@blamejs/pki 0.5.9 → 0.5.11

package/lib/webauthn.js

@@ -474,8 +474,8 @@ var ATT_STMT_MAJOR = { compound: 4 };
 var _AAGUID_SIGNED_BY_FMT = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { "fido-u2f": false });
 function _aaguidIsSigned(fmt) { return _AAGUID_SIGNED_BY_FMT[fmt] !== false; }
 
-// The options pki.webauthn.verify recognises. Null-prototype, so a caller-supplied key cannot
-// resolve to an inherited Object member and read as recognised.
+// The options pki.webauthn.verify recognizes. Null-prototype, so a caller-supplied key cannot
+// resolve to an inherited Object member and read as recognized.
 var _VERIFY_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   time: 1, metadata: 1, tpmPolicy: 1, safetyNetRoots: 1, verifySafetyNetJws: 1, requireCtsProfileMatch: 1,
   expectedRpId: 1, requireUserPresence: 1, requireUserVerification: 1, allowedAlgorithms: 1,
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ var _FORMAT_SCOPED_BOOLEAN_OPTS = ["verifySafetyNetJws", "requireCtsProfileMatch
 // so a caller that recycles the array or overwrites a certificate's bytes in between
 // would have the attestation anchored against the replacement roots while the verdict
 // still reports `anchoredTo: "rootCertificates"` (CWE-367 reaching a wrong trust
-// decision). Same defence, and the same reason, as the assertion input's snapshot.
+// decision). Same defense, and the same reason, as the assertion input's snapshot.
 // Shape faults are NOT raised here: the array is validated where it is consumed, so
 // supplying a malformed pin alongside a metadata catalogue that answers keeps failing
 // exactly where it did before.
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ function _cloneParsed(v, depth) {
   if (depth > 64) throw _err("webauthn/bad-input", "opts.rootCertificates[] is nested too deeply to be a parsed certificate");
   if (Buffer.isBuffer(v) || v instanceof Uint8Array) return guard.bytes.snapshot(v, _err, "webauthn/bad-input", "a byte field of opts.rootCertificates[]");
   if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.map(function (x) { return _cloneParsed(x, depth + 1); });
-  if (v instanceof Date) return new Date(v.getTime());
+  if (guard.time.isDate(v)) return new Date(guard.time.instantOf(v));
   if (v && typeof v === "object") {
     var out = {};
     Object.keys(v).forEach(function (k) { out[k] = _cloneParsed(v[k], depth + 1); });
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ function _applyCallerRoots(res, supplied, vopts, onlyPaths) {
   var at = vopts.time !== undefined ? vopts.time : new Date();
   // EVERY path, not merely one: a compound's elements are independent claims, and
   // accepting the whole because one element anchored would let an unanchored element
-  // ride along on its neighbour's trust.
+  // ride along on its neighbor's trust.
   return paths.reduce(function (p, info) {
     return p.then(function () {
       var pathAt = vopts.time !== undefined ? vopts.time : (info.at || at);
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ var VERIFIERS = {
           });
       });
     }, Promise.resolve()).then(function () {
-      // sec. 8.9 lists the supported attestation type as "Any" and authorises returning
+      // sec. 8.9 lists the supported attestation type as "Any" and authorizes returning
       // "implementation-specific values representing any combination of outputs". A distinct type
       // rather than a merge: collapsing to the strongest element would let a wrapper upgrade a
       // caller's attestationType check, and collapsing to the weakest would spuriously fail one.
@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ function verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) {
   // Every option here either GATES the verdict or supplies the trust material a gate needs, so a
   // misspelled key is not a harmless no-op: `metdata` leaves the metadata gate switched off and the
   // call returns a pass the caller believes was checked against the catalogue. Reject an
-  // unrecognised key at the boundary, and validate the one shared option every arm reads, so a bad
+  // unrecognized key at the boundary, and validate the one shared option every arm reads, so a bad
   // instant is a config fault here rather than a trust failure reported from deep inside a chain.
   try {
     if (!_isPlainObject(opts)) throw _err("webauthn/bad-input", "opts must be an object");
@@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ function verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) {
     // The boolean switches are typed HERE rather than in the arm that reads them. Validated only
     // inside the android-safetynet arm, `requireCtsProfileMatch: "true"` reaching any other format
     // is never examined at all -- a truthy string that demands nothing, silently accepted. A
-    // recognised key with an unusable value is the same class of caller mistake as an unrecognised
+    // recognized key with an unusable value is the same class of caller mistake as an unrecognized
     // key, and belongs at the same boundary.
     _FORMAT_SCOPED_BOOLEAN_OPTS.forEach(function (k) {
       if (opts[k] !== undefined && typeof opts[k] !== "boolean") throw _err("webauthn/bad-input", "opts." + k + " must be a boolean");
@@ -1597,7 +1597,7 @@ function verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) {
 function _applyMetadata(res, att, opts) {
   var md = opts.metadata;
   // Provenance, not shape: only a catalogue this toolkit actually verified may decide which roots
-  // an authenticator is allowed to chain to. Recognising it by its property names would accept a
+  // an authenticator is allowed to chain to. Recognizing it by its property names would accept a
   // hand-built object, or one restored from a cache an attacker can write -- neither of which has
   // been through the signature and chain checks that give the catalogue its authority.
   if (!mds.isVerifiedResult(md)) {
@@ -1703,7 +1703,7 @@ function _applyMetadata(res, att, opts) {
   mds.assertFresh(md, at, "the metadata supplied as opts.metadata");
   // EVERY path must pass, not merely one of them: for a compound attestation each element is an
   // independent claim, and accepting the whole because one element anchored would let an
-  // unanchored -- or revoked -- element ride along on its neighbour's trust.
+  // unanchored -- or revoked -- element ride along on its neighbor's trust.
   // Govern EVERY path BEFORE any is chain-validated, and let the SEVEREST outcome decide
   // rather than the first one reached. A compound's elements are independent claims and
   // its element order is NOT signed, so aborting on the first failure lets that order pick
@@ -1836,7 +1836,7 @@ void constants;
  *     (the default; any disqualifying report ever filed), `"latest-by-date"` (only the
  *     most recent report counts, so a later remediation clears an earlier revocation),
  *     or a function receiving the raw report array and returning true to deny.
- *   - `rejectUnknownStatus` -- treat a status this toolkit does not recognise as
+ *   - `rejectUnknownStatus` -- treat a status this toolkit does not recognize as
  *     disqualifying. Off by default: the specification requires an unknown status be
  *     ignored, never failed on.
  *
@@ -2146,7 +2146,7 @@ function parseAuthenticatorData(bytes) {
   return _parseAuthData(_bytesArg(bytes, "authenticatorData"), _err);
 }
 
-// The options pki.webauthn.verifyAssertion recognises, null-prototype for the same
+// The options pki.webauthn.verifyAssertion recognizes, null-prototype for the same
 // reason _VERIFY_OPTS is.
 var _ASSERT_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   authenticatorData: 1, clientDataHash: 1, clientDataJSON: 1, signature: 1,

package/lib/webcrypto.js

@@ -1275,14 +1275,23 @@ Crypto.prototype.getRandomValues = function getRandomValues(typedArray) {
   if (!ArrayBuffer.isView(typedArray) || typedArray instanceof Float32Array || typedArray instanceof Float64Array || typedArray instanceof DataView) {
     throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues: expected an integer TypedArray");
   }
-  if (typedArray.byteLength > MAX_RANDOM_BYTES) {
+  // Re-view the (already integer-TypedArray-validated) output buffer through the OUTPUT door --
+  // any TypedArray, not just Uint8Array -- so a detached backing store fails closed here; the
+  // returned Buffer aliases typedArray, so randomFillSync writes through to the caller's array.
+  //
+  // The output door, because the input one refuses shared memory: bytes another thread can rewrite
+  // after they have been checked cannot be checked. That answers a question about input. Here the
+  // caller is asking for random bytes in memory they chose, and a `SharedArrayBuffer`-backed view
+  // is a supported W3C argument that the platform fills; refusing it made a working call an error.
+  var out = guard.bytes.outputView(typedArray, WebCryptoError, "webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues");
+  // The ceiling is measured on that view, and never on `typedArray.byteLength`. `byteLength` is an
+  // accessor on the shared typed-array prototype, so a caller's subclass answers it: one reporting
+  // 0 passed the ceiling while the fill below wrote the array's real length, which is the bound
+  // being bypassed rather than enforced. The view is built from the internal slot.
+  if (out.length > MAX_RANDOM_BYTES) {
     throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues: byteLength exceeds " + MAX_RANDOM_BYTES);
   }
-  // Re-view the (already integer-TypedArray-validated) output buffer via
-  // guard.bytes.source -- any TypedArray, not just Uint8Array -- so a detached
-  // backing store fails closed here; the returned Buffer aliases typedArray, so
-  // randomFillSync writes through to the caller's array.
-  nodeCrypto.randomFillSync(guard.bytes.source(typedArray, WebCryptoError, "webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues"));
+  nodeCrypto.randomFillSync(out);
   return typedArray;
 };
 
@@ -1344,7 +1353,7 @@ function exportAnyKey(key, E, code) {
   // A separately-installed copy of this engine is the same code under a different class identity, so
   // its keys fail the `instanceof` above while carrying the very handle this engine reads -- and no
   // WebCrypto implementation but that copy would accept them. Read the handle directly. The
-  // extractable check above stays AHEAD of this: the handle can always be read, so honouring the
+  // extractable check above stays AHEAD of this: the handle can always be read, so honoring the
   // key's own extractable promise is this branch's responsibility, not the crypto library's.
   var handle = key._handle;
   if (handle instanceof nodeCrypto.KeyObject && handle.type === key.type) {

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   guard.time.assertValid(spec.notBefore, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notBefore");
   guard.time.assertValid(spec.notAfter, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notAfter");
   // allow:nan-date-comparison-unguarded -- both operands are guard.time.assertValid'd on the two lines above (an Invalid Date throws before this comparison).
-  if (spec.notBefore.getTime() > spec.notAfter.getTime()) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "notBefore must not be after notAfter (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5)");
+  if (guard.time.instantOf(spec.notBefore) > guard.time.instantOf(spec.notAfter)) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "notBefore must not be after notAfter (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5)");
   var validityDer = b.sequence([_timeDer(spec.notBefore, "notBefore"), _timeDer(spec.notAfter, "notAfter")]);
 
   var exts = _buildExtensions(spec.extensions, { spki: spki, issuerSpki: issuerSpki, issuerCert: issuerCert, subjectEmpty: subjectEmpty });

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.5.9",
+  "version": "0.5.11",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",
@@ -68,9 +68,11 @@
     "test": "node test/smoke.js",
     "lint": "eslint --max-warnings 0 .",
     "fuzz": "npm ci --prefix fuzz && npx --prefix fuzz jazzer fuzz/asn1-der.fuzz.js -- -max_total_time=60",
-    "gates": "node test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js && node scripts/validate-source-comment-blocks.js && node scripts/check-api-snapshot.js",
+    "gates": "node test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js && node scripts/validate-source-comment-blocks.js && node scripts/check-api-snapshot.js && node scripts/check-spelling-consistency.js",
+    "check:spelling": "node scripts/check-spelling-consistency.js",
     "coverage": "c8 --include=lib/** --include=index.js --reporter=text-summary --reporter=lcov node test/smoke.js",
     "check:prose": "node scripts/check-operator-prose.js",
+    "check:prose:all": "node -e \"process.env.PKI_PROSE_CHECKS='all';var r=require('child_process').spawnSync(process.execPath,['scripts/check-operator-prose.js'],{stdio:'inherit'});if(r.error)throw r.error;process.exit(r.signal?1:r.status)\"",
     "check:swallows": "node scripts/check-swallow-coverage.js",
     "coverage:gated": "npm run coverage && npm run check:swallows",
     "coverage:unified": "node scripts/coverage-unified.js",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:0541b2cd-7339-4ee1-9122-38999da30d35",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:70c8692d-688f-45e6-a4af-49916d0b01c7",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-08-18T06:52:40.138Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-08-19T06:52:36.445Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.9",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.11",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.5.9",
+      "version": "0.5.11",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.5.9",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.5.11",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.9",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.11",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]