@blamejs/pki 0.1.29 → 0.1.31

package/lib/jose.js

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 var constants = require("./constants");
 var webcrypto = require("./webcrypto").webcrypto;
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
+var guard = require("./guard-all");
 
 var JoseError = frameworkError.JoseError;
 function E(code, message, cause) { return new JoseError(code, message, cause); }
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ var B64U_ALPHABET = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]*$/;
  * @primitive  pki.jose.base64url.encode
  * @signature  pki.jose.base64url.encode(bytes) -> string
  * @since      0.1.25
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7515, RFC 4648
  * @related    pki.jose.base64url.decode
  *
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ function b64uEncode(bytes) {
  * @primitive  pki.jose.base64url.decode
  * @signature  pki.jose.base64url.decode(text) -> Buffer
  * @since      0.1.25
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7515, RFC 4648, RFC 8555
  * @related    pki.jose.base64url.encode
  *
@@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ function _jsonReader(str) {
  * @primitive  pki.jose.parseJson
  * @signature  pki.jose.parseJson(input) -> value
  * @since      0.1.25
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7515, RFC 8259
  * @related    pki.jose.base64url.decode
  *
@@ -228,17 +229,11 @@ function _jsonReader(str) {
  *   pki.jose.parseJson('{"a":1}');   // -> { a: 1 }
  */
 function parseJson(input) {
-  var str;
-  if (Buffer.isBuffer(input)) {
-    if (input.length > LIMITS.JSON_MAX_BYTES) throw E("jose/too-large", "the JSON document exceeds the size cap");
-    try { str = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(input); }
-    catch (e) { throw E("jose/bad-json", "the JSON document is not valid UTF-8", e); }
-  } else if (typeof input === "string") {
-    if (Buffer.byteLength(input, "utf8") > LIMITS.JSON_MAX_BYTES) throw E("jose/too-large", "the JSON document exceeds the size cap");
-    str = input;
-  } else {
-    throw E("jose/bad-input", "parseJson requires a Buffer or string");
-  }
+  // guard.text.decode caps the raw byte length BEFORE the (strict, fatal) UTF-8
+  // decode, so an oversized document is rejected before it is materialized.
+  var str = guard.text.decode(input, LIMITS.JSON_MAX_BYTES, JoseError, {
+    charset: "utf-8", fatal: true, tooLarge: "jose/too-large", badDecode: "jose/bad-json", badInput: "jose/bad-input", label: "the JSON document",
+  });
   return _jsonReader(str);
 }
 
@@ -413,7 +408,7 @@ var PRIVATE_JWK_MEMBERS = ["d", "p", "q", "dp", "dq", "qi", "k", "priv"];
  * @primitive  pki.jose.assertPublicJwk
  * @signature  pki.jose.assertPublicJwk(jwk) -> jwk
  * @since      0.1.25
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7517, RFC 7518
  * @related    pki.jose.sign, pki.jose.thumbprint
  *
@@ -440,7 +435,7 @@ function assertPublicJwk(jwk) {
  * @primitive  pki.jose.verify
  * @signature  pki.jose.verify(jws, opts) -> Promise<{ header, payload }>
  * @since      0.1.25
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7515, RFC 7518, RFC 8555
  * @related    pki.jose.sign, pki.jose.parseJson
  *
@@ -493,7 +488,7 @@ async function verify(jws, opts) {
  * @primitive  pki.jose.sign
  * @signature  pki.jose.sign(opts) -> Promise<{ protected, payload, signature }>
  * @since      0.1.25
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7515, RFC 7518, RFC 8555
  * @related    pki.jose.verify
  *
@@ -579,7 +574,7 @@ var THUMBPRINT_MEMBERS = {
  * @primitive  pki.jose.thumbprint
  * @signature  pki.jose.thumbprint(jwk) -> Promise<string>
  * @since      0.1.25
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7638, RFC 8037, RFC 9964
  * @related    pki.jose.verify
  *

package/lib/merkle.js

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
 var constants = require("./constants");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
+var guard = require("./guard-all");
 
 var MerkleError = frameworkError.MerkleError;
 
@@ -58,17 +59,7 @@ function _sha256(buf) {
 }
 
 function _toBuffer(v, field) {
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(v) && !(v instanceof Uint8Array)) {
-    throw new MerkleError("merkle/bad-input", field + " must be a Buffer or Uint8Array");
-  }
-  try {
-    // A zero-copy view over the same bytes; this also surfaces a detached
-    // backing ArrayBuffer (a transferred / structuredClone'd view) as a typed
-    // error here rather than a raw TypeError from a later concat / digest.
-    return Buffer.from(v.buffer, v.byteOffset, v.byteLength);
-  } catch (e) {
-    throw new MerkleError("merkle/bad-input", field + " is not a usable byte view", e);
-  }
+  return guard.bytes.view(v, MerkleError, "merkle/bad-input", field);
 }
 
 function _node32(v, field) {
@@ -113,7 +104,7 @@ function _proofNodes(proof) {
 
 // Constant-time equality of two already-validated equal-length 32-byte buffers.
 function _ctEq(a, b) {
-  return a.length === b.length && nodeCrypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
+  return guard.crypto.constantTimeEqual(a, b);
 }
 
 /**

package/lib/oid.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 
 var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
+var guard = require("./guard-all");
 
 var OidError = frameworkError.OidError;
 
@@ -454,7 +455,7 @@ function fromArcs(arcs) {
 // one namespace when they have a dotted string in hand.
 function toDER(dotted) { _assertDotted(dotted, "toDER"); return asn1.build.oid(dotted); }
 function fromDER(input) {
-  var buf = Buffer.isBuffer(input) ? input : Buffer.from(input);
+  var buf = guard.bytes.view(input, OidError, "oid/bad-input", "fromDER");
   var node = asn1.decode(buf);
   return asn1.read.oid(node);
 }

package/lib/path-validate.js

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
 var schema = require("./schema-engine");
 var x509 = require("./schema-x509");
 var crl = require("./schema-crl");
+var guard = require("./guard-all");
 var constants = require("./constants");
 
 var PathError = errors.PathError;
@@ -226,14 +227,11 @@ function resolveRsaPss(paramsBytes) {
       // verifier binds to the salt length the certificate states, so a value
       // that would round is not verifiable material (no real salt exceeds the
       // modulus size, let alone this).
-      if (sl < 0n || sl > 2147483647n) throw E("path/unsupported-algorithm", "RSASSA-PSS saltLength must be a non-negative integer within the salt-length range");
-      saltLength = Number(sl);
+      saltLength = guard.range.uint31(sl, E, "path/unsupported-algorithm", "RSASSA-PSS saltLength");
     } else if (f.tagNumber === 3) {
       // Compared for equality with 1 below -- bound before conversion so an
       // oversized value cannot round on its way to the comparison.
-      var tf = asn1.read.integer(f.children[0]);
-      if (tf < 0n || tf > 2147483647n) throw E("path/unsupported-algorithm", "unsupported RSASSA-PSS trailerField " + tf.toString());
-      trailer = Number(tf);
+      trailer = guard.range.uint31(asn1.read.integer(f.children[0]), E, "path/unsupported-algorithm", "RSASSA-PSS trailerField");
     }
   });
   if (hash === null) throw E("path/unsupported-algorithm", "RSASSA-PSS hashAlgorithm must be stated explicitly (the SHA-1 default is rejected)");
@@ -347,10 +345,7 @@ function normalizeAttrValue(v) {
   // Reject embedded NUL / control bytes so a truncation attack (CVE-2009-2408)
   // cannot make two different names compare equal.
   if (typeof v !== "string") return v;
-  for (var i = 0; i < v.length; i++) {
-    var c = v.charCodeAt(i);
-    if (c === 0 || (c < 0x20 && c !== 0x09)) throw E("path/name-chaining", "distinguished name contains an embedded control byte (CVE-2009-2408)");
-  }
+  guard.name.assertNoControlBytes(v, E, "path/name-chaining", "distinguished name");
   return v.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ").toLowerCase();
 }
 

package/lib/schema-all.js

@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ var FORMATS = [
  * @primitive  pki.schema.all
  * @signature  pki.schema.all() -> string[]
  * @since      0.1.7
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 5280
  * @related    pki.schema.parse
  *
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ function all() { return FORMATS.map(function (f) { return f.name; }); }
  * @primitive  pki.schema.parse
  * @signature  pki.schema.parse(input) -> parsed
  * @since      0.1.7
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 5280
  * @related    pki.schema.x509, pki.schema.all
  *

package/lib/schema-attrcert.js

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ var ATTRIBUTE_CERTIFICATE = pkix.signedEnvelope(NS, ACINFO, {
  * @primitive  pki.schema.attrcert.parse
  * @signature  pki.schema.attrcert.parse(input) -> attributeCertificate
  * @since      0.1.14
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 5755, X.509
  * @related    pki.schema.parse, pki.schema.x509.parse
  *
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ function parseV1(input) {
  * @primitive  pki.schema.attrcert.pemDecode
  * @signature  pki.schema.attrcert.pemDecode(text, label?) -> Buffer
  * @since      0.1.14
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7468, RFC 5755
  * @related    pki.schema.attrcert.parse
  *
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ function pemDecode(text, label) { return pkix.pemDecode(text, label === null ? n
  * @primitive  pki.schema.attrcert.pemEncode
  * @signature  pki.schema.attrcert.pemEncode(der, label?) -> string
  * @since      0.1.23
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7468, RFC 5755
  * @related    pki.schema.attrcert.pemDecode
  *

package/lib/schema-cmp.js

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ var pkix = require("./schema-pkix.js");
 var cms = require("./schema-cms.js");
 var crmf = require("./schema-crmf.js");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error.js");
+var guard = require("./guard-all.js");
 
 var CmpError = frameworkError.CmpError;
 var PemError = frameworkError.PemError;
@@ -99,9 +100,7 @@ var PKI_FAILURE_INFO = schema.decode(function (n, ctx) {
 // PollRep checkAfter is a delay in seconds -- negative poisons scheduling, and
 // the value surfaces as an exact number or not at all.
 var CHECK_AFTER = schema.decode(function (n, ctx) {
-  var v = asn1.read.integer(n);
-  if (v < 0n || v > 2147483647n) throw ctx.E("cmp/bad-poll-rep", "checkAfter must be a non-negative delay in seconds (RFC 9810 sec. 5.3.22)");
-  return Number(v);
+  return guard.range.uint31(asn1.read.integer(n), ctx.E, "cmp/bad-poll-rep", "checkAfter delay in seconds (RFC 9810 sec. 5.3.22)");
 });
 
 // A raw certificate / CRL / publication-info element -- surfaced byte-exact for
@@ -841,7 +840,7 @@ var PKI_MESSAGE = schema.seq([
  * @primitive  pki.schema.cmp.parse
  * @signature  pki.schema.cmp.parse(input) -> pkiMessage
  * @since      0.1.19
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 9810, RFC 9483, RFC 9481
  * @related    pki.schema.parse, pki.schema.crmf.parse, pki.schema.cms.parse
  *
@@ -895,7 +894,7 @@ var parse = pkix.makeParser({
  * @primitive  pki.schema.cmp.pemDecode
  * @signature  pki.schema.cmp.pemDecode(text, label?) -> Buffer
  * @since      0.1.19
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7468, RFC 9810
  * @related    pki.schema.cmp.parse
  *
@@ -912,7 +911,7 @@ function pemDecode(text, label) { return pkix.pemDecode(text, label || "CMP", Pe
  * @primitive  pki.schema.cmp.pemEncode
  * @signature  pki.schema.cmp.pemEncode(der, label?) -> string
  * @since      0.1.19
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7468
  * @related    pki.schema.cmp.pemDecode
  *

package/lib/schema-crmf.js

@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ var CERT_REQ_MESSAGES = schema.seqOf(CERT_REQ_MSG, {
  * @primitive  pki.schema.crmf.parse
  * @signature  pki.schema.crmf.parse(input) -> certReqMessages
  * @since      0.1.17
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 4211
  * @related    pki.schema.parse, pki.schema.csr.parse
  *
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ var parse = pkix.makeParser({
  * @primitive  pki.schema.crmf.pemDecode
  * @signature  pki.schema.crmf.pemDecode(text, label?) -> Buffer
  * @since      0.1.17
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7468, RFC 4211
  * @related    pki.schema.crmf.parse
  *
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ function pemDecode(text, label) { return pkix.pemDecode(text, label || null, Pem
  * @primitive  pki.schema.crmf.pemEncode
  * @signature  pki.schema.crmf.pemEncode(der, label) -> string
  * @since      0.1.23
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7468, RFC 4211
  * @related    pki.schema.crmf.pemDecode
  *

package/lib/schema-csrattrs.js

@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ var CSR_ATTRS = schema.seqOf(ATTR_OR_OID, {
  * @primitive  pki.schema.csrattrs.parse
  * @signature  pki.schema.csrattrs.parse(der) -> { items }
  * @since      0.1.24
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 8951, RFC 9908, RFC 7030
  * @related    pki.schema.parse, pki.est.buildEnrollAttributes
  *

package/lib/schema-pkcs12.js

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ var pkix = require("./schema-pkix.js");
 var cms = require("./schema-cms.js");
 var pkcs8 = require("./schema-pkcs8.js");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error.js");
+var guard = require("./guard-all.js");
 
 var Pkcs12Error = frameworkError.Pkcs12Error;
 var PemError = frameworkError.PemError;
@@ -102,16 +103,10 @@ var PBKDF2_PARAMS = schema.seq([
     if (!m.fields.keyLength.present) {
       throw ctx.E("pkcs12/bad-mac-data", "PBMAC1 PBKDF2-params must carry keyLength (RFC 9579 sec. 5)");
     }
-    // Both counters surface as exact JS numbers -- a value past the bound
-    // would round silently on conversion and hand a verifier wrong inputs.
-    var iterations = m.fields.iterationCount.value;
-    if (iterations < 1n || iterations > 2147483647n) {
-      throw ctx.E("pkcs12/bad-mac-data", "PBKDF2 iterationCount must be a positive integer within the iteration-count range");
-    }
-    var keyLength = m.fields.keyLength.value;
-    if (keyLength < 1n || keyLength > 2147483647n) {
-      throw ctx.E("pkcs12/bad-mac-data", "PBKDF2 keyLength must be a positive integer within the key-length range");
-    }
+    // guard.range.positiveInt31 bounds + narrows each counter atomically -- a
+    // value past the bound would round silently and hand a verifier wrong inputs.
+    var iterationCount = guard.range.positiveInt31(m.fields.iterationCount.value, ctx.E, "pkcs12/bad-mac-data", "PBKDF2 iterationCount");
+    var keyLength = guard.range.positiveInt31(m.fields.keyLength.value, ctx.E, "pkcs12/bad-mac-data", "PBKDF2 keyLength");
     var prf = m.fields.prf.present ? m.fields.prf.value.result : null;
     // X.690 sec. 11.5 -- a DEFAULT-valued component must be omitted from a DER
     // encoding, and the prf DEFAULT is algid-hmacWithSHA1: hmacWithSHA1 with
@@ -124,8 +119,8 @@ var PBKDF2_PARAMS = schema.seq([
     }
     return {
       salt: m.fields.salt.value,
-      iterationCount: Number(iterations),
-      keyLength: Number(keyLength),
+      iterationCount: iterationCount,
+      keyLength: keyLength,
       prfOid: prf ? prf.oid : OID_HMAC_SHA1,
       prfName: prf ? prf.name : "hmacWithSHA1",
     };
@@ -172,8 +167,7 @@ var MAC_DATA = schema.seq([
     if (it.present) {
       var v = it.value;
       if (v === 1n) throw ctx.E("pkcs12/bad-mac-iterations", "iterations equal to its DEFAULT 1 must be omitted (X.690 sec. 11.5)");
-      if (v < 1n || v > 2147483647n) throw ctx.E("pkcs12/bad-mac-iterations", "iterations must be a positive integer within the iteration-count range");
-      iterations = Number(v);
+      iterations = guard.range.positiveInt31(v, ctx.E, "pkcs12/bad-mac-iterations", "MacData iterations");
     }
     var di = m.fields.mac.value.result;
     var pbmac1 = null;
@@ -529,7 +523,7 @@ function _buildBag(rec, state, ctx) {
  * @primitive  pki.schema.pkcs12.parse
  * @signature  pki.schema.pkcs12.parse(input) -> pfx
  * @since      0.1.18
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7292, RFC 9579
  * @defends    ASN.1-parser-DoS (CWE-400)
  * @related    pki.schema.parse, pki.schema.pkcs8.parse, pki.schema.cms.parse
@@ -577,7 +571,7 @@ var parse = pkix.makeParser({
  * @primitive  pki.schema.pkcs12.pemDecode
  * @signature  pki.schema.pkcs12.pemDecode(text, label?) -> Buffer
  * @since      0.1.18
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7468, RFC 7292
  * @related    pki.schema.pkcs12.parse
  *
@@ -594,7 +588,7 @@ function pemDecode(text, label) { return pkix.pemDecode(text, label || "PKCS12",
  * @primitive  pki.schema.pkcs12.pemEncode
  * @signature  pki.schema.pkcs12.pemEncode(der, label?) -> string
  * @since      0.1.18
- * @status     experimental
+ * @status     stable
  * @spec       RFC 7468
  * @related    pki.schema.pkcs12.pemDecode
  *

package/lib/schema-pkix.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 var asn1 = require("./asn1-der");
 var constants = require("./constants");
 var schema = require("./schema-engine");
+var guard = require("./guard-all");
 // ct is a leaf format module (requires only the codec / oid / constants / error
 // core, never pkix) so the SCT-list extension VALUE decoder registers here as a
 // registry row, not a switch. The one-directional edge keeps the layering acyclic.
@@ -35,16 +36,13 @@ var PEM_RE = /-----BEGIN ([A-Z0-9 ]+)-----([\s\S]*?)-----END \1-----/;
 // lenient Buffer.from would otherwise let several distinct PEM texts alias one
 // DER (PEM-layer malleability) and silently drop trailing content bits.
 function pemDecode(text, label, PemError) {
-  // The size cap is enforced on the raw byte length BEFORE the latin1 string
-  // copy: converting first would allocate a full-size string for an input the
-  // cap is about to reject, and a buffer above Node's max string length would
-  // escape as an untyped ERR_STRING_TOO_LONG instead of pem/too-large.
-  if (Buffer.isBuffer(text)) {
-    if (text.length > constants.LIMITS.PEM_MAX_BYTES) throw new PemError("pem/too-large", "PEM input exceeds size cap");
-    text = text.toString("latin1");
-  }
-  if (typeof text !== "string") throw new PemError("pem/bad-input", "pemDecode expects a string or Buffer");
-  if (text.length > constants.LIMITS.PEM_MAX_BYTES) throw new PemError("pem/too-large", "PEM input exceeds size cap");
+  // guard.text.decode caps the raw byte length BEFORE the latin1 string copy:
+  // converting first would allocate a full-size string for input the cap is
+  // about to reject, and a buffer above Node's max string length would escape as
+  // an untyped ERR_STRING_TOO_LONG instead of pem/too-large.
+  text = guard.text.decode(text, constants.LIMITS.PEM_MAX_BYTES, PemError, {
+    charset: "latin1", tooLarge: "pem/too-large", badInput: "pem/bad-input", label: "PEM input",
+  });
   var m = PEM_RE.exec(text);
   if (!m) throw new PemError("pem/no-block", "no PEM block found");
   if (label && m[1] !== label) throw new PemError("pem/label-mismatch", "expected " + JSON.stringify(label) + " block, got " + JSON.stringify(m[1]));
@@ -64,12 +62,9 @@ function pemDecode(text, label, PemError) {
 // base64 body is canonical (the pemDecode rule); returns an array of DER buffers.
 function pemDecodeAll(text, label, PemError) {
   label = label || "CERTIFICATE";
-  if (Buffer.isBuffer(text)) {
-    if (text.length > constants.LIMITS.PEM_MAX_BYTES) throw new PemError("pem/too-large", "PEM input exceeds size cap");
-    text = text.toString("latin1");
-  }
-  if (typeof text !== "string") throw new PemError("pem/bad-input", "pemDecodeAll expects a string or Buffer");
-  if (text.length > constants.LIMITS.PEM_MAX_BYTES) throw new PemError("pem/too-large", "PEM input exceeds size cap");
+  text = guard.text.decode(text, constants.LIMITS.PEM_MAX_BYTES, PemError, {
+    charset: "latin1", tooLarge: "pem/too-large", badInput: "pem/bad-input", label: "PEM input",
+  });
   var re = /-----BEGIN ([A-Z0-9 ]+)-----([\s\S]*?)-----END \1-----/g;
   var blocks = [];
   var lastEnd = 0, m;
@@ -107,9 +102,12 @@ function pemEncode(der, label, PemError) {
 // Uint8Array is taken as bytes. opts: { pemLabel, PemError, ErrorClass, prefix }.
 function coerceToDer(input, opts) {
   if (typeof input === "string") return pemDecode(input, opts.pemLabel, opts.PemError);
-  if (input instanceof Uint8Array && !Buffer.isBuffer(input)) input = Buffer.from(input);
-  if (Buffer.isBuffer(input)) {
-    return _isPemArmor(input) ? pemDecode(input, opts.pemLabel, opts.PemError) : input;
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(input) || input instanceof Uint8Array) {
+    // Route the DER Buffer / Uint8Array through the shared byte guard so a
+    // detached backing store fails closed here for EVERY format that composes
+    // this boundary (x509/crl/csr/pkcs8/cms/pkcs12), not per-format.
+    var buf = guard.bytes.view(input, opts.ErrorClass, opts.prefix + "/bad-input", "parse");
+    return _isPemArmor(buf) ? pemDecode(buf, opts.pemLabel, opts.PemError) : buf;
   }
   throw new opts.ErrorClass(opts.prefix + "/bad-input", "parse expects a DER Buffer or a PEM string");
 }
@@ -502,12 +500,9 @@ function generalName(ns, opts) {
       if (constructed) throw ctx.E(code, "GeneralName [" + t + "] must be primitive (X.690 sec. 10.2)");
       if (GN_IA5[t]) {
         if (n.content.length === 0) throw ctx.E(code, "GeneralName [" + t + "] must be a non-empty IA5String");
-        for (var i = 0; i < n.content.length; i++) {
-          // 7-bit IA5, and no C0/DEL control byte -- an embedded NUL/control in a
-          // dNSName/rfc822Name/URI enables a name-truncation/confusion bypass
-          // (CVE-2009-2408 class) downstream, so reject it at decode.
-          if (n.content[i] < 0x20 || n.content[i] > 0x7e) throw ctx.E(code, "GeneralName [" + t + "] must be a printable IA5String (no control bytes)");
-        }
+        // 7-bit IA5, no C0/DEL control byte -- an embedded NUL/control in a
+        // dNSName/rfc822Name/URI enables a name-truncation bypass (CVE-2009-2408).
+        guard.name.assertPrintableIa5(n.content, ctx.E, code, "GeneralName [" + t + "]");
         if (decodeValue) value = n.content.toString("latin1");
       } else if (t === 7) {
         if (subtreeBase) {
@@ -621,11 +616,10 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     if (kids[i] && kids[i].tagClass === "universal" && kids[i].tagNumber === _T.INTEGER) {
       if (!cA) throw ns.E(C, "BasicConstraints pathLenConstraint is only permitted when cA is TRUE (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9)");
       var pl = readInt(kids[i], C, "pathLenConstraint");
-      // Bounded before Number() narrowing -- a value past the safe-integer range
-      // would round silently and be compared as a path-length ceiling, so it is
-      // exact-or-rejected (the same rule the RSASSA-PSS/PKCS#12 counters follow).
-      if (pl < 0n || pl > 2147483647n) throw ns.E(C, "BasicConstraints pathLenConstraint must be a non-negative integer within range");
-      pathLen = Number(pl); i++;
+      // guard.range.uint31 bounds the decoded BigInt and narrows atomically -- a
+      // value past the safe-integer range would otherwise round silently and be
+      // compared as a path-length ceiling.
+      pathLen = guard.range.uint31(pl, ns.E, C, "BasicConstraints pathLenConstraint (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9)"); i++;
     }
     if (i !== kids.length) throw ns.E(C, "BasicConstraints has unexpected trailing fields");
     return { cA: cA, pathLenConstraint: pathLen };
@@ -748,11 +742,11 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
       pcLastTag = k.tagNumber;
       var v;
       try { v = asn1.read.integerImplicit(k, k.tagNumber); } catch (e) { throw ns.E(C, "PolicyConstraints field must be an INTEGER", e); }
-      // Bounded before Number() narrowing (a skip count past the safe-integer
-      // range would round silently) -- exact-or-rejected.
-      if (v < 0n || v > 2147483647n) throw ns.E(C, "PolicyConstraints skip count must be a non-negative integer within range");
-      if (k.tagNumber === 0) rep = Number(v);
-      else if (k.tagNumber === 1) ipm = Number(v);
+      // guard.range.uint31 bounds + narrows atomically (a skip count past the
+      // safe-integer range would round silently).
+      var skip = guard.range.uint31(v, ns.E, C, "PolicyConstraints skip count (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.11)");
+      if (k.tagNumber === 0) rep = skip;
+      else if (k.tagNumber === 1) ipm = skip;
       else throw ns.E(C, "PolicyConstraints has an unexpected field [" + k.tagNumber + "]");
     });
     return { requireExplicitPolicy: rep, inhibitPolicyMapping: ipm };
@@ -764,10 +758,9 @@ function certExtensionDecoders(ns) {
     var n = decodeTop(buf, C, "InhibitAnyPolicy");
     if (n.tagClass !== "universal" || n.tagNumber !== _T.INTEGER) throw ns.E(C, "InhibitAnyPolicy must be an INTEGER (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.14)");
     var v = readInt(n, C, "InhibitAnyPolicy");
-    // Bounded before Number() narrowing (a skip count past the safe-integer
-    // range would round silently) -- exact-or-rejected.
-    if (v < 0n || v > 2147483647n) throw ns.E(C, "InhibitAnyPolicy skip count must be a non-negative integer within range");
-    return Number(v);
+    // guard.range.uint31 bounds + narrows atomically (a skip count past the
+    // safe-integer range would round silently).
+    return guard.range.uint31(v, ns.E, C, "InhibitAnyPolicy skip count (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.14)");
   }
 
   // subjectAltName / issuerAltName ::= GeneralNames -- decoded values surfaced.

package/lib/webcrypto.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 
 var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
 var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
+var guard = require("./guard-all");
 
 // Single-owner error class -- co-located with its module (framework-error
 // stays the cross-module home; this is webcrypto-private). withCause: a
@@ -47,21 +48,7 @@ var MAX_RANDOM_BYTES = 65536;
 // ---- value helpers ---------------------------------------------------
 
 function _toBuf(data, who) {
-  var isAb = data instanceof ArrayBuffer;
-  // A Buffer is itself an ArrayBuffer view, so it is handled by the view arm --
-  // NOT a `Buffer.isBuffer` fast-path that would return it as-is. A detached
-  // backing ArrayBuffer (a transferred / structuredClone'd Buffer, view, or
-  // ArrayBuffer) has had its bytes removed and reads as zero-length; the
-  // fast-path would silently hash / sign EMPTY (a fail-OPEN). Always re-view
-  // through Buffer.from so a detached input fails closed here as a typed error.
-  if (isAb || ArrayBuffer.isView(data)) {
-    try {
-      return isAb ? Buffer.from(data) : Buffer.from(data.buffer, data.byteOffset, data.byteLength);
-    } catch (e) {
-      throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/data", (who || "input") + ": input is not a usable byte source (detached backing buffer?)", e);
-    }
-  }
-  throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/data", (who || "input") + ": expected BufferSource (ArrayBuffer / TypedArray / Buffer)");
+  return guard.bytes.source(data, WebCryptoError, "webcrypto/data", who || "input");
 }
 
 function _toArrayBuffer(buf) {
@@ -354,7 +341,7 @@ SubtleCrypto.prototype.verify = async function verify(algorithm, key, signature,
     // in constant time. The length check leaks nothing a constant-time compare
     // would protect; the secret-dependent byte comparison is timingSafeEqual.
     var digest = hm.digest();
-    return digest.length === sig.length && nodeCrypto.timingSafeEqual(digest, sig);
+    return guard.crypto.constantTimeEqual(digest, sig);
   }
   throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/not-supported", "verify: unsupported algorithm " + JSON.stringify(name));
 };
@@ -729,15 +716,11 @@ Crypto.prototype.getRandomValues = function getRandomValues(typedArray) {
   if (typedArray.byteLength > MAX_RANDOM_BYTES) {
     throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues: byteLength exceeds " + MAX_RANDOM_BYTES);
   }
-  var view;
-  try {
-    // A detached backing ArrayBuffer surfaces as a typed error rather than a
-    // raw TypeError from Buffer.from over the transferred/cloned view.
-    view = Buffer.from(typedArray.buffer, typedArray.byteOffset, typedArray.byteLength);
-  } catch (e) {
-    throw new WebCryptoError("webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues: byte view is not usable (detached backing buffer?)", e);
-  }
-  nodeCrypto.randomFillSync(view);
+  // Re-view the (already integer-TypedArray-validated) output buffer via
+  // guard.bytes.source -- any TypedArray, not just Uint8Array -- so a detached
+  // backing store fails closed here; the returned Buffer aliases typedArray, so
+  // randomFillSync writes through to the caller's array.
+  nodeCrypto.randomFillSync(guard.bytes.source(typedArray, WebCryptoError, "webcrypto/data", "getRandomValues"));
   return typedArray;
 };
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/pki",
-  "version": "0.1.29",
+  "version": "0.1.31",
   "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:26032baa-c793-470f-863c-569dc97c186e",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:2ed2aa23-5194-4472-96f3-c4013f134834",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-07-11T05:58:59.165Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-07-11T16:09:44.713Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.1.29",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.1.31",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "pki",
-      "version": "0.1.29",
+      "version": "0.1.31",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "Pure-JavaScript PKI toolkit that owns its stack — X.509, ASN.1/DER, CMS, PQC-first.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.1.29",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/pki@0.1.31",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.1.29",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/pki@0.1.31",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]