@blamejs/pki 0.5.22 → 0.5.24

package/lib/schema-pkix.js

@@ -17,6 +17,43 @@ var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
 var constants = require("./constants");
 var schema = require("./schema-engine");
 var guard = require("./guard-all");
+var intrinsic = require("./guard-intrinsic");
+// Own-key membership through an operation taken at load. Written out, the question reads two
+// replaceable properties to answer one thing, and here it decides which version numbers a format
+// accepts -- shared by every format module, so one admitted name widens all of them at once.
+var _hasOwn = intrinsic.hasOwn;
+// The rest of the operations this module decides with, taken at load for the same reason. What
+// these factories produce is what a consumer compares an identity against -- a certificate's
+// subject alternative names against an enrollment's own, a distinguished name against an issuer's
+// -- so a name that traversal, folding or a byte copy invents here is a name the encoded structure
+// never carried, and the comparison downstream still answers true.
+var _forEach = intrinsic.forEach;
+var _map = intrinsic.map;
+var _push = intrinsic.push;
+var _join = intrinsic.join;
+var _stringify = intrinsic.stringify;
+var _String = intrinsic.String;
+var _isBuffer = intrinsic.isBuffer;
+var _bufferFrom = intrinsic.bufferFrom;
+var _bufferConcat = intrinsic.bufferConcat;
+var _assign = intrinsic.assign;
+var _subarray = intrinsic.subarray;
+var _strIndexOf = intrinsic.stringIndexOf;
+var _bufToString = intrinsic.uncurry(Buffer.prototype.toString);
+var _strSlice = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.slice);
+var _charAt = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.charAt);
+var _strReplace = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.replace);
+var _split = intrinsic.uncurry(String.prototype.split);
+var _reExec = intrinsic.uncurry(RegExp.prototype.exec);
+var _reTest = intrinsic.uncurry(RegExp.prototype.test);
+var _create = intrinsic.create;
+var _isUint8Array = intrinsic.types.isUint8Array;
+var _bigIntToString = intrinsic.bigIntToString;
+var _weakGet = intrinsic.weakGet;
+var _weakSet = intrinsic.weakSet;
+var _WeakMapI = intrinsic.WeakMap;
+var _arrayFrom = Array.from;
+var _getUTCFullYear = intrinsic.uncurry(Date.prototype.getUTCFullYear);
 // ct is a leaf format module (requires only the codec / oid / constants / error
 // core, never pkix) so the SCT-list extension VALUE decoder registers here as a
 // registry row, not a switch. The one-directional edge keeps the layering acyclic.
@@ -43,10 +80,10 @@ function pemDecode(text, label, PemError) {
   text = guard.text.decode(text, constants.LIMITS.PEM_MAX_BYTES, PemError, {
     charset: "latin1", tooLarge: "pem/too-large", badInput: "pem/bad-input", label: "PEM input",
   });
-  var m = PEM_RE.exec(text);
+  var m = _reExec(PEM_RE, text);
   if (!m) throw new PemError("pem/no-block", "no PEM block found");
-  if (label && m[1] !== label) throw new PemError("pem/label-mismatch", "expected " + JSON.stringify(label) + " block, got " + JSON.stringify(m[1]));
-  var b64 = m[2].replace(/[\r\n\t ]+/g, "");
+  if (label && m[1] !== label) throw new PemError("pem/label-mismatch", "expected " + _stringify(label) + " block, got " + _stringify(m[1]));
+  var b64 = _strReplace(m[2], /[\r\n\t ]+/g, "");
   // Strict canonical base64 (RFC 4648 sec. 3.5) via the shared encoding guard.
   return guard.encoding.base64(b64, null, function (c, msg) { return new PemError(c, msg); }, "pem/bad-base64", "PEM base64 body");
 }
@@ -65,15 +102,15 @@ function pemDecodeAll(text, label, PemError) {
   var re = /-----BEGIN ([A-Z0-9 ]+)-----([\s\S]*?)-----END \1-----/g;
   var blocks = [];
   var lastEnd = 0, m;
-  while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
-    if (/\S/.test(text.slice(lastEnd, m.index))) throw new PemError("pem/explanatory-text", "explanatory text is not permitted around PEM blocks (RFC 8555 sec. 9.1)");
-    if (m[1] !== label) throw new PemError("pem/label-mismatch", "expected " + JSON.stringify(label) + " block, got " + JSON.stringify(m[1]));
-    var b64 = m[2].replace(/[\r\n\t ]+/g, "");
-    blocks.push(guard.encoding.base64(b64, null, function (c, msg) { return new PemError(c, msg); }, "pem/bad-base64", "PEM base64 body"));
+  while ((m = _reExec(re, text)) !== null) {
+    if (_reTest(/\S/, _strSlice(text, lastEnd, m.index))) throw new PemError("pem/explanatory-text", "explanatory text is not permitted around PEM blocks (RFC 8555 sec. 9.1)");
+    if (m[1] !== label) throw new PemError("pem/label-mismatch", "expected " + _stringify(label) + " block, got " + _stringify(m[1]));
+    var b64 = _strReplace(m[2], /[\r\n\t ]+/g, "");
+    _push(blocks, guard.encoding.base64(b64, null, function (c, msg) { return new PemError(c, msg); }, "pem/bad-base64", "PEM base64 body"));
     lastEnd = re.lastIndex;
   }
   if (blocks.length === 0) throw new PemError("pem/no-block", "no PEM block found");
-  if (/\S/.test(text.slice(lastEnd))) throw new PemError("pem/explanatory-text", "explanatory text is not permitted after the PEM chain (RFC 8555 sec. 9.1)");
+  if (_reTest(/\S/, _strSlice(text, lastEnd))) throw new PemError("pem/explanatory-text", "explanatory text is not permitted after the PEM chain (RFC 8555 sec. 9.1)");
   return blocks;
 }
 
@@ -83,14 +120,14 @@ function pemDecodeAll(text, label, PemError) {
 // an embedded "-----" or newline) would emit armor pemDecode itself rejects
 // or corrupt the armor grammar: a config-time authoring fault, thrown here.
 function pemEncode(der, label, PemError) {
-  if (typeof label !== "string" || !/^[A-Z0-9]+( [A-Z0-9]+)*$/.test(label)) {
+  if (typeof label !== "string" || !_reTest(/^[A-Z0-9]+( [A-Z0-9]+)*$/, label)) {
     throw new PemError("pem/bad-label", "pemEncode requires an uppercase A-Z0-9 label with single spaces");
   }
   // Re-view through the byte guard: a string input would silently utf8-armor into
   // a bogus PEM, and a detached-backed Buffer would armor an empty body; both
   // fail closed (a Uint8Array / Buffer of real DER re-views cleanly).
   var buf = guard.bytes.view(der, PemError, "pem/bad-input", "pemEncode DER input");
-  var b64 = buf.toString("base64").replace(/(.{64})/g, "$1\n").replace(/\n$/, "");
+  var b64 = _strReplace(_strReplace(_bufToString(buf, "base64"), /(.{64})/g, "$1\n"), /\n$/, "");
   return "-----BEGIN " + label + "-----\n" + b64 + "\n-----END " + label + "-----\n";
 }
 
@@ -99,7 +136,7 @@ function pemEncode(der, label, PemError) {
 // Uint8Array is taken as bytes. opts: { pemLabel, PemError, ErrorClass, prefix }.
 function coerceToDer(input, opts) {
   if (typeof input === "string") return pemDecode(input, opts.pemLabel, opts.PemError);
-  if (Buffer.isBuffer(input) || input instanceof Uint8Array) {
+  if (_isBuffer(input) || _isUint8Array(input)) {
     // Route the DER Buffer / Uint8Array through the shared byte guard so a
     // detached backing store fails closed here for every format that composes
     // this boundary (x509/crl/csr/pkcs8/cms/pkcs12), not per-format.
@@ -115,8 +152,8 @@ function coerceToDer(input, opts) {
 // leading tag+length bytes are non-printable, so a non-SEQUENCE DER (a bare
 // SET / INTEGER) is not misrouted here; it decodes and fails closed structurally.
 function _isPemArmor(buf) {
-  var head = buf.slice(0, 4096).toString("latin1");
-  var idx = head.indexOf("-----BEGIN");
+  var head = _bufToString(_subarray(buf, 0, 4096), "latin1");
+  var idx = _strIndexOf(head, "-----BEGIN");
   if (idx === -1) return false;
   for (var i = 0; i < idx; i++) {
     var c = buf[i];
@@ -138,7 +175,7 @@ function decodeRoot(der, opts) {
   // strictness verdict included.
   try { return asn1.decode(der, opts.ber ? { ber: true } : undefined); }
   catch (e) {
-    throw new opts.ErrorClass(opts.prefix + "/bad-der", (opts.what || "input") + " DER did not decode: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)), e);
+    throw new opts.ErrorClass(opts.prefix + "/bad-der", (opts.what || "input") + " DER did not decode: " + ((e && e.message) || _String(e)), e);
   }
 }
 
@@ -173,8 +210,8 @@ function makeNS(prefix, ErrorClass, oidModule) {
 // version is rejected at the leaf (asn1/*).
 function versionReader(ns, accept) {
   return schema.decode(function (n) {
-    var key = asn1.read.integer(n).toString();
-    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(accept, key)) return accept[key];
+    var key = _bigIntToString(asn1.read.integer(n));
+    if (_hasOwn(accept, key)) return accept[key];
     throw ns.E(ns.prefix + "/bad-version", "unsupported version " + key);
   });
 }
@@ -332,7 +369,7 @@ function attrValueToString(ns) {
     try { s = asn1.read.string(node); }
     catch (e) {
       if (!e || (e.code !== "asn1/expected-string" && e.code !== "asn1/expected-primitive")) {
-        throw ns.E(ns.prefix + "/bad-atv", "malformed string in attribute value: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+        throw ns.E(ns.prefix + "/bad-atv", "malformed string in attribute value: " + ((e && e.message) || _String(e)));
       }
       // asn1.read.string does not read NumericString, and that is deliberate: a value that returns a plain
       // string joins the RFC 5280 sec. 7.1 name-comparison identity class, and NumericString is not a
@@ -342,11 +379,11 @@ function attrValueToString(ns) {
       // surfacing it in the type-distinct RFC 4514 hex form, which keeps it out of that identity class.
       if (node.tagClass === "universal" && node.tagNumber === asn1.TAGS.NUMERIC_STRING) {
         try { asn1.read.numericString(node); }
-        catch (e2) { throw ns.E(ns.prefix + "/bad-atv", "malformed NumericString in attribute value: " + ((e2 && e2.message) || String(e2))); }
+        catch (e2) { throw ns.E(ns.prefix + "/bad-atv", "malformed NumericString in attribute value: " + ((e2 && e2.message) || _String(e2))); }
       }
-      return "#" + node.bytes.toString("hex");
+      return "#" + _bufToString(node.bytes, "hex");
     }
-    if (s.charAt(0) === "#" || s.charAt(0) === "\\") return "\\" + s;
+    if (_charAt(s, 0) === "#" || _charAt(s, 0) === "\\") return "\\" + s;
     return s;
   }, function (value) {
     // encode: a leading '\' escapes the next character (the decode's escape of a
@@ -356,9 +393,9 @@ function attrValueToString(ns) {
     // the first invalid character and would emit truncated bytes. Any other
     // string encodes as UTF8String (the decode does not preserve the original
     // string type, so this is the canonical re-encoding, not a byte-exact one).
-    if (typeof value === "string" && value.charAt(0) === "\\") return asn1.build.utf8(value.slice(1));
-    if (typeof value === "string" && value.charAt(0) === "#") {
-      var hex = value.slice(1);
+    if (typeof value === "string" && _charAt(value, 0) === "\\") return asn1.build.utf8(_strSlice(value, 1));
+    if (typeof value === "string" && _charAt(value, 0) === "#") {
+      var hex = _strSlice(value, 1);
       if (hex.length === 0) {
         throw ns.E(ns.prefix + "/bad-atv", "a #hex attribute value must be a non-empty even run of hex digits (RFC 4514 sec. 2.4)");
       }
@@ -390,8 +427,8 @@ var _escapeDnValue = guard.name.escapeDnValue;
 // the semantic string and then rendered with the full escape set.
 function _dnDisplayValue(v) {
   if (typeof v !== "string") return v;
-  if (v.charAt(0) === "#") return v;
-  return _escapeDnValue(v.charAt(0) === "\\" ? v.slice(1) : v);
+  if (_charAt(v, 0) === "#") return v;
+  return _escapeDnValue(_charAt(v, 0) === "\\" ? _strSlice(v, 1) : v);
 }
 
 // time(ns): the RFC 5280 Time production under its profile encoding rule
@@ -410,7 +447,7 @@ function time(ns) {
   return schema.decode(function (n, ctx) {
     var d = base.fn(n, ctx);
     if (n.tagNumber === asn1.TAGS.GENERALIZED_TIME) {
-      var y = d.getUTCFullYear();
+      var y = _getUTCFullYear(d);
       if (y >= 1950 && y < 2050) {
         throw ctx.E(ctx.prefix + "/bad-time", "a date through 2049 must be encoded as UTCTime, not GeneralizedTime (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5)");
       }
@@ -448,16 +485,19 @@ function name(ns, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   function nameBuild(m) {
     var rdns = [], parts = [];
-    m.items.forEach(function (rdnItem) {
+    // Through the captured traversal: `rdns` is the parsed subject a consumer reads a common name
+    // out of, so a replaced Array.prototype.forEach or push could drop the name the certificate
+    // carries and seat one it does not.
+    _forEach(m.items, function (rdnItem) {
       var atvs = [], atvParts = [];
-      rdnItem.value.items.forEach(function (atvItem) {
+      _forEach(rdnItem.value.items, function (atvItem) {
         var a = atvItem.value.result; // atvItem.value = the atv seq-match; .result = its build result
-        atvs.push(a);
-        var label = (a.name && DN_SHORT[a.name]) || a.name || a.type;
-        atvParts.push(label + "=" + _dnDisplayValue(a.value));
+        _push(atvs, a);
+        var label = (a.name && _hasOwn(DN_SHORT, a.name) && DN_SHORT[a.name]) || a.name || a.type;
+        _push(atvParts, label + "=" + _dnDisplayValue(a.value));
       });
-      rdns.push(atvs);
-      parts.push(atvParts.join("+"));
+      _push(rdns, atvs);
+      _push(parts, _join(atvParts, "+"));
     });
     // `dn` is a DISPLAY string, and its spelling is `openssl x509 -subject`: the RDNs in the
     // certificate's own order, joined by ", ". That is deliberately not the RFC 4514 / LDAP
@@ -468,7 +508,7 @@ function name(ns, opts) {
     // guard.name.dnEqual compares the DER under RFC 5280 sec. 7.1, and `bytes` below carries the raw
     // Name DER for a consumer that needs the exact octets (the EST re-enroll subject MUST). Every
     // renderer in the toolkit uses this one spelling, so a certificate has one dn whichever parsed it.
-    return { rdns: rdns, dn: parts.join(", "), bytes: opts.implicitTag != null ? asn1.sequenceTlv(m.node) : m.node.bytes };
+    return { rdns: rdns, dn: _join(parts, ", "), bytes: opts.implicitTag != null ? asn1.sequenceTlv(m.node) : m.node.bytes };
   }
   if (opts.implicitTag != null) {
     return schema.implicitSeqOf(opts.implicitTag, relativeDistinguishedName(ns), {
@@ -556,8 +596,13 @@ function rawNonEmptySequence(ns, opts) {
 // (shared with the OCSP revoked-status decoder, which surfaces the same numeric code).
 var CRL_REASON_NAMES = constants.NAMES.CRL_REASON;
 
-var GN_CONSTRUCTED = { 0: 1, 3: 1, 4: 1, 5: 1 };
-var GN_IA5 = { 1: 1, 2: 1, 6: 1 };
+// Which GeneralName alternatives are constructed, and which carry an IA5String. Both tables answer
+// off a tag number the encoded value supplies, and both decide which validation an alternative
+// gets, so neither may inherit: with an ordinary prototype a planted numeric property routes a tag
+// down another alternative's arm, and a dNSName then reaches the IA5 arm's control-byte reject as
+// a constructed value, or misses it altogether.
+var GN_CONSTRUCTED = _assign(_create(null), { 0: 1, 3: 1, 4: 1, 5: 1 });
+var GN_IA5 = _assign(_create(null), { 1: 1, 2: 1, 6: 1 });
 function generalName(ns, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   var code = opts.code || (ns.prefix + "/bad-general-name");
@@ -597,7 +642,7 @@ function generalName(ns, opts) {
         // 7-bit IA5, no C0/DEL control byte. An embedded NUL/control in a
         // dNSName/rfc822Name/URI enables a name-truncation bypass (CVE-2009-2408).
         guard.name.assertPrintableIa5(n.content, ctx.E, code, "GeneralName [" + t + "]");
-        if (decodeValue) value = n.content.toString("latin1");
+        if (decodeValue) value = _bufToString(n.content, "latin1");
       } else if (t === 7) {
         if (subtreeBase) {
           if (n.content.length !== 8 && n.content.length !== 32) throw ctx.E(code, "GeneralName iPAddress [7] subtree base must be an 8- or 32-octet address+mask (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.10)");
@@ -606,7 +651,7 @@ function generalName(ns, opts) {
         }
         // n.content is proven non-null here (the primitive-form guard above
         // threw on a constructed node); copy the octets out.
-        if (decodeValue) value = Buffer.concat([n.content]);
+        if (decodeValue) value = _bufferConcat([n.content]);
       } else if (t === 8) {
         var regId;
         try { regId = asn1.decodeOidContent(n.content); }
@@ -637,7 +682,10 @@ function generalNames(ns, opts) {
   // decodeValue / subtreeBase thread through to each element (the path
   // validator's constraint matcher passes decodeValue:true).
   var gn = generalName(ns, { code: code, decodeValue: opts.decodeValue === true, subtreeBase: opts.subtreeBase === true });
-  function build(m) { return { names: m.items.map(function (it) { return it.value; }), bytes: m.node.bytes }; }
+  // Through the captured traversal: the names this yields are what a consumer compares an identity
+  // against -- a certificate's subject alternative names against an enrollment's own -- and a
+  // replaced Array.prototype.map could present a name the encoded GeneralNames does not carry.
+  function build(m) { return { names: _map(m.items, function (it) { return it.value; }), bytes: m.node.bytes }; }
   if (opts.implicitTag != null) {
     return schema.implicitSeqOf(opts.implicitTag, gn, { min: 1, code: code, what: opts.what || "GeneralNames", build: build });
   }
@@ -662,7 +710,7 @@ function generalNames(ns, opts) {
 function distributionPointName(ns, node, code) {
   if (node && node.tagClass === "context" && node.tagNumber === 0) {
     var gns = schema.walk(generalNames(ns, { implicitTag: 0, code: code, what: "DistributionPointName fullName" }), node, ns).result;
-    return { kind: "fullName", names: gns.names.map(function (n) { return n.bytes; }) };
+    return { kind: "fullName", names: _map(gns.names, function (n) { return n.bytes; }) };
   }
   if (node && node.tagClass === "context" && node.tagNumber === 1) {
     // In [1] IMPLICIT RelativeDistinguishedName the context tag replaces the
@@ -687,14 +735,14 @@ function distributionPointName(ns, node, code) {
 //
 // `E(code, message, cause)` is the caller's typed error factory, so each boundary keeps its own
 // domain while the RULE stays single-homed.
-var _KU_DECODER = new WeakMap();       // one decoder table per namespace, built on first use
+var _KU_DECODER = new _WeakMapI();     // one decoder table per namespace, built on first use
 function keyUsageOf(ns, cert, E, code, label) {
   var exts = (cert && cert.extensions) || [];
   var want = ns.oid.byName("keyUsage");
   for (var i = 0; i < exts.length; i++) {
     if (exts[i].oid !== want || exts[i].value == null) continue;
-    var dec = _KU_DECODER.get(ns);
-    if (!dec) { dec = certExtensionDecoders(ns).byOid[want]; _KU_DECODER.set(ns, dec); }
+    var dec = _weakGet(_KU_DECODER, ns);
+    if (!dec) { dec = certExtensionDecoders(ns).byOid[want]; _weakSet(_KU_DECODER, ns, dec); }
     try { return dec(exts[i].value); }
     catch (e) { throw E(code, "the " + label + " keyUsage extension is malformed", e); }
   }
@@ -760,7 +808,7 @@ function assertPolicyQualifiers(qNode, fail) {
   if (qNode.tagClass !== "universal" || qNode.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !qNode.children || !qNode.children.length) {
     fail("policyQualifiers must be a non-empty SEQUENCE (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.4)");
   }
-  qNode.children.forEach(function (pq) {
+  _forEach(qNode.children, function (pq) {
     if (pq.tagClass !== "universal" || pq.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !pq.children || pq.children.length !== 2) {
       fail("policyQualifiers element must be a PolicyQualifierInfo SEQUENCE { policyQualifierId, qualifier } (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.4)");
     }
@@ -781,7 +829,7 @@ function assertPolicyQualifiers(qNode, fail) {
 // octets, so `.length` (UTF-16 units) or a byte count would misjudge a valid value. Exported so
 // every layer that reports the bound counts it identically instead of keeping its own copy.
 var DISPLAY_TEXT_MAX = 200;
-function displayTextChars(str) { return Array.from(str).length; }
+function displayTextChars(str) { return _arrayFrom(str).length; }
 
 // @internal
 // userNoticeTexts(qualifier) -- the DisplayText values of a decoded UserNotice qualifier, as
@@ -798,7 +846,9 @@ function displayTextChars(str) { return Array.from(str).length; }
 var _DISPLAY_TEXT_TAGS = null;
 function _isDisplayTextNode(n) {
   if (!_DISPLAY_TEXT_TAGS) {
-    _DISPLAY_TEXT_TAGS = {};
+    // Indexed by a tag number the encoded value supplies, so it holds no prototype: an inherited
+    // numeric name would make an unregistered universal tag read as a DisplayText alternative.
+    _DISPLAY_TEXT_TAGS = _create(null);
     _DISPLAY_TEXT_TAGS[_T.IA5_STRING] = 1; _DISPLAY_TEXT_TAGS[_T.VISIBLE_STRING] = 1;
     _DISPLAY_TEXT_TAGS[_T.BMP_STRING] = 1; _DISPLAY_TEXT_TAGS[_T.UTF8_STRING] = 1;
   }
@@ -831,9 +881,9 @@ function _dtEntry(field, node) {
 function _noticeNumbers(node) {
   if (!node || node.tagClass !== "universal" || node.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !node.children) return null;
   var nums = [], ok = true;
-  node.children.forEach(function (n) {
+  _forEach(node.children, function (n) {
     // allow:swallow-unverified a non-INTEGER member makes the whole reference undecodable, and the caller falls back
-    try { nums.push(String(asn1.read.integer(n))); } catch (_e) { ok = false; }
+    try { _push(nums, _String(asn1.read.integer(n))); } catch (_e) { ok = false; }
   });
   return ok ? nums : null;
 }
@@ -858,13 +908,13 @@ function userNoticeTexts(qualifier) {
     if (!nr.children || nr.children.length !== 2 || !_isDisplayTextNode(nr.children[0])) return [];
     var org = _dtEntry("organization", nr.children[0]);
     org.noticeNumbers = _noticeNumbers(nr.children[1]);
-    out.push(org);
+    _push(out, org);
     i++;
   }
   // explicitText [absent | last]: a DisplayText. Anything else remaining is not a UserNotice member.
   if (i < kids.length) {
     if (!_isDisplayTextNode(kids[i])) return [];
-    out.push(_dtEntry("explicitText", kids[i]));
+    _push(out, _dtEntry("explicitText", kids[i]));
     i++;
   }
   return i === kids.length ? out : [];
@@ -877,7 +927,7 @@ function _decodeHelpers(ns) {
   function decodeTop(buf, code, what) {
     var n;
     try { n = asn1.decode(buf); }
-    catch (e) { throw ns.E(code, "malformed " + what + " value: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)), e); }
+    catch (e) { throw ns.E(code, "malformed " + what + " value: " + ((e && e.message) || _String(e)), e); }
     return n;
   }
   function seqChildren(buf, code, what) {
@@ -895,7 +945,7 @@ function _decodeHelpers(ns) {
   // by an unresolved name would silently never match, treating a real extension/attribute as opaque).
   function O(nm) {
     var d = ns.oid.byName(nm);
-    if (typeof d !== "string") throw new TypeError("pki.schema.pkix: " + JSON.stringify(nm) + " is not a registered OID name");
+    if (typeof d !== "string") throw new TypeError("pki.schema.pkix: " + _stringify(nm) + " is not a registered OID name");
     return d;
   }
   return { decodeTop: decodeTop, seqChildren: seqChildren, readInt: readInt, O: O };
@@ -945,7 +995,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     // KeyUsage is a NamedBitList -- enforce the shared X.690 sec. 11.2.2 minimal-DER rule.
     schema.assertMinimalNamedBits(bs.unusedBits, bs.bytes, function (m) { throw ns.E(C, m); });
     var out = {};
-    KU_BITS.forEach(function (nm, bit) {
+    _forEach(KU_BITS, function (nm, bit) {
       var byte = bit >> 3, mask = 0x80 >> (bit & 7);
       out[nm] = byte < bs.bytes.length && (bs.bytes[byte] & mask) !== 0;
     });
@@ -966,7 +1016,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     // GeneralSubtrees is SIZE(1..MAX) -- an explicitly present but empty subtree
     // list (a0 00) absorbs no constraint and is malformed, not a no-op.
     if (!node.children || node.children.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "NameConstraints permittedSubtrees/excludedSubtrees must be a non-empty GeneralSubtrees (SIZE 1..MAX, RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.10)");
-    return node.children.map(function (st) {
+    return _map(node.children, function (st) {
       if (st.tagClass !== "universal" || st.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !st.children || st.children.length < 1) {
         throw ns.E(C, "GeneralSubtree must be a SEQUENCE { base, minimum?, maximum? }");
       }
@@ -984,7 +1034,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-name-constraints";
     var kids = seqChildren(buf, C, "NameConstraints");
     var permitted = [], excluded = [], sawP = false, sawE = false, ncLastTag = -1;
-    kids.forEach(function (k) {
+    _forEach(kids, function (k) {
       if (k.tagClass !== "context" || !k.children) throw ns.E(C, "NameConstraints fields are [0] permittedSubtrees / [1] excludedSubtrees");
       if (k.tagNumber <= ncLastTag) throw ns.E(C, "NameConstraints fields must be unique and in ascending order (DER)");
       ncLastTag = k.tagNumber;
@@ -1001,8 +1051,10 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-policy";
     var kids = seqChildren(buf, C, "CertificatePolicies");
     if (kids.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "CertificatePolicies must contain at least one PolicyInformation (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.4)");
-    var seen = {};
-    return kids.map(function (pi) {
+    // The duplicate-policy set answers off a dotted OID the encoded value supplies, so it holds no
+    // prototype: an inherited name would report a policy as already seen and reject a valid one.
+    var seen = _create(null);
+    return _map(kids, function (pi) {
       // PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { policyIdentifier, policyQualifiers
       // SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OPTIONAL }. Exactly one or two fields; a second
       // field, if present, MUST be a SEQUENCE. Extra/mis-typed fields are malformed.
@@ -1030,7 +1082,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-policy";
     var kids = seqChildren(buf, C, "PolicyMappings");
     if (kids.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "PolicyMappings must contain at least one mapping (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.5)");
-    return kids.map(function (mp) {
+    return _map(kids, function (mp) {
       if (mp.tagClass !== "universal" || mp.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !mp.children || mp.children.length !== 2) {
         throw ns.E(C, "policy mapping must be a SEQUENCE { issuerDomainPolicy, subjectDomainPolicy }");
       }
@@ -1047,7 +1099,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var kids = seqChildren(buf, C, "PolicyConstraints");
     if (kids.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "PolicyConstraints must contain at least one field (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.11)");
     var rep = null, ipm = null, pcLastTag = -1;
-    kids.forEach(function (k) {
+    _forEach(kids, function (k) {
       if (k.tagClass !== "context") throw ns.E(C, "PolicyConstraints fields are context-tagged [0]/[1]");
       if (k.tagNumber <= pcLastTag) throw ns.E(C, "PolicyConstraints fields must be unique and in ascending order (DER)");
       pcLastTag = k.tagNumber;
@@ -1093,7 +1145,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var descs = seqChildren(buf, C, "AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax");
     if (descs.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax must contain at least one AccessDescription (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1, SIZE(1..MAX))");
     var GN = generalName(ns, { decodeValue: true, code: C });
-    return descs.map(function (d) {
+    return _map(descs, function (d) {
       if (d.tagClass !== "universal" || d.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !d.children || d.children.length !== 2) {
         throw ns.E(C, "AccessDescription must be a SEQUENCE { accessMethod, accessLocation } (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1)");
       }
@@ -1110,7 +1162,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-extension-value";
     var kids = seqChildren(buf, C, "ExtKeyUsage");
     if (kids.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "ExtKeyUsage must contain at least one KeyPurposeId (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.12)");
-    return kids.map(function (k) {
+    return _map(kids, function (k) {
       try { return asn1.read.oid(k); } catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, "ExtKeyUsage KeyPurposeId must be an OBJECT IDENTIFIER", e); }
     });
   }
@@ -1121,7 +1173,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var kids = seqChildren(buf, C, "AuthorityKeyIdentifier");
     var out = { keyIdentifier: null, authorityCertIssuer: null, authorityCertSerialNumber: null };
     var lastTag = -1;
-    kids.forEach(function (k) {
+    _forEach(kids, function (k) {
       if (k.tagClass !== "context") throw ns.E(C, "AuthorityKeyIdentifier fields are context-tagged");
       // DER: the OPTIONAL fields appear at most once and in ascending tag order.
       if (k.tagNumber <= lastTag) throw ns.E(C, "AuthorityKeyIdentifier fields must be unique and in ascending order (DER)");
@@ -1130,7 +1182,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
       // [2] IMPLICIT INTEGER are primitive leaves; the readers enforce the
       // primitive form fail-closed (a constructed context node is rejected,
       // never dereferenced for its absent content).
-      if (k.tagNumber === 0) { try { out.keyIdentifier = Buffer.from(asn1.read.octetStringImplicit(k, 0)); } catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, "AuthorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier [0] must be an IMPLICIT OCTET STRING", e); } }
+      if (k.tagNumber === 0) { try { out.keyIdentifier = _bufferFrom(asn1.read.octetStringImplicit(k, 0)); } catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, "AuthorityKeyIdentifier keyIdentifier [0] must be an IMPLICIT OCTET STRING", e); } }
       else if (k.tagNumber === 1) out.authorityCertIssuer = schema.walk(generalNames(ns, { implicitTag: 1, decodeValue: true, code: C }), k, ns).result;
       else if (k.tagNumber === 2) { try { out.authorityCertSerialNumber = asn1.read.integerImplicit(k, 2); } catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, "authorityCertSerialNumber must be an INTEGER", e); } }
       else throw ns.E(C, "AuthorityKeyIdentifier has an unexpected field [" + k.tagNumber + "]");
@@ -1145,7 +1197,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
   function subjectKeyIdentifier(buf) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-extension-value";
     var n = decodeTop(buf, C, "SubjectKeyIdentifier");
-    try { return Buffer.concat([asn1.read.octetString(n)]); }
+    try { return _bufferConcat([asn1.read.octetString(n)]); }
     catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, "SubjectKeyIdentifier must be an OCTET STRING (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.2)", e); }
   }
 
@@ -1188,13 +1240,13 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-crl-distribution-points";
     var kids = seqChildren(buf, C, "CRLDistributionPoints");
     if (kids.length < 1) throw ns.E(C, "CRLDistributionPoints must contain at least one DistributionPoint (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.13)");
-    return kids.map(function (dp) {
+    return _map(kids, function (dp) {
       if (dp.tagClass !== "universal" || dp.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !dp.children) {
         throw ns.E(C, "DistributionPoint must be a SEQUENCE { distributionPoint?, reasons?, cRLIssuer? }");
       }
       var out = { distributionPoint: null, reasons: null, cRLIssuer: null };
       var lastTag = -1;
-      dp.children.forEach(function (f) {
+      _forEach(dp.children, function (f) {
         if (f.tagClass !== "context") throw ns.E(C, "DistributionPoint fields are context-tagged [0]/[1]/[2]");
         if (f.tagNumber <= lastTag) throw ns.E(C, "DistributionPoint fields must be unique and in ascending order (DER)");
         lastTag = f.tagNumber;
@@ -1236,7 +1288,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
   }
   function _qcOidSeq(node, C, what) {   // a non-empty SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
     if (!node || node.tagClass !== "universal" || node.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !node.children || !node.children.length) throw ns.E(C, what + " must be a non-empty SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER");
-    return node.children.map(function (c) {
+    return _map(node.children, function (c) {
       if (c.tagClass !== "universal" || c.tagNumber !== _T.OBJECT_IDENTIFIER) throw ns.E(C, what + " members must be OBJECT IDENTIFIERs");
       try { return asn1.read.oid(c); } catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, what + " member is not a valid OID", e); }
     });
@@ -1261,14 +1313,16 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     if (i !== node.children.length) throw ns.E(C, "SemanticsInformation has unexpected trailing fields");
     return { semanticsIdentifier: sid, nameRegistrationAuthorities: nras };
   }
-  var qcInfoByOid = {};
+  // The per-statement decoder table answers off a dotted OID the encoded value supplies, so it holds
+  // no prototype: an inherited name would hand a statement a decoder nothing registered.
+  var qcInfoByOid = _create(null);
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcCompliance")] = _qcPresenceOnly("QcCompliance");
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcSSCD")] = _qcPresenceOnly("QcSSCD");
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcsPkixQCSyntaxV1")] = _qcSemantics;
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcsPkixQCSyntaxV2")] = _qcSemantics;
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcType")] = function (node, C) {
     var oids = _qcOidSeq(node, C, "QcType");   // SIZE(1) in EN 319 412-5 V2.5.1; accept >=1 for legacy certs
-    return { types: oids, typeNames: oids.map(function (d) { return ns.oid.name(d) || null; }) };
+    return { types: oids, typeNames: _map(oids, function (d) { return ns.oid.name(d) || null; }) };
   };
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcRetentionPeriod")] = function (node, C) {
     if (!node) throw ns.E(C, "QcRetentionPeriod requires an INTEGER statementInfo");
@@ -1297,11 +1351,11 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
   };
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcCClegislation")] = function (node, C) {   // SEQUENCE OF CountryName (PrintableString SIZE 2)
     if (!node || node.tagClass !== "universal" || node.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !node.children || !node.children.length) throw ns.E(C, "QcCClegislation must be a non-empty SEQUENCE OF CountryName");
-    return { countries: node.children.map(function (c) { var v = _qcStr(c, _T.PRINTABLE_STRING, C, "QcCClegislation CountryName must be a PrintableString"); if (v.length !== 2) throw ns.E(C, "QcCClegislation CountryName must be a 2-letter ISO 3166-1 code"); return v; }) };
+    return { countries: _map(node.children, function (c) { var v = _qcStr(c, _T.PRINTABLE_STRING, C, "QcCClegislation CountryName must be a PrintableString"); if (v.length !== 2) throw ns.E(C, "QcCClegislation CountryName must be a 2-letter ISO 3166-1 code"); return v; }) };
   };
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcPDS")] = function (node, C) {   // PdsLocations ::= SEQUENCE OF PdsLocation { url IA5, language Printable(2) }
     if (!node || node.tagClass !== "universal" || node.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !node.children || !node.children.length) throw ns.E(C, "QcPDS must be a non-empty SEQUENCE OF PdsLocation");
-    return { locations: node.children.map(function (loc) {
+    return { locations: _map(node.children, function (loc) {
       if (loc.tagClass !== "universal" || loc.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !loc.children || loc.children.length !== 2) throw ns.E(C, "a QcPDS PdsLocation must be a SEQUENCE { url, language }");
       var lang = _qcStr(loc.children[1], _T.PRINTABLE_STRING, C, "a QcPDS language must be a PrintableString");
       if (lang.length !== 2) throw ns.E(C, "a QcPDS language must be a 2-letter ISO 639-1 code");
@@ -1312,11 +1366,11 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
   // QcQSCDlegislation (SEQUENCE OF CountryName, like QcCClegislation). Both are registered ids, decoded.
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcIdentMethod")] = function (node, C) {
     var oids = _qcOidSeq(node, C, "QcIdentMethod");
-    return { methods: oids, methodNames: oids.map(function (d) { return ns.oid.name(d) || null; }) };
+    return { methods: oids, methodNames: _map(oids, function (d) { return ns.oid.name(d) || null; }) };
   };
   qcInfoByOid[O("qcQSCDlegislation")] = function (node, C) {
     if (!node || node.tagClass !== "universal" || node.tagNumber !== _T.SEQUENCE || !node.children || !node.children.length) throw ns.E(C, "QcQSCDlegislation must be a non-empty SEQUENCE OF CountryName");
-    return { countries: node.children.map(function (c) { var v = _qcStr(c, _T.PRINTABLE_STRING, C, "QcQSCDlegislation CountryName must be a PrintableString"); if (v.length !== 2) throw ns.E(C, "QcQSCDlegislation CountryName must be a 2-letter ISO 3166-1 code"); return v; }) };
+    return { countries: _map(node.children, function (c) { var v = _qcStr(c, _T.PRINTABLE_STRING, C, "QcQSCDlegislation CountryName must be a PrintableString"); if (v.length !== 2) throw ns.E(C, "QcQSCDlegislation CountryName must be a 2-letter ISO 3166-1 code"); return v; }) };
   };
   function qcStatements(buf) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-qc-statements", CS = ns.prefix + "/bad-qc-statement";
@@ -1333,7 +1387,7 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
       var infoNode = st.children.length === 2 ? st.children[1] : null;
       var decoder = qcInfoByOid[id];
       var info = decoder ? decoder(infoNode, CS) : { opaque: true, bytes: infoNode ? infoNode.bytes : null };
-      out.push({ statementId: id, name: ns.oid.name(id) || null, info: info });
+      _push(out, { statementId: id, name: ns.oid.name(id) || null, info: info });
     }
     return out;
   }
@@ -1383,13 +1437,16 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var C = ns.prefix + "/bad-ms-previous-cert-hash";
     var n = decodeTop(buf, C, "CAPrevCertHash");
     var hash;
-    try { hash = Buffer.concat([asn1.read.octetString(n)]); }
+    try { hash = _bufferConcat([asn1.read.octetString(n)]); }
     catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, "CAPrevCertHash must be an OCTET STRING", e); }
     if (hash.length !== 20) throw ns.E(C, "CAPrevCertHash must be a 20-octet SHA-1 certificate thumbprint");
     return hash;
   }
 
-  var byOid = {};
+  // The extension-decoder registry every consumer indexes with an OID read off the wire
+  // (path validation, inspection, the ACME certificate binding), so it holds no prototype: a
+  // planted dotted name would otherwise hand an extension a decoder nothing registered.
+  var byOid = _create(null);
   byOid[O("qcStatements")] = qcStatements;
   byOid[O("basicConstraints")] = basicConstraints;
   byOid[O("keyUsage")] = keyUsage;
@@ -1455,10 +1512,10 @@ function extensions(ns, opts) {
   var extOpts = {
     min: 1, code: ns.prefix + "/bad-extensions", what: "Extensions",
     unique: function (it) { return it.value.oid; }, dupCode: ns.prefix + "/duplicate-extension",
-    build: function (m) { return m.items.map(function (it) { return it.value; }); },
+    build: function (m) { return _map(m.items, function (it) { return it.value; }); },
   };
   if (opts.implicitTag != null) return schema.implicitSeqOf(opts.implicitTag, EXT, extOpts);
-  return schema.seqOf(EXT, Object.assign({ assert: "sequence" }, extOpts));
+  return schema.seqOf(EXT, _assign({ assert: "sequence" }, extOpts));
 }
 
 // SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
@@ -1512,7 +1569,7 @@ function attribute(ns, opts) {
       return {
         type: t,
         name: ctx.oid.name(t) || null,
-        values: m.fields.values.value.items.map(function (it) { return it.node.bytes; }),
+        values: _map(m.fields.values.value.items, function (it) { return it.node.bytes; }),
       };
     },
   });
@@ -1617,10 +1674,10 @@ function signedEnvelope(ns, tbsSchema, opts) {
 function dnsNameProblem(s) {
   if (typeof s !== "string" || !s.length) return "empty";
   if (s.length > 253) return "exceeds 253 octets";
-  if (/\s/.test(s)) return "whitespace";
-  if (s.charAt(0) === "." || s.charAt(s.length - 1) === ".") return "leading/trailing dot";
-  if (s.indexOf("_") !== -1) return "underscore forbidden in dNSName";
-  var labels = s.split(".");
+  if (_reTest(/\s/, s)) return "whitespace";
+  if (_charAt(s, 0) === "." || _charAt(s, s.length - 1) === ".") return "leading/trailing dot";
+  if (_strIndexOf(s, "_") !== -1) return "underscore forbidden in dNSName";
+  var labels = _split(s, ".");
   for (var i = 0; i < labels.length; i++) {
     var label = labels[i];
     if (label.length === 0) return "empty label";
@@ -1629,7 +1686,7 @@ function dnsNameProblem(s) {
       if (labels.length < 2) return "bare wildcard";
       continue;
     }
-    if (!/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?$/i.test(label)) return "invalid label syntax";
+    if (!_reTest(/^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?$/i, label)) return "invalid label syntax";
   }
   return null;
 }

package/lib/tls-cert-compress.js

@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@
 
 var C = require("./constants");
 var guard = require("./guard-all");
+var intrinsic = require("./guard-intrinsic");
+// Own-key membership through an operation taken at load. Written out, the question reads two
+// replaceable properties to answer one thing, and here it decides which algorithms are supported.
+var _hasOwn = intrinsic.hasOwn;
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
 var validator = require("./validator-all");
 var ByteWriter = require("./byte-writer");
@@ -88,7 +92,7 @@ var LEVEL_OPT = {
 // guard on this runtime. An algorithm the guard cannot decompress must never be offered
 // or accepted: advertising one would mean accepting a message we then cannot open.
 var SUPPORTED = guard.compress.algorithms().filter(function (n) {
-  return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ALG_BY_NAME, n) && typeof COMPRESS[n] === "function";
+  return _hasOwn(ALG_BY_NAME, n) && typeof COMPRESS[n] === "function";
 });
 
 // The minimum Certificate message size and the widest opaque<..2^24-1> vector, both owned