@blamejs/pki 0.1.21 → 0.1.23

package/lib/oid.js

@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@
  *   OID strings and their human names, plus arc conversion and DER
  *   encode/decode convenience. Every algorithm, attribute type, and
  *   extension in PKI is named by an OID, and resolving them through one
- *   registry — rather than scattering magic dotted strings across the
- *   codebase — is what lets a new algorithm be a data entry instead of a
+ *   registry -- rather than scattering magic dotted strings across the
+ *   codebase -- is what lets a new algorithm be a data entry instead of a
  *   code change.
  *
  *   The seed set is declared by FAMILY: an OID belongs to a class with a
- *   shared base arc (the "starting variable" — `2.5.4` for the RFC 5280
+ *   shared base arc (the "starting variable" -- `2.5.4` for the RFC 5280
  *   attribute types, `2.5.29` for the extensions, `2.16.840.1.101.3.4` for
  *   the NIST algorithms), and each member names only its trailing arc. The
  *   full OID is derived from base + leaf at load, so the arc hierarchy that
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
  *   extend it with `register` (one OID) or `registerFamily` (a whole arc).
  *
  * @card
- *   Two-way OID ↔ name registry with arc conversion, seeded by family from
+ *   Two-way OID <-> name registry with arc conversion, seeded by family from
  *   the RFC 5280 and NIST post-quantum object identifiers.
  */
 
@@ -38,72 +38,72 @@ var frameworkError = require("./framework-error");
 
 var OidError = frameworkError.OidError;
 
-// FAMILIES — OIDs grouped by their shared base arc (the "similar starting
+// FAMILIES -- OIDs grouped by their shared base arc (the "similar starting
 // variable" that defines a class). A member is `name: leaf`, where leaf is a
 // trailing arc (number) or a short arc array for a multi-level leaf; the full
 // arc is derived at load via base.concat(leaf). Declaring by family means no
 // dotted-decimal OID literal appears in this source at all, and adding a
-// member is one `name: leaf` line under its class — no base to re-type.
+// member is one `name: leaf` line under its class -- no base to re-type.
 var FAMILIES = {
   // RFC 5280 attribute types.
   attributeType: { base: [2, 5, 4], of: {
     commonName: 3, surname: 4, serialNumber: 5, countryName: 6,
     localityName: 7, stateOrProvinceName: 8, streetAddress: 9,
     organizationName: 10, organizationalUnitName: 11, title: 12, givenName: 42,
-    // RFC 5755 §4.4 attribute-certificate attribute types.
+    // RFC 5755 sec. 4.4 attribute-certificate attribute types.
     clearance: 55, role: 72 } },
 
   // RFC 5280 certificate extensions.
   certExtension: { base: [2, 5, 29], of: {
     subjectKeyIdentifier: 14, keyUsage: 15, subjectAltName: 17, issuerAltName: 18,
     basicConstraints: 19,
-    // CRL + CRL-entry extensions (RFC 5280 §5.2, §5.3)
+    // CRL + CRL-entry extensions (RFC 5280 sec. 5.2, sec. 5.3)
     cRLNumber: 20, reasonCode: 21, invalidityDate: 24, deltaCRLIndicator: 27,
     issuingDistributionPoint: 28, certificateIssuer: 29,
     nameConstraints: 30, cRLDistributionPoints: 31,
     certificatePolicies: 32, policyMappings: 33, authorityKeyIdentifier: 35,
     policyConstraints: 36, extKeyUsage: 37, freshestCRL: 46,
     inhibitAnyPolicy: 54,
-    // The two special-OID leaves under extension arcs (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.4 /
-    // §4.2.1.12): the certificate-policies wildcard and the EKU wildcard.
+    // The two special-OID leaves under extension arcs (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.4 /
+    // sec. 4.2.1.12): the certificate-policies wildcard and the EKU wildcard.
     anyPolicy: [32, 0], anyExtendedKeyUsage: [37, 0],
-    // RFC 5755 attribute-certificate extensions (§4.3.2, §4.3.6).
+    // RFC 5755 attribute-certificate extensions (sec. 4.3.2, sec. 4.3.6).
     targetInformation: 55, noRevAvail: 56 } },
 
   // PKIX private extensions on the id-pe arc (authorityInfoAccess et al, plus the
-  // RFC 5755 attribute-certificate id-pe extensions: ac-auditIdentity §4.3.1,
-  // aaControls §7.4, ac-proxying §7.2).
+  // RFC 5755 attribute-certificate id-pe extensions: ac-auditIdentity sec. 4.3.1,
+  // aaControls sec. 7.4, ac-proxying sec. 7.2).
   pkixAccess: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1], of: {
     authorityInfoAccess: 1, acAuditIdentity: 4, aaControls: 6, acProxying: 10 } },
 
-  // id-aca — RFC 5755 attribute-certificate attribute types on the id-pkix 10 arc:
-  // authenticationInfo §4.4.1 .. group §4.4.4, plus encAttrs §7.1 (the encrypted-
+  // id-aca -- RFC 5755 attribute-certificate attribute types on the id-pkix 10 arc:
+  // authenticationInfo sec. 4.4.1 .. group sec. 4.4.4, plus encAttrs sec. 7.1 (the encrypted-
   // attribute wrapper, syntax ContentInfo). { id-aca 5 } is reserved.
   idAca: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 10], of: {
     authenticationInfo: 1, accessIdentity: 2, chargingIdentity: 3, group: 4, encAttrs: 6 } },
 
   // The legacy RFC 3281 id-at-clearance on the X.501 selected-attribute-types arc.
-  // RFC 5755 §4.4.6 says implementations MUST NOT OUTPUT this form but SHOULD ACCEPT
+  // RFC 5755 sec. 4.4.6 says implementations MUST NOT OUTPUT this form but SHOULD ACCEPT
   // it for decoding, so it is registered as an alias of "clearance". The canonical
   // name -> OID reverse stays the RFC 5755 attributeType-arc 2.5.4.55 (registered
   // first under attributeType, so it wins the reverse mapping).
   selectedAttrType: { base: [2, 5, 1, 5], of: { clearance: 55 } },
 
-  // PKIX Access Descriptor methods (id-ad, RFC 5280 §4.2.2.1/§4.2.2.2). id-ad-ocsp
+  // PKIX Access Descriptor methods (id-ad, RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.2.1/sec. 4.2.2.2). id-ad-ocsp
   // is the arc the OCSP responder OIDs hang under; id-ad-caIssuers names the AIA
   // CA-issuers access method.
   adAccess: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48], of: { ocsp: 1, caIssuers: 2 } },
 
   // OCSP (RFC 6960) on the id-pkix-ocsp arc (= id-ad-ocsp). id-pkix-ocsp-basic is
-  // the ResponseBytes.responseType this build decodes; id-pkix-ocsp-nonce (§4.4.1)
+  // the ResponseBytes.responseType this build decodes; id-pkix-ocsp-nonce (sec. 4.4.1)
   // names the nonce extension; the remaining members name the other OCSP extensions
   // (CRL references, acceptable-response-types, archive-cutoff, service-locator,
-  // preferred-signature-algorithms, extended-revoke — RFC 6960 §4.4, RFC 9654).
+  // preferred-signature-algorithms, extended-revoke -- RFC 6960 sec. 4.4, RFC 9654).
   ocsp: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1], of: {
     ocspBasic: 1, ocspNonce: 2, ocspCrl: 3, ocspResponse: 4, ocspNoCheck: 5,
     ocspArchiveCutoff: 6, ocspServiceLocator: 7, ocspPrefSigAlgs: 8, ocspExtendedRevoke: 9 } },
 
-  // CRMF (RFC 4211) registration controls (§6) and registration info (§7) on the
+  // CRMF (RFC 4211) registration controls (sec. 6) and registration info (sec. 7) on the
   // id-pkip arc (id-pkix 5). id-regCtrl (id-pkip 1) names the control types a
   // CertRequest carries; id-regInfo (id-pkip 2) names the registration-info types.
   // The parser surfaces each control/info value RAW keyed by these names.
@@ -111,15 +111,15 @@ var FAMILIES = {
     regToken: 1, authenticator: 2, pkiPublicationInfo: 3, pkiArchiveOptions: 4, oldCertID: 5, protocolEncrKey: 6 } },
   regInfo: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 5, 2], of: { utf8Pairs: 1, certReq: 2 } },
 
-  // PKIX extended key purposes (id-kp, RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12). timeStamping is required
-  // — critical and sole — on an RFC 3161 TSA signing certificate (§2.3).
+  // PKIX extended key purposes (id-kp, RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.12). timeStamping is required
+  // -- critical and sole -- on an RFC 3161 TSA signing certificate (sec. 2.3).
   pkixKp: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 3], of: {
     serverAuth: 1, clientAuth: 2, codeSigning: 3, emailProtection: 4, timeStamping: 8, ocspSigning: 9 } },
 
   // Google Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962) on the 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4 arc:
-  // the SCT-list X.509 extension (§3.3), the precertificate poison (§3.1), the
-  // precert-signing EKU (§3.1, naming only), and the OCSP-delivered SCT list
-  // (§3.3). The SCT payload itself is TLS presentation language, not DER — it is
+  // the SCT-list X.509 extension (sec. 3.3), the precertificate poison (sec. 3.1), the
+  // precert-signing EKU (sec. 3.1, naming only), and the OCSP-delivered SCT list
+  // (sec. 3.3). The SCT payload itself is TLS presentation language, not DER -- it is
   // parsed by lib/ct.js (pki.ct), never routed through the DER schema engine.
   ct: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 4], of: {
     signedCertificateTimestampList: 2, precertificatePoison: 3,
@@ -131,26 +131,27 @@ var FAMILIES = {
     sha256WithRSAEncryption: 11,
     sha384WithRSAEncryption: 12, sha512WithRSAEncryption: 13 } },
 
-  // PKCS#7 / CMS content types (RFC 5652 §4, RFC 2315). id-signedData is the one
+  // PKCS#7 / CMS content types (RFC 5652 sec. 4, RFC 2315). id-signedData is the one
   // this toolkit structurally decodes; the rest are recognized-and-deferred.
   pkcs7: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 7], of: {
     data: 1, signedData: 2, envelopedData: 3, signedAndEnvelopedData: 4,
     digestedData: 5, encryptedData: 6 } },
 
-  // PKCS#9 attribute types — incl. the CMS signed-attribute OIDs (RFC 5652 §11)
-  // and the PKCS#12 bag attributes friendlyName / localKeyId (RFC 7292 §4.2).
+  // PKCS#9 attribute types -- incl. the CMS signed-attribute OIDs (RFC 5652 sec. 11)
+  // and the PKCS#12 bag attributes friendlyName / localKeyId (RFC 7292 sec. 4.2).
   pkcs9: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9], of: {
     emailAddress: 1, contentType: 3, messageDigest: 4, signingTime: 5,
-    challengePassword: 7, extensionRequest: 14, friendlyName: 20, localKeyId: 21 } },
+    countersignature: 6, challengePassword: 7, extensionRequest: 14,
+    smimeCapabilities: 15, friendlyName: 20, localKeyId: 21 } },
 
-  // PKCS#9 CertBag / CRLBag value discriminators (RFC 7292 §4.2.3-§4.2.4).
+  // PKCS#9 CertBag / CRLBag value discriminators (RFC 7292 sec. 4.2.3-sec. 4.2.4).
   pkcs9CertTypes: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 22], of: { x509Certificate: 1, sdsiCertificate: 2 } },
   pkcs9CrlTypes:  { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 23], of: { x509CRL: 1 } },
 
   // PKCS#5 password-based schemes (RFC 8018) + the PBMAC1 MacData arm (RFC 9579).
   pkcs5: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 5], of: { pbkdf2: 12, pbes2: 13, pbmac1: 14 } },
 
-  // CMP InfoTypeAndValue types — id-it under id-pkix (RFC 9810 §5.3.19; the
+  // CMP InfoTypeAndValue types -- id-it under id-pkix (RFC 9810 sec. 5.3.19; the
   // PKIXCMP-2023 module assigns these leaves, 8/9 unassigned).
   idIt: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 4], of: {
     caProtEncCert: 1, signKeyPairTypes: 2, encKeyPairTypes: 3, preferredSymmAlg: 4,
@@ -161,15 +162,15 @@ var FAMILIES = {
     crls: 23, kemCiphertextInfo: 24 } },
 
   // CMP message-protection MAC algorithms on the Entrust arc (RFC 9810
-  // §5.1.3.1/.2/.4; RFC 9481 §6.1.1).
+  // sec. 5.1.3.1/.2/.4; RFC 9481 sec. 6.1.1).
   entrustAlg: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113533, 7, 66], of: {
     passwordBasedMac: 13, kemBasedMac: 16, dhBasedMac: 30 } },
 
-  // PKCS#12 bag types (RFC 7292 §4.2, Appendix D).
+  // PKCS#12 bag types (RFC 7292 sec. 4.2, Appendix D).
   pkcs12BagTypes: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 12, 10, 1], of: {
     keyBag: 1, pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag: 2, certBag: 3, crlBag: 4, secretBag: 5, safeContentsBag: 6 } },
 
-  // PKCS#12 password-based encryption schemes (RFC 7292 Appendix C) — legacy
+  // PKCS#12 password-based encryption schemes (RFC 7292 Appendix C) -- legacy
   // PBE identifiers still emitted by deployed exporters; recognized so a
   // shrouded bag's algorithm resolves to a name, never decrypted here.
   pkcs12Pbe: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 12, 1], of: {
@@ -177,18 +178,42 @@ var FAMILIES = {
     "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC": 3, "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC": 4,
     "pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC": 5, "pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC": 6 } },
 
-  // RSADSI digest / HMAC algorithms (RFC 8018 §B.1) — the PBKDF2 / PBMAC1 PRFs.
+  // RSADSI digest / HMAC algorithms (RFC 8018 sec. B.1) -- the PBKDF2 / PBMAC1 PRFs.
   rsadsiDigest: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 2], of: {
     hmacWithSHA1: 7, hmacWithSHA224: 8, hmacWithSHA256: 9,
     hmacWithSHA384: 10, hmacWithSHA512: 11 } },
 
   // S/MIME content types on the PKCS#9 smime arc (RFC 5652, RFC 3161): id-ct.
-  smimeCt: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 16, 1], of: { authData: 2, tSTInfo: 4, encKeyWithID: 21 } },
+  // authData is RFC 5652 sec. 9 AuthenticatedData; authEnvelopedData is RFC 5083.
+  smimeCt: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 16, 1], of: { authData: 2, tSTInfo: 4, authEnvelopedData: 23, encKeyWithID: 21 } },
+
+  // S/MIME other-recipient-info types (id-ori, RFC 5652 sec. 6.2.5). id-ori-kem
+  // carries a KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629) inside the ori [4] RecipientInfo arm.
+  smimeOri: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 16, 13], of: { kem: 3 } },
+
+  // S/MIME algorithm identifiers (id-alg). The HKDF KDFs (RFC 8619) and the
+  // CEK-HKDF content-encryption wrapper (RFC 9709) a KEMRecipientInfo names, plus
+  // the RSA-KEM SPKI algorithm (RFC 9690). Parameters are absent for the HKDFs.
+  smimeAlg: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 16, 3], of: {
+    "id-rsa-kem": 14, hkdfWithSha256: 28, hkdfWithSha384: 29, hkdfWithSha512: 30, cekHkdfSha256: 31 } },
+
+  // RSA-KEM key-transport algorithm (RFC 9690, obsoletes RFC 5990) on the ISO
+  // 18033-2 arc -- the kem OID an RSA KEMRecipientInfo carries (distinct from the
+  // id-rsa-kem SPKI algorithm above).
+  iso18033: { base: [1, 0, 18033, 2, 2], of: { "id-kem-rsa": 4 } },
+
+  // RFC 3370 HMAC-SHA-1 MAC algorithm (the AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm on the
+  // PKIX arc, distinct from the RSADSI hmacWithSHA1).
+  pkixHmac: { base: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 8, 1], of: { "hmac-SHA1": 2 } },
 
   // S/MIME authenticated attributes (id-aa, RFC 2634 / RFC 5035 / RFC 5816). The ESS
   // signing-certificate attributes bind a CMS / TSP SignerInfo to its signing cert;
-  // signingCertificateV2 (ESSCertIDv2) carries a non-SHA-1 cert hash (RFC 5816 §2.2.1).
+  // signingCertificateV2 (ESSCertIDv2) carries a non-SHA-1 cert hash (RFC 5816 sec. 2.2.1).
+  // The RFC 2634 originals (receiptRequest .. contentReference) are name-only: they
+  // resolve to a name so an unsupported-attribute diagnostic is legible, not decoded.
   smimeAa: { base: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 9, 16, 2], of: {
+    receiptRequest: 1, eSSSecurityLabel: 2, mlExpansionHistory: 3, contentHints: 4,
+    msgSigDigest: 5, contentIdentifier: 7, equivalentLabels: 9, contentReference: 10,
     signingCertificate: 12, timeStampToken: 14, signingCertificateV2: 47 } },
 
   // ANSI X9.62 EC public key, named curve, and ECDSA signatures.
@@ -202,22 +227,23 @@ var FAMILIES = {
   // Edwards / Montgomery curves (RFC 8410).
   edwards: { base: [1, 3, 101], of: { X25519: 110, X448: 111, Ed25519: 112, Ed448: 113 } },
 
-  // OIW Secsig SHA-1 (1.3.14.3.2.26) — the most common OCSP CertID hashAlgorithm;
+  // OIW Secsig SHA-1 (1.3.14.3.2.26) -- the most common OCSP CertID hashAlgorithm;
   // nistHash covers only SHA-256 and above.
   oiwSecsig: { base: [1, 3, 14, 3, 2], of: { sha1: 26 } },
 
-  // NIST AES content-encryption algorithms (arc 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1) — the
+  // NIST AES content-encryption algorithms (arc 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1) -- the
   // modern PBES2 / CMS content ciphers a PKCS#12 or EnvelopedData names.
   nistAes: { base: [2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 1], of: {
-    "aes128-CBC": 2, "aes128-GCM": 6, "aes192-CBC": 22, "aes192-GCM": 26,
-    "aes256-CBC": 42, "aes256-GCM": 46 } },
+    "aes128-CBC": 2, "aes128-wrap": 5, "aes128-GCM": 6, "aes128-CCM": 7,
+    "aes192-CBC": 22, "aes192-wrap": 25, "aes192-GCM": 26, "aes192-CCM": 27,
+    "aes256-CBC": 42, "aes256-wrap": 45, "aes256-GCM": 46, "aes256-CCM": 47 } },
 
   // NIST hash functions (SHA-2, SHA-3, SHAKE).
   nistHash: { base: [2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2], of: {
     sha256: 1, sha384: 2, sha512: 3, "sha3-256": 8, "sha3-512": 10, shake256: 12 } },
 
-  // NIST signature algorithms — FIPS 204 ML-DSA + FIPS 205 SLH-DSA share the
-  // signature arc 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3. RFC 9909 §3 assigns the 12 Pure SLH-DSA
+  // NIST signature algorithms -- FIPS 204 ML-DSA + FIPS 205 SLH-DSA share the
+  // signature arc 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3. RFC 9909 sec. 3 assigns the 12 Pure SLH-DSA
   // sets .20-.31 (SHA-2 .20-.25, SHAKE .26-.31) and the 12 pre-hash HashSLH-DSA
   // sets .35-.46, each pairing a parameter set with its message-digest hash. The
   // parameters MUST be absent for every one of them (enforced via paramsMustBeAbsent).
@@ -236,7 +262,7 @@ var FAMILIES = {
     "id-hash-slh-dsa-shake-192s-with-shake256": 43, "id-hash-slh-dsa-shake-192f-with-shake256": 44,
     "id-hash-slh-dsa-shake-256s-with-shake256": 45, "id-hash-slh-dsa-shake-256f-with-shake256": 46 } },
 
-  // NIST KEM — FIPS 203 ML-KEM (arc 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.4).
+  // NIST KEM -- FIPS 203 ML-KEM (arc 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.4).
   nistKem: { base: [2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 4], of: {
     "id-ml-kem-512": 1, "id-ml-kem-768": 2, "id-ml-kem-1024": 3 } },
 
@@ -261,7 +287,7 @@ function _isArc(a) {
   return typeof a === "number" && Number.isSafeInteger(a) && a >= 0;
 }
 
-// Seed the registry family by family — the built-in set is registered through
+// Seed the registry family by family -- the built-in set is registered through
 // the exact same primitive an operator uses (registerFamily), so there is one
 // path from a declared family to indexed OIDs and no dotted literals anywhere.
 Object.keys(FAMILIES).forEach(function (fam) {
@@ -269,11 +295,27 @@ Object.keys(FAMILIES).forEach(function (fam) {
 });
 
 function _assertDotted(dotted, who) {
-  if (typeof dotted !== "string" || !/^\d+(\.\d+)+$/.test(dotted)) {
-    throw new OidError("oid/bad-input", who + ": expected a dotted-decimal OID string");
+  // No leading-zero components: "01.2.840" is a key no decoded OID can match,
+  // and the arc converters round-trip it to a DIFFERENT OID ("1.2.840").
+  if (typeof dotted !== "string" || !/^(0|[1-9]\d*)(\.(0|[1-9]\d*))+$/.test(dotted)) {
+    throw new OidError("oid/bad-input", who + ": expected a dotted-decimal OID string (no leading-zero components)");
   }
 }
 
+// X.660 encodability: the root arc is 0..2 and, under roots 0 and 1, the
+// second arc is 0..39 (the first two arcs pack into a single octet as
+// 40*X+Y). An OID outside these bounds can never be DER-encoded, so a
+// registration carrying one fails at config time rather than at first use.
+function _assertEncodableArcs(arcs, who) {
+  if (arcs.length < 2) {
+    throw new OidError("oid/bad-input", who + ": an OID must have at least 2 arcs");
+  }
+  var root = typeof arcs[0] === "bigint" ? arcs[0] : BigInt(arcs[0]);
+  var second = typeof arcs[1] === "bigint" ? arcs[1] : BigInt(arcs[1]);
+  if (root > 2n) throw new OidError("oid/bad-arc", who + ": the root arc must be 0, 1, or 2 (X.660)");
+  if (root < 2n && second > 39n) throw new OidError("oid/bad-arc", who + ": the second arc must be 0..39 under roots 0 and 1 (X.660)");
+}
+
 /**
  * @primitive  pki.oid.name
  * @signature  pki.oid.name(dotted) -> string | undefined
@@ -312,10 +354,10 @@ function has(dotted) {
  * @spec       X.660, RFC 5280
  * @related    pki.oid.registerFamily, pki.oid.name
  *
- * Add (or override) an OID → name mapping so an operator's private or
+ * Add (or override) an OID -> name mapping so an operator's private or
  * newly-standardized arc resolves through the same registry as the seed
  * set. A later registration of the same OID replaces the forward name;
- * the reverse (name → OID) keeps the first registration as canonical.
+ * the reverse (name -> OID) keeps the first registration as canonical.
  *
  * @example
  *   pki.oid.register("1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1", "acmeWidgetPolicy");
@@ -323,6 +365,7 @@ function has(dotted) {
 function register(dotted, n) {
   _assertDotted(dotted, "register");
   if (typeof n !== "string" || n.length === 0) throw new OidError("oid/bad-input", "register: name must be a non-empty string");
+  _assertEncodableArcs(dotted.split(".").map(BigInt), "register");
   _index(dotted, n);
 }
 
@@ -336,7 +379,7 @@ function register(dotted, n) {
  *
  * Register a whole OID family in one call. `base` is the shared arc prefix
  * (the starting variable a class of OIDs has in common) and `members` maps
- * each name to its trailing arc — a number, or a short arc array for a
+ * each name to its trailing arc -- a number, or a short arc array for a
  * multi-level leaf. Each full OID is derived as `base` followed by the leaf,
  * so a family is declared as its hierarchy rather than as re-spelled full
  * paths. This is the primitive the built-in seed set itself is built from.
@@ -367,6 +410,7 @@ function registerFamily(base, members) {
     if (!arcs.every(_isArc)) {
       throw new OidError("oid/bad-arc", "registerFamily: member " + JSON.stringify(nm) + " has a non-arc leaf");
     }
+    _assertEncodableArcs(arcs, "registerFamily");
     _index(arcs.join("."), nm);
   });
 }
@@ -377,7 +421,7 @@ function all() {
   return out;
 }
 
-// toArcs / fromArcs — dotted <-> numeric arc array. Arcs come back as
+// toArcs / fromArcs -- dotted <-> numeric arc array. Arcs come back as
 // Number where safe and BigInt where an arc exceeds 2^53 (rare, but a
 // UUID-based OID arc can), so the round-trip never loses precision.
 function toArcs(dotted) {
@@ -400,7 +444,7 @@ function fromArcs(arcs) {
   }).join(".");
 }
 
-// DER convenience — thin pass-throughs to the codec so callers reach for
+// DER convenience -- thin pass-throughs to the codec so callers reach for
 // one namespace when they have a dotted string in hand.
 function toDER(dotted) { _assertDotted(dotted, "toDER"); return asn1.build.oid(dotted); }
 function fromDER(input) {
@@ -409,11 +453,11 @@ function fromDER(input) {
   return asn1.read.oid(node);
 }
 
-// Algorithm identifiers whose `parameters` field MUST be absent — no explicit
+// Algorithm identifiers whose `parameters` field MUST be absent -- no explicit
 // NULL, no bytes. The FIPS 204 ML-DSA and FIPS 205 SLH-DSA signature families
-// and the RFC 8410 Edwards / Montgomery curves each carry this MUST: RFC 9909 §3
-// (SLH-DSA in X.509), RFC 9814 §4 (SLH-DSA in CMS), RFC 9881 §2 (ML-DSA in X.509),
-// RFC 8410 §3 (Ed25519 / Ed448 / X25519 / X448). Built by NAME through the same
+// and the RFC 8410 Edwards / Montgomery curves each carry this MUST: RFC 9909 sec. 3
+// (SLH-DSA in X.509), RFC 9814 sec. 4 (SLH-DSA in CMS), RFC 9881 sec. 2 (ML-DSA in X.509),
+// RFC 8410 sec. 3 (Ed25519 / Ed448 / X25519 / X448). Built by NAME through the same
 // registry every caller uses, so a typo fails closed at load rather than silently
 // dropping a member. One set drives the single shared AlgorithmIdentifier reject
 // (schema-pkix), so every format consumer inherits the rule with no per-format code.
@@ -424,7 +468,7 @@ var _PARAMS_ABSENT = new Set();
   "id-slh-dsa-sha2-192f", "id-slh-dsa-sha2-256s", "id-slh-dsa-sha2-256f",
   "id-slh-dsa-shake-128s", "id-slh-dsa-shake-128f", "id-slh-dsa-shake-192s",
   "id-slh-dsa-shake-192f", "id-slh-dsa-shake-256s", "id-slh-dsa-shake-256f",
-  // Pre-hash HashSLH-DSA sets (RFC 9909 §3) — parameters MUST be absent too.
+  // Pre-hash HashSLH-DSA sets (RFC 9909 sec. 3) -- parameters MUST be absent too.
   "id-hash-slh-dsa-sha2-128s-with-sha256", "id-hash-slh-dsa-sha2-128f-with-sha256",
   "id-hash-slh-dsa-sha2-192s-with-sha512", "id-hash-slh-dsa-sha2-192f-with-sha512",
   "id-hash-slh-dsa-sha2-256s-with-sha512", "id-hash-slh-dsa-sha2-256f-with-sha512",
@@ -432,7 +476,19 @@ var _PARAMS_ABSENT = new Set();
   "id-hash-slh-dsa-shake-192s-with-shake256", "id-hash-slh-dsa-shake-192f-with-shake256",
   "id-hash-slh-dsa-shake-256s-with-shake256", "id-hash-slh-dsa-shake-256f-with-shake256",
   "Ed25519", "Ed448", "X25519", "X448",
-].forEach(function (nm) { _PARAMS_ABSENT.add(byName(nm)); });
+  // FIPS 203 ML-KEM (RFC 9936 sec. 3: PARAMS ARE absent).
+  "id-ml-kem-512", "id-ml-kem-768", "id-ml-kem-1024",
+  // HKDF key-derivation identifiers (RFC 8619 sec. 2: when any of these appear
+  // within AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters component SHALL be absent).
+  "hkdfWithSha256", "hkdfWithSha384", "hkdfWithSha512",
+].forEach(function (nm) {
+  var d = byName(nm);
+  // A seed-list typo must fail at module load -- admitting undefined would
+  // make paramsMustBeAbsent(byName(sameTypo)) return TRUE for every other
+  // unregistered name (Set.has(undefined)), a fail-open guard.
+  if (typeof d !== "string") throw new OidError("oid/unknown-name", "paramsMustBeAbsent seed: " + JSON.stringify(nm) + " is not a registered name");
+  _PARAMS_ABSENT.add(d);
+});
 
 /**
  * @primitive  pki.oid.paramsMustBeAbsent