@blamejs/pki 0.5.10 → 0.5.12

package/lib/schema-c509.js

@@ -2205,14 +2205,14 @@ function _requireResultShape(r) {
   if (r.serialNumber == null && r.serialNumberHex == null) throw _err("c509/bad-input", "a C509 result must carry serialNumber or serialNumberHex");
   if (!r.signatureAlgorithm || typeof r.signatureAlgorithm.name !== "string") throw _err("c509/bad-input", "a C509 result must carry signatureAlgorithm.name");
   if (!r.subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm || typeof r.subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm.name !== "string") throw _err("c509/bad-input", "a C509 result must carry subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm.name");
-  if (!r.validity || !(r.validity.notBefore instanceof Date) || (r.validity.notAfter !== null && !(r.validity.notAfter instanceof Date))) throw _err("c509/bad-input", "a C509 result must carry validity.notBefore (Date) and notAfter (Date or null)");
+  if (!r.validity || !guard.time.isDate(r.validity.notBefore) || (r.validity.notAfter !== null && !guard.time.isDate(r.validity.notAfter))) throw _err("c509/bad-input", "a C509 result must carry validity.notBefore (Date) and notAfter (Date or null)");
   if (!Array.isArray(r.extensions)) throw _err("c509/bad-input", "a C509 result must carry an extensions array");
   if (!Buffer.isBuffer(r.signatureValue)) throw _err("c509/bad-input", "a C509 result must carry a Buffer signatureValue");
 }
 // A validity Date -> its C509 ~time (a non-negative CBOR epoch uint). A pre-epoch date cannot be
 // represented (the parser accepts only an unwrapped major-type-0 integer) and fails closed here.
 function _validityUint(date, label) {
-  var secs = Math.floor(date.getTime() / 1000);
+  var secs = Math.floor(guard.time.instantOf(date) / 1000);
   if (!isFinite(secs) || secs < 0) throw _err("c509/bad-validity", label + " is before the Unix epoch or not a valid date; C509 ~time is a non-negative CBOR epoch");
   return cbor.build.uint(BigInt(secs));
 }
@@ -2433,7 +2433,7 @@ _derToType3 = function (input, opts) {
     // against a UTF8String of the same characters) would rebuild different bytes and break the
     // signature that covers them. Byte-identical is exactly the condition under which that is safe.
     issuer: c.issuer.bytes.equals(c.subject.bytes) ? null : _c509NameFromDer(c.issuer.bytes),
-    validity: { notBefore: c.validity.notBefore, notAfter: c.validity.notAfter.getTime() === _NO_EXPIRY ? null : c.validity.notAfter },
+    validity: { notBefore: c.validity.notBefore, notAfter: guard.time.instantOf(c.validity.notAfter) === _NO_EXPIRY ? null : c.validity.notAfter },
     subject: _c509NameFromDer(c.subject.bytes),
     subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm: { name: "ecPublicKey", oid: c.subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.oid, curve: curve },
     subjectPublicKey: _compressEcPoint(asn1.read.bitString(spkiNode.children[1]).bytes, coordLen),   // 0x04||X||Y -> C509 compressed marker

package/lib/sigstore.js

@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ function _toMs(x) {
   // Coverage residual -- _inWindow gates every _toMs call behind a != null check; the null guard is dead defensive code.
   if (x == null) return null;
   if (typeof x === "number") return Number.isFinite(x) ? x : null;
-  if (x instanceof Date) { var d = x.getTime(); return isNaN(d) ? null : d; }
+  if (guard.time.isDate(x)) { var d = guard.time.instantOf(x); return isNaN(d) ? null : d; }
   if (typeof x === "string") { var t = Date.parse(x); return isNaN(t) ? null : t; }
   return null;
 }
@@ -671,7 +671,11 @@ async function verifyBundle(bundle, opts) {
   if (integratedTime === null) throw lastErr;
 
   // Leg 3 -- Fulcio chain, validated as of the (trusted) log time; then identity.
-  var checkTime = (opts.time instanceof Date) ? opts.time.getTime() : C.TIME.seconds(integratedTime);
+  // The instant comes through the time guard's intrinsic read. `getTime` is an ordinary method a
+  // subclass answers, and the slot predicate above accepts a subclass from any realm, so reading
+  // the method off the value let a caller name the moment the Fulcio chain is validated at --
+  // epoch zero, say, where every certificate in it is still unissued.
+  var checkTime = guard.time.isDate(opts.time) ? guard.time.instantOf(opts.time) : C.TIME.seconds(integratedTime);
   await _verifyChain(leaf, _chainDers(vm), fulcioRoots, checkTime);
   var identity = _identity(leaf);
   var identityChecked = _checkIdentity(identity, opts.identity);

package/lib/trust.js

@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ function _copyDistrustAfter(src) {
   var out = {};
   if (!src || typeof src !== "object") return out;
   Object.keys(src).forEach(function (k) {
-    out[k] = src[k] instanceof Date ? new Date(src[k].getTime()) : src[k];
+    out[k] = guard.time.isDate(src[k]) ? new Date(guard.time.instantOf(src[k])) : src[k];
   });
   return out;
 }
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ function _copyName(name) {
 function _datesEqual(x, y) {
   var kx = Object.keys(x).sort(), ky = Object.keys(y).sort();
   if (kx.join(",") !== ky.join(",")) return false;
-  return kx.every(function (k) { return x[k].getTime() === y[k].getTime(); });
+  return kx.every(function (k) { return guard.time.instantOf(x[k]) === guard.time.instantOf(y[k]); });
 }
 
 function _purposesEqual(x, y) {

package/lib/tsp-sign.js

@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ function _sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts) {
   // genTime defaults to now; a supplied value MUST be a valid Date (never a silently-ignored
   // non-Date or an Invalid Date that would encode a garbage GeneralizedTime).
   if (opts.genTime != null) guard.time.assertValid(opts.genTime, _err, "tsp/bad-input", "genTime");
-  var genTime = opts.genTime instanceof Date ? opts.genTime : new Date();
+  var genTime = guard.time.isDate(opts.genTime) ? opts.genTime : new Date();
   // A caller-authored INTEGER is coerced through the shared guard, so a value that is not one is a
   // typed tsp/bad-input rather than a raw SyntaxError or RangeError out of BigInt() -- an untyped
   // fault escaping a public verb, which a caller cannot catch by code.
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ async function verify(token, data, opts) {
     // notBefore is rejected at the floor (ceil >= notBefore but floor < notBefore). Certificate
     // validity is seconds-precise (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5), so this never over-rejects a valid token.
     var floorT = tst.genTime;
-    var ceilT = (tst.genTimeFraction != null && /[1-9]/.test(tst.genTimeFraction.slice(3))) ? new Date(floorT.getTime() + 1) : floorT;
+    var ceilT = (tst.genTimeFraction != null && /[1-9]/.test(tst.genTimeFraction.slice(3))) ? new Date(guard.time.instantOf(floorT) + 1) : floorT;
     try {
       // parseToken surfaces each embedded cert as { bytes, tagClass, ... }; take the X.509 certs
       // (universal SEQUENCE), skipping any attribute-certificate choices, and parse their raw bytes.

package/lib/validator-attcert.js

@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@
 //
 // validator-attcert -- the SINGLE home for "does this X.509 leaf meet the WebAuthn
 // attestation-certificate profile" (WebAuthn sec. 8.2.1 packed, sec. 8.3.1 TPM AIK).
-// Sibling to the guard family: a validator owns a decoded TYPE's COMPLETE conformance rule
-// set once, so the packed and AIK profiles cannot drift apart or lose a gate (e.g. the v3
-// check that previously lived split out in the tpm verifier, away from the profile).
+// Sibling to the guard family: a validator owns a decoded type's complete conformance rule
+// set once, so the packed and AIK profiles cannot drift apart or lose a gate. The version
+// check belongs to the profile, not to whichever verifier reaches it first.
 //
 // The caller supplies its parsed certificate + an extension-accessor object `exts`
 // { find(cert, oidName) -> rawExt|null, decode(cert, oidName) -> {critical, value}|null }

package/lib/webauthn-mds.js

@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ function _chainToAnchor(chain, anchors, at, what, code) {
 function _staleAfter(nextUpdate) {
   var d = rfc3339.parseDate(nextUpdate, function (c, m) { return _err("webauthn/bad-metadata-blob", m); },
     "webauthn/bad-metadata-blob", "the metadata BLOB nextUpdate");
-  return d.getTime() + constants.TIME.days(1);
+  return guard.time.instantOf(d) + constants.TIME.days(1);
 }
 
 // A verified result is a plain object the caller may hold for as long as it likes, so its freshness
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ function _staleAfter(nextUpdate) {
 // here, so opting out stays opted out and never silently reappears at the point of use.
 function assertFresh(metadata, at, label) {
   if (!metadata || metadata.allowStale === true || typeof metadata.nextUpdate !== "string") return;
-  var atMs = at instanceof Date ? at.getTime() : NaN;
+  var atMs = guard.time.isDate(at) ? guard.time.instantOf(at) : NaN;
   var limit = _staleAfter(metadata.nextUpdate);
   if (!isFinite(atMs) || !isFinite(limit)) return;
   if (atMs >= limit) {
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ function _parsePayload(seg, at, opts) {
     throw _err("webauthn/metadata-rollback", "the metadata BLOB no " + payload.no + " does not exceed the previously held " + opts.previousNo);
   }
   var staleAfter = _staleAfter(payload.nextUpdate);
-  var atMs = at.getTime();
+  var atMs = guard.time.instantOf(at);
   // An unusable comparison instant must not read as "fresh": without this, a NaN date makes every
   // comparison false and the staleness check silently passes.
   //
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ function _reportInForceAt(report, atMs) {
   // parseDate throws and never returns an Invalid Date, so d is finite; atMs was isFinite-
   // checked by the caller before this runs.
   // allow:nan-date-comparison-unguarded -- both operands are source-validated, as described above.
-  return d.getTime() <= atMs;
+  return guard.time.instantOf(d) <= atMs;
 }
 
 function statusDenied(entry, metadata, leaf, at) {
@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ function statusDenied(entry, metadata, leaf, at) {
   // after the time it asks about. When every dated report is still in the future, the answer is
   // that none of them is in force, not that all of them are.
   var isDated = function (r) { return r && typeof r.effectiveDate === "string" && rfc3339.isValidDate(r.effectiveDate); };
-  var atMs = (at instanceof Date && isFinite(at.getTime())) ? at.getTime() : null;
+  var atMs = (guard.time.isDate(at) && isFinite(guard.time.instantOf(at))) ? guard.time.instantOf(at) : null;
   if (atMs !== null) {
     reports = reports.filter(function (r) { return !isDated(r) || _reportInForceAt(r, atMs); });
   }

package/lib/webauthn.js

@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ function _cloneParsed(v, depth) {
   if (depth > 64) throw _err("webauthn/bad-input", "opts.rootCertificates[] is nested too deeply to be a parsed certificate");
   if (Buffer.isBuffer(v) || v instanceof Uint8Array) return guard.bytes.snapshot(v, _err, "webauthn/bad-input", "a byte field of opts.rootCertificates[]");
   if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.map(function (x) { return _cloneParsed(x, depth + 1); });
-  if (v instanceof Date) return new Date(v.getTime());
+  if (guard.time.isDate(v)) return new Date(guard.time.instantOf(v));
   if (v && typeof v === "object") {
     var out = {};
     Object.keys(v).forEach(function (k) { out[k] = _cloneParsed(v[k], depth + 1); });

package/lib/webcrypto.js

@@ -1275,14 +1275,23 @@ Crypto.prototype.getRandomValues = function getRandomValues(typedArray) {
   if (!ArrayBuffer.isView(typedArray) || typedArray instanceof Float32Array || typedArray instanceof Float64Array || typedArray instanceof DataView) {
     throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues: expected an integer TypedArray");
   }
-  if (typedArray.byteLength > MAX_RANDOM_BYTES) {
+  // Re-view the (already integer-TypedArray-validated) output buffer through the OUTPUT door --
+  // any TypedArray, not just Uint8Array -- so a detached backing store fails closed here; the
+  // returned Buffer aliases typedArray, so randomFillSync writes through to the caller's array.
+  //
+  // The output door, because the input one refuses shared memory: bytes another thread can rewrite
+  // after they have been checked cannot be checked. That answers a question about input. Here the
+  // caller is asking for random bytes in memory they chose, and a `SharedArrayBuffer`-backed view
+  // is a supported W3C argument that the platform fills; refusing it made a working call an error.
+  var out = guard.bytes.outputView(typedArray, WebCryptoError, "webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues");
+  // The ceiling is measured on that view, and never on `typedArray.byteLength`. `byteLength` is an
+  // accessor on the shared typed-array prototype, so a caller's subclass answers it: one reporting
+  // 0 passed the ceiling while the fill below wrote the array's real length, which is the bound
+  // being bypassed rather than enforced. The view is built from the internal slot.
+  if (out.length > MAX_RANDOM_BYTES) {
     throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues: byteLength exceeds " + MAX_RANDOM_BYTES);
   }
-  // Re-view the (already integer-TypedArray-validated) output buffer via
-  // guard.bytes.source -- any TypedArray, not just Uint8Array -- so a detached
-  // backing store fails closed here; the returned Buffer aliases typedArray, so
-  // randomFillSync writes through to the caller's array.
-  nodeCrypto.randomFillSync(guard.bytes.source(typedArray, WebCryptoError, "webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues"));
+  nodeCrypto.randomFillSync(out);
   return typedArray;
 };
 

package/lib/x509-sign.js

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ function _sign(spec, issuer, opts) {
   guard.time.assertValid(spec.notBefore, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notBefore");
   guard.time.assertValid(spec.notAfter, _err, "x509/bad-input", "notAfter");
   // allow:nan-date-comparison-unguarded -- both operands are guard.time.assertValid'd on the two lines above (an Invalid Date throws before this comparison).
-  if (spec.notBefore.getTime() > spec.notAfter.getTime()) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "notBefore must not be after notAfter (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5)");
+  if (guard.time.instantOf(spec.notBefore) > guard.time.instantOf(spec.notAfter)) throw _err("x509/bad-input", "notBefore must not be after notAfter (RFC 5280 sec. 4.1.2.5)");
   var validityDer = b.sequence([_timeDer(spec.notBefore, "notBefore"), _timeDer(spec.notAfter, "notAfter")]);
 
   var exts = _buildExtensions(spec.extensions, { spki: spki, issuerSpki: issuerSpki, issuerCert: issuerCert, subjectEmpty: subjectEmpty });

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.5.10",
+  "version": "0.5.12",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:b51c65a4-3df8-4dec-af37-301d0b285af6",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:6ebd5615-4e36-40ba-85f5-0b2b1cb013fd",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-08-18T10:39:56.596Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-08-19T07:54:19.360Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.10",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.12",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.5.10",
+      "version": "0.5.12",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.5.10",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.5.12",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.10",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.5.12",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]