@blamejs/pki 0.5.8 → 0.5.10

package/lib/webauthn-mds.js

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ function _schemeE(kind, message, cause) { return new WebauthnError("webauthn/" +
 // WebCrypto algorithms.
 //
 // Null-prototype: `alg` is attacker-supplied, and an inherited Object member would otherwise
-// resolve to a truthy non-row and read as a recognised algorithm.
+// resolve to a truthy non-row and read as a recognized algorithm.
 function _deriveBlobAlgs() {
   var out = Object.create(null);
   jose.sigAlgs().forEach(function (row) {
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ function _blobAlgParams(algRow, leafAlgName) {
 
 // The status values that deny trust (MDS v3.0 sec. 3.1.4). An unknown status is IGNORED for the
 // gate and surfaced raw -- the specification requires that a verifier not fail on a status it does
-// not recognise -- unless the caller opts into refusing them.
+// not recognize -- unless the caller opts into refusing them.
 var DISQUALIFYING = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   REVOKED: 1, ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE: 1, USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE: 1,
   USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE: 1, USER_VERIFICATION_BYPASS: 1,
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ var _BLOB_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
 function _isPlainObject(v) { return !!v && typeof v === "object" && !Array.isArray(v); }
 
 // The results this module actually produced. Membership is the PROVENANCE check: a metadata object
-// is only allowed to decide trust if verifyMetadataBlob made it. Recognising it by shape instead
+// is only allowed to decide trust if verifyMetadataBlob made it. Recognizing it by shape instead
 // would accept anything carrying the right property names, including a catalogue deserialized
 // from a cache, where nothing establishes that the signature and chain were ever checked, and an
 // attacker who can write that cache chooses which roots an authenticator is allowed to chain to.
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ function _isAnchorItself(cert, anchor) {
 //
 // An already-parsed certificate is taken as-is, never re-encoded and re-parsed, but the
 // recognition test names every field the anchor is later read for: the subject name, the public
-// key bytes, and the signature algorithm OID. Recognising an object on a looser test lets something
+// key bytes, and the signature algorithm OID. Recognizing an object on a looser test lets something
 // that is merely certificate-SHAPED through: a parsed CSR satisfies "has a subject and an SPKI", and
 // a hand-built object literal satisfies it too and then raises a raw TypeError from deep inside the
 // path validator, which is an untyped throw escaping a public verb.
@@ -250,8 +250,8 @@ function _verifyMetadataBlob(blob, opts) {
     throw _err("webauthn/bad-input", "opts.previousNo must be a non-negative safe integer");
   }
   // The boolean options are checked for TYPE, not merely compared against true. A caller who wrote
-  // `rejectUnknownStatus: "true"` from a config file is asking for the stricter behaviour; comparing
-  // against `true` silently records the policy as off and the authenticator carrying an unrecognised
+  // `rejectUnknownStatus: "true"` from a config file is asking for the stricter behavior; comparing
+  // against `true` silently records the policy as off and the authenticator carrying an unrecognized
   // status is then accepted -- the fail-open the option exists to prevent.
   ["requireRollbackCheck", "allowStale", "rejectUnknownStatus"].forEach(function (k) {
     if (opts[k] !== undefined && typeof opts[k] !== "boolean") {
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ function _verifyMetadataBlob(blob, opts) {
       maxBytes: C.MDS_BLOB_HEADER_MAX_BYTES, maxDepth: C.JSON_MAX_DEPTH,
       tooLarge: "webauthn/too-large", badJson: "webauthn/bad-metadata-blob",
       // Every code the guard can raise is named. An omitted one falls back to the framework default
-      // and the module's own defences -- duplicate-member smuggling, the depth cap -- surface under
+      // and the module's own defenses -- duplicate-member smuggling, the depth cap -- surface under
       // a generic code no webauthn/* consumer can switch on.
       tooDeep: "webauthn/bad-metadata-blob", duplicateMember: "webauthn/bad-metadata-blob",
       badInput: "webauthn/bad-metadata-blob", label: "the metadata BLOB header",
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ function _verifyMetadataBlob(blob, opts) {
 // anchors through this same walk while keeping the verdict its own callers already handle. A second copy
 // of the walk is not merely duplication: the anchor-stripping rule is subtle (a terminal
 // certificate that IS the anchor is identified by subject name AND public key, which is what
-// recognises a cross-signed root), and a copy that got it slightly differently would refuse a valid
+// recognizes a cross-signed root), and a copy that got it slightly differently would refuse a valid
 // chain in one place and accept a self-validated one in another.
 function _chainToAnchor(chain, anchors, at, what, code) {
   var subject = what || "metadata BLOB certificate chain";
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ function _staleAfter(nextUpdate) {
 // has to be re-established every time it decides something, not only when it was parsed. A
 // catalogue fetched before its nextUpdate and reused a month later would otherwise keep authorizing
 // an authenticator whose status reports have since revoked it, which is precisely what nextUpdate
-// exists to prevent. The caller's original allowStale decision is carried on the result and honoured
+// exists to prevent. The caller's original allowStale decision is carried on the result and honored
 // here, so opting out stays opted out and never silently reappears at the point of use.
 function assertFresh(metadata, at, label) {
   if (!metadata || metadata.allowStale === true || typeof metadata.nextUpdate !== "string") return;
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ function metadataFor(metadata, identifier) {
   return null;
 }
 
-// The options metadataAnchors recognises. Null-prototype for the same reason every other
+// The options metadataAnchors recognizes. Null-prototype for the same reason every other
 // caller-keyed table in this namespace is: a supplied key must not resolve to an inherited member.
 var _ANCHOR_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { metadata: 1, time: 1, certificate: 1 });
 
@@ -846,13 +846,13 @@ function statusDenied(entry, metadata, leaf, at) {
     if (s === null) return false;
     // Scope was settled above, so anything still here applies to this authenticator.
     if (DISQUALIFYING[s]) return true;
-    // An unrecognised status is IGNORED for the gate unless the caller opted in: the specification
+    // An unrecognized status is IGNORED for the gate unless the caller opted in: the specification
     // requires a verifier not to fail on a status value it does not know.
     return rejectUnknown && !_KNOWN_STATUS[s];
   });
 }
 
-// Status values this library recognises as non-disqualifying, so `rejectUnknownStatus` can tell an
+// Status values this library recognizes as non-disqualifying, so `rejectUnknownStatus` can tell an
 // unknown value from a known-good one.
 var _KNOWN_STATUS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   NOT_FIDO_CERTIFIED: 1, SELF_ASSERTION_SUBMITTED: 1, FIDO_CERTIFIED: 1, FIDO_CERTIFIED_L1: 1,

package/lib/webauthn.js

@@ -474,8 +474,8 @@ var ATT_STMT_MAJOR = { compound: 4 };
 var _AAGUID_SIGNED_BY_FMT = Object.assign(Object.create(null), { "fido-u2f": false });
 function _aaguidIsSigned(fmt) { return _AAGUID_SIGNED_BY_FMT[fmt] !== false; }
 
-// The options pki.webauthn.verify recognises. Null-prototype, so a caller-supplied key cannot
-// resolve to an inherited Object member and read as recognised.
+// The options pki.webauthn.verify recognizes. Null-prototype, so a caller-supplied key cannot
+// resolve to an inherited Object member and read as recognized.
 var _VERIFY_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   time: 1, metadata: 1, tpmPolicy: 1, safetyNetRoots: 1, verifySafetyNetJws: 1, requireCtsProfileMatch: 1,
   expectedRpId: 1, requireUserPresence: 1, requireUserVerification: 1, allowedAlgorithms: 1,
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ var _FORMAT_SCOPED_BOOLEAN_OPTS = ["verifySafetyNetJws", "requireCtsProfileMatch
 // so a caller that recycles the array or overwrites a certificate's bytes in between
 // would have the attestation anchored against the replacement roots while the verdict
 // still reports `anchoredTo: "rootCertificates"` (CWE-367 reaching a wrong trust
-// decision). Same defence, and the same reason, as the assertion input's snapshot.
+// decision). Same defense, and the same reason, as the assertion input's snapshot.
 // Shape faults are NOT raised here: the array is validated where it is consumed, so
 // supplying a malformed pin alongside a metadata catalogue that answers keeps failing
 // exactly where it did before.
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ function _applyCallerRoots(res, supplied, vopts, onlyPaths) {
   var at = vopts.time !== undefined ? vopts.time : new Date();
   // EVERY path, not merely one: a compound's elements are independent claims, and
   // accepting the whole because one element anchored would let an unanchored element
-  // ride along on its neighbour's trust.
+  // ride along on its neighbor's trust.
   return paths.reduce(function (p, info) {
     return p.then(function () {
       var pathAt = vopts.time !== undefined ? vopts.time : (info.at || at);
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ var VERIFIERS = {
           });
       });
     }, Promise.resolve()).then(function () {
-      // sec. 8.9 lists the supported attestation type as "Any" and authorises returning
+      // sec. 8.9 lists the supported attestation type as "Any" and authorizes returning
       // "implementation-specific values representing any combination of outputs". A distinct type
       // rather than a merge: collapsing to the strongest element would let a wrapper upgrade a
       // caller's attestationType check, and collapsing to the weakest would spuriously fail one.
@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ function verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) {
   // Every option here either GATES the verdict or supplies the trust material a gate needs, so a
   // misspelled key is not a harmless no-op: `metdata` leaves the metadata gate switched off and the
   // call returns a pass the caller believes was checked against the catalogue. Reject an
-  // unrecognised key at the boundary, and validate the one shared option every arm reads, so a bad
+  // unrecognized key at the boundary, and validate the one shared option every arm reads, so a bad
   // instant is a config fault here rather than a trust failure reported from deep inside a chain.
   try {
     if (!_isPlainObject(opts)) throw _err("webauthn/bad-input", "opts must be an object");
@@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ function verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) {
     // The boolean switches are typed HERE rather than in the arm that reads them. Validated only
     // inside the android-safetynet arm, `requireCtsProfileMatch: "true"` reaching any other format
     // is never examined at all -- a truthy string that demands nothing, silently accepted. A
-    // recognised key with an unusable value is the same class of caller mistake as an unrecognised
+    // recognized key with an unusable value is the same class of caller mistake as an unrecognized
     // key, and belongs at the same boundary.
     _FORMAT_SCOPED_BOOLEAN_OPTS.forEach(function (k) {
       if (opts[k] !== undefined && typeof opts[k] !== "boolean") throw _err("webauthn/bad-input", "opts." + k + " must be a boolean");
@@ -1597,7 +1597,7 @@ function verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) {
 function _applyMetadata(res, att, opts) {
   var md = opts.metadata;
   // Provenance, not shape: only a catalogue this toolkit actually verified may decide which roots
-  // an authenticator is allowed to chain to. Recognising it by its property names would accept a
+  // an authenticator is allowed to chain to. Recognizing it by its property names would accept a
   // hand-built object, or one restored from a cache an attacker can write -- neither of which has
   // been through the signature and chain checks that give the catalogue its authority.
   if (!mds.isVerifiedResult(md)) {
@@ -1703,7 +1703,7 @@ function _applyMetadata(res, att, opts) {
   mds.assertFresh(md, at, "the metadata supplied as opts.metadata");
   // EVERY path must pass, not merely one of them: for a compound attestation each element is an
   // independent claim, and accepting the whole because one element anchored would let an
-  // unanchored -- or revoked -- element ride along on its neighbour's trust.
+  // unanchored -- or revoked -- element ride along on its neighbor's trust.
   // Govern EVERY path BEFORE any is chain-validated, and let the SEVEREST outcome decide
   // rather than the first one reached. A compound's elements are independent claims and
   // its element order is NOT signed, so aborting on the first failure lets that order pick
@@ -1836,7 +1836,7 @@ void constants;
  *     (the default; any disqualifying report ever filed), `"latest-by-date"` (only the
  *     most recent report counts, so a later remediation clears an earlier revocation),
  *     or a function receiving the raw report array and returning true to deny.
- *   - `rejectUnknownStatus` -- treat a status this toolkit does not recognise as
+ *   - `rejectUnknownStatus` -- treat a status this toolkit does not recognize as
  *     disqualifying. Off by default: the specification requires an unknown status be
  *     ignored, never failed on.
  *
@@ -2146,7 +2146,7 @@ function parseAuthenticatorData(bytes) {
   return _parseAuthData(_bytesArg(bytes, "authenticatorData"), _err);
 }
 
-// The options pki.webauthn.verifyAssertion recognises, null-prototype for the same
+// The options pki.webauthn.verifyAssertion recognizes, null-prototype for the same
 // reason _VERIFY_OPTS is.
 var _ASSERT_OPTS = Object.assign(Object.create(null), {
   authenticatorData: 1, clientDataHash: 1, clientDataJSON: 1, signature: 1,

package/lib/webcrypto.js

@@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ function exportAnyKey(key, E, code) {
   // A separately-installed copy of this engine is the same code under a different class identity, so
   // its keys fail the `instanceof` above while carrying the very handle this engine reads -- and no
   // WebCrypto implementation but that copy would accept them. Read the handle directly. The
-  // extractable check above stays AHEAD of this: the handle can always be read, so honouring the
+  // extractable check above stays AHEAD of this: the handle can always be read, so honoring the
   // key's own extractable promise is this branch's responsibility, not the crypto library's.
   var handle = key._handle;
   if (handle instanceof nodeCrypto.KeyObject && handle.type === key.type) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.5.8",
+  "version": "0.5.10",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",
@@ -68,9 +68,11 @@
     "test": "node test/smoke.js",
     "lint": "eslint --max-warnings 0 .",
     "fuzz": "npm ci --prefix fuzz && npx --prefix fuzz jazzer fuzz/asn1-der.fuzz.js -- -max_total_time=60",
-    "gates": "node test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js && node scripts/validate-source-comment-blocks.js && node scripts/check-api-snapshot.js",
+    "gates": "node test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js && node scripts/validate-source-comment-blocks.js && node scripts/check-api-snapshot.js && node scripts/check-spelling-consistency.js",
+    "check:spelling": "node scripts/check-spelling-consistency.js",
     "coverage": "c8 --include=lib/** --include=index.js --reporter=text-summary --reporter=lcov node test/smoke.js",
     "check:prose": "node scripts/check-operator-prose.js",
+    "check:prose:all": "node -e \"process.env.PKI_PROSE_CHECKS='all';var r=require('child_process').spawnSync(process.execPath,['scripts/check-operator-prose.js'],{stdio:'inherit'});if(r.error)throw r.error;process.exit(r.signal?1:r.status)\"",
     "check:swallows": "node scripts/check-swallow-coverage.js",
     "coverage:gated": "npm run coverage && npm run check:swallows",
     "coverage:unified": "node scripts/coverage-unified.js",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:7e436b38-9f18-4222-a517-c69211740ba0",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:b51c65a4-3df8-4dec-af37-301d0b285af6",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-08-18T02:52:33.662Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-08-18T10:39:56.596Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.8",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.10",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.5.8",
+      "version": "0.5.10",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.5.8",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.5.10",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.8",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.10",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]