@blamejs/pki 0.3.26 → 0.3.27

package/lib/cmp-verify.js

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ function _verdict(m, type, protectionAlg, valid, trusted, code, reason, signer)
     trusted: trusted,
     protectionType: type,
     protectionAlg: protectionAlg ? { oid: protectionAlg.oid, name: protectionAlg.name || null } : null,
-    signer: signer ? { cert: signer.der, spki: signer.spki, subject: signer.subject } : null,
+    signer: signer ? { cert: signer.der, spki: signer.spki, subject: signer.subject, chain: signer.chain || null } : null,
     transactionID: m.header.transactionID || null,
     senderNonce: m.header.senderNonce || null,
     recipNonce: m.header.recipNonce || null,
@@ -496,6 +496,10 @@ async function _verifySignature(m, protectedPart, protectionAlg, protection, opt
   // the caller to anchor. With a trust store the signer cert gets the FULL RFC 5280 sec. 6.1 path gates.
   if (opts.trustAnchors == null) return _ok(m, "signature", protectionAlg, false, signer);
   var trust = await _chainSigner(signer, m, opts, extra);
+  // Surface the ACTUAL validated chain (signer + the intermediates path.build used) on a trusted verdict, so a
+  // caller can cache exactly the certificates that established trust rather than the UNSIGNED extraCerts a peer
+  // can pad -- an appended-but-unused certificate never enters this chain.
+  if (trust.chain) signer.chain = trust.chain;
   return _verdict(m, "signature", protectionAlg, true, trust.trusted, trust.trusted ? null : "cmp/untrusted-signer", trust.reason, signer);
 }
 
@@ -545,7 +549,17 @@ async function _chainSigner(signer, m, opts, extra) {
   try {
     var res = await _engine.build(signer.der, buildOpts);
     if (!res || res.valid !== true) return { trusted: false, reason: "the signer certificate did not chain to a supplied trust anchor" };
-    return { trusted: true, reason: null };
+    // res.path is the ordered certificates path.build assembled (signer + the intermediates it used), as PARSED
+    // objects whose byte fields are subarrays of the (possibly multi-MB) response allocation. Map each back to its
+    // source DER (the signer, or a DER pool entry) and return an INDEPENDENT copy, so a caller caching the chain
+    // holds standalone buffers -- never slices pinning the whole response. Only certs on the trusted path enter it,
+    // so unsigned extraCerts padding is excluded. (A path cert sourced from an already-parsed intermediate carries
+    // no DER to copy and is omitted; for a Buffer/DER pool -- the cmp.session case -- the chain is complete.)
+    var byKey = Object.create(null);
+    var skey = _certKey(signer.parsed); if (skey) byKey[skey] = signer.der;
+    pool.forEach(function (c) { if (Buffer.isBuffer(c) || c instanceof Uint8Array) { var k = _certKey(c); if (k && !byKey[k]) byKey[k] = c; } });
+    var chain = res.path.map(function (pc) { var k = _certKey(pc); var d = k ? byKey[k] : null; return d ? Buffer.from(d) : null; }).filter(Boolean);
+    return { trusted: true, reason: null, chain: chain };
   } catch (e) {
     // A config-tier fault from path.build (an invalid opts.time, an empty / malformed trustAnchors or
     // intermediate) is a DEPLOYMENT error, not an untrusted signer -- rethrow it as cmp/bad-input so it is
@@ -669,9 +683,12 @@ async function _verify(message, opts) {
  * Returns a verdict (never a bare boolean): `{ valid, trusted, protectionType, protectionAlg, signer,
  * transactionID, senderNonce, recipNonce, header, body, code?, reason? }`. `valid` is whether the
  * protection is cryptographically intact under the declared algorithm; `trusted` is whether a MAC secret
- * matched or a signature signer certificate chained to a supplied trust anchor. A well-formed but
- * unverifiable message is a `{ valid: false }` verdict carrying a `cmp/*` code, not a throw; only malformed
- * input (a non-PKIMessage, a bad required opt, a flavor/credential mismatch) throws a typed `CmpError`.
+ * matched or a signature signer certificate chained to a supplied trust anchor. On a trusted signature
+ * verdict `signer.chain` is the validated certificate path as independent DER buffers (the signer plus the
+ * intermediates that chained it to the anchor) -- the certificates actually used, never the unsigned
+ * `extraCerts` a peer can pad, and never a slice pinning the response allocation. A
+ * well-formed but unverifiable message is a `{ valid: false }` verdict carrying a `cmp/*` code, not a throw;
+ * only malformed input (a non-PKIMessage, a bad required opt, a flavor/credential mismatch) throws a typed `CmpError`.
  *
  * @opts
  *   - `sharedSecret` (string|Buffer) -- the PBMAC1 secret; REQUIRED for a MAC-protected message (UTF-8).
@@ -702,4 +719,5 @@ module.exports = {
   wellKnownUrl: cmpBuild.wellKnownUrl,
   verify: verify,
   setEngine: setEngine,
+  senderBoundToCert: _senderBoundToCert,
 };

package/lib/path-validate.js

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ var ocsp = require("./schema-ocsp");
 var ocspVerify = require("./ocsp-verify");
 var crlVerify = require("./crl-verify");
 var cmpVerify = require("./cmp-verify");
+var cmpSession = require("./cmp-session");
 var guard = require("./guard-all");
 var constants = require("./constants");
 var validator = require("./validator-all");
@@ -1887,6 +1888,8 @@ var ocspCore = ocspVerify.makeOcspVerify({
 // out-of-path signer certificate through the FULL RFC 5280 sec. 6.1 path validation -- without exposing any
 // of it on the public pki.path surface (index.js exports the whole path-validate module).
 cmpVerify.setEngine({ verifyWithSpki: _verifyWithSpki, build: build, validate: validate });
+// pki.cmp.session validates the ISSUED leaf certificate (its signature + chain) through the same engine.
+cmpSession.setEngine({ build: build, validate: validate, toAnchor: toAnchor, coerceCert: coerceCert });
 
 /**
  * @primitive  pki.path.ocspChecker

package/lib/sleep.js

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
+"use strict";
+//
+// @internal -- the shared bounded poll sleeper for the stateful network clients (pki.acme.client and
+// pki.cmp.session). A delay above Node's 32-bit setTimeout ceiling is SPLIT into chained maximum-size
+// chunks: a bare setTimeout(fn, > 2^31-1) is silently clamped to 1 ms (a TimeoutOverflowWarning) and would
+// then rapidly re-poll instead of waiting the full interval. Each client's opts.sleep overrides this in
+// tests, so this default -- the ONLY sleeper that touches a real timer -- is never driven by a test wait.
+
+var SETTIMEOUT_MAX_MS = 2147483647;   // 2^31 - 1: Node's setTimeout delay ceiling
+
+// sleep(ms) -> Promise resolved after `ms` milliseconds, chunking a delay past the timer ceiling.
+function sleep(ms) {
+  return new Promise(function (resolve) {
+    (function step(remaining) {
+      if (remaining <= SETTIMEOUT_MAX_MS) { setTimeout(resolve, remaining); return; }
+      setTimeout(function () { step(remaining - SETTIMEOUT_MAX_MS); }, SETTIMEOUT_MAX_MS);
+    })(ms);
+  });
+}
+
+module.exports = { sleep: sleep, SETTIMEOUT_MAX_MS: SETTIMEOUT_MAX_MS };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.3.26",
+  "version": "0.3.27",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:2d9fa8bb-e93e-450a-991c-ef2f3b3fb9e2",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:98a7ec9f-9442-4c90-b486-f206cdde5325",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-07-30T20:38:00.777Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-07-31T20:40:18.144Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.3.26",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.3.27",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.3.26",
+      "version": "0.3.27",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.3.26",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.3.27",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.3.26",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.3.27",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]