@blamejs/pki 0.2.4 → 0.2.5

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## v0.2.5 — 2026-07-12
+
+WebAuthn / passkey attestation verification joins the toolkit as pki.webauthn.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.webauthn.parseAttestationObject(bytes) structurally decodes a WebAuthn attestation object (the CBOR { fmt, attStmt, authData }) and its authenticatorData over the strict pki.cbor codec, returning the format id, the decoded rpIdHash / flags / signCount, the attested credential data (aaguid, credentialId, and the decoded COSE credentialPublicKey), and the raw authenticatorData bytes a signature covers. Malformed input throws webauthn/bad-attestation-object. W3C WebAuthn Level 3.
+- pki.webauthn.verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) verifies a WebAuthn attestation statement -- packed, tpm, android-key, apple, fido-u2f, or none -- checking the attestation signature over authenticatorData || clientDataHash and each format's structural bindings (the x5c leaf key, the apple nonce, the tpm certInfo Name / extraData over the pubArea, the android KeyDescription, the fido-u2f verificationData), binding each attestation certificate key to the credential public key, and enforcing each format's certificate requirements (a packed leaf's Authenticator Attestation subject and non-CA basic constraints, a tpm AIK's empty subject and non-CA constraints). It resolves the attestation type and trust path or throws a typed webauthn/* error; a signature that does not verify is a webauthn/verify-failed verdict, never a silent pass. The error taxonomy gains WebauthnError (webauthn/*). W3C WebAuthn Level 3, RFC 9052.
+- The OID registry gains the FIDO id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid, Android key-attestation, Apple anonymous-attestation, and TCG TPM (AIK key purpose, tpmManufacturer / tpmModel / tpmVersion) arcs that WebAuthn attestation certificates carry.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The bounded big-endian byte cursor under pki.ct's TLS-vector decoding is extracted to a shared engine primitive so the packed big-endian TPM structures in pki.webauthn read through the same bounds-before-slice cursor -- one definition of the length-checked read, carrying each caller's typed error domain.
+
 ## v0.2.4 — 2026-07-12
 
 Human-readable certificate inspection joins the toolkit as pki.inspect.

package/README.md

@@ -228,8 +228,9 @@ is callable today; nothing below is a stub.
 | `pki.hpke` | Hybrid Public Key Encryption (RFC 9180) — the encrypt-to-a-public-key primitive behind TLS ECH, MLS, and OHTTP. `setupS`/`setupR` establish a sender/recipient context (KEM encapsulation + HKDF key schedule); the context's `seal`/`open` AEAD-encrypt with a sequence-counter nonce and `export` derives further secrets; `seal`/`open` are single-shot wrappers. DHKEM (P-256, P-521, X25519, X448) × HKDF-SHA256/SHA512 × AES-GCM/ChaCha20Poly1305/export-only × all four modes, proven against the RFC 9180 Appendix A vectors. DHKEM(P-384) and HKDF-SHA384 are RFC-registered but Appendix A ships no vector for them, so they fail closed until an authoritative KAT exists. Pure composition over `node:crypto`; ML-KEM / X-Wing are a registry data-row extension pending stable drafts — `suites`, `setupS`, `setupR`, `seal`, `open` |
 | `pki.sigstore` | Offline verifier for a Sigstore bundle — the exact artifact `npm publish --provenance` produces and the registry serves. `verifyBundle` composes five fail-closed legs against caller-pinned trust (Fulcio CA roots + Rekor log keys, never trusted from the bundle): the DSSE signature over its PAE preimage under the Fulcio leaf key; the ephemeral Fulcio certificate chain, validated as of the Rekor log time; the RFC 9162 inclusion proof folded to a Rekor-signed tree root; the log entry bound to this exact signature; and the in-toto SLSA subject digest the caller confirms against the published artifact. Zero runtime deps — reuses the X.509 parser, RFC 5280 path validator, and Merkle verifier; the net-new codecs are the DSSE PAE byte-builder and a fail-closed JSON reader. `pae`, `parseBundle`, `verifyBundle` |
 | `pki.inspect` | Human-readable certificate inspection — the pure-JS equivalent of `openssl x509 -text`. `certificate(pem | der | parsed)` renders a familiar OpenSSL-style report: version, serial, signature algorithm, issuer/subject distinguished names, validity, public-key details (curve or modulus size + the raw point/modulus), every decoded extension with its critical flag, and the signature. Built over the strict parser and the two-way OID registry, so it names extension and algorithm OIDs an OpenSSL build shows only as raw bytes. No OpenSSL dependency; the format is stable and OpenSSL-familiar rather than pinned to one OpenSSL version; a malformed extension falls back to a hex dump rather than throwing — `certificate` |
+| `pki.webauthn` | WebAuthn / passkey attestation verification — offline trust evaluation of a W3C WebAuthn (Level 3) attestation. `parseAttestationObject(bytes)` decodes the CBOR attestation object + authenticatorData + COSE credential key over the strict `pki.cbor` codec; `verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts)` checks the attestation-statement signature and each format's structural bindings for **packed / tpm / android-key / apple / fido-u2f / none** — the x5c leaf key, the apple nonce, the tpm `certInfo` Name/`extraData` over the `pubArea`, the android `KeyDescription`, the fido-u2f `verificationData` — binding the credential public key to each attestation (via the signed authenticatorData for packed/fido-u2f, or a cert/`pubArea`-key equality check for android-key/apple/tpm) and enforcing each leaf's certificate requirements. A verifier, not a ceremony client; fail-closed with typed `webauthn/*` errors. Chaining the returned trust path to a pinned root (and aaguid→root via FIDO MDS) is the caller's step through `pki.path.validate` — `parseAttestationObject`, `verify` |
 | `pki.C` / `pki.constants` | Version-stable constants — functional scale helpers (`C.TIME.*`, `C.BYTES.*`), codec `LIMITS`, `version` |
-| `pki.errors` | The `PkiError` taxonomy — `defineClass` plus `ConstantsError` / `Asn1Error` / `OidError` / `PemError` / `CertificateError` / `CrlError` / `CsrError` / `Pkcs8Error` / `CmsError` / `OcspError` / `TspError` / `AttrCertError` / `CrmfError` / `Pkcs12Error` / `CmpError` / `PathError` / `CtError` / `JoseError` / `AcmeError`, each carrying a stable `code` in `domain/reason` form |
+| `pki.errors` | The `PkiError` taxonomy — `defineClass` plus `ConstantsError` / `Asn1Error` / `OidError` / `PemError` / `CertificateError` / `CrlError` / `CsrError` / `Pkcs8Error` / `CmsError` / `OcspError` / `TspError` / `AttrCertError` / `CrmfError` / `Pkcs12Error` / `CmpError` / `PathError` / `CtError` / `JoseError` / `AcmeError` / `WebauthnError`, each carrying a stable `code` in `domain/reason` form |
 | `pki` CLI | `pki version`, `pki oid <dotted\|name>`, `pki parse <cert>` |
 
 ### CLI
@@ -324,7 +325,8 @@ modules reached by explicit call rather than DER routing: `pki.path` (RFC 5280
 path validation), `pki.trust` (trust anchors), `pki.ct` (Certificate Transparency
 SCTs), `pki.hpke` (RFC 9180), `pki.shbs` (HSS/LMS stateful hash signatures),
 `pki.merkle` (RFC 9162 transparency proofs), `pki.sigstore` (offline npm-provenance
-verification), and the `jose` / `acme` / `est` enrollment surfaces. Each composes
+verification), `pki.webauthn` (WebAuthn / passkey attestation verification), and the
+`jose` / `acme` / `est` enrollment surfaces. Each composes
 the shared structure, foundation, and crypto layers directly. Alongside the schema
 engine, the fail-closed **guard family** (`guard-*`) centralizes each CVE-class
 defense — detached-buffer re-view, resource caps, constant-time compares,

package/index.js

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ var jose       = require("./lib/jose");
 var acme       = require("./lib/acme");
 var trust      = require("./lib/trust");
 var inspect    = require("./lib/inspect");
+var webauthn   = require("./lib/webauthn");
 
 module.exports = {
   version:   constants.version,
@@ -116,6 +117,14 @@ module.exports = {
   // OID registry, naming extension/algorithm OIDs OpenSSL shows only as raw bytes.
   // Pure, no OpenSSL dependency; best-effort (a bad extension falls back to hex).
   inspect:   inspect,
+  // `webauthn` verifies a W3C WebAuthn / passkey attestation -- pki.webauthn.verify
+  // checks the attestation-statement signature + each format's structural bindings
+  // (packed / tpm / android-key / apple / fido-u2f / none) and surfaces the x5c chain
+  // for the caller to anchor to a pinned root via pki.path.validate; it does not
+  // itself chain to a trust anchor. parseAttestationObject structurally decodes the
+  // attestation object + authenticatorData + COSE key over the strict pki.cbor codec.
+  // A verifier, not a ceremony client; fail-closed.
+  webauthn:  webauthn,
   // A ready W3C Crypto instance (globalThis.crypto shape) with the classes for
   // constructing more attached under the same namespace (pki.webcrypto.CryptoKey,
   // .SubtleCrypto, .Crypto, .WebCryptoError). PQC-first, classical-capable, zero-dep.

package/lib/byte-reader.js

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * @internal
+ * lib/byte-reader.js -- a bounded big-endian byte cursor: the shared ENCODING-layer
+ * primitive under the toolkit's non-ASN.1 length-prefixed wire formats (TLS-vector
+ * SCTs in pki.ct, the packed big-endian TPM2B_* / authenticatorData structures in
+ * pki.webauthn). Every read is length-checked against a hard [pos, end) window
+ * BEFORE a byte is taken, so a lying inner length can overrun only the current
+ * sub-reader's `end`, never the parent buffer -- bounds-before-slice is structural,
+ * not a per-call discipline. It carries the CALLER's typed ErrorClass so every wire
+ * format keeps its own `domain/reason` fault code, exactly as the guard family does.
+ *
+ * This is an engine primitive, not a format: a new fixed-width or length-prefixed
+ * wire field is a method here (with its own bounds check), never a hand-rolled
+ * offset walk in a format module.
+ */
+
+// A bounded cursor over `buf[start, end)`, faulting through the caller's ErrorClass
+// `E` (constructed `new E(code, message)`). `defaultCode` is the fault code used
+// when a read is not given its own.
+function ByteReader(buf, start, end, E, defaultCode) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf)) throw new TypeError("ByteReader: buf must be a Buffer");
+  this.buf = buf;
+  this.pos = start | 0;
+  this.end = end == null ? buf.length : (end | 0);
+  this.E = E;
+  this.defaultCode = defaultCode || "byte-reader/truncated";
+}
+ByteReader.prototype._need = function (n, code) {
+  if (this.pos + n > this.end) {
+    throw new this.E(code || this.defaultCode, "need " + n + " byte(s), only " + (this.end - this.pos) + " remain");
+  }
+};
+ByteReader.prototype.u8 = function (code) { this._need(1, code); return this.buf[this.pos++]; };
+ByteReader.prototype.u16 = function (code) { this._need(2, code); var v = this.buf.readUInt16BE(this.pos); this.pos += 2; return v; };
+ByteReader.prototype.u24 = function (code) {
+  this._need(3, code);
+  var v = (this.buf[this.pos] << 16) | (this.buf[this.pos + 1] << 8) | this.buf[this.pos + 2];
+  this.pos += 3; return v >>> 0;
+};
+ByteReader.prototype.u32 = function (code) { this._need(4, code); var v = this.buf.readUInt32BE(this.pos); this.pos += 4; return v; };
+ByteReader.prototype.u64 = function (code) { this._need(8, code); var v = this.buf.readBigUInt64BE(this.pos); this.pos += 8; return v; };
+// A fixed-width opaque slice (zero-copy view into the backing buffer).
+ByteReader.prototype.fixed = function (n, code) {
+  this._need(n, code);
+  var s = this.buf.subarray(this.pos, this.pos + n); this.pos += n; return s;
+};
+// opaque<min..max> -- a length-prefixed vector (lenWidth-byte big-endian prefix:
+// 2 or 3). The length prefix itself is a plain read (a truncation there is the
+// default code); only a LYING length whose body overruns the bound carries `code`.
+ByteReader.prototype.vector = function (lenWidth, min, max, code) {
+  var len = lenWidth === 3 ? this.u24() : this.u16();
+  if (len < min) throw new this.E(code, "vector length " + len + " below minimum " + min);
+  if (max != null && len > max) throw new this.E(code, "vector length " + len + " above maximum " + max);
+  this._need(len, code);
+  var s = this.buf.subarray(this.pos, this.pos + len); this.pos += len; return s;
+};
+// A bounded child cursor over the next `len` bytes, sharing the same ErrorClass.
+ByteReader.prototype.subReader = function (len, code) {
+  this._need(len, code);
+  var r = new ByteReader(this.buf, this.pos, this.pos + len, this.E, this.defaultCode); this.pos += len; return r;
+};
+ByteReader.prototype.remaining = function () { return this.end - this.pos; };
+ByteReader.prototype.atEnd = function () { return this.pos === this.end; };
+
+module.exports = ByteReader;

package/lib/ct.js

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ var asn1 = require("./asn1-der.js");
 var constants = require("./constants.js");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error.js");
 var guard = require("./guard-all.js");
+var ByteReader = require("./byte-reader.js");
 
 var CtError = frameworkError.CtError;
 var C = constants;
@@ -64,44 +65,11 @@ var SCT_MIN_BODY = 47;
 var LOGID_BYTES = 32;
 var MAX_SAFE = 9007199254740991n;   // 2^53 - 1; above this a Number loses precision
 
-// ---- TlsReader -- the one net-new primitive (an ENCODING layer, not a schema
-// combinator): a bounded big-endian TLS-vector cursor with a hard [pos, end).
-// A lying inner length can overrun only the current sub-reader's `end`, never
-// the parent buffer, so bounds-before-slice is structural.
-function TlsReader(buf, start, end) { this.buf = buf; this.pos = start; this.end = end; }
-TlsReader.prototype._need = function (n, code) {
-  if (this.pos + n > this.end) {
-    throw new CtError(code || "ct/truncated", "need " + n + " byte(s), only " + (this.end - this.pos) + " remain");
-  }
-};
-TlsReader.prototype.u8 = function (code) { this._need(1, code); return this.buf[this.pos++]; };
-TlsReader.prototype.u16 = function (code) { this._need(2, code); var v = this.buf.readUInt16BE(this.pos); this.pos += 2; return v; };
-TlsReader.prototype.u24 = function (code) {
-  this._need(3, code);
-  var v = (this.buf[this.pos] << 16) | (this.buf[this.pos + 1] << 8) | this.buf[this.pos + 2];
-  this.pos += 3; return v;
-};
-TlsReader.prototype.u64 = function (code) { this._need(8, code); var v = this.buf.readBigUInt64BE(this.pos); this.pos += 8; return v; };
-TlsReader.prototype.fixed = function (n, code) {
-  this._need(n, code);
-  var s = this.buf.subarray(this.pos, this.pos + n); this.pos += n; return s;
-};
-// opaque<min..max> -- a length-prefixed vector (lenWidth-byte big-endian prefix).
-// The length prefix itself is a plain read (a truncation there is ct/truncated);
-// only a LYING length whose body overruns the bound carries the field's own code.
-TlsReader.prototype.vector = function (lenWidth, min, max, code) {
-  var len = lenWidth === 3 ? this.u24() : this.u16();
-  if (len < min) throw new CtError(code, "vector length " + len + " below minimum " + min);
-  if (max != null && len > max) throw new CtError(code, "vector length " + len + " above maximum " + max);
-  this._need(len, code);
-  var s = this.buf.subarray(this.pos, this.pos + len); this.pos += len; return s;
-};
-TlsReader.prototype.subReader = function (len, code) {
-  this._need(len, code);
-  var r = new TlsReader(this.buf, this.pos, this.pos + len); this.pos += len; return r;
-};
-TlsReader.prototype.remaining = function () { return this.end - this.pos; };
-TlsReader.prototype.atEnd = function () { return this.pos === this.end; };
+// ---- TlsReader -- the RFC 6962 TLS-vector cursor, the shared bounded big-endian
+// ByteReader engine primitive bound to the ct/* fault domain. A lying inner length
+// can overrun only the current sub-reader's `end`, never the parent buffer, so
+// bounds-before-slice is structural (see lib/byte-reader.js).
+function TlsReader(buf, start, end) { return new ByteReader(buf, start, end, CtError, "ct/truncated"); }
 
 // Peel the RFC 6962 sec. 3.3 inner DER OCTET STRING (the certificate/OCSP layer
 // already peeled the outer extnValue OCTET STRING). Rides the strict codec, so

package/lib/framework-error.js

@@ -298,6 +298,11 @@ var SigstoreError = defineClass("SigstoreError", { withCause: true });
 // whose label does not decode. Rendering itself is best-effort and never throws on
 // a malformed field -- an undecodable extension falls back to a hex dump.
 var InspectError = defineClass("InspectError", { withCause: true });
+// WebauthnError -- a malformed or unverifiable WebAuthn attestation (pki.webauthn):
+// a non-well-formed attestation object / COSE key, an authenticatorData that fails
+// its bounded layout, an attestation-statement signature that does not verify, or a
+// trust path that does not reach the caller's anchor. Fail-closed, typed reason.
+var WebauthnError = defineClass("WebauthnError", { withCause: true });
 
 module.exports = {
   PkiError:         PkiError,
@@ -325,6 +330,7 @@ module.exports = {
   HpkeError:        HpkeError,
   SigstoreError:    SigstoreError,
   InspectError:     InspectError,
+  WebauthnError:    WebauthnError,
   MerkleError:      MerkleError,
   SmimeError:       SmimeError,
   CsrattrsError:    CsrattrsError,

package/lib/oid.js

@@ -300,6 +300,30 @@ var FAMILIES = {
 
   // Misc datatypes (RFC 4519 domainComponent).
   datatype: { base: [0, 9, 2342, 19200300, 100, 1], of: { domainComponent: 25 } },
+
+  // FIDO Alliance generated-credential certificate extensions (arc
+  // 1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1). id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid carries the authenticator's
+  // AAGUID -- a WebAuthn packed-attestation leaf-cert extension (WebAuthn L3 8.2.1)
+  // whose OCTET STRING value MUST equal the attestedCredentialData aaguid.
+  fidoGenCe: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 45724, 1, 1], of: { idFidoGenCeAaguid: 4 } },
+
+  // Android Keystore key-attestation extension (arc 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1). The
+  // keyDescription extension carries the hardware-backed KeyDescription SEQUENCE a
+  // WebAuthn android-key attestation leaf cert asserts (WebAuthn L3 8.4.1).
+  androidKeystore: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 1], of: { keyDescription: 17 } },
+
+  // Apple anonymous-attestation extension (arc 1.2.840.113635.100.8). The value in
+  // a WebAuthn apple attestation leaf cert embeds the SHA-256 nonce over
+  // authenticatorData || clientDataHash (WebAuthn L3 8.8).
+  appleAttest: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113635, 100, 8], of: { appleAnonymousAttestation: 2 } },
+
+  // TCG (Trusted Computing Group) TPM identifiers on the 2.23.133 arc. tcgKp
+  // (id-tcg-kp) names the AIK-certificate extended key purpose a WebAuthn tpm
+  // attestation leaf cert MUST carry; tcgAt (id-tcg-at) names the tpmManufacturer /
+  // tpmModel / tpmVersion directory attributes its subjectAltName MUST carry
+  // (WebAuthn L3 8.3.1).
+  tcgKp: { base: [2, 23, 133, 8], of: { tcgKpAikCertificate: 3 } },
+  tcgAt: { base: [2, 23, 133, 2], of: { tpmManufacturer: 1, tpmModel: 2, tpmVersion: 3 } },
 };
 
 var _byOid = new Map();

package/lib/webauthn.js

@@ -0,0 +1,896 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * @module pki.webauthn
+ * @nav        Validation
+ * @title      WebAuthn
+ * @intro Trust evaluation of a W3C WebAuthn (Level 3) / passkey attestation: parse
+ *   the attestation object + authenticatorData, decode the COSE credential public
+ *   key, and verify each defined attestation-statement format (packed, tpm,
+ *   android-key, apple, fido-u2f, none) -- the attestation-statement signature and
+ *   each format's structural bindings. The attestation CBOR is decoded by the strict,
+ *   fail-closed `pki.cbor` codec (WebAuthn keys are CTAP2-canonical), the signature by
+ *   `pki.webcrypto`. Chaining the returned x5c trust path to a caller-pinned root via
+ *   `pki.path.validate` is the caller's step: this module verifies the statement, not
+ *   the certificate chain. A verifier, not a ceremony client: the relying party
+ *   supplies the clientDataHash + any trust anchors; this module never touches a
+ *   socket. Fail-closed -- every malformed shape or failed check throws a typed
+ *   `WebauthnError`, never a partial verdict.
+ * @spec W3C WebAuthn Level 3 sec. 6.5 / 8, RFC 9052 (COSE)
+ * @card Verify a WebAuthn / passkey attestation (packed / tpm / android-key / apple / fido-u2f / none).
+ */
+
+var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
+var cbor = require("./cbor-det");
+var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
+var x509 = require("./schema-x509");
+var pkix = require("./schema-pkix");
+var oid = require("./oid");
+var webcrypto = require("./webcrypto");
+var constants = require("./constants");
+var ByteReader = require("./byte-reader");
+var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
+
+var WebauthnError = frameworkError.WebauthnError;
+function _err(code, message, cause) { return new WebauthnError(code, message, cause); }
+// The shared certificate-extension decoder registry (keyed by OID), so an
+// attestation-certificate extension (extKeyUsage, subjectAltName) is decoded by the
+// same fail-closed pkix decoder every other format uses, not a local hand-roll.
+var NS = pkix.makeNS("webauthn", WebauthnError, oid);
+var EXT_DECODERS = pkix.certExtensionDecoders(NS).byOid;
+function _decodeExt(cert, oidName) {
+  var ext = _findExt(cert, oidName);
+  if (!ext) return null;
+  var dec = EXT_DECODERS[ext.oid];
+  if (!dec) return null;
+  return { critical: ext.critical, value: dec(ext.value) };
+}
+var subtle = webcrypto.webcrypto.subtle;
+
+// A one-shot digest over a bounded buffer (the attestation nonce / TPM Name / TPM
+// extraData preimages), by the node hash name the caller has already resolved.
+function _sha(name, buf) { return nodeCrypto.createHash(name).update(buf).digest(); }
+// Unsigned big-endian magnitude compare: strip leading zero octets, then byte-equal.
+// TPM2B buffers and COSE fixed-length coordinates can differ by a leading 0x00, so a
+// raw memcmp would spuriously reject an equal key (WebAuthn 8.3, item 22).
+function _ucmp(a, b) {
+  function strip(x) { var i = 0; while (i < x.length - 1 && x[i] === 0) i++; return x.subarray(i); }
+  return Buffer.compare(strip(a), strip(b)) === 0;
+}
+// A decoded node is a primitive universal INTEGER (so `.content` is a real buffer,
+// not null as it is for a constructed node).
+function _isInteger(node) { return !!node && !node.constructed && node.tagClass === "universal" && node.tagNumber === asn1.TAGS.INTEGER; }
+// The minimal unsigned big-endian encoding of a non-negative integer (no sign octet,
+// no leading zeros) -- for an unsigned compare against a COSE fixed-width field.
+function _uintBytes(n) {
+  var hex = n.toString(16); if (hex.length % 2) hex = "0" + hex;
+  var b = Buffer.from(hex, "hex"); var i = 0; while (i < b.length - 1 && b[i] === 0) i++; return b.subarray(i);
+}
+// COSE signature algorithm -> the node hash name of its signature scheme (the digest
+// the TPM extraData / apple nonce is taken under).
+var COSE_ALG_HASH = { "-7": "sha256", "-257": "sha256", "-37": "sha256", "-35": "sha384", "-258": "sha384", "-36": "sha512", "-259": "sha512", "-65535": "sha1" };
+function _coseAlgHash(alg, E) {
+  var h = COSE_ALG_HASH[String(alg)];
+  if (!h) throw E("webauthn/unsupported-algorithm", "no hash mapping for COSE algorithm " + alg);
+  return h;
+}
+
+// ---- CBOR map access over the strict pki.cbor node tree ----------------------
+
+// A decoded CBOR map is a node whose `children` is an array of [keyNode, valNode].
+// Look a text-keyed entry up, or null. The strict codec already rejected a
+// duplicate map key, so at most one match exists.
+function _mapGet(node, key) {
+  if (!node || node.majorType !== 5 || !node.children) return null;
+  for (var i = 0; i < node.children.length; i++) {
+    var k = node.children[i][0];
+    if (k.majorType === 3 && cbor.read.textString(k) === key) return node.children[i][1];
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+// An integer-keyed entry (COSE_Key labels are ints), by its signed value.
+function _mapGetInt(node, key) {
+  if (!node || node.majorType !== 5 || !node.children) return null;
+  for (var i = 0; i < node.children.length; i++) {
+    var k = node.children[i][0];
+    if ((k.majorType === 0 || k.majorType === 1) && cbor.read.int(k) === BigInt(key)) return node.children[i][1];
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+// ---- authenticatorData bounded reader (WebAuthn sec. 6.1) --------------------
+
+// authData = rpIdHash[32] || flags[1] || signCount[4 BE] || (AT? attestedCredentialData) || (ED? extensions CBOR).
+// A bounded big-endian read: every slice is length-checked before it is taken, so a
+// truncated / oversize field fails closed rather than reading past the buffer.
+var AAGUID_LEN = 16;
+function _parseAuthData(buf, E) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf) || buf.length < 37) throw E("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "authenticatorData is shorter than the 37-byte minimum (RFC WebAuthn sec. 6.1)");
+  var flags = buf[32];
+  var out = {
+    rpIdHash: buf.subarray(0, 32),
+    flags: { up: !!(flags & 0x01), uv: !!(flags & 0x04), be: !!(flags & 0x08), bs: !!(flags & 0x10), at: !!(flags & 0x40), ed: !!(flags & 0x80) },
+    signCount: buf.readUInt32BE(33),
+    aaguid: null, credentialId: null, credentialPublicKey: null, credentialPublicKeyBytes: null, extensions: null,
+  };
+  // Backup State is only valid when Backup Eligibility is set: a credential cannot be
+  // "backed up" if it is not "backup eligible" (WebAuthn sec. 6.1).
+  if (out.flags.bs && !out.flags.be) throw E("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "authenticatorData sets Backup State (BS) without Backup Eligibility (BE) (WebAuthn sec. 6.1)");
+  // The reserved flag bits (bit 1 = 0x02, bit 5 = 0x20) are undefined; a conforming
+  // authenticator leaves them 0. Reject a set reserved bit rather than ignore an
+  // unknown flag (WebAuthn sec. 6.1, fail-closed on undefined structure).
+  if (flags & 0x22) throw E("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "authenticatorData sets a reserved (RFU) flag bit (WebAuthn sec. 6.1)");
+  var off = 37;
+  if (out.flags.at) {
+    if (buf.length < off + AAGUID_LEN + 2) throw E("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "attestedCredentialData is truncated before the credentialId length");
+    out.aaguid = buf.subarray(off, off + AAGUID_LEN); off += AAGUID_LEN;
+    var credLen = buf.readUInt16BE(off); off += 2;
+    if (credLen < 1 || credLen > 1023) throw E("webauthn/bad-credential-id", "credentialIdLength " + credLen + " is outside 1..1023 (RFC WebAuthn sec. 6.1)");
+    if (buf.length < off + credLen) throw E("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "credentialId overruns authenticatorData");
+    out.credentialId = buf.subarray(off, off + credLen); off += credLen;
+    // credentialPublicKey is a COSE_Key: a single CBOR map occupying [off, its end).
+    var keyNode;
+    try { keyNode = cbor.decode(buf.subarray(off), { allowTrailing: true }); }
+    catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "the credential public key is not well-formed CBOR", e); }
+    out.credentialPublicKeyBytes = buf.subarray(off, off + keyNode.bytes.length);
+    out.credentialPublicKey = _decodeCoseKey(keyNode, E);
+    off += keyNode.bytes.length;
+  }
+  if (out.flags.ed) {
+    // With the ED flag set, the remainder MUST be exactly one well-formed CBOR map
+    // (the extensions); the strict decoder rejects a non-map, malformed bytes, an
+    // empty remainder, or trailing bytes (RFC WebAuthn sec. 6.1).
+    var extNode;
+    try { extNode = cbor.decode(buf.subarray(off)); }
+    catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "the authenticatorData extensions are not a single well-formed CBOR map", e); }
+    if (extNode.majorType !== 5) throw E("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "the authenticatorData extensions must be a CBOR map");
+    out.extensions = buf.subarray(off);
+  } else if (off < buf.length) {
+    // authenticatorData is fixed-layout: with the ED flag clear there MUST be no
+    // bytes after the attestedCredentialData (RFC WebAuthn sec. 6.1). Trailing
+    // bytes are a malformed structure -- fail closed rather than ignore them.
+    throw E("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "authenticatorData has trailing bytes after attestedCredentialData with the ED flag clear");
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+// ---- COSE_Key decode (WebAuthn sec. 6.5.1, RFC 9052 sec. 7) ------------------
+
+// COSE EC2 curve (label -1) -> the fixed field-element byte length its x/y carry,
+// and the named-curve OID a certificate on that curve declares.
+var EC2_CRV_LEN = { 1: 32, 2: 48, 3: 66 };   // P-256 / P-384 / P-521
+var EC2_CRV_OID = { 1: "prime256v1", 2: "secp384r1", 3: "secp521r1" };
+// COSE OKP curve (label -1) -> its RFC 8410 named-key OID + fixed public-key length.
+// Ed25519 (crv 6, 32-byte) and Ed448 (crv 7, 57-byte) both sign under COSE alg -8.
+var OKP_CRV = { 6: { oid: "Ed25519", len: 32 }, 7: { oid: "Ed448", len: 57 } };
+// The WebAuthn credential-key profile: a COSE signature algorithm (label 3) pins the
+// key type (label 1) and, for EC2, the curve -- so an EC2 key claiming EdDSA, or an
+// OKP key claiming ES256, is a profile violation (WebAuthn sec. 6.5.1, RFC 9052).
+var ALG_PROFILE = {
+  "-7": { kty: 2, crv: 1 }, "-35": { kty: 2, crv: 2 }, "-36": { kty: 2, crv: 3 },
+  "-8": { kty: 1 },
+  "-257": { kty: 3 }, "-258": { kty: 3 }, "-259": { kty: 3 }, "-37": { kty: 3 }, "-65535": { kty: 3 },
+};
+
+// kty 1 / alg 3; EC2 (kty 2): crv -1, x -2, y -3; OKP (kty 1): crv -1, x -2;
+// RSA (kty 3): n -1, e -2. Surface the raw coordinate/modulus buffers.
+function _decodeCoseKey(node, E) {
+  if (!node || node.majorType !== 5) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "a COSE_Key must be a CBOR map (RFC 9052 sec. 7)");
+  // Every parameter read maps a wrong-type cbor/* fault to the webauthn domain -- a
+  // wrong-typed COSE label (x as an integer, kty as a string) is bad-cose-key input,
+  // not a leaked codec error.
+  function ib(label) { var n = _mapGetInt(node, label); if (!n) return null; try { return cbor.read.byteString(n); } catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "COSE_Key parameter " + label + " must be a byte string", e); } }
+  function ii(label) { var n = _mapGetInt(node, label); if (!n) return null; try { return cbor.read.int(n); } catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "COSE_Key parameter " + label + " must be an integer", e); } }
+  var ktyN = _mapGetInt(node, 1), algN = _mapGetInt(node, 3);
+  if (!ktyN) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "a COSE_Key is missing the kty (label 1) parameter");
+  // The credential public key MUST declare its algorithm (label 3): a relying party
+  // needs it to verify the later assertion signature (WebAuthn sec. 6.5.1, COSE sec. 7).
+  if (!algN) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "a COSE_Key is missing the alg (label 3) parameter");
+  var kty, algv;
+  try { kty = cbor.read.int(ktyN); algv = cbor.read.int(algN); }
+  catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "COSE_Key kty (label 1) and alg (label 3) must be integers", e); }
+  var key = { kty: Number(kty), alg: Number(algv) };
+  // A credential key MUST carry every parameter its key type requires; an incomplete
+  // key (or an unknown kty) is rejected at decode rather than surfaced with null
+  // material a later binding check would have to defend against.
+  if (kty === 2n) {
+    key.crv = ii(-1) != null ? Number(ii(-1)) : null; key.x = ib(-2); key.y = ib(-3);
+    if (key.crv == null || !key.x || !key.y) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "an EC2 COSE_Key must carry crv (-1), x (-2), and y (-3)");
+    var el = EC2_CRV_LEN[key.crv];
+    if (!el || key.x.length !== el || key.y.length !== el) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "an EC2 COSE_Key x/y length is inconsistent with its curve");
+  } else if (kty === 1n) {
+    key.crv = ii(-1) != null ? Number(ii(-1)) : null; key.x = ib(-2);
+    var okp = OKP_CRV[key.crv];
+    if (!okp || !key.x || key.x.length !== okp.len) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "an OKP COSE_Key must be Ed25519 (crv 6) or Ed448 (crv 7) with a matching-length x (-2)");
+  } else if (kty === 3n) {
+    key.n = ib(-1); key.e = ib(-2);
+    if (!key.n || !key.n.length || !key.e || !key.e.length) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "an RSA COSE_Key must carry n (-1) and e (-2)");
+  } else {
+    throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "unsupported COSE_Key kty " + Number(kty));
+  }
+  // A WebAuthn credential key is the CANONICAL CTAP2 COSE_Key for its type -- exactly
+  // its defined parameters, nothing more: EC2 = { 1, 3, -1, -2, -3 } (5), OKP/RSA = 4.
+  // Extra parameters are rejected (a padded key is a canonicalization ambiguity).
+  var expectedParams = kty === 2n ? 5 : 4;
+  if (node.children.length !== expectedParams) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "the COSE_Key carries parameters beyond the canonical set for its key type (WebAuthn sec. 6.5.1)");
+  // Enforce the alg <-> kty/crv profile: the declared algorithm must match the key
+  // type (and, for EC2, the curve) it is used with.
+  var prof = ALG_PROFILE[String(key.alg)];
+  if (!prof) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "unsupported credential key algorithm " + key.alg);
+  if (prof.kty !== key.kty) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "credential key algorithm " + key.alg + " is inconsistent with key type " + key.kty);
+  if (prof.crv != null && prof.crv !== key.crv) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "credential key algorithm " + key.alg + " requires a different curve");
+  return key;
+}
+
+// ---- signature verification bridge ------------------------------------------
+
+// COSE algorithm id -> the WebCrypto import + verify descriptor. WebAuthn packed /
+// android-key / tpm ECDSA signatures are DER ECDSA-Sig-Value, so they are converted
+// to the raw r||s form pki.webcrypto (ieee-p1363) expects.
+var COSE_ALG = {
+  "-7":   { imp: { name: "ECDSA", namedCurve: "P-256" }, verify: { name: "ECDSA", hash: "SHA-256" }, ecdsa: 32 },
+  "-35":  { imp: { name: "ECDSA", namedCurve: "P-384" }, verify: { name: "ECDSA", hash: "SHA-384" }, ecdsa: 48 },
+  "-36":  { imp: { name: "ECDSA", namedCurve: "P-521" }, verify: { name: "ECDSA", hash: "SHA-512" }, ecdsa: 66 },
+  "-8":   { imp: { name: "Ed25519" }, verify: { name: "Ed25519" }, ecdsa: 0 },
+  "-257": { imp: { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5", hash: "SHA-256" }, verify: { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5" }, ecdsa: 0 },
+  "-258": { imp: { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5", hash: "SHA-384" }, verify: { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5" }, ecdsa: 0 },
+  "-259": { imp: { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5", hash: "SHA-512" }, verify: { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5" }, ecdsa: 0 },
+  "-37":  { imp: { name: "RSA-PSS", hash: "SHA-256" }, verify: { name: "RSA-PSS", saltLength: 32 }, ecdsa: 0 },
+  // RS1 (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 / SHA-1): a legacy COSE algorithm real Windows Hello TPM
+  // authenticators emit in their attestation statement. VERIFY-only support -- the
+  // toolkit never signs with SHA-1; it must still evaluate the attestations that
+  // ship using it, or a large class of TPM authenticators cannot be verified.
+  "-65535": { imp: { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5", hash: "SHA-1" }, verify: { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5" }, ecdsa: 0 },
+};
+
+// DER ECDSA-Sig-Value SEQUENCE { r INTEGER, s INTEGER } -> raw r||s, each left-
+// padded to `coordLen` (the ieee-p1363 form WebCrypto verify expects).
+function _derEcdsaToRaw(der, coordLen, E) {
+  var node;
+  try { node = asn1.decode(der); } catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/bad-signature", "ECDSA signature is not a DER SEQUENCE", e); }
+  if (node.tagClass !== "universal" || node.tagNumber !== asn1.TAGS.SEQUENCE || !node.children || node.children.length !== 2) {
+    throw E("webauthn/bad-signature", "ECDSA signature must be a DER SEQUENCE { r, s }");
+  }
+  function coord(c) {
+    // r and s MUST be primitive universal INTEGERs; a constructed child has a null
+    // content buffer, so assert the shape before touching `.content` (else a crafted
+    // SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE {}, SEQUENCE {} } would raw-throw instead of failing typed).
+    if (c.constructed || c.tagClass !== "universal" || c.tagNumber !== asn1.TAGS.INTEGER) {
+      throw E("webauthn/bad-signature", "ECDSA signature r/s must be a primitive INTEGER");
+    }
+    var b = c.content;
+    // r and s MUST be positive: an empty INTEGER, or a DER-negative one (top bit of
+    // the first content octet set, with no leading 0x00 sign octet), is not a valid
+    // ECDSA signature coordinate.
+    if (!b.length || (b[0] & 0x80)) throw E("webauthn/bad-signature", "ECDSA signature r/s must be a positive integer");
+    while (b.length > 1 && b[0] === 0x00) b = b.subarray(1);   // strip the DER sign octet
+    if (b.length === 1 && b[0] === 0x00) throw E("webauthn/bad-signature", "ECDSA signature r/s must be a positive integer");   // reject zero
+    if (b.length > coordLen) throw E("webauthn/bad-signature", "ECDSA signature coordinate exceeds the curve field size");
+    var out = Buffer.alloc(coordLen); b.copy(out, coordLen - b.length); return out;
+  }
+  return Buffer.concat([coord(node.children[0]), coord(node.children[1])]);
+}
+
+// Verify `sig` over `message` with the SPKI public key `spkiBytes` under COSE `alg`.
+// A wrong signature resolves `false` from subtle.verify without throwing (a false
+// verdict is a verdict); a structural failure -- an unimportable key, a bad
+// descriptor -- is re-thrown as a typed fail-closed error, never masked as false.
+function _verifySig(alg, sig, spkiBytes, message, E) {
+  var d = COSE_ALG[String(alg)];
+  if (!d) throw _err("webauthn/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported COSE algorithm " + alg);
+  var imp = d.imp, ver = d.verify;
+  // COSE alg -8 (EdDSA) covers Ed25519 and Ed448; the WebCrypto name follows the
+  // signing key's own SPKI algorithm OID, not the (curve-agnostic) alg id.
+  if (alg === -8) { var nm = _edName(spkiBytes, E); imp = { name: nm }; ver = { name: nm }; }
+  var s = d.ecdsa ? _derEcdsaToRaw(sig, d.ecdsa, E) : sig;
+  return subtle.importKey("spki", spkiBytes, imp, false, ["verify"])
+    .then(function (key) { return subtle.verify(ver, key, s, message); })
+    .catch(function (e) { throw _err("webauthn/verify-error", "the attestation signature could not be evaluated", e); });
+}
+// The WebCrypto EdDSA name (Ed25519 / Ed448) an SPKI declares via its algorithm OID.
+var ED_OID_NAME = {};
+ED_OID_NAME[oid.byName("Ed25519")] = "Ed25519";
+ED_OID_NAME[oid.byName("Ed448")] = "Ed448";
+function _edName(spkiBytes, E) {
+  var algOid;
+  try { algOid = asn1.read.oid(asn1.decode(spkiBytes).children[0].children[0]); }
+  catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/bad-signature", "the EdDSA public key is not a well-formed SPKI", e); }
+  var nm = ED_OID_NAME[algOid];
+  if (!nm) throw E("webauthn/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported EdDSA curve OID " + algOid);
+  return nm;
+}
+
+// COSE EC2 / RSA credential key -> a self-contained SPKI the WebCrypto import
+// consumes, so a credential public key and a certificate key verify by one path.
+function _coseKeyToSpki(key, E) {
+  if (key.kty === 2 && key.x && key.y) {
+    var curveOid = key.crv === 1 ? "prime256v1" : key.crv === 2 ? "secp384r1" : key.crv === 3 ? "secp521r1" : null;
+    if (!curveOid) throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "unsupported EC2 curve " + key.crv);
+    var b = asn1.build;
+    return b.sequence([
+      b.sequence([b.oid(oid.byName("ecPublicKey")), b.oid(oid.byName(curveOid))]),
+      b.bitString(Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x04]), key.x, key.y])),
+    ]);
+  }
+  if (key.kty === 3 && key.n && key.n.length && key.e && key.e.length) {
+    var bb = asn1.build;
+    return bb.sequence([
+      bb.sequence([bb.oid(oid.byName("rsaEncryption")), bb.nullValue()]),
+      bb.bitString(bb.sequence([bb.integer(BigInt("0x" + key.n.toString("hex"))), bb.integer(BigInt("0x" + key.e.toString("hex")))])),
+    ]);
+  }
+  if (key.kty === 1 && OKP_CRV[key.crv] && key.x && key.x.length === OKP_CRV[key.crv].len) {
+    // OKP Ed25519 / Ed448: the SPKI is AlgorithmIdentifier { id-Ed* } (no parameters)
+    // over the raw public key -- RFC 8410.
+    var eb = asn1.build;
+    return eb.sequence([eb.sequence([eb.oid(oid.byName(OKP_CRV[key.crv].oid))]), eb.bitString(key.x)]);
+  }
+  throw E("webauthn/bad-cose-key", "cannot build an SPKI for this COSE key type");
+}
+
+// The attestation-certificate subject public key MUST equal the credential public
+// key that authenticatorData carries (WebAuthn 8.4/8.8 item 30). Compare the raw
+// key material unsigned: an EC2 uncompressed point's X/Y vs the COSE x/y; an RSA
+// modulus/exponent vs the COSE n/e. `cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey.bytes` is
+// the BIT STRING key material the SPKI carries.
+// The named-curve OID a certificate's EC SubjectPublicKeyInfo declares (the DER
+// OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the algorithm parameters). Fail-closed: absent or malformed
+// curve parameters throw a typed key-mismatch -- never swallowed to a null the
+// caller would compare as "no match by default".
+function _certEcCurveOid(cert, E) {
+  var params = cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo && cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm && cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.parameters;
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(params)) throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate EC key carries no named-curve parameters");
+  try { return asn1.read.oid(asn1.decode(params)); }
+  catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate EC curve is not a valid OBJECT IDENTIFIER", e); }
+}
+// A void assert: throws webauthn/key-mismatch on any inequality, returns nothing on
+// success (called for its throw side-effect, like the other _check* asserts).
+function _certPubKeyEqualsCose(cert, cose, E) {
+  var raw = cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo && cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey && cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey.bytes;
+  if (!raw) throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate exposes no public key");
+  if (cose.kty === 2) {
+    // The certificate's declared EC curve MUST equal the credential key's curve --
+    // a curve substitution is a different key even if the coordinate bytes line up.
+    var wantCurve = EC2_CRV_OID[cose.crv];
+    if (!wantCurve) throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "unsupported credential EC curve " + cose.crv);
+    if (_certEcCurveOid(cert, E) !== oid.byName(wantCurve)) throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate EC curve does not equal the credential key curve");
+    if (raw.length < 1 || raw[0] !== 0x04) throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate key is not an uncompressed EC point");
+    var coordLen = (raw.length - 1) >> 1;
+    var cx = raw.subarray(1, 1 + coordLen), cy = raw.subarray(1 + coordLen);
+    if (!cose.x || !cose.y || !_ucmp(cx, cose.x) || !_ucmp(cy, cose.y)) throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate EC key does not equal the credential public key");
+    return;
+  }
+  if (cose.kty === 3) {
+    var seq;
+    try { seq = asn1.decode(raw); } catch (e) { throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate RSA key is not decodable", e); }
+    // RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { modulus INTEGER, publicExponent INTEGER }; both
+    // MUST be primitive INTEGERs (a constructed child has a null content buffer).
+    if (!seq.children || seq.children.length !== 2 || !_isInteger(seq.children[0]) || !_isInteger(seq.children[1])) {
+      throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate RSA key is malformed");
+    }
+    var n = seq.children[0].content, ee = seq.children[1].content;
+    if (!cose.n || !cose.e || !_ucmp(n, cose.n) || !_ucmp(ee, cose.e)) throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate RSA key does not equal the credential public key");
+    return;
+  }
+  if (cose.kty === 1) {
+    // OKP Ed25519 / Ed448: the SPKI BIT STRING body IS the raw public key (fixed
+    // width, so a byte-exact compare, not a leading-zero-stripping unsigned compare).
+    if (!cose.x || !Buffer.from(raw).equals(cose.x)) throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the attestation certificate OKP key does not equal the credential public key");
+    return;
+  }
+  throw E("webauthn/key-mismatch", "unsupported credential key type for the certificate comparison");
+}
+
+// ---- TPM structure readers (WebAuthn 8.3; TCG TPM 2.0 Part 2) ----------------
+// Every field is unsigned big-endian, packed with no padding; every TPM2B_* is a
+// UINT16 size followed by exactly `size` bytes. The bare certInfo (TPMS_ATTEST) and
+// pubArea (TPMT_PUBLIC) carry NO outer TPM2B size prefix.
+var TPM_GENERATED_VALUE = 0xff544347;
+var TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY = 0x8017;
+var TPM_ALG = { RSA: 0x0001, SHA1: 0x0004, SHA256: 0x000b, SHA384: 0x000c, SHA512: 0x000d, NULL: 0x0010, ECC: 0x0023 };
+var TPM_ALG_HASH = {}; TPM_ALG_HASH[TPM_ALG.SHA1] = "sha1"; TPM_ALG_HASH[TPM_ALG.SHA256] = "sha256"; TPM_ALG_HASH[TPM_ALG.SHA384] = "sha384"; TPM_ALG_HASH[TPM_ALG.SHA512] = "sha512";
+// TPM_ECC_CURVE -> COSE crv (the codepoints differ; this is a mapping, not equality).
+var TPM_CURVE_TO_COSE = {}; TPM_CURVE_TO_COSE[0x0003] = 1; TPM_CURVE_TO_COSE[0x0004] = 2; TPM_CURVE_TO_COSE[0x0005] = 3;
+
+function _tpmReader(buf) { return new ByteReader(buf, 0, buf.length, WebauthnError, "webauthn/bad-tpm"); }
+
+// TPMT_PUBLIC (WebAuthn 8.3 item 17-20): decode type/nameAlg + the public key in
+// `unique`, walking past `parameters` per the algorithm union.
+function _parseTpmPubArea(buf) {
+  var r = _tpmReader(buf);
+  var type = r.u16(), nameAlg = r.u16();
+  r.u32();                       // objectAttributes (full policy validation deferred)
+  r.vector(2, 0, null);          // authPolicy TPM2B_DIGEST
+  var pub = { type: type, nameAlg: nameAlg, nameAlgBytes: buf.subarray(2, 4) };
+  if (type === TPM_ALG.RSA) {
+    _tpmSymDef(r);               // symmetric TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT
+    _tpmScheme(r);               // scheme TPMT_RSA_SCHEME
+    r.u16();                     // keyBits
+    var exp = r.u32();           // exponent (0 => default 65537)
+    pub.exponent = exp === 0 ? 65537 : exp;
+    pub.rsa = r.vector(2, 0, null);   // unique TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA (the modulus)
+  } else if (type === TPM_ALG.ECC) {
+    _tpmSymDef(r);               // symmetric
+    _tpmScheme(r);               // scheme TPMT_ECC_SCHEME
+    pub.curveId = r.u16();       // curveID TPMI_ECC_CURVE
+    _tpmScheme(r);               // kdf TPMT_KDF_SCHEME
+    pub.x = r.vector(2, 0, null);     // unique.ecc.x TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER
+    pub.y = r.vector(2, 0, null);     // unique.ecc.y TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER
+  } else {
+    throw _err("webauthn/bad-tpm", "unsupported TPMT_PUBLIC type 0x" + type.toString(16));
+  }
+  // TPMT_PUBLIC ends with `unique`; trailing bytes mean a malformed pubArea (and
+  // would perturb the TPM Name hash), so fail closed rather than silently ignore them.
+  if (!r.atEnd()) throw _err("webauthn/bad-tpm", "pubArea has trailing bytes after the unique field (WebAuthn 8.3)");
+  return pub;
+}
+// TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT: algorithm UINT16; when not NULL, keyBits+mode follow. An
+// attestation (restricted signing) key is NULL, so the non-NULL arm is defensive.
+function _tpmSymDef(r) { if (r.u16() !== TPM_ALG.NULL) { r.u16(); r.u16(); } }
+// TPMT_*_SCHEME / TPMT_KDF_SCHEME: scheme UINT16; when not NULL, a TPMS_SCHEME_HASH
+// (a single UINT16 hashAlg) follows for the signing/kdf schemes in scope.
+function _tpmScheme(r) { if (r.u16() !== TPM_ALG.NULL) { r.u16(); } }
+
+// TPMS_ATTEST (WebAuthn 8.3 item 13-15): magic/type + extraData + attested.name.
+// The whole certInfo is walked -- through qualifiedName and to the end -- so a
+// certInfo with trailing bytes past the TPMS_CERTIFY_INFO union fails closed.
+function _parseTpmCertInfo(buf) {
+  var r = _tpmReader(buf);
+  var magic = r.u32(), type = r.u16();
+  r.vector(2, 0, null);          // qualifiedSigner TPM2B_NAME
+  var extraData = r.vector(2, 0, null);   // extraData TPM2B_DATA
+  r.u64(); r.u32(); r.u32(); r.u8();      // clockInfo TPMS_CLOCK_INFO (17 bytes)
+  r.u64();                       // firmwareVersion
+  var name = r.vector(2, 0, null);        // attested.name TPM2B_NAME (nameAlg||H)
+  r.vector(2, 0, null);          // attested.qualifiedName TPM2B_NAME
+  if (!r.atEnd()) throw _err("webauthn/bad-tpm", "certInfo has trailing bytes after the attested structure (WebAuthn 8.3)");
+  return { magic: magic, type: type, extraData: extraData, attestedName: name };
+}
+
+// ---- extension helpers -------------------------------------------------------
+// `oidName` is a registered name (byName resolves it at call time); an unregistered
+// name is a programming error that surfaces as an undefined target, never swallowed.
+function _findExt(cert, oidName) {
+  var target = oid.byName(oidName);
+  return (cert.extensions || []).filter(function (e) { return e.oid === target; })[0] || null;
+}
+// AuthorizationList (Android key attestation) is a SEQUENCE of [tag] EXPLICIT
+// OPTIONAL fields with non-contiguous tag numbers; return the EXPLICIT-unwrapped
+// value node for a tag, or null when absent (a tolerant, skip-unknown scan).
+function _alGet(seqNode, tag) {
+  if (!seqNode || !seqNode.children) return null;
+  for (var i = 0; i < seqNode.children.length; i++) {
+    var c = seqNode.children[i];
+    if (c.tagClass === "context" && c.tagNumber === tag) return c.children && c.children[0] ? c.children[0] : c;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+// ---- public: parseAttestationObject -----------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * @primitive pki.webauthn.parseAttestationObject
+ * @signature pki.webauthn.parseAttestationObject(bytes) -> { fmt, attStmt, authData, authDataBytes }
+ * @since 0.2.5
+ * @status experimental
+ * @spec W3C WebAuthn Level 3 sec. 6.5.4 / 6.1
+ * @related pki.webauthn.verify
+ *
+ * Structurally decode a WebAuthn attestation object (the CBOR `{fmt, attStmt,
+ * authData}`) and its authenticatorData, fail-closed. `authData` carries the decoded
+ * rpIdHash / flags / signCount and, when the AT flag is set, the attestedCredentialData
+ * (aaguid, credentialId, and the decoded COSE `credentialPublicKey`). `authDataBytes`
+ * is the raw authenticatorData -- the exact bytes an attestation signature covers.
+ * A malformed object throws `webauthn/bad-attestation-object`.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var att = pki.webauthn.parseAttestationObject(attestationObject);
+ *   att.fmt;                               // "packed"
+ *   att.authData.credentialPublicKey.kty;  // 2 (EC2)
+ */
+function parseAttestationObject(bytes) {
+  var root;
+  try { root = cbor.decode(bytes); } catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-attestation-object", "the attestation object is not well-formed CBOR", e); }
+  if (root.majorType !== 5) throw _err("webauthn/bad-attestation-object", "the attestation object must be a CBOR map { fmt, attStmt, authData }");
+  var fmtN = _mapGet(root, "fmt"), attStmtN = _mapGet(root, "attStmt"), authDataN = _mapGet(root, "authData");
+  // The attestation object is EXACTLY { fmt, attStmt, authData } -- no more, no fewer
+  // (WebAuthn 6.5.4); an extra top-level key is a non-canonical envelope, rejected.
+  if (root.children.length !== 3 || !fmtN || !attStmtN || !authDataN) throw _err("webauthn/bad-attestation-object", "the attestation object must be exactly { fmt, attStmt, authData }");
+  if (fmtN.majorType !== 3) throw _err("webauthn/bad-attestation-object", "attestation object 'fmt' must be a text string");
+  if (authDataN.majorType !== 2) throw _err("webauthn/bad-attestation-object", "attestation object 'authData' must be a byte string");
+  var authDataBytes = cbor.read.byteString(authDataN);
+  return {
+    fmt: cbor.read.textString(fmtN),
+    attStmt: attStmtN,
+    authData: _parseAuthData(authDataBytes, _err),
+    authDataBytes: authDataBytes,
+  };
+}
+
+// ---- attestation-format verifiers -------------------------------------------
+
+function _reqAttr(map, key) {
+  var n = _mapGet(map, key);
+  if (!n) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "the attestation statement is missing the '" + key + "' field");
+  return n;
+}
+// Read a required attStmt field of an expected CBOR type, mapping a wrong-type
+// cbor/* fault to the webauthn domain (an attStmt field is not-well-formed input to
+// this layer, so it is a webauthn/bad-att-stmt verdict, not a leaked codec error).
+function _attRead(map, key, reader, what) {
+  var n = _reqAttr(map, key);
+  try { return reader(n); }
+  catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "the attestation statement '" + key + "' must be " + what, e); }
+}
+function _algOf(attStmt) { return Number(_attRead(attStmt, "alg", cbor.read.int, "an integer")); }
+function _sigOf(attStmt) { return _attRead(attStmt, "sig", cbor.read.byteString, "a byte string"); }
+// A format's attStmt is its CANONICAL field set: every present key must be in
+// `allowed`, and every key in `required` must be present. An unexpected field is a
+// non-canonical statement, rejected before any field is trusted (WebAuthn sec. 8.*).
+function _requireAttShape(attStmt, allowed, required) {
+  var have = {};
+  if (attStmt && attStmt.children) attStmt.children.forEach(function (kv) {
+    // attStmt keys are text strings; a non-text key is a malformed statement,
+    // rejected (not silently skipped, which would evade the unexpected-field check).
+    if (kv[0].majorType !== 3) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "the attestation statement has a non-text-string field key");
+    have[cbor.read.textString(kv[0])] = true;
+  });
+  Object.keys(have).forEach(function (k) { if (allowed.indexOf(k) === -1) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "the attestation statement carries an unexpected field '" + k + "'"); });
+  required.forEach(function (k) { if (!have[k]) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "the attestation statement is missing the '" + k + "' field"); });
+}
+function _readX5c(attStmt) {
+  var x5cN = _mapGet(attStmt, "x5c");
+  if (!x5cN || x5cN.majorType !== 4 || !x5cN.children || !x5cN.children.length) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "x5c must be a non-empty array of certificates");
+  return x5cN.children.map(function (c) {
+    var der;
+    try { der = cbor.read.byteString(c); } catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "an x5c entry must be a byte string", e); }
+    try { return x509.parse(der); } catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "an x5c certificate is not a well-formed X.509 certificate", e); }
+  });
+}
+// Every attestation leaf cert MUST be an X.509 v3 certificate (WebAuthn 8.2.1 /
+// 8.3.1 / 8.4). The chain to a trust anchor is the caller's to run through
+// pki.path.validate with a supplied root; a bare chain is surfaced in trustPath.
+function _requireV3(cert) {
+  if (cert.version !== 3) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "an attestation certificate must be X.509 version 3");
+}
+// A packed / tpm attestation LEAF certificate MUST carry a basicConstraints
+// extension asserting cA=false (WebAuthn 8.2.1 / 8.3.1). Requiring the extension --
+// not merely rejecting a present cA=true -- is the gate that stops a genuine CA
+// certificate under the caller's pinned root, or a leaf that simply omits the
+// constraint, from being repurposed as an attestation leaf; RFC 5280 path validation
+// does not reject a CA-asserting or unconstrained leaf.
+function _assertNotCa(cert) {
+  var bc = _decodeExt(cert, "basicConstraints");
+  if (!bc) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "an attestation leaf certificate MUST carry a basicConstraints extension (WebAuthn 8.2.1 / 8.3.1)");
+  if (bc.value && bc.value.cA === true) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "an attestation leaf certificate MUST NOT be a CA (basicConstraints cA=true)");
+}
+// Packed attestation certificate requirements (WebAuthn 8.2.1): v3, non-CA, and the
+// subject set to C (country), O (organization), OU = "Authenticator Attestation",
+// and CN (a vendor string).
+function _checkPackedCert(cert) {
+  _requireV3(cert);
+  _assertNotCa(cert);
+  var have = {};
+  (cert.subject.rdns || []).forEach(function (rdn) { rdn.forEach(function (a) { have[a.type] = a.value; }); });
+  if (have[oid.byName("countryName")] == null || have[oid.byName("organizationName")] == null || have[oid.byName("commonName")] == null) {
+    throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the packed attestation certificate subject MUST set C, O, OU, and CN (WebAuthn 8.2.1)");
+  }
+  if (have[oid.byName("organizationalUnitName")] !== "Authenticator Attestation") {
+    throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the packed attestation certificate subject OU MUST be \"Authenticator Attestation\" (WebAuthn 8.2.1)");
+  }
+}
+var AAGUID_EXT_OID = oid.byName("idFidoGenCeAaguid");   // a registered name, resolved at load
+// The id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid extension value (when present) MUST equal the
+// attestedCredentialData aaguid, and it MUST NOT be critical (WebAuthn 8.2.1).
+function _checkAaguidExt(cert, aaguid) {
+  var ext = (cert.extensions || []).filter(function (e) { return e.oid === AAGUID_EXT_OID; })[0];
+  if (!ext) return;   // absence is tolerated; presence must match
+  if (ext.critical) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid extension MUST NOT be critical (WebAuthn 8.2.1)");
+  var val;
+  try { val = asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(ext.value)); }
+  catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid extension value is not a valid OCTET STRING", e); }
+  if (!val.equals(aaguid)) throw _err("webauthn/aaguid-mismatch", "the id-fido-gen-ce-aaguid extension value does not equal the authenticatorData aaguid");
+}
+
+var VERIFIERS = {
+  // packed (WebAuthn 8.2): the x5c arm (Basic/AttCA) or self-attestation.
+  packed: function (att, clientDataHash) {
+    var isX5c = !!_mapGet(att.attStmt, "x5c");
+    _requireAttShape(att.attStmt, isX5c ? ["alg", "sig", "x5c"] : ["alg", "sig"], isX5c ? ["alg", "sig", "x5c"] : ["alg", "sig"]);
+    var alg = _algOf(att.attStmt), sig = _sigOf(att.attStmt);
+    var message = Buffer.concat([att.authDataBytes, clientDataHash]);
+    if (isX5c) {
+      var chain = _readX5c(att.attStmt), leaf = chain[0];
+      _checkPackedCert(leaf);   // 8.2.1: v3, non-CA, OU=Authenticator Attestation
+      return _verifySig(alg, sig, leaf.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes, message, _err).then(function (ok) {
+        if (!ok) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "the packed attestation signature does not verify under the x5c leaf key");
+        _checkAaguidExt(leaf, att.authData.aaguid);
+        return _result("packed", "Basic", chain, att);
+      });
+    }
+    // Self-attestation: the statement alg MUST equal the credential key's own alg
+    // (WebAuthn 8.2), then sig verifies under the credential key itself.
+    if (alg !== att.authData.credentialPublicKey.alg) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "the packed self-attestation alg does not match the credential public key algorithm (WebAuthn 8.2)");
+    var spki = _coseKeyToSpki(att.authData.credentialPublicKey, _err);
+    return _verifySig(alg, sig, spki, message, _err).then(function (ok) {
+      if (!ok) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "the packed self-attestation signature does not verify under the credential key");
+      return _result("packed", "Self", [], att);
+    });
+  },
+
+  // fido-u2f (WebAuthn 8.6): reconstruct the U2F verificationData and verify with
+  // the single x5c cert. The credential key MUST be EC2/P-256.
+  "fido-u2f": function (att, clientDataHash) {
+    _requireAttShape(att.attStmt, ["sig", "x5c"], ["sig", "x5c"]);
+    var chain = _readX5c(att.attStmt);
+    if (chain.length !== 1) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "fido-u2f x5c MUST contain exactly one certificate (WebAuthn 8.6)");
+    // WebAuthn 8.6 does not require a version-3 certificate for fido-u2f (unlike the
+    // packed 8.2.1 / tpm 8.3.1 leaves), so a legacy v1 U2F attestation cert is valid.
+    var leaf = chain[0];
+    var sig = _sigOf(att.attStmt);
+    var key = att.authData.credentialPublicKey;
+    if (key.kty !== 2 || key.crv !== 1 || !key.x || !key.y || key.x.length !== 32 || key.y.length !== 32) {
+      throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "fido-u2f requires an EC2 P-256 credential public key (WebAuthn 8.6)");
+    }
+    var publicKeyU2F = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x04]), key.x, key.y]);
+    var verificationData = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x00]), att.authData.rpIdHash, clientDataHash, att.authData.credentialId, publicKeyU2F]);
+    return _verifySig(-7, sig, leaf.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes, verificationData, _err).then(function (ok) {
+      if (!ok) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "the fido-u2f attestation signature does not verify under the x5c leaf key");
+      return _result("fido-u2f", "Basic", chain, att);
+    });
+  },
+
+  // apple (WebAuthn 8.8): the binding is the SHA-256 nonce over authData ||
+  // clientDataHash embedded in the leaf cert; there is no signature field.
+  apple: function (att, clientDataHash) {
+    _requireAttShape(att.attStmt, ["alg", "x5c"], ["x5c"]);   // alg optional, ignored
+    var chain = _readX5c(att.attStmt), leaf = chain[0];
+    _requireV3(leaf);
+    var nonce = _sha("sha256", Buffer.concat([att.authDataBytes, clientDataHash]));
+    var ext = _findExt(leaf, "appleAnonymousAttestation");
+    if (!ext) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the apple attestation certificate is missing the anonymous-attestation extension (WebAuthn 8.8)");
+    var embedded = _appleNonce(ext.value);
+    if (!embedded.equals(nonce)) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "the apple attestation nonce does not equal SHA-256(authData || clientDataHash)");
+    _certPubKeyEqualsCose(leaf, att.authData.credentialPublicKey, _err);   // 8.8 item 30
+    return Promise.resolve(_result("apple", "AnonCA", chain, att));
+  },
+
+  // android-key (WebAuthn 8.4): verify sig with the leaf key, bind the leaf key to
+  // the credential key, and enforce the four KeyDescription checks (8.4.1).
+  "android-key": function (att, clientDataHash) {
+    _requireAttShape(att.attStmt, ["alg", "sig", "x5c"], ["alg", "sig", "x5c"]);
+    var chain = _readX5c(att.attStmt), leaf = chain[0];
+    _requireV3(leaf);
+    var alg = _algOf(att.attStmt), sig = _sigOf(att.attStmt);
+    var message = Buffer.concat([att.authDataBytes, clientDataHash]);
+    return _verifySig(alg, sig, leaf.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes, message, _err).then(function (ok) {
+      if (!ok) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "the android-key attestation signature does not verify under the x5c leaf key");
+      _certPubKeyEqualsCose(leaf, att.authData.credentialPublicKey, _err);
+      _checkAndroidKeyDescription(leaf, clientDataHash);   // 8.4.1
+      return _result("android-key", "Basic", chain, att);
+    });
+  },
+
+  // tpm (WebAuthn 8.3): decode certInfo/pubArea, enforce magic/type/extraData/Name,
+  // bind pubArea to the credential key, and verify sig over certInfo with the AIK.
+  tpm: function (att, clientDataHash) {
+    _requireAttShape(att.attStmt, ["ver", "alg", "sig", "certInfo", "pubArea", "x5c"], ["ver", "alg", "sig", "certInfo", "pubArea", "x5c"]);
+    var verN = _mapGet(att.attStmt, "ver");
+    if (!verN || verN.majorType !== 3 || cbor.read.textString(verN) !== "2.0") throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "tpm attestation 'ver' MUST be \"2.0\" (WebAuthn 8.3)");
+    var alg = _algOf(att.attStmt), sig = _sigOf(att.attStmt);
+    var pubAreaBytes = _attRead(att.attStmt, "pubArea", cbor.read.byteString, "a byte string");
+    var certInfoBytes = _attRead(att.attStmt, "certInfo", cbor.read.byteString, "a byte string");
+    var chain = _readX5c(att.attStmt), aik = chain[0];
+    _requireV3(aik);
+
+    var pub = _parseTpmPubArea(pubAreaBytes);
+    _tpmPubKeyEqualsCose(pub, att.authData.credentialPublicKey);   // 8.3 item 22
+
+    var certInfo = _parseTpmCertInfo(certInfoBytes);
+    if (certInfo.magic !== TPM_GENERATED_VALUE) throw _err("webauthn/bad-tpm", "certInfo magic is not TPM_GENERATED_VALUE (WebAuthn 8.3)");
+    if (certInfo.type !== TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY) throw _err("webauthn/bad-tpm", "certInfo type is not TPM_ST_ATTEST_CERTIFY (WebAuthn 8.3)");
+
+    // extraData == hash_alg(authData || clientDataHash) (bare digest, no method id).
+    var attToBeSigned = Buffer.concat([att.authDataBytes, clientDataHash]);
+    if (!certInfo.extraData.equals(_sha(_coseAlgHash(alg, _err), attToBeSigned))) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "certInfo extraData does not equal the hash of authData || clientDataHash");
+
+    // attested.name == nameAlg || H_nameAlg(pubArea).
+    var nameHash = TPM_ALG_HASH[pub.nameAlg];
+    if (!nameHash) throw _err("webauthn/bad-tpm", "unsupported TPM nameAlg 0x" + pub.nameAlg.toString(16));
+    var computedName = Buffer.concat([pub.nameAlgBytes, _sha(nameHash, pubAreaBytes)]);
+    if (!certInfo.attestedName.equals(computedName)) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "certInfo attested Name does not match the pubArea TPM Name");
+
+    // WebAuthn 8.3 verification step: "Verify the sig is a valid signature over
+    // certInfo ... with the algorithm specified in alg" -- sig is verified DIRECTLY
+    // with alg, not parsed as a TPMT_SIGNATURE and unwrapped. The attStmt-syntax
+    // "in the form of a TPMT_SIGNATURE" is a description of the byte string; real
+    // authenticators put the raw signature here (the interop KAT's tpm sig is a bare
+    // 256-byte RSASSA signature that verifies as-is), and the reference verifier
+    // (py_webauthn) verifies it directly with alg the same way.
+    return _verifySig(alg, sig, aik.subjectPublicKeyInfo.bytes, certInfoBytes, _err).then(function (ok) {
+      if (!ok) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "the tpm attestation signature does not verify over certInfo under the AIK");
+      _checkAikCert(aik);   // 8.3.1
+      _checkAaguidExt(aik, att.authData.aaguid);   // 8.3.1: aaguid ext, if present, MUST match
+      return _result("tpm", "AttCA", chain, att);
+    });
+  },
+
+  // none (WebAuthn 8.7): the authenticator provides no attestation. attStmt MUST be
+  // an empty map; there is no statement to verify, so the result carries no trust
+  // path. The credential public key still binds via authenticatorData (AT flag).
+  none: function (att) {
+    // attStmt MUST BE an empty CBOR map -- reject a missing, non-map, or non-empty
+    // attStmt, not only a non-empty map (WebAuthn 8.7).
+    if (!att.attStmt || att.attStmt.majorType !== 5 || (att.attStmt.children && att.attStmt.children.length !== 0)) {
+      throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-stmt", "the none attestation statement MUST be an empty map (WebAuthn 8.7)");
+    }
+    return Promise.resolve(_result("none", "None", [], att));
+  },
+};
+
+// `chain` is the x5c order (leaf-first); trustPath is surfaced in pki.path.validate
+// order (anchor-adjacent first, target/leaf last) so the caller passes it straight
+// to the path validator without re-ordering. The input array is not mutated.
+function _result(fmt, attestationType, chain, att) {
+  return { verified: true, fmt: fmt, attestationType: attestationType, trustPath: (chain || []).slice().reverse(), aaguid: att.authData.aaguid, credentialPublicKey: att.authData.credentialPublicKey };
+}
+
+// pubArea public key == credentialPublicKey (unsigned compare; WebAuthn 8.3 item 22).
+function _tpmPubKeyEqualsCose(pub, cose) {
+  if (pub.type === TPM_ALG.ECC) {
+    if (cose.kty !== 2 || TPM_CURVE_TO_COSE[pub.curveId] !== cose.crv || !_ucmp(pub.x, cose.x || Buffer.alloc(0)) || !_ucmp(pub.y, cose.y || Buffer.alloc(0))) {
+      throw _err("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the TPM pubArea EC key does not equal the credential public key");
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  if (pub.type === TPM_ALG.RSA) {
+    // Compare the exponent as an unsigned integer over its FULL width (a UINT32 up to
+    // 0xFFFFFFFF); a fixed 3-byte re-encode would silently truncate an exponent
+    // > 0xFFFFFF and let a mismatched key pass (WebAuthn 8.3 item 22).
+    var e = _uintBytes(pub.exponent >>> 0);
+    if (cose.kty !== 3 || !_ucmp(pub.rsa, cose.n || Buffer.alloc(0)) || !_ucmp(e, cose.e || Buffer.alloc(0))) {
+      throw _err("webauthn/key-mismatch", "the TPM pubArea RSA key does not equal the credential public key");
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  throw _err("webauthn/bad-tpm", "unsupported TPM pubArea key type");
+}
+
+// Decode the Apple extension AppleAnonymousAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { nonce [1]
+// EXPLICIT OCTET STRING } (WebAuthn 8.8 item 29) and return the 32-byte nonce.
+function _appleNonce(extValue) {
+  var seq;
+  try { seq = asn1.decode(extValue); } catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the apple attestation extension is not decodable", e); }
+  var tagged = seq.children && seq.children[0];
+  if (!tagged || tagged.tagClass !== "context" || tagged.tagNumber !== 1 || !tagged.children || !tagged.children[0]) {
+    throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the apple attestation extension is not SEQUENCE { [1] OCTET STRING }");
+  }
+  try { return asn1.read.octetString(tagged.children[0]); } catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the apple attestation nonce is not an OCTET STRING", e); }
+}
+
+// The four Android KeyDescription checks (WebAuthn 8.4.1 item 28).
+function _checkAndroidKeyDescription(cert, clientDataHash) {
+  var ext = _findExt(cert, "keyDescription");
+  if (!ext) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the android-key attestation certificate is missing the key-description extension (WebAuthn 8.4.1)");
+  var kd;
+  try { kd = asn1.decode(ext.value); } catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the android KeyDescription is not decodable", e); }
+  if (!kd.children || kd.children.length < 8) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the android KeyDescription is not a positional 8-field SEQUENCE");
+  // (1) attestationChallenge (position 4) == clientDataHash.
+  var challenge;
+  try { challenge = asn1.read.octetString(kd.children[4]); } catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the android attestationChallenge is not an OCTET STRING", e); }
+  if (!challenge.equals(clientDataHash)) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "the android attestationChallenge does not equal clientDataHash");
+  var softwareEnforced = kd.children[6], hardwareEnforced = kd.children[7];
+  // (2) [600] allApplications MUST be ABSENT in both lists.
+  if (_alGet(softwareEnforced, 600) || _alGet(hardwareEnforced, 600)) throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "android allApplications MUST be absent (WebAuthn 8.4.1)");
+  // (3)+(4) origin == KM_ORIGIN_GENERATED (0) and purpose == exactly {KM_PURPOSE_SIGN}
+  // (2), evaluated over the UNION of the teeEnforced and softwareEnforced lists --
+  // the WebAuthn 8.4.1 default (a teeEnforced-only policy is the caller's opt-in).
+  // Origin: at least one list MUST declare it, and EVERY list that declares one MUST
+  // say GENERATED -- a mixed teeEnforced=IMPORTED / softwareEnforced=GENERATED key is
+  // contradictory and rejected, not accepted on the strength of one list.
+  var origins = [_alGet(softwareEnforced, 702), _alGet(hardwareEnforced, 702)].filter(Boolean);
+  if (!origins.length || !origins.every(function (o) { return _alInt(o) === 0n; })) {
+    throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "android key origin is not KM_ORIGIN_GENERATED in every authorization list that declares it (WebAuthn 8.4.1)");
+  }
+  var purposes = _purposeUnion(softwareEnforced, hardwareEnforced);
+  if (purposes.length !== 1 || purposes[0] !== 2n) {
+    throw _err("webauthn/verify-failed", "android key purpose is not exactly KM_PURPOSE_SIGN (WebAuthn 8.4.1)");
+  }
+}
+// Read an android KeyDescription authorization INTEGER, mapping a wrong-type asn1/*
+// fault to the webauthn domain (a malformed authorization value is bad-att-cert input
+// to this layer, not a leaked codec error).
+function _alInt(node) {
+  try { return asn1.read.integer(node); }
+  catch (e) { throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "an android KeyDescription authorization value is not an INTEGER", e); }
+}
+// The union of the [1] purpose (SET OF INTEGER) values across both authorization
+// lists -- an attestation key MUST be usable for SIGN and nothing else.
+function _purposeUnion(a, b) {
+  var out = [];
+  [a, b].forEach(function (list) {
+    var p = _alGet(list, 1);
+    if (p && p.children) p.children.forEach(function (c) { var v = _alInt(c); if (out.indexOf(v) === -1) out.push(v); });
+  });
+  return out;
+}
+
+// AIK-certificate requirements (WebAuthn 8.3.1): non-CA, an empty subject, the tcg
+// AIK-certificate EKU, and the tcg tpmManufacturer/tpmModel/tpmVersion subjectAltName
+// directory attributes.
+function _checkAikCert(cert) {
+  _assertNotCa(cert);
+  if ((cert.subject.rdns || []).length !== 0) throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the tpm AIK certificate subject MUST be empty (WebAuthn 8.3.1)");
+  var eku = _decodeExt(cert, "extKeyUsage");
+  if (!eku || !Array.isArray(eku.value) || eku.value.indexOf(oid.byName("tcgKpAikCertificate")) === -1) {
+    throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the tpm AIK certificate lacks the tcg-kp-AIKCertificate extended key purpose (WebAuthn 8.3.1)");
+  }
+  var san = _decodeExt(cert, "subjectAltName");
+  var dirName = san && san.value && san.value.names && san.value.names.filter(function (n) { return n.tagNumber === 4; })[0];
+  var types = {};
+  if (dirName && dirName.value && dirName.value.rdns) {
+    dirName.value.rdns.forEach(function (rdn) { rdn.forEach(function (a) { types[a.type] = true; }); });
+  }
+  if (!types[oid.byName("tpmManufacturer")] || !types[oid.byName("tpmModel")] || !types[oid.byName("tpmVersion")]) {
+    throw _err("webauthn/bad-att-cert", "the tpm AIK certificate subjectAltName lacks the required tcg attributes (WebAuthn 8.3.1)");
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive pki.webauthn.verify
+ * @signature pki.webauthn.verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) -> Promise<{ verified, fmt, attestationType, trustPath, aaguid, credentialPublicKey }>
+ * @since 0.2.5
+ * @status experimental
+ * @spec W3C WebAuthn Level 3 sec. 8
+ * @related pki.webauthn.parseAttestationObject
+ *
+ * Verify a WebAuthn attestation statement: the attestation signature over
+ * `authenticatorData || clientDataHash` and (for the x5c formats) the format's
+ * certificate requirements. `clientDataHash` is the SHA-256 of the serialized client
+ * data, supplied by the relying party. Resolves the attestation type + trust path or
+ * throws a typed `webauthn/*` error; a signature that does not verify is a
+ * `webauthn/verify-failed` verdict, never a silent pass.
+ *
+ * @intro This verifies the attestation STATEMENT -- the signature and the format's
+ *   structural bindings (the x5c leaf key == credential key, the apple nonce, the tpm
+ *   certInfo Name/extraData, the android KeyDescription, the fido-u2f verificationData).
+ *   Chaining the returned `trustPath` (the x5c certificates in `pki.path.validate`
+ *   order -- anchor-adjacent first, leaf last) to a trusted root is the caller's
+ *   step: anchor it with `pki.path.validate` against roots you pin. Resolving an
+ *   authenticator's root from its aaguid via the FIDO Metadata Service, plus the
+ *   chain-to-anchor call, are not built in yet -- re-open when the caller supplies an
+ *   explicit trusted-root set or a FIDO MDS BLOB (`opts.mdsBlob`) to bind the path.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var res = await pki.webauthn.verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, {});
+ *   res.verified;         // true (statement signature + bindings hold)
+ *   res.attestationType;  // "Basic"
+ *   // anchor res.trustPath to your pinned roots with pki.path.validate
+ */
+function verify(attestationObject, clientDataHash, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(clientDataHash) || clientDataHash.length !== 32) {
+    return Promise.reject(_err("webauthn/bad-input", "clientDataHash must be a 32-byte SHA-256 digest"));
+  }
+  var att;
+  try { att = parseAttestationObject(attestationObject); } catch (e) { return Promise.reject(e); }
+  // A registration attestation MUST carry attestedCredentialData (the AT flag): the
+  // whole point is to bind the attestation to a credential public key. Reject an
+  // AT-clear authenticatorData up front -- else the packed x5c arm could resolve a
+  // positive verdict bound to NO credential, and every arm would dereference the
+  // null credential key with a raw (untyped) throw (WebAuthn 6.1 / 7.1).
+  if (!att.authData.flags.at || !att.authData.credentialPublicKey) {
+    return Promise.reject(_err("webauthn/bad-auth-data", "attestation requires attestedCredentialData (the AT flag must be set)"));
+  }
+  var verifier = VERIFIERS[att.fmt];
+  if (!verifier) return Promise.reject(_err("webauthn/unsupported-format", "attestation statement format '" + att.fmt + "' is not supported"));
+  return Promise.resolve().then(function () { return verifier(att, clientDataHash, opts); });
+}
+
+void constants;
+
+module.exports = {
+  parseAttestationObject: parseAttestationObject,
+  verify: verify,
+};

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.2.4",
+  "version": "0.2.5",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:8b4b818c-aa9b-48e0-bee9-d1588bcc6621",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:0c805130-1ce6-499f-b389-67252a2e8b93",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-07-12T18:33:27.056Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-07-13T00:36:23.753Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.2.4",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.2.5",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.2.4",
+      "version": "0.2.5",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.2.4",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.2.5",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.2.4",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.2.5",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]