@blamejs/pki 0.5.34 → 0.5.36

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,27 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.5.36 — 2026-08-29
+
+pki.cms.encrypt accepts an async-iterable plaintext, encrypting a large payload without holding it whole in memory.
+
+### Added
+
+- `pki.cms.encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` accepts an async iterable of byte chunks as `content` (detected by `Symbol.asyncIterator`), alongside the existing `Buffer`, typed-array, `DataView`, and `ArrayBuffer` forms. It streams the plaintext through the AES-GCM or AES-CBC content cipher chunk by chunk, assembling only the ciphertext, so a large plaintext is not held in memory whole. The output is a byte-for-byte match for the buffered form and decrypts with `pki.cms.decrypt` and OpenSSL. This covers the recipient-based EnvelopedData and AuthEnvelopedData as well as the `{ cek }` and `{ password }` EncryptedData forms.
+
+## v0.5.35 — 2026-08-29
+
+pki.cmp.build now assembles the nested PKIMessage body an RA uses to forward or batch complete messages.
+
+### Added
+
+- `pki.cmp.build` accepts a `nested` body: `{ body: { nested: [pkiMessageDer, ...] } }` wraps an array of complete PKIMessage DER as a `NestedMessageContent` under the explicit `[20]` PKIBody tag (RFC 9810 sec. 5.1.3.5). This is the body a registration authority sends when it forwards or batches messages that were protected by other parties. Each entry is checked to parse as a PKIMessage and is then wrapped byte-for-byte unchanged, so a byte string that is not a PKIMessage is refused. An empty array is refused, because the field is `SIZE (1..MAX)`. Both failures raise `cmp/bad-input`. Following the same section, the inner messages are forwarded unchanged: each keeps its own protection, which the recipient validates, and `pki.cmp.build` does not re-sign, re-verify, or deeply inspect their contents.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A caller array passed where a list of complete items is required is now refused with a typed error unless every position from 0 to its length is the array's own element. `pki.cms.sign` (the signer list) and `pki.cmp.build` (the `nested` message list) previously reached a native `TypeError` for a sparse array such as `new Array(2)`, or one carrying an empty slot or a `null` entry. An entry resolvable only through the array's prototype, including a polluted `Array.prototype` index, was worse: the entry deep-copy materialized it and the value was signed as though the caller had supplied it. The deep-copy now copies own array indices only, so a hole stays a hole, and a dense-array check refuses the list with `cms/bad-input` or `cmp/bad-input`, failing fast so a large sparse length cannot force a long traversal.
+- A PEM-armored byte source passed to `pki.cmp.build` where DER is required is now refused with a typed error up front. Every field that takes a DER value the builder both validates with a parser and embeds verbatim is covered: the `nested` message list, the `p10cr` request, the signer certificate (`opts.cert`) and `opts.extraCerts`, and an embedded certificate or CRL. Because the parsers accept a PEM string, a PEM-armored `Buffer` (a file read straight from disk) passed validation but was embedded as ASCII armor, so the message was rejected only later, by its own parse, as `cmp/bad-der`, and for the signer certificate only after the private-key operation. The builder now requires a DER SEQUENCE for these fields, so a PEM or non-DER input fails immediately with a clear code and the bytes checked are the bytes embedded.
+
 ## v0.5.34 — 2026-08-29
 
 A subjectAltName URI shorthand whose authority is a bracketed IPv6 literal is now accepted rather than refused.

package/README.md

@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ comment blocks, is at [pkijs.com](https://pkijs.com).
 | `pki.csr` | PKCS#10 certification-request issuance (RFC 2986 / RFC 2985). `sign(spec, key, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificationRequest` from a `spec` of subject (which may be empty), the public key being certified, an optional `extensionRequest` carrying the requested v3 extensions a CA copies into the issued certificate (subject alternative names, key usage, extended key usage, basic constraints, certificate policies, subject key identifier, or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER), and an optional `challengePassword`. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the subject's own private key: the request is self-signed to prove possession of the private half of `subjectPublicKey`, and that proof is verified before the request is returned, which is what `openssl req -verify` checks. The signature algorithm is resolved from the subject key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. Returns DER, or a PEM `CERTIFICATE REQUEST` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CsrError`. `verify(request)` asks the same question of a request someone else produced, over its exact signed `certificationRequestInfo` bytes under the `subjectPKInfo` inside them, through the one path-validation signature engine. It answers `{ verified, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, attributes, certificationRequestInfoBytes }`, all re-derived from the signed bytes, so a CA issues from the fields the signature covers rather than from the object it passed in. A `verified: true` says the producer held that private key and that the subject and requested extensions are the ones they signed; who they are is the enrollment protocol's question, not this one. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.csr.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.attrcert` | Attribute-certificate issuance (RFC 5755). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs an `AttributeCertificate` as an Attribute Authority: a `spec` of `holder` (exactly one of an entity name, a `baseCertificateID` reference, a `fromCertificate` binding, or an object digest), the validity window as GeneralizedTime, an optional serial (positive, at most 20 octets, randomly generated when omitted), the `attributes` (role, clearance, group, chargingIdentity, accessIdentity, authenticationInfo, or pre-encoded Attribute DER), and optional `extensions` (auditIdentity, targetInformation, noRevAvail, aaControls, acProxying, authorityKeyIdentifier, or pre-encoded Extension DER) each with its RFC 5755 criticality. An attribute certificate is never self-signed, so the `issuer` is the signing AA, supplied as `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the AA key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, and the signature is verified under the AA public key before the certificate is returned. Returns DER, or a PEM `ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `AttrCertError`. `verify(ac, issuer, opts)` is the receiving side, performing the RFC 5755 sec. 5 checks an attribute certificate and a named issuer can settle between them: the signature over the exact `AttributeCertificateInfo` bytes through the one path-validation signature engine, the AC naming the issuer this verifier trusts (compared as a distinguished name), the evaluation instant lying within the validity with equality at either bound succeeding as the section states, the sec. 4.3.2 targeting rule, and rejection of any critical extension this verb does not process (section 5 defines support as parsing the value AND rejecting where the value would reject, so `aaControls` and `acProxying`, whose constraints it does not evaluate, are refused when critical). It answers `{ verified, signatureValid, validityChecked, targetingChecked, holderBindingChecked, issuerPathChecked, holder, issuer, attributes, extensions, notBefore, notAfter, serialNumberHex, reason }` with the fields re-derived from the signed bytes; the holder's own certificate chain and the AC issuer's chain need certificates the verb is not given, so those slots report `false` rather than letting their absence read as a pass. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.attrcert.parse` — `sign`, `verify` |
 | `pki.crmf` | Certificate-request-message issuance (RFC 4211). `build(spec, key, opts)` assembles a `CertReqMessages` from a `spec` of `certReqId` (default 0, with the RFC 9483 `-1` sentinel allowed), a `certTemplate` of the requested fields (`subject`, `publicKey` as the SPKI DER of the key being certified, `validity`, requested `extensions`, an optional `version` 2), optional `controls` and `regInfo` (regToken, authenticator, utf8Pairs, oldCertID, protocolEncrKey, or pre-encoded `AttributeTypeAndValue` DER), and an optional `pop` selector. `key` (or `{ key }`) is the requester's private key: the message carries a `POPOSigningKey` proof of possession signed with the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey` and verified before the message is returned, exactly as a PKCS#10 CSR proves possession. A complete template signs the `CertRequest`; an incomplete one signs a `POPOSigningKeyInput`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the requested public key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. `key` is optional for a `raVerified` proof. A key that cannot sign, which is where an ML-KEM enrollment sits, takes a `POPOPrivKey` proof instead (RFC 4211 sec. 4.2, sec. 4.3): `pop.type` of `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` with `pop.method: 'subsequentMessage'` declares whether an encrypted certificate (`encrCert`) or a challenge (`challengeResp`) completes the proof over the enrolling protocol's next exchange, and `pop.method: 'encryptedKey'` encloses the requester's private key for the CA in a CMS `EnvelopedData` under `id-ct-encKeyWithID`, requiring `pop.privateKey`, `pop.recipients`, the `pop.identifier` sec. 4.2.1 makes mandatory, and `pop.archive: true` because RFC 9810 sec. 5.2.8.3.1 permits the method only where archival is intended. The enclosed key must be the private half of `certTemplate.publicKey`, or the proof demonstrates possession of a key the request never asked to have certified. The `thisMessage` and `dhMAC` alternatives the specification deprecates are refused with their successors named, and `agreeMAC` is not built, since it needs the RFC 2875 static Diffie-Hellman secret against a CA certificate the requester already holds. Pass an array of specs for a batch; the CA-assigned template fields are never emitted. Returns DER, or a PEM block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrmfError`. `verifyPop(messages)` is the receiving side: for each `CertReqMsg` it verifies the `POPOSigningKey` signature over the bytes RFC 4211 sec. 4.1 names — the DER of `poposkInput` when present, of `certReq` when not — through the one path-validation signature engine, and answers `{ verified, messages: [{ verified, method, cryptographicallyVerified, certReqId, subject, subjectBound, publicKey, reason }] }` with the fields re-derived from the message's own bytes. Each verdict reports only what its preimage covers: `publicKey` is the key possession was proven for, and `subject` is the requested name when the `certReq` was signed. A `poposkInput` preimage covers the key and the sender alone, so any subject beside it is unsigned and is withheld with `subjectBound: false`. A `raVerified` proof is an RA's out-of-band assertion and a `keyEncipherment` or `keyAgreement` proof completes over a later exchange, so each is reported unverified with its `method` named instead of guessed. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crmf.parse` — `build`, `verifyPop` |
-| `pki.cmp` | CMP message building, transfer, and verification (RFC 9810). `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` and `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata; `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm — request-side `ir`, `cr`, `kur`, `p10cr`, `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`, and responder-side `ip`, `cp`, `kup`, `ccp`, `rp`, `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp`, `pkiconf`. Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }`, a signature under the sender key with the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, or `opts.mac`, a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived). Protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` and is self-verified before the message is returned, and `protectionAlg` is derived rather than caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. `transfer(url, message, opts)` carries a built message to a CMP endpoint over `pki.transport` (RFC 9811): one POST of the DER PKIMessage, with the response classified fail-closed — 200 only for success, a non-200 2xx or an un-followed 3xx refused, a 4xx or 5xx carrying a CMP error PKIMessage forwarded as the integrity-protected verdict — and protection surfaced rather than verified. `wellKnownUrl(base, opts)` builds the §3.4 `/.well-known/cmp` request-URIs. `verify(message, opts)` checks the protection on an incoming message, either a signature through the same certification-path engine `pki.crl.verify` and `pki.ocsp.verify` use, with the EdDSA low-order-point and algorithm-confusion gates, or a PBMAC1 MAC recomputed from `opts.sharedSecret` and the message's own PBKDF2 parameters and constant-time compared, over the exact `ProtectedPart` reconstructed from the parser's raw slices. It is fail-closed on an unprotected message, a legacy or KEM MAC algorithm, an omitted keyLength, or a SHA-1 PRF, and returns a `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, signer, ... }` verdict. With `opts.trustAnchors` the signer certificate is fully path-validated (RFC 5280 §6.1 plus the RFC 9483 §3.2 `keyUsage.digitalSignature` gate) at a trusted current time, or an explicit `opts.time` for historical verification and never the message's self-asserted `messageTime`, before it is reported trusted; without one the verdict is crypto-only and the signer certificate is surfaced to anchor. `session(opts)` returns a stateful enrollment session whose `enroll(request)` drives a full `ir` / `cr` / `kur` / `p10cr` transaction over the shared transport, composing `build`, `transfer`, and `verify`. Every response is protection-verified, signer-trusted, and bound to the exchange (a stable `transactionID`, a fresh-`senderNonce` and echoed-`recipNonce` chain) before its body is read, with a bounded `pollReq` / `pollRep` loop for a `waiting` status and a `certConf` / `pkiConf` (or implicit) confirmation carrying an explicit `hashAlg` for a signature algorithm that does not convey its hash. It returns a terminal `{ outcome, certificate, chain, status, trusted, confirmed, implicitConfirm, transactionID, polls, transcript }`. The same session also drives the other two RFC 9483 operations under that shell: `revoke(request)` sends an `rr` naming a certificate as `{ certificate }` or `{ certDetails }` with an optional CRLReason `reason`, and returns `revoked` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`; `info(request)` sends a `genm` for one of the four support messages — `{ caCerts }`, `{ rootCaCert }`, `{ certReqTemplate }`, `{ crlUpdate }` — and returns `answered` with the decoded `value` and a `present` flag, since an absent response value is how each says nothing is available. A session revokes its own certificate: the signature over the request is the proof of authorization (§4.2), so the named certificate must be `opts.cert` and a PBMAC1 session is refused. The signature flavor requires `opts.trustAnchors` to authenticate the CA; a verified rejection or error and an exhausted poll budget are terminal verdicts, while a tampered, untrusted, or desynchronized response is a typed throw. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build`, `transfer`, `wellKnownUrl`, `verify`, `session` |
+| `pki.cmp` | CMP message building, transfer, and verification (RFC 9810). `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` and `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata; `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm — request-side `ir`, `cr`, `kur`, `p10cr`, `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`, responder-side `ip`, `cp`, `kup`, `ccp`, `rp`, `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp`, `pkiconf`, and the registration-authority `nested` wrapper of complete PKIMessages (RFC 9810 §5.1.3.5). Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }`, a signature under the sender key with the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch, or `opts.mac`, a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived). Protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` and is self-verified before the message is returned, and `protectionAlg` is derived rather than caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. `transfer(url, message, opts)` carries a built message to a CMP endpoint over `pki.transport` (RFC 9811): one POST of the DER PKIMessage, with the response classified fail-closed — 200 only for success, a non-200 2xx or an un-followed 3xx refused, a 4xx or 5xx carrying a CMP error PKIMessage forwarded as the integrity-protected verdict — and protection surfaced rather than verified. `wellKnownUrl(base, opts)` builds the §3.4 `/.well-known/cmp` request-URIs. `verify(message, opts)` checks the protection on an incoming message, either a signature through the same certification-path engine `pki.crl.verify` and `pki.ocsp.verify` use, with the EdDSA low-order-point and algorithm-confusion gates, or a PBMAC1 MAC recomputed from `opts.sharedSecret` and the message's own PBKDF2 parameters and constant-time compared, over the exact `ProtectedPart` reconstructed from the parser's raw slices. It is fail-closed on an unprotected message, a legacy or KEM MAC algorithm, an omitted keyLength, or a SHA-1 PRF, and returns a `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, signer, ... }` verdict. With `opts.trustAnchors` the signer certificate is fully path-validated (RFC 5280 §6.1 plus the RFC 9483 §3.2 `keyUsage.digitalSignature` gate) at a trusted current time, or an explicit `opts.time` for historical verification and never the message's self-asserted `messageTime`, before it is reported trusted; without one the verdict is crypto-only and the signer certificate is surfaced to anchor. `session(opts)` returns a stateful enrollment session whose `enroll(request)` drives a full `ir` / `cr` / `kur` / `p10cr` transaction over the shared transport, composing `build`, `transfer`, and `verify`. Every response is protection-verified, signer-trusted, and bound to the exchange (a stable `transactionID`, a fresh-`senderNonce` and echoed-`recipNonce` chain) before its body is read, with a bounded `pollReq` / `pollRep` loop for a `waiting` status and a `certConf` / `pkiConf` (or implicit) confirmation carrying an explicit `hashAlg` for a signature algorithm that does not convey its hash. It returns a terminal `{ outcome, certificate, chain, status, trusted, confirmed, implicitConfirm, transactionID, polls, transcript }`. The same session also drives the other two RFC 9483 operations under that shell: `revoke(request)` sends an `rr` naming a certificate as `{ certificate }` or `{ certDetails }` with an optional CRLReason `reason`, and returns `revoked` / `rejected` / `poll-timeout`; `info(request)` sends a `genm` for one of the four support messages — `{ caCerts }`, `{ rootCaCert }`, `{ certReqTemplate }`, `{ crlUpdate }` — and returns `answered` with the decoded `value` and a `present` flag, since an absent response value is how each says nothing is available. A session revokes its own certificate: the signature over the request is the proof of authorization (§4.2), so the named certificate must be `opts.cert` and a PBMAC1 session is refused. The signature flavor requires `opts.trustAnchors` to authenticate the CA; a verified rejection or error and an exhausted poll budget are terminal verdicts, while a tampered, untrusted, or desynchronized response is a typed throw. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build`, `transfer`, `wellKnownUrl`, `verify`, `session` |
 | `pki.crl` | CRL issuance and verification (RFC 5280 §5). `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList` from a `spec` of `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` and `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER, with an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, the RFC fixes per-extension criticality, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine, algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included; handed a certificate rather than a bare key it also asks what only a certificate can answer — that the certificate is the issuer the CRL names, and that its `keyUsage`, when present, asserts `cRLSign` — so a CRL minted under an end-entity certificate of the same CA does not verify as that CA's. `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber, opts)` looks a serial up, and first checks that the CRL is one a serial can be looked up in at all — it is handed a serial and nothing else, so a CRL that speaks for part of its issuer's certificates is refused rather than answered from. A delta CRL lists changes since a base, so an entry recording a release reads as a revocation when read alone; an indirect CRL carries other issuers' entries, whose serials are unrelated to yours; and any other `issuingDistributionPoint` narrows the CRL to one distribution point, one kind of certificate, or a subset of revocation reasons, none of which a serial can be matched against. A CRL speaks for a span as well as a set, so `opts.time` states the instant the question is asked at and a list that has stopped speaking for it — `nextUpdate` passed, `thisUpdate` later, or no `nextUpdate` stated at all — is refused rather than read as a clean bill of health; without `opts.time` the lookup is structural and an absent serial means only that it is not on that list. `pki.path.crlChecker` is the verb for all of them: it is handed the certificate, merges a delta with its base, performs the §6.3.3 correspondence, and decides currency against the material it fetched. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign`, `verify`, `isRevoked` |
 | `pki.key` | Key-material lifecycle (RFC 5958 / RFC 8018). `encrypt(privateKey, password, opts)` wraps a PKCS#8 private key (DER, PEM, or an extractable `CryptoKey`) into an `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` under PBES2 (PBKDF2 with AES-CBC-Pad), where `opts` selects the `cipher` (`aes-256-cbc` default, `aes-192-cbc`, `aes-128-cbc`), the `prf` (`hmacWithSHA256` default, SHA-384/512, SHA-1), the `iterations` (default 600000), and the `salt`. The plaintext is validated as PKCS#8 before encryption, a default `prf` and `keyLength` are omitted so the parameters are byte-exact with OpenSSL, and the output is re-parsed before return. `decrypt(encrypted, password, opts)` recovers the inner `PrivateKeyInfo`, re-validated through `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse`: only PBES2 / PBKDF2 / AES-CBC is accepted (PBES1, PBMAC1, and scrypt are refused), the salt and iteration count are bounded before any derivation (`opts.maxIterations` lowers the cap), and a malformed parameter set or wrong-length IV is a distinct typed error. Because a MAC-less PBES2-CBC decrypt must not become a padding oracle (RFC 8018 §8), a wrong password and a valid-pad-but-not-a-key both surface the one uniform `key/decrypt-failed`. `export(key, opts)` and `import(input, opts)` move a private key as PKCS#8 or a public key as SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The key may come from the platform's WebCrypto or from a separately installed copy of this toolkit, and is exported through whichever holds its material; a non-extractable key, or one whose implementation keeps its material out of reach, is refused with that as the reason. Encoding is delegated to WebCrypto, so RSA carries an explicit NULL, EC a named curve, and Ed25519/Ed448/X25519/X448 omit parameters, and an ambiguous RSA or EC import requires `opts.algorithm`. `generate(algorithm, opts)` produces a key pair over RSA, ECDSA/ECDH, the Edwards and Montgomery curves, and the FIPS post-quantum ML-DSA and ML-KEM; `publicFromPrivate(privateKey)` derives the public key. Returns DER or PEM, with a typed `KeyError` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse` — `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `export`, `import`, `generate`, `publicFromPrivate` |
 | `pki.pkcs12` | PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance and reading (RFC 7292 / RFC 9579). `build(spec, opts)` assembles a store from the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key, shroudedKey, cert, crl, secret, or nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping, and `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` are single-value. Integrity is a classic Appendix B HMAC (the default, for maximum interoperability) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`) over SHA-256/384/512, with shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 — which is what OpenSSL and NSS consume, so a file it emits opens in both, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC covers the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity (`opts.integrity.mode: "public-key"`) wraps the AuthenticatedSafe in a CMS SignedData instead of a MAC, signed by any `pki.cms.sign` signer and carrying no MacData (§4); privacy stays independent, so `password` still PBES2-encrypts the bags. Public-key privacy wraps a SafeContents as a CMS EnvelopedData (AES-CBC, `id-envelopedData`, never GCM) encrypted to recipient public keys through the `pki.cms.encrypt` recipient model, via per-safe `recipients` or the `opts.recipientCerts` convenience, restricted to certificate recipients (RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, X448, ML-KEM) since a password or KEK recipient could not be reopened by `open`. All four integrity-by-privacy combinations are permitted (§3.1). `open(pfx, password, opts)` reads a store back: it verifies the MAC first, so a wrong password is the MAC verdict rather than a decrypt error, then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and shrouded key bag and returns `{ integrityMode, macVerified, signers, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` — keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certs, CRLs and secrets as raw DER, all with `friendlyName` and `localKeyId`, nested safes recursively. A MAC-less store is refused unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated`. A public-key-integrity store is verified through its CMS SignedData signature first (`pkcs12/signature-invalid` on failure), with the signer surfaced in `signers` but never trust-chained, which remains the caller's `pki.path.validate` step. A legacy-PBE store's Appendix C 3DES and RC2 bags are decrypted, RC2 through an in-tree RFC 2268 cipher, so an `openssl pkcs12 -legacy` or NSS store opens; the legacy RC4 schemes are refused. An `id-envelopedData` safe is decrypted with `opts.recipientKey` after the integrity gate (`pkcs12/no-recipient-key` when absent), every recipient-side fault and every post-integrity decrypt failure collapsing to the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`, and `opts.keys: 'crypto'` imports each key to a `CryptoKey`. It reads what OpenSSL and NSS produce. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`, with a typed `Pkcs12Error` on failure. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build`, `verifyMac`, `open` |
-| `pki.cms` | CMS signing, verification, encryption, and compression (RFC 5652). `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (§5), attached or detached, with one or many signers over RSA, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA key (accepted only when both components verify, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs). It builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, which signs a large detached payload without holding it in memory: the payload is hashed incrementally under every signer's digest algorithm in one pass, and `verify` accepts the same streamed form as its `content` option. A signer may also be key-only — `{ key, spki, keyIdentifier }` with no certificate — which RFC 5272 §3.2 requires when a Full PKI Request's signer is the key of a certification request that request carries: the signer identifier takes the subjectKeyIdentifier form carrying the identifier the request declares, the signature scheme resolves from the request's own public key, and no certificate is embedded. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: with signed attributes present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), and otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate. `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims and neither implies the other: a SignedData carries its own certificates, so `valid` says the signature is sound under one of them and nothing about who signed, while `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280 path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted` is `false`; anchors that cannot be read throw, rather than reading as untrusted. An unrecognized option is refused rather than ignored. `countersign(cms, signers, opts)` adds a countersignature (§11.4) — a `SignerInfo` over the countersigned SignerInfo's signature value, any signer algorithm, nestable, with the primary bytes preserved so it still verifies — attached as the id-countersignature unsigned attribute; `verify` returns each countersignature's verdict under `signers[i].countersignatures` and every unsigned attribute — including an RFC 3161 timestamp token, attachable via `sign`'s `unsignedAttributes` — under `signers[i].unsignedAttrs`, surfaced unauthenticated. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData, with recipients auto-dispatched off the certificate key to key transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 is never emitted), key agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key wrap, password (PBKDF2 with RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936), wrapping one fresh content key for every recipient. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher, EFAIL, and password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. Every key-establishment secret the toolkit allocates is wiped once used, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one: the KEM shared secret and its derived key-encryption key, the raw ECDH / X25519 / X448 agreement secret, a password-derived key-encryption key, and the content-encryption key itself, cleared once the message is complete since all recipients share it. Caller-supplied key material is never written to (best-effort; NIST SP 800-227 §4.2, RFC 9629 §7). `authenticate(content, recipients, opts)` produces an `id-ct-authData` (§9): cleartext content plus an HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 MAC, authenticated but not encrypted, with the fresh MAC key wrapped for every recipient through the same RecipientInfo model. The MAC covers the authenticated attributes (content-type and message-digest) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT SET OF (§9.2), or the content octets directly; `decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC and independently the message-digest (§9.3), and releases the content only after both pass, with every secret-dependent failure collapsing to the uniform `cms/decrypt-failed`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (RFC 3274; ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large`. Compression is a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `countersign`, `encrypt`, `authenticate`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
+| `pki.cms` | CMS signing, verification, encryption, and compression (RFC 5652). `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (§5), attached or detached, with one or many signers over RSA, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA, EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA, ECDSA, or EdDSA key (accepted only when both components verify, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs). It builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, which signs a large detached payload without holding it in memory: the payload is hashed incrementally under every signer's digest algorithm in one pass, and `verify` accepts the same streamed form as its `content` option. A signer may also be key-only — `{ key, spki, keyIdentifier }` with no certificate — which RFC 5272 §3.2 requires when a Full PKI Request's signer is the key of a certification request that request carries: the signer identifier takes the subjectKeyIdentifier form carrying the identifier the request declares, the signature scheme resolves from the request's own public key, and no certificate is embedded. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: with signed attributes present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), and otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate. `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims and neither implies the other: a SignedData carries its own certificates, so `valid` says the signature is sound under one of them and nothing about who signed, while `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`, validated through the same RFC 5280 path engine `pki.path.validate` uses. Without anchors there is nothing to chain to and `trusted` is `false`; anchors that cannot be read throw, rather than reading as untrusted. An unrecognized option is refused rather than ignored. `countersign(cms, signers, opts)` adds a countersignature (§11.4) — a `SignerInfo` over the countersigned SignerInfo's signature value, any signer algorithm, nestable, with the primary bytes preserved so it still verifies — attached as the id-countersignature unsigned attribute; `verify` returns each countersignature's verdict under `signers[i].countersignatures` and every unsigned attribute — including an RFC 3161 timestamp token, attachable via `sign`'s `unsignedAttributes` — under `signers[i].unsignedAttrs`, surfaced unauthenticated. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData, with recipients auto-dispatched off the certificate key to key transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 is never emitted), key agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key wrap, password (PBKDF2 with RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936), wrapping one fresh content key for every recipient. The content may also be an async iterable of byte chunks, streamed through the AES-GCM or AES-CBC content cipher so a large plaintext is encrypted without being buffered whole; the ciphertext is assembled before the definite-length encryptedContent is emitted, byte-for-byte the buffered form. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher, EFAIL, and password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. Every key-establishment secret the toolkit allocates is wiped once used, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one: the KEM shared secret and its derived key-encryption key, the raw ECDH / X25519 / X448 agreement secret, a password-derived key-encryption key, and the content-encryption key itself, cleared once the message is complete since all recipients share it. Caller-supplied key material is never written to (best-effort; NIST SP 800-227 §4.2, RFC 9629 §7). `authenticate(content, recipients, opts)` produces an `id-ct-authData` (§9): cleartext content plus an HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 MAC, authenticated but not encrypted, with the fresh MAC key wrapped for every recipient through the same RecipientInfo model. The MAC covers the authenticated attributes (content-type and message-digest) re-tagged to the EXPLICIT SET OF (§9.2), or the content octets directly; `decrypt` recovers the MAC key, recomputes the MAC and independently the message-digest (§9.3), and releases the content only after both pass, with every secret-dependent failure collapsing to the uniform `cms/decrypt-failed`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (RFC 3274; ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large`. Compression is a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `countersign`, `encrypt`, `authenticate`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
 | `pki.smime` | S/MIME message assembly, verification, encryption, and compression over the CMS layer (RFC 8551). `sign(content, signers, opts)` wraps a MIME entity in either form: `multipart/signed`, where the content stays readable in any MUA and a detached CMS SignedData rides alongside as `application/pkcs7-signature` with a matching `micalg`, or `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data`, where the whole entity is a base64 CMS SignedData. The signed bytes are the entity's §3.1.1 canonical form with CRLF line endings, and `verify(message, opts)` unwraps both forms and recomputes over the same canonicalizer, so a transport that re-wraps line endings still verifies while a tampered part fails. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` envelopes a MIME entity as an opaque `application/pkcs7-mime` message and `decrypt(message, keyMaterial, opts)` opens one, as `smime-type=authEnveloped-data` (AES-GCM, confidentiality and integrity, the default) or `smime-type=enveloped-data` (AES-CBC, confidentiality only, so `decrypt` reports `authenticated: false`, the §3.3 no-integrity caveat). The `smime-type` is derived from the CMS body rather than the header, and decryption is fail-closed and oracle-free. The crypto is entirely `pki.cms.sign` / `verify` / `encrypt` / `decrypt`, so it is algorithm-agnostic: any RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA signer and any RSA-OAEP / ECDH / X25519 / X448 / AES-KW / PBKDF2 / ML-KEM recipient carries through. As with `cms.verify`, `verify` returns the per-signer verdict plus the recovered content, and `valid` and `trusted` are separate claims: `valid` says the signature is sound under a certificate the message carried, `trusted` says every signer chained to a root named in `opts.trustAnchors`. Anchoring here is validated for email at both ends of the chain — the signer certificate must carry `emailProtection` (RFC 8551 §4.4.4) and the anchor's own trust metadata must permit that purpose, since a root can be distrusted for email while remaining a good TLS root. Override either with `requiredEku` / `checkPurpose`. `compress(content, opts)` and `decompress(message, opts)` add the opaque `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=compressed-data; name=smime.p7z` frame (§3.6, RFC 3274), a size transform with no integrity or confidentiality (§2.4.5), bounded against a bomb; the recovered content, which may itself be signed or enveloped, is returned for the caller to re-verify. Header protection (RFC 9788): `sign` and `encrypt` take `opts.protectHeaders`, which inlines the caller's `opts.headers` on the Cryptographic Payload root (its Content-Type gaining `hp="clear"` when signed or `hp="cipher"` when encrypted) so the CMS signature or encryption covers them, defeating a transport that rewrites or reads Subject, From, and the rest. `verify` and `decrypt` surface the authenticated inner set as `protectedHeaders` plus `headerProtection { present, mode, fromMismatch, confidential, legacy }`, so a tampered outer header cannot alter it and `fromMismatch` flags an outer From that disagrees. Encryption applies a Header Confidentiality Policy: the default `hcp_baseline` obscures the outer Subject to `[...]` and removes Comments and Keywords, so the real values live only in the ciphertext, and `decrypt` recovers them. Every emitted header routes through a fail-closed injection guard that rejects a CR, LF, or NUL value and a non-ftext name, and a malformed or contradictory `hp` wrap fails closed as `smime/bad-header-protection` rather than silently downgrading. The CMS crypto is unchanged. Inbound legacy RFC 8551 header protection is recognized opt-in: `verify` and `decrypt` with `opts.legacyHeaderProtection` detect a legacy `message/rfc822`-wrapped payload by the RFC 9788 §4.10.1 four-condition identification and surface the inner headers under `headerProtection.legacy = { headers, mode, fromMismatch, confidential }`, where `headers` is an ordered `[{ name, value }]` array retaining legally repeated fields such as `Received`. Those never appear in `protectedHeaders` and never set `present: true`. Because a legacy message is structurally indistinguishable from an ordinary forwarded `message/rfc822`, this is an explicit heuristic (§4.10.2, "no strong end-to-end guarantees"): a caller keying trust off `present` or `protectedHeaders` is never misled, and only one that explicitly reads `headerProtection.legacy.headers` and cross-checks `legacy.fromMismatch` consumes it. It is off by default, and a nested crypto layer, an inner `hp=`, a non-`message/rfc822` payload, or a duplicate Content-Type reports `legacy: null`. Bidirectionally interoperable with `openssl smime` and `openssl cms`. Fail-closed with typed `smime/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
 | `pki.tsp` | Time-Stamp Protocol (RFC 3161). `sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts)` produces a TimeStampToken: a CMS SignedData over `pki.cms.sign` whose content is a `TSTInfo` carrying the timestamped message imprint, the TSA policy, a serial number, and `genTime` with optional accuracy, nonce, and ordering, plus the §2.4.2 signing-certificate attribute binding the token to the TSA certificate (SHA-2 imprints, any `pki.cms.sign` TSA key). `request` and `parseRequest` build and parse the TimeStampReq a client sends (imprint, requested policy, nonce, certReq); `response` and `parseResponse` handle the TimeStampResp a TSA returns, either a granted status wrapping a token or a rejection with PKIStatus and failure info, with the §2.4.2 status-to-token coupling enforced in both directions. `verify(token, data, opts)` verifies a token fail-closed: the CMS signature over the exact signed bytes, the message imprint recomputed from the data, the TSTInfo content type, the ESSCertID(V2) binding to the TSA certificate, the §2.3 critical timeStamping-only extendedKeyUsage, the request nonce when used, and, with a trust anchor supplied, full certification-path validation of the TSA certificate at the token's `genTime` — judged under the `timeStamping` purpose, so an anchor's own per-purpose trust metadata reaches the decision rather than sitting inert. It returns `{ valid, trusted, genTime, serialNumber, tstInfo, ... }`, where `trusted` is the separate claim that the authority chained to an anchor you named: without one there is nothing to chain to and it is `false`, which is the distinction a timestamp re-read years later turns on — `sign`, `request`, `parseRequest`, `response`, `parseResponse`, `verify` |
 | `pki.ocsp` | Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 6960), both the responder and relying-party surface. `buildRequest(query, opts)` builds an OCSPRequest for one or more `{ cert, issuer }` pairs, with the CertID hashed under SHA-1 by default per the RFC 5019 lightweight profile or under SHA-2, plus an optional RFC 9654 nonce and an optional requestor signature. `sign(responseData, responder, opts)` produces a signed BasicOCSPResponse over the exact `ResponseData` DER, from the issuing CA directly or a delegated responder, under any `pki.cms.sign` key including the post-quantum ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sets, with `good`, `revoked` (reason and time), or `unknown` per-certificate status. `buildErrorResponse(status)` produces the unsigned §2.3 error (`tryLater`, `unauthorized`, and the rest). `verify(response, opts)` verifies a response fail-closed against the same hardened gates `pki.path.ocspChecker` runs: the CertID binding, responder authorization (the issuing CA, or a CA-issued delegate bearing id-kp-OCSPSigning and id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck and passing the full out-of-path certificate gates), the signature over `tbsResponseDataBytes`, currency against `thisUpdate` and `nextUpdate`, and the request-nonce echo. It returns `{ status: "good" / "revoked" / "unknown", ... }` and never silently accepts. Transport-free — `buildRequest`, `sign`, `buildErrorResponse`, `verify` |

package/lib/cmp-build.js

@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
  * @intro The RFC 9810 Certificate Management Protocol producing side. `pki.cmp.build` assembles a
  *   `PKIMessage` -- a `PKIHeader` (sender / recipient / transaction metadata), a `PKIBody` carrying one
  *   request or transaction (an `ir` / `cr` / `kur` certificate request via `pki.crmf.build`, a `p10cr`
- *   PKCS#10 via `pki.csr.sign`, or a `certConf` / `pollReq` / `genm` / `rr`), and an optional
+ *   PKCS#10 via `pki.csr.sign`, a `certConf` / `pollReq` / `genm` / `rr`, or a `nested` wrapper of other
+ *   PKIMessages an RA forwards), and an optional
  *   `PKIProtection` computed over the message. Protection is a signature under the sender key (any
  *   registry algorithm) or a PBMAC1 shared-secret MAC. The emitted message round-trips through
  *   `pki.schema.cmp.parse` and its protection verifies. `pki.cmp.transfer` carries a message to a CMP
@@ -91,11 +92,13 @@ var KNOWN_HEADER_KEYS = {
 var KNOWN_BODY_KEYS = {
   ir: 1, cr: 1, kur: 1, p10cr: 1, certConf: 1, pollReq: 1, genm: 1, rr: 1,   // request-side
   ip: 1, cp: 1, kup: 1, ccp: 1, krp: 1, rp: 1, genp: 1, error: 1, pollRep: 1, pkiconf: 1,   // CA/responder-side
+  nested: 1,   // an RA wrapper of complete, independently-protected PKIMessages (RFC 9810 sec. 5.1.3.5)
 };
 // The PKIBody arm -> its EXPLICIT context tag number (schema-cmp.js BODY_ARMS). rr is [11], not [15].
 var BODY_TAG = {
   ir: 0, cr: 2, p10cr: 4, kur: 7, rr: 11, genm: 21, certConf: 24, pollReq: 25,
   ip: 1, cp: 3, kup: 8, krp: 10, rp: 12, ccp: 14, pkiconf: 19, genp: 22, error: 23, pollRep: 26,
+  nested: 20,   // NestedMessageContent (schema-cmp.js BODY_ARMS [20])
 };
 var CRMF_BODY = { ir: 1, cr: 1, kur: 1 };   // arms whose content is a CertReqMessages via pki.crmf.build
 var CERT_REP_ARM = { ip: 1, cp: 1, kup: 1, ccp: 1 };   // arms carrying a CertRepMessage
@@ -460,7 +463,7 @@ function _encodeCertOrEncCert(coec, state) {
   if (!coec || typeof coec !== "object" || Buffer.isBuffer(coec)) throw _err("cmp/bad-cert-response", "certifiedKeyPair must carry certificate or encryptedCert");
   if (coec.certificate != null && coec.encryptedCert != null) throw _err("cmp/bad-cert-response", "certOrEncCert is a CHOICE: supply exactly one of certificate or encryptedCert, not both");
   if (coec.certificate != null) {
-    var certDer = _b.reqDer(coec.certificate, "certifiedKeyPair.certificate (a Certificate DER)");
+    var certDer = _b.reqDerSequence(coec.certificate, "certifiedKeyPair.certificate (a Certificate DER)");
     try { x509.parse(certDer); } catch (e) { if (e instanceof CmpError) throw e; throw _err("cmp/bad-cert-response", "certifiedKeyPair.certificate is not a valid X.509 certificate", e); }
     return b.explicit(0, b.raw(certDer));   // certificate [0] EXPLICIT
   }
@@ -524,7 +527,7 @@ function _encodeCertRepMessage(spec, state, arm) {
 
 // A raw Certificate DER, validated via the real parser before it is embedded.
 function _certRaw(c, code, what) {
-  var der = _b.reqDer(c, what + " (a Certificate DER)");
+  var der = _b.reqDerSequence(c, what + " (a Certificate DER)");
   try { x509.parse(der); } catch (e) { if (e instanceof CmpError) throw e; throw _err(code, what + " is not a valid X.509 certificate", e); }
   return b.raw(der);
 }
@@ -545,7 +548,7 @@ function _encodeRevRepContent(spec) {
   if (spec.crls != null) {
     if (!Array.isArray(spec.crls) || !spec.crls.length) throw _err("cmp/bad-rev-rep", "rp.crls must be a non-empty array of CertificateList DERs");
     children.push(b.explicit(1, b.sequence(spec.crls.map(function (c) {
-      var der = _b.reqDer(c, "crls entry (a CertificateList DER)");
+      var der = _b.reqDerSequence(c, "crls entry (a CertificateList DER)");
       try { crl.parse(der); }   // each crls entry MUST be a valid X.509 CRL (CertificateList)
       catch (e) { if (e instanceof CmpError) throw e; throw _err("cmp/bad-rev-rep", "a crls entry is not a valid CRL (CertificateList)", e); }
       return b.raw(der);
@@ -616,6 +619,36 @@ function _popNeedsCmp2021(crmfDer) {
   return false;
 }
 
+// nested [20] NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage (RFC 9810 sec.
+// 5.1.3.5 "Multiple Protection"): an RA forwards or batches complete, independently-protected PKIMessages,
+// wrapping them UNCHANGED under its OWN protection. Each entry is a full PKIMessage DER, checked by the real
+// parser so a non-PKIMessage fails closed here rather than wrapping as opaque bytes. The check is the toolkit's
+// PKIMessage parse: it validates the envelope and every arm the parser decodes and, exactly as a parse
+// anywhere else does, surfaces the raw arms (p10cr, the announcements, a further nested) without re-validating
+// their content -- which sec. 5.1.3.5 leaves to the recipient, since the RA forwards each message unchanged.
+// The wrapper's protection covers this SEQUENCE, not the inner messages, and the parser never auto-recurses a
+// nested body (the operator re-feeds each inner message).
+function _encodeNestedContent(list) {
+  if (!intrinsic.isArray(list) || list.length === 0) {
+    throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "nested must be a non-empty array of PKIMessage DER (RFC 9810 sec. 5.1.3.5 PKIMessages is SIZE (1..MAX))");
+  }
+  // reqDenseArray rejects a sparse hole or a nullish entry up front: Array.prototype.map SKIPS a hole,
+  // which would otherwise reach Buffer.concat as a native ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE and, on a huge sparse
+  // length, traverse the empty slots. With the array proven dense, the map validates each entry in turn.
+  return b.sequence(intrinsic.map(_b.reqDenseArray(list, "nested"), function (m, i) {
+    // reqDerSequence requires a DER SEQUENCE up front: cmp.parse also unwraps PEM from a byte source, so a
+    // PEM-armored entry (a Buffer straight from fs.readFileSync) would otherwise pass the parse yet be
+    // embedded by b.raw as ASCII armor and rejected as cmp/bad-der by the outer message's own parse, only
+    // after protection is computed. With DER assured, the bytes cmp.parse checks are the bytes embedded.
+    var der = _b.reqDerSequence(m, "nested[" + i + "] (a PKIMessage DER)");
+    // A bad entry is a build-time authoring error, so any parse failure is one uniform cmp/bad-input naming
+    // the offending index (the underlying reason rides along as the cause), never the parser's internal code.
+    try { cmp.parse(der); }   // check each embedded message parses as a PKIMessage (fail-closed on a non-PKIMessage)
+    catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "nested[" + i + "] does not parse as a PKIMessage", e); }
+    return b.raw(der);
+  }));
+}
+
 // Dispatch the single-key body object to its EXPLICIT-tagged arm. Returns { bodyTLV, usesCmp2021 }.
 function _encodeBody(bodySpec, key, opts) {
   if (!bodySpec || typeof bodySpec !== "object" || Buffer.isBuffer(bodySpec)) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "message.body must be a single-key object");
@@ -647,7 +680,7 @@ function _encodeBody(bodySpec, key, opts) {
   }
   var inner;
   if (arm === "p10cr") {
-    var csrDer = _b.reqDer(bodySpec.p10cr, "p10cr (a CertificationRequest DER)");
+    var csrDer = _b.reqDerSequence(bodySpec.p10cr, "p10cr (a CertificationRequest DER)");
     try { csr.parse(csrDer); }   // validate the embedded PKCS#10 via the real parser (fail-closed on a non-CSR)
     catch (e) { if (e instanceof CmpError) throw e; throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "p10cr is not a valid PKCS#10 CertificationRequest", e); }
     inner = b.raw(csrDer);
@@ -671,6 +704,8 @@ function _encodeBody(bodySpec, key, opts) {
     inner = _encodePollRepContent(bodySpec.pollRep);
   } else if (arm === "krp") {
     inner = _encodeKeyRecRepContent(bodySpec.krp, state);
+  } else if (arm === "nested") {
+    inner = _encodeNestedContent(bodySpec.nested);
   } else {   // pkiconf -- PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
     if (bodySpec.pkiconf !== null && bodySpec.pkiconf !== true) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "pkiconf takes null or true (PKIConfirmContent is NULL)");
     inner = b.nullValue();
@@ -691,7 +726,7 @@ function _resolveProtection(opts) {
 
   if (hasSig) {
     if (opts.key == null || opts.cert == null) throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "signature protection requires both opts.key (the private key) and opts.cert (the signer certificate)");
-    var certDer = _b.reqDer(opts.cert, "opts.cert (the signer certificate DER)");
+    var certDer = _b.reqDerSequence(opts.cert, "opts.cert (the signer certificate DER)");
     var senderSpki;
     try { senderSpki = x509.parse(certDer).subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes; }
     catch (e) { throw _err("cmp/bad-input", "opts.cert is not a valid X.509 certificate", e); }
@@ -821,7 +856,7 @@ function _collectExtraCerts(opts, protCertDer) {
   if (opts.extraCerts != null) {
     if (!Array.isArray(opts.extraCerts)) throw _err("cmp/bad-extra-certs", "opts.extraCerts must be an array of certificate DERs");
     opts.extraCerts.forEach(function (c) {
-      var der = _b.reqDer(c, "extraCerts entry (a Certificate DER)");
+      var der = _b.reqDerSequence(c, "extraCerts entry (a Certificate DER)");
       try { x509.parse(der); }   // each extraCerts entry MUST be a valid X.509 certificate (RFC 9810 sec. 5.1)
       catch (e) { if (e instanceof CmpError) throw e; throw _err("cmp/bad-extra-certs", "an extraCerts entry is not a valid X.509 certificate", e); }
       out.push(b.raw(der));
@@ -846,7 +881,10 @@ function _collectExtraCerts(opts, protCertDer) {
  * CertificationRequest DER), `{ certConf }`, `{ pollReq }`, `{ genm }`, `{ rr }`. CA/responder-side: `{ ip }` /
  * `{ cp }` / `{ kup }` / `{ ccp }` (a `CertRepMessage`: `caPubs` plus `response` of `CertResponse` each with a
  * `PKIStatusInfo` and, under a granting status, a `certifiedKeyPair`), `{ rp }` (`RevRepContent`), `{ genp }`,
- * `{ error }` (`ErrorMsgContent`), `{ pollRep }`, `{ krp }` (`KeyRecRepContent`), `{ pkiconf }` (NULL). The
+ * `{ error }` (`ErrorMsgContent`), `{ pollRep }`, `{ krp }` (`KeyRecRepContent`), `{ pkiconf }` (NULL).
+ * Registration-authority: `{ nested }` (an array of complete PKIMessage DER, each forwarded unchanged and
+ * wrapped as `NestedMessageContent`, RFC 9810 sec. 5.1.3.5; each entry is checked to parse as a PKIMessage
+ * before it is wrapped, and an empty array or an entry that does not parse is refused). The
  * message is protected: `opts` carries exactly
  * one of `{ key, cert }` (a signature under the sender key over the message, using any registry algorithm: RSA
  * / ECDSA / EdDSA / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA / composite, resolved from the certificate) or `{ mac }` (a PBMAC1

package/lib/cms-encrypt.js

@@ -492,7 +492,21 @@ var _AUTHENTICATE_OPTS_BARE = {
   keyIdentifier: 1, oaepHash: 1, ukm: 1, pem: 1,
 };
 
-async function encrypt(content, recipients, opts) {
+function encrypt(content, recipients, opts) {
+  // The options and recipients are copied BEFORE the content is classified. Classifying reads
+  // content[Symbol.asyncIterator] -- a caller accessor that runs in-realm -- which could otherwise
+  // change the content type, the output encoding, or a recipient after the call has begun. With the
+  // copies taken first, that probe cannot reach them; the streamed sign path copies the same way. The
+  // copy runs inside guard-async's boundary, so a fault in it leaves as a rejection, and the copies
+  // (which may hold a symmetric key or a password) are cleared on every path out.
+  return guard.bytes.fixedCall(CmsError, "cms/bad-input", [
+    [recipients, "recipients"], [opts, "pki.cms.encrypt options"],
+  ], function (recipientsCopy, optsCopy) {
+    return _encryptImpl(content, recipientsCopy, optsCopy);
+  });
+}
+
+async function _encryptImpl(content, recipients, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   // The content algorithm selects the structure, so it is resolved before the door and the table
   // that runs is the one belonging to the structure this call will emit.
@@ -506,7 +520,11 @@ async function encrypt(content, recipients, opts) {
           ? " for a CBC content algorithm; authenticated attributes are carried only by an AuthEnvelopedData, which an AEAD algorithm produces"
           : "");
     });
-  var contentBytes = guard.bytes.view(content, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", "content");
+  // An async-iterable content streams the plaintext through the cipher without buffering it whole; a byte
+  // source takes the one-shot path. asyncStreamOf reads Symbol.asyncIterator once and wins only when the
+  // value is not already a byte source, so a Buffer with a stray asyncIterator stays a Buffer.
+  var contentStream = guard.bytes.asyncStreamOf(content);
+  var contentBytes = contentStream ? null : guard.bytes.view(content, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", "content");
   var contentType = opts.contentType || "data";
   var cek = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(ca.keyBits / 8);
 
@@ -515,7 +533,7 @@ async function encrypt(content, recipients, opts) {
   // inside the recipient loop would destroy the key the remaining recipients must be given.
   try {
     // EncryptedData: a single non-array { cek } or { password } descriptor, no RecipientInfos.
-    if (!Array.isArray(recipients)) return _encryptedData(contentBytes, recipients, ca, contentType, opts, cek);
+    if (!Array.isArray(recipients)) return await _encryptedData(contentBytes, contentStream, recipients, ca, contentType, opts, cek);
 
     if (!recipients.length) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "at least one recipient is required (RFC 5652 sec. 6.1)");
     var recips = [];
@@ -524,8 +542,8 @@ async function encrypt(content, recipients, opts) {
     _assertDefaultsConsumed(opts, consumed);
     var riNodes = recips.map(_taggedRecipient);
 
-    if (ca.aead) return _emit(_authEnvelopedData(contentBytes, cek, ca, contentType, opts, riNodes, recips), "authEnvelopedData", opts);
-    return _emit(_envelopedData(contentBytes, cek, ca, contentType, riNodes, recips), "envelopedData", opts);
+    if (ca.aead) return _emit(await _authEnvelopedData(contentBytes, contentStream, cek, ca, contentType, opts, riNodes, recips), "authEnvelopedData", opts);
+    return _emit(await _envelopedData(contentBytes, contentStream, cek, ca, contentType, riNodes, recips), "envelopedData", opts);
   } finally {
     guard.secret.zeroize(cek, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", "the content-encryption key");
   }
@@ -536,9 +554,25 @@ function _emit(inner, ctName, opts) {
   return opts.pem ? schemaCms.pemEncode(ci, "CMS") : ci;
 }
 
-function _envelopedData(contentBytes, cek, ca, contentType, riNodes, recips) {
+// Run a streamed plaintext through the content cipher, translating the engine's malformed-streamed-content
+// domain into this verb's cms/bad-input via the shared guard, so pki.cms.encrypt keeps its typed CmsError
+// contract (the streamed sign/verify paths translate the same way).
+async function _encStream(spec, stream) {
+  try {
+    return await subtle.encryptStream(spec, stream);
+  } catch (e) {
+    guard.bytes.translateStreamError(e, _err, "cms/bad-input");
+  }
+}
+
+async function _envelopedData(contentBytes, contentStream, cek, ca, contentType, riNodes, recips) {
   var iv = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(16);
-  var enc = pbes2.cbcEncrypt(cek, iv, contentBytes, ca.keyBits, CmsError, "cms/bad-input");
+  // A streamed plaintext runs through the CBC cipher incrementally (assembling only the ciphertext, whose
+  // length the encryptedContent OCTET STRING needs); a Buffer takes the one-shot path. Both produce the
+  // same wire bytes for the same plaintext, so the emitted DER is identical to the buffered form.
+  var enc = contentStream
+    ? (await _encStream({ algNode: "aes-" + ca.keyBits + "-cbc", key: cek, iv: iv }, contentStream)).ciphertext
+    : pbes2.cbcEncrypt(cek, iv, contentBytes, ca.keyBits, CmsError, "cms/bad-input");
   var eci = b.sequence([b.oid(O(contentType)), b.sequence([b.oid(O(ca.oid)), b.octetString(iv)]), b.contextPrimitive(0, enc)]);
   return b.sequence([b.integer(BigInt(_envelopedVersion(recips, false))), b.setOf(riNodes), eci]);
 }
@@ -580,7 +614,7 @@ var AUTH_ENVELOPED_FORBIDDEN = {
   why: "authAttrs must not carry the message-digest attribute in an AuthEnvelopedData: its value is the unencrypted hash of the plaintext, which enables content tracking and confirmation of a guessed plaintext (RFC 5083 sec. 2.1, sec. 5)",
 };
 
-function _authEnvelopedData(contentBytes, cek, ca, contentType, opts, riNodes, recips) {
+async function _authEnvelopedData(contentBytes, contentStream, cek, ca, contentType, opts, riNodes, recips) {
   var nonce = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(12);
   var authAttrsDer = null, aad = Buffer.alloc(0);
   // RFC 5083 sec. 2.1: authAttrs MUST be present when the content type is not id-data. Emitting an
@@ -597,7 +631,15 @@ function _authEnvelopedData(contentBytes, cek, ca, contentType, opts, riNodes, r
   // A 16-octet (128-bit) GCM tag, the strongest ICV and what OpenSSL emits, so the message
   // interops across OpenSSL 3.5 / 4.x. The aes-ICVlen (16) is carried explicitly (RFC 5084 sec. 3.2
   // omits it only when it equals the DEFAULT 12); it MUST equal the mac octet length (M42).
-  var g = _gcmEncrypt(cek, nonce, contentBytes, aad, ca.keyBits, 16);
+  // A streamed plaintext runs through the GCM cipher incrementally; the tag is produced at final() over the
+  // same bytes, so the ciphertext + tag equal the one-shot form for the same plaintext and AAD.
+  var g;
+  if (contentStream) {
+    var r = await _encStream({ algNode: "aes-" + ca.keyBits + "-gcm", key: cek, iv: nonce, aad: aad, authTagLength: 16 }, contentStream);
+    g = { ct: r.ciphertext, tag: r.tag };
+  } else {
+    g = _gcmEncrypt(cek, nonce, contentBytes, aad, ca.keyBits, 16);
+  }
   var eci = b.sequence([b.oid(O(contentType)), b.sequence([b.oid(O(ca.oid)), _gcmParams(nonce, 16)]), b.contextPrimitive(0, g.ct)]);
   var kids = [b.integer(0n), b.setOf(riNodes), eci];
   if (authAttrsDer) kids.push(authAttrsDer);
@@ -616,7 +658,7 @@ function _authEnvelopedData(contentBytes, cek, ca, contentType, opts, riNodes, r
 var _ENCRYPTED_DATA_CEK_KEYS = { cek: 1 };
 var _ENCRYPTED_DATA_PW_KEYS = { password: 1, iterations: 1, salt: 1, prf: 1 };
 
-function _encryptedData(contentBytes, desc, ca, contentType, opts, cek) {
+async function _encryptedData(contentBytes, contentStream, desc, ca, contentType, opts, cek) {
   if (ca.aead) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "EncryptedData supports only CBC content encryption");
   // An EncryptedData carries no RecipientInfos at all, so nothing here reads a per-recipient
   // default. This branch returns before the recipient loop, so it answers for them itself.
@@ -638,17 +680,19 @@ function _encryptedData(contentBytes, desc, ca, contentType, opts, cek) {
     if (encKey.length !== ca.keyBits / 8) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the supplied cek length does not match " + opts.contentEncryptionAlgorithm);
     contentAlgNode = b.sequence([b.oid(O(ca.oid)), b.octetString(iv)]);
   } else if (desc && desc.password != null) {
-    return _encryptedDataPbes2(contentBytes, desc, ca, contentType, iv, opts);
+    return _encryptedDataPbes2(contentBytes, contentStream, desc, ca, contentType, iv, opts);
   } else {
     throw _err("cms/bad-input", "EncryptedData needs a single { cek } or { password } descriptor");
   }
-  var enc = pbes2.cbcEncrypt(encKey, iv, contentBytes, ca.keyBits, CmsError, "cms/bad-input");
+  var enc = contentStream
+    ? (await _encStream({ algNode: "aes-" + ca.keyBits + "-cbc", key: encKey, iv: iv }, contentStream)).ciphertext
+    : pbes2.cbcEncrypt(encKey, iv, contentBytes, ca.keyBits, CmsError, "cms/bad-input");
   var eci = b.sequence([b.oid(O(contentType)), contentAlgNode, b.contextPrimitive(0, enc)]);
   var inner = b.sequence([b.integer(0n), eci]);
   return _emit(inner, "encryptedData", opts);
 }
 
-function _encryptedDataPbes2(contentBytes, desc, ca, contentType, iv, opts) {
+async function _encryptedDataPbes2(contentBytes, contentStream, desc, ca, contentType, iv, opts) {
   // A string / Uint8Array password is encoded into a buffer this toolkit allocated, a credential
   // copy, so it is cleared once the derivation has consumed it. A caller-supplied Buffer is
   // borrowed and left intact.
@@ -662,7 +706,9 @@ function _encryptedDataPbes2(contentBytes, desc, ca, contentType, iv, opts) {
   var key = nodeCrypto.pbkdf2Sync(password, salt, iterations, ca.keyBits / 8, pbes2.prfNodeByName(prf, _err, "cms"));
   if (pwOwn2.owned) guard.secret.zeroize(password, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", "the password encoding");
   try {
-    var enc = pbes2.cbcEncrypt(key, iv, contentBytes, ca.keyBits, CmsError, "cms/bad-input");
+    var enc = contentStream
+      ? (await _encStream({ algNode: "aes-" + ca.keyBits + "-cbc", key: key, iv: iv }, contentStream)).ciphertext
+      : pbes2.cbcEncrypt(key, iv, contentBytes, ca.keyBits, CmsError, "cms/bad-input");
     var contentAlg = pbes2.pbes2AlgId(salt, iterations, prf, ca.oid, iv);
     var eci = b.sequence([b.oid(O(contentType)), contentAlg, b.contextPrimitive(0, enc)]);
     var inner = b.sequence([b.integer(0n), eci]);

package/lib/cms-sign.js

@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ async function _signStream(stream, signers, opts) {
     throw _err("cms/bad-input", "a streaming content cannot be signed without signed attributes: the message-digest " +
       "attribute is the streamed hash, and there is no content to sign directly (RFC 5652 sec. 5.4)");
   }
-  var list = intrinsic.isArray(signers) ? signers : [signers];
+  var list = intrinsic.isArray(signers) ? _b.reqDenseArray(signers, "the signer list") : [signers];
   if (!list.length) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "pki.cms.sign requires at least one signer");
   var eContentType = opts.eContentType ? O(opts.eContentType) : OID_DATA;
   if (eContentType === OID_PKI_DATA && list.length > 1 &&
@@ -464,14 +464,10 @@ async function _signStream(stream, signers, opts) {
   try {
     digests = await subtle.digestStream(wcNames, stream);
   } catch (e) {
-    // The engine reports malformed streamed content in its own domain; report it in this verb's domain
-    // instead, exactly as a buffered content's bad bytes are, rather than leaking the engine code. A
-    // non-byte chunk is webcrypto/data; a source whose async-iterator protocol is malformed (a
-    // non-callable next, or a factory returning a non-iterator) is webcrypto/syntax. The digest
-    // algorithm names are this module's own, so webcrypto/syntax here is never an algorithm fault.
-    if (e && e.code === "webcrypto/data") throw _err("cms/bad-input", "a streamed content chunk is not a byte source", e);
-    if (e && e.code === "webcrypto/syntax") throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the streamed content is not a valid async iterable of byte chunks", e);
-    throw e;
+    // The engine reports malformed streamed content in its own domain; report it in this verb's via the
+    // shared guard, rather than leaking the engine code. The digest algorithm names are this module's own,
+    // so a webcrypto/syntax here is never an algorithm fault.
+    guard.bytes.translateStreamError(e, _err, "cms/bad-input");
   }
   var byName = {};
   intrinsic.forEach(digestNames, function (n, i) { byName[n] = intrinsic.bufferFrom(digests[i]); });
@@ -495,7 +491,7 @@ function _sign(content, signers, opts) {
   // the attribute-shaped-content check while the signer signs that content directly, which is the
   // very signature the stripping attack needs.
   var contentBuf = _toBuf(content, "content");
-  var list = Array.isArray(signers) ? signers : [signers];
+  var list = Array.isArray(signers) ? _b.reqDenseArray(signers, "the signer list") : [signers];
   if (!list.length) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "pki.cms.sign requires at least one signer");
   var eContentType = opts.eContentType ? O(opts.eContentType) : OID_DATA;
   // RFC 5272 sec. 3.2: "If the request key is used for signing, there MUST be only

package/lib/cms-verify.js

@@ -743,14 +743,10 @@ async function _resolveContentDigests(parsed, streamSource) {
   try {
     ds = await subtle.digestStream(intrinsic.map(names, function (n) { return DIGEST_HASH[n]; }), streamSource);
   } catch (e) {
-    // The engine reports malformed streamed content in its own domain; report it in this verb's domain
-    // instead, exactly as a buffered content's bad bytes are, rather than leaking the engine code. A
-    // non-byte chunk is webcrypto/data; a source whose async-iterator protocol is malformed (a
-    // non-callable next, or a factory returning a non-iterator) is webcrypto/syntax. The digest
-    // algorithm names are this module's own, so webcrypto/syntax here is never an algorithm fault.
-    if (e && e.code === "webcrypto/data") throw _err("cms/bad-input", "a streamed content chunk is not a byte source", e);
-    if (e && e.code === "webcrypto/syntax") throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the streamed content is not a valid async iterable of byte chunks", e);
-    throw e;
+    // The engine reports malformed streamed content in its own domain; report it in this verb's via the
+    // shared guard, rather than leaking the engine code. The digest algorithm names are this module's own,
+    // so a webcrypto/syntax here is never an algorithm fault.
+    guard.bytes.translateStreamError(e, _err, "cms/bad-input");
   }
   var byName = {};
   intrinsic.forEach(names, function (n, i) { byName[n] = intrinsic.bufferFrom(ds[i]); });
@@ -1252,6 +1248,10 @@ var countersign = cmsSign.countersign;
  * (AES key wrap). For EncryptedData (no RecipientInfos), pass a single non-array `{ cek }` or
  * `{ password }` descriptor. The default AES-256-GCM content encryption produces an
  * authenticated AuthEnvelopedData; a CBC choice produces an unauthenticated EnvelopedData.
+ * `content` is a byte source (a `Buffer`, typed array, `DataView`, or `ArrayBuffer`) OR an async
+ * iterable of byte chunks. An async iterable is streamed through the content cipher incrementally, so
+ * a large plaintext is never buffered whole; the ciphertext is assembled before the DER is emitted, and
+ * the emitted message is byte-for-byte what the buffered form of the same plaintext would produce.
  * Malformed input throws a typed `CmsError`.
  *
  * @opts contentEncryptionAlgorithm `"aes-256-gcm"` (default, AuthEnvelopedData) / `"aes-128-gcm"` / `"aes-256-cbc"` / `"aes-128-cbc"` (EnvelopedData).

package/lib/guard-bytes.js

@@ -69,6 +69,24 @@ var _Map = intrinsic.Map;
 // Appended by index rather than through `push`, so the growth reads no prototype method at all.
 function _append(arr, v) { _defineProperty(arr, arr.length, { value: v, writable: true, enumerable: true, configurable: true }); }
 
+// The array's OWN element indices below `length`, the positions it actually holds rather than the ones
+// a read resolves. A hole reads through the prototype chain, so enumerating what reads resolve would
+// materialize an inherited index -- a polluted `Array.prototype[i]` among them -- as an own element on
+// the copy, importing a value the array never held. Copying own indices alone leaves the hole a hole,
+// so the caller-array density check the verbs apply sees the original sparsity and refuses it, rather
+// than the copy silently answering with a prototype-supplied element.
+function _ownArrayIndices(v, n) {
+  var keys = _ownKeys(v);
+  var out = [];
+  for (var j = 0; j < keys.length; j++) {
+    var k = keys[j];
+    if (typeof k !== "string") continue;
+    var ix = k >>> 0;
+    if (_String(ix) === k && ix !== 0xFFFFFFFF && ix < n) _append(out, k);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
 // isByteSource(x) -> boolean: is this one of the four forms the toolkit calls bytes?
 //
 // A Buffer, any typed-array view, a DataView, or a bare ArrayBuffer. Exported so a door deciding
@@ -111,6 +129,20 @@ function asyncStreamOf(x) {
   return stream;
 }
 
+// A streamed content driven through the engine's digestStream / encryptStream reports a malformed chunk
+// or iterator in the ENGINE's domain: a non-byte chunk is webcrypto/data, and a malformed async-iterator
+// protocol (a non-callable next, or a factory returning a non-iterator) is webcrypto/syntax. Rethrow both
+// in the CALLER's domain through its typed factory E, so the public verb keeps its own <ns>/bad-input
+// contract for malformed streamed content rather than leaking the engine code; a caller's own next()
+// fault (any other error) is rethrown unchanged. E(code, msg, cause) is the caller's error factory. Always
+// throws. The digest / cipher algorithm names each verb passes are its own, so webcrypto/syntax here is
+// never an algorithm fault.
+function translateStreamError(e, E, code) {
+  if (e && e.code === "webcrypto/data") throw E(code, "a streamed content chunk is not a byte source", e);
+  if (e && e.code === "webcrypto/syntax") throw E(code, "the streamed content is not a valid async iterable of byte chunks", e);
+  throw e;
+}
+
 // Is this value a byte store, asked of the internal slot rather than the prototype?
 //
 // `v instanceof ArrayBuffer` answers what a value inherits from, which is a different question
@@ -822,20 +854,27 @@ function _deep(v, ErrorClass, code, label, cap, depth, collect) {
   }
   if (_isArray(v)) {
     var arr = [];
-    // The indices a read on the array resolves, rather than a count from zero to `length`. An
-    // array is sparse whenever a caller sets a high index or assigns `length`, and
-    // `[].length = 4e9` is one statement: walking to `length` then does four billion iterations
-    // for an array holding nothing, inside a guard whose job includes keeping a caller's argument
-    // from costing unbounded work. Copying the indices that resolve costs what the array actually
-    // holds. `length` is carried across afterwards so trailing holes survive and the copy measures
-    // the same.
+    // The indices a read on the array resolves, rather than a count from zero to `length`. An array is
+    // sparse whenever a caller sets a high index or assigns `length`, and `[].length = 4e9` is one
+    // statement: walking to `length` then does four billion iterations for an array holding nothing,
+    // inside a guard whose job includes keeping a caller's argument from costing unbounded work. Copying
+    // the indices it actually holds costs what it holds; `length` is carried across afterwards so trailing
+    // holes survive and the copy measures the same.
     //
-    // Asked of guard-identifier, which owns the same question for names. Its own keys are not the
-    // answer: an array consults its prototype for a hole, so a length-one signer list holding its
-    // only signer on its prototype reports no own index while every consumer reads one element.
-    // Copying the own keys alone handed the verb an empty list.
+    // OWN indices only, and refuse an index a read resolves through the PROTOTYPE. An array reads its
+    // holes through the prototype chain, so an inherited in-range index -- a polluted `Array.prototype[i]`,
+    // or one a hostile prototype supplies -- is a value the caller never placed on the array. Materializing
+    // it would import it; leaving it a hole would let a verb's map silently skip an element the array
+    // appears to hold. Neither is safe, so the copy refuses it, once, for every argument the module copies,
+    // rather than each verb having to. A GENUINE hole -- own-absent AND prototype-absent -- is preserved,
+    // so an ordinary sparse array round-trips unchanged and the per-verb density check on a list that must
+    // be dense still refuses that. `readableIndices` walks own + inherited in-range indices; when it holds
+    // one the array does not own, an in-range index came from the prototype.
     var indexE = function (c, m) { return _raise(ErrorClass, c, m); };
-    var indices = identifier.readableIndices(v, indexE, code, label);
+    var indices = _ownArrayIndices(v, v.length);
+    if (identifier.readableIndices(v, indexE, code, label).length !== indices.length) {
+      throw _raise(ErrorClass, code, label + " has an in-range index supplied by its prototype rather than the array itself; a list resolved through the prototype chain is refused");
+    }
     // An accessor is refused among the elements for the reason it is refused among the names:
     // reading it once and writing what it returned as plain data leaves the later check nothing
     // to find, since it sees a value and cannot tell an accessor was ever there. The refusal
@@ -1088,6 +1127,6 @@ function fixedCall(ErrorClass, code, args, body) {
 // call, so a writable export would let a caller replace the check rather than pass it.
 module.exports = intrinsic.freeze({
   view: view, source: source, snapshot: snapshot, snapshotSource: snapshotSource,
-  isByteSource: isByteSource, asyncStreamOf: asyncStreamOf, lengthOf: lengthOf, outputView: outputView,
+  isByteSource: isByteSource, asyncStreamOf: asyncStreamOf, translateStreamError: translateStreamError, lengthOf: lengthOf, outputView: outputView,
   snapshotDeep: snapshotDeep, fixArguments: fixArguments, fixedCall: fixedCall,
 });

package/lib/pki-build.js

@@ -593,6 +593,35 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
     if (guard.bytes.isByteSource(v)) return guard.bytes.snapshotSource(v, ErrorClass, ctx.prefix + "/bad-input", what);
     throw E("bad-input", what + " must be a DER Buffer");
   }
+  // A caller-supplied array a builder is about to map over: reject a sparse hole or a nullish entry HERE
+  // as a typed error. Array.prototype.map SKIPS a hole, which would otherwise reach Buffer.concat as a
+  // native ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE and, on a huge sparse length, traverse the empty slots. Test OWN-property
+  // presence at each index BEFORE reading it: a bare `list[i]` on a hole walks the prototype chain, so a
+  // polluted `Array.prototype[i]` would read as a value and slip a hole past the check while map still
+  // skips it. Fails fast at the first bad index, so the length alone can never force a walk. Returns the
+  // validated dense array for the caller to map normally.
+  function reqDenseArray(list, what) {
+    if (!_isArray(list)) throw E("bad-input", what + " must be an array");
+    var n = list.length;
+    for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+      if (!intrinsic.hasOwn(list, i)) throw E("bad-input", what + "[" + i + "] is missing (a sparse array is not allowed)");
+      var v = list[i];
+      if (v === undefined || v === null) throw E("bad-input", what + "[" + i + "] is missing (a nullish array entry is not allowed)");
+    }
+    return list;
+  }
+  // A caller-supplied DER a builder validates with a PEM-accepting parser and then embeds verbatim with
+  // b.raw. Those parsers unwrap PEM from a byte source, so a PEM-armored input (a Buffer straight from
+  // fs.readFileSync) passes the parse, but b.raw embeds the raw ASCII armor -- which the enclosing
+  // structure's own parse rejects only later, after protection is computed, and with the wrong code.
+  // Require a DER SEQUENCE first (a Certificate / CRL / CSR / PKIMessage / CertReqMessages is one; PEM
+  // opens with 0x2D), so a PEM or non-DER input is a typed bad-input up front and the bytes the parse
+  // checks are the bytes embedded.
+  function reqDerSequence(v, what) {
+    var der = reqDer(v, what);
+    if (der.length === 0 || der[0] !== 0x30) throw E("bad-input", what + " must be DER (a SEQUENCE), not PEM or other bytes");
+    return der;
+  }
   // Full validation of an embedded SubjectPublicKeyInfo, walked through the parser the decoder uses.
   function assertValidSpki(spkiDer, what) {
     var node;
@@ -761,7 +790,7 @@ function makeBuilder(ctx) {
     extBasicConstraints: extBasicConstraints, pathLen: pathLen, extSki: extSki, extAki: extAki,
     extSan: extSan, extCertPolicies: extCertPolicies, ext: ext,
     spkiKeyId: spkiKeyId, skiKeyId: skiKeyId,
-    reqDer: reqDer, assertValidSpki: assertValidSpki, assertValidExtension: assertValidExtension,
+    reqDer: reqDer, reqDenseArray: reqDenseArray, reqDerSequence: reqDerSequence, assertValidSpki: assertValidSpki, assertValidExtension: assertValidExtension,
     certLikeFromSpki: certLikeFromSpki, assertSignatureVerifies: assertSignatureVerifies,
     samePublicKey: samePublicKey,
   };

package/lib/webcrypto.js

@@ -62,6 +62,15 @@ var _bufToString = intrinsic.uncurry(Buffer.prototype.toString);
 // one-shot digest needs no such capture: its single update and digest run with no suspension between.
 var _hashUpdate = intrinsic.uncurry(nodeCrypto.Hash.prototype.update);
 var _hashDigest = intrinsic.uncurry(nodeCrypto.Hash.prototype.digest);
+// The node Cipheriv instance methods, captured at load for the same reason as the hash methods above:
+// encryptStream feeds plaintext chunks through the cipher across `await` points, and a co-resident that
+// replaced Cipheriv.prototype.update while the stream was suspended between chunks could drop or alter a
+// chunk, so the emitted ciphertext would not be the encryption of the plaintext the caller streamed.
+// Calling the captured update/final keeps the ciphertext bound to the bytes the stream actually yielded.
+var _cipherUpdate = intrinsic.uncurry(nodeCrypto.Cipheriv.prototype.update);
+var _cipherFinal = intrinsic.uncurry(nodeCrypto.Cipheriv.prototype.final);
+var _cipherGetAuthTag = intrinsic.uncurry(nodeCrypto.Cipheriv.prototype.getAuthTag);
+var _cipherSetAAD = intrinsic.uncurry(nodeCrypto.Cipheriv.prototype.setAAD);
 var _bufferConcat = intrinsic.bufferConcat;
 var _bufferAlloc = intrinsic.bufferAlloc;
 var _isBuffer = intrinsic.isBuffer;
@@ -413,6 +422,46 @@ SubtleCrypto.prototype.digestStream = async function digestStream(algorithms, so
   return _map(hashes, function (h) { return _toArrayBuffer(_hashDigest(h)); });
 };
 
+// encryptStream(spec, source) -> { ciphertext, tag }. Runs the plaintext chunks of an async iterable
+// through the content cipher incrementally, assembling the ciphertext -- its definite length is needed
+// for the EnvelopedData encryptedContent OCTET STRING, and the plaintext is never held whole (the memory
+// win of streaming encrypt). Mirrors digestStream's captured-method + acquire-iterator-once discipline so
+// a chunk-boundary prototype swap cannot steer the ciphertext, and drives the iterator's return() on any
+// exit. spec: { algNode, key, iv, aad (optional), authTagLength (optional, AEAD -> a tag is returned) }.
+SubtleCrypto.prototype.encryptStream = async function encryptStream(spec, source) {
+  var cipher = spec.authTagLength
+    ? nodeCrypto.createCipheriv(spec.algNode, spec.key, spec.iv, { authTagLength: spec.authTagLength })
+    : nodeCrypto.createCipheriv(spec.algNode, spec.key, spec.iv);
+  if (spec.aad && spec.aad.length) _cipherSetAAD(cipher, spec.aad);
+  var acquire = source == null ? undefined : source[_asyncIterator];
+  if (typeof acquire !== "function") {
+    throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/syntax", "encryptStream: source must be an async iterable of byte chunks");
+  }
+  var iterator = _apply(acquire, source, _NO_ARGS);
+  var out = [];
+  try {
+    var nextMethod = iterator == null ? undefined : iterator.next;
+    if (typeof nextMethod !== "function") {
+      throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/syntax", "encryptStream: source must be an async iterable of byte chunks");
+    }
+    for (;;) {
+      var step = await _apply(nextMethod, iterator, _NO_ARGS);
+      if (step && step.done) break;
+      var buf = _toBuf(step == null ? undefined : step.value, "encryptStream chunk");
+      var piece = _cipherUpdate(cipher, buf);
+      if (piece && piece.length) out[out.length] = piece;
+    }
+  } catch (e) {
+    try {
+      var ret = iterator == null ? undefined : iterator.return;
+      if (typeof ret === "function") await _apply(ret, iterator, _NO_ARGS);
+    } catch (_r) { /* cleanup is best-effort */ }
+    throw e;
+  }
+  out[out.length] = _cipherFinal(cipher);
+  return { ciphertext: _bufferConcat(out), tag: spec.authTagLength ? _cipherGetAuthTag(cipher) : null };
+};
+
 SubtleCrypto.prototype.generateKey = async function generateKey(algorithm, extractable, keyUsages) {
   var alg = _normalizeAlg(algorithm, "generateKey");
   // Before the partition below, not only in the CryptoKey constructor: the asymmetric branch splits

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.5.34",
+  "version": "0.5.36",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:849173ca-4a17-451d-91be-1f2d75d83f00",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:ad664181-2b29-47c9-9841-12e12097a2ea",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-08-29T10:04:44.768Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-08-29T23:29:58.331Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.34",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.36",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.5.34",
+      "version": "0.5.36",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.5.34",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.5.36",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.34",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.36",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]