, unauth: true, unprotected: true };
@@ -145,37 +117,20 @@ var ATTR_PLACE_LABELS = {
   unauth: "an unauthenticated attribute", unprotected: "an unprotected attribute",
 };
 
-// Enforce the sec. 11 placement rows on one parsed attribute set. `place` names the
-// context the set occupies (signed / unsigned / auth / unauth / unprotected).
 function _checkAttrPlacement(attrs, place) {
   for (var i = 0; i < attrs.length; i++) {
     var row = ATTR_FORBIDDEN_IN[attrs[i].type];
     if (row && row[place]) {
-      // Coverage residual -- reached only when the OID is a registry entry (the guard above
-      // guarantees it), so oid.name() never returns undefined and this fallback is a
-      // defensive belt, not selectable through the public parse path.
       throw NS.E("cms/misplaced-attr", "the " + (oid.name(attrs[i].type) || attrs[i].type) +
         " attribute must not be " + ATTR_PLACE_LABELS[place] + " (RFC 5652 sec. 11)");
     }
   }
 }
 
-// Enforce the content-binding-attribute value constraints (RFC 5652 sec. 11.1-sec. 11.3)
-// shared by SignedData signedAttrs (sec. 5.3), AuthenticatedData authAttrs (sec. 9.1),
-// and a countersignature value's signedAttrs (sec. 11.4): the set MUST contain
-// exactly one message-digest attribute, each sec. 11 attribute is single-valued with
-// valid syntax, and no attribute type repeats. `mode` selects the content-type
-// presence rule -- "content" (sec. 5.3/sec. 9.1) REQUIRES one; "countersig" (sec. 11.4)
-// FORBIDS it (there is no content type for what a countersignature signs). The
-// content-type value == eContentType cross-check is a separate per-build step
-// (it needs the eContentType in scope); messageDigest == the actual content
-// hash is a sec. 5.6 VERIFICATION concern surfaced, not a structural-parse concern.
 function _checkContentBindingAttrs(attrs, mode) {
   var ct = 0, md = 0, seen = Object.create(null);
   for (var i = 0; i < attrs.length; i++) {
     var a = attrs[i];
-    // RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 -- a signerInfo MUST NOT include multiple instances of the
-    // same signed-attribute type (specific codes for the two mandatory types).
     if (seen[a.type]) {
       if (a.type === OID_CONTENT_TYPE) throw NS.E("cms/duplicate-content-type", "the attribute set must not repeat the content-type attribute");
       if (a.type === OID_MESSAGE_DIGEST) throw NS.E("cms/duplicate-message-digest", "the attribute set must not repeat the message-digest attribute");
@@ -184,74 +139,34 @@ function _checkContentBindingAttrs(attrs, mode) {
     seen[a.type] = true;
     if (a.type === OID_CONTENT_TYPE) {
       ct += 1;
-      // RFC 5652 sec. 11.4 -- a countersignature's signedAttrs MUST NOT carry a
-      // content-type attribute (what it signs has no content type).
       if (mode === "countersig") throw NS.E("cms/misplaced-attr", "a countersignature's signedAttrs must not carry a content-type attribute (RFC 5652 sec. 11.4)");
       if (a.values.length !== 1) throw NS.E("cms/bad-content-type-attr", "the content-type attribute must be single-valued");
-      // ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER (RFC 5652 sec. 11.1): validate the value's
-      // full syntax (tag AND minimal base-128 OID content), not just the tag, so a
-      // truncated / non-minimal subidentifier is rejected here, not at verify time.
       try { asn1.read.oid(asn1.decode(a.values[0])); }
       catch (e) { throw NS.E("cms/bad-content-type-attr", "the content-type attribute value must be a valid OBJECT IDENTIFIER", e); }
     } else if (a.type === OID_MESSAGE_DIGEST) {
       md += 1;
       if (a.values.length !== 1) throw NS.E("cms/bad-message-digest-attr", "the message-digest attribute must be single-valued");
-      // MessageDigest ::= OCTET STRING (RFC 5652 sec. 11.2): validate the full syntax.
       try { asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(a.values[0])); }
       catch (e) { throw NS.E("cms/bad-message-digest-attr", "the message-digest attribute value must be an OCTET STRING", e); }
     } else if (a.type === OID_SIGNING_TIME) {
-      // RFC 5652 sec. 11.3 -- signing-time MUST be single-valued and its value is
-      // SigningTime ::= Time (UTCTime | GeneralizedTime, full syntax validated).
       if (a.values.length !== 1) throw NS.E("cms/bad-signing-time-attr", "the signing-time attribute must be single-valued (RFC 5652 sec. 11.3)");
       try { asn1.read.time(asn1.decode(a.values[0])); }
       catch (e) { throw NS.E("cms/bad-signing-time-attr", "the signing-time attribute value must be a Time (RFC 5652 sec. 11.3)", e); }
     }
   }
-  // Duplicates are rejected in the loop (the seen-set); here only presence.
   if (mode !== "countersig" && ct === 0) throw NS.E("cms/missing-content-type", "the attribute set must contain a content-type attribute (RFC 5652 sec. 11.1)");
   if (md === 0) throw NS.E("cms/missing-message-digest", "the attribute set must contain a message-digest attribute (RFC 5652 sec. 11.2)");
 }
 
-// looksLikeSignedAttributes(bytes) -> boolean.
-//
-// Does `bytes` parse as a DER SignedAttributes block, a SET OF Attribute carrying both the
-// content-type and message-digest attributes RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 makes mandatory whenever signed
-// attributes are present?
-//
-// This is the detector for the signed-attribute stripping forgery
-// (draft-vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata, Attack Type 1). A CMS signature does not commit to
-// WHETHER signed attributes were present, so a signature made over a SignedAttributes block can be
-// re-presented as one made over content: drop the signedAttrs field and set the encapsulated
-// content to the DER of those same attributes. Sec. 5.4 then says the signature is over the content
-// itself, which is exactly what it covers, and with no attributes there is no message-digest or
-// content-type attribute left to disagree. The proposed standards fixes are protocol changes (a
-// context string naming which mode was signed) that no verifier can apply on its own.
-//
-// What a verifier CAN do is refuse the shape. Every message produced by the attack has, as its
-// content, the encoded SignedAttributes of a real message, and sec. 5.3 requires those to carry
-// both attributes named above. That makes their presence a NECESSARY condition of the attack rather
-// than a guess, and the shape is one ordinary content does not have: a certificate, a JSON payload,
-// arbitrary bytes, and even a SET OF other attributes all fail it. The cost is a message whose
-// legitimate content really is an encoded SignedAttributes block signed without attributes, which
-// is refused as genuinely ambiguous -- sign it with attributes and it is unambiguous again.
-//
-// One mandatory attribute value, held to all three conditions a real SignedAttributes meets:
-// exactly one value (RFC 5652 sec. 11.1 / sec. 11.2 make both single-valued), the right tag, and a
-// body that actually reads as that type. All three together, for each attribute; checking the
-// cardinality and the tag while letting an undecodable body through would refuse content the real
-// SignedAttributes parser could never have produced, which is the false positive this whole
-// detector is shaped to avoid.
 function _readsAs(vals, tagNumber, reader) {
   if (vals.length !== 1 || !schema.isUniversal(vals[0], tagNumber)) return false;
   var reads = true;
   try { reader(vals[0]); }
   catch (_e) {
-    reads = false;   // right tag, unreadable body -- not a preimage anything signed
+    reads = false;
   }
   return reads;
 }
-// SigningTime ::= Time is a CHOICE of UTCTime and GeneralizedTime, so the tag is one of two and the
-// reader settles which -- _readsAs pins a single tag and cannot express it.
 function _readsAsTime(vals) {
   if (vals.length !== 1) return false;
   var reads = true;
@@ -262,9 +177,6 @@ function _readsAsTime(vals) {
   return reads;
 }
 
-// Deliberately a total function: it answers about arbitrary attacker bytes and must never throw.
-// The X.690 sec. 11.6 SET OF ordering rule, as the schema engine applies it: each component's
-// encoding is greater than or equal to the one before it.
 function _ascendingDer(nodes) {
   for (var i = 1; i < nodes.length; i++) {
     if (Buffer.compare(nodes[i - 1].bytes, nodes[i].bytes) > 0) return false;
@@ -276,25 +188,14 @@ function looksLikeSignedAttributes(bytes) {
   if (!bytes || !bytes.length) return false;
   var node;
   try { node = asn1.decode(bytes); }
-  catch (_e) { return false; }   // not DER at all -- not this shape
+  catch (_e) { return false; }
   if (!schema.isUniversal(node, asn1.TAGS.SET) || !node.constructed) return false;
   var kids = node.children || [];
   if (!kids.length) return false;
-  // Every rule _checkContentBindingAttrs applies to a real SignedAttributes is applied here, and
-  // for one reason: the detector must match only what a conforming block can be. A set the real
-  // parser would have rejected cannot be the preimage of any signature, so matching it would refuse
-  // content no attack could have produced. Enumerated against that function, never discovered
-  // one rule at a time -- no duplicate attribute types (sec. 5.3), content-type single-valued and a
-  // readable OID (sec. 11.1), message-digest single-valued and a readable OCTET STRING (sec. 11.2),
-  // signing-time when present single-valued and a readable Time (sec. 11.3).
-  // X.690 sec. 11.6: the components of a SET OF appear in ascending DER order, and the schema
-  // engine enforces exactly that on the real SignedAttributes. An out-of-order set is one the
-  // walker refuses, so it is not the preimage of any signature either.
   if (!_ascendingDer(kids)) return false;
   var sawContentType = false, sawMessageDigest = false, seenTypes = Object.create(null);
   for (var i = 0; i < kids.length; i++) {
     var a = kids[i];
-    // Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attrValues SET OF ANY }
     if (!schema.isUniversal(a, asn1.TAGS.SEQUENCE)) return false;
     if (!a.children || a.children.length !== 2) return false;
     var t = a.children[0], vs = a.children[1];
@@ -303,31 +204,13 @@ function looksLikeSignedAttributes(bytes) {
     var attrOid;
     try { attrOid = asn1.read.oid(t); }
     catch (_e2) { return false; }
-    if (seenTypes[attrOid]) return false;   // a repeated attribute type -- sec. 5.3 forbids it
+    if (seenTypes[attrOid]) return false;
     seenTypes[attrOid] = true;
-    // The sec. 11 PLACEMENT rows, from the same table the real parser reads. An attribute the
-    // parser refuses to see in signedAttrs -- id-countersignature is the one sec. 11.4 names --
-    // cannot appear in a conforming SignedAttributes, so a set containing it is not a preimage any
-    // signature covers. Missing this row was the difference between a necessary condition and a
-    // guess: it would have refused ordinary content that merely carried that attribute encoding.
     var placement = ATTR_FORBIDDEN_IN[attrOid];
     if (placement && placement.signed) return false;
-    // RFC 5652 gives every AttributeValue set SIZE (1..MAX), so an attribute with an EMPTY value
-    // set is one no conforming signer produced and no signature covers. The upper bound is
-    // deliberately not applied: this decoder caps values per attribute as a resource limit of its
-    // own, and a limit this implementation chose is not a fact about what a signature can cover.
-    // An external signer may sign a conforming set larger than that cap, and the stripped message
-    // presents those bytes as opaque content where the cap never applies, so refusing to recognize
-    // it because of a local limit would miss exactly the preimage the attack reuses.
     var n = (vs.children || []).length;
     if (n < 1) return false;
-    if (!_ascendingDer(vs.children || [])) return false;   // the inner SET OF is ordered too
-    // The two mandatory attributes are checked down to their VALUES, not just their type OIDs.
-    // RFC 5652 sec. 11.1 makes content-type a single OBJECT IDENTIFIER and sec. 11.2 makes
-    // message-digest a single OCTET STRING, so a set carrying those OIDs over an empty or
-    // wrongly-typed value cannot be the preimage of a real signature, and refusing it would be a
-    // false positive on content that merely resembles the shape. The detector has to stay a
-    // necessary condition of the attack; anything broader costs a legitimate caller.
+    if (!_ascendingDer(vs.children || [])) return false;
     var vals = vs.children || [];
     if (attrOid === OID_CONTENT_TYPE) {
       if (!_readsAs(vals, asn1.TAGS.OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, asn1.read.oid)) return false;
@@ -336,28 +219,16 @@ function looksLikeSignedAttributes(bytes) {
       if (!_readsAs(vals, asn1.TAGS.OCTET_STRING, asn1.read.octetString)) return false;
       sawMessageDigest = true;
     } else if (attrOid === OID_SIGNING_TIME) {
-      // Not mandatory, but when present sec. 11.3 constrains it the same way, so a set carrying an
-      // unreadable signing-time is one the real parser would have refused.
       if (!_readsAsTime(vals)) return false;
     }
   }
   return sawContentType && sawMessageDigest;
 }
 
-// RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 / sec. 9.3: when a content-type attribute is present, it MUST
-// be single-valued (sec. 11.1) and its value MUST equal the eContentType (a
-// cross-field consistency both parsed here). Shared by SignedData signedAttrs,
-// AuthenticatedData authAttrs, and AuthEnvelopedData authAttrs, where the single-value
-// rule holds even where content-type is not REQUIRED (RFC 5083), so an
-// expected-first-value-plus-extra set can never surface as ambiguous.
 function _assertContentTypeMatchesAttrs(attrs, eContentType) {
   for (var i = 0; i < attrs.length; i++) {
     if (attrs[i].type !== OID_CONTENT_TYPE) continue;
     if (attrs[i].values.length !== 1) throw NS.E("cms/bad-content-type-attr", "the content-type attribute must be single-valued (RFC 5652 sec. 11.1)");
-    // ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER: validate the value's full syntax (tag and
-    // minimal base-128 OID content) with the CMS typed verdict, so a malformed value
-    // on a path that does not run _checkContentBindingAttrs (AuthEnvelopedData,
-    // RFC 5083 sec. 2.1) surfaces cms/bad-content-type-attr, not the raw asn1/* error.
     var ctv;
     try { ctv = asn1.read.oid(asn1.decode(attrs[i].values[0])); }
     catch (e) { throw NS.E("cms/bad-content-type-attr", "the content-type attribute value must be a valid OBJECT IDENTIFIER", e); }
@@ -365,11 +236,6 @@ function _assertContentTypeMatchesAttrs(attrs, eContentType) {
   }
 }
 
-// RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 -- an attribute set MUST NOT include multiple instances of the
-// same attribute type. AuthEnvelopedData authAttrs (RFC 5083 sec. 2.1) gets only this
-// duplicate check, and not the content-type/message-digest presence rules (RFC 5652
-// sec. 11.1/sec. 11.2 bind only signed-data and authenticated-data), so it must not reuse
-// _checkContentBindingAttrs, which would over-enforce.
 function _checkNoDuplicateAttrs(attrs) {
   var seen = Object.create(null);
   for (var i = 0; i < attrs.length; i++) {
@@ -378,22 +244,12 @@ function _checkNoDuplicateAttrs(attrs) {
   }
 }
 
-// RFC 5084 -- validate the AES-GCM/CCM content-encryption parameters when the OID
-// is a recognized AEAD (an unknown OID surfaces its parameters raw with no AEAD
-// check). Returns { kind, nonce, icvLen } or null. `macLen` (the AuthEnvelopedData
-// mac length) is cross-checked against the effective ICVlen. The bounded nonce read
-// is the pre-auth surface the oversized-IV class (CVE-2025-15467) targets.
 function _validateAeadParams(alg, macLen) {
   var kind = AEAD_ALGS[alg.oid];
   if (!kind) return null;
   var K = kind.toUpperCase();
-  // sec. 3.1/sec. 3.2: the parameters field MUST be present and carry the Parameters SEQUENCE.
   if (alg.parameters === null) throw NS.E("cms/bad-aead-params", "an AES-" + K + " content-encryption algorithm MUST carry its parameters (RFC 5084 sec. 3." + (kind === "gcm" ? "2" : "1") + ")");
   var node;
-  // Coverage residual -- alg.parameters is an AlgorithmIdentifier child already fully
-  // validated by the eager-recursive asn1.decode during the enclosing SEQUENCE parse;
-  // re-decoding the same TLV cannot fault, so this catch is an unreachable fail-closed
-  // belt (malformed parameters are rejected as asn1/* before _validateAeadParams runs).
   try { node = asn1.decode(alg.parameters); }
   catch (e) { throw NS.E("cms/bad-aead-params", "malformed AES-" + K + " parameters", e); }
   if (node.tagClass !== "universal" || node.tagNumber !== T.SEQUENCE || !node.children || node.children.length < 1 || node.children.length > 2) {
@@ -402,12 +258,8 @@ function _validateAeadParams(alg, macLen) {
   var nonce;
   try { nonce = asn1.read.octetString(node.children[0]); }
   catch (e) { throw NS.E("cms/bad-aead-params", "the AEAD aes-nonce must be an OCTET STRING", e); }
-  // CCM: aes-nonce is SIZE(7..13) (RFC 5084 sec. 3.1). GCM has no ASN.1 bound; the raw
-  // nonce is surfaced (a subarray, never copied into a fixed buffer), bounded by the
-  // DER size cap -- a nonzero length is the only structural floor.
   if (kind === "ccm" && (nonce.length < 7 || nonce.length > 13)) throw NS.E("cms/bad-aead-params", "the AES-CCM aes-nonce must be 7..13 octets (RFC 5084 sec. 3.1)");
   if (nonce.length < 1) throw NS.E("cms/bad-aead-params", "the AEAD aes-nonce must be non-empty");
-  // aes-ICVlen INTEGER DEFAULT 12.
   var icvLen = 12, icvEncoded = false;
   if (node.children.length === 2) {
     var iv;
@@ -418,40 +270,20 @@ function _validateAeadParams(alg, macLen) {
   }
   var legal = kind === "gcm" ? AEAD_GCM_ICVLENS : AEAD_CCM_ICVLENS;
   if (!legal.has(icvLen)) throw NS.E("cms/bad-aead-params", "the AES-" + K + " aes-ICVlen " + icvLen + " is not an allowed value (RFC 5084)");
-  // X.690 sec. 11.5: a DEFAULT value MUST be omitted in DER, so an encoded ICVlen equal
-  // to the default 12 is non-canonical.
   if (icvEncoded && icvLen === 12) throw NS.E("cms/non-canonical-default", "the AEAD aes-ICVlen equal to the DEFAULT 12 MUST be omitted (X.690 sec. 11.5)");
-  // RFC 5084 sec. 3.1/sec. 3.2: aes-ICVlen MUST match the AuthEnvelopedData mac length.
   if (macLen != null && icvLen !== macLen) throw NS.E("cms/mac-length-mismatch", "the AEAD aes-ICVlen " + icvLen + " must equal the mac length " + macLen + " (RFC 5084)");
   return { kind: kind, nonce: nonce, icvLen: icvLen };
 }
 
-// RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 / sec. 9.1 + RFC 5083 sec. 2.1: a signed / authenticated attribute SET
-// MUST be DER encoded even when the enclosing structure was decoded as BER (its
-// bytes feed the sec. 5.4 / sec. 9.2 re-tagged hash / MAC input, so a non-DER TLV makes
-// the surfaced raw bytes unusable for verification). Strictly re-decoding the
-// on-wire TLV rejects any indefinite-length or non-minimal encoding in the
-// subtree; on the strict parse path this always passes.
 function _assertDerEncodedAttrs(node, code) {
   try { asn1.decode(node.bytes); }
   catch (e) { throw NS.E(code, "the attribute set must be DER encoded even inside a BER envelope (RFC 5652 sec. 5.3)", e); }
 }
 
-// A CertificateChoices / RevocationInfoChoice element, surfaced raw (its DER +
-// outer tag) and never recursively parsed: the obsolete CHOICE alternatives
-// (extendedCertificate, attribute certs, otherRevocationInfo) never fail the
-// parse, and a caller re-parses a `certificate`/`CertificateList` element itself.
 function rawElement(item) {
   return { bytes: item.node.bytes, tagClass: item.node.tagClass, tagNumber: item.node.tagNumber };
 }
 
-// CertificateChoices (RFC 5652 sec. 10.2.2) and RevocationInfoChoice (sec. 10.2.1) are
-// CLOSED CHOICE sets -- Certificate / CertificateList (a universal SEQUENCE) or
-// the listed context tags, every alternative constructed. An element outside
-// the set is structurally malformed even though members are surfaced raw: the
-// [3] / [1] `other` arms ARE the RFC's extension points for unknown formats,
-// so an open tag set is never needed. The tag sets also feed the sec. 5.1 / sec. 6.1
-// version rules, which must never be computed over undefined-type elements.
 var CERT_CHOICE_TAGS = { universal: {}, context: { 0: true, 1: true, 2: true, 3: true } };
 var CRL_CHOICE_TAGS = { universal: {}, context: { 1: true } };
 CERT_CHOICE_TAGS.universal[asn1.TAGS.SEQUENCE] = true;
@@ -467,24 +299,17 @@ function rawChoiceElement(allowed, code, what) {
   };
 }
 
-// RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 -- the exact SignedData CMSVersion, computed from the raw
-// CertificateChoices / RevocationInfoChoice outer tags (a certificate `other` is
-// [3], a v2AttrCert [2], a v1AttrCert [1]; a RevocationInfoChoice `other` is [1]),
-// the SignerInfo versions, and whether the content type is id-data.
 function _expectedSignedDataVersion(certificates, crls, signerInfos, eContentType) {
   var otherCert = certificates.some(function (c) { return schema.isContext(c, 3); });
   var otherCrl = crls.some(function (c) { return schema.isContext(c, 1); });
   if (otherCert || otherCrl) return 5;
-  if (certificates.some(function (c) { return schema.isContext(c, 2); })) return 4;   // v2AttrCert [2]
-  if (certificates.some(function (c) { return schema.isContext(c, 1); }) ||           // v1AttrCert [1]
+  if (certificates.some(function (c) { return schema.isContext(c, 2); })) return 4;
+  if (certificates.some(function (c) { return schema.isContext(c, 1); }) ||
       signerInfos.some(function (si) { return si.version === 3; }) ||
       eContentType !== OID_DATA) return 3;
   return 1;
 }
 
-// EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { eContentType OID,
-//   eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } (RFC 5652 sec. 5.2). Absent eContent
-// is a detached signature (surfaced as null); present is the raw content bytes.
 var ENCAP_CONTENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   schema.field("eContentType", schema.oidLeaf()),
   schema.optional("eContent", schema.octetString(), { tag: 0, explicit: true, emptyCode: "cms/bad-econtent" }),
@@ -498,8 +323,6 @@ var ENCAP_CONTENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE { issuer Name, serialNumber INTEGER }
-// (RFC 5652 sec. 10.2.4). serialNumberHex preserves the DER sign padding.
 var ISSUER_AND_SERIAL = schema.seq([
   schema.field("issuer", NAME),
   schema.field("serialNumber", schema.integerLeaf()),
@@ -514,23 +337,11 @@ var ISSUER_AND_SERIAL = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
-//   subjectKeyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING } (RFC 5652 sec. 5.3), where the arm is
-// disambiguated by tag (universal SEQUENCE vs context [0]).
 var SIGNER_IDENTIFIER = schema.choice([
   { when: { tagClass: "universal", tagNumber: asn1.TAGS.SEQUENCE }, schema: ISSUER_AND_SERIAL },
   { when: { tagClass: "context", tagNumber: 0 }, schema: schema.implicitOctetString(0) },
 ], { code: "cms/bad-signer-identifier", what: "SignerIdentifier" });
 
-// SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version, sid SignerIdentifier, digestAlgorithm,
-//   signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL, signatureAlgorithm, signature OCTET STRING,
-//   unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL } (RFC 5652 sec. 5.3). signedAttrs/unsignedAttrs
-// are positional optionals (a required signatureAlgorithm sits between them, so
-// they cannot be a trailing block). One definition drives both consumers: the
-// signerInfos of a SignedData (mode "content") and a countersignature attribute
-// value (mode "countersig", RFC 5652 sec. 11.4: syntactically a SignerInfo whose
-// signedAttrs MUST carry message-digest and MUST NOT carry content-type), so
-// the two can never diverge structurally.
 function makeSignerInfo(mode) {
   return schema.seq([
     schema.field("version", SIGNER_VERSION),
@@ -548,34 +359,24 @@ function makeSignerInfo(mode) {
       var isSkid = sidNode.tagClass === "context" && sidNode.tagNumber === 0;
       var sid;
       if (isSkid) {
-        // RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 -- a subjectKeyIdentifier sid forces SignerInfo version 3.
         if (version !== 3) throw NS.E("cms/bad-signer-version", "a subjectKeyIdentifier signer identifier requires SignerInfo version 3");
         sid = { subjectKeyIdentifier: m.fields.sid.value };
       } else {
-        // RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 -- an issuerAndSerialNumber sid forces SignerInfo version 1.
         if (version !== 1) throw NS.E("cms/bad-signer-version", "an issuerAndSerialNumber signer identifier requires SignerInfo version 1");
         sid = m.fields.sid.value.result;
       }
       var signedAttrs = null, signedAttrsBytes = null;
       if (m.fields.signedAttrs.present) {
-        // sec. 5.3 -- signedAttrs MUST be DER even in a BER envelope (feeds the sec. 5.4 hash).
         _assertDerEncodedAttrs(m.fields.signedAttrs.node, "cms/bad-signed-attrs");
         signedAttrs = m.fields.signedAttrs.value.items.map(function (it) { return it.value.result; });
         _checkAttrPlacement(signedAttrs, "signed");
         _checkContentBindingAttrs(signedAttrs, mode);
-        // The raw on-wire signedAttrs bytes (leading 0xA0) so a verifier can re-tag to
-        // a universal SET and reproduce the signed hash (RFC 5652 sec. 5.4).
         signedAttrsBytes = m.fields.signedAttrs.node.bytes;
       }
       var unsignedAttrs = null;
       if (m.fields.unsignedAttrs.present) {
         unsignedAttrs = m.fields.unsignedAttrs.value.items.map(function (it) { return it.value.result; });
         _checkAttrPlacement(unsignedAttrs, "unsigned");
-        // sec. 11.4 -- every countersignature value IS a SignerInfo (validated by
-        // content, never accepted on the attribute type alone). Multiple
-        // countersignature instances are explicitly permitted here, and a
-        // countersignature's own unsignedAttrs may nest further ones, so the
-        // recursion is bounded by the decoder's depth cap.
         for (var u = 0; u < unsignedAttrs.length; u++) {
           if (unsignedAttrs[u].type !== OID_COUNTERSIGNATURE) continue;
           for (var v = 0; v < unsignedAttrs[u].values.length; v++) {
@@ -602,10 +403,6 @@ function makeSignerInfo(mode) {
 var SIGNER_INFO = makeSignerInfo("content");
 var COUNTERSIGNATURE_SIGNER_INFO = makeSignerInfo("countersig");
 
-// SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithms SET OF,
-//   encapContentInfo, certificates [0] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL, crls [1] IMPLICIT
-//   OPTIONAL, signerInfos SET OF } (RFC 5652 sec. 5.1). digestAlgorithms and
-//   signerInfos are min:0, since a degenerate certs-only SignedData carries neither.
 var SIGNED_DATA = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", SIGNED_DATA_VERSION),
   schema.field("digestAlgorithms", schema.setOf(ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER, { min: 0, code: "cms/bad-digest-algorithms", what: "digestAlgorithms" })),
@@ -622,23 +419,16 @@ var SIGNED_DATA = schema.seq([
     var crls = m.fields.crls.present ? m.fields.crls.value.items.map(rawChoiceElement(CRL_CHOICE_TAGS, "cms/bad-crls", "crls")) : [];
     var signerInfos = m.fields.signerInfos.value.items.map(function (it) { return it.value.result; });
 
-    // RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 -- signedAttrs MAY be omitted only when the content type is
-    // id-data; any other eContentType requires each SignerInfo to carry signedAttrs
-    // (so the content-type + message-digest attributes bind the signature).
     if (encapContentInfo.eContentType !== OID_DATA) {
       for (var s = 0; s < signerInfos.length; s++) {
         if (signerInfos[s].signedAttrs === null) throw NS.E("cms/missing-signed-attrs", "a SignerInfo must carry signedAttrs when the content type is not id-data (RFC 5652 sec. 5.3)");
       }
     }
 
-    // RFC 5652 sec. 5.3 -- when signedAttrs are present, the content-type attribute's
-    // value MUST equal the eContentType (a cross-field consistency both parsed
-    // here; a mismatch is an internally-inconsistent SignedData).
     for (var si = 0; si < signerInfos.length; si++) {
       if (signerInfos[si].signedAttrs) _assertContentTypeMatchesAttrs(signerInfos[si].signedAttrs, encapContentInfo.eContentType);
     }
 
-    // RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 -- the SignedData CMSVersion is determined by its contents.
     var expected = _expectedSignedDataVersion(certificates, crls, signerInfos, encapContentInfo.eContentType);
     if (version !== expected) throw NS.E("cms/bad-version", "SignedData version " + version + " does not match its contents (RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 requires v" + expected + ")");
 
@@ -653,15 +443,8 @@ var SIGNED_DATA = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// ==== EnvelopedData / EncryptedData (RFC 5652 sec. 6/sec. 8, RFC 5753) ========
 var T = asn1.TAGS;
 
-// EncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType OID, contentEncryptionAlgorithm
-//   AlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } (RFC
-//   5652 sec. 6.1). encryptedContent is [0] IMPLICIT (context primitive), so its content
-//   octets ARE the ciphertext directly, so it reads through implicitOctetString(0),
-//   and not the [0] EXPLICIT shape ENCAP_CONTENT_INFO uses (which would double-strip a
-//   length header). The ciphertext + algorithm parameters are surfaced raw.
 var ENCRYPTED_CONTENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   schema.field("contentType", schema.oidLeaf()),
   schema.field("contentEncryptionAlgorithm", ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER),
@@ -677,16 +460,11 @@ var ENCRYPTED_CONTENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// RecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber, subjectKeyIdentifier [0]
-//   IMPLICIT OCTET STRING } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.1), structurally identical to
-//   SignerIdentifier; reuse ISSUER_AND_SERIAL + the implicitOctetString(0) leaf.
 var RECIPIENT_IDENTIFIER = schema.choice([
   { when: { tagClass: "universal", tagNumber: T.SEQUENCE }, schema: ISSUER_AND_SERIAL },
   { when: { tagClass: "context", tagNumber: 0 }, schema: schema.implicitOctetString(0) },
 ], { code: "cms/bad-recipient-identifier", what: "RecipientIdentifier" });
 
-// KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version(0|2), rid RecipientIdentifier,
-//   keyEncryptionAlgorithm, encryptedKey OCTET STRING } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.1).
 var KEY_TRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", KTRI_VERSION),
   schema.field("rid", RECIPIENT_IDENTIFIER),
@@ -698,7 +476,6 @@ var KEY_TRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
     var version = m.fields.version.value;
     var ridNode = m.fields.rid.node;
     var isSkid = ridNode.tagClass === "context" && ridNode.tagNumber === 0;
-    // RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.1 -- rid <=> version: issuerAndSerialNumber => 0, subjectKeyIdentifier => 2.
     if (isSkid && version !== 2) throw NS.E("cms/bad-recipient-version", "a subjectKeyIdentifier recipient identifier requires KeyTransRecipientInfo version 2 (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.1)");
     if (!isSkid && version !== 0) throw NS.E("cms/bad-recipient-version", "an issuerAndSerialNumber recipient identifier requires KeyTransRecipientInfo version 0 (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.1)");
     return {
@@ -711,9 +488,6 @@ var KEY_TRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// OriginatorPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm, publicKey BIT STRING } (RFC 5753
-//   sec. 3.1.1), reached as originatorKey [1] IMPLICIT: SPKI-shaped but cannot reuse
-//   pkix.spki (which asserts a universal SEQUENCE), so assert:"constructed".
 var ORIGINATOR_PUBLIC_KEY = schema.seq([
   schema.field("algorithm", ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER),
   schema.field("publicKey", schema.bitString()),
@@ -722,19 +496,12 @@ var ORIGINATOR_PUBLIC_KEY = schema.seq([
   build: function (m) { return { algorithm: m.fields.algorithm.value.result, publicKey: m.fields.publicKey.value }; },
 });
 
-// OriginatorIdentifierOrKey ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber, subjectKeyIdentifier
-//   [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, originatorKey [1] IMPLICIT OriginatorPublicKey }.
 var ORIGINATOR_IDENTIFIER_OR_KEY = schema.choice([
   { when: { tagClass: "universal", tagNumber: T.SEQUENCE }, schema: ISSUER_AND_SERIAL },
   { when: { tagClass: "context", tagNumber: 0 }, schema: schema.implicitOctetString(0) },
   { when: { tagClass: "context", tagNumber: 1 }, schema: ORIGINATOR_PUBLIC_KEY },
 ], { code: "cms/bad-originator-identifier", what: "OriginatorIdentifierOrKey" });
 
-// RecipientKeyIdentifier (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.2) and KEKIdentifier (sec. 6.2.3) are one
-//   shape -- { <keyId> OCTET STRING, date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, other
-//   OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL }, differing only in the key-id field's name and
-//   the enclosing tag form. One factory defines both so the OPTIONAL handling
-//   (date and the raw-surfaced OtherKeyAttribute) cannot diverge between them.
 function keyIdentifierSchema(keyIdName, assert, code, what) {
   return schema.seq([
     schema.field(keyIdName, schema.octetString()),
@@ -752,19 +519,14 @@ function keyIdentifierSchema(keyIdName, assert, code, what) {
   });
 }
 
-// Reached as rKeyId [0] IMPLICIT (a SEQUENCE, constructed, unlike ktri's [0] leaf).
 var RECIPIENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER = keyIdentifierSchema("subjectKeyIdentifier",
   "constructed", "cms/bad-recipient-key-identifier", "RecipientKeyIdentifier");
 
-// KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber, rKeyId [0] IMPLICIT
-//   RecipientKeyIdentifier } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.2).
 var KEY_AGREE_RECIPIENT_IDENTIFIER = schema.choice([
   { when: { tagClass: "universal", tagNumber: T.SEQUENCE }, schema: ISSUER_AND_SERIAL },
   { when: { tagClass: "context", tagNumber: 0 }, schema: RECIPIENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER },
 ], { code: "cms/bad-kari-identifier", what: "KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier" });
 
-// RecipientEncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE { rid KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, encryptedKey
-//   OCTET STRING } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.2).
 var RECIPIENT_ENCRYPTED_KEY = schema.seq([
   schema.field("rid", KEY_AGREE_RECIPIENT_IDENTIFIER),
   schema.field("encryptedKey", schema.octetString()),
@@ -775,18 +537,12 @@ var RECIPIENT_ENCRYPTED_KEY = schema.seq([
     var isRkid = ridNode.tagClass === "context" && ridNode.tagNumber === 0;
     return {
       rid: m.fields.rid.value.result,
-      // Which KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier arm was taken -- the recipient-matching
-      // form differs (mirrors ktri.ridType / kari.originator.form).
       ridType: isRkid ? "rKeyId" : "issuerAndSerialNumber",
       encryptedKey: m.fields.encryptedKey.value,
     };
   },
 });
 
-// KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ::= [1] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { version(3), originator [0]
-//   EXPLICIT OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, ukm [1] EXPLICIT OPTIONAL,
-//   keyEncryptionAlgorithm, recipientEncryptedKeys SEQUENCE OF } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.2 +
-//   RFC 5753 sec. 3.1.1). originator [0] is EXPLICIT (wraps a CHOICE).
 var KEY_AGREE_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", KARI_VERSION),
   schema.field("originator", schema.explicit(0, ORIGINATOR_IDENTIFIER_OR_KEY, { code: "cms/bad-kari" })),
@@ -809,8 +565,6 @@ var KEY_AGREE_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// KEKRecipientInfo ::= [2] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { version(4), kekid KEKIdentifier,
-//   keyEncryptionAlgorithm, encryptedKey } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.3).
 var KEK_IDENTIFIER = keyIdentifierSchema("keyIdentifier",
   "sequence", "cms/bad-kek-identifier", "KEKIdentifier");
 var KEK_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
@@ -830,10 +584,6 @@ var KEK_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// PasswordRecipientInfo ::= [3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { version(0), keyDerivationAlgorithm
-//   [0] IMPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, encryptedKey }
-//   (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.4). keyDerivationAlgorithm [0] IMPLICIT is the one field needing
-//   the implicitTag AlgorithmIdentifier; present iff the first post-version node is [0].
 var PASSWORD_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", PWRI_VERSION),
   schema.optional("keyDerivationAlgorithm", pkix.algorithmIdentifier(NS, { implicitTag: 0 }), { tag: 0 }),
@@ -851,12 +601,6 @@ var PASSWORD_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// KEMRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion (0), rid RecipientIdentifier,
-//   kem KEMAlgorithmIdentifier, kemct OCTET STRING, kdf KeyDerivationAlgorithm-
-//   Identifier, kekLength INTEGER (1..65535), ukm [0] EXPLICIT OPTIONAL, wrap
-//   KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedKey OCTET STRING } (RFC 9629 sec. 3).
-//   Reached through the ori [4] arm under id-ori-kem. The kem / kdf params-absent
-//   rules (ML-KEM, HKDF) ride the shared AlgorithmIdentifier registry guard.
 var KEM_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", KEMRI_VERSION),
   schema.field("rid", RECIPIENT_IDENTIFIER),
@@ -875,26 +619,15 @@ var KEM_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
     var kem = m.fields.kem.value.result;
     var kemct = m.fields.kemct.value;
     var wrap = m.fields.wrap.value.result;
-    // kekLength INTEGER (1..65535) -- bound the unbounded INTEGER before narrowing.
     var kl = m.fields.kekLength.value;
     if (kl < 1n || kl > 65535n) throw NS.E("cms/bad-kek-length", "KEMRecipientInfo kekLength must be 1..65535 (RFC 9629 sec. 3)");
     var kekLength = Number(kl);
-    // RFC 9629 sec. 3 -- kekLength MUST be consistent with the wrap algorithm; a
-    // recognized AES key-wrap pins the exact KEK size (registry, not switch).
     var wrapLen = WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS[wrap.oid];
     if (wrapLen !== undefined && kekLength !== wrapLen) {
-      // Coverage residual -- reached only when the OID is a registry entry (the guard above
-      // guarantees it), so oid.name() never returns undefined and this fallback is a
-      // defensive belt, not selectable through the public parse path.
       throw NS.E("cms/kek-length-mismatch", "kekLength " + kekLength + " does not match the " + (oid.name(wrap.oid) || wrap.oid) + " KEK size " + wrapLen + " (RFC 9629 sec. 3)");
     }
-    // FIPS 203 -- a recognized ML-KEM kem produces a fixed-size ciphertext; any
-    // other kemct length can never decapsulate.
     var ctLen = KEM_CT_LENGTHS[kem.oid];
     if (ctLen !== undefined && kemct.length !== ctLen) {
-      // Coverage residual -- reached only when the OID is a registry entry (the guard above
-      // guarantees it), so oid.name() never returns undefined and this fallback is a
-      // defensive belt, not selectable through the public parse path.
       throw NS.E("cms/bad-kem-ciphertext", "the " + (oid.name(kem.oid) || kem.oid) + " kemct must be exactly " + ctLen + " octets (FIPS 203)");
     }
     return {
@@ -912,11 +645,6 @@ var KEM_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// OtherRecipientInfo ::= [4] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { oriType OID, oriValue ANY } (RFC
-//   5652 sec. 6.2.5). A RECOGNIZED oriType is validated by content, never accepted on
-//   the type OID alone: id-ori-kem walks KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629) and surfaces
-//   the parsed structure as `kemri` alongside the raw oriValue. An unrecognized
-//   oriType stays raw-opaque (the ORI extension point), kemri null.
 var OTHER_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   schema.field("oriType", schema.oidLeaf()),
   schema.field("oriValue", schema.any()),
@@ -933,9 +661,6 @@ var OTHER_RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE { ktri KeyTransRecipientInfo, kari [1], kekri [2], pwri
-//   [3], ori [4] } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2). A bare universal SEQUENCE is ktri (the untagged
-//   alternative). An unknown context tag -> no arm -> cms/bad-recipient-info.
 var RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.choice([
   { when: { tagClass: "universal", tagNumber: T.SEQUENCE }, schema: KEY_TRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO },
   { when: { tagClass: "context", tagNumber: 1 }, schema: KEY_AGREE_RECIPIENT_INFO },
@@ -944,9 +669,6 @@ var RECIPIENT_INFO = schema.choice([
   { when: { tagClass: "context", tagNumber: 4 }, schema: OTHER_RECIPIENT_INFO },
 ], { code: "cms/bad-recipient-info", what: "RecipientInfo" });
 
-// OriginatorInfo ::= [0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { certs [0] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL, crls [1]
-//   IMPLICIT OPTIONAL } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.1). Members surfaced raw (their outer tag feeds
-//   the version rule).
 var ORIGINATOR_INFO = schema.seq([
   schema.optional("certs", schema.implicitSetOf(0, schema.any(), { min: 1, code: "cms/bad-originator-certs", what: "certs" }), { tag: 0 }),
   schema.optional("crls", schema.implicitSetOf(1, schema.any(), { min: 1, code: "cms/bad-originator-crls", what: "crls" }), { tag: 1 }),
@@ -960,10 +682,6 @@ var ORIGINATOR_INFO = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// RFC 5652 sec. 6.1 -- the exact EnvelopedData CMSVersion, from originatorInfo's raw
-// cert/crl outer tags and the recipient arms (a cert `other` is [3], a v2AttrCert
-// [2]; a crl `other` is [1]; a pwri or ori forces v3; all-ktri-IAS with no
-// originatorInfo/unprotectedAttrs is v0; everything else v2).
 function _expectedEnvelopedDataVersion(originatorInfo, recipientInfos, hasUnprotectedAttrs) {
   var hasOrig = !!originatorInfo;
   var certs = hasOrig ? originatorInfo.certs : [];
@@ -976,10 +694,6 @@ function _expectedEnvelopedDataVersion(originatorInfo, recipientInfos, hasUnprot
   return 2;
 }
 
-// RFC 5652 sec. 9.1 -- the exact AuthenticatedData CMSVersion, from originatorInfo's raw
-// cert/crl outer tags only. Unlike EnvelopedData sec. 6.1, the recipient-info kinds do
-// not influence the version. If originatorInfo is present and (other-cert [3] or
-// other-crl [1]) -> 3; ELSE IF originatorInfo present AND v2AttrCert [2] -> 1; ELSE 0.
 function _expectedAuthDataVersion(originatorInfo) {
   if (!originatorInfo) return 0;
   var certs = originatorInfo.certs, crls = originatorInfo.crls;
@@ -988,11 +702,6 @@ function _expectedAuthDataVersion(originatorInfo) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-// EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE { version, originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL,
-//   recipientInfos RecipientInfos (SET SIZE 1..MAX), encryptedContentInfo,
-//   unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL } (RFC 5652 sec. 6.1). recipientInfos is
-//   min:1 (an empty SET is non-conformant, the inverse of SignedData's degenerate
-//   signerInfos).
 var ENVELOPED_DATA = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", ENVELOPED_DATA_VERSION),
   schema.optional("originatorInfo", ORIGINATOR_INFO, { tag: 0 }),
@@ -1020,9 +729,6 @@ var ENVELOPED_DATA = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { version, encryptedContentInfo, unprotectedAttrs [1]
-//   IMPLICIT OPTIONAL } (RFC 5652 sec. 8): no recipients, no originatorInfo; the CEK is
-//   distributed out of band. version is 0, or 2 iff unprotectedAttrs are present.
 var ENCRYPTED_DATA = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", ENCRYPTED_DATA_VERSION),
   schema.field("encryptedContentInfo", ENCRYPTED_CONTENT_INFO),
@@ -1044,11 +750,6 @@ var ENCRYPTED_DATA = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE { version, originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL,
-//   recipientInfos RecipientInfos, macAlgorithm, digestAlgorithm [1] OPTIONAL,
-//   encapContentInfo, authAttrs [2] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL, mac OCTET STRING,
-//   unauthAttrs [3] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL } (RFC 5652 sec. 9.1). digestAlgorithm [1] is
-//   IMPLICIT (module default) -- the same shape as pwri's keyDerivationAlgorithm.
 var AUTHENTICATED_DATA = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", AUTHDATA_VERSION),
   schema.optional("originatorInfo", ORIGINATOR_INFO, { tag: 0 }),
@@ -1068,13 +769,9 @@ var AUTHENTICATED_DATA = schema.seq([
     var hasDigestAlg = m.fields.digestAlgorithm.present;
     var hasAuthAttrs = m.fields.authAttrs.present;
 
-    // RFC 5652 sec. 9.1 -- the version is computed from originatorInfo's raw cert/crl
-    // tags only (recipient kinds never influence it, unlike EnvelopedData sec. 6.1).
     var expected = _expectedAuthDataVersion(originatorInfo);
     if (version !== expected) throw NS.E("cms/bad-version", "AuthenticatedData version " + version + " does not match its contents (RFC 5652 sec. 9.1 requires v" + expected + ")");
 
-    // RFC 5652 sec. 9.1 -- authAttrs MUST be present when the content type is not
-    // id-data, and digestAlgorithm <=> authAttrs is a strict biconditional.
     if (!hasAuthAttrs && encapContentInfo.eContentType !== OID_DATA) {
       throw NS.E("cms/missing-auth-attrs", "AuthenticatedData must carry authAttrs when the content type is not id-data (RFC 5652 sec. 9.1)");
     }
@@ -1083,16 +780,11 @@ var AUTHENTICATED_DATA = schema.seq([
 
     var authAttrs = null, authAttrsBytes = null;
     if (hasAuthAttrs) {
-      // sec. 9.1 -- AuthAttributes MUST be DER even in a BER envelope (feeds the sec. 9.2 MAC).
       _assertDerEncodedAttrs(m.fields.authAttrs.node, "cms/bad-auth-attrs");
       authAttrs = m.fields.authAttrs.value.items.map(function (it) { return it.value.result; });
       _checkAttrPlacement(authAttrs, "auth");
-      // sec. 9.1 -- authAttrs MUST contain content-type + message-digest (sec. 11.1/sec. 11.2),
-      // and the content-type value MUST equal the eContentType.
       _checkContentBindingAttrs(authAttrs, "content");
       _assertContentTypeMatchesAttrs(authAttrs, encapContentInfo.eContentType);
-      // The raw on-wire authAttrs bytes (leading 0xA2) so a verifier can re-tag to
-      // a universal SET and reproduce the MAC input (RFC 5652 sec. 9.2).
       authAttrsBytes = m.fields.authAttrs.node.bytes;
     }
     var unauthAttrs = null;
@@ -1115,12 +807,6 @@ var AUTHENTICATED_DATA = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// AuthEnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion (0), originatorInfo [0]
-//   IMPLICIT OPTIONAL, recipientInfos RecipientInfos, authEncryptedContentInfo
-//   EncryptedContentInfo, authAttrs [1] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL, mac OCTET STRING,
-//   unauthAttrs [2] IMPLICIT OPTIONAL } (RFC 5083 sec. 2.1). The version is a fixed 0
-//   -- originatorInfo contents never change it. The authAttrs tags are SHIFTED
-//   ([1]/[2]) relative to AuthenticatedData's ([2]/[3]).
 var AUTH_ENVELOPED_DATA = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", AUTHENV_VERSION),
   schema.optional("originatorInfo", ORIGINATOR_INFO, { tag: 0 }),
@@ -1134,24 +820,14 @@ var AUTH_ENVELOPED_DATA = schema.seq([
   build: function (m) {
     var encryptedContentInfo = m.fields.authEncryptedContentInfo.value.result;
     var mac = m.fields.mac.value;
-    // RFC 5084 -- a recognized AES-GCM/CCM content-encryption algorithm carries
-    // validated parameters, and its aes-ICVlen MUST equal the mac length.
     var aead = _validateAeadParams(encryptedContentInfo.contentEncryptionAlgorithm, mac.length);
 
-    // RFC 5083 sec. 2.1 -- authAttrs MUST be present when the content type carried in
-    // EncryptedContentInfo is not id-data.
     var hasAuthAttrs = m.fields.authAttrs.present;
     if (!hasAuthAttrs && encryptedContentInfo.contentType !== OID_DATA) {
       throw NS.E("cms/missing-auth-attrs", "AuthEnvelopedData must carry authAttrs when the content type is not id-data (RFC 5083 sec. 2.1)");
     }
     var authAttrs = null, authAttrsBytes = null;
     if (hasAuthAttrs) {
-      // RFC 5083 sec. 2.1 -- AuthAttributes MUST be DER even in a BER envelope (the
-      // sec. 2.2 AAD is the re-tagged DER SET). No content-type/message-digest
-      // presence rules bind here (sec. 11.1/sec. 11.2 name signed-data and
-      // authenticated-data; sec. 2.1 says message-digest SHOULD NOT appear), so only
-      // the duplicate rule, the sec. 11 placement rows, and, when a content-type
-      // attribute IS present -- the value == contentType coherence apply.
       _assertDerEncodedAttrs(m.fields.authAttrs.node, "cms/bad-auth-attrs");
       authAttrs = m.fields.authAttrs.value.items.map(function (it) { return it.value.result; });
       _checkAttrPlacement(authAttrs, "auth");
@@ -1178,19 +854,6 @@ var AUTH_ENVELOPED_DATA = schema.seq([
   },
 });
 
-// ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType OID, content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY
-//   contentType } (RFC 5652 sec. 3). The content is captured raw (explicit(0, any()))
-//   and re-dispatched by contentType inside the build: id-signedData walks
-//   SIGNED_DATA; id-envelopedData / id-encryptedData / id-ct-authData /
-//   id-ct-authEnvelopedData walk their schemas; the other PKCS#7 types are
-//   recognized-and-deferred; unknown OIDs are rejected.
-// CompressedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion (0), compressionAlgorithm
-//   CompressionAlgorithmIdentifier, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo }
-//   (RFC 3274 sec. 1.1). The eContent is an RFC 1950 ZLIB stream of the inner
-//   content. Parse decodes the structure and surfaces the raw compressionAlgorithm
-//   + eContent; the zlib-only algorithm check + the bounded inflate live in the
-//   pki.cms.decompress consuming operation, not the parser (mirroring how the
-//   content-encryption algorithm is validated by decrypt, not the envelope parse).
 var COMPRESSED_DATA = schema.seq([
   schema.field("version", COMPRESSED_DATA_VERSION),
   schema.field("compressionAlgorithm", ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER),
@@ -1222,21 +885,12 @@ var CONTENT_INFO = schema.seq([
     else if (ct === OID_COMPRESSED_DATA) inner = COMPRESSED_DATA;
     if (inner === null) {
       if (DEFERRED.has(ct)) {
-        // Coverage residual -- reached only when the OID is a registry entry (the guard above
-        // guarantees it), so oid.name() never returns undefined and this fallback is a
-        // defensive belt, not selectable through the public parse path.
         throw NS.E("cms/unsupported-content-type", (ctx.oid.name(ct) || ct) + " is recognized but not parsed by this build");
       }
       throw NS.E("cms/unknown-content-type", "unrecognized ContentInfo content type " + ct);
     }
-    // The dispatched ContentInfo type rides the result (mirroring the ocsp
-    // responseType/responseTypeName pair and the RecipientInfo `type` tags), so
-    // a consumer branches on contentTypeName instead of duck-typing the shape.
     var result = schema.walk(inner, m.fields.content.value, ctx).result;
     result.contentType = ct;
-    // Coverage residual -- reached only when the OID is a registry entry (the guard above
-    // guarantees it), so oid.name() never returns undefined and this fallback is a
-    // defensive belt, not selectable through the public parse path.
     result.contentTypeName = ctx.oid.name(ct) || null;
     return result;
   },
@@ -1283,14 +937,6 @@ var CONTENT_INFO = schema.seq([
  *   cms.signerInfos[0].sid.serialNumberHex;   // -> "0a1b"
  *   cms.encapContentInfo.eContent;            // -> Buffer | null (detached)
  */
-// Recording, for the reason the certificate and CRL parsers are: a SignedData is one or more
-// signatures over byte ranges, and a parsed one presents those ranges (`signedAttrsBytes`, the
-// encapsulated `eContent`), the signatures, and the certificates that verify them as separate
-// properties of one object. Keep a genuine signer's `signature` and `signedAttrsBytes` and replace
-// the `eContent` beside them, and every part of the check still passes for content that signer never
-// signed -- which is exactly the forgery pki.cms.verify's own block claims to defend. The verdict
-// verbs re-derive from what is recorded here, so the object a caller passes names bytes rather than
-// asserting facts.
 var parse = pkix.makeRecordingParser({ pemLabel: "CMS", PemError: PemError, ErrorClass: CmsError, prefix: "cms", what: "CMS ContentInfo", topSchema: CONTENT_INFO, ns: NS }, "cms");
 
 /**
@@ -1334,11 +980,6 @@ function pemDecode(text, label) { return pkix.pemDecode(text, label || "CMS", Pe
  */
 function pemEncode(der, label) { return pkix.pemEncode(der, label || "CMS", PemError); }
 
-// A CMS ContentInfo root is the only registered structure whose root leads with an
-// OBJECT IDENTIFIER child: a SEQUENCE of exactly 2 whose first child is an OID and
-// second a context [0] constructed wrapper. x509/crl/csr lead with a tbs SEQUENCE
-// and pkcs8 with an INTEGER, so the detectors are mutually exclusive regardless of
-// registry order.
 function matches(root) {
   var TAGS = asn1.TAGS;
   var k = pkix.rootSequenceChildren(root, 2, 2);
@@ -1348,41 +989,14 @@ function matches(root) {
   return true;
 }
 
-// Validate a bare EnvelopedData (RFC 5652 sec. 6.1) -- a universal SEQUENCE node --
-// returning its structured value; throws a typed cms/* error on a malformed
-// structure. Exposed for a composer that carries a bare EnvelopedData OUTSIDE a
-// ContentInfo (an RFC 4211 CRMF encryptedKey [4] POPOPrivKey arm), which the
-// content-type dispatch in `parse` cannot reach. The node MUST already be a
-// universal SEQUENCE (an IMPLICIT [n] EnvelopedData is retagged by the caller).
 function walkEnvelopedData(node) { return schema.walk(ENVELOPED_DATA, node, NS).result; }
 
-// Validate a bare SignedData / EncryptedData node the same way -- for a composer
-// that holds an already-decoded content node and must not re-decode its bytes
-// (an RFC 7292 PFX authSafe or encrypted safe, whose wire encoding may be BER
-// that the strict `parse` entry would refuse). Same contract as
-// walkEnvelopedData: the node is the bare structure, typed cms/* on rejection.
-// Records provenance, like parse: the structure a consumer hands to pki.cms.verify must be
-// re-derivable from the bytes it was walked from, and a PFX authSafe reaches verify this way. The
-// walker's own BER-tolerant decode is what replays it -- the strict `parse` entry would refuse the
-// indefinite-length encoding real stores carry.
 var walkSignedData = guard.parsed.recordingWalker("cms", function (node) {
   return schema.walk(SIGNED_DATA, node, NS).result;
 }, function (der) { return asn1.decode(der, { ber: true }); });
 function walkEncryptedData(node) { return schema.walk(ENCRYPTED_DATA, node, NS).result; }
-// Validate + surface one countersignature value (RFC 5652 sec. 11.4, Countersignature ::=
-// SignerInfo) into the same parsed shape parse() gives a top-level SignerInfo -- so pki.cms.verify
-// can verify a countersignature through the ONE SignerInfo definition (its sec. 11.4 rules
-// enforced: message-digest present, content-type FORBIDDEN via mode "countersig"). The node is the
-// bare id-countersignature value; a malformed / content-type-carrying value throws a typed cms/*.
 function walkCountersignature(node) { return schema.walk(COUNTERSIGNATURE_SIGNER_INFO, node, NS).result; }
 
-// assertAttachedCiphertext(eci, E, code, label): reject an EnvelopedData /
-// EncryptedData encryptedContentInfo whose encryptedContent (the payload itself)
-// is absent OR zero-length. RFC 5652 sec. 6.1 / RFC 5083 permit DETACHED content,
-// so this is NOT enforced in the base walker -- it is a per-PROFILE opt-in for a
-// consumer that requires the ciphertext to be present (an EST server-generated
-// key, a PKCS#12 shrouded bag): a valid envelope that delivers NOTHING is
-// verification-of-nothing (CWE-20). E is the caller's (code, message) factory.
 function assertAttachedCiphertext(eci, E, code, label) {
   if (!eci || eci.encryptedContent === null || eci.encryptedContent.length === 0) {
     throw E(code, (label || "encrypted content") + " must carry a non-empty attached ciphertext (RFC 5652 sec. 6.1), not be detached or empty");
@@ -1390,21 +1004,6 @@ function assertAttachedCiphertext(eci, E, code, label) {
   return eci;
 }
 
-// The "certs-only" Simple PKI Response (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1): a degenerate SignedData carrying certificates (and
-// optionally CRLs) but NO signed content -- id-data with no eContent and EMPTY signerInfos. It is how RFC 7030
-// EST returns a CA chain (/cacerts) and how an RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1 AIA caIssuers URL may serve issuers
-// (application/pkcs7-mime). Returns { certificates: [raw DER], crls: [raw DER] } -- the RAW bytes only; the
-// caller validates each cert/CRL for its own purpose (EST re-parses; path building runs each through validate).
-// Shared so the EST client and the path builder decode an identical shape; the caller passes its typed-error
-// factory `E(code, msg, cause)` and domain `prefix` so a fault surfaces the caller's own `prefix/*` code.
-// `maxCerts` (optional) caps how many certificates / CRLs are validated + returned, BEFORE the per-element
-// X.509 / CRL parse -- so an untrusted source (an AIA caIssuers URL) cannot force tens of thousands of parses
-// with one in-cap-bytes bundle; the EST client passes no cap (a /cacerts chain is small and fully returned).
-// `requireCert` (default true) sets the profile floor: the RFC 5272 sec. 4.1 Simple PKI Response the
-// EST client and path builder read REQUIRES at least one certificate, so they pass nothing and get the
-// strict floor. The general RFC 8551 sec. 3.8 / RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 certificate-management message
-// permits "certificates and/or CRLs", so pki.cms.parseCertsOnly passes `requireCert: false` and a
-// CRL-only message is accepted; a message with neither is still refused.
 function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts, requireCert) {
   var needCert = requireCert !== false;
   var r;
@@ -1415,29 +1014,20 @@ function parseCertsOnly(der, E, prefix, maxCerts, requireCert) {
     throw E(prefix + "/not-certs-only", "a certs-only Simple PKI Response must carry id-data with no eContent (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
   }
   if (r.signerInfos.length !== 0) throw E(prefix + "/not-certs-only", "a certs-only Simple PKI Response must have empty signerInfos (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
-  // digestAlgorithms is NOT required to be empty: RFC 5652 sec. 5.1 permits any number of elements
-  // (including algorithms no SignerInfo uses), so a valid EST /cacerts or AIA caIssuers bundle may
-  // carry a non-empty set. The builder emits an empty one (the canonical form), but the reader
-  // accepts a non-empty one rather than rejecting valid CMS.
-  var allCerts = r.certificates;   // parse always surfaces certificates and crls as arrays (empty when the field is absent)
+  var allCerts = r.certificates;
   var allCrls = r.crls;
   if (needCert) {
     if (allCerts.length === 0) throw E(prefix + "/no-certificates", "a certs-only response must contain at least one certificate (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)");
   } else if (allCerts.length === 0 && allCrls.length === 0) {
     throw E(prefix + "/no-certificates", "a certs-only message must contain at least one certificate or CRL (RFC 8551 sec. 3.8)");
   }
-  // Cap BEFORE the per-element parse: bound parse work by count, not only by the decoded byte size. The
-  // cap is on the COMBINED number of certificates and CRLs, so a bundle carrying both cannot force up to
-  // 2*maxCerts parses: certificates are counted first and CRLs draw only from the remaining budget.
   var certs = (maxCerts != null && allCerts.length > maxCerts) ? allCerts.slice(0, maxCerts) : allCerts;
   for (var i = 0; i < certs.length; i++) {
-    // A universal-SEQUENCE CertificateChoice must be a well-formed X.509 Certificate, not merely any SEQUENCE;
-    // a tagged CertificateChoices alternative (attribute cert / other) is not a plain certificate.
     if (certs[i].tagClass !== "universal") throw E(prefix + "/bad-certificate-choice", "a certs-only response exchanges plain X.509 certificates; a tagged CertificateChoices alternative is not permitted (RFC 5272)");
     try { schemaX509.parse(certs[i].bytes); }
     catch (e) { throw E(prefix + "/bad-certificate", "a certs-only response carried a non-certificate in its certificates field (RFC 5272 sec. 4.1)", e); }
   }
-  var crlCap = maxCerts != null ? (maxCerts - certs.length) : null;   // the budget certificates left for CRLs
+  var crlCap = maxCerts != null ? (maxCerts - certs.length) : null;
   var crls = (crlCap != null && allCrls.length > crlCap) ? allCrls.slice(0, crlCap) : allCrls;
   for (var j = 0; j < crls.length; j++) {
     if (crls[j].tagClass !== "universal") throw E(prefix + "/bad-crl", "a certs-only response CRL must be a plain X.509 CertificateList, not a tagged otherRevInfo alternative (RFC 5652 sec. 10.2.1)");
@@ -1462,10 +1052,6 @@ module.exports = {
   walkCountersignature: walkCountersignature,
   looksLikeSignedAttributes: looksLikeSignedAttributes,
   assertAttachedCiphertext: assertAttachedCiphertext,
-  // The structure's own algorithm tables, exported (like the walk* helpers) as the single source
-  // of truth the crypto layer (cms-encrypt / cms-decrypt) shares -- so the wrap<->KEK-length, the
-  // ML-KEM ciphertext-length, and the AEAD-mode/ICV-length rules the parser enforces cannot drift
-  // from what the producer/consumer emit and accept.
   WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS: WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS,
   KEM_CT_LENGTHS: KEM_CT_LENGTHS,
   AEAD_ALGS: AEAD_ALGS,