@blamejs/pki 0.3.11 → 0.3.12

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,14 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.3.12 — 2026-07-24
+
+pki.pkcs12.open reads and decrypts a password-integrity PKCS#12 store (RFC 7292, RFC 9579).
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.pkcs12.open(pfx, password, opts) reads a password-integrity PKCS#12 store. It verifies the classic Appendix B HMAC or RFC 9579 PBMAC1 MAC before decrypting (RFC 7292 sec. 5.1), then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, returning { integrityMode, macVerified, keys, certs, crls, secrets } -- private keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certificates/CRLs/secrets as raw DER, all carrying friendlyName and localKeyId, and nested safeContents recursively. A wrong password fails at the MAC gate (pkcs12/mac-mismatch); a MAC-less store is refused (pkcs12/no-integrity) unless opts.allowUnauthenticated is set; a public-key-integrity store and a legacy (non-PBES2) bag are refused; a post-MAC decrypt failure is the uniform pkcs12/decrypt-failed. opts.maxIterations lowers the KDF/MAC iteration cap for the call, and opts.keys 'crypto' imports each private key to a WebCrypto CryptoKey (opts.importAlgorithm for the ambiguous RSA/EC arms). pfx accepts a DER Buffer, PEM string, or a pki.schema.pkcs12.parse result. RFC 7292 sec. 5.1, RFC 9579, RFC 8018.
+
 ## v0.3.11 — 2026-07-23
 
 pki.pkcs12 builds and MAC-verifies password-integrity PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) stores (RFC 7292, RFC 9579).

package/README.md

@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ is callable today; nothing below is a stub.
 | `pki.cmp` | RFC 9810 Certificate Management Protocol message building — `build(message, opts)` assembles a protected `PKIMessage`. `message.header` carries the `sender` / `recipient` GeneralNames (including the anonymous NULL-DN) plus optional transaction metadata (`transactionID`, `senderNonce` / `recipNonce`, `messageTime` as a GeneralizedTime, `senderKID` / `recipKID`, `freeText`, `generalInfo`); `message.body` is a single-key object naming the arm. Request-side: `ir` / `cr` / `kur` (a `CertReqMessages` spec delegated to `pki.crmf.build`), `p10cr` (a PKCS#10 `CertificationRequest`), `certConf`, `pollReq`, `genm`, `rr`. CA/responder-side: `ip` / `cp` / `kup` / `ccp` (a `CertRepMessage` — `caPubs` and `response` entries carrying a `PKIStatusInfo` and, under a granting status, a `certifiedKeyPair`), `rp` (revocation response), `genp`, `error`, `pollRep`, `krp` (key-recovery response), `pkiconf`. Protection is exactly one of `opts.{ key, cert }` — a signature over the message under the sender key, the algorithm resolved from the signer certificate so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch — or `opts.mac` — a PBMAC1 shared-secret HMAC (RFC 9481 / 9579, PBKDF2-derived). The protection covers the exact DER of the virtual `ProtectedPart` (the header and body) and is self-verified before the message is returned; the `protectionAlg` is derived, never caller-set, so the message the parser accepts is coherent by construction. Returns DER, or a PEM `CMP` block with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CmpError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.cmp.parse` — `build` |
 | `pki.crl` | RFC 5280 §5 certificate revocation list issuance — `sign(spec, issuer, opts)` builds and signs a `CertificateList`: a `spec` of `thisUpdate` / `nextUpdate`, an optional `crlNumber`, a `revoked` array (each entry a `serialNumber` + `revocationDate` with an optional `reason` or `invalidityDate`), and an optional `extensions` object (authority key identifier, issuing distribution point, delta-CRL indicator, freshest CRL, authority information access) or an array of pre-encoded Extension DER; an `issuer` of `{ cert, key }` or `{ name, publicKey, key }`. The signature algorithm is resolved from the issuer key, so RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS via `opts.pss`), ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and the composite arms all sign without a per-algorithm branch. The version is derived from the extension set (v2 when any CRL or entry extension is present, else v1), the outer `signatureAlgorithm` matches `tbsCertList.signature`, an empty revocation list omits the field rather than emitting an empty SEQUENCE, `reasonCode` is an ENUMERATED and `invalidityDate` is always GeneralizedTime, per-extension criticality is fixed by the RFC, and the produced signature is verified under the issuer key before return. `verify(crl, issuer)` checks a CRL signature through the one path-validation signature engine (algorithm-confusion and EdDSA low-order gates included), and `isRevoked(crl, serialNumber)` looks a serial up in the revocation list. Returns DER, or a PEM `X509 CRL` with `opts.pem`; malformed input throws a typed `CrlError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.crl.parse` — `sign` / `verify` / `isRevoked` |
 | `pki.key` | RFC 5958 / RFC 8018 key-material lifecycle — `encrypt(privateKey, password, opts)` wraps a PKCS#8 private key (DER, PEM, or an extractable `CryptoKey`) into an `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` under PBES2 (PBKDF2 + AES-CBC-Pad): `opts` selects the `cipher` (`aes-256-cbc` default, `aes-192-cbc`, `aes-128-cbc`), the `prf` (`hmacWithSHA256` default, SHA-384/512, SHA-1), the `iterations` (default 600000), and the `salt`; the plaintext is validated as PKCS#8 before encryption, a default `prf` and `keyLength` are omitted so the parameters are byte-exact with OpenSSL, and the output is re-parsed before return. `decrypt(encrypted, password, opts)` recovers the inner `PrivateKeyInfo` (re-validated through `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse`) — only PBES2/PBKDF2/AES-CBC is accepted (PBES1, PBMAC1, scrypt refused), the salt and iteration count are bounded before any derivation (`opts.maxIterations` lowers the cap), a malformed parameter set or wrong-length IV is a distinct typed error, and — because a MAC-less PBES2-CBC decrypt must not be a padding oracle (RFC 8018 §8) — a wrong password and a valid-pad-but-not-a-key both surface the one uniform `key/decrypt-failed`. `export(key, opts)` / `import(input, opts)` move a private key as PKCS#8 or a public key as SubjectPublicKeyInfo, delegating the encoding to WebCrypto so RSA carries an explicit NULL, EC a named curve, and Ed25519/Ed448/X25519/X448 omit parameters (an ambiguous RSA/EC import requires `opts.algorithm`). `generate(algorithm, opts)` produces a key pair over RSA, ECDSA/ECDH, the Edwards/Montgomery curves, and the FIPS post-quantum ML-DSA / ML-KEM, and `publicFromPrivate(privateKey)` derives the public key. Returns DER or PEM; fail-closed with typed `KeyError`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs8.parse` — `encrypt` / `decrypt` / `export` / `import` / `generate` / `publicFromPrivate` |
-| `pki.pkcs12` | RFC 7292 / RFC 9579 PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance — `build(spec, opts)` assembles a password-integrity store. `spec` is the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key / shroudedKey / cert / crl / secret / nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping; `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` attributes are single-value. The store is protected by a classic Appendix B HMAC (default, max interop) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`), over SHA-256/384/512, with the shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 (what OpenSSL and NSS consume) — so a file it emits opens in OpenSSL and NSS, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC is computed over the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a store's classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity and bag decryption are not yet built. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`; fail-closed with typed `Pkcs12Error`. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build` / `verifyMac` |
+| `pki.pkcs12` | RFC 7292 / RFC 9579 PKCS#12 (.p12/.pfx) issuance — `build(spec, opts)` assembles a password-integrity store. `spec` is the OpenSSL-style `{ key, cert, ca?, friendlyName?, localKeyId? }` or the full `{ safeContents: [...] }`, where each element is a plaintext or PBES2-encrypted `SafeContents` of key / shroudedKey / cert / crl / secret / nested `safeContents` bags. Keys and certs are validated before wrapping; `friendlyName` (BMPString) and `localKeyId` attributes are single-value. The store is protected by a classic Appendix B HMAC (default, max interop) or an RFC 9579 PBMAC1 (`opts.mac.algorithm`), over SHA-256/384/512, with the shrouded keys and cert safes encrypted under RFC 8018 PBES2 (AES-128/192/256-CBC). Every password is encoded the PKCS#12 way — BMPString+NULL for the classic MAC, UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags and PBMAC1 (what OpenSSL and NSS consume) — so a file it emits opens in OpenSSL and NSS, cross-checked bidirectionally. The MAC is computed over the exact AuthenticatedSafe byte range, a DEFAULT-1 `MacData.iterations` is rejected up front, and the store is re-parsed before return. `verifyMac(pfx, password, opts)` recomputes a store's classic or PBMAC1 MAC over `macedBytes` and constant-time-compares it, throwing on a MAC-less or public-key-integrity store. Public-key integrity and legacy-PBE (PKCS#12 Appendix C) bag decryption are not yet built. Returns DER or a PEM `PKCS12`; fail-closed with typed `Pkcs12Error`. `open(pfx, password, opts)` reads a store back: it verifies the MAC **first** (a wrong password is the MAC verdict, not a decrypt error), then PBES2-decrypts every privacy safe and shrouded key bag and returns `{ integrityMode, macVerified, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` — keys as re-validated PKCS#8 DER, certs/CRLs/secrets as raw DER, all with `friendlyName`/`localKeyId`, nested safes recursively. A MAC-less store is refused unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated`, a public-key-integrity or legacy-PBE store is refused, a post-MAC decrypt failure is the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`, and `opts.keys: 'crypto'` imports each key to a `CryptoKey`; it reads what OpenSSL and NSS produce. Parsing stays at `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` — `build` / `verifyMac` / `open` |
 | `pki.cms` | RFC 5652 §5 CMS SignedData signing + signature verification — `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (attached or detached, one or many signers, RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA (pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA / ECDSA / EdDSA — accepted only when **both** components verify — draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs)); it builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: when signed attributes are present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate; it does not chain that certificate to a trust anchor — that is the caller's step through `pki.path.validate`. **Content encryption** (RFC 5652/5083/5084/9629): `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData — recipients auto-dispatch off the certificate key to key-transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 never emitted), key-agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key-wrap, password (PBKDF2 + RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936) — one fresh content key wrapped for every recipient. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher / EFAIL / password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. **Compression** (RFC 3274): `compress(content, opts)` / `decompress(input, opts)` produce and consume a CompressedData (ZLIB, version 0, id-alg-zlibCompress); decompress bounds the uncompressed output at 16 MiB and stops before it is materialized, so a decompression bomb fails closed as `cms/decompress-too-large` — a size transform with no integrity/confidentiality (RFC 8551 §2.4.5). Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
 | `pki.smime` | RFC 8551 S/MIME message assembly, verification, encryption, and compression over the CMS layer — `sign(content, signers, opts)` wraps a MIME entity as a signed S/MIME message in either form: `multipart/signed` (clear-signed — the content stays readable in any MUA, a detached CMS SignedData rides alongside as `application/pkcs7-signature` with a matching `micalg`) or `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data` (opaque — the whole entity is a base64 CMS SignedData). The signed bytes are the entity's RFC 8551 §3.1.1 canonical form (CRLF line endings); `verify(message, opts)` unwraps both forms and recomputes over the same canonicalizer, so a transport that re-wraps line endings still verifies and a tampered part fails. `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` envelopes a MIME entity as an opaque `application/pkcs7-mime` message and `decrypt(message, keyMaterial, opts)` opens one — `smime-type=authEnveloped-data` (AES-GCM, confidentiality and integrity, the default) or `smime-type=enveloped-data` (AES-CBC, confidentiality only, so `decrypt` reports `authenticated: false`, the §3.3 no-integrity caveat); the `smime-type` is derived from the CMS body, not the header, and decryption is fail-closed and oracle-free. The crypto is entirely `pki.cms.sign` / `verify` / `encrypt` / `decrypt` — any RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA signer and any RSA-OAEP / ECDH / X25519 / X448 / AES-KW / PBKDF2 / ML-KEM recipient carries through (algorithm-agnostic). Like `cms.verify`, `verify` returns the per-signer cryptographic verdict plus the recovered content; chaining a signer to a trust anchor is the caller's `pki.path.validate` step. `compress(content, opts)` / `decompress(message, opts)` add the opaque `application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=compressed-data; name=smime.p7z` frame (RFC 8551 §3.6, RFC 3274) — a size transform with no integrity/confidentiality (§2.4.5), decompress bounded against a bomb; the recovered content, which may itself be signed or enveloped, is returned for the caller to re-verify. Bidirectionally interoperable with `openssl smime` / `openssl cms`. Fail-closed with typed `smime/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `compress`, `decompress` |
 | `pki.tsp` | RFC 3161 Time-Stamp Protocol — `sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts)` produces a TimeStampToken: a CMS SignedData (over `pki.cms.sign`) whose content is a `TSTInfo` carrying the timestamped message imprint, the TSA policy, a serial number, and `genTime` (with optional accuracy / nonce / ordering), plus the RFC 3161 §2.4.2 signing-certificate attribute binding the token to the TSA certificate (SHA-2 imprints, any `pki.cms.sign` TSA key). `request` / `parseRequest` build and parse the TimeStampReq a client sends (imprint, requested policy, nonce, certReq), `response` / `parseResponse` the TimeStampResp a TSA returns — a granted status wrapping a token, or a rejection with PKIStatus and failure info, the §2.4.2 status↔token coupling enforced in both directions. `verify(token, data, opts)` verifies a token fail-closed: the CMS signature over the exact signed bytes, the message imprint recomputed from the data, the TSTInfo content type, the ESSCertID(V2) binding to the TSA certificate, the §2.3 critical timeStamping-only extendedKeyUsage, the request nonce when used, and — with a trust anchor supplied — full certification-path validation of the TSA certificate at the token's `genTime`, returning `{ valid, genTime, serialNumber, tstInfo, … }` — `sign`, `request`, `parseRequest`, `response`, `parseResponse`, `verify` |
@@ -271,11 +271,10 @@ certificate and writes a DER (or `--pem`) SignedData to `--out` or stdout.
 
 ### What's coming
 
-Certificate build/sign/verify, CMS AuthenticatedData /
-AuthEnvelopedData, PKCS#8 decryption (PBES2) / SPKI, PKCS#12 MAC verification
-and bag decryption, and the post-quantum certificate and CMS surface (ML-DSA /
-ML-KEM / SLH-DSA and hybrid composites) are on the roadmap and ride this same
-core. See
+Thin enrollment-protocol HTTP clients (ACME, EST, CMP transport over
+`node:https`), PKCS#12 public-key integrity and legacy-PBE (Appendix C) bag
+decryption, and CMS countersignatures / unsigned attributes are on the roadmap
+and ride this same core. See
 [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md) for the full plan and current status of each area, and
 [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) for what has landed.
 

package/lib/key.js

@@ -174,37 +174,10 @@ async function decrypt(encrypted, password, opts) {
 }
 
 function _decryptPbes2(encAlg, ciphertext, password, opts) {
-  var pb, keyBits, iv;
-  // Structural parse (typed, pre-derivation). These faults are not password-dependent, so a distinct code
-  // per fault leaks no oracle; a raw asn1 fault is normalized to key/bad-algorithm-parameters.
-  try {
-    var params = pbes2.seqChildren(encAlg.parameters, 2, "PBES2 parameters", _err, "key");
-    var kdf = pbes2.requireChildren(params[0], 2, "PBES2 keyDerivationFunc", _err, "key");
-    var encScheme = pbes2.requireChildren(params[1], 2, "PBES2 encryptionScheme", _err, "key");
-    if (asn1.read.oid(kdf[0]) !== O("pbkdf2")) throw _err("key/unsupported-algorithm", "the PBES2 keyDerivationFunc must be PBKDF2 (RFC 8018 sec. 6.2)");
-    pb = pbes2.parsePbkdf2Params(kdf[1].bytes, opts, _err, "key", true);   // strictPrf: reject a non-canonical explicit default prf
-    var encOid = asn1.read.oid(encScheme[0]);
-    keyBits = pbes2.CONTENT_KEYBITS[encOid];
-    if (!keyBits || !/CBC/.test(oid.name(encOid) || "")) throw _err("key/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported PBES2 encryptionScheme " + (oid.name(encOid) || encOid) + " (AES-CBC only)");
-    iv = asn1.read.octetString(encScheme[1]);
-    if (iv.length !== 16) throw _err("key/bad-algorithm-parameters", "the AES-CBC IV must be 16 octets");
-  } catch (e) {
-    // The shared PBES2 home rejects a malformed / truncated / over-cap parameter with the generic
-    // key/bad-input; in the PBES2 parameter-structure context that IS a bad-algorithm-parameters. The
-    // semantic verdicts it raises (unsupported-algorithm, iteration-limit) keep their precise codes.
-    if (e instanceof KeyError) {
-      if (e.code === "key/bad-input") throw _err("key/bad-algorithm-parameters", e.message, e.cause);
-      throw e;
-    }
-    throw _err("key/bad-algorithm-parameters", "malformed PBES2 parameters", e);
-  }
-  var dk = nodeCrypto.pbkdf2Sync(pbes2.passwordBytes(password, _err, "key"), pb.salt, pb.iterations, keyBits / 8, pb.prfNode);
-  // Post-derivation failures collapse to ONE uniform verdict (RFC 8018 sec. 8): a bad PKCS#7 pad and a
-  // valid pad whose plaintext is not a PrivateKeyInfo are indistinguishable -- the re-parse is the integrity
-  // check for MAC-less PBES2-CBC, and it MUST run (never skipped).
-  var plaintext;
-  try { plaintext = pbes2.cbcDecrypt(dk, iv, ciphertext, keyBits); }
-  catch (_e) { throw _err("key/decrypt-failed", "decryption failed"); }
+  // The shared PBES2 decrypt home (strict params + the uniform decrypt-failed on a wrong key / bad pad). The
+  // plaintext re-parse below is the MAC-less PBES2-CBC integrity check (RFC 8018 sec. 8): a bad pad and a
+  // valid pad whose plaintext is not a PrivateKeyInfo are indistinguishable, and it MUST run (never skipped).
+  var plaintext = pbes2.pbes2Decrypt(pbes2.passwordBytes(password, _err, "key"), encAlg.parameters, ciphertext, opts, _err, "key");
   try { pkcs8.parse(plaintext); }
   catch (_e) { throw _err("key/decrypt-failed", "decryption failed"); }
   return plaintext;

package/lib/pbes2.js

@@ -145,6 +145,38 @@ function pbes2Encrypt(pwBytes, plaintext, opts, E, prefix) {
   return { algId: pbes2AlgId(salt, iterations, prf, cipherName, iv), ct: cbcEncrypt(key, iv, plaintext, keyBits) };
 }
 
+// PBES2 AES-CBC DECRYPT: parse the PBES2 params (PBKDF2 kdf + AES-CBC scheme), derive the key from
+// PRE-FORMATTED password bytes (the caller owns UTF-8 vs BMPString), and AES-CBC-decrypt. Structural faults
+// (a non-PBKDF2 KDF, a non-AES-CBC scheme, an over-cap salt/iteration, a wrong-length IV, a malformed param
+// SEQUENCE) are typed pre-derivation and password-independent, so they leak no oracle; the generic
+// <prefix>/bad-input a param guard raises is normalized to the structural <prefix>/bad-algorithm-parameters.
+// A wrong key / bad PKCS#7 pad collapses to the UNIFORM <prefix>/decrypt-failed (RFC 8018 sec. 8). The
+// plaintext integrity re-check (re-parse as a PrivateKeyInfo / SafeContents) is the CALLER's step.
+function pbes2Decrypt(pwBytes, params, ciphertext, opts, E, prefix) {
+  var keyBits, iv, pb;
+  try {
+    var p = seqChildren(params, 2, "PBES2 parameters", E, prefix);
+    var kdf = requireChildren(p[0], 2, "PBES2 keyDerivationFunc", E, prefix);
+    var encScheme = requireChildren(p[1], 2, "PBES2 encryptionScheme", E, prefix);
+    if (asn1.read.oid(kdf[0]) !== O("pbkdf2")) throw E(prefix + "/unsupported-algorithm", "the PBES2 keyDerivationFunc must be PBKDF2 (RFC 8018 sec. 6.2)");
+    pb = parsePbkdf2Params(kdf[1].bytes, opts, E, prefix, true);   // strictPrf: reject a non-canonical explicit default prf
+    var encOid = asn1.read.oid(encScheme[0]);
+    keyBits = CONTENT_KEYBITS[encOid];
+    if (!keyBits || !/CBC/.test(oid.name(encOid) || "")) throw E(prefix + "/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported PBES2 encryptionScheme " + (oid.name(encOid) || encOid) + " (AES-CBC only)");
+    iv = asn1.read.octetString(encScheme[1]);
+    if (iv.length !== 16) throw E(prefix + "/bad-algorithm-parameters", "the AES-CBC IV must be 16 octets");
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e && e.isPkiError && typeof e.code === "string" && e.code.indexOf(prefix + "/") === 0) {
+      if (e.code === prefix + "/bad-input") throw E(prefix + "/bad-algorithm-parameters", e.message, e.cause);
+      throw e;
+    }
+    throw E(prefix + "/bad-algorithm-parameters", "malformed PBES2 parameters", e);
+  }
+  var dk = nodeCrypto.pbkdf2Sync(pwBytes, pb.salt, pb.iterations, keyBits / 8, pb.prfNode);
+  try { return cbcDecrypt(dk, iv, ciphertext, keyBits); }
+  catch (_e) { throw E(prefix + "/decrypt-failed", "decryption failed"); }
+}
+
 // ---- PBMAC1 (RFC 9579 / RFC 8018 App. A.5) : PBKDF2 -> HMAC over a message --
 // An hmacWithSHA_n AlgorithmIdentifier carries NULL parameters (RFC 8018 B.1.1).
 function _hmacAlgId(name) { return b.sequence([b.oid(O(name)), b.nullValue()]); }
@@ -179,6 +211,6 @@ module.exports = {
   prfNodeByName: prfNodeByName, prfNodeByOid: prfNodeByOid,
   pbkdf2ParamsSeq: pbkdf2ParamsSeq, pbes2AlgId: pbes2AlgId, parsePbkdf2Params: parsePbkdf2Params,
   requireChildren: requireChildren, seqChildren: seqChildren,
-  cbcEncrypt: cbcEncrypt, cbcDecrypt: cbcDecrypt, pbes2Encrypt: pbes2Encrypt, CONTENT_KEYBITS: CONTENT_KEYBITS,
+  cbcEncrypt: cbcEncrypt, cbcDecrypt: cbcDecrypt, pbes2Encrypt: pbes2Encrypt, pbes2Decrypt: pbes2Decrypt, CONTENT_KEYBITS: CONTENT_KEYBITS,
   pbmac1AlgId: pbmac1AlgId, pbmac1: pbmac1,
 };

package/lib/pkcs12-build.js

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ var pbes2 = require("./pbes2");
 var pkcs8 = require("./schema-pkcs8");
 var x509 = require("./schema-x509");
 var schemaCrl = require("./schema-crl");
+var key = require("./key");
 var schemaPkcs12 = require("./schema-pkcs12");
 var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
 var guard = require("./guard-all");
@@ -428,7 +429,123 @@ function _capWork(iterations, salt, opts, keyLength, hardCap) {
   if (keyLength != null && (keyLength < 20 || keyLength > MAX_PBMAC1_KEYLEN)) throw _err("pkcs12/bad-input", "the PBMAC1 keyLength must be in [20, " + MAX_PBMAC1_KEYLEN + "] (RFC 9579 sec. 9)");
 }
 
+/**
+ * @primitive pki.pkcs12.open
+ * @signature pki.pkcs12.open(pfx, password, opts?) -> Promise<OpenResult>
+ * @since 0.3.12
+ * @status experimental
+ * @spec RFC 7292 sec. 5.1, RFC 9579, RFC 8018
+ * @defends pkcs12-unauthenticated-decrypt (CWE-347), pbes2-padding-oracle (CWE-208)
+ * @related pki.pkcs12.build, pki.pkcs12.verifyMac, pki.schema.pkcs12.parse
+ *
+ * Read a password-integrity PKCS#12 store: verify its MAC FIRST (RFC 7292 sec. 5.1 -- never trust a bag from a
+ * store whose password MAC fails), then decrypt every PBES2 privacy safe and pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag with the same
+ * password, returning a structured bundle `{ integrityMode, macVerified, keys, certs, crls, secrets }` -- each
+ * private key as PKCS#8 `PrivateKeyInfo` DER (re-validated), each certificate / CRL / secret as raw DER, all
+ * carrying their `friendlyName` / `localKeyId` for pairing. `pfx` is a DER `Buffer`, PEM string, or a
+ * `pki.schema.pkcs12.parse` result.
+ *
+ * A MAC-less store is refused (`pkcs12/no-integrity`) unless `opts.allowUnauthenticated` is set; a public-key
+ * integrity store is refused. Only PBES2 (AES-CBC) bags are decrypted -- a legacy PBE scheme is named and
+ * refused. The password is BMPString+NULL for the MAC and UTF-8 for the PBES2 bags; a wrong password fails at
+ * the MAC gate (`pkcs12/mac-mismatch`), and a post-MAC decrypt failure is the uniform `pkcs12/decrypt-failed`.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   - `allowUnauthenticated` (boolean) -- open a MAC-less store anyway (result carries `macVerified: false`).
+ *   - `maxIterations` (number) -- lower the PBKDF2 / MAC iteration cap for this call (downward-only).
+ *   - `keys` (string) -- `der` (default) or `crypto` (also `pki.key.import` each private key to a CryptoKey).
+ *   - `importAlgorithm` -- forwarded to `pki.key.import` for the ambiguous RSA / EC arms when `keys: crypto`.
+ * @example
+ *   var p12 = await pki.pkcs12.build({ key: signerKeyPkcs8, cert: signerCertDer }, { password: 'changeit' });
+ *   var store = await pki.pkcs12.open(p12, 'changeit');
+ *   var keyDer = store.keys[0].pkcs8, certDer = store.certs[0].cert;
+ */
+async function open(pfx, password, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  if (opts.maxIterations != null && (typeof opts.maxIterations !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.maxIterations) || opts.maxIterations < 1 || Math.floor(opts.maxIterations) !== opts.maxIterations)) {
+    throw _err("pkcs12/bad-input", "maxIterations must be a positive integer");
+  }
+  var m = (pfx && pfx.integrityMode !== undefined && pfx.mac !== undefined) ? pfx : schemaPkcs12.parse(_coerceDer(pfx, "pfx"));
+  if (m.integrityMode === "public-key") throw _err("pkcs12/bad-integrity-mode", "public-key-integrity (id-signedData) stores are not supported by open");
+  var macVerified = false;
+  if (m.integrityMode === "password") {
+    macVerified = await verifyMac(m, password, opts);
+    if (!macVerified) throw _err("pkcs12/mac-mismatch", "the PKCS#12 MAC did not verify (wrong password or a tampered store)");
+  } else if (!opts.allowUnauthenticated) {
+    throw _err("pkcs12/no-integrity", "the store carries no integrity MAC (integrityMode " + m.integrityMode + "); set opts.allowUnauthenticated to open it anyway");
+  }
+  // The PBES2 bag/safe password is UTF-8 (the pinned interop convention), distinct from the classic MAC BMPString.
+  var pwBytes = _pbePassword(password);
+  var out = { integrityMode: m.integrityMode, macVerified: macVerified, keys: [], certs: [], crls: [], secrets: [] };
+  var i;
+  for (i = 0; i < m.safeBags.length; i++) _openBag(m.safeBags[i], pwBytes, opts, out, 0);
+  for (i = 0; i < m.encryptedSafes.length; i++) _openEncryptedSafe(m.encryptedSafes[i], pwBytes, opts, out, 0);
+  if (opts.keys === "crypto") {
+    for (i = 0; i < out.keys.length; i++) out.keys[i].key = await key.import(out.keys[i].pkcs8, { algorithm: opts.importAlgorithm });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+function _openBag(bag, pwBytes, opts, out, depth) {
+  switch (bag.type) {
+    case "keyBag":
+      // The open contract surfaces keys[].pkcs8 as canonical PrivateKeyInfo DER (key.import re-decodes strict
+      // DER). The parser accepts a BER keyBag value, so re-parse it strictly here -- guaranteeing DER exactly as
+      // the shrouded path does via _decryptShroudedKey's pkcs8.parse. A non-DER (BER) plaintext key is refused.
+      try { pkcs8.parse(bag.keyDer); }
+      catch (e) { throw _err("pkcs12/bad-der", "a plaintext keyBag PrivateKeyInfo is not canonical DER", e); }
+      out.keys.push({ pkcs8: bag.keyDer, encrypted: false, friendlyName: bag.friendlyName, localKeyId: bag.localKeyId });
+      break;
+    case "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag":
+      out.keys.push({ pkcs8: _decryptShroudedKey(bag.encrypted, pwBytes, opts), encrypted: true, friendlyName: bag.friendlyName, localKeyId: bag.localKeyId });
+      break;
+    case "certBag":
+      out.certs.push({ cert: bag.certValue, certType: bag.certType, friendlyName: bag.friendlyName, localKeyId: bag.localKeyId });
+      break;
+    case "crlBag":
+      out.crls.push({ crl: bag.crlValue, crlType: bag.crlType, friendlyName: bag.friendlyName, localKeyId: bag.localKeyId });
+      break;
+    case "secretBag":
+      out.secrets.push({ secretTypeId: bag.secretTypeId, secretTypeName: bag.secretTypeName, secretValue: bag.secretValue, friendlyName: bag.friendlyName, localKeyId: bag.localKeyId });
+      break;
+    case "safeContentsBag":
+      if (depth + 1 > C.LIMITS.PKCS12_MAX_BAG_DEPTH) throw _err("pkcs12/too-deep", "safeContentsBag nesting exceeds the depth cap " + C.LIMITS.PKCS12_MAX_BAG_DEPTH);
+      for (var n = 0; n < (bag.nested || []).length; n++) _openBag(bag.nested[n], pwBytes, opts, out, depth + 1);
+      break;
+    default:
+      throw _err("pkcs12/bad-input", "unexpected bag type " + bag.type);
+  }
+}
+
+// A pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag is a bare EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo (RFC 5958 sec. 3): PBES2-decrypt to a PrivateKeyInfo,
+// re-validated (the re-parse is the MAC-less integrity check for the bag ciphertext).
+function _decryptShroudedKey(encrypted, pwBytes, opts) {
+  if (encrypted.encryptionAlgorithm.oid !== O("pbes2")) throw _err("pkcs12/unsupported-algorithm", "the shrouded key uses " + (encrypted.encryptionAlgorithm.name || encrypted.encryptionAlgorithm.oid) + " (only RFC 8018 PBES2 is decrypted; re-export with -keypbe AES-256-CBC)");
+  var der = pbes2.pbes2Decrypt(pwBytes, encrypted.encryptionAlgorithm.parameters, encrypted.encryptedData, opts, _err, "pkcs12");
+  try { pkcs8.parse(der); } catch (_e) { throw _err("pkcs12/decrypt-failed", "decryption failed"); }
+  return der;
+}
+
+// An id-encryptedData privacy safe: PBES2-decrypt the SafeContents, then re-walk it through the strict parser
+// (same PKCS12_MAX_* caps) and open each recovered bag.
+function _openEncryptedSafe(encSafe, pwBytes, opts, out, depth) {
+  if (encSafe.type !== "encryptedData") throw _err("pkcs12/unsupported-algorithm", "an " + encSafe.type + " privacy safe is not supported (only id-encryptedData under PBES2)");
+  var eci = encSafe.content.encryptedContentInfo;
+  if (eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm.oid !== O("pbes2")) throw _err("pkcs12/unsupported-algorithm", "the privacy safe uses " + (eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm.name || eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm.oid) + " (only RFC 8018 PBES2 is decrypted; re-export with -certpbe AES-256-CBC)");
+  if (eci.encryptedContent == null) throw _err("pkcs12/bad-input", "the encrypted privacy safe has no content");
+  var safeContentsDer = pbes2.pbes2Decrypt(pwBytes, eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm.parameters, eci.encryptedContent, opts, _err, "pkcs12");
+  // The bag/safe password MAY differ from the (already-verified) MAC password, so a decrypt under the MAC
+  // password can succeed with a valid pad yet yield bytes that are not a SafeContents. Collapse THAT re-parse
+  // failure into the same uniform pkcs12/decrypt-failed as a bad pad -- a distinguishable structural code here
+  // would be a padding oracle (RFC 8018 sec. 8). The strict walk's caps still fire (bounding the work).
+  var bags;
+  try { bags = schemaPkcs12.walkSafeContents(safeContentsDer); }
+  catch (_e) { throw _err("pkcs12/decrypt-failed", "decryption failed"); }
+  for (var i = 0; i < bags.length; i++) _openBag(bags[i], pwBytes, opts, out, depth);
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   build: build,
   verifyMac: verifyMac,
+  open: open,
 };

package/lib/schema-pkcs12.js

@@ -437,6 +437,19 @@ function _walkAuthenticatedSafe(bytes, state, ctx) {
 // carries plaintext SafeContents (re-decoded here); the two privacy modes are
 // full CMS structures validated by the CMS module on the already-decoded node
 // -- ciphertext stays opaque inside the CMS surface.
+// @internal -- re-parse a DECRYPTED privacy-safe's plaintext (a SafeContents ::= SEQUENCE OF SafeBag) through
+// the SAME strict SAFE_CONTENTS walk + bag dispatch the plaintext path uses, so a decrypted blob shares every
+// PKCS12_MAX_* cap and produces the identical bag records. Consumed by pki.pkcs12.open for an encrypted safe.
+function walkSafeContents(der) {
+  // PKCS#12 content regions are normatively BER (RFC 7292 sec. 4.1) -- a decrypted SafeContents may use an
+  // indefinite-length SEQUENCE, exactly as the plaintext-safe path (_dispatchSafes) decodes it with ber:true.
+  var walked = schema.walk(SAFE_CONTENTS, asn1.decode(der, { ber: true }), NS);
+  var state = { budget: { remaining: C.LIMITS.PKCS12_MAX_REDECODES }, bagDepth: 0 };
+  var bags = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < walked.items.length; i++) bags.push(_buildBag(walked.items[i].value.result, state, NS));
+  return bags;
+}
+
 function _dispatchSafes(asMatch, state, ctx) {
   var safeBags = [];
   var encryptedSafes = [];
@@ -476,6 +489,7 @@ function _buildBag(rec, state, ctx) {
   if (rec.bagId === OID_KEY_BAG) {
     bag.type = "keyBag";
     bag.key = pkcs8.walkPrivateKeyInfo(rec.valueNode);
+    bag.keyDer = rec.valueNode.bytes;   // the raw PrivateKeyInfo DER (pki.pkcs12.open surfaces it verbatim)
     return bag;
   }
   if (rec.bagId === OID_SHROUDED_KEY_BAG) {
@@ -621,4 +635,5 @@ module.exports = {
   pemDecode: pemDecode,
   pemEncode: pemEncode,
   matches: matches,
+  walkSafeContents: walkSafeContents,
 };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.3.11",
+  "version": "0.3.12",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:253a6908-56c1-4a56-bdf4-33cb2035a161",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:a2281c9c-5058-4827-83e2-53a8a4561863",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-07-23T22:26:59.213Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-07-24T02:15:58.035Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.3.11",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.3.12",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.3.11",
+      "version": "0.3.12",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.3.11",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.3.12",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.3.11",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.3.12",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]