@blamejs/pki 0.2.22 → 0.2.23

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,7 +4,17 @@ All notable changes to `@blamejs/pki` are documented here. The format
 follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); this
 project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
-## v0.2.22 — 2026-07-16
+## v0.2.23 — 2026-07-16
+
+CMS content encryption arrives as pki.cms.encrypt and pki.cms.decrypt: EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData, and EncryptedData with every RFC 5652 recipient type -- RSA-OAEP, ephemeral-static ECDH, X25519/X448, symmetric key-wrap, password, and post-quantum ML-KEM (RFC 9629/9936) -- and a single, oracle-free decryption verdict.
+
+### Added
+
+- pki.cms.encrypt(content, recipients, opts) produces a CMS EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the default), or EncryptedData. Recipients auto-dispatch off the certificate key: RSA -> ktri RSAES-OAEP-SHA256/384/512 (v1.5 never emitted); EC P-256/384/521 -> kari ephemeral-static ECDH with the ANSI-X9.63 KDF; X25519/X448 -> kari with HKDF (RFC 8418); ML-KEM-512/768/1024 -> ori/KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936). A { password } recipient uses PBKDF2 + the RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK; a { kek, kekId } recipient uses AES key wrap. EncryptedData takes a raw { cek } or a PBES2 { password }. Content is AES-128/192/256-GCM or -CBC; the same fresh content-encryption key is wrapped for every recipient. Fail-closed with typed CmsError.
+- pki.cms.decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts) decrypts an EnvelopedData / AuthEnvelopedData / EncryptedData (DER or PEM). It selects the recipient the key material { key, cert } / { password } / { kek } / { cek } targets, acquires the content-encryption key through the matching arm (RSA-OAEP or PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure, ECDH / X25519 / X448, AES key-unwrap, PBKDF2, ML-KEM decapsulation), and decrypts + authenticates the content -- returning { content, contentType, contentTypeName, recipientType, recipientIndex, contentEncryptionAlgorithm, authenticated }. Every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform cms/decrypt-failed verdict (Bleichenbacher / EFAIL / password-oracle freedom); a PBKDF2 iteration cap bounds password-based decryption work.
+- The WebCrypto engine gains ML-KEM key encapsulation (SubtleCrypto.encapsulateBits / decapsulateBits over FIPS 203) and the ANSI-X9.63 single-step key-derivation function (the X963KDF derive algorithm), the two primitives the post-quantum and elliptic-curve CMS recipient arms compose.
+
+## v0.2.22 — 2026-07-15
 
 The RFC 6960 OCSP producer and relying-party surface arrives as pki.ocsp: build and sign OCSP requests and responses, mint unsigned error responses, and verify a response end to end against the same hardened responder-authorization, signature, CertID, currency, and nonce gates the certification-path revocation checker runs.
 

package/README.md

@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ is callable today; nothing below is a stub.
 | `pki.schema.smime` | Decode S/MIME ESS signed-attribute values (RFC 5035 / RFC 8551) — `parseSigningCertificate` / `parseSigningCertificateV2` bind a signature to its signing certificate (cert hash, hash algorithm, issuer `GeneralNames` + serial), `parseSmimeCapabilities` decodes the ordered capability list, and `decodeAttribute` OID-dispatches a CMS attribute (enforcing the single-value rule, recognize-and-defer for unknown types). A companion decoder for CMS signed attributes, not an auto-routed format, fail-closed — `parseSigningCertificate`, `parseSigningCertificateV2`, `parseSmimeCapabilities`, `decodeAttribute` |
 | `pki.schema.engine` | The declarative ASN.1 structure-schema engine every format parser composes — `walk` / `encode` / `embeddedDer` plus the schema combinators |
 | `pki.path` | RFC 5280 §6 certification-path validation — `validate` runs the §6.1 state machine (signature chaining across RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and hybrid composite ML-DSA signatures — a composite is accepted only when **both** its post-quantum and traditional components verify; validity windows, name chaining, basic constraints and path length, key usage, name constraints, the certificate-policy tree) over an ordered path and a trust anchor, returning a structured verdict with per-check reason codes, and enforces a `pki.trust` anchor's per-purpose distrust-after dates and delegator purposes via `checkPurpose`; `crlChecker` supplies CRL-based revocation — including partitioned/sharded CRLs, whose §6.3.3 Distribution Point ↔ IDP correspondence lets a corresponding full-reason shard establish non-revocation — and `ocspChecker` supplies OCSP-based revocation (RFC 6960 — CertID binding, responder authorization, signature, currency) over the same pluggable hook. Pure and re-entrant, fail-closed — `validate`, `crlChecker`, `ocspChecker` |
-| `pki.cms` | RFC 5652 §5 CMS SignedData signing + signature verification — `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (attached or detached, one or many signers, RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA (pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA / ECDSA / EdDSA — accepted only when **both** components verify — draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs)); it builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: when signed attributes are present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate; it does not chain that certificate to a trust anchor — that is the caller's step through `pki.path.validate`. Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify` |
+| `pki.cms` | RFC 5652 §5 CMS SignedData signing + signature verification — `sign(content, signers, opts)` produces a SignedData (attached or detached, one or many signers, RSA / RSASSA-PSS / ECDSA / EdDSA, the post-quantum ML-DSA-44/65/87 (RFC 9882) and SLH-DSA (all twelve FIPS 205 sets, RFC 9814), and composite ML-DSA (pairing ML-DSA with a traditional RSA / ECDSA / EdDSA — accepted only when **both** components verify — draft-ietf-lamps-cms-composite-sigs)); it builds the signed attributes (content-type, message-digest, signing-time) as canonical DER, signs the exact §5.4 preimage, and emits a DER `Buffer` or PEM. `verify(input, opts)` parses a SignedData over the strict `pki.schema.cms` codec, locates each SignerInfo's signer certificate by its issuerAndSerialNumber or subjectKeyIdentifier, and checks the signature over the exact §5.4 preimage: when signed attributes are present it confirms the message-digest attribute equals the content digest and verifies over the DER re-encoding of the SignedAttributes (the on-wire `[0]` tag replaced by a universal SET OF), otherwise directly over the content. It returns a per-signer verdict with the matched signer certificate; it does not chain that certificate to a trust anchor — that is the caller's step through `pki.path.validate`. **Content encryption** (RFC 5652/5083/5084/9629): `encrypt(content, recipients, opts)` produces an EnvelopedData, AuthEnvelopedData (AES-GCM, the authenticated default), or EncryptedData — recipients auto-dispatch off the certificate key to key-transport (RSAES-OAEP; v1.5 never emitted), key-agreement (ephemeral-static ECDH over P-256/384/521 with the X9.63 KDF, and X25519/X448 with HKDF), symmetric key-wrap, password (PBKDF2 + RFC 3211 PWRI-KEK), or the post-quantum ML-KEM KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629/9936) — one fresh content key wrapped for every recipient. `decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts)` recovers the content through the matching arm and returns it with an `authenticated` flag; every secret-dependent failure collapses to one uniform `cms/decrypt-failed` verdict (Bleichenbacher / EFAIL / password-oracle freedom), and PKCS#1 v1.5 is decrypt-only under the RFC 3218 implicit-rejection countermeasure. Fail-closed with typed `cms/*` errors — `sign`, `verify`, `encrypt`, `decrypt` |
 | `pki.tsp` | RFC 3161 Time-Stamp Protocol — `sign(messageImprint, tsa, opts)` produces a TimeStampToken: a CMS SignedData (over `pki.cms.sign`) whose content is a `TSTInfo` carrying the timestamped message imprint, the TSA policy, a serial number, and `genTime` (with optional accuracy / nonce / ordering), plus the RFC 3161 §2.4.2 signing-certificate attribute binding the token to the TSA certificate (SHA-2 imprints, any `pki.cms.sign` TSA key). `request` / `parseRequest` build and parse the TimeStampReq a client sends (imprint, requested policy, nonce, certReq), `response` / `parseResponse` the TimeStampResp a TSA returns — a granted status wrapping a token, or a rejection with PKIStatus and failure info, the §2.4.2 status↔token coupling enforced in both directions. `verify(token, data, opts)` verifies a token fail-closed: the CMS signature over the exact signed bytes, the message imprint recomputed from the data, the TSTInfo content type, the ESSCertID(V2) binding to the TSA certificate, the §2.3 critical timeStamping-only extendedKeyUsage, the request nonce when used, and — with a trust anchor supplied — full certification-path validation of the TSA certificate at the token's `genTime`, returning `{ valid, genTime, serialNumber, tstInfo, … }` — `sign`, `request`, `parseRequest`, `response`, `parseResponse`, `verify` |
 | `pki.ocsp` | RFC 6960 Online Certificate Status Protocol — the responder and relying-party surface. `buildRequest(query, opts)` builds an OCSPRequest for one or more `{ cert, issuer }` pairs (CertID hashed under SHA-1 by default per the RFC 5019 lightweight profile, or SHA-2; optional RFC 9654 nonce, optional requestor signature). `sign(responseData, responder, opts)` produces a signed BasicOCSPResponse over the exact `ResponseData` DER — the issuing CA directly or a delegated responder, any `pki.cms.sign` key including the post-quantum ML-DSA / SLH-DSA sets, with `good` / `revoked` (reason + time) / `unknown` per-certificate status, and `buildErrorResponse(status)` the unsigned §2.3 error (`tryLater` / `unauthorized` / …). `verify(response, opts)` verifies a response fail-closed against the same hardened gates `pki.path.ocspChecker` runs: the CertID binding, responder authorization (the issuing CA or a CA-issued delegate bearing id-kp-OCSPSigning **and** id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck, passing the full out-of-path certificate gates), the signature over `tbsResponseDataBytes`, currency (`thisUpdate`/`nextUpdate`), and the request-nonce echo — returning `{ status: "good" / "revoked" / "unknown", … }`, never a silent accept. Transport-free — `buildRequest`, `sign`, `buildErrorResponse`, `verify` |
 | `pki.ct` | RFC 6962 Certificate Transparency SCTs — `parseSctList` decodes the `SignedCertificateTimestampList` a certificate or OCSP response carries in the SCT extension (a TLS-presentation-language payload inside the §3.3 double DER wrap) into per-SCT log id, exact `timestamp` (BigInt), named signature algorithm, and raw signature; `reconstructSignedData` rebuilds the exact `digitally-signed` preimage; `verifySct` verifies an SCT signature against a log's public key by reconstructing the signed data, routing an ECDSA signature through the strict DER-conformance gate, and verifying through the crypto engine — resolving true or false, and throwing a typed error on a structural fault. Structure decoded, crypto fail-closed — `parseSctList`, `reconstructSignedData`, `verifySct` |

package/lib/cms-decrypt.js

@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
+"use strict";
+//
+// @internal -- the pki.cms.decrypt implementation. The operator-facing @module pki.cms + the
+// @primitive pki.cms.decrypt block live in cms-verify.js, which re-exports this function.
+//
+// CMS EnvelopedData / AuthEnvelopedData / EncryptedData decryption (RFC 5652/5083/5084/3560/5753/
+// 8418/9629/9936/3211/8018), the consuming side of pki.cms.encrypt. Three stages behind ONE
+// oracle-free choke point: (1) SELECT the recipient (identifier matching -- typed + distinct),
+// (2) ACQUIRE the CEK (per-arm unwrap/decap/derive), (3) OPEN the content (AEAD verify / CBC
+// decrypt+unpad). Every secret-dependent failure in stages 2-3 collapses to the SINGLE uniform
+// verdict `cms/decrypt-failed` (Bleichenbacher / EFAIL / PWRI-check-byte oracle freedom); the
+// ktri v1.5 arm substitutes a random CEK on any decode fault (RFC 3218 implicit rejection) so its
+// failure emerges at stage 3 identically to every other bad-key path.
+
+var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
+var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
+var oid = require("./oid");
+var x509 = require("./schema-x509");
+var pkcs8 = require("./schema-pkcs8");
+var schemaCms = require("./schema-cms");
+var webcrypto = require("./webcrypto");
+var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
+var guard = require("./guard-all");
+var C = require("./constants");
+var b = asn1.build;
+var subtle = webcrypto.webcrypto.subtle;
+var CmsError = frameworkError.CmsError;
+var WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS = schemaCms.WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS;
+var KEM_CT_LENGTHS = schemaCms.KEM_CT_LENGTHS;
+
+function O(n) { return oid.byName(n); }
+function _err(code, message, cause) { return new CmsError(code, message, cause); }
+// The ONE uniform secret-dependent-failure verdict. No cause chaining that distinguishes the site.
+function _fail() { return new CmsError("cms/decrypt-failed", "the CMS content could not be decrypted (uniform by design -- padding / integrity / key-unwrap failures are indistinguishable to defeat oracles)"); }
+
+var CONTENT_KEYBITS = {}; // content-encryption OID -> key bits
+[["aes128-CBC", 128], ["aes192-CBC", 192], ["aes256-CBC", 256], ["aes128-GCM", 128], ["aes192-GCM", 192], ["aes256-GCM", 256]].forEach(function (r) { CONTENT_KEYBITS[O(r[0])] = r[1]; });
+
+// ---- entry -----------------------------------------------------------------
+async function decrypt(input, keyMaterial, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  if (keyMaterial == null || typeof keyMaterial !== "object") throw _err("cms/bad-input", "decrypt requires a key-material object");
+  var parsed = _parse(input);
+  var ct = parsed.contentTypeName;
+  if (ct === "encryptedData") return _decryptEncryptedData(parsed, keyMaterial, opts);
+  if (ct !== "envelopedData" && ct !== "authEnvelopedData") throw _err("cms/bad-input", "input is not an EnvelopedData / AuthEnvelopedData / EncryptedData (got " + ct + ")");
+
+  var recips = parsed.recipientInfos || [];
+  var candidates = _selectCandidates(recips, keyMaterial, opts);   // stage 1 (typed, distinct)
+  var eci = parsed.encryptedContentInfo;
+  // Password- and KEK-based recipients carry no rid, so several may match the same key material; try
+  // each until one yields a CEK that opens the content. A single candidate propagates its exact
+  // verdict; multiple ambiguous candidates collapse to the uniform verdict so nothing is leaked.
+  for (var ci = 0; ci < candidates.length; ci++) {
+    try {
+      _assertSupported(candidates[ci].ri, keyMaterial);                    // distinct-code reject (MQV / non-KEM ori)
+      var cek = await _acquireCek(candidates[ci].ri, keyMaterial, opts);   // stage 2 (uniform)
+      var content = await _openContent(parsed, eci, cek, ct);              // stage 3 (uniform)
+      return {
+        content: content,
+        contentType: eci.contentType, contentTypeName: oid.name(eci.contentType) || eci.contentType,
+        recipientType: candidates[ci].ri.type, recipientIndex: candidates[ci].index,
+        contentEncryptionAlgorithm: eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm.name || eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm.oid,
+        authenticated: ct === "authEnvelopedData",
+      };
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (candidates.length === 1) throw e;   // one candidate: preserve its exact (distinct or uniform) verdict
+    }
+  }
+  throw _fail();   // every ambiguous candidate failed -> uniform, leaking nothing about which
+}
+
+function _parse(input) {
+  // Always drive the strict parser over caller-supplied bytes -- an arbitrary object that merely
+  // carries a contentTypeName is not a trusted parse result and must not bypass DER validation.
+  return schemaCms.parse(_toDer(input));
+}
+function _toDer(input) {
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(input)) return input;
+  if (input instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(input);
+  if (typeof input === "string") { try { return schemaCms.pemDecode(input); } catch (e) { throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the CMS PEM could not be decoded", e); } }
+  throw _err("cms/bad-input", "input must be a DER Buffer, Uint8Array, or PEM string");
+}
+
+// ---- stage 1: recipient selection (NOT secret-dependent) -------------------
+// Returns every recipient the key material may target. An explicit recipientIndex or an rid match
+// yields exactly one; unlabelled pwri / kekri recipients yield all matches for the caller to try.
+function _selectCandidates(recips, km, opts) {
+  if (!recips.length) throw _err("cms/no-matching-recipient", "the message carries no RecipientInfos");
+  if (opts.recipientIndex != null) {
+    var i = opts.recipientIndex;
+    if (typeof i !== "number" || !isFinite(i) || i < 0 || i >= recips.length || Math.floor(i) !== i) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "recipientIndex must be an in-range integer");
+    return [{ ri: recips[i], index: i }];
+  }
+  var want = _riKindForKey(km);
+  var cert = km.cert != null ? x509.parse(_normCertDer(km.cert)) : null;
+  var out = [];
+  for (var k = 0; k < recips.length; k++) {
+    var r = recips[k];
+    if (want === "asym" && (r.type === "ktri" || r.type === "kari" || r.type === "ori")) {
+      if (cert && _ridMatches(r, cert)) out.push({ ri: r, index: k });   // a cert may match several recipients
+    } else if (want === "pwri" && r.type === "pwri") { out.push({ ri: r, index: k }); }
+    else if (want === "kekri" && r.type === "kekri") {
+      if (km.kekId == null || _kekIdMatches(r, km.kekId)) out.push({ ri: r, index: k });
+    }
+  }
+  if (!out.length) throw _err("cms/no-matching-recipient", "no recipient matches the supplied key material");
+  return out;
+}
+function _riKindForKey(km) {
+  if (km.password != null) return "pwri";
+  if (km.kek != null) return "kekri";
+  if (km.key != null) return "asym";
+  throw _err("cms/bad-input", "key material needs { key, cert }, { password }, { kek }, or { cek }");
+}
+function _assertSupported(ri, km) {
+  if (ri.type === "kari" && ri.keyEncryptionAlgorithm && /mqv/i.test(ri.keyEncryptionAlgorithm.name || "")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "ECMQV kari is not supported");
+  if (ri.type === "ori") {
+    if (ri.oriType !== O("kem")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-recipient-type", "unsupported OtherRecipientInfo type " + ri.oriType);
+    if (ri.kemri && ri.kemri.kem && ri.kemri.kem.oid === O("id-kem-rsa")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "RSA-KEM is not supported");
+  }
+  void km;
+}
+
+function _ridMatches(ri, cert) {
+  // A kari carries a RecipientEncryptedKey per agreeing recipient (RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.2); this
+  // recipient may be at ANY position, so match against every rek, not just element 0.
+  if (ri.type === "kari") return !!_kariRekFor(ri, cert);
+  var rid = ri.rid || (ri.kemri && ri.kemri.rid);
+  if (!rid) return false;
+  return _ridEq(rid, cert);
+}
+function _kariRekFor(ri, cert) {
+  var reks = ri.recipientEncryptedKeys || [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < reks.length; i++) if (reks[i].rid && _ridEq(reks[i].rid, cert)) return reks[i];
+  return null;
+}
+function _ridEq(rid, cert) {
+  if (rid.issuer && rid.serialNumber != null) {
+    try { return guard.name.dnEqual(cert.issuer.rdns, rid.issuer.rdns, _err, "cms/bad-input", "recipient issuer") && cert.serialNumber === rid.serialNumber; }
+    catch (_e) { return false; }
+  }
+  if (rid.subjectKeyIdentifier) { var ski = _skiOf(cert); return !!ski && Buffer.compare(ski, rid.subjectKeyIdentifier) === 0; }
+  return false; // coverage residual: unreachable -- a parsed rid is always issuerAndSerialNumber or a SKI form
+}
+function _skiOf(cert) {
+  var exts = cert.extensions || [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < exts.length; i++) if (exts[i].name === "subjectKeyIdentifier" && exts[i].value != null) {
+    try { return asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(exts[i].value)); } catch (e) { throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the certificate's subjectKeyIdentifier extension is malformed", e); }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function _kekIdMatches(ri, kekId) {
+  var id = ri.kekid && ri.kekid.keyIdentifier;
+  if (!id) return false;
+  return Buffer.compare(id, guard.bytes.view(kekId, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", "kekId")) === 0;
+}
+
+// Codes that name a structural / resource / config fault and MUST NOT be masked by the uniform
+// secret-dependent verdict (they leak nothing about the key or plaintext).
+var _passThrough = { "cms/unsupported-algorithm": 1, "cms/unsupported-recipient-type": 1, "cms/bad-input": 1, "cms/iteration-limit": 1, "cms/missing-key-derivation": 1, "cms/no-encrypted-content": 1 };
+
+// ---- stage 2: acquire the CEK (uniform failure) ----------------------------
+async function _acquireCek(ri, km, opts) {
+  try {
+    if (ri.type === "ktri") return await _ktriCek(ri, km);
+    if (ri.type === "kari") return await _kariCek(ri, km);
+    if (ri.type === "kekri") return await _kekriCek(ri, km);
+    if (ri.type === "pwri") return await _pwriCek(ri, km, opts);
+    if (ri.type === "ori") return await _kemriCek(ri, km);
+  } catch (e) {
+    // Structural / resource / config faults keep their own code -- only SECRET-DEPENDENT failures
+    // (a bad unwrap, a wrong key, a padding fault) collapse to the uniform verdict.
+    if (e instanceof CmsError && _passThrough[e.code]) throw e;
+    throw _fail();
+  }
+  // Coverage residual: unreachable -- _selectCandidates only returns one of the five handled types.
+  throw _err("cms/unsupported-recipient-type", "unsupported recipient type " + ri.type);
+}
+
+// ktri: OAEP or PKCS#1 v1.5 (v1.5 = decrypt-only + RFC 3218 implicit rejection).
+async function _ktriCek(ri, km) {
+  var kea = ri.keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+  var keyDer = _normKeyDer(km.key);
+  if (kea.oid === O("rsaesOaep")) {
+    var hash = _oaepHashFromParams(kea.parameters);
+    var pub = await subtle.importKey("pkcs8", keyDer, { name: "RSA-OAEP", hash: hash }, false, ["decrypt"]);
+    return Buffer.from(await subtle.decrypt({ name: "RSA-OAEP" }, pub, ri.encryptedKey));
+  }
+  if (kea.oid === O("rsaEncryption")) {
+    // RFC 3218 sec. 2.3.2 implicit rejection: NEVER surface a v1.5 failure here. Any decode fault
+    // yields a fresh random CEK of the content-alg length; the mismatch emerges at stage 3.
+    var keyObj = nodeCrypto.createPrivateKey({ key: keyDer, format: "der", type: "pkcs8" });
+    try { return nodeCrypto.privateDecrypt({ key: keyObj, padding: nodeCrypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING }, ri.encryptedKey); }
+    catch (_e) { return null; } // signal: use a random CEK (length decided at open time)
+  }
+  // Coverage residual: reachable only from a hostile message (our encrypt emits only OAEP; OpenSSL
+  // emits OAEP or rsaEncryption) -- a fail-closed reject the fuzz harness exercises.
+  throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported ktri keyEncryptionAlgorithm " + kea.oid);
+}
+
+// kari: reconstruct Z from the originatorKey + recipient private key, KDF -> KEK, AES-KW unwrap.
+async function _kariCek(ri, km) {
+  var keyDer = _normKeyDer(km.key);
+  var kea = ri.keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+  var wrapAlg = _kariWrap(kea);
+  var scheme = kea.oid;
+  var origSpki = _originatorSpki(ri.originator);
+  // Unwrap THIS recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey (matched by rid), not element 0 -- a kari may list
+  // several recipients under one ephemeral key.
+  var rek = (km.cert != null && _kariRekFor(ri, x509.parse(_normCertDer(km.cert)))) || ri.recipientEncryptedKeys[0];
+  var kekBytes = WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS[wrapAlg.oid];
+  if (!kekBytes) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported kari key-wrap");
+  var ukm = ri.ukm || null;
+  var kek;
+  if (_isMont(origSpki)) {
+    var mont = _montName(origSpki);
+    var recipPriv = await subtle.importKey("pkcs8", keyDer, { name: mont.name }, false, ["deriveBits"]);
+    var origPub = await subtle.importKey("spki", origSpki, { name: mont.name }, false, []);
+    var mz = Buffer.from(await subtle.deriveBits({ name: mont.name, public: origPub }, recipPriv, null));
+    if (mz.every(function (x) { return x === 0; })) throw _fail();
+    var mzKey = await subtle.importKey("raw", mz, { name: "HKDF" }, false, ["deriveBits"]);
+    // RFC 8418 sec. 2.2: a present ukm is used BOTH as the HKDF salt AND as the ECC-CMS-SharedInfo
+    // entityUInfo -- mirror the producer so both sides derive the same KEK as a conformant peer.
+    kek = Buffer.from(await subtle.deriveBits({ name: "HKDF", hash: mont.hkdf, salt: ukm || Buffer.alloc(0), info: _eccSharedInfo(wrapAlg.name, ukm, kekBytes) }, mzKey, kekBytes * 8));
+  } else {
+    // RFC 5753 sec. 7.1 permits the originator EC key to omit its curve parameters, inheriting the
+    // curve from the recipient's certificate; resolve the curve from the recipient (authoritative)
+    // and rebuild the originator SPKI with explicit parameters so importKey can consume it.
+    var origAlg = asn1.decode(origSpki).children[0];
+    var origHasParams = origAlg.children.length > 1;
+    var curveOid = (km.cert != null && _ecCurveFromCert(km.cert)) || (origHasParams ? asn1.read.oid(origAlg.children[1]) : null);
+    var curve = curveOid ? CURVE[curveOid] : null;
+    if (!curve) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported or missing originator EC curve");
+    var origSpkiFull = origHasParams ? origSpki : _withEcCurveParams(origSpki, curveOid);
+    var recipEc = await subtle.importKey("pkcs8", keyDer, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: curve.curve }, false, ["deriveBits"]);
+    var origEc = await subtle.importKey("spki", origSpkiFull, { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: curve.curve }, false, []);
+    var z = Buffer.from(await subtle.deriveBits({ name: "ECDH", public: origEc }, recipEc, null));
+    var zKey = await subtle.importKey("raw", z, { name: "X963KDF" }, false, ["deriveBits"]);
+    kek = Buffer.from(await subtle.deriveBits({ name: "X963KDF", hash: _x963Hash(scheme), info: _eccSharedInfo(wrapAlg.name, ukm, kekBytes) }, zKey, kekBytes * 8));
+  }
+  return await _aesKwUnwrap(kek, rek.encryptedKey);
+}
+
+// kekri: AES-KW unwrap under the caller-supplied KEK.
+async function _kekriCek(ri, km) {
+  var kek = guard.bytes.view(km.kek, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", "kek");
+  return await _aesKwUnwrap(kek, ri.encryptedKey);
+}
+
+// pwri: PBKDF2 -> KEK, RFC 3211 double-CBC unwrap.
+async function _pwriCek(ri, km, opts) {
+  var kdf = ri.keyDerivationAlgorithm;
+  if (!kdf) throw _err("cms/missing-key-derivation", "the pwri recipient has no keyDerivationAlgorithm (externally-supplied KEK is not supported)");
+  if (kdf.oid !== O("pbkdf2")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported pwri key-derivation " + kdf.oid);
+  var pb = _pbkdf2Params(kdf.parameters, opts);
+  var kea = ri.keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+  if (kea.oid !== O("id-alg-PWRI-KEK")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported pwri key-encryption " + kea.oid);
+  var inner = asn1.decode(kea.parameters);                 // inner AES-CBC AlgorithmIdentifier
+  var innerOid = asn1.read.oid(inner.children[0]);
+  var innerBits = CONTENT_KEYBITS[innerOid];
+  if (!innerBits || !/CBC/.test(oid.name(innerOid) || "")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported pwri inner cipher");
+  var iv = asn1.read.octetString(inner.children[1]);
+  var kek = nodeCrypto.pbkdf2Sync(_passwordBytes(km.password), pb.salt, pb.iterations, innerBits / 8, pb.prfNode);
+  return _pwriUnwrap(kek, ri.encryptedKey, iv, innerBits);
+}
+
+// kemri (ML-KEM ori): decapsulate -> ss, HKDF(CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo) -> KEK, AES-KW unwrap.
+async function _kemriCek(ri, km) {
+  var k = ri.kemri;
+  var wcName = _mlkemName(k.kem.oid);
+  if (!wcName) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported KEM " + k.kem.oid);
+  // Honor the declared key-derivation function: we implement HKDF-SHA256 (RFC 9629), so a message
+  // naming any other KDF is rejected rather than silently derived with the wrong one.
+  if (k.kdf.oid !== O("hkdfWithSha256")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported KEM key-derivation " + k.kdf.oid);
+  var wantCt = KEM_CT_LENGTHS[k.kem.oid];
+  var kemct = k.kemct;
+  // Coverage residual (both _fail re-checks): unreachable via a parsed message -- the strict parser
+  // already rejects a wrong kemct length (cms/bad-kem-ciphertext) and a kekLength != wrap size
+  // (cms/kek-length-mismatch). These are defense-in-depth on the consumer path (M32 / M29).
+  if (wantCt && kemct.length !== wantCt) throw _fail();          // M32: exact ct length BEFORE decap
+  var kekBytes = Number(k.kekLength);
+  var wrapAlg = k.wrap;
+  if (WRAP_KEK_LENGTHS[wrapAlg.oid] !== kekBytes) throw _fail(); // M29 re-check on the consumer path
+  var priv = await subtle.importKey("pkcs8", _normKeyDer(km.key), { name: wcName }, false, ["decapsulateBits"]);
+  var ss = Buffer.from(await subtle.decapsulateBits({ name: wcName }, priv, kemct));
+  var ssKey = await subtle.importKey("raw", ss, { name: "HKDF" }, false, ["deriveBits"]);
+  var kek = Buffer.from(await subtle.deriveBits({ name: "HKDF", hash: "SHA-256", salt: Buffer.alloc(0), info: _kemOtherInfo(wrapAlg.name, kekBytes, k.ukm || null) }, ssKey, kekBytes * 8));
+  return await _aesKwUnwrap(kek, k.encryptedKey);
+}
+
+// ---- stage 3: open the content (uniform failure) ---------------------------
+async function _openContent(parsed, eci, cek, ct) {
+  var alg = eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
+  var keyBits = CONTENT_KEYBITS[alg.oid];
+  if (!keyBits) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported contentEncryptionAlgorithm " + alg.oid);
+  if (eci.encryptedContent == null) throw _err("cms/no-encrypted-content", "the message has no encryptedContent (detached; supply it out of band)");
+  // A null CEK (v1.5 implicit rejection) or a wrong-length CEK -> a fresh random key of the right
+  // length, so the failure surfaces here as the uniform verdict, never earlier.
+  if (cek == null || cek.length !== keyBits / 8) cek = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(keyBits / 8);
+  try {
+    if (ct === "authEnvelopedData") {
+      var aad = parsed.authAttrsBytes != null ? _explicitSetOf(parsed.authAttrsBytes) : Buffer.alloc(0);
+      return _gcmOpen(cek, parsed.aead.nonce, eci.encryptedContent, parsed.mac, aad, keyBits, parsed.aead.icvLen);
+    }
+    var iv = asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(alg.parameters));
+    if (iv.length !== 16) throw _fail();
+    return _cbcOpen(cek, iv, eci.encryptedContent, keyBits);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof CmsError && e.code !== "cms/decrypt-failed") throw e;
+    throw _fail();
+  }
+}
+function _gcmOpen(cek, nonce, ct, tag, aad, keyBits, icvLen) {
+  // Coverage residual: unreachable via a parsed message -- the strict parser rejects any
+  // AuthEnvelopedData whose mac length != aes-ICVlen (cms/mac-length-mismatch) before we get here.
+  if (!tag || tag.length !== icvLen) throw _fail();
+  var d = nodeCrypto.createDecipheriv("aes-" + keyBits + "-gcm", cek, nonce, { authTagLength: icvLen });
+  d.setAuthTag(tag);
+  if (aad && aad.length) d.setAAD(aad);
+  return Buffer.concat([d.update(ct), d.final()]); // final() throws on tag mismatch -> uniform
+}
+function _cbcOpen(cek, iv, ct, keyBits) {
+  var d = nodeCrypto.createDecipheriv("aes-" + keyBits + "-cbc", cek, iv);
+  return Buffer.concat([d.update(ct), d.final()]); // final() throws on bad pad -> uniform
+}
+
+// ---- EncryptedData (sec. 8) ------------------------------------------------
+async function _decryptEncryptedData(parsed, km, opts) {
+  var eci = parsed.encryptedContentInfo;
+  var alg = eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
+  if (eci.encryptedContent == null) throw _err("cms/no-encrypted-content", "the EncryptedData has no encryptedContent");
+  if (alg.oid === O("pbes2")) return _decryptPbes2(parsed, eci, km, opts);
+  var keyBits = CONTENT_KEYBITS[alg.oid];
+  if (!keyBits) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported EncryptedData content algorithm " + alg.oid);
+  if (km.cek == null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "this EncryptedData needs a raw { cek }");
+  var cek = guard.bytes.view(km.cek, CmsError, "cms/bad-input", "cek");
+  if (cek.length !== keyBits / 8) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the supplied cek length does not match the content algorithm");
+  var iv = asn1.read.octetString(asn1.decode(alg.parameters));
+  try { return { content: _cbcOpen(cek, iv, eci.encryptedContent, keyBits), contentType: eci.contentType, contentTypeName: oid.name(eci.contentType) || eci.contentType, recipientType: "cek", recipientIndex: -1, contentEncryptionAlgorithm: alg.name || alg.oid, authenticated: false }; }
+  catch (_e) { throw _fail(); }
+}
+async function _decryptPbes2(parsed, eci, km, opts) {
+  if (km.password == null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "this EncryptedData needs a { password }");
+  // The PBES2 parameters are attacker-controlled structure the strict parser surfaces raw (PBES2 is
+  // not an AEAD it validates): parse them behind a structural guard so a malformed shape is a typed
+  // cms/bad-input, never a raw dereference fault (the PBES2 structure is public -- not a decrypt oracle).
+  var kdf, encOid, iv, pb;
+  try {
+    var params = _seqChildren(eci.contentEncryptionAlgorithm.parameters, 2, "PBES2 parameters");
+    kdf = _requireChildren(params[0], 2, "PBES2 keyDerivationFunc");
+    var encScheme = _requireChildren(params[1], 2, "PBES2 encryptionScheme");
+    if (asn1.read.oid(kdf[0]) !== O("pbkdf2")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "PBES2 keyDerivationFunc must be PBKDF2");
+    pb = _pbkdf2Params(kdf[1].bytes, opts);
+    encOid = asn1.read.oid(encScheme[0]);
+    iv = asn1.read.octetString(encScheme[1]);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof CmsError) throw e;
+    throw _err("cms/bad-input", "malformed PBES2 parameters", e);
+  }
+  var keyBits = CONTENT_KEYBITS[encOid];
+  if (!keyBits) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported PBES2 content cipher " + encOid);
+  var key = nodeCrypto.pbkdf2Sync(_passwordBytes(km.password), pb.salt, pb.iterations, keyBits / 8, pb.prfNode);
+  try { return { content: _cbcOpen(key, iv, eci.encryptedContent, keyBits), contentType: eci.contentType, contentTypeName: oid.name(eci.contentType) || eci.contentType, recipientType: "password", recipientIndex: -1, contentEncryptionAlgorithm: oid.name(encOid) || encOid, authenticated: false }; }
+  catch (_e) { throw _fail(); }
+}
+
+// ---- shared helpers (mirror cms-encrypt's builders) ------------------------
+async function _aesKwUnwrap(kek, wrapped) {
+  var kekKey = await subtle.importKey("raw", kek, { name: "AES-KW" }, false, ["unwrapKey"]);
+  var cekKey = await subtle.unwrapKey("raw", wrapped, kekKey, { name: "AES-KW" }, { name: "AES-CBC" }, true, ["decrypt"]);
+  return Buffer.from(await subtle.exportKey("raw", cekKey));
+}
+function _eccSharedInfo(wrapName, ukm, kekBytes) {
+  var kids = [b.sequence([b.oid(O(wrapName))])];
+  if (ukm) kids.push(b.explicit(0, b.octetString(ukm)));
+  var supp = Buffer.alloc(4); supp.writeUInt32BE(kekBytes * 8, 0);
+  kids.push(b.explicit(2, b.octetString(supp)));
+  return b.sequence(kids);
+}
+function _kemOtherInfo(wrapName, kekBytes, ukm) {
+  var kids = [b.sequence([b.oid(O(wrapName))]), b.integer(BigInt(kekBytes))];
+  if (ukm) kids.push(b.explicit(0, b.octetString(ukm)));
+  return b.sequence(kids);
+}
+// RFC 3211 double-CBC unwrap (M26): decrypt pass 2 (IV = last block of pass 1), then pass 1
+// (IV = first block), validate the count + complement check bytes -- uniform failure on mismatch.
+function _pwriUnwrap(kek, wrapped, iv, keyBits) {
+  var blk = 16, alg = "aes-" + keyBits + "-cbc";
+  if (wrapped.length < 2 * blk || wrapped.length % blk !== 0) throw _fail();
+  var n = wrapped.length;
+  // pass2 = CBC(kek, iv2 = pass1[last block], pass1). Recover pass1's last block by decrypting the
+  // last ciphertext block (ECB) and XORing the previous ciphertext block -- a standard CBC last-
+  // block decrypt that needs no IV -- then CBC-decrypt pass2 under that recovered iv2 to get pass1.
+  var ecb = nodeCrypto.createDecipheriv("aes-" + keyBits + "-ecb", kek, Buffer.alloc(0)); ecb.setAutoPadding(false);
+  var lastDec = Buffer.concat([ecb.update(wrapped.subarray(n - blk)), ecb.final()]);
+  var iv2 = Buffer.alloc(blk);
+  for (var i = 0; i < blk; i++) iv2[i] = lastDec[i] ^ wrapped[n - 2 * blk + i];
+  var d1 = nodeCrypto.createDecipheriv(alg, kek, iv2); d1.setAutoPadding(false);
+  var pass1 = Buffer.concat([d1.update(wrapped), d1.final()]);
+  var d2 = nodeCrypto.createDecipheriv(alg, kek, iv); d2.setAutoPadding(false);
+  var body = Buffer.concat([d2.update(pass1), d2.final()]);
+  var count = body[0];
+  if (count < 1 || count + 4 > body.length) throw _fail();
+  var cek = body.subarray(4, 4 + count);
+  var bad = 0;
+  for (var j = 0; j < 3; j++) bad |= (body[1 + j] ^ 0xff) ^ cek[j]; // complement check bytes
+  if (bad !== 0) throw _fail();
+  return Buffer.from(cek);
+}
+// SEQUENCE structural guards -- a malformed (primitive / too-short) attacker-controlled parameter
+// SEQUENCE is a typed cms/bad-input, never a raw `.children` dereference fault.
+function _requireChildren(node, minLen, what) {
+  if (!node || !node.children || node.children.length < minLen) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "malformed " + what);
+  return node.children;
+}
+function _seqChildren(paramsDer, minLen, what) {
+  if (paramsDer == null) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "missing " + what);
+  return _requireChildren(asn1.decode(paramsDer), minLen, what);
+}
+function _pbkdf2Params(paramsDer, opts) {
+  var node = Buffer.isBuffer(paramsDer) ? asn1.decode(paramsDer) : paramsDer;
+  var kids = _requireChildren(node, 2, "PBKDF2 parameters");
+  var salt = asn1.read.octetString(kids[0]);
+  if (salt.length > C.LIMITS.PBKDF2_MAX_SALT) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "PBKDF2 salt exceeds the " + C.LIMITS.PBKDF2_MAX_SALT + "-octet cap");
+  var iterations = guard.range.positiveInt31(asn1.read.integer(kids[1]), _err, "cms/bad-input", "PBKDF2 iterationCount");
+  // A caller-supplied maxIterations must be a positive integer -- a NaN / non-number would make
+  // Math.min return NaN and silently disable the DoS cap (iterations > NaN is always false).
+  var cap = C.LIMITS.PBKDF2_MAX_ITERATIONS;
+  if (opts.maxIterations != null) {
+    if (typeof opts.maxIterations !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.maxIterations) || opts.maxIterations < 1 || Math.floor(opts.maxIterations) !== opts.maxIterations) throw _err("cms/bad-input", "maxIterations must be a positive integer");
+    cap = Math.min(opts.maxIterations, cap);
+  }
+  if (iterations > cap) throw _err("cms/iteration-limit", "PBKDF2 iterationCount " + iterations + " exceeds the cap " + cap);
+  var prfNode = "sha1";
+  for (var i = 2; i < node.children.length; i++) {
+    var ch = node.children[i];
+    if (ch.tagClass === "universal" && ch.tagNumber === asn1.TAGS.SEQUENCE) prfNode = _prfNode(asn1.read.oid(ch.children[0]));
+  }
+  return { salt: salt, iterations: iterations, prfNode: prfNode };
+}
+// Coverage residual (the unsupported-algorithm throw arm of each lookup below -- _prfNode, _hashW3c,
+// _x963Hash, and _originatorSpki that follow): reachable only from a fully well-formed recipient that
+// names an inner algorithm we do not implement (a non-registry prf / OAEP hash / kari scheme /
+// originator form). The producer never emits one; the fuzz harness (fuzz/cms-decrypt.fuzz.js) drives
+// these arms behaviorally under the PkiError-only contract.
+var PRF_NODE = {}; PRF_NODE[O("hmacWithSHA1")] = "sha1"; PRF_NODE[O("hmacWithSHA256")] = "sha256"; PRF_NODE[O("hmacWithSHA384")] = "sha384"; PRF_NODE[O("hmacWithSHA512")] = "sha512";
+function _prfNode(oidStr) { if (!PRF_NODE[oidStr]) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported PBKDF2 prf " + oidStr); return PRF_NODE[oidStr]; }
+
+function _oaepHashFromParams(paramsBytes) {
+  if (paramsBytes == null) return "SHA-1"; // absent = the RFC 4055 defaults (accept floor)
+  var node = asn1.decode(paramsBytes);
+  var hashName = "SHA-1", mgfHash = null, label = null;
+  (node.children || []).forEach(function (ch) {
+    if (ch.tagClass !== "context") return;
+    if (ch.tagNumber === 0) { hashName = _hashW3c(asn1.read.oid(ch.children[0].children[0])); }               // hashAlgorithm [0]
+    else if (ch.tagNumber === 1) {                                                                            // maskGenAlgorithm [1]
+      var mg = ch.children[0];
+      if (asn1.read.oid(mg.children[0]) !== O("mgf1")) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported OAEP mask generation function");
+      mgfHash = _hashW3c(asn1.read.oid(mg.children[1].children[0]));
+    } else if (ch.tagNumber === 2) { label = asn1.read.octetString(ch.children[0].children[1]); }             // pSourceAlgorithm [2]
+  });
+  // WebCrypto RSA-OAEP ties the MGF1 hash to the OAEP hash and supports only an empty label -- reject,
+  // rather than silently ignore, any parameter set we cannot faithfully honor.
+  if (mgfHash != null && mgfHash !== hashName) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "the OAEP MGF1 hash must equal the OAEP hash");
+  if (label != null && label.length > 0) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "a non-empty OAEP label is not supported");
+  return hashName;
+}
+var HASH_W3C = {}; HASH_W3C[O("sha1")] = "SHA-1"; HASH_W3C[O("sha256")] = "SHA-256"; HASH_W3C[O("sha384")] = "SHA-384"; HASH_W3C[O("sha512")] = "SHA-512";
+function _hashW3c(o) { if (!HASH_W3C[o]) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported OAEP hash " + o); return HASH_W3C[o]; }
+
+var X963_HASH = {}; // kari stdDH scheme OID -> W3C hash
+[["dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme", "SHA-1"], ["dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme", "SHA-224"], ["dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme", "SHA-256"], ["dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme", "SHA-384"], ["dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme", "SHA-512"],
+ ["dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme", "SHA-1"], ["dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme", "SHA-224"], ["dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme", "SHA-256"], ["dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme", "SHA-384"], ["dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme", "SHA-512"]
+].forEach(function (r) { X963_HASH[O(r[0])] = r[1]; });
+function _x963Hash(scheme) { if (!X963_HASH[scheme]) throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported kari key-agreement scheme " + scheme); return X963_HASH[scheme]; }
+function _kariWrap(kea) {
+  var params = asn1.decode(kea.parameters);
+  var wrapOid = asn1.read.oid(params.children[0]);
+  return { oid: wrapOid, name: oid.name(wrapOid) };
+}
+function _originatorSpki(originator) {
+  // originator OriginatorIdentifierOrKey CHOICE; we require originatorKey [1] (RFC 5753 MUST for
+  // ephemeral-static). The parser surfaces { form, value:{ algorithm, publicKey } } -- reconstruct
+  // the SPKI (SEQUENCE { algorithm, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }) for importKey.
+  if (!originator || originator.form !== "originatorKey") throw _err("cms/unsupported-algorithm", "kari requires an originatorKey (ephemeral-static ECDH)");
+  var v = originator.value;
+  var algKids = [b.oid(v.algorithm.oid)];
+  if (v.algorithm.parameters != null) algKids.push(b.raw(v.algorithm.parameters));
+  return b.sequence([b.sequence(algKids), b.bitString(v.publicKey.bytes, v.publicKey.unusedBits)]);
+}
+var MONT = {}; MONT[O("X25519")] = { name: "X25519", hkdf: "SHA-256" }; MONT[O("X448")] = { name: "X448", hkdf: "SHA-512" };
+function _isMont(spki) { var o = asn1.read.oid(asn1.decode(spki).children[0].children[0]); return !!MONT[o]; }
+function _montName(spki) { return MONT[asn1.read.oid(asn1.decode(spki).children[0].children[0])]; }
+var CURVE = {}; CURVE[O("prime256v1")] = { curve: "P-256" }; CURVE[O("secp384r1")] = { curve: "P-384" }; CURVE[O("secp521r1")] = { curve: "P-521" };
+// The recipient certificate's EC curve OID -- authoritative for the kari agreement (both keys share it).
+function _ecCurveFromCert(cert) {
+  var spki = x509.parse(_normCertDer(cert)).subjectPublicKeyInfo;
+  if (spki.algorithm.oid !== O("ecPublicKey") || spki.algorithm.parameters == null) return null;
+  return asn1.read.oid(asn1.decode(spki.algorithm.parameters));
+}
+// Rebuild an EC SPKI with explicit namedCurve parameters (for an originator key that omitted them).
+function _withEcCurveParams(spki, curveOid) {
+  var node = asn1.decode(spki);
+  var alg = node.children[0];
+  return b.sequence([b.sequence([b.raw(alg.children[0].bytes), b.oid(curveOid)]), b.raw(node.children[1].bytes)]);
+}
+var MLKEM = {}; MLKEM[O("id-ml-kem-512")] = "ML-KEM-512"; MLKEM[O("id-ml-kem-768")] = "ML-KEM-768"; MLKEM[O("id-ml-kem-1024")] = "ML-KEM-1024";
+function _mlkemName(o) { return MLKEM[o]; }
+
+function _explicitSetOf(implicitBytes) {
+  // The AAD is the authAttrs re-encoded under the EXPLICIT SET OF tag (RFC 5083 sec. 2.2). The
+  // parser surfaces authAttrsBytes as the transmitted [1] IMPLICIT form; retag 0xA1 -> 0x31.
+  var out = Buffer.from(implicitBytes);
+  out[0] = 0x31;
+  return out;
+}
+function _normKeyDer(key) {
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(key)) return key;
+  if (key instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(key);
+  if (typeof key === "string") { try { return pkcs8.pemDecode(key); } catch (e) { throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the recipient private-key PEM could not be decoded", e); } }
+  throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the recipient private key must be a PKCS#8 DER Buffer or PEM string");
+}
+function _normCertDer(cert) {
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(cert)) return cert;
+  if (cert instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(cert);
+  if (typeof cert === "string") { try { return x509.pemDecode(cert); } catch (e) { throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the recipient certificate PEM could not be decoded", e); } }
+  throw _err("cms/bad-input", "the recipient certificate must be a DER Buffer or PEM string");
+}
+function _passwordBytes(p) {
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(p)) return p;
+  if (p instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(p);
+  if (typeof p === "string") return Buffer.from(p, "utf8");
+  throw _err("cms/bad-input", "a password must be a string, Buffer, or Uint8Array");
+}
+
+module.exports = { decrypt: decrypt };