@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.9.1

package/data/global-frameworks.json

@@ -0,0 +1,2913 @@
+{
+  "_meta": {
+    "schema_version": "1.3.0",
+    "version": "1.3.0",
+    "last_updated": "2026-05-11",
+    "note": "Multi-jurisdiction framework registry. patch_sla in hours. notification_sla in hours. source field must be primary regulatory source. v1.3.0 expansion: NO, MX, AR, TR, TH, PH, US_CALIFORNIA top-level jurisdictions added; EU member-state sub-regulator blocks added for Germany (BSI), France (ANSSI), Spain (AEPD + AESIA), Italy (ACN + AgID); EU-level technical body ENISA added as cross-cutting reference. v1.2.0 expansion: IL, CH, HK, TW, ID, VN, US_NYDFS added; JP expanded with APPI/PPC, FISC, NISC, METI, Economic Security Promotion Act, AI Strategy Council guidance. v1.1.0 expansion: BR, CN, ZA, AE, SA, NZ, KR, CL added; IN and CA enriched with data-protection law entries (DPDPA, Quebec Law 25, PIPEDA).",
+    "tlp": "CLEAR",
+    "source_confidence": {
+      "scheme": "Admiralty (A-F + 1-6)",
+      "default": "A1",
+      "note": "B = usually reliable; 2 = probably true. Per-entry overrides via entry-level source_confidence field. Public-record catalogs (NVD, ATLAS, CWE, RFC, framework publishers) get A1 (completely reliable, confirmed). Project-curated catalogs (zeroday-lessons, exploit-availability) default to B2 with source citations."
+    },
+    "freshness_policy": {
+      "default_review_cadence_days": 90,
+      "stale_after_days": 180,
+      "rebuild_after_days": 365,
+      "note": "Per-entry last_verified governs decay. Skills depending on this catalog must check entry freshness before high-stakes use."
+    }
+  },
+  "EU": {
+    "jurisdiction": "European Union",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "GDPR": {
+        "full_name": "General Data Protection Regulation",
+        "authority": "European Data Protection Board (EDPB)",
+        "source": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679",
+        "effective_date": "2018-05-25",
+        "version": "2016/679",
+        "security_article": "Article 32 — Security of Processing",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach affecting data subject rights",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 32 — appropriate technical and organizational measures",
+          "Art. 33 — 72-hour breach notification to supervisory authority",
+          "Art. 34 — direct notification to affected individuals when high risk"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Art. 32 'appropriate measures' is undefined — no technical specification",
+          "Patch management not explicitly required",
+          "AI/ML systems: no specific Art. 32 guidance for model security",
+          "Prompt injection is not a recognized Art. 32 risk category"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "GDPR applies to AI processing personal data; no specific AI security requirements beyond Art. 32",
+        "pqc_coverage": "No PQC requirement; encryption 'appropriate' is undefined",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — broad language allows checkbox compliance"
+      },
+      "NIS2": {
+        "full_name": "Network and Information Security Directive 2",
+        "authority": "ENISA + Member State NCAs",
+        "source": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022L2555",
+        "effective_date": "2024-10-17",
+        "version": "2022/2555",
+        "security_article": "Article 21 — Cybersecurity Risk Management Measures",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 24,
+        "notification_trigger": "Significant incident (substantial impact on service provision)",
+        "notification_stages": {
+          "early_warning": "24h — initial notification to NCA",
+          "incident_notification": "72h — significant incident report",
+          "final_report": "P+30 days — full post-incident report"
+        },
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 21(2)(a) — policies on risk analysis and information system security",
+          "Art. 21(2)(b) — incident handling",
+          "Art. 21(2)(e) — supply chain security",
+          "Art. 21(2)(h) — cryptography and encryption",
+          "Art. 21(2)(i) — human resources security and access control"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Art. 21 patch SLA undefined — no required remediation timeline",
+          "Supply chain: MCP servers and AI tool plugins not contemplated",
+          "Cryptography: 'state of the art' acknowledged but no PQC deadline",
+          "AI systems: not explicitly scoped as NIS2 critical infrastructure in most implementations"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI systems may be in scope if classified as essential/important entity; no AI-specific security measures",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Art. 21(2)(h) — encryption required; 'state of the art' standard but no PQC deadline",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high — requirements are substantive but patch SLA gap is critical"
+      },
+      "DORA": {
+        "full_name": "Digital Operational Resilience Act",
+        "authority": "ESAs (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA)",
+        "source": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2554",
+        "effective_date": "2025-01-17",
+        "version": "2022/2554",
+        "sector": "Financial services",
+        "security_article": "Articles 9-14 — ICT Risk Management",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 4,
+        "notification_trigger": "Major ICT-related incident (RTO/RPO breach, high financial impact, reputational damage)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 9 — ICT risk management framework",
+          "Art. 10 — identification of ICT assets and dependencies",
+          "Art. 11 — ICT business continuity",
+          "Art. 19 — major incident classification and reporting (4h initial, 24h intermediate, 30d final)",
+          "Art. 28-30 — ICT third-party risk (DORA extends to all ICT providers including cloud)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA not specified — risk-based interpretation required",
+          "AI/ML systems in scope but no AI-specific controls",
+          "MCP servers: 'ICT third-party service providers' may apply but no specific guidance",
+          "PQC: not addressed; 'appropriate level of security' standard"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI systems providing ICT services to financial entities are in scope as ICT third-party service providers",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Implicit in Art. 9 risk management; no explicit requirement",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — DORA has strong third-party oversight; patching gap remains"
+      },
+      "EU_AI_ACT": {
+        "full_name": "EU Artificial Intelligence Act",
+        "authority": "EU AI Office + National Market Surveillance Authorities",
+        "source": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689",
+        "effective_date": "2024-08-01",
+        "full_application_date": "2026-08-01",
+        "version": "2024/1689",
+        "security_article": "Article 9 — Risk Management System (High-Risk AI)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 9 — mandatory risk management system for high-risk AI (ongoing, not one-time)",
+          "Art. 10 — data governance requirements for training/validation/testing data",
+          "Art. 12 — technical documentation and logging requirements",
+          "Art. 15 — accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity requirements for high-risk AI",
+          "Art. 72 — GPAI model adversarial testing requirements"
+        ],
+        "high_risk_categories": [
+          "Biometric identification",
+          "Critical infrastructure management",
+          "Employment/recruitment decisions",
+          "Education access decisions",
+          "Law enforcement applications",
+          "Migration/asylum/border control",
+          "Justice/democratic process"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Art. 15 'cybersecurity' is undefined — no technical specification",
+          "Prompt injection not addressed in Art. 15 or implementing measures",
+          "Supply chain security for GPAI models: Art. 72 adversarial testing but no signing requirements",
+          "MCP servers/agent tools: not contemplated in implementing regulations"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Specific AI security requirements for high-risk AI and GPAI models — most complete AI security framework globally",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "unknown — implementing measures still developing as of 2026-05"
+      },
+      "EU_CRA": {
+        "full_name": "EU Cyber Resilience Act",
+        "authority": "ENISA + National Market Surveillance Authorities",
+        "source": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2847",
+        "effective_date": "2024-12-10",
+        "full_application_date": "2027-12-11",
+        "version": "2024/2847",
+        "sector": "Products with digital elements (hardware + software)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 13 — security by design and default obligations",
+          "Art. 14 — vulnerability handling obligations",
+          "Art. 16 — 24-hour notification for actively exploited vulnerabilities",
+          "Annex I — essential cybersecurity requirements (patch delivery, secure updates, secure defaults)"
+        ],
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 24,
+        "notification_trigger": "Actively exploited vulnerability discovered in the product",
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch delivery SLA: product must support patching but no required timeline for customers",
+          "AI components in products: no AI-specific security requirements beyond general CRA",
+          "MCP servers as 'products with digital elements': legal status unclear under CRA"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI software products are subject to CRA; no AI-specific security requirements",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not explicitly required; 'state of the art' standard",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — notification requirement is strong; customer-side patching gap remains"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "UK": {
+    "jurisdiction": "United Kingdom",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "CYBER_ESSENTIALS": {
+        "full_name": "Cyber Essentials",
+        "authority": "NCSC",
+        "source": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/overview",
+        "effective_date": "2014-06-01",
+        "version": "Montpelier (2023)",
+        "patch_sla": 336,
+        "patch_sla_note": "14 days for critical patches (internet-facing). Better than NIST 30-day, worse than ASD 48h.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Firewalls — boundary protection and device-level firewall",
+          "Secure Configuration — remove or disable unnecessary accounts and software",
+          "User Access Control — principle of least privilege",
+          "Malware Protection — anti-malware for all devices",
+          "Patch Management — 14-day critical patch SLA for internet-facing systems"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "14-day patch SLA still too long for CISA KEV + deterministic PoC class",
+          "No AI system security requirements",
+          "No MCP/agent trust requirements",
+          "No PQC requirements",
+          "No supply chain security beyond basic vendor controls"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "None",
+        "pqc_coverage": "None — NCSC PQC guidance is advisory, not Cyber Essentials requirement",
+        "theater_risk": "high — certification is binary pass/fail; 14-day SLA accepted as sufficient"
+      },
+      "NCSC_CAF": {
+        "full_name": "NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework",
+        "authority": "NCSC",
+        "source": "https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/caf",
+        "effective_date": "2019-01-01",
+        "version": "3.2",
+        "sector": "Critical national infrastructure",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "A1 — Governance — board-level cyber risk ownership",
+          "B3 — Identity and Access Control",
+          "B5 — Resilient Networks and Systems",
+          "B6 — Staff Awareness and Training",
+          "C1 — Security Monitoring",
+          "D1 — Response and Recovery"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA undefined — 'timely' interpretation only",
+          "AI systems: not addressed in CAF 3.2",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: NCSC recommends hybrid post-quantum but CAF does not require it"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI systems in CNI recommended to apply CAF; no AI-specific objectives",
+        "pqc_coverage": "NCSC has published PQC migration guidance but it is not CAF-required",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — outcome-based framework reduces checkbox risk but lacks AI specificity"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "AU": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Australia",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "ASD_ISM": {
+        "full_name": "Australian Signals Directorate Information Security Manual",
+        "authority": "Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)",
+        "source": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/essential-cyber-security/ism",
+        "effective_date": "Monthly updates",
+        "version": "2026-03",
+        "patch_sla": 48,
+        "patch_sla_note": "ISM-1623: 48h for critical with existing exploit. Best non-CISA-aware SLA of any major framework.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "ISM-1623 — Critical patches with exploits: 48h remediation",
+          "ISM-1754 — Patches with existing exploit for extreme risk: emergency patching",
+          "ISM-1698 — Application control (allowlisting)",
+          "ISM-0974 — Multi-factor authentication",
+          "ISM-1585 — Privileged access workstations"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "ISM-1623 48h SLA still too long for CISA KEV + deterministic 732-byte PoC",
+          "Live kernel patching: not a required capability",
+          "AI/ML systems: no ISM controls specifically for AI security",
+          "MCP server trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: under development; quantum computing risk guidance exists but no mandate"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI systems recommended to apply ISM; no AI-specific controls as of 2026-03",
+        "pqc_coverage": "ASD Quantum computing risks guidance published; ISM controls not yet updated with PQC mandate",
+        "theater_risk": "low — ISM is prescriptive and specific; 48h SLA is substantive"
+      },
+      "ESSENTIAL_8": {
+        "full_name": "ASD Essential Eight",
+        "authority": "Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)",
+        "source": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/essential-cyber-security/essential-eight",
+        "effective_date": "2017-06-01",
+        "version": "2023-11 (Maturity Level 3)",
+        "patch_sla": 48,
+        "patch_sla_note": "Maturity Level 3 — 48h for extreme risk. ML1 = 1 month, ML2 = 2 weeks, ML3 = 48h.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Application Control — allowlisting approved applications",
+          "Patch Applications — 48h extreme risk, 2w high risk (ML3)",
+          "Configure Microsoft Office Macro Settings",
+          "User Application Hardening — browser security",
+          "Restrict Admin Privileges",
+          "Patch Operating Systems — 48h extreme risk (ML3)",
+          "Multi-factor Authentication",
+          "Regular Backups"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "E8 Maturity Level 3 48h SLA: still insufficient for CISA KEV + deterministic public PoC",
+          "AI/ML: not in Essential Eight",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not in Essential Eight",
+          "PQC: not in Essential Eight",
+          "Supply chain: not specifically addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "None",
+        "pqc_coverage": "None",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — maturity levels create real progression; but AI/MCP gaps are total"
+      },
+      "APRA_CPS234": {
+        "full_name": "APRA Prudential Standard CPS 234 Information Security",
+        "authority": "Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)",
+        "source": "https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/cps_234_july_2019_for_public_release.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "2019-07-01",
+        "version": "2019",
+        "sector": "Financial services (ADIs, general insurers, life insurers, RSE licensees)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Material information security incident",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Para 15 — Information asset classification",
+          "Para 16 — Controls implementation commensurate with criticality",
+          "Para 21 — Internal audit of information security capability",
+          "Para 23 — Third-party provider information security obligations",
+          "Para 26 — Notify APRA within 72h of material incident"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: undefined — 'appropriate controls' standard",
+          "AI systems: no CPS 234 guidance for ML model security",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI systems subject to CPS 234 as information assets; no AI-specific requirements",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed; crypto standards reference only",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — third-party obligations are strong; technical specificity low"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "SG": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Singapore",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "MAS_TRM": {
+        "full_name": "MAS Technology Risk Management Guidelines",
+        "authority": "Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)",
+        "source": "https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/guidelines/technology-risk-management-guidelines",
+        "effective_date": "2021-01-18",
+        "version": "2021",
+        "sector": "Financial institutions regulated by MAS",
+        "patch_sla": 720,
+        "patch_sla_note": "1 month for critical patches — same PCI problem. Risk-based timeline in practice.",
+        "notification_sla": 2,
+        "notification_trigger": "Significant IT disruption (> 30min customer impact), security breach",
+        "notification_notes": "2-hour notification to MAS is fastest mandatory notification globally (tied with CSA CCoP)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Sec 11.2 — System patch management (1-month critical SLA)",
+          "Sec 13 — Cyber incident management (2-hour notification)",
+          "Sec 12.2 — Cryptography management",
+          "Sec 9.1 — Third-party risk management"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "1-month critical patch SLA: exploitation acceptance window for KEV + deterministic PoC",
+          "AI/ML: Sec 7 discusses AI governance but no AI security controls",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not required; cryptography guidance is algorithm-agnostic"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "MAS has published AI governance principles; TRM 2021 does not include AI-specific security controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not required; MAS Cryptography Advisory 2020 references NIST recommendations",
+        "theater_risk": "high for patching — 1-month SLA is the critical gap"
+      },
+      "CSA_CCOP": {
+        "full_name": "Cybersecurity Code of Practice for Critical Information Infrastructure",
+        "authority": "Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA)",
+        "source": "https://www.csa.gov.sg/our-programmes/critical-information-infrastructure-protection/cybersecurity-code-of-practice",
+        "effective_date": "2022-01-01",
+        "version": "2022",
+        "sector": "Critical information infrastructure (CII) operators",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 2,
+        "notification_trigger": "Cybersecurity incident affecting CII",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Section 5 — Asset management and classification",
+          "Section 7 — Vulnerability and patch management",
+          "Section 10 — Incident management (2-hour notification)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA in Section 7 is risk-based, not time-bound for critical classes",
+          "AI/ML systems: not addressed",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "None",
+        "pqc_coverage": "None",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — outcome-oriented; 2h notification is genuinely fast"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "JP": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Japan",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "APPI": {
+        "full_name": "Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI, Act No. 57 of 2003)",
+        "authority": "Personal Information Protection Commission (PPC, 個人情報保護委員会)",
+        "source": "https://www.ppc.go.jp/en/legal/",
+        "effective_date": "2005-04-01",
+        "last_major_amendment": "2022-04-01",
+        "version": "Amended Act effective 2022-04-01 (further partial amendments in force 2023-04-01 for public-sector integration)",
+        "security_article": "Art. 23 — Security Control Action (安全管理措置); PPC Guidelines (General Rules) Chapter 3-4",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Leak, loss, or damage of personal data likely to harm individual rights (specifically: special-care-required PI, breaches likely to cause financial damage, intentional acts, or >1,000 affected individuals)",
+        "notification_notes": "PPC Rules Art. 7: 'preliminary report' promptly (sokuhō, ~3-5 days in practice) and 'final report' within 30 days (60 days for intentional acts). Affected individuals to be notified without delay. This is statutory since 2022-04-01 amendment — prior regime was guideline-only.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 23 — Security control action: organisational, human, physical, and technical safeguards (4-pillar model per PPC Guidelines)",
+          "Art. 26 — Mandatory breach notification to PPC and affected individuals (post-2022 amendment)",
+          "Art. 28 — Cross-border transfer: opt-in consent + adequacy + supplementary measures (PPC Rules require pre-transfer information to data subject on recipient-country law)",
+          "Art. 16-2 — Restrictions on improper use of personal information (added 2022)",
+          "Art. 39 — Penalties: up to JPY 100M for legal entities (raised from JPY 500K in 2022 amendment)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: undefined — Art. 23 'necessary and appropriate' standard, no technical specification",
+          "Notification SLA: 'promptly' is undefined in days/hours — PPC practice ~3-5 days for preliminary report",
+          "AI systems: APPI applies to AI processing personal data; no AI-specific security controls",
+          "Prompt injection / MCP servers: not contemplated in PPC Guidelines",
+          "PQC: not addressed; cryptography is at controller's discretion"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "Japan-EU mutual adequacy decision (2019-01-23, renewed 2023) recognises APPI as providing essentially equivalent protection — only major non-EEA adequacy alongside UK and Korea",
+            "2022 amendment added breach notification, extraterritoriality, and stricter cross-border transfer rules, narrowing the GDPR delta"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "Notification timeline 'promptly' (~3-5 days preliminary, 30-60 days final) is slower and less prescriptive than GDPR 72h",
+            "No equivalent of GDPR Art. 22 automated-decision-making right",
+            "Penalties capped at JPY 100M (~USD 670K) vs GDPR EUR 20M / 4% turnover — orders of magnitude lower",
+            "Special-care-required personal information categories are narrower than GDPR Art. 9 special categories (e.g., trade-union membership not enumerated)"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "APPI applies to AI training data and inference where personal information is processed; no AI-specific security controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed; CRYPTREC publishes recommended cipher list referenced by guidelines, no PQC mandate",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high — 'necessary and appropriate' allows wide interpretation; PPC enforcement is improving post-2022 but penalty ceiling limits deterrence"
+      },
+      "METI_CYBERSECURITY": {
+        "full_name": "METI Cybersecurity Management Guidelines for Business Leadership",
+        "authority": "Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)",
+        "source": "https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/netsecurity/mng_guide.html",
+        "effective_date": "2015-12-28",
+        "version": "3.0 (2023-03)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Principle 5 — Identifying and understanding cyber risks",
+          "Principle 7 — Implementing countermeasures commensurate with risk",
+          "Principle 9 — Preparing for cyberattacks by continuously updating countermeasures",
+          "Principle 10 — Business continuity in the event of cyberattacks",
+          "Principle 12 — Ensuring security of business partners and supply chains"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: undefined — risk management principle only",
+          "AI/ML: METI Guidelines 3.0 reference AI Governance Guidelines but include no AI-specific cyber controls",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: METI references CRYPTREC roadmap but no mandate"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Companion document: METI/MIC 'AI Guidelines for Business v1.0' (2024-04) — non-binding; Cybersecurity Management Guidelines do not include AI-specific controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "NICT and CRYPTREC have published PQC recommendations; METI guidelines do not mandate",
+        "theater_risk": "high — principle-based framework allows broad interpretation"
+      },
+      "FISC_GUIDELINES": {
+        "full_name": "FISC Security Guidelines on Computer Systems for Banking and Related Financial Institutions",
+        "authority": "Center for Financial Industry Information Systems (FISC, 金融情報システムセンター); JFSA references as de facto standard",
+        "source": "https://www.fisc.or.jp/publication/guideline/",
+        "effective_date": "1985 (initial); continuously updated",
+        "version": "v9 series (v9 Supplement Revised, 2024 update; v9.x as of 2026-05)",
+        "sector": "Banking and related financial institutions (de facto for FSA-supervised entities)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Tech-1 to Tech-200+ — Technical safeguards (network segmentation, encryption, access control)",
+          "Ope-series — Operational controls (incident response, change management, patch management)",
+          "Org-series — Governance, third-party management, cloud risk",
+          "Cloud Computing supplement — JFSA-aligned cloud risk requirements",
+          "Contingency planning standards aligned with BOJ inspections"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically pinned — risk-based, similar to MAS TRM in spirit but less prescriptive",
+          "AI/ML: v9 update added cloud and outsourcing guidance; AI-specific controls remain minimal",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: CRYPTREC referenced; no transition deadline"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "FISC v9 series references AI risk under outsourcing/third-party management; no AI-specific cyber controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Algorithm choices defer to CRYPTREC list; no PQC mandate",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — FISC is highly prescriptive technically; major gap is patch SLA and AI"
+      },
+      "NISC_CRITICAL_INFRA": {
+        "full_name": "Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (4th Edition, NISC)",
+        "authority": "National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC, 内閣サイバーセキュリティセンター)",
+        "source": "https://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/index.html",
+        "effective_date": "2022-06-17 (4th Edition); update cycle ongoing under Cybersecurity Strategy 2024-2027",
+        "version": "4th Edition (2022); aligned with Cybersecurity Strategy Cabinet Decision 2021-09-28",
+        "sector": "15 designated critical infrastructure sectors (finance, telecom, electricity, gas, water, railway, aviation, government services, medical, etc.)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Risk management governance at executive level",
+          "Information sharing via sector-specific ISACs and NISC's CEPTOAR scheme",
+          "Incident response coordination via NISC and sectoral regulators",
+          "Supply chain risk management aligned with Economic Security Promotion Act"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Notification SLA: not numerically pinned — discretionary sectoral reporting",
+          "AI in CI: 4th Edition does not specifically address AI as a CI dependency or attack surface",
+          "PQC: under Cybersecurity Strategy 2024 roadmap; no mandate"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not specifically addressed in 4th Edition; AI Strategy Council guidance handled separately",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Strategy-level acknowledgement; no operational mandate",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — outcome-oriented; depends on sectoral regulator translation"
+      },
+      "ECONOMIC_SECURITY_PROMOTION_ACT": {
+        "full_name": "Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Economic Measures (Economic Security Promotion Act, Act No. 43 of 2022)",
+        "authority": "Cabinet Office; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), METI, MLIT and other sectoral ministers per designated sector",
+        "source": "https://www.cao.go.jp/keizai_anzen_hosho/",
+        "effective_date": "2022-05-18 (promulgation); pillars phased 2023-2024",
+        "version": "Act No. 43 of 2022",
+        "sector": "14 designated critical infrastructure sectors with pre-screening of 'specified critical equipment' procurement",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Pillar 1 — Supply chain resilience for specified critical materials (semiconductors, batteries, rare earths, pharmaceuticals)",
+          "Pillar 2 — Pre-installation review of specified critical infrastructure equipment (in force 2024-05-17)",
+          "Pillar 3 — Government-funded R&D for sensitive technologies",
+          "Pillar 4 — Patent non-disclosure for security-sensitive inventions"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not the focus; Act is structural rather than operational",
+          "Pre-installation review covers hardware/firmware supply chain but does not cover MCP-style software supply chain or AI model provenance",
+          "AI components: not enumerated as 'specified critical equipment' as of 2026-05"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI/ML systems may be in scope under sectoral designation; not directly enumerated",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low — pre-installation review is a substantive procurement gate; scope gap in software supply chain remains"
+      },
+      "AI_STRATEGY_COUNCIL": {
+        "full_name": "Human-Centric AI Society Principles + AI Guidelines for Business v1.0 + Hiroshima AI Process",
+        "authority": "Cabinet Office AI Strategy Council (AI戦略会議); METI and MIC as joint AI Guidelines for Business publishers",
+        "source": "https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/jinkouchinou/index.html",
+        "effective_date": "2019-03 (Society Principles); 2024-04 (AI Guidelines for Business v1.0); 2023-10 (Hiroshima AI Process G7 Code of Conduct)",
+        "version": "AI Guidelines for Business v1.0 (2024-04); Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct (2023-10)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Human-Centric AI Society Principle 5 — Security: AI systems should be safe and secure throughout their lifecycle (non-binding)",
+          "AI Guidelines for Business — common guiding principles for developers, providers, and users including incident response and red-teaming for advanced foundation models",
+          "Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct — voluntary commitments by frontier model developers"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Entire regime is non-binding — no statutory AI law as of 2026-05; LDP/Cabinet discussions on a Japanese AI Act ongoing",
+          "No mandatory adversarial testing equivalent to EU AI Act Art. 72",
+          "Prompt injection / MCP server risks: acknowledged in Guidelines, not mandated",
+          "No notification or patch SLAs"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Voluntary AI governance; high-level principles only — Japan's deliberate 'soft law first' posture contrasts with EU AI Act hard-law approach",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed in AI guidelines",
+        "theater_risk": "high — voluntary regime depends on industry self-application"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "IN": {
+    "jurisdiction": "India",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "CERT_IN": {
+        "full_name": "CERT-In Information Security Directions",
+        "authority": "Computer Emergency Response Team — India (CERT-In)",
+        "source": "https://www.cert-in.org.in/PDF/CERT-In_Directions_70B_28.04.2022.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "2022-06-27",
+        "version": "2022 Directions (Section 70B)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 6,
+        "notification_trigger": "Mandatory incident reporting categories (data breach, ransomware, website defacement, etc.)",
+        "notification_notes": "6-hour notification is the shortest mandatory window globally (faster than SG's 2h for specific categories)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Mandatory 6-hour incident reporting for defined categories",
+          "Log retention: 180 days minimum (system, network, application logs)",
+          "Time synchronization to NTP servers traceable to NPL",
+          "Virtual asset service providers: mandatory KYC + transaction records"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch management: not addressed — only incident reporting requirements",
+          "AI/ML security: not addressed",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Security controls beyond logging and notification: absent"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "None — CERT-In directions focus on incident reporting, not preventive controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "None",
+        "theater_risk": "high — directions are narrow (reporting + logging); no substantive security controls"
+      },
+      "DPDPA": {
+        "full_name": "Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023",
+        "authority": "Data Protection Board of India (DPBI)",
+        "source": "https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/06/2bf1f0e9f04e6fb4f8fef35e82c42aa5.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "2023-08-11",
+        "full_application_date": "2025-01-01",
+        "version": "Act No. 22 of 2023",
+        "security_article": "Section 8(5) — Reasonable security safeguards",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach affecting Data Principals",
+        "notification_notes": "DPDPA Section 8(6) requires breach notification to both the Data Protection Board and each affected Data Principal; Draft DPDP Rules 2025 specify timelines and a 72h initial window with extended detailed reporting.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Sec. 4 — Lawful processing on consent or legitimate use basis",
+          "Sec. 6 — Consent must be free, specific, informed, unconditional, unambiguous",
+          "Sec. 8(4) — Data Fiduciary accountability for processors",
+          "Sec. 8(5) — Reasonable security safeguards to prevent personal data breach",
+          "Sec. 8(6) — Breach notification to Board and affected Data Principals",
+          "Sec. 9 — Processing of children's data: verifiable parental consent + no tracking/behavioural monitoring",
+          "Sec. 10 — Significant Data Fiduciary additional duties (DPO, audit, DPIA)",
+          "Sec. 16 — Cross-border transfers permitted except to countries specifically restricted by Central Government (negative list model — diverges from GDPR adequacy)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Sec. 8(5) 'reasonable security safeguards' is undefined — DPDP Rules 2025 reference encryption, access control, monitoring but no specific algorithm/SLA",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "AI/ML model security: not addressed; no automated decision-making rights equivalent to GDPR Art. 22",
+          "Negative-list cross-border model gives Central Government discretionary restriction power but no equivalent of GDPR Chapter V adequacy/SCC framework",
+          "Prompt injection / MCP / agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "Lawful basis + consent (DPDPA Sec. 6 ~ GDPR Art. 6/7)",
+            "Data Principal rights to access, correction, erasure (DPDPA Sec. 11-13 ~ GDPR Art. 15-17)",
+            "Breach notification duty (DPDPA Sec. 8(6) ~ GDPR Art. 33)",
+            "Children's data protections (DPDPA Sec. 9 ~ GDPR Art. 8)"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "No 'legitimate interests' lawful basis (DPDPA limits to consent + statutorily-defined 'legitimate uses')",
+            "No data localisation default, but Sec. 16 negative-list mechanism replaces GDPR adequacy framework",
+            "No right to data portability",
+            "No right to object to automated decision-making (no DPDPA equivalent of GDPR Art. 22)",
+            "Penalties up to ₹250 crore per instance (~USD 30M) — fixed cap, not turnover-based as in GDPR",
+            "No statutory DPIA requirement except for Significant Data Fiduciaries"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "None — DPDPA does not contemplate AI-specific risks or automated decision rights",
+        "pqc_coverage": "None",
+        "theater_risk": "high — 'reasonable security safeguards' is undefined and rules-level guidance is still consolidating"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "CA": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Canada",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "OSFI_B10": {
+        "full_name": "OSFI Guideline B-10: Third-Party Risk Management",
+        "authority": "Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)",
+        "source": "https://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/en/guidance/guidance-library/third-party-risk-management-guideline",
+        "effective_date": "2023-05-01",
+        "version": "2023",
+        "sector": "Federally regulated financial institutions",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 24,
+        "notification_trigger": "Technology or cyber incident with material operational impact",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Principle 1 — Board-level accountability for third-party risk",
+          "Principle 3 — Risk assessment before entering arrangements",
+          "Principle 5 — Contract requirements (security, audit rights, incident notification)",
+          "Technology incident reporting — 24h to OSFI for significant incidents"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "B-10 is third-party focused; own-system security controls not specified",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "AI/ML: OSFI has published AI model risk guidance (SR 11-7 equivalent) — security controls absent",
+          "MCP/agent trust: third-party AI tool plugins would be in scope as 'arrangements' under B-10",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "OSFI expects FRFIs to manage AI model risk under existing guidelines; no B-10 AI-specific security controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — third-party scope is real but own-system gaps remain"
+      },
+      "QC_LAW_25": {
+        "full_name": "Quebec Law 25 — An Act to modernize legislative provisions as regards the protection of personal information",
+        "authority": "Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec (CAI)",
+        "source": "https://www.legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/document/cs/p-39.1",
+        "effective_date": "2023-09-22",
+        "full_application_date": "2024-09-22",
+        "version": "Chapter 25 of the Statutes of Québec 2021 (Bill 64)",
+        "sector": "All organisations holding personal information of Québec residents",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Confidentiality incident presenting a 'risk of serious injury' must be reported to the CAI and affected individuals 'with diligence'",
+        "notification_notes": "Law 25 does not set a numeric hour SLA; CAI guidance interprets 'with diligence' as promptly after confirmation of risk of serious injury — typically days, not weeks. Incident register is mandatory regardless of severity.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Sec. 3.1 — Mandatory Chief Privacy Officer (Person in Charge of Protection of Personal Information)",
+          "Sec. 3.3 — Privacy Impact Assessments required before any IT project involving personal information or cross-border transfer",
+          "Sec. 8.1 — Privacy by default for technological products and services with privacy settings",
+          "Sec. 17 — Cross-border transfers require adequacy assessment of the destination jurisdiction's legal framework",
+          "Sec. 28 — Right to data portability (in force 2024-09-22)",
+          "Sec. 63.5 — Mandatory confidentiality incident register and reporting to CAI when risk of serious injury",
+          "Sec. 65 — Administrative monetary penalties up to CAD 10M or 2% of worldwide turnover; penal up to CAD 25M or 4%"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed; 'security measures appropriate to the sensitivity' standard",
+          "AI/ML systems: Sec. 12.1 grants right to be informed of automated decision-making and to request human review — no AI security controls",
+          "Prompt injection / MCP / agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed; encryption strength only required to be 'reasonable in the circumstances'",
+          "Cross-border adequacy assessment is organisation-self-conducted — no public adequacy list"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Sec. 12.1 automated decision transparency + human review right — procedural, not security-substantive",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — penalties are real but 'with diligence' notification standard and self-assessed cross-border adequacy invite latitude"
+      },
+      "PIPEDA": {
+        "full_name": "Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act",
+        "authority": "Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC)",
+        "source": "https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/p-8.6/",
+        "effective_date": "2001-01-01",
+        "version": "S.C. 2000, c. 5, consolidated; mandatory breach reporting in force 2018-11-01 via PIPEDA Breach of Security Safeguards Regulations",
+        "sector": "Private-sector organisations engaged in commercial activity outside Quebec (Quebec organisations covered by Law 25; Alberta + BC have substantially similar provincial PIPA statutes)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Breach of security safeguards involving personal information where it is reasonable to believe there is a 'real risk of significant harm'",
+        "notification_notes": "PIPEDA requires notification to OPC and affected individuals 'as soon as feasible' after determining real risk of significant harm — no fixed hour SLA. Breach records must be kept for 24 months.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Principle 7 (Safeguards) — Schedule 1 cl. 4.7: physical, organisational, technological safeguards appropriate to sensitivity",
+          "Sec. 10.1 — Mandatory breach reporting to OPC for breaches posing real risk of significant harm",
+          "Sec. 10.1(3) — Mandatory notification to affected individuals",
+          "Sec. 10.3 — Mandatory breach record retention (24 months)",
+          "Sec. 5(3) — Purposes for collection, use, disclosure limited to those a reasonable person would consider appropriate"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Sec. 10.1 timing: 'as soon as feasible' — no hour-bound SLA",
+          "Patch management: not addressed",
+          "AI/ML systems: PIPEDA does not address automated decision-making (Bill C-27 / AIDA stalled as of 2026-05)",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Penalty ceiling (CAD 100,000 per offence) is materially low vs Law 25 and GDPR"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "None at federal level; AIDA (Bill C-27) has not received Royal Assent as of 2026-05",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed; OPC has issued advisory guidance on cryptography but no mandate",
+        "theater_risk": "high — soft notification timing, low penalty ceiling, no AI controls, no technical specification of safeguards"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "BR": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Brazil",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "LGPD": {
+        "full_name": "Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados (Law No. 13,709/2018)",
+        "authority": "Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de Dados (ANPD)",
+        "source": "https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2018/lei/l13709.htm",
+        "effective_date": "2020-08-01",
+        "enforcement_date": "2021-08-01",
+        "version": "Lei nº 13.709/2018 as amended by Lei nº 13.853/2019",
+        "security_article": "Art. 46 — Security measures for personal data processing",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Security incident that may cause relevant risk or damage to data subjects",
+        "notification_notes": "Art. 48 requires controller to notify ANPD and data subjects in 'reasonable time' as defined by ANPD. ANPD Resolution CD/ANPD No. 15/2024 sets a 3-business-day (~72h) communication window for incidents presenting relevant risk or damage.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 6 — Ten processing principles incl. security, prevention, accountability",
+          "Art. 7 — Lawful basis for processing (10 enumerated bases — broader than GDPR's 6)",
+          "Art. 37 — Data processing records (RoPA equivalent) for controllers and processors",
+          "Art. 38 — Data Protection Impact Report (RIPD) on ANPD request",
+          "Art. 41 — Mandatory DPO (Encarregado) for controllers (limited exemptions per ANPD Resolution 2/2022)",
+          "Art. 46 — Technical and administrative security measures protecting data from unauthorized access and incidents",
+          "Art. 48 — Breach notification to ANPD and data subjects",
+          "Art. 50 — Good practices and governance programs",
+          "Art. 52 — Sanctions: up to 2% of Brazilian revenue per infraction capped at BRL 50M (per ANPD enforcement)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Art. 46 'technical and administrative measures' is undefined — ANPD has issued only orientation guides, not binding technical baselines",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "AI/ML: LGPD Art. 20 grants right to review automated decisions; ANPD pending sectoral AI regulation (PL 2338/2023 not yet enacted as of 2026-05)",
+          "Prompt injection / MCP / agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed; ANPD cryptography guidance is non-binding"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "Lawful bases for processing largely mirror GDPR Art. 6",
+            "Data subject rights (access, correction, deletion, portability) mirror GDPR Art. 15-20",
+            "Breach notification duty (LGPD Art. 48 ~ GDPR Art. 33)",
+            "DPO designation (LGPD Art. 41 ~ GDPR Art. 37-39)",
+            "Cross-border transfer regime (LGPD Art. 33 ~ GDPR Chapter V)"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "Ten lawful bases (LGPD) vs six (GDPR) — LGPD adds 'credit protection', 'health protection', 'regular exercise of rights'",
+            "No equivalent of GDPR Art. 22 absolute right to non-automated decisions (LGPD Art. 20 is a right to review, not opt-out)",
+            "Notification timing is 'reasonable time' (ANPD CD/ANPD 15/2024 ~ 3 business days) vs GDPR fixed 72h",
+            "Sanctions capped at 2% / BRL 50M per infraction vs GDPR 4% / EUR 20M global turnover",
+            "ANPD adequacy framework still under construction — Brazil itself was added to GDPR adequacy candidate list but no inbound adequacy decisions yet"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "Art. 20 right to review of automated decisions; substantive AI security controls absent",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — ANPD enforcement is increasing but technical specificity remains low"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "CN": {
+    "jurisdiction": "China",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PIPL": {
+        "full_name": "Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China",
+        "authority": "Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) — co-regulating with MIIT, MPS, SAMR",
+        "source": "https://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202108/a8c4e3672c74491a80b53a172bb753fe.shtml",
+        "effective_date": "2021-11-01",
+        "version": "Adopted 2021-08-20",
+        "security_article": "Art. 51 — Personal information processor security obligations",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal information leak, tampering, or loss",
+        "notification_notes": "Art. 57: notify regulators and individuals 'immediately' (立即) upon discovering or suspecting an incident. CAC practice expects notification within 24-72h depending on severity tier; no fixed hour SLA in statute.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 5-9 — Processing principles (lawfulness, necessity, proportionality, openness, accuracy)",
+          "Art. 13 — Lawful bases: consent, contract, legal duty, public health emergency, news reporting, public-interest processing, statutory permission",
+          "Art. 28 — Sensitive personal information requires separate consent + necessity assessment",
+          "Art. 51 — Security obligations: internal management, classification, encryption/de-identification, access control, training, incident response",
+          "Art. 55-56 — Personal Information Protection Impact Assessment (PIPIA) required for sensitive PI, automated decision-making, cross-border, processor engagement",
+          "Art. 57 — Breach notification to authorities and individuals",
+          "Art. 58 — Large platform obligations: external supervisory body, platform rules, public social responsibility reporting"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Art. 51 security measures are principle-level — implementing GB/T standards (e.g., GB/T 35273-2020 PI Security Specification, GB/T 39335-2020 PIPIA) provide detail but compliance to GB/T standards is not directly mandated by PIPL itself",
+          "Patch SLA: not in PIPL; MLPS 2.0 (Multi-Level Protection Scheme, GB/T 22239-2019) imposes patching at Level 3+ but does not state hours",
+          "AI/ML: Art. 24 governs automated decision transparency + opt-out for marketing; Interim Measures for Generative AI Services (2023-08-15, CAC) impose additional obligations on public-facing generative AI",
+          "Prompt injection: not explicitly addressed; AI-specific obligations in the 2023 Generative AI Measures focus on content compliance, not adversarial robustness",
+          "PQC: not addressed in PIPL; OSCCA/SCA promotes domestic SM2/SM3/SM4 algorithms"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "PIPL Art. 24 + 2023 Generative AI Interim Measures + 2024 Network Security Technical Requirements for Generative AI Services (TC260-003)",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed in PIPL; separate quantum cryptography initiatives under MIIT",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high — substantive obligations exist but enforcement priorities are politically directed"
+      },
+      "DSL": {
+        "full_name": "Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China",
+        "authority": "CAC, MPS, MSS — sectoral regulators with national security coordination",
+        "source": "https://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202106/7c9af12f51334a73b56d7938f99a788a.shtml",
+        "effective_date": "2021-09-01",
+        "version": "Adopted 2021-06-10",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Data security incident; immediate disposal + notification to competent authority",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 21 — Data classification and graded protection system (general / important / core data)",
+          "Art. 27 — Data processing risk monitoring and incident response",
+          "Art. 29 — Risk assessment and reporting for important data processors",
+          "Art. 30 — Periodic risk assessment reports to competent authorities for important data",
+          "Art. 31 — Cross-border transfer of important data subject to security assessment",
+          "Art. 36 — Data localization and government data export controls",
+          "Art. 45 — Sanctions up to RMB 10M + business suspension for core data violations"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Definition of 'important data' is sector-specific and still being catalogued — TC260 and sectoral regulators publish industry-specific catalogues (e.g., 2024 automotive important data list)",
+          "Cross-border 'security assessment' under DSL + PIPL is the principal compliance burden; see CN_CROSS_BORDER",
+          "AI training data classification under DSL is unclear when sourced from public web scraping",
+          "Patch SLA: not in DSL; MLPS 2.0 separately"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI training corpora and model weights may qualify as 'important data' depending on sector — case-by-case determination",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — sanctions are concrete; theater risk arises in 'important data' classification gaming"
+      },
+      "CSL": {
+        "full_name": "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China",
+        "authority": "CAC, MIIT, MPS",
+        "source": "https://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201611/270b43e8b35e4f7ea98502b6f0e26f8a.shtml",
+        "effective_date": "2017-06-01",
+        "version": "Adopted 2016-11-07",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 21 — Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS) tiered cybersecurity obligations",
+          "Art. 25 — Incident response plans and immediate remediation duty",
+          "Art. 31 — Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) special protections",
+          "Art. 37 — CII operator data localization and cross-border security assessment",
+          "Art. 38 — Annual cybersecurity risk assessment for CII",
+          "Art. 41-44 — Personal information collection and use (now largely superseded by PIPL)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "MLPS 2.0 (GB/T 22239-2019) provides technical baselines but patch SLA is risk-based",
+          "AI-specific controls absent — handled by sectoral CAC measures",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed; OSCCA mandates SM-series algorithms for certain sensitive contexts"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "None directly; CAC sectoral measures govern AI services",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed; commercial cryptography administration under separate OSCCA regime",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — MLPS provides concrete baselines but graded self-attestation invites theater at lower levels"
+      },
+      "CN_CROSS_BORDER": {
+        "full_name": "Cross-border data transfer regime (PIPL + DSL + CAC Measures)",
+        "authority": "Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)",
+        "source": "https://www.cac.gov.cn/2023-02/24/c_1678884830036813.htm",
+        "effective_date": "2022-09-01",
+        "version": "CAC Security Assessment Measures (2022); CAC Standard Contract Measures (2023-06-01); Regulations on Promoting and Standardizing Cross-Border Data Flows (2024-03-22)",
+        "sector": "Any entity transferring personal information or important data from mainland China abroad",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "CAC Security Assessment — required for: CII operators, important data exporters, processors of PI of >1M individuals, exporters of PI of >100K individuals or sensitive PI of >10K individuals cumulatively since 1 Jan of prior year",
+          "CAC Standard Contract (China SCC) — alternative path below assessment thresholds; filed with provincial CAC",
+          "PI Protection Certification — third path under TC260-PG-20222A standard",
+          "2024 Cross-Border Data Flow Regulations carve out exemptions: necessary for contract performance, HR, low-volume non-sensitive transfers under 100K individuals",
+          "Free Trade Zone negative-list mechanism — pilot zones publish negative lists; transfers off the list exempt"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Differentiator vs GDPR: there is no adequacy concept — every outbound transfer requires one of three positive mechanisms regardless of destination",
+          "Important data outbound transfers always require Security Assessment (no SCC alternative)",
+          "Assessment review timeline officially 45 working days but in practice 3-6 months",
+          "Re-assessment required every 2 years or upon material change",
+          "AI training data exports involving PI of Chinese subjects fall within the regime regardless of where the model is trained"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI model training data containing Chinese PI is subject to one of the three mechanisms; outbound model weights derived from important data also captured",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low — mechanism is procedural and binding; theater risk is misclassification of data sensitivity to avoid the higher mechanism"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "ZA": {
+    "jurisdiction": "South Africa",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "POPIA": {
+        "full_name": "Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013",
+        "authority": "Information Regulator (South Africa)",
+        "source": "https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/3706726-11act4of2013popi.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "2020-07-01",
+        "full_enforcement_date": "2021-07-01",
+        "version": "Act No. 4 of 2013",
+        "security_article": "Sec. 19 — Security safeguards (Condition 7)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Compromise of personal information where reasonable grounds to believe the information has been accessed or acquired by unauthorised person",
+        "notification_notes": "Sec. 22 requires notification to the Information Regulator and data subject 'as soon as reasonably possible' after discovery; the Regulator's eServices portal is the official channel. No fixed hour SLA in statute; Regulator practice indicates within 72h where feasible.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Condition 1 (Sec. 8) — Accountability of the responsible party",
+          "Condition 2 (Sec. 9-12) — Processing limitation: lawfulness, minimality, consent/justification",
+          "Condition 7 (Sec. 19) — Security safeguards: identify risks, establish controls, regularly verify, update",
+          "Condition 7 (Sec. 20-21) — Operator (processor) obligations and written contract",
+          "Sec. 22 — Notification of security compromises",
+          "Sec. 57 — Prior authorisation by Regulator for certain processing (e.g., unique identifiers, criminal behaviour, credit reporting, cross-border transfer of children's data)",
+          "Sec. 72 — Transborder information flow restrictions: recipient must be subject to law/binding rules providing adequate protection, or data subject consents, or transfer necessary"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Sec. 19 'reasonable technical and organisational measures' is undefined — Regulator has issued guidance notes but no binding technical baseline",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "AI/ML systems: Sec. 71 covers automated decision-making (limited prohibition unless safeguards exist); no AI security requirements",
+          "Prompt injection / MCP / agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Penalty: administrative fines up to ZAR 10M; criminal up to 10 years imprisonment — penalty ceiling is low by international comparison"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Sec. 71 automated decision-making protections (procedural); no AI security controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high — 'reasonable measures' is undefined and Regulator enforcement capacity is constrained"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "AE": {
+    "jurisdiction": "United Arab Emirates",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "UAE_PDPL": {
+        "full_name": "Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 Regarding the Protection of Personal Data",
+        "authority": "UAE Data Office (Federal); TDRA coordinates digital sector; sectoral regulators apply in finance, health",
+        "source": "https://u.ae/-/media/Documents-2022/Federal-Decree-Law-No-45-of-2021-Regarding-the-Protection-of-Personal-Data-Protection.ashx",
+        "effective_date": "2022-01-02",
+        "enforcement_date": "Pending Executive Regulations (delayed; Data Office consultations 2024-2025; expected operationalisation through 2026)",
+        "version": "Federal Decree-Law No. 45/2021",
+        "security_article": "Art. 20 — Security of personal data",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Breach or violation of personal data that would prejudice privacy, confidentiality, or security of the data subject",
+        "notification_notes": "Art. 9 requires controller to notify the Data Office and affected data subject upon discovery; Executive Regulations expected to set specific hour SLA. As of 2026-05, enforcement timing varies and is generally not yet litigated at federal level.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 5 — Lawful processing on consent or one of enumerated bases",
+          "Art. 7-8 — Controller obligations including records of processing",
+          "Art. 9 — Personal data breach notification",
+          "Art. 10 — Mandatory DPO for sensitive data processors and high-risk processing",
+          "Art. 11 — Data Protection Impact Assessment for high-risk processing",
+          "Art. 20 — Technical and organisational measures appropriate to risk",
+          "Art. 22-23 — Cross-border transfer: adequacy decision by Data Office, otherwise appropriate safeguards or explicit consent"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Executive Regulations operationalising most provisions are still pending as of 2026-05 — enforcement window and specific technical measures undefined",
+          "Coexistence with sectoral and free-zone regimes (DIFC DP Law 2020, ADGM Data Protection Regulations 2021, DHA, CBUAE, SCA) creates fragmented compliance surface",
+          "AI/ML: no AI-specific controls; UAE Charter for the Development and Use of AI 2024 is policy, not statute",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed; TDRA Information Assurance Regulation covers cryptography but not PQC migration"
+        ],
+        "free_zone_overlay": {
+          "DIFC": "DIFC Data Protection Law DIFC Law No. 5 of 2020 — GDPR-aligned, applies in DIFC free zone",
+          "ADGM": "ADGM Data Protection Regulations 2021 — GDPR-aligned, applies in ADGM free zone",
+          "note": "Entities operating across federal mainland and a financial free zone are subject to the free-zone law in that zone and the federal PDPL elsewhere"
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "Not addressed in PDPL; sector guidance via UAE AI Office",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high — Executive Regulations delay creates de facto non-enforcement of detailed obligations on mainland; free-zone regimes are stricter"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "SA": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Saudi Arabia",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "KSA_PDPL": {
+        "full_name": "Personal Data Protection Law (Royal Decree M/19 of 9/2/1443H)",
+        "authority": "Saudi Data and AI Authority (SDAIA)",
+        "source": "https://sdaia.gov.sa/en/SDAIA/about/Files/PersonalDataEnglishV2.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "2023-09-14",
+        "enforcement_date": "2024-09-14",
+        "version": "Royal Decree M/19 as amended by Royal Decree M/148 of 5/9/1444H (2023-03-27); Implementing Regulations effective 2023-09-14",
+        "security_article": "Art. 19 — Necessary organisational, technical, administrative measures",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach that may cause damage to personal data or to the data subject",
+        "notification_notes": "Implementing Regulations Art. 24: notify SDAIA within 72 hours of becoming aware; notify data subject without undue delay where likely to cause serious damage.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 5-6 — Lawful bases for processing (consent default; enumerated exceptions narrower than GDPR)",
+          "Art. 12 — Privacy notice obligations",
+          "Art. 17 — Designation of Personal Data Protection Officer where processing involves regular and systematic monitoring or sensitive data",
+          "Art. 19 — Security measures proportionate to nature and sensitivity of data",
+          "Art. 20-22 — Processor obligations and contractual requirements",
+          "Art. 23 — Data Protection Impact Assessment",
+          "Art. 29 — Cross-border transfer: required for state or vital data-subject interest; SDAIA assessment of recipient country protection level; standard contracts and binding corporate rules as alternative paths",
+          "Art. 35 — Sanctions: fines up to SAR 5M (doubled on repeat), criminal penalties for unlawful disclosure of sensitive data up to 2 years"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Art. 19 'necessary measures' is benchmarked to SDAIA Implementing Regulations and NCA Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC-1:2018) — the latter provides concrete baselines but PDPL itself does not pin them",
+          "Cross-border transfer regime requires SDAIA assessment + Personal Data subject's consent unless data necessary to perform contract or implement international treaty obligations — stricter than GDPR adequacy",
+          "AI/ML: AI Ethics Principles published by SDAIA 2023 are non-binding; PDPL does not address automated decision-making rights specifically",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed (NCA ECC controls cover patching at framework level)",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Sensitive data definition includes 'racial origin, religious belief, criminal data, biometric data, genetic data, credit data, health data, location data' — broader than GDPR special categories"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not addressed in PDPL; SDAIA AI Ethics Principles + Generative AI Guidelines (2023) are non-binding",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — SDAIA enforcement began Sep 2024 with grace period for existing operators; specific technical measures still maturing via SDAIA guidance"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "NZ": {
+    "jurisdiction": "New Zealand",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PRIVACY_ACT_2020": {
+        "full_name": "Privacy Act 2020",
+        "authority": "Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) — Te Mana Mātāpono Matatapu",
+        "source": "https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0031/latest/LMS23223.html",
+        "effective_date": "2020-12-01",
+        "version": "Public Act 2020 No 31",
+        "security_article": "IPP 5 — Storage and security of personal information",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Notifiable privacy breach: unauthorised access, disclosure, loss of personal information that has caused or is likely to cause serious harm",
+        "notification_notes": "Part 6 (Sec. 112-119) requires notification to the Privacy Commissioner and affected individuals 'as soon as practicable' after the agency becomes aware. OPC interprets 'as soon as practicable' as within 72 hours; statute does not pin an hour value.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "IPP 1-4 — Collection principles (purpose, source, manner)",
+          "IPP 5 — Storage and security: reasonable safeguards against loss, unauthorised access, use, modification, disclosure",
+          "IPP 6-7 — Access and correction rights",
+          "IPP 8 — Accuracy",
+          "IPP 9-10 — Retention and use limitations",
+          "IPP 11 — Disclosure limitations",
+          "IPP 12 — Cross-border disclosure: recipient must be subject to comparable safeguards (e.g., binding scheme, contractual safeguards, prescribed country)",
+          "Sec. 22 — Compliance notices issued by Commissioner",
+          "Part 6 — Notifiable Privacy Breach scheme (Sec. 112-119)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "IPP 5 'reasonable safeguards' is undefined — OPC publishes guidance but no binding technical baseline",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "AI/ML: Privacy Act does not address automated decision rights; OPC has issued 2023 guidance on generative AI but it is non-binding",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Penalty ceiling is materially low: NZD 10,000 for individuals breaching access requests, NZD 350K class action precedent maximum to date — no statutory turnover-percentage cap"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not addressed; OPC Generative AI Guidance 2023 non-binding",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high — low penalty ceiling and undefined safeguards standard reduce deterrent effect"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "KR": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Korea (Republic of)",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PIPA": {
+        "full_name": "Personal Information Protection Act",
+        "authority": "Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC)",
+        "source": "https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/eng/engLsSc.do?menuId=2&section=lawNm&query=Personal+Information+Protection+Act",
+        "effective_date": "2011-09-30",
+        "version": "Act No. 19234 (2023-03-14 amendment, effective 2023-09-15) — consolidates online/offline regime, expands data portability, automated decision rights",
+        "security_article": "Art. 29 — Duty of safety measures",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal information leakage",
+        "notification_notes": "Art. 34: notify affected data subjects without delay and report to PIPC or KISA within 72 hours of becoming aware (Enforcement Decree Art. 39). For >=1,000 affected subjects, additional public notice via the controller's website for >=7 days.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 15-22 — Lawful processing and consent requirements (separate consent for distinct purposes; opt-in default)",
+          "Art. 23 — Sensitive information requires separate consent and necessity",
+          "Art. 24 — Unique identifier (resident registration number) special restrictions",
+          "Art. 28-2 to 28-7 — Pseudonymised data regime: scientific research, statistics, public-interest archiving permitted without consent under safeguards",
+          "Art. 29 — Safety measures: physical, technical, administrative — see PIPC Standards for Safety Measures Notification 2023-9",
+          "Art. 34 — Breach notification to data subjects and PIPC/KISA within 72h",
+          "Art. 37-2 — Right to refuse automated decision-making and request human intervention (effective 2024-03-15 per 2023 amendment)",
+          "Art. 28-8 to 28-11 — Cross-border transfers: consent default; alternative paths via certification, adequacy decision, contract with recipient",
+          "Art. 75 — Administrative fines up to 3% of total turnover (raised from prior penalty surcharge of revenue from violation in 2023 amendment)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Art. 29 safety measures pinned to PIPC Notification 2023-9 — specific (encryption, access logs, screen lock, vulnerability scans) but no patch SLA",
+          "Art. 37-2 automated decision rights apply to fully automated decisions producing legal or similarly significant effects — does not address adversarial robustness or prompt injection",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed; KISA cryptography guidance promotes ARIA, SEED, HIGHT alongside international algorithms; PQC migration roadmap published 2024 but non-mandatory",
+          "Resident registration number (RRN) special regime creates re-identification risk surface not fully addressed by Art. 29"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Art. 37-2 automated decision rights (procedural); AI Basic Act (인공지능기본법, passed 2024-12, enforcement 2026-01-22) imposes additional obligations on high-impact AI but is separate from PIPA",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed in PIPA",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — PIPC enforcement is active with significant fines (e.g., 2023-2024 actions against major platforms); turnover-based penalty raises deterrent"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "CL": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Chile",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "CL_DPL": {
+        "full_name": "Law No. 19,628 on Protection of Private Life (as amended by Law No. 21,719 of 2024)",
+        "authority": "Agencia de Protección de Datos Personales (APDP) — established by Law 21,719; pre-existing oversight by SERNAC and Civil Registry",
+        "source": "https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=141599",
+        "effective_date": "1999-10-28",
+        "amendment_date": "2024-12-13",
+        "amendment_enforcement_date": "2026-12-01",
+        "version": "Law No. 19,628 as amended by Law No. 21,719 (2024)",
+        "security_article": "Art. 14-quinquies (post-2024 amendment) — Duty of security",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Security breach affecting personal data with risk to data subject rights",
+        "notification_notes": "Law 21,719 amendment Art. 14-octies aligns with GDPR Art. 33: notify APDP within 72 hours of awareness; notify data subjects without undue delay where high risk to rights and freedoms.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 4 — Lawful basis: consent default + enumerated exceptions (legitimate interests now included post-2024)",
+          "Art. 9 — Data subject rights: access, rectification, deletion, opposition, portability, automated-decision review (added 2024)",
+          "Art. 14-bis to 14-decies (post-2024) — Controller and processor obligations modelled on GDPR",
+          "Art. 14-quinquies — Security duty: technical and organisational measures proportionate to risk",
+          "Art. 14-octies — Breach notification",
+          "Art. 16-bis — Cross-border transfer: adequacy or appropriate safeguards (SCCs, BCRs, certifications) post-2024",
+          "Art. 22 onwards — APDP enforcement, sanctions up to 4% of annual sales (capped at UTA 20,000 ~ USD 16M) per infraction"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Pre-2024 Law 19,628 had minimal substantive obligations and no dedicated regulator — Law 21,719 substantially closes the gap with a 2-year vacatio legis to 2026-12-01",
+          "Until 2026-12-01 enforcement date, organisations operating in Chile face a transitional regime with limited regulator capacity",
+          "AI/ML: Law 21,719 introduces automated-decision review right; no AI security controls",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "Law 21,719 explicitly modelled on GDPR — lawful bases, data subject rights, controller/processor split, DPIA, DPO, cross-border safeguards, 72h notification all aligned",
+            "Penalty cap at 4% of annual sales mirrors GDPR Art. 83(5) structure"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "Penalty cap denominated in UTA (Annual Tax Unit) at ~USD 16M ceiling — lower than GDPR EUR 20M",
+            "Transition period to 2026-12-01 creates a window where pre-amendment Law 19,628 remains the operative regime",
+            "Sensitive data definition includes 'socioeconomic data' — broader than GDPR special categories",
+            "No equivalent of GDPR EDPB single-regulator consistency mechanism"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "Automated decision-making review right under amended Art. 9 (procedural); no AI security controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high during transition (2024-12 to 2026-12) — until APDP is staffed and enforcement starts, paper-only compliance is the default"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "IL": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Israel",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PPL_5741_1981": {
+        "full_name": "Privacy Protection Law 5741-1981 (as amended by Amendment 13, 2024) + Privacy Protection Regulations (Data Security) 5777-2017",
+        "authority": "Privacy Protection Authority (PPA, רשות הגנת הפרטיות); transitioning to 'Public Authority for Privacy Protection' under Amendment 13 with expanded enforcement powers",
+        "source": "https://www.gov.il/en/departments/the_privacy_protection_authority",
+        "effective_date": "1981-03-11 (original PPL); 2018-05-08 (Data Security Regulations); Amendment 13 enacted 2024-08-05, in force 2025-08-14",
+        "version": "PPL 5741-1981 as amended through Amendment 13 (2024); Data Security Regulations 5777-2017",
+        "security_article": "Data Security Regulations 5777-2017 — graduated obligations by database security level (basic, medium, high)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Severe security incident affecting databases at medium or high security level (Regulation 11)",
+        "notification_notes": "Regulation 11 of Data Security Regulations 5777-2017: notify PPA 'immediately' upon awareness of severe incident; PPA may direct controller to notify data subjects. Amendment 13 (in force 2025-08) introduces administrative fines up to NIS 3.2M and brings notification timelines closer to GDPR practice.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Data Security Regulations Reg. 4 — Database security definition document (mandatory written security policy)",
+          "Reg. 5 — Risk mapping and inventory",
+          "Reg. 8 — Access control with documented authorisation procedures",
+          "Reg. 9 — Audit logging with retention obligations",
+          "Reg. 11 — Severe security incident notification and quarterly review by board",
+          "Reg. 15 — Penetration testing at least every 18 months for high-level databases",
+          "Reg. 16 — Annual security audit for medium and high level databases",
+          "Amendment 13 — Administrative fines up to NIS 3.2M; criminal liability for officers"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not explicitly required — embedded in Reg. 5 risk mapping",
+          "Notification SLA: 'immediately' is undefined; PPA practice as of 2026-05 trends toward 72h",
+          "AI/ML: PPL applies to AI processing personal data; no AI-specific security regulations",
+          "Sectoral overlay required: Banking sector subject to Banking Supervision Department Directive 361 with stricter cyber-resilience obligations"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "Israel holds EU adequacy (2011, reaffirmed under GDPR review 2024) — one of the longest-standing non-EEA adequacy regimes",
+            "Amendment 13 narrows the GDPR delta by adding administrative fines, controller/processor distinction, and DPO requirements for high-volume processors"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "Tiered database security levels (basic/medium/high) under 5777-2017 is unique — GDPR uses risk-based 'appropriate measures' without prescriptive tiers",
+            "Database registration requirement persists (Section 8 PPL) — abandoned by GDPR",
+            "Penalty ceiling at NIS 3.2M (~USD 870K) is well below GDPR 4% turnover"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "PPL applies; no AI-specific security controls under privacy law",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — Data Security Regulations are technically prescriptive, but pre-Amendment 13 enforcement was light; 2025-2026 ramp underway"
+      },
+      "INCD_METHODOLOGY": {
+        "full_name": "INCD Cyber Defense Methodology for Organizations + INCD Cyber Defense for AI Systems Guidance (2024)",
+        "authority": "Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD, מערך הסייבר הלאומי), Prime Minister's Office",
+        "source": "https://www.gov.il/en/departments/israel_national_cyber_directorate",
+        "effective_date": "2019-09 (Methodology v2.0); 2021-04 (v2.1 with supply chain expansion); 2024 (Cyber Defense for AI Systems guidance)",
+        "version": "Cyber Defense Methodology v2.1 (2021); Cyber Defense for AI Systems v1.0 (2024)",
+        "sector": "Voluntary for private sector; mandatory for designated essential service providers via INCD directives",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Methodology Domain A — Governance and risk management",
+          "Domain B — Protection (asset management, access control, network defence, patching)",
+          "Domain C — Detection and response (24/7 SOC for higher tiers, INCD threat intel sharing)",
+          "Domain D — Resilience (BCP, drills, incident learning)",
+          "Cyber Defense for AI Systems (2024) — adversarial ML threat modelling, prompt injection guidance, training-data integrity, model supply chain"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Methodology v2.1 (2021) predates GenAI threat landscape — 2024 AI guidance fills the gap but is non-binding",
+          "Patch SLA: tier-dependent; no universal timeline",
+          "MCP/agent trust: addressed conceptually in 2024 AI guidance, not enumerated"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "INCD 'Cyber Defense for AI Systems' (2024) is one of the earliest national-level AI-cyber guidance documents — addresses adversarial inputs, model theft, training data poisoning, supply chain. Non-binding but referenced by sectoral regulators.",
+        "pqc_coverage": "INCD published PQC migration roadmap 2023; not yet mandatory",
+        "theater_risk": "low — INCD has high technical credibility globally; gap is voluntariness for non-essential sectors"
+      },
+      "BOI_DIRECTIVE_361": {
+        "full_name": "Bank of Israel Banking Supervision Department, Proper Conduct of Banking Business Directive 361 — Cyber Defense Management",
+        "authority": "Bank of Israel — Banking Supervision Department",
+        "source": "https://www.boi.org.il/en/banking-supervision/proper-conduct-of-banking-business-directives/",
+        "effective_date": "2015-03-16 (initial); revised 2020-10 and 2024",
+        "version": "Directive 361 (2024 revision)",
+        "sector": "Banks and credit-card companies under Bank of Israel supervision",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Section 4 — Board and senior management cyber defense oversight",
+          "Section 6 — Cyber defense framework aligned with INCD Methodology",
+          "Section 10 — Third-party cyber risk management (extends to cloud and fintech)",
+          "Section 12 — Incident reporting to BoI Supervision",
+          "Section 14 — Cyber resilience testing including red-teaming"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically specified — risk-based",
+          "AI/ML: not directly addressed; cross-references general INCD AI guidance",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not contemplated"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Cross-references INCD AI guidance; no Directive 361-specific AI controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low — Directive 361 plus INCD methodology overlay produces one of the strictest banking cyber regimes globally"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "CH": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Switzerland",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "REVFADP": {
+        "full_name": "Federal Act on Data Protection (revFADP / nFADP / nDSG)",
+        "authority": "Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC, EDÖB)",
+        "source": "https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2022/491/en",
+        "effective_date": "2023-09-01 (revised Act in force, replacing 1992 FADP)",
+        "version": "SR 235.1 (revFADP); Data Protection Ordinance SR 235.11 (DPO)",
+        "security_article": "Art. 8 revFADP — Data security; Art. 1-6 DPO — minimum technical and organisational measures",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach likely to result in a high risk to data subjects' personality or fundamental rights (Art. 24 revFADP)",
+        "notification_notes": "Art. 24 revFADP: notification to FDPIC 'as soon as possible' (so rasch als möglich) — deliberately non-numeric, in contrast to GDPR 72h. FDPIC guidance practice trends toward 72h but stays explicitly flexible.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 7 revFADP — Privacy by design and by default",
+          "Art. 8 — Data security: technical and organisational measures appropriate to risk",
+          "Art. 22 — DPIA mandatory for high-risk processing",
+          "Art. 24 — Breach notification to FDPIC",
+          "Art. 26 — Cross-border transfer: adequacy + SCCs + BCRs + supplementary safeguards (post-Schrems II aligned)",
+          "DPO Art. 1-6 — Minimum technical measures (pseudonymisation, encryption, integrity, confidentiality, resilience, restoration)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Notification SLA: 'as soon as possible' undefined — slower regulatory clarity than GDPR 72h",
+          "AI/ML: revFADP applies to AI processing personal data; FDPIC AI Guidance 2023-11 clarifies applicability but adds no new security controls",
+          "Penalty regime is criminal-only (up to CHF 250,000 against responsible individuals) — no administrative GDPR-style fines against entities",
+          "PQC: not addressed; cryptography 'appropriate to risk'"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "Switzerland holds EU adequacy (1992; renewed under GDPR review 2024) — revFADP modelled on GDPR including DPO requirements, DPIA, breach notification, cross-border transfer regime",
+            "FDPIC accepted EU SCCs (2021/914) for transfers from Switzerland with limited adaptations"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "Penalties imposed on individuals (executives, DPOs), not entities — max CHF 250K vs GDPR EUR 20M / 4% turnover",
+            "Notification timing 'as soon as possible' is intentionally flexible; no equivalent of GDPR Art. 33(1) 72h",
+            "Scope includes data of legal persons (until 2023-09 revision removed natural-persons-only restriction was added — Switzerland uniquely retained legal-person data protection until 2023)",
+            "FDPIC has investigation but not direct fining power — sanctions require criminal proceedings"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "FDPIC AI Guidance 2023-11 confirms revFADP applies to AI processing personal data; no AI Act equivalent. Federal Council 2023-11 decision: prefer sector-specific adaptation over horizontal AI law",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed in revFADP; National Cyber Strategy 2023 references PQC migration",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — modernised Act but enforcement model (criminal, individual) is structurally weak vs GDPR administrative regime"
+      },
+      "FINMA_CIRC_2023_01": {
+        "full_name": "FINMA Circular 2023/01 'Operational Risks and Resilience – Banks'",
+        "authority": "Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)",
+        "source": "https://www.finma.ch/en/documentation/circulars/",
+        "effective_date": "2024-01-01",
+        "version": "Circ. 2023/01 (replaces Circ. 2008/21)",
+        "sector": "Banks and securities firms under FINMA supervision; companion guidance for insurers (FINMA Circ. 2008/21 Insurers)",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Margin nos. 22-29 — ICT and cyber risk management",
+          "Margin nos. 30-39 — Critical data management (data classification, retention, integrity)",
+          "Margin nos. 40-49 — Cyber risk: threat-led penetration testing, incident response, recovery",
+          "Margin nos. 50-59 — Operational resilience: critical functions identification, tolerance levels, scenario testing",
+          "Reference to FINMA Guidance 05/2020 — cyber incident reporting via FINMA EHP within 24 hours of detection for severe incidents"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically specified — risk-based",
+          "AI/ML: Circ. 2023/01 does not include AI-specific cyber controls; FINMA Guidance 08/2024 on Governance and Risk Management of AI is separate, non-prescriptive on cyber",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not contemplated"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "FINMA Guidance 08/2024 'Governance and risk management of AI'; Circ. 2023/01 cyber controls not AI-tuned",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not mandated; FINMA monitoring per National Cyber Strategy",
+        "theater_risk": "low — TLPT (threat-led penetration testing) and operational resilience tolerance levels are substantive"
+      },
+      "NCSC_CH": {
+        "full_name": "National Cyber Security Centre Switzerland (NCSC) — Minimum Standard for IT Security (MELANI/NCSC Minimum Standard)",
+        "authority": "Federal Office for Cybersecurity (BACS, formerly NCSC-CH; previously MELANI)",
+        "source": "https://www.ncsc.admin.ch/ncsc/en/home.html",
+        "effective_date": "2018-08 (initial Minimum Standard); 2023 transferred to new Federal Office for Cybersecurity (BACS) per Information Security Act",
+        "version": "Minimum Standard 2018 (NIST CSF-based); Information Security Act in force 2024-01-01",
+        "sector": "Voluntary baseline for private sector; mandatory reporting for critical infrastructure under Information Security Act",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 24,
+        "notification_trigger": "Cyberattack on critical infrastructure operators (per Information Security Act Art. 74e, in force 2025-04-01)",
+        "notification_notes": "Information Security Act (ISG) added mandatory cyberattack notification to NCSC for CI operators — 24 hours from awareness (Art. 74e). First Swiss numeric cyber notification SLA.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Minimum Standard — adoption of NIST CSF Identify/Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover with Swiss-specific maturity targets",
+          "Information Security Act (ISG) — federal information security baseline plus CI cyber notification regime",
+          "BACS — operational coordination, GovCERT.ch incident response"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Minimum Standard remains voluntary outside CI",
+          "AI/ML: not addressed in Minimum Standard 2018; BACS to issue updated guidance under ISG mandate",
+          "PQC: BACS roadmap published 2024; no mandate"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not addressed in Minimum Standard; ongoing BACS work",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Roadmap only",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — voluntary baseline for non-CI; CI notification regime is substantive but new (2025)"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "HK": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Hong Kong SAR",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China; distinct legal regime under 'one country, two systems'. Mainland China PIPL does not apply directly; cross-border data transfers to mainland are governed by separate Standard Contract for Cross-boundary Flow of Personal Information (GBA Standard Contract, in force 2023-12 for Greater Bay Area pilot).",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PDPO": {
+        "full_name": "Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Cap. 486 (PDPO)",
+        "authority": "Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (PCPD)",
+        "source": "https://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/data_privacy_law/ordinance_at_a_Glance/ordinance.html",
+        "effective_date": "1996-12-20 (original); major amendment 2012-10-01 (direct marketing); 2021-10-08 (anti-doxxing amendments creating criminal offences)",
+        "version": "Cap. 486 as amended through 2021-10",
+        "security_article": "Data Protection Principle 4 (DPP4) — Security of Personal Data; PCPD Guidance Note on Data Security Measures 2022",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Voluntary breach notification to PCPD recommended for breaches involving sensitive data or significant harm potential",
+        "notification_notes": "PDPO does not mandate breach notification as of 2026-05 — voluntary regime per PCPD 'Guidance on Data Breach Handling and Data Breach Notifications'. A statutory notification regime is in the LegCo legislative pipeline but not enacted. This is a major divergence from regional peers (Mainland PIPL, Singapore PDPA, Korea PIPA).",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "DPP1 — Purpose and collection",
+          "DPP2 — Accuracy and retention",
+          "DPP3 — Use limitation",
+          "DPP4 — Security: 'practicable steps' to protect personal data — non-prescriptive",
+          "DPP5 — Openness",
+          "DPP6 — Data access and correction rights",
+          "Section 64 — Criminal offence: doxxing (2021 amendment) — up to 5 years imprisonment and HKD 1M fine"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "PDPO predates GDPR by ~22 years and was last substantively modernised in 2012 (excluding 2021 doxxing-specific amendments) — significant gaps vs international baseline",
+          "No mandatory breach notification, no DPIA requirement, no statutory DPO requirement, no GDPR-style penalties",
+          "Penalty regime: maximum HKD 50K (~USD 6.4K) for first DPP contravention — orders of magnitude below GDPR",
+          "Cross-border transfer: Section 33 of PDPO has been enacted since 1996 but never brought into force — no statutory transfer restriction exists",
+          "AI/ML: PCPD published 'Guidance on the Ethical Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence' (2021) and 'Artificial Intelligence: Model Personal Data Protection Framework' (2024) — both voluntary",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "Six DPPs broadly correspond to GDPR principles (lawfulness, accuracy, retention, purpose limitation, transparency, data subject rights)"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "PDPO is principles-based and less prescriptive than GDPR; predates GDPR by 23 years and lacks modern updates",
+            "No mandatory breach notification (vs GDPR Art. 33 72h)",
+            "No administrative fines — enforcement is via PCPD enforcement notices then prosecution under PDPO; penalties cap at HKD 50K-1M",
+            "No DPIA, no DPO, no data portability right",
+            "Section 33 cross-border transfer restriction never in force — Hong Kong has no statutory restriction on outbound personal data transfers"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "PCPD AI Model Framework 2024 — voluntary guidance; no statutory AI controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high — DPP4 'practicable steps' allows broad interpretation; HKD 50K penalty cap eliminates deterrence for major controllers"
+      },
+      "HKMA_CFI2": {
+        "full_name": "HKMA Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative 2.0 (CFI 2.0) + Supervisory Policy Manual TM-G-1 'General Principles for Technology Risk Management'",
+        "authority": "Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)",
+        "source": "https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/banking/banking-regulatory-and-supervisory-regime/cybersecurity/",
+        "effective_date": "CFI 2.0 launched 2020-11; ongoing rollout. TM-G-1 last revised 2003 with regular Circulars overlay.",
+        "version": "CFI 2.0 (2020); TM-G-1 v3 (2003 with Circular overlay through 2024)",
+        "sector": "Authorized Institutions (banks, restricted licence banks, deposit-taking companies) under HKMA supervision",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Significant IT control failures or cyber events affecting customer services or risk profile",
+        "notification_notes": "HKMA Circular 'Reporting of Operational Incidents' — report 'as soon as practicable' typically interpreted as within 24 hours for significant events; no statutory hour-pinned SLA",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "CFI 2.0 Cyber Resilience Assessment Framework (C-RAF 2.0) — three-tier risk-based maturity assessment",
+          "CFI 2.0 Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation (iCAST) — red-team testing for higher-inherent-risk AIs",
+          "CFI 2.0 Professional Development Programme (PDP) — workforce certification",
+          "TM-G-1 Annex on cloud computing (2022 update)",
+          "Circular 'Use of AI for Cybersecurity' (2023) and 'Generative AI Risk Management' (2024)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically pinned",
+          "AI/ML: GenAI Risk Management Circular 2024 addresses governance and model risk; cyber-specific controls for AI systems remain high-level",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not yet contemplated in HKMA guidance",
+          "PQC: HKMA published roadmap 2024; no mandate"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "HKMA GenAI Circular 2024 — model governance, output review, third-party AI vendor risk; no AI-specific cyber TTP catalogue",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Industry consultation underway",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — C-RAF 2.0 and iCAST are substantive and tier-calibrated; gap is in AI cyber specifics"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "TW": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Taiwan",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "Taiwan's regime is administered independently of mainland PRC; mainland PIPL/CSL/DSL do not apply. Sectoral posture reflects Taiwan's role as semiconductor supply-chain critical infrastructure, with substantial divergence from PRC mainland data laws.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PDPA_TW": {
+        "full_name": "Personal Data Protection Act (個人資料保護法, PDPA)",
+        "authority": "Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC, 個人資料保護委員會) — established under 2023 amendment; previously sectoral regulators",
+        "source": "https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=I0050021",
+        "effective_date": "1995-08-11 (original Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law); 2010-05-26 (current PDPA enacted); 2012-10-01 (effective); amendments 2023-05-31 (independent regulator established)",
+        "version": "PDPA as amended through 2023-05-31",
+        "security_article": "Art. 27 — Government and non-government agencies must take appropriate security measures",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data theft, alteration, damage, loss, or leakage (Art. 12)",
+        "notification_notes": "Art. 12 PDPA: notify data subjects 'after investigating the facts' — no statutory hour SLA. PDPC 2024 enforcement guidance recommends preliminary notification within 72 hours of confirmed breach.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 8-9 — Notice obligations at collection",
+          "Art. 12 — Breach notification to data subjects",
+          "Art. 18-19 — Cross-border transfer requires destination jurisdiction to provide adequate protection; sectoral regulators may impose specific restrictions (e.g., FSC for financial)",
+          "Art. 27 — Security measures: 'appropriate' and 'necessary' technical and organisational measures",
+          "Art. 41-50 — Sanctions: up to NTD 15M for serious violations, criminal liability for unlawful processing",
+          "Sectoral implementing rules: FSC, NCC (telecom), Ministry of Health and Welfare each issue sub-regulations"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Notification SLA: 'after investigating the facts' allows controller-controlled timeline",
+          "AI/ML: PDPA applies to AI processing personal data; no AI-specific controls",
+          "Cross-border transfers: Art. 21 government-restriction mechanism rarely invoked except by FSC for financial-sector transfers",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Independent regulator (PDPC) only operational from 2024 — early enforcement years"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "PDPA structure broadly aligns with GDPR principles (notice, consent or lawful basis, data subject rights, cross-border restrictions)"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "No DPO requirement, no DPIA requirement, no privacy-by-design statutory mandate",
+            "Notification timing is controller-discretionary",
+            "Penalties cap at NTD 15M (~USD 470K) per violation — well below GDPR",
+            "No EU adequacy decision as of 2026-05 — Taiwan's adequacy review by EDPB ongoing"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "PDPA applies; Ministry of Digital Affairs draft AI Basic Law 2024 (legislative pipeline, not enacted)",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed in PDPA; National Institute of Cyber Security pilot underway",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high during PDPC ramp-up (2024-2026); penalty ceiling limits deterrence"
+      },
+      "CYBER_SECURITY_MGMT_ACT": {
+        "full_name": "Cyber Security Management Act (資通安全管理法, CSMA)",
+        "authority": "Ministry of Digital Affairs (MoDA, 數位發展部) — established 2022-08-27; previously National Information and Communication Security Taskforce. Operational arm: National Institute of Cyber Security (NICS, 國家資通安全研究院)",
+        "source": "https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030297",
+        "effective_date": "2019-01-01",
+        "version": "CSMA 2018 (in force 2019-01-01); Enforcement Rules 2018",
+        "sector": "Government agencies, public-controlled entities, and designated Critical Infrastructure Providers (CIPs) across 8 sectors: energy, water, telecom, transport, banking and finance, emergency services, hospitals, high-tech parks",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 1,
+        "notification_trigger": "Cyber incident affecting CIP critical information and communications systems",
+        "notification_notes": "Cyber Security Management Act Enforcement Rules: notify supervising authority of cyber incidents within 1 hour for highest-tier (Level 3-4) incidents at CIPs — one of the fastest mandatory cyber notification SLAs globally. Lower-tier incidents have graduated timelines.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 10-11 — CIPs must establish, maintain, and improve cyber defense plans aligned with NICS technical specifications",
+          "Art. 14 — Incident notification with graduated SLAs (1h for Level 3-4, longer for Levels 1-2)",
+          "Art. 16-17 — Information sharing via N-CERT and sectoral ISACs",
+          "Enforcement Rules — supply chain restrictions including prohibited country-of-origin equipment lists (effectively restricting PRC-origin ICT components for government and CIP)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically specified — risk-based per NICS technical standards",
+          "Private sector outside CIP designation: not covered",
+          "AI/ML systems in CIPs: NICS published 'Generative AI Cyber Risk Guidance' 2024 — non-binding for non-CIP",
+          "MCP/agent trust: emerging NICS guidance; not in primary law"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "NICS GenAI Cyber Risk Guidance 2024 covers government and CIP usage; non-binding for private sector",
+        "pqc_coverage": "NICS PQC migration pilots underway in government sector",
+        "theater_risk": "low for CIPs — 1-hour notification SLA is among the strictest globally; gap is private-sector coverage outside CIP designation"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "ID": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Indonesia",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PDP_LAW": {
+        "full_name": "Law No. 27 of 2022 on Personal Data Protection (Undang-Undang Pelindungan Data Pribadi, UU PDP)",
+        "authority": "Personal Data Protection Agency (Lembaga Pelindungan Data Pribadi) — being established under Presidential Regulation pursuant to UU PDP Art. 58-60; interim oversight by Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo, now Komdigi)",
+        "source": "https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/229798/uu-no-27-tahun-2022",
+        "effective_date": "2022-10-17 (promulgation); transition period to 2024-10-17 (full enforcement)",
+        "version": "UU No. 27/2022; implementing Government Regulation in legislative pipeline",
+        "security_article": "Art. 35 — Controller obligation to protect personal data and ensure security including encryption",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data protection failure causing data leakage, loss, or unauthorised processing (Art. 46)",
+        "notification_notes": "UU PDP Art. 46: notify the Personal Data Protection Agency and affected data subjects in writing within 3x24 hours (72h) of becoming aware of the failure. Aligned with GDPR Art. 33 timing.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 16 — Lawful basis (consent or 5 other enumerated bases)",
+          "Art. 35 — Security obligation: technical, organisational, and operational measures",
+          "Art. 36 — Confidentiality obligation",
+          "Art. 39 — Cross-border transfer: adequacy + binding agreement + consent",
+          "Art. 46 — Breach notification within 72h",
+          "Art. 53 — Penalties: administrative fines up to 2% of annual revenue per violation; criminal penalties up to 6 years imprisonment for unlawful processing of sensitive data"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "Implementing Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) not yet finalised as of 2026-05 — operational specifics await secondary legislation",
+          "Personal Data Protection Agency not yet operational — interim Kominfo/Komdigi oversight limits enforcement",
+          "AI/ML: UU PDP applies; no AI-specific controls; separate Komdigi GenAI Circular 2024 is non-binding",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "UU PDP structurally modelled on GDPR: lawful bases, controller/processor distinction, DPO requirement (Art. 53), DPIA (Art. 34), data subject rights, cross-border restrictions, 72h notification",
+            "Penalty ceiling at 2% of annual revenue references GDPR 4% structure (lower ceiling)"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "Penalty cap 2% of annual revenue vs GDPR 4%",
+            "Mandatory criminal penalties for unlawful processing of sensitive data (up to 6 years) — more punitive than GDPR which is administrative only",
+            "No equivalent of GDPR EDPB consistency mechanism",
+            "Personal Data Protection Agency model still being established — enforcement maturity lags formal legal alignment"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "UU PDP applies to AI processing personal data; Komdigi Circular SE 9/2023 on AI Ethics is non-binding",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high during 2024-2026 transition — formal alignment with GDPR exceeds enforcement capacity"
+      },
+      "BSSN_CYBER": {
+        "full_name": "BSSN Technical Standards and ISO 27001 Implementation Guidance for Electronic System Operators (ESOs)",
+        "authority": "National Cyber and Crypto Agency (Badan Siber dan Sandi Negara, BSSN)",
+        "source": "https://bssn.go.id/",
+        "effective_date": "BSSN Regulation 8/2020 (electronic system security standards); BSSN Regulation 4/2021 (sectoral CSIRT)",
+        "version": "BSSN Reg. 8/2020; BSSN Reg. 4/2021",
+        "sector": "Electronic System Operators (Penyelenggara Sistem Elektronik, PSE) including private platforms operating in Indonesia; Critical Information Infrastructure sectors via sub-regulations",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "ISO/IEC 27001 implementation required for higher-risk PSEs",
+          "Sectoral CSIRT participation under BSSN coordination",
+          "Cryptography algorithm restrictions for government use (BSSN-approved list)",
+          "Coordination with Bank Indonesia for financial sector and OJK for capital markets"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not specified",
+          "Notification SLA: sectoral, not BSSN-pinned",
+          "AI/ML cyber controls: emerging — BSSN draft AI Cyber Resilience Guidance 2024 consultation",
+          "Coordination overlap with Komdigi UU PDP regime creates dual-regulator complexity"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "BSSN draft guidance under consultation",
+        "pqc_coverage": "BSSN ongoing assessment; crypto-localisation policy (use of BSSN-approved algorithms for government) overlaps PQC roadmap",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — ISO 27001 baseline is enforceable; sectoral fragmentation creates coverage gaps"
+      },
+      "BI_CYBER_REG": {
+        "full_name": "Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 23/6/PBI/2021 on Payment Service Providers + OJK Regulation 11/POJK.03/2022 on Cyber Resilience for Commercial Banks",
+        "authority": "Bank Indonesia (BI); Financial Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, OJK)",
+        "source": "https://www.bi.go.id/en/publikasi/peraturan/Pages/PBI_230621.aspx",
+        "effective_date": "BI Reg. 23/6 in force 2021-07-01; OJK POJK 11/2022 in force 2022-07-01",
+        "version": "PBI No. 23/6/PBI/2021; POJK No. 11/POJK.03/2022",
+        "sector": "Payment service providers (BI); commercial banks (OJK); each regulator has parallel cyber resilience requirements",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Significant cyber incident affecting payment services or banking operations",
+        "notification_notes": "POJK 11/2022 requires reporting to OJK 'as soon as possible' typically interpreted as within 24 hours for major incidents",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "POJK 11/2022 Articles on governance, risk management, security testing, incident response",
+          "PBI 23/6 Articles on payment system reliability and security including TLPT for payment institutions",
+          "Coordination with BSSN for sectoral CSIRT"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically specified",
+          "AI/ML and GenAI: not specifically addressed in primary regulations",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not directly addressed; OJK separate AI/ML guidance in development",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — sector-specific regimes are substantive; cross-regulator coordination gaps"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "VN": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Vietnam",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PDPD": {
+        "full_name": "Decree No. 13/2023/ND-CP on Personal Data Protection (Personal Data Protection Decree, PDPD)",
+        "authority": "Ministry of Public Security (Bộ Công An) — Department of Cybersecurity and Hi-Tech Crime Prevention (A05)",
+        "source": "https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Cong-nghe-thong-tin/Nghi-dinh-13-2023-ND-CP-bao-ve-du-lieu-ca-nhan-465185.aspx",
+        "effective_date": "2023-07-01",
+        "version": "Decree 13/2023/ND-CP — first comprehensive personal data protection framework; draft Personal Data Protection Law in legislative pipeline (expected 2026)",
+        "security_article": "Art. 27 — Measures for protecting personal data",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach causing risk to data subject rights and interests",
+        "notification_notes": "Decree 13 Art. 23: notify Ministry of Public Security within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach. Notification to data subjects also required for high-risk breaches.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 11 — Consent as primary lawful basis (narrower than GDPR)",
+          "Art. 23 — Breach notification (72h to MoPS)",
+          "Art. 25 — Mandatory Impact Assessment for personal data processing filed with A05 before processing commences",
+          "Art. 25 — Mandatory Impact Assessment for cross-border data transfer filed with A05",
+          "Art. 27 — Security measures: encryption, access control, secure deletion, processor agreements",
+          "Penalties: Decree 13 cross-references administrative penalties under Decree 15/2020/ND-CP and criminal liability under Penal Code"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not specified",
+          "Mandatory impact assessment filing with MoPS creates de facto state-visibility into processing activities — significant divergence from GDPR DPIA (internal record)",
+          "AI/ML: not specifically addressed; covered by general personal data rules",
+          "Penalty regime spread across multiple decrees — uncertain ceiling",
+          "Draft PDP Law (2024-2025 consultation) expected to consolidate and add administrative fines"
+        ],
+        "cross_reference_gdpr": {
+          "overlaps": [
+            "72-hour notification timing aligned with GDPR Art. 33",
+            "Concept of impact assessment (Art. 25) parallels GDPR DPIA"
+          ],
+          "divergences": [
+            "Mandatory pre-processing impact assessment filing with Ministry of Public Security — state-visibility model, no GDPR equivalent",
+            "Consent-default model is narrower than GDPR 6 lawful bases",
+            "Penalty regime is decentralised across multiple decrees vs GDPR Art. 83 unified structure",
+            "Cross-border transfer impact assessment required for any outbound transfer — far stricter than GDPR Chapter V"
+          ]
+        },
+        "ai_coverage": "Not specifically addressed in PDPD; subject to MoPS oversight under cybersecurity framework",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — pre-processing filings produce real visibility for MoPS but private-sector compliance maturity is uneven"
+      },
+      "CYBERSECURITY_LAW": {
+        "full_name": "Law on Cybersecurity 2018 (Luật An ninh mạng) + Decree 53/2022/ND-CP on guidelines for implementation",
+        "authority": "Ministry of Public Security (A05); Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) for technical standards",
+        "source": "https://english.luatvietnam.vn/cyber-security-law-2018-no-242018qh14-of-the-national-assembly-159039-Doc1.html",
+        "effective_date": "2019-01-01 (Cybersecurity Law); 2022-10-01 (Decree 53/2022 — data localisation obligations)",
+        "version": "Law 24/2018/QH14; Decree 53/2022/ND-CP",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 26 of Law — Foreign enterprises providing services in cyberspace in Vietnam must store user data in Vietnam and establish a local representative office or branch",
+          "Decree 53 Art. 26 — Data localisation: personal data of Vietnamese users, data generated in Vietnam, user behaviour data, relationship data must be stored locally for designated services (telecom, e-commerce, OTT, social, gaming, banking)",
+          "Decree 53 — 24-month grace period for compliance; MoPS may issue specific localisation orders after risk assessment",
+          "Art. 17-18 of Law — Critical information system protection (8-tier classification)",
+          "Cyber incident response coordination by VNCERT (under MIC) and A05 (under MoPS)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Notification SLA: incident reporting timelines vary by sector and Critical Information System tier",
+          "AI/ML cyber controls: not specifically addressed",
+          "Overlap with PDPD creates dual-regulator complexity for personal data + cybersecurity"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not specifically addressed",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high — data localisation is enforceable in principle; selective MoPS enforcement to date"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "US_NYDFS": {
+    "jurisdiction": "United States — New York State (sub-national, financial services)",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "US sub-national but functionally a global financial-cyber baseline. Every entity holding a New York banking, insurance, or financial services licence — including non-US institutions — must comply, making Part 500 a de facto global standard for financial cyber posture. Distinct from US federal frameworks (NIST, CISA) covered under GLOBAL.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "NYDFS_PART_500": {
+        "full_name": "23 NYCRR Part 500 — Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies",
+        "authority": "New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS)",
+        "source": "https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/cybersecurity",
+        "effective_date": "2017-03-01 (original); Second Amendment adopted 2023-11-01 with phased compliance dates through 2025-11-01",
+        "version": "Part 500 as amended 2023-11-01 (Second Amendment)",
+        "sector": "Covered Entities: any individual or non-governmental entity operating under a DFS-issued licence, registration, charter, certificate, permit, accreditation, or similar authorisation — including foreign banks with NY branches, foreign insurers, money service businesses, virtual currency businesses (BitLicense), and mortgage entities",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Cybersecurity event that has a reasonable likelihood of materially harming any material part of the normal operations of the Covered Entity OR a Cybersecurity Event involving Nonpublic Information that requires notice to a government body, self-regulatory agency, or other supervisory body (§500.17(a))",
+        "notification_notes": "Section 500.17(a): notify DFS within 72 hours. Section 500.17(c) (Second Amendment): notify DFS within 24 hours of any ransom or extortion payment, with detailed follow-up explanation within 30 days. Section 500.17(b): annual written notice of compliance (CISO certification) due by April 15 each year — failure to file is itself a violation.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "§500.2 — Cybersecurity Program: risk-based program with required functions",
+          "§500.3 — Cybersecurity Policy: written, approved by senior governing body annually",
+          "§500.4 — CISO designation; CISO report to senior governing body at least annually (Second Amendment expanded to material risks, exceptions, test results)",
+          "§500.5 — Vulnerability management: annual penetration testing + bi-annual vulnerability assessments (Second Amendment added automated scans + manual reviews)",
+          "§500.7 — Access privileges with periodic review; privileged access tightly restricted (Second Amendment)",
+          "§500.9 — Risk Assessment: at least annually; foundation for the Cybersecurity Program",
+          "§500.11 — Third Party Service Provider Security Policy",
+          "§500.12 — Multi-Factor Authentication for all individuals accessing any information system (Second Amendment expanded to all remote and privileged access, no exceptions for senior officers)",
+          "§500.13 — Asset management with documented end-of-life policy (Second Amendment new requirement)",
+          "§500.14 — Cybersecurity awareness training including social engineering",
+          "§500.15 — Encryption of Nonpublic Information in transit and at rest",
+          "§500.16 — Incident Response Plan plus Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery plans (Second Amendment added BCDR/exercises)",
+          "§500.17(a) — 72h DFS notification",
+          "§500.17(c) — 24h ransom payment notification",
+          "§500.17(b) — Annual CISO compliance certification (signed by CISO + highest-ranking executive)",
+          "§500.19 — Class A Companies (large entities by employees + revenue thresholds): heightened requirements including independent audit, privileged access management tools, password vaults, EDR + SIEM"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically specified — risk-based vulnerability management programme",
+          "AI/ML: 2024-10 DFS Industry Letter 'Cybersecurity Risks Arising from Artificial Intelligence' is interpretive guidance under Part 500; no AI-specific Part 500 amendment yet",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not contemplated in Part 500",
+          "PQC: not addressed — encryption requirement is algorithm-agnostic"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "DFS Industry Letter 2024-10 'Cybersecurity Risks Arising from Artificial Intelligence' — interpretive guidance applying Part 500 requirements to AI-driven attacks (deepfakes, AI-enabled social engineering, AI-enhanced reconnaissance) and Covered Entity AI use; expands MFA, training, third-party, and risk assessment obligations to AI context",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low — Part 500 has prescriptive technical requirements and the §500.17(b) annual CISO certification creates personal accountability; gap is in AI specificity",
+        "global_influence_note": "Part 500 set the template for: NAIC Insurance Data Security Model Law (adopted by 25+ US states); FTC Safeguards Rule (2021 amendments); SEC Cybersecurity Risk Management Rules (2023); NYDFS-aligned amendments to NIST 800-53 references in financial sector. Foreign-headquartered banks with NY branches (e.g., UBS, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Mizuho) apply Part 500 globally as the binding minimum."
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "GLOBAL": {
+    "jurisdiction": "International / Multi-Jurisdiction",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "ISO_27001_2022": {
+        "full_name": "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information Security Management Systems",
+        "authority": "ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27",
+        "source": "https://www.iso.org/standard/27001",
+        "effective_date": "2022-10-25",
+        "version": "ISO/IEC 27001:2022",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "A.8.8 — Management of technical vulnerabilities (patch management)",
+          "A.8.28 — Secure coding",
+          "A.8.30 — Outsourced development",
+          "A.8.34 — Protection of information systems during audit testing",
+          "A.6.8 — Information security event reporting"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "A.8.8 'appropriate timescales' undefined — typically 30-day critical, which is exploitation acceptance",
+          "A.8.28 secure coding does not address prompt injection (semantic vulnerability, not code vulnerability)",
+          "A.8.30 outsourced development does not cover MCP server supply chain",
+          "No AI system security annex — ISO 42001 (AI management) published separately, not yet integrated",
+          "No PQC requirement — 'appropriate cryptography' standard (A.8.24) allows classical-only",
+          "No live kernel patching requirement"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "ISO 42001:2023 (AI management systems) is the companion standard; not integrated into 27001 certification",
+        "pqc_coverage": "A.8.24 (use of cryptography) requires policy but does not mandate algorithm evolution",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high — certification is achievable with theater in A.8.8 patch SLA"
+      },
+      "CSA_CCM_V4": {
+        "full_name": "CSA Cloud Controls Matrix v4.0",
+        "authority": "Cloud Security Alliance",
+        "source": "https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/cloud-controls-matrix",
+        "effective_date": "2021-09-01",
+        "version": "4.0",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "TVM-02 — Vulnerability Management (identification and prioritization)",
+          "TVM-03 — Patch Management",
+          "AIS-01 through AIS-06 — Application and Interface Security",
+          "SEF-06 — Incident Reporting (24h notification target)",
+          "STA-09 — Third Party Security",
+          "CEK-01 through CEK-21 — Cryptography, Encryption and Key Management"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "TVM-03 patch SLA: cloud-specific but undefined timeline for customer-side OS patching",
+          "AIS controls: no AI/ML security controls in CCM v4.0",
+          "STA-09 third-party: MCP servers and AI tool plugins not in cloud third-party scope",
+          "CEK controls: comprehensive but no PQC requirement — algorithm agnostic",
+          "Prompt injection: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "CSA has published AI Safety Initiative; CCM v4.0 does not include AI-specific controls",
+        "pqc_coverage": "CEK controls are algorithm-agnostic; no PQC mandate",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — CCM is specific to cloud; gaps in AI and patching SLA"
+      },
+      "CIS_V8": {
+        "full_name": "CIS Controls v8",
+        "authority": "Center for Internet Security",
+        "source": "https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/v8",
+        "effective_date": "2021-05-18",
+        "version": "8.0",
+        "patch_sla": 336,
+        "patch_sla_note": "CIS Control 7.3: 14 days for critical OS patches on enterprise assets. Same as Cyber Essentials — better than NIST, worse than ASD.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "CIS 1 — Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets",
+          "CIS 2 — Inventory and Control of Software Assets",
+          "CIS 4 — Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets",
+          "CIS 7 — Continuous Vulnerability Management (7.3 = 14-day critical SLA)",
+          "CIS 12 — Network Infrastructure Management",
+          "CIS 13 — Network Monitoring and Defense"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "CIS 7.3 14-day SLA: insufficient for CISA KEV + deterministic public PoC",
+          "AI/ML: no CIS controls for AI system security",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not addressed",
+          "PQC: CIS 10 (Malware Defenses) does not contemplate quantum threat to current crypto",
+          "Prompt injection: not addressed",
+          "Live kernel patching: not addressed as a required capability"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "None in CIS v8",
+        "pqc_coverage": "None in CIS v8",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — Implementation Groups (IG1/2/3) provide maturity pathway; SLA gap is the main issue"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "NO": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Norway",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "EEA member, not EU member. Norway implements EU acts via EEA Joint Committee decisions; GDPR and NIS2 apply via national implementing statutes rather than direct effect. Aligns broadly with the EU baseline; deviations are flagged below.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PERSONOPPLYSNINGSLOVEN": {
+        "full_name": "Personopplysningsloven (Personal Data Act) — implementing GDPR via the EEA",
+        "authority": "Datatilsynet (Norwegian Data Protection Authority)",
+        "source": "https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2018-06-15-38",
+        "effective_date": "2018-07-20",
+        "version": "LOV-2018-06-15-38 (transposes Regulation (EU) 2016/679 via EEA Joint Committee Decision No 154/2018)",
+        "security_article": "GDPR Art. 32 (incorporated by reference) + sectoral Norwegian rules",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach affecting data subject rights (GDPR Art. 33 standard)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "GDPR Art. 32 — appropriate technical and organisational measures (incorporated)",
+          "GDPR Art. 33 — 72-hour breach notification to Datatilsynet",
+          "Sectoral overlays: Helseregisterloven (health registries), Politiregisterloven (police data), Ekomloven (electronic communications)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Same Art. 32 ambiguity as EU GDPR baseline — no technical specification",
+          "AI/ML: no Norway-specific statute as of 2026-05; EU AI Act will apply via EEA once incorporated (EEA Joint Committee process pending)",
+          "PQC: not addressed in Personopplysningsloven; NSM cryptographic recommendations are separate"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "EU AI Act incorporation into EEA is pending as of 2026-05; Datatilsynet has published AI guidance under GDPR for automated decision-making and profiling",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed at statute level; see NSM_GRUNNPRINSIPPER below",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — Datatilsynet is an active enforcer; SLA gap is the EU baseline gap"
+      },
+      "NSM_GRUNNPRINSIPPER": {
+        "full_name": "NSM Grunnprinsipper for IKT-sikkerhet (NSM Basic Principles for ICT Security) v2.1",
+        "authority": "Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet (NSM) — Norwegian National Security Authority",
+        "source": "https://nsm.no/regelverk-og-hjelp/rad-og-anbefalinger/grunnprinsipper-for-ikt-sikkerhet/",
+        "effective_date": "2020-04-01",
+        "version": "v2.1 (2023)",
+        "sector": "Cross-sector; mandatory for entities subject to Sikkerhetsloven (Security Act 2018); strongly recommended baseline for public sector",
+        "patch_sla": 720,
+        "patch_sla_note": "NSM Grunnprinsipper 2.2.5 recommends 'as soon as possible' for known-exploited vulnerabilities; sector guidance and audit practice operationalise this as ~30 days for critical, with accelerated handling for actively exploited cases.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Identify (1.x) — asset and dependency inventory",
+          "Protect (2.x) — secure configuration, patch management (2.2.5), access control, cryptography (2.5)",
+          "Detect (3.x) — security monitoring and detection",
+          "Respond and Recover (4.x) — incident handling and continuity",
+          "Sikkerhetsloven §§4-5 to 4-7 — mandatory security measures for entities handling classified or critical-function information"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Grunnprinsipper is guidance, not statute, except where pulled in by Sikkerhetsloven scope",
+          "AI/ML: NSM Threat Assessment 2025 names AI as accelerant; Grunnprinsipper has no AI-specific control yet",
+          "MCP/agent trust: not contemplated",
+          "PQC: NSM published PQC migration guidance in 2024 recommending hybrid schemes for classified systems; no statutory deadline"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Threat-level awareness in NSM annual assessments; no specific Grunnprinsipper control",
+        "pqc_coverage": "NSM PQC migration guidance (2024) — hybrid recommended for high-sensitivity systems; aligned with BSI and ANSSI direction",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — Grunnprinsipper is comprehensive but compliance is largely self-attested outside Sikkerhetsloven scope",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "Aligned with ISO/IEC 27001:2022, NIST CSF 2.0, and the EU NIS2 Art. 21 control families; Norway-specific overlay for national-security context"
+      },
+      "NIS2_NORWAY": {
+        "full_name": "Digitalsikkerhetsloven (Digital Security Act) — Norwegian transposition of NIS2",
+        "authority": "NSM as national CSIRT; Nkom (telecom), Finanstilsynet (finance), NVE (energy), Helsedirektoratet (health), and other sectoral authorities",
+        "source": "https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/prop.-109-l-20232024/id3035898/",
+        "effective_date": "Anticipated EEA-implementation effective in 2026; Prop. 109 L (2023-2024) submitted to Storting; NIS2 incorporated into the EEA Agreement subject to Joint Committee adoption",
+        "version": "Prop. 109 L (2023-2024) — Digitalsikkerhetsloven (in legislative process as of 2026-05)",
+        "notification_sla": 24,
+        "notification_trigger": "Significant incident at essential/important entity (NIS2 standard)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "NIS2 Art. 21 risk management measures (incorporated)",
+          "Art. 23 — 24h early warning / 72h notification / final report timing",
+          "Sectoral overlays: Finanstilsynet's IKT-forskrift for finance, NVE's beredskapsforskrift for energy"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Legislative delay relative to EU 2024-10-17 deadline — EEA Joint Committee process",
+          "Same Art. 21 patch-SLA undefined gap as EU NIS2",
+          "OT/ICS coverage: NVE beredskapsforskrift §6 covers Norwegian energy OT, but cross-sector OT guidance is fragmented across NSM, DSB and sectoral regulators"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Same as EU NIS2 — no AI-specific measures",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Same as EU NIS2 — 'state of the art' without PQC deadline",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — substantive once enacted; transition window creates current ambiguity"
+      },
+      "FINANSTILSYNET_IKT": {
+        "full_name": "Forskrift om bruk av informasjons- og kommunikasjonsteknologi (IKT-forskriften)",
+        "authority": "Finanstilsynet (Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority)",
+        "source": "https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2003-05-21-630",
+        "effective_date": "2003-07-01",
+        "version": "FOR-2003-05-21-630 (current consolidated text; DORA-aligned amendments expected as DORA enters EEA)",
+        "sector": "Finance — banks, insurers, payment service providers, investment firms",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "§3 — ICT strategy and governance",
+          "§4-5 — Risk analysis and incident management",
+          "§7-8 — Operations management, change control, backup",
+          "§9 — Outsourcing oversight (alignment path for DORA Art. 28-30)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Pre-DORA framework — Finanstilsynet circulars expand on incident reporting in practice; DORA EEA incorporation will supersede in financial scope",
+          "AI/ML: not specifically addressed; Finanstilsynet 2024 letter on AI in finance is supervisory expectation, not statute"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Finanstilsynet supervisory expectations letter on AI use in financial institutions (2024) — interpretive only",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low — Finanstilsynet conducts on-site ICT inspections"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "MX": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Mexico",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "LFPDPPP": {
+        "full_name": "Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (Federal Law on Protection of Personal Data in Possession of Private Parties)",
+        "authority": "Until 2025: INAI (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales); reform in progress to transfer functions to a successor agency under the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (constitutional reform published 2024-12-20 dissolving INAI; transition law pending)",
+        "source": "https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LFPDPPP.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "2010-07-06",
+        "version": "DOF 05-07-2010 (Reglamento DOF 21-12-2011)",
+        "security_article": "Art. 19 — Security measures",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Security breach affecting rights of data subjects (Reglamento Art. 63)",
+        "notification_notes": "Reglamento Art. 64: notify data subjects 'without delay' (sin dilación). No statutory hour SLA. Practice after 2024 INAI guidance trended toward 72h alignment with international norms; successor-agency rulemaking will set the new floor.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 6 — Principles: legality, consent, information, quality, purpose, fidelity, proportionality, accountability",
+          "Art. 19 — Administrative, technical and physical security measures appropriate to risk",
+          "Reglamento Arts. 57-66 — Detailed security obligations including risk analysis, vulnerability management, breach handling",
+          "INAI Recommendations on Security of Personal Data (2018 update) — non-binding but used in enforcement"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "INAI dissolution (constitutional reform 2024-12-20) creates institutional discontinuity — enforcement priorities and timelines uncertain through transition",
+          "Art. 19 'appropriate' measures undefined at statute level",
+          "AI/ML: not addressed in LFPDPPP; pending Iniciativa de Ley Federal para Regular la Inteligencia Artificial under congressional discussion",
+          "Patch SLA: not specified",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Cross-border transfers: Art. 36 requires consent or enumerated exception, weaker than GDPR adequacy/SCC structure"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not in LFPDPPP; INAI 2023 'Guía para el Tratamiento de Datos Personales en la Inteligencia Artificial' is non-binding",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high during 2025-2026 transition — institutional successor and rulemaking pace uncertain",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "Article 19 'appropriate measures' standard mirrors GDPR Art. 32 ambiguity; LFPDPPP predates GDPR but Reglamento Arts. 57-66 introduce GDPR-comparable risk methodology. Diverges sharply from EU on cross-border transfer mechanism (consent-default vs adequacy/SCC)."
+      },
+      "LGPDPPSO": {
+        "full_name": "Ley General de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de Sujetos Obligados (General Law on Protection of Personal Data in Possession of Obligated Parties)",
+        "authority": "INAI / successor federal authority; state-level data protection authorities for state and municipal obligated parties",
+        "source": "https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGPDPPSO.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "2017-01-27",
+        "version": "DOF 26-01-2017",
+        "sector": "Public sector — federal, state, municipal entities and entities exercising public authority",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Title III — Principles, duties and rights",
+          "Arts. 31-39 — Security measures, breach notification, security incident response",
+          "Title VII — Inter-agency data transfers within Mexican public sector",
+          "Title IX — National System of Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Same constitutional reform uncertainty as LFPDPPP — INAI dissolution affects both public and private regimes",
+          "Coordination between federal and 32 state-level data protection authorities is uneven; enforcement varies by state",
+          "AI/ML in public-sector deployments (e.g., predictive policing pilots in CDMX, Jalisco): no statute-level controls"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not in LGPDPPSO; ad-hoc state and federal AI policies (e.g., CDMX Estrategia de IA)",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high — fragmented public-sector compliance with limited enforcement resources outside federal level"
+      },
+      "CONDUSEF_CNBV_CYBER": {
+        "full_name": "CNBV Disposiciones de Carácter General Aplicables a las Instituciones de Crédito — Annex 71 (Cyber Resilience) + CUB updates",
+        "authority": "Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV); CONDUSEF for consumer protection in financial services; Banco de México for payment systems oversight",
+        "source": "https://www.cnbv.gob.mx/Normatividad/Disposiciones%20de%20car%C3%A1cter%20general%20aplicables%20a%20las%20instituciones%20de%20cr%C3%A9dito.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "Annex 71 effective in stages from 2021; cyber resilience requirements consolidated through 2024 reforms",
+        "sector": "Banking, broker-dealers and other CNBV-regulated entities",
+        "notification_sla": 24,
+        "notification_trigger": "Cyber incident affecting operations, services, or sensitive information",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Annex 71 — Cyber Resilience Programme: governance, threat intelligence, incident response, third-party risk, continuous monitoring",
+          "Cybersecurity certification of internal officers (CISO equivalent designation)",
+          "Annual cyber-resilience attestation to CNBV",
+          "Coordination with Banxico for incidents affecting SPEI (interbank payment system)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Cybersecurity rules apply to regulated financial entities only — fintechs under Ley Fintech follow a related but separate regime",
+          "AI/ML in credit scoring and AML: addressed by sectoral supervisory letters, not by Annex 71 specifically",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Sectoral CNBV supervisory expectations; no statute-level AI rule",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — CNBV inspections are substantive; SPEI incidents trigger Banxico oversight in parallel"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "AR": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Argentina",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "LPDP": {
+        "full_name": "Ley de Protección de los Datos Personales (Personal Data Protection Act) Law 25.326",
+        "authority": "Agencia de Acceso a la Información Pública (AAIP) — Dirección Nacional de Protección de Datos Personales",
+        "source": "http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/60000-64999/64790/norma.htm",
+        "effective_date": "2000-11-02",
+        "version": "Law 25.326 (2000); modernised by Decree 480/2024 (2024-05-30) aligning with GDPR transfer mechanisms; AAIP Resolution 240/2022 sets technical security measures",
+        "adequacy_status": "Argentina holds an EU adequacy decision under Decision 2003/490/EC; renewal under GDPR Art. 45 is the basis for Decree 480/2024 modernisation work",
+        "security_article": "Art. 9 — Data security",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Security incident affecting personal data",
+        "notification_notes": "AAIP Resolution 47/2018 and successor Resolution 240/2022 establish reporting expectations; Resolution 240/2022 Art. 4 references reporting incidents 'within 72 hours of knowledge' as recommended practice for medium/high-risk databases. No hard statutory hour SLA in Law 25.326.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 9 — security and confidentiality of data",
+          "Art. 11-12 — Consent and information requirements",
+          "Art. 16-17 — Rights of access, rectification, deletion",
+          "AAIP Resolution 240/2022 — three-tier risk classification (basic, medium, critical) with corresponding technical measures",
+          "Cross-border transfers: Art. 12 requires adequate destination or specified exception; Decree 480/2024 introduces SCC-style mechanisms"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Underlying Law 25.326 is 25+ years old; modernisation Bill (Proyecto de Ley de Protección de Datos Personales) tabled multiple times since 2018 has not been enacted as of 2026-05",
+          "Decree 480/2024 is executive-level and addresses transfers but cannot rewrite the statutory penalty regime",
+          "AI/ML: not addressed; Disposición 2/2023 of AAIP is non-binding guidance on AI",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Enforcement penalties low relative to GDPR — historical fines capped at ARS amounts that erode with inflation"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Disposición AAIP 2/2023 non-binding guidance",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high — adequacy maintenance pressure drives Decree-level fixes but penalty erosion undermines deterrence",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "Law 25.326 was modelled on Spain's 1999 LOPD which itself reflected Directive 95/46/EC. EU adequacy maintains a structural bridge to GDPR. Decree 480/2024 explicitly mirrors GDPR Chapter V transfer architecture (SCCs, adequacy, derogations)."
+      },
+      "BCRA_CYBER": {
+        "full_name": "BCRA Comunicación 'A' 7724 and successor — Cyber Risk Management Requirements for Financial Entities",
+        "authority": "Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA) — Superintendencia de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias",
+        "source": "https://www.bcra.gob.ar/Pdfs/comytexord/A7724.pdf",
+        "effective_date": "2023-04-12",
+        "version": "Comunicación 'A' 7724 (consolidates earlier 'A' 7266 series)",
+        "sector": "Banking and exchange entities supervised by BCRA",
+        "notification_sla": 24,
+        "notification_trigger": "Cyber incident with significant impact on operations, customers or sensitive information",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Cyber risk governance with board-level oversight",
+          "Identification, protection, detection, response and recovery functions aligned with NIST CSF",
+          "Third-party cyber risk management",
+          "Mandatory cyber incident notification to BCRA within 24 hours of identification",
+          "Annual cyber resilience self-assessment"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically pinned",
+          "AI/ML: not specifically addressed",
+          "OT-style requirements limited to ATM/POS networks; broader OT not in scope"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — BCRA inspections are substantive; smaller entities show maturity gaps"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "TR": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Türkiye",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "NATO member with national-level cyber posture coordinated via USOM. KVKK has been the personal-data baseline since 2016 and is undergoing a multi-year GDPR-alignment programme.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "KVKK": {
+        "full_name": "Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu (Law on the Protection of Personal Data) No. 6698",
+        "authority": "Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurumu (KVKK Authority / KVKK)",
+        "source": "https://www.kvkk.gov.tr/Icerik/6649/Personal-Data-Protection-Law",
+        "effective_date": "2016-04-07",
+        "version": "Law No. 6698 (2016); substantively amended by Law No. 7499 (Official Gazette 2024-03-12) effective 2024-06-01, aligning cross-border transfer rules with GDPR-style adequacy / SCC / BCR / explicit consent framework",
+        "security_article": "Art. 12 — Obligations regarding data security",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach (data being acquired by unauthorised parties)",
+        "notification_notes": "Art. 12(5): 'as soon as possible' to the Board; KVKK Board Decision 2019/10 operationalises this as 72 hours from awareness, retained after the 2024 amendments.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 4 — Principles (lawfulness, accuracy, purpose limitation, data minimisation, storage limitation)",
+          "Art. 5-6 — Lawful basis for general and special-category data",
+          "Art. 9 (as amended 2024) — Cross-border transfers: adequacy decision by KVKK, SCC-equivalent contracts, binding corporate rules, or specified derogations; previous explicit-consent-default replaced",
+          "Art. 12 — Security measures and breach notification",
+          "Art. 16 — VERBİS — controllers' registry obligation"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Art. 12 'every kind of technical and administrative measure' undefined at statute level; Board decisions operationalise",
+          "AI/ML: KVKK 2021 'Recommendations on Artificial Intelligence' are non-binding; no statute-level AI control",
+          "Patch SLA: not specified",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Pre-2024 Art. 9 created mass non-compliance — newly created mechanisms still maturing operationally as of 2026-05"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "KVKK 2021 AI Recommendations + Sectoral guidance (banking, health) — non-binding",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed; TÜBİTAK BİLGEM PQC research is preparatory",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — Board has active enforcement record; cross-border transfer transition risk during 2024-2026",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "Pre-2024 KVKK diverged sharply from GDPR on cross-border transfers (explicit-consent default). Law 7499 (2024) realigns Art. 9 with GDPR Chapter V mechanisms. Notification SLA (72h) matches GDPR Art. 33."
+      },
+      "BDDK_CYBER": {
+        "full_name": "BDDK Information Systems and Electronic Banking Regulation",
+        "authority": "Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu (BDDK) — Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency",
+        "source": "https://www.bddk.org.tr/Mevzuat/DokumanGetir/1102",
+        "effective_date": "2020-03-15",
+        "version": "Regulation on Banks' Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services (Official Gazette 2020-03-15)",
+        "sector": "Banking",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Art. 24-30 — Information security management programme",
+          "Art. 32 — Penetration testing requirements (at least annual; following major changes)",
+          "Art. 41 — Cyber incident management and reporting to BDDK",
+          "Art. 22 — Outsourcing and third-party information system risk",
+          "TR.SOME (national CERT) coordination for incidents with sectoral impact"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically specified",
+          "AI/ML: not specifically addressed",
+          "PQC: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not specifically addressed",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — BDDK conducts on-site IT examinations"
+      },
+      "USOM_NATIONAL": {
+        "full_name": "USOM — Ulusal Siber Olaylara Müdahale Merkezi (National Computer Emergency Response Centre) Directives",
+        "authority": "USOM (under BTK, Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu)",
+        "source": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/",
+        "effective_date": "USOM established 2013; coordination role formalised via Presidential Decree No. 48 (2019)",
+        "sector": "Cross-sector — critical infrastructure SOMEs (Siber Olaylara Müdahale Ekibi) report to USOM",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Mandatory SOME formation for critical infrastructure operators in defined sectors (energy, water, transport, electronic communications, banking, finance, critical public services)",
+          "Cyber threat intelligence sharing via USOM bulletins",
+          "Coordination with NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "No single comprehensive cyber-incident statute equivalent to NIS2 as of 2026-05; draft Cybersecurity Law has been in discussion",
+          "Notification thresholds vary by sector and SOME maturity",
+          "AI/ML cyber incident scope unclear"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not specifically addressed",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — SOME maturity varies sharply across sectors"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "TH": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Thailand",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "PDPA_TH": {
+        "full_name": "Personal Data Protection Act B.E. 2562 (2019)",
+        "authority": "Personal Data Protection Committee (PDPC) — Office of the PDPC (PDPC Office)",
+        "source": "https://www.pdpc.or.th/en/laws-and-regulations/",
+        "effective_date": "2019-05-27 (partial); 2022-06-01 (full enforcement)",
+        "version": "B.E. 2562 (2019), full enforcement effective 2022-06-01 after two postponements",
+        "security_article": "Sec. 37(1) — Security measures for personal data",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach that risks the rights and freedoms of persons",
+        "notification_notes": "Sec. 37(4): notification to PDPC within 72 hours of becoming aware where there is risk to rights and freedoms; data subject notification where high risk.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Sec. 19-21 — Lawful basis for processing including consent default",
+          "Sec. 23 — Information to be provided to data subjects",
+          "Sec. 26 — Special-category data restrictions",
+          "Sec. 28-29 — Cross-border transfer requirements (adequacy or appropriate safeguards)",
+          "Sec. 37 — Controller security and breach-notification obligations",
+          "Sec. 41-42 — Data Protection Officer mandatory for specified controllers/processors"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Sec. 37(1) 'appropriate security measures' operationalised by PDPC Notification on Security Measures (2022) — minimum baseline only",
+          "AI/ML: not addressed in PDPA; draft Royal Decree on AI under MDES consultation as of 2026-05",
+          "Patch SLA: not specified",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "Cross-border transfer regime: PDPC has not yet finalised adequacy list; certification and BCR-style mechanisms still maturing"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not in PDPA; ETDA AI Governance Guideline (2022) non-binding",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high — full enforcement only since 2022; PDPC capacity and case law still developing",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "PDPA Thailand is structurally GDPR-aligned (consent default, DPO obligation, 72h notification, DPIA-equivalent). Diverges on cross-border transfers (no adequacy list yet) and lower penalty caps than GDPR."
+      },
+      "CSA_TH": {
+        "full_name": "Cybersecurity Act B.E. 2562 (2019)",
+        "authority": "National Cyber Security Agency (NCSA) — สำนักงานคณะกรรมการการรักษาความมั่นคงปลอดภัยไซเบอร์แห่งชาติ",
+        "source": "https://www.ncsa.or.th/laws.html",
+        "effective_date": "2019-05-28",
+        "version": "B.E. 2562 (2019) plus NCSA secondary regulations 2020-2024",
+        "sector": "Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) — 8 sectors: national security, public service, banking and finance, ICT, transport and logistics, energy and utilities, public health, others designated",
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "Cyber threat affecting CII (graduated severity)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Sec. 13 — National Cybersecurity Committee oversight",
+          "Sec. 49 — CII operator duties: risk assessment, vulnerability assessment, audit, incident reporting",
+          "Sec. 56-60 — Cyber threat response powers (with judicial oversight requirements after 2019 controversy)",
+          "NCSA Notification on CII Standards (2021) — three-tier maturity model"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Notification timelines defined by NCSA secondary regulation per severity tier — not uniformly 72h",
+          "Overlap with PDPA where personal data is involved creates dual-regulator reporting",
+          "AI/ML cyber risks: not specifically addressed",
+          "Pre-emptive monitoring powers (Sec. 60) raised constitutional concerns; require court approval for higher tiers"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not specifically addressed",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — CII designation list and tier mapping still evolving"
+      },
+      "BOT_IT_RISK": {
+        "full_name": "Bank of Thailand Notification on IT Risk Management of Financial Institutions",
+        "authority": "Bank of Thailand (BOT) — ธนาคารแห่งประเทศไทย",
+        "source": "https://www.bot.or.th/en/our-roles/financial-institutions/fi-supervision/regulations.html",
+        "effective_date": "Current version 2020 (FPG. 13/2563) with subsequent updates including the 2023 Digital Resilience Framework",
+        "sector": "Commercial banks, finance companies, credit foncier, e-payment service providers",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "IT governance and risk management framework",
+          "Vulnerability management and penetration testing",
+          "Cyber incident notification to BOT",
+          "Third-party / cloud risk management",
+          "Business continuity and disaster recovery testing"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Specific patch SLA not numerically pinned in the Notification",
+          "Cloud-specific guidance via separate BOT Cloud Guidelines (2022)",
+          "AI/ML: BOT 2023 guidance on responsible AI use in financial services — supervisory expectation, not regulation"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "BOT 2023 Responsible AI guidance — supervisory, not statutory",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low — BOT on-site examinations are substantive"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "PH": {
+    "jurisdiction": "Philippines",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "BPO and IT-BPM sector makes the Philippines one of the world's largest processors of foreign personal data. Compliance posture is therefore export-critical, especially under GDPR / CCPA / APRA controller obligations toward Filipino processors.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "DPA_2012": {
+        "full_name": "Data Privacy Act of 2012 (Republic Act No. 10173)",
+        "authority": "National Privacy Commission (NPC)",
+        "source": "https://privacy.gov.ph/data-privacy-act/",
+        "effective_date": "2012-09-08; Implementing Rules and Regulations effective 2016-09-09",
+        "version": "RA 10173 (2012); IRR (2016); NPC Circular 16-03 Personal Data Breach Management; NPC Circular 2022-01 (Updated IRR amendments); NPC Circular 2023-04 Security of Personal Data in Government Agencies",
+        "security_article": "Sec. 20 — Security of personal information",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": 72,
+        "notification_trigger": "Personal data breach where (a) sensitive personal information or information that may enable identity fraud are reasonably believed to have been acquired by an unauthorised person, and (b) it is likely to give rise to a real risk of serious harm",
+        "notification_notes": "NPC Circular 16-03 Sec. 17 / Updated NPC Circular 2022-01: 72 hours from knowledge of breach to NPC and affected data subjects, except in limited circumstances; mandatory regardless of size of breach where criteria are met.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Sec. 11 — Principles of transparency, legitimate purpose, proportionality",
+          "Sec. 12-13 — Lawful basis for personal and sensitive personal information",
+          "Sec. 20 — Security measures: organisational, physical, technical",
+          "Sec. 21 — Principle of accountability — controller accountable for processors",
+          "IRR Rule VI — Security obligations including DPO mandatory designation, privacy impact assessment, breach reporting",
+          "Penalties: RA 10173 Secs. 25-37 include imprisonment for unauthorised processing and disclosure"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Sec. 20 'reasonable and appropriate' measures undefined at statute; NPC Toolkit operationalises but is guidance",
+          "AI/ML: NPC Advisory 2023-01 on AI-driven processing is non-binding",
+          "Patch SLA: not specified",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "BPO-specific data-handling overlay: controller agreements often impose stricter foreign-law obligations than DPA itself"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "NPC Advisory 2023-01 (AI processing) non-binding; DICT National AI Strategy Roadmap is policy, not statute",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — NPC has active enforcement and breach-publication practice; BPO supply chain creates extraterritorial control gap visibility",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "DPA 2012 was modelled on the EU 1995 Directive and APEC Privacy Framework. Updated NPC Circular 2022-01 explicitly aligns breach mechanics with GDPR Art. 33-34. Diverges in penalty structure (criminal liability for individuals; civil fines less developed)."
+      },
+      "DICT_CYBER": {
+        "full_name": "DICT National Cybersecurity Plan (NCSP) 2023-2028 and supporting issuances",
+        "authority": "Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT); National Cyber Security Inter-Agency Committee",
+        "source": "https://dict.gov.ph/national-cybersecurity-plan-2023-2028/",
+        "effective_date": "2023-09-25",
+        "version": "NCSP 2023-2028",
+        "sector": "Cross-sector; CII designated in coordination with sectoral regulators",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Establishment of Sectoral Computer Emergency Response Teams (Sec-CERTs)",
+          "NCERT-PH for national incident coordination",
+          "Cyber threat intelligence sharing programme",
+          "Cybersecurity workforce development"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "NCSP is policy; a comprehensive Cybersecurity Act bill has not been enacted as of 2026-05",
+          "Patch SLA: not specified",
+          "AI/ML cyber risk: addressed at policy level only",
+          "Notification thresholds depend on sectoral regulators"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Policy-level only",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium-high — absence of an overarching cybersecurity statute leaves enforcement fragmented across sectoral regulators"
+      },
+      "BSP_CYBER": {
+        "full_name": "BSP Manual of Regulations for Banks (MORB) — IT Risk Management Framework",
+        "authority": "Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)",
+        "source": "https://www.bsp.gov.ph/Pages/Regulations/MORB.aspx",
+        "effective_date": "BSP Circular 982 (2017) — Enhanced Guidelines on Information Security Management; updated through Circular 1140 (2022) and 1156 (2023) on operational resilience",
+        "sector": "Banks and BSP-supervised financial institutions",
+        "notification_sla": 2,
+        "notification_trigger": "Major cyber incident or significant disruption to banking operations",
+        "notification_notes": "BSP Circular 1019 (2018) / Memorandum M-2020-007: initial notification within 2 hours of discovery for major cyber events; follow-up reporting per incident classification.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "Information Security Management Framework with board-level oversight",
+          "Cyber resilience testing including penetration tests and red-team exercises for D-SIBs",
+          "Third-party / cloud risk management (Circular 1085, cloud guidelines)",
+          "Customer protection requirements: Anti-Financial Account Scamming Act (RA 11765) liability allocation",
+          "Sectoral incident reporting: BSP, AMLC for AML-related incidents, NPC for data breaches"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Patch SLA: not numerically pinned",
+          "AI/ML: BSP 2024 Advisory on AI in financial services is supervisory expectation",
+          "Triple-regulator overlap (BSP, NPC, AMLC) creates incident-classification complexity"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "BSP 2024 supervisory guidance — non-statutory",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "low — 2-hour SLA is among the world's fastest sector notifications; BSP examinations are substantive"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "US_CALIFORNIA": {
+    "jurisdiction": "United States — California (sub-national, privacy + AI baseline)",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "US sub-national but functionally the US privacy baseline. Coverage thresholds (CCPA/CPRA) bind any business serving California residents at scale, making compliance national in effect. Distinct from US_NYDFS (financial-sector cyber) and from federal NIST/FTC frameworks under GLOBAL.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "CCPA_CPRA": {
+        "full_name": "California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) as amended by the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA)",
+        "authority": "California Privacy Protection Agency (CPPA) — primary; California Attorney General — concurrent enforcement",
+        "source": "https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa",
+        "effective_date": "CCPA: 2020-01-01 (enforcement 2020-07-01); CPRA amendments: 2023-01-01 (enforcement 2023-07-01)",
+        "version": "Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100-1798.199.100; CPPA Regulations Title 11, Div. 6 (effective 2023-03-29) plus 2024-2025 rulemakings on automated decisionmaking technology (ADMT), cybersecurity audits, and risk assessments",
+        "security_article": "Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100(e) — reasonable security",
+        "patch_sla": null,
+        "notification_sla": null,
+        "notification_trigger": "California's separate breach-notification statute Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 applies to security breaches of personal information",
+        "notification_notes": "Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82: notify affected California residents 'in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay'; AG notification required where breach affects more than 500 California residents. No statutory hour SLA. CPRA private right of action under § 1798.150 for breaches caused by failure to implement reasonable security.",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "§ 1798.100 — Notice at collection",
+          "§ 1798.105 — Right to deletion",
+          "§ 1798.106 — Right to correction (CPRA)",
+          "§ 1798.110 — Right to know",
+          "§ 1798.120 — Right to opt out of sale or sharing",
+          "§ 1798.121 — Right to limit use of sensitive personal information (CPRA)",
+          "§ 1798.135 — Universal opt-out signal compliance (Global Privacy Control as of CPPA Reg § 7025)",
+          "§ 1798.150 — Private right of action for data breach caused by failure to maintain reasonable security",
+          "§ 1798.185(a)(15)-(16) — CPPA mandate to issue ADMT, cybersecurity audit, and risk-assessment regulations"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "'Reasonable security' is benchmarked by AG against CIS Controls (per 2016 AG Data Breach Report) but not statutorily pinned",
+          "Pre-CPRA private right of action limited to breach of unencrypted/unredacted PI categories — semantic AI-attack vectors not contemplated",
+          "Cross-border transfers: no GDPR-style mechanism; sectoral export controls only",
+          "Patch SLA: not specified",
+          "PQC: not addressed",
+          "CPPA cybersecurity audit and risk assessment regulations were finalised in 2024-2025 rulemakings — implementation timelines staged through 2026-2027"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "CPPA ADMT regulations (finalised 2024-2025) require pre-use notices, opt-out rights, and access rights for automated decisionmaking technology; risk-assessment regulations require documented assessments before high-risk ADMT processing",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — 'reasonable security' standard invites checkbox compliance; private right of action and CPPA audit regulation are the real deterrents",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "CCPA/CPRA was the first US comprehensive privacy statute and shaped 18+ US state privacy laws (Virginia, Colorado, Connecticut, Utah, Texas, etc.). CPRA's ADMT regulations are the US functional analogue to EU AI Act Art. 14 (human oversight) and Art. 13 (transparency) for non-high-risk AI."
+      },
+      "CAIA_AND_SB942": {
+        "full_name": "California AI Transparency Act (SB 942, 2024) and adjacent AI-specific statutes",
+        "authority": "California Attorney General; CPPA for overlapping ADMT scope",
+        "source": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB942",
+        "effective_date": "2026-01-01",
+        "version": "SB 942 (chaptered 2024-09-19); related: SB 1001 (bot disclosure, 2018); AB 2013 (training-data transparency, 2024); SB 896 (state-use AI risk, 2024)",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "SB 942 §§ 22757.1-22757.3 — Covered providers of generative AI systems with >1M monthly visitors must (a) offer a free AI-detection tool, (b) include latent disclosures in synthetic content, and (c) include manifest disclosures",
+          "AB 2013 — Generative AI training-data documentation disclosure (effective 2026-01-01)",
+          "SB 1001 — Bot disclosure for commercial transactions and political communications",
+          "SB 896 — State agency AI risk assessment (Generative AI Accountability Act)"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "SB 1047 (Safe and Secure Innovation for Frontier AI Models Act) vetoed 2024-09-29 — frontier model safety obligations remain unlegislated in California",
+          "SB 53 (2025 proposal) reintroduces frontier model transparency obligations; status pending as of 2026-05",
+          "SB 942 covers transparency only, not prompt-injection or model-tampering security",
+          "AB 2013 training-data disclosure does not create a security baseline for the training pipeline itself"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "California has the most extensive US AI statutory regime as of 2026-05, focused on transparency and disclosure; frontier-model safety remains a gap pending SB 53 or successor",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — transparency-only frame allows compliant deployment of systems that remain materially insecure against prompt injection and adversarial inputs",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "Functionally complements EU AI Act Art. 50 (transparency obligations for AI systems including synthetic content), but California has no high-risk-AI risk-management equivalent to EU AI Act Art. 9. UK has no equivalent statute. Australia's Voluntary AI Safety Standard (2024) is non-binding."
+      },
+      "CALOPPA": {
+        "full_name": "California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA)",
+        "authority": "California Attorney General",
+        "source": "https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/online-privacy-protection-act",
+        "effective_date": "2004-07-01; amended 2014 to require Do Not Track disclosures",
+        "version": "Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575-22579",
+        "critical_controls": [
+          "§ 22575 — Conspicuously post privacy policy on websites and online services collecting personally identifiable information from California consumers",
+          "§ 22575(b)(5) — Disclose how operator responds to Do Not Track signals",
+          "§ 22577 — Definition of personally identifiable information"
+        ],
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Pre-CCPA framework largely superseded for CCPA-scope businesses",
+          "No security obligations beyond disclosure",
+          "AI/ML: not addressed",
+          "Patch SLA: not addressed"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not addressed",
+        "theater_risk": "high — disclosure-only; primarily relevant for entities below CCPA thresholds"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "EU_DE_BSI": {
+    "jurisdiction": "EU member state sub-regulator — Germany",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "Most technical EU national authority. BSI publications underpin large parts of EU NIS2 implementation, EU CRA conformity assessment, and the EU Cybersecurity Certification (EUCC) scheme. Read alongside the EU block, not as a replacement.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "BSI": {
+        "full_name": "Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik — Federal Office for Information Security",
+        "authority": "BSI (Federal-level cybersecurity authority within the Federal Ministry of the Interior)",
+        "source": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/",
+        "key_publications": [
+          "BSI-Standard 200-1 — Information Security Management Systems (replaces BSI-Standard 100-1)",
+          "BSI-Standard 200-2 — IT-Grundschutz Methodology",
+          "BSI-Standard 200-3 — Risk Analysis based on IT-Grundschutz",
+          "BSI-Standard 200-4 — Business Continuity Management (final version 2023)",
+          "IT-Grundschutz Kompendium — annual baseline catalogue (Edition 2024 is current; 2025/2026 editions ship annually)",
+          "TR-02102 (Technical Guideline) — Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths (current part 1 version 2024)",
+          "BSI-Mindeststandards (Minimum Standards) per § 8 BSIG for federal administration including external cloud use, secure web browsers, logging and detection of cybersecurity attacks, and the Mindeststandard for use of External Cloud Services",
+          "BSI TR-03145 — Secure CA Operation; TR-03116 — Cryptographic Requirements for Telematics Applications and electronic ID"
+        ],
+        "fields": [
+          "Information security management (IT-Grundschutz)",
+          "Cryptographic guidance and approvals (TR-02102, BSI-approved schemes)",
+          "Common Criteria evaluation (BSI is the German CC certification body)",
+          "EUCC scheme operation under EU Implementing Regulation 2024/482",
+          "KRITIS (critical infrastructure) supervision under BSIG § 8a / § 8b",
+          "PQC migration guidance — joint with ANSSI and Dutch NLNCSA 'PQC Migration Handbook' 2024; BSI considers stateful hash-based signatures (XMSS/LMS) approved for current use and recommends hybrid schemes during transition"
+        ],
+        "applies_to": "Federal administration (binding via § 8 BSIG); KRITIS operators (binding via BSIG § 8a); voluntary baseline for private sector and Länder administrations; foundational input to EU NIS2 implementation in Germany via BSIG and NIS2UmsuCG (NIS2 implementation law; in Bundestag process 2024-2026)",
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "IT-Grundschutz is comprehensive but resource-intensive; SMEs often default to ISO 27001 with looser interpretation",
+          "AI/ML: BSI has issued 'AI Cloud Service Compliance Criteria Catalogue (AIC4)' 2021 and updated guidance 2024 but binding rules await NIS2UmsuCG and EU AI Act implementation",
+          "MCP/agent trust: BSI 2025 advisories on LLM application security recognise prompt injection as a class but do not yet provide a Grundschutz module",
+          "Compliance theater: IT-Grundschutz certification of an information domain that excludes legacy systems is a known pattern"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AIC4 (2021/2024 update) for AI in cloud — voluntary baseline; BSI 2024 LLM security advisories",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Most concrete EU national PQC guidance: TR-02102 recommends hybrid (classical + Kyber/Dilithium) for protection beyond ~2030; stateful hash-based signatures (XMSS/LMS) approved for code-signing and similar use cases now",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — depth of guidance is high, but scope-cutting in IT-Grundschutz audits is common",
+        "notable_framework_gap": "BSIG § 8a 'state of the art' for KRITIS is benchmarked by industry-specific B3S documents endorsed by BSI; absent or stale B3S in a sub-sector creates a control vacuum (e.g., select critical-infrastructure verticals operated without a current B3S as of 2026-05)",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "Aligned with EU NIS2 Art. 21, EU CRA Annex I, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, NIST CSF 2.0; provides the most prescriptive German overlay on those baselines."
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "EU_FR_ANSSI": {
+    "jurisdiction": "EU member state sub-regulator — France",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "France's national cybersecurity authority. Strong qualification regime for security providers (PASSI/PVID/PDIS/PRIS), sovereign-cloud (SecNumCloud), and OIV/OSE supervision under LPM and the NIS2 transposition.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "ANSSI": {
+        "full_name": "Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information — National Agency for Information System Security",
+        "authority": "ANSSI (under the Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security, SGDSN)",
+        "source": "https://cyber.gouv.fr/",
+        "key_publications": [
+          "RGS (Référentiel Général de Sécurité) v2.0 — security framework for administrations interacting with citizens",
+          "PGSSI-S — Politique Générale de Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information de Santé (health sector)",
+          "II 901 / II 920 — Instructions interministérielles on protection of sensitive non-classified information and classified information systems",
+          "SecNumCloud v3.2 — qualification for sovereign-cloud providers, basis for the French position in EUCS",
+          "Cryptographic guidance: RGS Annex B1 (cryptographic mechanisms), B2 (key management), B3 (cryptographic device authentication)",
+          "Guide d'hygiène informatique — 42 recommended hygiene measures",
+          "ANSSI PQC guidance 'ANSSI views on the PQC transition' (2022, updated 2024) — recommends hybrid mode during transition"
+        ],
+        "qualification_schemes": [
+          "PASSI — Prestataires d'Audit de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information (security audit providers)",
+          "PVID — Prestataires de Vérification d'Identité à Distance (remote identity verification, including for eIDAS-HighAssurance use)",
+          "PDIS — Prestataires de Détection d'Incidents de Sécurité (security incident detection / SOC providers)",
+          "PRIS — Prestataires de Réponse aux Incidents de Sécurité (incident response providers)",
+          "SecNumCloud — qualified cloud providers"
+        ],
+        "fields": [
+          "OIV (Opérateurs d'Importance Vitale) supervision under LPM Loi de Programmation Militaire 2013-1168 and successor LPM 2024-449",
+          "OSE (Opérateurs de Services Essentiels) supervision under the French NIS implementation; OSE replaced by NIS2 'essential entities' under the loi de transposition (2024 process)",
+          "Cryptographic mechanism approvals for state and sensitive systems",
+          "CSPN (Certification de Sécurité de Premier Niveau) — French national product certification, complementary to Common Criteria",
+          "EUCC and EUCS schemes — France is a principal architect of EUCS sovereignty tiers"
+        ],
+        "applies_to": "OIV (binding under LPM); OSE / NIS2 essential and important entities (binding); French public administrations (RGS binding); private sector providers seeking qualification (voluntary but contractually required for state procurement)",
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "RGS v2.0 dates from 2014 — modernisation work ongoing as of 2026-05; gaps in coverage of cloud-native architectures and AI systems",
+          "Qualification schemes are slow and resource-intensive; backlog of PDIS applicants",
+          "AI/ML: ANSSI has published security recommendations for AI systems (2024) but no qualification scheme for AI providers",
+          "SecNumCloud and EUCS High tier sovereignty requirements are politically contested at EU level — possible scope changes through 2026-2027"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "ANSSI 'Recommandations de sécurité pour un système d'IA générative' (April 2024) — non-binding security recommendations; no qualification scheme yet",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Hybrid recommended during transition; ML-KEM and ML-DSA tracked; ANSSI joint work with BSI/NLNCSA on the 2024 PQC Migration Handbook",
+        "theater_risk": "low for OIV scope (substantive LPM supervision); medium elsewhere due to qualification-scheme bottlenecks",
+        "notable_framework_gap": "PDIS/PRIS qualification covers detection and response providers; there is no equivalent qualification for cloud-native or AI-system providers as of 2026-05, leaving a sovereignty/assurance gap for those technology classes",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "Aligned with EU NIS2 Art. 21, EU CRA, ISO/IEC 27001:2022. SecNumCloud is the most concrete EU sovereign-cloud overlay and informs the EUCS debate."
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "EU_ES_AEPD": {
+    "jurisdiction": "EU member state sub-regulator — Spain",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "AEPD has been among the most active GDPR enforcers by number of decisions and fines. Spain hosts the EU's first dedicated AI supervisory agency (AESIA).",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "AEPD": {
+        "full_name": "Agencia Española de Protección de Datos — Spanish Data Protection Agency",
+        "authority": "AEPD (independent administrative authority)",
+        "source": "https://www.aepd.es/",
+        "key_publications": [
+          "Guía del Reglamento General de Protección de Datos para Responsables de Tratamiento",
+          "Guía de Privacidad desde el Diseño (Privacy by Design Guide)",
+          "Guía Adecuación al RGPD de Tratamientos que Incorporan Inteligencia Artificial (2020) and 2024 update on generative AI",
+          "Notas técnicas on cookies, biometrics, fingerprinting, DPO designation, breach notification",
+          "Esquema Nacional de Seguridad guidance overlap with INCIBE and CCN-CERT (Centro Criptológico Nacional)"
+        ],
+        "fields": [
+          "GDPR enforcement and DPO registry",
+          "LOPDGDD (Ley Orgánica 3/2018) — Spain's GDPR implementing organic law including additional rights such as digital wills and right to be forgotten in internet searches",
+          "Coordination with Catalan, Basque and Andalusian regional DPAs (APDCAT, AVPD, CTPDA)",
+          "Cross-border GDPR cases via EDPB One-Stop-Shop"
+        ],
+        "applies_to": "All controllers and processors in scope of GDPR with establishment or targeting in Spain; LOPDGDD provides additional Spanish-specific obligations",
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "LOPDGDD additional articles (e.g., Art. 80 digital wills) create national-specific obligations not present in GDPR baseline",
+          "Coordination with regional DPAs occasionally produces inconsistent guidance on the same processing scenario",
+          "AI/ML: AEPD AI guidance (2020/2024) is non-binding interpretive material; binding AI rules now flow primarily through AESIA and EU AI Act"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AEPD 2020 + 2024 guidance on AI under GDPR; binding AI supervision now coordinated with AESIA under EU AI Act implementation",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not specifically addressed; CCN-CERT issues complementary cryptographic guidance via CCN-STIC series",
+        "theater_risk": "low for high-profile cases; medium-high for SME compliance which often follows guidance-as-checklist",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "AEPD enforcement statistics are the most extensive in the EU and a leading indicator for GDPR Art. 32 'appropriate measures' interpretation across the bloc."
+      },
+      "AESIA": {
+        "full_name": "Agencia Española de Supervisión de la Inteligencia Artificial — Spanish AI Supervision Agency",
+        "authority": "AESIA (statutory agency, headquartered in A Coruña)",
+        "source": "https://aesia.digital.gob.es/",
+        "key_publications": [
+          "Royal Decree 729/2023 establishing AESIA",
+          "EU AI Act implementation strategy for Spain (in development through 2025-2026)"
+        ],
+        "fields": [
+          "National market surveillance authority under EU AI Act Art. 70",
+          "Spain's pre-Act sandboxes for high-risk AI systems (Royal Decree 817/2023 establishing the regulatory sandbox)",
+          "Supervisory cooperation with AEPD where AI systems process personal data"
+        ],
+        "applies_to": "Providers and deployers of AI systems with Spanish market presence; high-risk AI systems under EU AI Act Annex III",
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "First-of-its-kind agency — staffing, case law, and supervisory practice still maturing as of 2026-05",
+          "Overlap with AEPD where AI processes personal data; coordination protocol still developing",
+          "Cybersecurity-of-AI specifics (e.g., prompt injection) addressed only by reference to EU AI Act Art. 15"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Spain is the EU member state with the most mature institutional AI-supervision infrastructure as of 2026-05",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Not within AESIA scope",
+        "theater_risk": "unknown — agency too new for an enforcement-record assessment; sandboxes generate visibility but not yet adversarial evidence"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "EU_IT_AgID_ACN": {
+    "jurisdiction": "EU member state sub-regulator — Italy",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "Italy split its cyber authority in 2021 with the creation of ACN, separating cybersecurity from digital-government functions retained by AgID. Both authorities operate the Italian implementation of NIS2 and the Cybersecurity National Perimeter.",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "ACN": {
+        "full_name": "Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale — National Cybersecurity Agency",
+        "authority": "ACN (established by Decree-Law 82/2021 converted by Law 109/2021)",
+        "source": "https://www.acn.gov.it/",
+        "key_publications": [
+          "Italian National Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2026",
+          "Implementing measures for the Perimetro di Sicurezza Nazionale Cibernetica (PSNC) under DPCM 81/2021 and successor decrees",
+          "ACN technical guidelines for essential and important entities under the Italian NIS2 transposition (Decree-Law 138/2024 / Legislative Decree 138/2024)",
+          "Cloud qualifications under the National Cloud Strategy and PSN (Polo Strategico Nazionale)",
+          "CSIRT Italia advisories and vulnerability bulletins"
+        ],
+        "fields": [
+          "Italian PSNC operator supervision — PSNC scope covers entities whose disruption would prejudice national security, broader than NIS2 essential-entity scope in some sectors",
+          "National CSIRT (CSIRT Italia)",
+          "Cybersecurity certification (national scheme aligned with EUCC)",
+          "Cloud qualification for public-administration cloud procurement",
+          "NIS2 implementation supervision following Legislative Decree 138/2024"
+        ],
+        "applies_to": "PSNC operators (binding via DPCM 81/2021 and amendments); essential and important entities under Italian NIS2 transposition; public administration cloud procurement",
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "PSNC vendor-procurement notification regime ('Golden Power' interaction) is unique to Italy and creates dual-clearance complexity for ICT supply chain",
+          "AI/ML: AI Italian Strategy 2024-2026 is policy; AI supervisory authority designation under EU AI Act not yet finalised between AgID and ACN as of 2026-05",
+          "Coordination with Garante Privacy on incidents involving personal data is documented but case-specific"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Strategy level; supervisory designation pending",
+        "pqc_coverage": "ACN endorses ENISA/ETSI PQC guidance; no separate Italian PQC mandate yet",
+        "theater_risk": "low-medium — PSNC scope is enforced via state-security mechanisms; broader essential-entity supervision is newer",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "Aligned with EU NIS2 Art. 21 and EU CRA; PSNC adds Italy-specific national-security overlay above the EU baseline."
+      },
+      "AGID": {
+        "full_name": "Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale — Agency for Digital Italy",
+        "authority": "AgID (under Presidency of the Council of Ministers)",
+        "source": "https://www.agid.gov.it/",
+        "key_publications": [
+          "Linee Guida AgID per la sicurezza ICT delle pubbliche amministrazioni — minimum ICT security baseline for Italian public administration (Misure Minime)",
+          "SPID and CIE digital identity specifications",
+          "PagoPA technical specifications",
+          "Cloud qualification programme (transferred to ACN for cyber elements but AgID retains digital-government scope)"
+        ],
+        "fields": [
+          "Public-administration digital transformation",
+          "Digital identity (SPID, CIE) governance",
+          "Interoperability standards (Modello di Interoperabilità)",
+          "Italian Digital Administration Code (CAD) implementation"
+        ],
+        "applies_to": "Italian public administrations and contracted providers",
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Misure Minime baseline is dated (last comprehensive revision 2017) and overlapped by ACN guidance after 2021 split",
+          "Allocation between AgID and ACN for some controls remains ambiguous in practice"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "AI in public administration covered via AgID guidance on algorithmic transparency in administrative procedures",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Defers to ACN / ENISA",
+        "theater_risk": "medium — public-administration compliance is heterogeneous and Misure Minime baseline is overdue for refresh"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "EU_ENISA": {
+    "jurisdiction": "EU agency (not a member-state regulator)",
+    "jurisdiction_note": "Not a regulator. ENISA is the EU agency for cybersecurity producing guidance, threat-landscape reports, and operating the EU Cybersecurity Certification Framework. Its outputs frequently become the technical foundation for binding EU regulation (NIS2 implementing acts, CRA technical specifications, EUCC scheme).",
+    "frameworks": {
+      "ENISA": {
+        "full_name": "European Union Agency for Cybersecurity",
+        "authority": "ENISA (established by Regulation (EU) 2019/881 — Cybersecurity Act)",
+        "source": "https://www.enisa.europa.eu/",
+        "key_publications": [
+          "ENISA Threat Landscape (annual; ETL 2024 published 2024-09; ETL 2025 expected 2025-Q3) — primary EU threat-environment reference",
+          "EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme on Common Criteria (EUCC) — Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, operational from 2024",
+          "EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services (EUCS) — draft scheme in deliberation as of 2026-05; sovereignty tiers contested",
+          "EU 5G Cybersecurity Certification Scheme (EU5G) — in development",
+          "ENISA guidelines for NIS2 implementing acts on incident-handling, supply chain, registry of entities",
+          "ENISA Post-Quantum Cryptography reports (2021, 2022 updated) — technical input to EU PQC migration discussion",
+          "ENISA AI Threat Landscape (2023) and AI Cybersecurity Standardisation (2023) reports — input to EU AI Act and CRA implementing acts",
+          "ENISA Good Practices for Supply Chain Cybersecurity (2023) — input to NIS2 Art. 21(2)(d)/(j) and CRA Annex I"
+        ],
+        "fields": [
+          "EU-wide cybersecurity threat intelligence and trend reporting",
+          "Operation of the European Cybersecurity Certification Framework under the Cybersecurity Act",
+          "Technical input to Commission implementing and delegated acts under NIS2, CRA, EU AI Act, eIDAS 2",
+          "Coordination of EU CSIRTs Network and EU CyCLONe (operational crisis cooperation)",
+          "EU Cyber Skills Framework and capacity-building"
+        ],
+        "applies_to": "ENISA outputs are not binding on their own; they become binding through (a) certification under the EUCC and successor schemes, (b) referenced standards in Commission implementing acts, and (c) member-state adoption in national NCSC guidance",
+        "framework_gaps": [
+          "Certification schemes are slow to publish — EUCS draft has been in deliberation since 2020 and remains unfinalised as of 2026-05 due to sovereignty-tier disagreement",
+          "Voluntary character of most ENISA technical guidance means inconsistent adoption across member states",
+          "AI cybersecurity standardisation is downstream of EU AI Act implementing-act timeline — substantive technical baseline awaited through 2026-2027",
+          "PQC: ENISA reports recommend hybrid migration but do not bind member states to a deadline"
+        ],
+        "ai_coverage": "Foundational technical input to EU AI Act Art. 15 cybersecurity requirements via 2023 AI Cybersecurity Standardisation report; binding AI security baseline awaits implementing acts",
+        "pqc_coverage": "Recommends hybrid PQC migration plans; technical input to anticipated EU PQC roadmap",
+        "theater_risk": "n/a (not a regulator) — but reliance on ENISA voluntary guidance instead of binding controls is itself a compliance-theater pattern at national level",
+        "notable_framework_gap": "EUCS finalisation delay leaves a multi-year gap between the CSA-2019 mandate and an operational EU cloud certification — member states fill the gap with national sovereignty schemes (SecNumCloud, BSI C5, ENS Esquema Nacional de Seguridad)",
+        "cross_reference_baseline": "ENISA outputs are the cross-cutting EU technical layer beneath the EU GDPR, NIS2, DORA, CRA, EU AI Act, and eIDAS 2 frameworks. National regulators (BSI, ANSSI, AEPD, ACN, NCSC, etc.) localise these into binding national overlays."
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "_notification_summary": {
+    "note": "Notification SLAs by jurisdiction, sorted fastest to slowest. 'discretionary' indicates statutes using 'as soon as practicable', 'with diligence', 'reasonable time', or 'immediately' without numeric pinning.",
+    "table": [
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Taiwan (CSMA L3-L4)",
+        "sla_hours": 1,
+        "trigger": "Highest-tier cyber incident at CIP",
+        "note": "Enforcement Rules graduated by incident level — fastest mandatory cyber notification globally"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Philippines (BSP)",
+        "sla_hours": 2,
+        "trigger": "Major cyber incident at BSP-supervised financial institution",
+        "note": "BSP Circular 1019 / M-2020-007 — among the world's fastest sector notifications"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Singapore (MAS TRM)",
+        "sla_hours": 2,
+        "trigger": "> 30min customer impact or breach",
+        "note": "Tied with CSA CCoP and BSP"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Singapore (CSA CCoP)",
+        "sla_hours": 2,
+        "trigger": "CII cybersecurity incident",
+        "note": ""
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "EU (DORA)",
+        "sla_hours": 4,
+        "trigger": "Major ICT incident in financial sector",
+        "note": "Financial services only"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "India (CERT-In)",
+        "sla_hours": 6,
+        "trigger": "Defined incident categories",
+        "note": "Sectoral incident reporting (not data-protection)"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "US NYDFS Part 500 (ransom payment)",
+        "sla_hours": 24,
+        "trigger": "Extortion/ransom payment by Covered Entity",
+        "note": "§500.17(c) Second Amendment — 30-day follow-up explanation"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "EU (NIS2 early warning)",
+        "sla_hours": 24,
+        "trigger": "Significant incident early warning",
+        "note": "72h full notification follows"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Norway (NIS2 / Digitalsikkerhetsloven, anticipated)",
+        "sla_hours": 24,
+        "trigger": "Significant incident early warning at essential/important entity",
+        "note": "Prop. 109 L (2023-2024) — anticipated EEA-implementation in 2026; mirrors EU NIS2 timing"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Canada (OSFI B-10)",
+        "sla_hours": 24,
+        "trigger": "Material technology/cyber incident",
+        "note": "Financial services only"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "EU (CRA)",
+        "sla_hours": 24,
+        "trigger": "Actively exploited vulnerability in product",
+        "note": "Product manufacturers under EU CRA"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Switzerland (Information Security Act)",
+        "sla_hours": 24,
+        "trigger": "Cyberattack on critical infrastructure operators",
+        "note": "Art. 74e ISG, in force 2025-04-01 — first Swiss numeric cyber SLA"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Argentina (BCRA Comunicación 'A' 7724)",
+        "sla_hours": 24,
+        "trigger": "Cyber incident with significant impact at BCRA-supervised entity",
+        "note": "Financial sector only"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Mexico (CNBV Annex 71)",
+        "sla_hours": 24,
+        "trigger": "Cyber incident affecting CNBV-supervised institution",
+        "note": "Banking and broker-dealer sector"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Saudi Arabia (KSA PDPL)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach causing potential damage",
+        "note": "Implementing Regulations Art. 24"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Norway (Personopplysningsloven via EEA / GDPR)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach affecting data subject rights",
+        "note": "GDPR Art. 33 standard via EEA implementation"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Türkiye (KVKK)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach (unauthorised acquisition)",
+        "note": "KVKK Board Decision 2019/10 operationalises Art. 12(5)"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Thailand (PDPA)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach risking rights and freedoms",
+        "note": "PDPA Sec. 37(4)"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Philippines (DPA — NPC)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Sensitive PI breach with real risk of serious harm",
+        "note": "NPC Circular 16-03 / 2022-01"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Korea (PIPA)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal information leakage",
+        "note": "Enforcement Decree Art. 39"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "India (DPDPA)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach affecting Data Principals",
+        "note": "Per Draft DPDP Rules 2025"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Brazil (LGPD)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Incident with relevant risk or damage",
+        "note": "ANPD Resolution CD/ANPD 15/2024 ~ 3 business days"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Chile (Law 21,719)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Security breach with risk to rights",
+        "note": "Effective 2026-12-01"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Indonesia (UU PDP)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal data protection failure with leakage/loss/unauthorised processing",
+        "note": "Art. 46 — 3x24 hours"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Vietnam (PDPD)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach with risk to rights",
+        "note": "Decree 13/2023 Art. 23 — notify Ministry of Public Security"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "EU (GDPR)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach",
+        "note": "72h standard"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "EU (NIS2 notification)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Significant incident full notification",
+        "note": "After 24h early warning"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Australia (APRA CPS 234)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Material information security incident",
+        "note": ""
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "US NYDFS Part 500 (cyber event)",
+        "sla_hours": 72,
+        "trigger": "Material cybersecurity event affecting Covered Entity",
+        "note": "§500.17(a) — applies to foreign banks with NY branches globally"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Japan (APPI)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Leak/loss/damage of personal data likely to harm rights",
+        "note": "PPC Rules — 'promptly' (~3-5 days preliminary, 30-60 days final)"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Canada (Quebec Law 25)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Confidentiality incident with risk of serious injury",
+        "note": "discretionary — 'with diligence'; CAI practice trends toward days"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Canada (PIPEDA)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Breach with real risk of significant harm",
+        "note": "discretionary — 'as soon as feasible'"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "South Africa (POPIA)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Compromise of personal information",
+        "note": "discretionary — 'as soon as reasonably possible'; Regulator practice ~72h"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "New Zealand (Privacy Act 2020)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Notifiable privacy breach (serious harm)",
+        "note": "discretionary — 'as soon as practicable'; OPC practice ~72h"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "UAE (PDPL)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach",
+        "note": "discretionary — Executive Regulations pending as of 2026-05"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "China (PIPL)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "PI leak, tampering, or loss",
+        "note": "Art. 57 'immediately' (立即) — no fixed hour SLA"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Israel (Data Security Regulations)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Severe security incident at medium/high level database",
+        "note": "Reg. 11 — 'immediately'; PPA practice ~72h post-Amendment 13"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Switzerland (revFADP)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach with high risk to rights",
+        "note": "Art. 24 — 'as soon as possible'; FDPIC practice trends to 72h"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Hong Kong (PDPO)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Personal data breach",
+        "note": "Voluntary regime — no statutory mandate as of 2026-05"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Taiwan (PDPA)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Personal data theft/alteration/damage/loss/leakage",
+        "note": "Art. 12 — 'after investigating the facts'; PDPC 2024 guidance suggests 72h"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Mexico (LFPDPPP)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Security breach affecting data subjects",
+        "note": "Reglamento Art. 64 — 'without delay'; INAI dissolution creates 2025-2026 enforcement uncertainty"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "Argentina (Law 25.326)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Security incident affecting personal data",
+        "note": "AAIP Resolution 240/2022 recommends ~72h for medium/high-risk databases; no statutory hour SLA"
+      },
+      {
+        "jurisdiction": "US California (CCPA / § 1798.82)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "trigger": "Breach of unencrypted/unredacted personal information",
+        "note": "'Most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay'; AG notification when > 500 CA residents affected"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "_patch_sla_summary": {
+    "note": "Critical patch SLAs by framework, sorted fastest to slowest",
+    "table": [
+      {
+        "framework": "CISA KEV (US executive branch)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "sla_days": "varies",
+        "note": "CISA KEV does not set a universal SLA — BOD 22-01 requires 14 days for federal agencies"
+      },
+      {
+        "framework": "ASD ISM + Essential 8 ML3 (AU)",
+        "sla_hours": 48,
+        "sla_days": 2,
+        "note": "ISM-1623: exploit-confirmed critical patches"
+      },
+      {
+        "framework": "UK Cyber Essentials (UK)",
+        "sla_hours": 336,
+        "sla_days": 14,
+        "note": "Internet-facing systems"
+      },
+      {
+        "framework": "CIS Controls v8 (global)",
+        "sla_hours": 336,
+        "sla_days": 14,
+        "note": "Critical OS patches"
+      },
+      {
+        "framework": "NIST 800-53 SI-2 (US)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "sla_days": "organizationally defined",
+        "note": "Typically interpreted as 30 days"
+      },
+      {
+        "framework": "ISO 27001:2022 A.8.8 (global)",
+        "sla_hours": null,
+        "sla_days": "appropriate timescales",
+        "note": "Typically interpreted as 30 days"
+      },
+      {
+        "framework": "PCI DSS 4.0 6.3.3 (global)",
+        "sla_hours": 720,
+        "sla_days": 30,
+        "note": "Critical patches: 1 month"
+      },
+      {
+        "framework": "MAS TRM 11.2 (SG)",
+        "sla_hours": 720,
+        "sla_days": 30,
+        "note": "Critical patches: 1 month"
+      },
+      {
+        "framework": "NSM Grunnprinsipper 2.2.5 (NO)",
+        "sla_hours": 720,
+        "sla_days": 30,
+        "note": "'As soon as possible' for known-exploited; sector audit practice ~30 days for critical"
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}