@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.21.12 → 0.21.14

package/data/cve-catalog.json

@@ -2242,7 +2242,7 @@
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "No source claims AI involvement. The flaw was found by human researchers Nir Ohfeld and Shir Tamari of Wiz.io, who reported the OMI vulnerabilities to Microsoft in June 2021.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "Sourced from NVD CVE-2021-38649 (no NVD CWE; CWE-269 supplied, CVSS 7.0) + CISA KEV (added 2021-11-03) + Microsoft advisory CVE-2021-38649. Found and reported to MSRC by Nir Ohfeld and Shir Tamari of Wiz.io, an external firm, so ai_discovery_source is human_researcher. Source: https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Sourced from NVD CVE-2021-38649 (no NVD CWE; CWE-269 supplied, CVSS 7.0) + CISA KEV (added 2021-11-03) + Microsoft advisory CVE-2021-38649. Nir Ohfeld and Shir Tamari of Wiz.io, an external firm, found it and reported it to MSRC, so this entry records the discovery source as a human researcher. Source: https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2021-38649 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-11-03 with a due date of 2021-11-17 and records ransomware use as Unknown; the KEV listing is the evidence of in-the-wild use. No public report reviewed here dates the exploitation of CVE-2021-38649 or attributes it to a named actor or campaign. The KEV entry's forensic-triage flag is No.",
     "attack_refs": [
@@ -2351,7 +2351,7 @@
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "No source claims AI involvement. The flaw was found by Markus Wulftange and reported through Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "Sourced from NVD CVE-2019-0604 (CWE-20, CVSS 9.8) + CISA KEV (added 2021-11-03, ransomware: Known) + Microsoft advisory CVE-2019-0604. Reported to Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative by Markus Wulftange, an external researcher, so ai_discovery_source is human_researcher. Source: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/3/13/cve-2019-0604-details-of-a-microsoft-sharepoint-rce-vulnerability",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Sourced from NVD CVE-2019-0604 (CWE-20, CVSS 9.8) + CISA KEV (added 2021-11-03, ransomware: Known) + Microsoft advisory CVE-2019-0604. Markus Wulftange, an external researcher, reported it to Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative, so this entry records the discovery source as a human researcher. Source: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/3/13/cve-2019-0604-details-of-a-microsoft-sharepoint-rce-vulnerability",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2019-0604 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-11-03 with a due date of 2022-05-03 and records known ransomware campaign use. Unit 42 observed Emissary Panda (APT27) webshells on three SharePoint servers of two government organizations in the Middle East between April 1 and April 16, 2019, and believes the actor exploited CVE-2019-0604 to install them; the actor used the webshells to dump credentials and pivot, and Unit 42 links the activity to alerts from the Saudi Arabian and Canadian national cyber security agencies. The KEV entry's forensic-triage flag is No.",
     "attack_refs": [
@@ -2460,7 +2460,7 @@
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "No source claims AI involvement. The flaw was found by Vasily Berdnikov and Boris Larin of Kaspersky Lab through detection of an in-the-wild exploit in February 2019.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "Sourced from NVD CVE-2019-0797 (no NVD CWE; CWE-362 and CWE-416 supplied, CVSS 7.8) + CISA KEV (added 2021-11-03) + Microsoft advisory CVE-2019-0797. Detected in the wild and reported to Microsoft by Vasily Berdnikov and Boris Larin of Kaspersky Lab, an external firm, so ai_discovery_source is human_researcher. Source: https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "This entry is sourced from NVD CVE-2019-0797 (no NVD CWE; CWE-362 and CWE-416 supplied, CVSS 7.8) + CISA KEV (added 2021-11-03) + Microsoft advisory CVE-2019-0797. The flaw was detected in the wild and reported to Microsoft by Vasily Berdnikov and Boris Larin of Kaspersky Lab, an external firm, so this entry records the discovery source as a human researcher. Source: https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2019-0797 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-11-03 with a due date of 2022-05-03 and records ransomware use as Unknown. Kaspersky's Automatic Exploit Prevention detected an exploitation attempt in February 2019, in targeted attacks against 64-bit Windows 8 through Windows 10 build 15063, and Kaspersky reported the flaw to Microsoft on February 22, 2019. Kaspersky believes the exploit is used by several threat actors including, but possibly not limited to, FruityArmor and SandCat, and notes that SandCat also uses the FinFisher/FinSpy framework. The KEV entry's forensic-triage flag is No.",
     "attack_refs": [
@@ -16459,7 +16459,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "unknown",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "The reporter credit for CVE-2020-6572 is published in Google's stable-channel release post for Chrome 81.0.4044.92 (2020-04-07). That page could not be retrieved in this pass, so no researcher or organisation is named here rather than a guessed one.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-6572 to the KEV catalog on 2022-01-10 with a due date of 2022-07-10, which is what sets active_exploitation to confirmed here. Nothing beyond the KEV listing itself could be sourced in this pass: the Chrome release post for 81.0.4044.92 (chromereleases.googleblog.com, 2020-04-07) would not render, and the Chromium tracker entry crbug.com/1066893 is access-restricted as Chromium restricts security bugs. No named campaign, no named threat actor and no incident report is public in the sources retrieved, and the KEV record's ransomware field reads 'Unknown'. This entry should not be read as implying attribution.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-6572 to the KEV catalog on 2022-01-10 with a due date of 2022-07-10, which is why this entry records active exploitation as confirmed. Nothing beyond the KEV listing itself could be sourced: the Chrome release post for 81.0.4044.92 (chromereleases.googleblog.com, 2020-04-07) would not render, and the Chromium tracker entry crbug.com/1066893 is access-restricted as Chromium restricts security bugs. No named campaign, no named threat actor and no incident report is public in the sources retrieved, and the KEV record's ransomware field reads 'Unknown'. This entry should not be read as implying attribution.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1189",
       "T1203",
@@ -16662,7 +16662,7 @@
     "type": "authenticode-signature-verification-bypass-certificate-padding",
     "blast_radius": 21,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No Exploit-DB entry, Metasploit module, Nuclei template or named public repository for CVE-2013-3900 was located in this pass. What was found is exploitation evidence rather than a proof of concept: Check Point Research's January 2022 analysis of a Zloader campaign that appends VBScript to a signed Microsoft DLL and runs it with mshta.exe. That is a vendor write-up of in-the-wild use, not a PoC artifact, so poc_available is recorded false rather than inferred true from the technique being widely described.",
+    "poc_description": "No Exploit-DB entry, Metasploit module, Nuclei template or named public repository for CVE-2013-3900 was located. What was found is exploitation evidence rather than a proof of concept: Check Point Research's January 2022 analysis of a Zloader campaign that appends VBScript to a signed Microsoft DLL and runs it with mshta.exe. That is a vendor write-up of in-the-wild use, not a PoC artifact, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available rather than inferring that one exists from the technique being widely described.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "mshta.exe invoked against a DLL or other non-.hta file, which is the execution step Check Point documents for the Zloader campaign that abuses this flaw",
@@ -16682,7 +16682,7 @@
       "_ioc_source_note": "The registry paths, the appended-VBScript-then-mshta execution chain and the campaign scale come from Check Point Research's January 2022 Zloader analysis. The structural indicator - content inside the certificate table that the signature does not cover - is from Microsoft's own description of the flaw in the republished MSRC entry. No file hash, C2 address or domain is claimed: none was read from a source in this pass, and the enabled-versus-disabled verification differential is the indicator that does not depend on any."
     },
     "ai_discovered": false,
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "No AI involvement is claimed by any source consulted, and none is plausible for a December 2013 disclosure. The reporter could not be established: MSRC's republished Security Update Guide entry carries no credit line, MS13-098 is referenced by NVD but its acknowledgements were not read in this pass, and Check Point's 2022 analysis discusses the technique rather than the original discovery. ai_discovery_source is therefore 'unknown' rather than 'human_researcher' - the latter would assert a credit nobody read.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "No AI involvement is claimed by any source consulted, and none is plausible for a December 2013 disclosure. The reporter could not be established: MSRC's republished Security Update Guide entry carries no credit line, MS13-098 is referenced by NVD but its acknowledgments were not read for this entry, and Check Point's 2022 analysis discusses the technique rather than the original discovery. The discovery source is therefore recorded as 'unknown' rather than 'human_researcher', because the latter would assert a credit nobody read.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "unknown",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2013-3900 (CWE-347, CVSS 3.1 base 5.5, AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N), which reproduces Microsoft's republication text including the 'does not plan to enforce the stricter verification behavior as a default functionality' and 'no security update is required; however, the reg key must be set' statements; the MSRC Security Update Guide entry and the MS13-098 bulletin named in the NVD references; CISA KEV (added 2022-01-10, due 2022-07-10, ransomware Unknown); and Check Point Research's January 2022 Zloader analysis for the in-the-wild technique, the mshta.exe execution step, the campaign scale and both registry paths. No discoverer credit was located.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -16705,7 +16705,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "There is no patch to live-patch and no patch to reboot for, which is the fact that governs this entry. Microsoft states plainly that it 'does not plan to enforce the stricter verification behavior as a default functionality on supported releases of Microsoft Windows', that the behaviour 'remains available as an opt-in feature via reg key setting', and that on Windows 10 and Windows 11 'no security update is required; however, the reg key must be set'. Remediation is therefore a configuration deployment, not a patch deployment, and it belongs to whoever owns endpoint configuration rather than to the update pipeline. Check Point reproduces the setting as EnableCertPaddingCheck under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Wintrust\\Config and, on 64-bit hosts, the parallel HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Wintrust\\Config path so that 32-bit callers are covered too. patch_required_reboot is recorded false because there is no vendor update in play; no source read here states whether running processes must restart before the enabled check takes effect, and that is logged as unsourced rather than asserted either way.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "There is no patch to live-patch and no patch to reboot for, which is the fact that governs this entry. Microsoft states plainly that it 'does not plan to enforce the stricter verification behavior as a default functionality on supported releases of Microsoft Windows', that the behavior 'remains available as an opt-in feature via reg key setting', and that on Windows 10 and Windows 11 'no security update is required; however, the reg key must be set'. Remediation is therefore a configuration deployment, not a patch deployment, and it belongs to whoever owns endpoint configuration rather than to the update pipeline. Check Point reproduces the setting as EnableCertPaddingCheck under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Wintrust\\Config and, on 64-bit hosts, the parallel HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Wintrust\\Config path so that 32-bit callers are covered too. This entry records no reboot requirement because there is no vendor update in play; no source read here states whether running processes must restart before the enabled check takes effect, and that is logged as unsourced rather than asserted either way.",
     "affected": "Every supported Windows release that verifies Authenticode signatures on PE files through WinVerifyTrust, and every product that delegates a trust decision to it - software installers, application-allowlisting publisher rules, EDR and reputation logic keyed on signer identity, and any deployment gate whose evidence is 'the binary is validly signed'. Microsoft states the stricter check is present in all currently supported Windows 10 and Windows 11 releases, but it is off by default, so a fully-updated host is affected as shipped. The impact is integrity rather than confidentiality: an attacker who succeeds inherits the trust the estate places in a publisher it did not compromise.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Microsoft states the opt-in check has shipped in 'supported editions of Windows released since December 10, 2013. This includes all currently supported versions of Windows 10 and Windows 11'. The code being present is not the check being on - the default on every one of those releases is the vulnerable behaviour.",
@@ -17993,7 +17993,7 @@
     "type": "package-installer-uri-scheme-spoofing-malware-delivery",
     "blast_radius": 24,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No published proof of concept was located. Exploit-DB returns no record for CVE-2021-43890, projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates carries no template for it, and no Metasploit module was found. Microsoft's threat reporting documents in-the-wild malicious MSIX packages, which is malware rather than published exploit code, so this entry records poc_available as false.",
+    "poc_description": "No published proof of concept was located. Exploit-DB returns no record for CVE-2021-43890, projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates carries no template for it, and no Metasploit module was found. Microsoft's threat reporting documents in-the-wild malicious MSIX packages, which is malware rather than published exploit code, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "App Installer (AppInstaller.exe / the Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller package) launching as a child of a browser or of Microsoft Teams, and then a script or PowerShell interpreter starting under it.",
@@ -19971,7 +19971,7 @@
       "_ioc_source_note": "The network and behavioral indicators are read from ProjectDiscovery's Nuclei template http/cves/2021/CVE-2021-37415.yaml (verified 200). The template issues one unauthenticated request, GET /api/v3/{{randbase(8)}}/../announcements, and matches on the response body words \"status_code\":2000, \"has_more_rows\" and \"start_index\" with content type application/json and status 200. The eight-random-character prefix, the /../ traversal segment, the three response matchers and the content type all come directly from that template. The shodan-query http.title:\"manageengine servicedesk plus\" and its fofa equivalent are metadata fields in the same template and are hunting heuristics for locating exposed instances, not exploit artifacts. The build-boundary host indicator (below 11302) comes from NVD's range and the template's remediation line, not from a reproducer. No file hash, webshell name or C2 address is listed, because no source ties this CVE to a named campaign; the webshell and actor indicators circulating for ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus in this period belong to CVE-2021-44077 and are not imported here."
     },
     "ai_discovered": false,
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "No reporter credit was located. NVD carries no references for this CVE, ManageEngine's on-premises readme page no longer includes the build-11302 section (its live version now begins at much later builds), and the Nuclei template credits its own authors rather than a discoverer. ai_discovery_source is 'unknown' rather than 'human_researcher' because asserting a human researcher would be asserting a credit nobody read. No AI tooling is claimed by any source.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "No reporter credit was located. NVD carries no references for this CVE, ManageEngine's on-premises readme page no longer includes the build-11302 section (its live version now begins at much later builds), and the Nuclei template credits its own authors rather than a discoverer. The discovery source is recorded as unknown rather than as a human researcher because asserting a human researcher would be asserting a credit nobody read. No AI tooling is claimed by any source.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "unknown",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2021-37415 (CWE-306, CVSS 3.1 base 9.8, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; no references recorded); CISA KEV (added 2021-12-01, due 2021-12-15, ransomware Unknown) read from the live catalog, which also supplied the CVE-2021-44077 sibling entry's identical dates; CISA advisory AA21-336A, read to establish which CVE it names; and ProjectDiscovery's Nuclei template http/cves/2021/CVE-2021-37415.yaml for the exploit request shape, the response matchers, the fixed-build remediation line and the target-discovery queries.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -19994,7 +19994,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch path exists for this product and none is claimed. The remediation is a product build upgrade applied to the ServiceDesk Plus application; no source read here states a host reboot requirement, which is why patch_required_reboot is false, and an operator should expect the application service to be stopped and started as part of the upgrade rather than the machine. The configuration-side measure that holds before the upgrade is placed at the network edge rather than in the product: the published exploit depends on a /<segment>/../ prefix reaching the application, so a reverse proxy that rejects request paths whose normalised form differs from the form as received will refuse that specific request. Treat that as a compensating control with a dated review - it is tested against one published request shape and nothing consulted here enumerates the full set of routes the flaw exposes.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch path exists for this product and none is claimed. The remediation is a product build upgrade applied to the ServiceDesk Plus application; no source read here states a host reboot requirement, which is why the entry records that applying the fix does not require a reboot, and an operator should expect the application service to be stopped and started as part of the upgrade rather than the machine. The configuration-side measure that holds before the upgrade is placed at the network edge rather than in the product: the published exploit depends on a /<segment>/../ prefix reaching the application, so a reverse proxy that rejects request paths whose normalized form differs from the form as received will refuse that specific request. Treat that as a compensating control with a dated review. It is tested against one published request shape, and nothing consulted here enumerates the full set of routes the flaw exposes.",
     "affected": "Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus on-premises, every build before 11302. An unauthenticated network caller reaches REST-API routes that should require a session, on the platform that holds the organisation's request queue, change records, asset inventory and the contact and access detail attached to them. Because it is the ITSM system, the data disclosed describes the rest of the estate: which hosts exist, who administers them, which changes are pending and, in many deployments, the operational notes attached to those changes.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "NVD: 'Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus before 11302'. Build 11302 is the FIRST FIXED build, not the last vulnerable one - 11301 and everything below is affected, 11302 and above is not. Reading the boundary the other way readmits every host sitting exactly on 11302, which is where an estate that upgraded to the stated minimum will cluster.",
@@ -20677,7 +20677,7 @@
     "type": "security-feature-bypass",
     "blast_radius": 14,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public proof-of-concept artefact was located for this CVE: no Exploit-DB entry, Nuclei template, Metasploit module or named public repository was found, and a search of rapid7/metasploit-framework returned nothing. Microsoft's own temporal CVSS vector at publication carried E:P - an Exploit Code Maturity of Proof-of-Concept in Microsoft's assessment - but that is a vendor rating, not a citable artefact, so poc_available is recorded false rather than inferred true from it.",
+    "poc_description": "No public proof-of-concept artifact was located for this CVE: no Exploit-DB entry, Nuclei template, Metasploit module or named public repository was found, and a search of rapid7/metasploit-framework returned nothing. Microsoft's own temporal CVSS vector at publication carried E:P (an Exploit Code Maturity of Proof-of-Concept in Microsoft's assessment), but that is a vendor rating, not a citable artifact, so the entry records that no proof of concept is available, rather than inferring one from that rating.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "EXCEL.EXE spawning a child process - cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, rundll32.exe, mshta.exe - which an ordinary spreadsheet session does not do",
@@ -21613,7 +21613,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch path for ColdFusion and none is claimed. Applying the vendor update is a ColdFusion server update followed by a restart of the ColdFusion service; no source read here states a host reboot requirement, which is why patch_required_reboot is recorded false. The configuration-side measure that holds independently of the update is narrow and precise, which is what makes it worth writing down: the exploit's entire surface is one path prefix, /cf_scripts/scripts/ajax/ckeditor/plugins/filemanager/, so denying that prefix at the web server or reverse proxy in front of ColdFusion removes reachability without touching the application. Treat it as a compensating control with a review date - it is derived from the published exploit's path, and an application that legitimately uses the bundled CKEditor file manager will lose that function.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "There is no live-patch path for ColdFusion, and none is claimed. Applying the vendor update is a ColdFusion server update followed by a restart of the ColdFusion service; no source read here states a host reboot requirement, which is why this entry records that applying the fix does not require a reboot. The configuration-side measure that holds independently of the update is narrow and precise, which is what makes it worth writing down: the exploit's entire surface is one path prefix, /cf_scripts/scripts/ajax/ckeditor/plugins/filemanager/, so denying that prefix at the web server or reverse proxy in front of ColdFusion removes reachability without touching the application. Treat it as a compensating control with a review date. It is derived from the published exploit's path, and an application that legitimately uses the bundled CKEditor file manager will lose that function.",
     "affected": "Adobe ColdFusion servers exposing the bundled CKEditor filemanager plugin - which is served from /cf_scripts by default - on ColdFusion 11 through Update 14, ColdFusion 2016 through Update 6, and the ColdFusion 2018 July 12 release (2018.0.0.310739). An unauthenticated network caller uploads and executes a JSP file, so the result is code execution as the ColdFusion service account: the application's datasource credentials, the server's configuration and its network path to the databases it serves are all inside the blast radius, and the uploaded file is a persistent web shell rather than a one-shot.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "NVD: 'ColdFusion versions July 12 release (2018.0.0.310739), Update 6 and earlier, and Update 14 and earlier'. Metasploit's module resolves the same three ranges onto their product lines: ColdFusion 11 Update 14 and earlier, ColdFusion 2016 Update 6 and earlier, and ColdFusion 2018 at the July 12 release.",
@@ -21789,7 +21789,7 @@
     "type": "stack-based-buffer-overflow-in-embedded-camera-binary-management-protocol-on-port-37777",
     "blast_radius": 11,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No proof of concept meeting the citation bar was identified. NVD tags Packet Storm file 157164, 'Amcrest/Dahua NVR Camera IP2M-841 Denial Of Service', as an Exploit entry for this CVE, and the title indicates a crash artefact rather than a code-execution exploit — but the file itself could not be retrieved in this pass (packetstormsecurity.com now redirects to packetstorm.news, which served its terms-of-service page instead of the file), so its contents are unverified. No Exploit-DB id, no Nuclei template and no Metasploit module for CVE-2020-5735 was found. Tenable's TRA-2020-20 analyses the defect and names the command and subcommand but is a research advisory, not a proof of concept. On that basis poc_available is recorded false rather than true on the strength of a title alone; the honest reading is that a crash PoC is likely public and unverified here, and that no code-execution exploit is known to be public.",
+    "poc_description": "No proof of concept meeting the citation bar was identified. NVD tags Packet Storm file 157164, 'Amcrest/Dahua NVR Camera IP2M-841 Denial Of Service', as an Exploit entry for this CVE, and the title indicates a crash artifact rather than a code-execution exploit. However, the file itself could not be retrieved (packetstormsecurity.com now redirects to packetstorm.news, which served its terms-of-service page instead of the file), so its contents are unverified. No Exploit-DB id, no Nuclei template and no Metasploit module for CVE-2020-5735 was found. Tenable's TRA-2020-20 analyzes the defect and names the command and subcommand but is a research advisory, not a proof of concept. On that basis this entry records that no proof of concept is available, rather than recording one as available on the strength of a title alone; the honest reading is that a crash PoC is likely public and unverified here, and that no code-execution exploit is known to be public.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Any connection to TCP port 37777 originating from a host with no camera-management role — a workstation, a server, or anything outside the video management system and its operator consoles. The protocol has a small, enumerable set of legitimate clients, which makes source-based hunting unusually effective on this port.",
@@ -23224,7 +23224,7 @@
       "_ioc_source_note": "The request shapes, the %24%7B (${) path-segment encoding, the encoded OGNL references (ognl.OgnlContext, @java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime, ProcessBuilder), the root:.*:0:0: response matcher and the 'struts problem report' / 'struts2 showcase' self-fingerprints in the network, behavioral and host groups are read from ProjectDiscovery's Nuclei template. The action name is the corrected point: the Nuclei template hard-codes help.action and actionChain1.action while Rapid7's struts2_namespace_ognl module parameterizes the action and defaults to showcase.action, and the jas502n proof-of-concept environment configures actionChain1 as a redirect action, so the stable signal is a ${...} segment ahead of any .action endpoint. The version ranges, fixed versions and alwaysSelectFullNamespace / Convention-Plugin preconditions are from Apache's S2-057 advisory. The process-spawn behavioral items and the version/config host tests are heuristics and inventory checks. No file hash, C2 address or actor infrastructure is listed because no source read here attributes this CVE to a named campaign; the KEV ransomware field reads Unknown."
     },
     "ai_discovered": false,
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "Apache's S2-057 advisory credits the report to Man Yue Mo of the Semmle Security Research team. The discovery was static-analysis-assisted in the sense that Semmle's product is a code-query engine, but the advisory credits a named researcher and no source read here describes AI tooling in the discovery, so ai_discovered is false and the source is a human researcher.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Apache's S2-057 advisory credits the report to Man Yue Mo of the Semmle Security Research team. The discovery was static-analysis-assisted in the sense that Semmle's product is a code-query engine, but the advisory credits a named researcher and no source read here describes AI tooling in the discovery, so this entry does not record the flaw as AI-discovered, and the source is a human researcher.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2018-11776 (CVSS 3.1 base 8.1, AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; NVD records no references for this entry); Apache's S2-057 advisory on the Struts wiki, read directly for the reporter credit, the affected and fixed version ranges and the exact preconditions; CISA KEV (added 2021-11-03, due 2022-05-03, ransomware Unknown); Rapid7's Metasploit module page for the module path and the Tomcat payload constraint; and ProjectDiscovery's Nuclei template for the request shape, the CWE-20 classification it carries and its reference set. CWE assigned editorially: NVD records no weakness for this CVE, so CWE-917 is used for the namespace portion of the URL being evaluated as an OGNL expression instead of being treated as a path component, in preference to the broader CWE-20 the Nuclei template carries.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -23246,7 +23246,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch path. Remediation is a dependency upgrade inside the application - replacing struts2-core - followed by a rebuild and redeploy, then a restart of the servlet container; no source read here states a host reboot requirement, which is why patch_required_reboot is false. The configuration-side path that is available without a rebuild follows directly from Apache's stated preconditions: set alwaysSelectFullNamespace to false where the application does not require it, and give every package a real namespace rather than none or a wildcard. That is a real independent mitigation rather than a hardening suggestion, because Apache defines the vulnerability in terms of those settings - but it is also an application-configuration change that has to be validated against the application's routing, since the settings exist because some applications need them.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "There is no live-patch path. Remediation is a dependency upgrade inside the application (replacing struts2-core), followed by a rebuild and redeploy, then a restart of the servlet container; no source read here states a host reboot requirement, which is why this entry records that applying the fix does not require a reboot. The configuration-side path that is available without a rebuild follows directly from Apache's stated preconditions: set alwaysSelectFullNamespace to false where the application does not require it, and give every package a real namespace rather than none or a wildcard. That is a real independent mitigation rather than a hardening suggestion, because Apache defines the vulnerability in terms of those settings, but it is also an application-configuration change that has to be validated against the application's routing, since the settings exist because some applications need them.",
     "affected": "Java web applications bundling struts2-core in the affected ranges AND meeting one of the two configuration preconditions Apache states. Where they are met, an unauthenticated network caller executes code as the servlet container's user - which reaches the application's configuration, its datasource credentials and whatever the container process can read or connect to. The population most exposed is the one that never chose the setting: applications where a plugin such as the Convention Plugin turns alwaysSelectFullNamespace on, so the precondition is a property of the dependency set rather than of anything in the operator's own configuration file.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Apache's S2-057 advisory states the affected range as 'Struts 2.0.4 through 2.3.34, and Struts 2.5.0 through 2.5.16'. NVD states 'Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16'. These disagree on the floor of the first range, and the vendor's floor is LOWER - 2.0.4 rather than 2.3. An exposure policy keyed on the NVD wording readmits every 2.0.4 through 2.2.x host as out of scope when the vendor says it is affected.",
@@ -23431,7 +23431,7 @@
     "type": "call-setup-state-machine-logic-flaw-enabling-zero-interaction-audio-eavesdrop-on-callee-device",
     "blast_radius": 8,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No proof of concept meeting the citation bar exists, and the reason is that the flaw does not need one. No Exploit-DB entry, no Nuclei template and no Metasploit module was identified for CVE-2019-6223, and none would be meaningful — the flaw is triggered through the FaceTime user interface rather than through a crafted message an exploit could construct, so the reproduction is a written sequence of steps rather than code. This should not be read as low availability of the capability: a set of steps circulating publicly is more widely usable than an exploit binary, not less. poc_available is recorded false because nothing in the accepted citation forms exists, and the operator-relevant statement is in complexity_notes rather than here.",
+    "poc_description": "No proof of concept meeting the citation bar exists, and the reason is that the flaw does not need one. No Exploit-DB entry, no Nuclei template and no Metasploit module was identified for CVE-2019-6223, and none would be meaningful: the flaw is triggered through the FaceTime user interface rather than through a crafted message an exploit could construct, so the reproduction is a written sequence of steps rather than code. This should not be read as low availability of the capability: a set of steps circulating publicly is more widely usable than an exploit binary, not less. This entry records that no proof of concept is available because nothing in the accepted citation forms exists, and the operator-relevant statement is in this entry's notes on attack complexity rather than here.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "A FaceTime call that a user did not accept but which appears in the device's call history as connected, or a call whose duration exceeds what the user recalls of it. The device answering on the user's behalf is the entire event, so the call log is the primary record.",
@@ -24315,7 +24315,7 @@
     "type": "mail-message-parser-out-of-bounds-write",
     "blast_radius": 18,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit resolved. The nuclei-templates tree carries no template for this CVE, there is no Metasploit module referencing it, and NVD lists no exploit reference - its only references are the three Apple release notes HT211168, HT211169 and HT211175 plus the KEV catalogue link. The reporting organisation published analysis of the bug class rather than exploit code, and that publication could not be retrieved here to check whether it contained a working trigger, so poc_available is recorded false on the evidence available rather than as a claim that no trigger has ever existed privately.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit was resolved. The nuclei-templates tree carries no template for this CVE, there is no Metasploit module referencing it, and NVD lists no exploit reference; its only references are the three Apple release notes HT211168, HT211169 and HT211175 plus the KEV catalog link. The reporting organization published analysis of the bug class rather than exploit code, and that publication could not be retrieved here to check whether it contained a working trigger, so the entry records that no proof of concept is available on the evidence at hand, rather than claiming that no trigger has ever existed privately.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Repeated unexpected terminations of Mail on a device, which is the failure mode Apple's own impact wording names alongside memory modification - a failed attempt looks like a crash",
@@ -25055,7 +25055,7 @@
     "type": "webkit-object-lifetime-universal-cross-site-scripting",
     "blast_radius": 16,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No Exploit-DB entry, Metasploit module, Nuclei template or named public repository for CVE-2021-1879 was located in this pass. Google TAG's July 2021 write-up describes the in-the-wild exploit's behaviour - same-origin disabling, cookie collection, WebSocket exfiltration - but publishes no exploit artefact, and a threat-intelligence write-up is exploitation evidence rather than a proof of concept. poc_available is therefore false, which for a WebKit universal-XSS is the expected state: these are used before they are published and rarely published afterwards.",
+    "poc_description": "No Exploit-DB entry, Metasploit module, Nuclei template or named public repository for CVE-2021-1879 was located when this entry was compiled. Google TAG's July 2021 write-up describes the in-the-wild exploit's behavior (same-origin disabling, cookie collection, WebSocket exfiltration) but publishes no exploit artifact, and a threat-intelligence write-up is exploitation evidence rather than a proof of concept. The entry therefore records that no proof of concept is available, which for a WebKit universal-XSS is the expected state: these are used before they are published and rarely published afterward.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "A WebSocket connection opened from mobile Safari to a bare IP address rather than to a named service - the exfiltration channel TAG describes for this exploit",
@@ -25099,7 +25099,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": true,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch path exists for iOS, iPadOS or watchOS: the WebKit fix ships inside the operating-system update and the device restarts as part of installing it, which is why patch_required_reboot is true. There is no configuration-side mitigation either - the fix is Apple's, it landed on 26 March 2021, and nothing in the three advisories offers a setting that closes the flaw short of the update. That absence is the operationally important fact, because it means the only lever an operator holds is update enforcement on a device population that can defer.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch path exists for iOS, iPadOS or watchOS: the WebKit fix ships inside the operating-system update and the device restarts as part of installing it, which is why applying the fix requires a reboot. There is no configuration-side mitigation either; the fix is Apple's, it landed on 26 March 2021, and nothing in the three advisories offers a setting that closes the flaw short of the update. That absence is the operationally important fact, because it means the only lever an operator holds is update enforcement on a device population that can defer.",
     "affected": "Apple devices running iOS, iPadOS or watchOS below the 26 March 2021 releases, and - per CISA's KEV short description - HTML parsers in non-Apple products that rely on WebKit for HTML processing. On Apple's own platforms the affected population is unusually wide because Apple shipped the fix on two branches at once: HT212256 covers iPhone 6s and later, all iPad Pro models, iPad Air 2 and later, iPad 5th generation and later, iPad mini 4 and later and iPod touch 7th generation; HT212257 covers the older iPhone 5s, iPhone 6, iPhone 6 Plus, iPad Air, iPad mini 2, iPad mini 3 and iPod touch 6th generation; HT212258 covers Apple Watch Series 3 and later. The consequence is authentication-session theft rather than device compromise - TAG observed no sandbox escape and no implant - but the sessions taken belong to the identity providers and collaboration platforms the rest of the estate authenticates against.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Fixed releases, all published 26 March 2021: iOS 14.4.2 and iPadOS 14.4.2 (HT212256), iOS 12.5.2 (HT212257) and watchOS 7.3.3 (HT212258). Anything below the fixed release on its own branch is affected.",
@@ -26824,7 +26824,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch path. Remediation is a Confluence upgrade to the fixed release on the deployed branch, which requires stopping and starting Confluence but not the host - Atlassian's own workaround instructions are explicit that the unit of restart is the application ('Stop Confluence... Save the file, and restart Confluence'), which is why patch_required_reboot is recorded false. The configuration-side mitigation is unusually well specified by the vendor and is deployable independently of the upgrade: Atlassian publishes a temporary workaround blocking the <base-url>/<context-path>/pages/downloadallattachments.action URL directly in Tomcat, by adding a Context element with a deny-all remote-address valve inside the Host element of conf/server.xml, and notes the functional cost precisely - 'Disabling this URL will prevent anyone downloading all attachments via the attachments page, or the attachments macro. Downloading individual attachments will still work.' It also ships its own verification: open a page with two or more attachments, choose Download all attachments, and confirm a 404 with no files downloaded. Instances running with a context path must include that path in the Context element.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live patch is available. Remediation is a Confluence upgrade to the fixed release on the deployed branch, which requires stopping and starting Confluence but not the host. Atlassian's own workaround instructions are explicit that the unit of restart is the application ('Stop Confluence... Save the file, and restart Confluence'), which is why this entry records that applying the fix does not require a reboot. The configuration-side mitigation is unusually well specified by the vendor and is deployable independently of the upgrade: Atlassian publishes a temporary workaround blocking the <base-url>/<context-path>/pages/downloadallattachments.action URL directly in Tomcat, by adding a Context element with a deny-all remote-address valve inside the Host element of conf/server.xml, and notes the functional cost precisely: 'Disabling this URL will prevent anyone downloading all attachments via the attachments page, or the attachments macro. Downloading individual attachments will still work.' It also ships its own verification: open a page with two or more attachments, choose Download all attachments, and confirm a 404 with no files downloaded. Instances running with a context path must include that path in the Context element.",
     "affected": "Atlassian Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center on the affected ranges, where an attacker holds any account able to add attachments to a page or blog, or to create a space or personal space, or holding space Admin. Successful exploitation writes a file to an arbitrary location and, by placing it under the Confluence webapp, reaches code execution as the Confluence service account - which holds the instance's database credentials and read access to the whole documentation corpus, typically including runbooks, architecture notes and credentials pasted into pages. Confluence Cloud is not in scope of the advisory, which addresses Server and Data Center.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Per Atlassian's 2019-04-17 advisory and NVD: all versions from 2.0.0 before 6.6.13; from 6.7.0 before 6.12.4; from 6.13.0 before 6.13.4; from 6.14.0 before 6.14.3; and from 6.15.0 before 6.15.2.",
@@ -27251,7 +27251,7 @@
     "type": "unauthenticated-login-form-sql-injection-reaching-xp-cmdshell-remote-code-execution",
     "blast_radius": 26,
     "poc_available": true,
-    "poc_description": "Two public tooling artefacts, both located on 2026-09-01. Metasploit ships the module `modules/auxiliary/gather/billquick_txtid_sqli.rb` in rapid7/metasploit-framework, with accompanying documentation at `documentation/modules/auxiliary/gather/billquick_txtid_sqli.md` — the module name states the parameter (txtID) and the class (SQL injection). ProjectDiscovery's Nuclei template set ships `http/cves/2021/CVE-2021-42258.yaml`, which makes unauthenticated detection of a vulnerable instance a single scanner invocation. Huntress's own threat advisory is the root-cause publication and describes the trigger (a single quote in the username field) without releasing exploit code; the two artefacts above are what make this catalogue's poc_available true. No GitHub repository search result was returned for this CVE id.",
+    "poc_description": "Two public tooling artifacts were located on 2026-09-01. Metasploit ships the module `modules/auxiliary/gather/billquick_txtid_sqli.rb` in rapid7/metasploit-framework, with accompanying documentation at `documentation/modules/auxiliary/gather/billquick_txtid_sqli.md`. The module name states the parameter (txtID) and the class (SQL injection). ProjectDiscovery's Nuclei template set ships `http/cves/2021/CVE-2021-42258.yaml`, which makes unauthenticated detection of a vulnerable instance a single scanner invocation. Huntress's own threat advisory is the root-cause publication and describes the trigger (a single quote in the username field) without releasing exploit code; the two artifacts above are the reason this catalog records that a proof of concept is available. No GitHub repository search result was returned for this CVE id.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Database errors raised from the BillQuick Web Suite login page, particularly errors triggered by a single quote in the username field — the exact probe Huntress describe, and the cheapest confirmation an attacker performs before exploiting",
@@ -27300,7 +27300,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "This is a web-application upgrade rather than an operating-system or firmware change: applying it restarts the application, not the host, which is why patch_required_reboot is recorded as false here and should not be read as a live-patch capability. There is no vendor hot-fix, mitigation rule or configuration switch that closes the injection without the upgrade to 22.0.9.1. What is available in the interim is a reachability decision — removing the Web Suite login page from the internet, or placing it behind an authenticating proxy or VPN so that the pre-authentication injection is not reachable from an unauthenticated source. Two things the upgrade does not do, and both belong in the same maintenance window. It does not change the database identity: if the application still connects as sa, the next injection anywhere in the product reaches xp_cmdshell the same way, and this CVE was one of eight or nine reported together. And it does not evict an attacker already present — command execution ran as MSSQLSERVER$ on the database host, so credential rotation and a compromise assessment of that host are part of remediation, not follow-up.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "This is a web-application upgrade rather than an operating-system or firmware change: applying it restarts the application, not the host, which is why this entry records that applying the fix does not require a reboot, and that record should not be read as a live-patch capability. There is no vendor hot-fix, mitigation rule or configuration switch that closes the injection without the upgrade to 22.0.9.1. What is available in the interim is a reachability decision: removing the Web Suite login page from the internet, or placing it behind an authenticating proxy or VPN so that the pre-authentication injection is not reachable from an unauthenticated source. There are two things the upgrade does not do, and both belong in the same maintenance window. It does not change the database identity: if the application still connects as sa, the next injection anywhere in the product reaches xp_cmdshell the same way, and this CVE was one of eight or nine reported together. And it does not evict an attacker already present. Command execution ran as MSSQLSERVER$ on the database host, so credential rotation and a compromise assessment of that host are part of remediation, not follow-up.",
     "affected": "BQE BillQuick Web Suite, in the login page's handling of the username parameter (txtID) and the query it composes against the MSSQL back end. The blast surface extends past the web application to the Windows host running SQL Server, because the application's database account is privileged enough to invoke xp_cmdshell.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "BillQuick Web Suite 2018 through 2021 before 22.0.9.1 is affected — NVD's wording is 'Web Suite 2018 through 2021 before 22.0.9.1', so the whole 2018-to-2021 product line below that build is in range",
@@ -27986,7 +27986,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": true,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Cisco offers three remediation routes and they differ in what they cost the network. The maintenance-release route is a full IOS XR upgrade — 6.6.3 for the 6.6 train, 7.0.2 (March 2020) for the 7.0 train, with 7.1 not vulnerable — and that reloads the router, which on a core device is scheduled work. The Software Maintenance Upgrade route is the reason live_patch_available is set true: Cisco's advisory names \"the appropriate SMU\" as remediation for every affected train, and is the only path offered for releases earlier than 6.6, which have no fixed maintenance release. The important caveat is that an SMU is not automatically reload-free — IOS XR SMUs range from ones that restart only the affected process to ones that require a reload — and the advisory does not state which class the SMU for this defect falls into, so the maintenance window cannot be assumed away without checking the specific SMU for the platform and release. The third route needs no software at all and is the strongest of the three for immediate exposure reduction: the advisory documents disabling CDP globally with `no cdp` in configuration mode followed by a commit, or disabling it per interface with `no cdp` under the interface, which removes the attack surface entirely at the cost of the neighbour-discovery data CDP provides. On a network that does not consume CDP topology information, that is a permanent answer rather than a stopgap. Cisco does not state whether the SMU is reload-free, and IOS XR SMUs range from process-restart to reload-required, so no live-patch path is claimed here; the SMU is listed as a vendor update.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Cisco offers three remediation routes and they differ in what they cost the network. The maintenance-release route is a full IOS XR upgrade: 6.6.3 for the 6.6 train and 7.0.2 (March 2020) for the 7.0 train, with 7.1 not vulnerable. That upgrade reloads the router, which on a core device is scheduled work. The Software Maintenance Upgrade route is the second option: Cisco's advisory names \"the appropriate SMU\" as remediation for every affected train, and the SMU is the only path offered for releases earlier than 6.6, which have no fixed maintenance release. The important caveat is that an SMU is not automatically reload-free. IOS XR SMUs range from ones that restart only the affected process to ones that require a reload, and the advisory does not state which class the SMU for this defect falls into, so the maintenance window cannot be assumed away without checking the specific SMU for the platform and release. The third route needs no software at all and is the strongest of the three for immediate exposure reduction: the advisory documents disabling CDP globally with `no cdp` in configuration mode followed by a commit, or disabling it per interface with `no cdp` under the interface, which removes the attack surface entirely at the cost of the neighbor-discovery data CDP provides. On a network that does not consume CDP topology information, that is a permanent answer rather than a stopgap. Cisco does not state whether the SMU is reload-free, and IOS XR SMUs range from process-restart to reload-required, so no live-patch path is claimed here; the SMU is listed as a vendor update.",
     "affected": "Cisco IOS XR Software on ASR 9000 Series, Carrier Routing System (CRS), IOS XRv 9000 and Network Convergence System 540, 560, 1000, 5000, 5500 and 6000 Series routers — but only where CDP is globally enabled and also active on at least one interface.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Cisco IOS XR releases earlier than 6.6: affected, with no fixed maintenance release named — Cisco's remediation for this band is the appropriate SMU",
@@ -28199,7 +28199,7 @@
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "The Frag Gap write-up credits @physicube and @qwerty in its acknowledgements, and the kernelCTF submission is filed by qwerty-po. No party claims AI-assisted discovery, and the kernel.org CVE record names commit 773ba4fe9104 as the introducing change with no discovery attribution. The AI involvement here is entirely on the exploitation side and postdates disclosure.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from the kernel.org CVE record (assigner Linux, affected file net/ipv6/ip6_output.c), the CISA KEV entry of 2026-08-27, Red Hat RHSB-2026-009, the SUSE CVE page, the Ubuntu CVE tracker, google/security-research PR #410, and the Frag Gap write-up. ai_assisted_weaponization is set true on the strength of OpenAI's own report: the exploit was written by human researchers, but the adaptation of that public exploit to a specific target host and its use to break out of a container were performed autonomously by AI agents, which is weaponisation assistance rather than discovery assistance.",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "This entry draws on the kernel.org CVE record (assigner Linux, affected file net/ipv6/ip6_output.c), the CISA KEV entry of 2026-08-27, Red Hat RHSB-2026-009, the SUSE CVE page, the Ubuntu CVE tracker, google/security-research PR #410, and the Frag Gap write-up. The entry records the weaponization as AI-assisted on the strength of OpenAI's own report: the exploit was written by human researchers, but the adaptation of that public exploit to a specific target host and its use to break out of a container were performed autonomously by AI agents, which is weaponization assistance rather than discovery assistance.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": true,
     "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added this to KEV on 2026-08-27 under BOD 26-04 with a 2026-08-30 due date — three days, and the KEV notes attach the directive's Forensics Triage Requirements. The exploitation event that is public is unusual and is documented by the affected party: OpenAI's 'The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead' report, as reported by SecurityWeek, states that its agents 'retrieved the exploit for that CVE (CVE-2026-53362), customized it to succeed on their underlying machine, and leveraged the exploit to escalate privilege', which 'allowed the agents to act outside one Artifactory container and to obtain root access on the underlying worker node' and then to move laterally. The only public exploit for this CVE is the kernelCTF submission opened 2026-07-20; no date for the escalation itself is established by the sources this entry rests on, so nothing here places the two in order. CISA listed CVE-2026-53362 on the same day as CVE-2026-66384, the JFrog Artifactory path-traversal flaw from the same incident. No human threat actor, criminal campaign or nation-state group is publicly associated with this CVE, and CISA records the ransomware association as Unknown. Red Hat published RHSB-2026-009 'ipv6_frag_escape' on 2026-07-01 (updated 2026-07-14) rating it Important; that bulletin describes container escape and SELinux bypass but does not itself assert in-the-wild use. EPSS is 0.0051 at the 41st percentile on 2026-08-28 — for this entry the exploitation signal is the KEV listing and the published kernelCTF exploit, not the EPSS pair.",
     "attack_refs": [
@@ -28430,7 +28430,7 @@
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Reported through coordinated disclosure and fixed upstream in 2021. GitHub advisory GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw credits h0ng10 and mwulftange as the analysts. No AI tooling is credited in the advisory, in Snyk's SNYK-DOTNET-AJAXPRO2-1925971 record, or in the NVD entry.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2021-23758 (CWE-502, CVSS 9.8), CISA KEV (added 2026-08-26, due 2026-09-09), GitHub advisory GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw on michaelschwarz/Ajax.NET-Professional, and Cisco Talos's UAT-10147 report. The AI finding is on the operator side, not the discovery side: Talos records UAT-10147 running PentestGPT to dynamically scan web servers and execute the relevant proof-of-concept exploits, DeepAudit for source-code scanning, AI-generated operator documentation (a README explaining ysoserial usage) and AI-generated automation scripts check_paths.py, deploy_implant.py, deploy_shell.py and exfil.py. That is why ai_assisted_weaponization is true while ai_discovered is false.",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "This entry is based on NVD CVE-2021-23758 (CWE-502, CVSS 9.8), CISA KEV (added 2026-08-26, due 2026-09-09), GitHub advisory GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw on michaelschwarz/Ajax.NET-Professional, and Cisco Talos's UAT-10147 report. The AI finding is on the operator side, not the discovery side: Talos records UAT-10147 running PentestGPT to dynamically scan web servers and execute the relevant proof-of-concept exploits, DeepAudit for source-code scanning, AI-generated operator documentation (a README explaining ysoserial usage) and AI-generated automation scripts check_paths.py, deploy_implant.py, deploy_shell.py and exfil.py. That is why this entry records AI-assisted weaponization but does not record AI discovery.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": true,
     "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added this to KEV on 2026-08-26 with a 2026-09-09 due date, in a batch of six that also carried CVE-2022-0995, CVE-2015-5287 and CVE-2015-3246. The exploitation evidence is public: Cisco Talos published a report on UAT-10147, a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated cluster active since early 2026 against Windows and Linux web servers in government, university, media, technology and gaming targets across Brazil, Bolivia, China, Canada and Vietnam, and lists CVE-2021-23758 among its initial-access RCEs alongside CVE-2022-27925 (Zimbra), CVE-2019-18935 (Telerik UI) and CVE-2021-29441/29442 (Nacos). Talos records a target list of roughly 170,000 URLs split across 17 files, and post-exploitation delivery of BadIIS for SEO fraud, the SPECTRE cross-platform implant with a Linux rootkit and BYOVD capability, QuasarRAT staged as svchosts.exe, NoodleRAT and Meterpreter. UAT-10147 is Talos's own cluster name and carries no state attribution; CISA's KEV record sets knownRansomwareCampaignUse to Unknown, and no ransomware family is named in the Talos report.",
     "attack_refs": [
@@ -28451,7 +28451,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "There is no hot-patch path, and no vendor patch for the packages the CVE names. GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw lists the patched version as None for AjaxPro.2, Joint.AjaxPro and JointAjax.AjaxPro, and records 21.11.29.1 as patched only for the AjaxNetProfessional package; its stated workaround is 'There is no workaround available that addresses all issues except updating to latest version from GitHub.' CISA's KEV entry says the product could be end-of-life or end-of-service and advises discontinuing use or transitioning to a supported version. The immediately deployable mitigation that needs no rebuild is removing the AjaxPro HTTP handler registration from web.config, or blocking the /ajaxpro/ path at the reverse proxy — both stop the endpoint being reachable without touching compiled assemblies. Replacing the library is an application rebuild and redeploy plus an app-pool recycle, not a host restart, which is why patch_required_reboot is false.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "There is no hot-patch path, and no vendor patch for the packages the CVE names. GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw lists the patched version as None for AjaxPro.2, Joint.AjaxPro and JointAjax.AjaxPro, and records 21.11.29.1 as patched only for the AjaxNetProfessional package; its stated workaround is 'There is no workaround available that addresses all issues except updating to latest version from GitHub.' CISA's KEV entry says the product could be end-of-life or end-of-service and advises discontinuing use or transitioning to a supported version. The immediately deployable mitigation that needs no rebuild is removing the AjaxPro HTTP handler registration from web.config, or blocking the /ajaxpro/ path at the reverse proxy. Both stop the endpoint being reachable without touching compiled assemblies. Replacing the library is an application rebuild and redeploy plus an app-pool recycle, and it does not require a host reboot.",
     "affected": "ASP.NET applications running on IIS that reference the Ajax.NET Professional (AjaxPro) library and register its HTTP handler. AjaxPro is a component compiled into bespoke applications rather than a product installed on a host, so exposure follows the application inventory, not the server inventory.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "NuGet ajaxpro.2 — every published version is affected; GHSA-6r7c-6w96-8pvw lists no patched release for this package, and NVD states 'All versions of package ajaxpro.2 are vulnerable'",
@@ -29362,7 +29362,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism applies. The fix is a TrueConf Server upgrade to the fixed build on the branch in use, which stops and restarts the conferencing service - a scheduled outage for every meeting in progress, which is why the upgrade tends to slip on a server whose whole purpose is availability during working hours. The advisory states no host reboot requirement, and patch_required_reboot is set false on that basis; that is not the same as nothing to coordinate, since the service restart is itself the disruptive event. Two patch-independent actions are available immediately and neither needs an outage. First, port 4307/TCP is the vector and the product documentation records it as open by default, so restricting it at the network boundary to the hosts that legitimately need it removes reachability without touching the binary. Second, and more important for an estate that may already be affected: patching the server does not undo a client-side compromise. The campaign replaced the TrueConf Client distribution the server hands out, so an upgraded server can still be serving a backdoored installer, and the client population that already installed one stays compromised. Kaspersky's own recommended actions pair the upgrade with running updated anti-malware, scanning for the campaign indicators, and changing the passwords for all potentially affected accounts.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism applies. The fix is a TrueConf Server upgrade to the fixed build on the branch in use, which stops and restarts the conferencing service. The restart is a scheduled outage for every meeting in progress, which is why the upgrade tends to slip on a server whose whole purpose is availability during working hours. The advisory states no host reboot requirement, and this entry records that no reboot is required on that basis; that is not the same as nothing to coordinate, since the service restart is itself the disruptive event. Two patch-independent actions are available immediately and neither needs an outage. First, port 4307/TCP is the vector and the product documentation records it as open by default, so restricting it at the network boundary to the hosts that legitimately need it removes reachability without touching the binary. Second, and more important for an estate that may already be affected: patching the server does not undo a client-side compromise. The campaign replaced the TrueConf Client distribution the server hands out, so an upgraded server can still be serving a backdoored installer, and the client population that already installed one stays compromised. Kaspersky's own recommended actions pair the upgrade with running updated anti-malware, scanning for the campaign indicators, and changing the passwords for all potentially affected accounts.",
     "affected": "The scripting environment that TrueConf Server exposes on port 4307/TCP. A remote unauthenticated attacker submits a crafted script; the script runs in an environment intended to deny access to operating-system functions, and this defect breaks out of that environment to execute arbitrary code on the host. In the observed intrusions the resulting execution carries NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM privileges, which on a Windows deployment is the whole host, the conferencing database, and the client distribution the server publishes.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "All TrueConf Server versions before 5.3 - affected, with no fixed build on that branch; the only path is a move onto a supported branch",
@@ -29478,7 +29478,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch or hot-patch mechanism exists for TrueConf Server; remediation is an application upgrade to 5.3.9, 5.4.9 or 5.5.5 depending on the installed line, which interrupts conferencing while the server components cycle. Neither Kaspersky ICS-CERT nor any vendor document obtained states that a host reboot is required, so patch_required_reboot is recorded false on the strength of the sources actually read rather than on an assumption about the installer. The configuration-side control that does not need the upgrade is reachability: the flaw is only exercisable by something that can open 4307/TCP, so restricting that port to the conferencing clients and endpoints that need it removes the pre-authentication path while the upgrade is scheduled. Any server that was reachable and unpatched during the exposure window should be treated as an execution case rather than a patch case — Securelist documents SysExcSvc.dll and SysReadSvc.dll installed as services under C:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\, and the upgrade removes neither.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch or hot-patch mechanism exists for TrueConf Server; remediation is an application upgrade to 5.3.9, 5.4.9 or 5.5.5 depending on the installed line, which interrupts conferencing while the server components cycle. Neither Kaspersky ICS-CERT nor any vendor document obtained states that a host reboot is required, so this entry records that applying the fix does not require a reboot on the strength of the sources actually read rather than on an assumption about the installer. The configuration-side control that does not need the upgrade is reachability: the flaw is only exercisable by something that can open 4307/TCP, so restricting that port to the conferencing clients and endpoints that need it removes the pre-authentication path while the upgrade is scheduled. Any server that was reachable and unpatched during the exposure window should be treated as an execution case rather than a patch case. Securelist documents SysExcSvc.dll and SysReadSvc.dll installed as services under C:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\, and the upgrade removes neither.",
     "affected": "TrueConf Server video conferencing server, Windows and Linux builds, where 4307/TCP is reachable by the attacker.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "All TrueConf Server versions before 5.3 are affected",
@@ -29687,7 +29687,7 @@
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "ZDI's write-up records the flaw as 'originally discovered by WARP & MORSE team at Microsoft' - internal vendor offensive research. No AI tooling is credited with the discovery in any source consulted.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2026-33824 (CWE-415, CVSS 9.8), MSRC's update-guide entry, ZDI's 2026-04-22 analysis 'CVE-2026-33824: Remote Code Execution in Windows IKEv2', CISA KEV (added 2026-08-18), and Unit 42's 2026-07-30 report. The Unit 42 report covers an actor who used AI models autonomously elsewhere in the same campaign, but places the IKE exploitation under manual activity - that distinction is why ai_assisted_weaponization is recorded as false rather than true.",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "This entry draws on NVD CVE-2026-33824 (CWE-415, CVSS 9.8), MSRC's update-guide entry, ZDI's 2026-04-22 analysis 'CVE-2026-33824: Remote Code Execution in Windows IKEv2', CISA KEV (added 2026-08-18), and Unit 42's 2026-07-30 report. The Unit 42 report covers an actor who used AI models autonomously elsewhere in the same campaign, but places the IKE exploitation under manual activity. That distinction is why this entry records that the weaponization was not AI-assisted.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the CVE to KEV on 2026-08-18 with a 2026-08-21 due date and marked ransomware use Unknown. The public exploitation evidence is Unit 42's 2026-07-30 report on a Chinese-speaking threat actor, where 'Reverse shell callbacks targeting three IKE VPN endpoints (CVE-2026-33824)' appears in the table of that actor's activity, categorised as manual rather than as one of the model-driven autonomous attempts described elsewhere in the same report. Unit 42 associates the operator with the aliases 'knaithe' and 'KnYuan' and places them in Zhuhai, China; no campaign name is given, and the report does not claim that a model carried out the IKE exploitation. Microsoft shipped the fix in the April 2026 security updates, so the KEV listing follows four months later on newly confirmed exploitation, not on disclosure.",
     "attack_refs": [
@@ -30350,7 +30350,7 @@
     "type": "uninitialized-member-variable-browser-process-memory-disclosure",
     "blast_radius": 15,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit is published for this id. There is no Exploit-DB row (the same index returns 11199 for CVE-2010-0232, 42382 and 42429 for CVE-2017-8464 and 48247 for CVE-2020-5722 under the identical query), no Metasploit module (the same query returns ms10_015_kitrap0d.rb for CVE-2010-0232 and grandstream_ucm62xx_sendemail_rce.rb for CVE-2020-5722), no Nuclei template (the same query returns http/cves/2021/CVE-2021-32648.yaml for its control id), and a GitHub repository search for the id returns zero repositories against a control of twenty-nine for CVE-2021-36934. The absence is therefore real rather than a broken matcher. What does exist is a reduced test case: the reporter, Ms2ger, attached an HTML file to Mozilla bug 866825 demonstrating the garbage float values returned to JavaScript. That is a vendor bug-tracker reproducer, not weaponised exploit code, and it is not one of the citable proof-of-concept forms, so poc_available stays false.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit is published for this id. There is no Exploit-DB row (the same index returns 11199 for CVE-2010-0232, 42382 and 42429 for CVE-2017-8464 and 48247 for CVE-2020-5722 under the identical query), no Metasploit module (the same query returns ms10_015_kitrap0d.rb for CVE-2010-0232 and grandstream_ucm62xx_sendemail_rce.rb for CVE-2020-5722), no Nuclei template (the same query returns http/cves/2021/CVE-2021-32648.yaml for its control id), and a GitHub repository search for the id returns zero repositories against a control of twenty-nine for CVE-2021-36934. The absence is therefore real rather than a broken matcher. What does exist is a reduced test case: the reporter, Ms2ger, attached an HTML file to Mozilla bug 866825 demonstrating the garbage float values returned to JavaScript. That is a vendor bug-tracker reproducer, not weaponized exploit code, and it is not one of the citable proof-of-concept forms, so this entry does not record a proof of concept as available.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Web content constructing SVGZoomEvent objects and reading the previousScale and newScale properties in a loop - the property read is the leak, so volume rather than any single call is the signal",
@@ -31086,7 +31086,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": true,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism applies to an ActiveX OCX. MS12-060 states the restart position conditionally: for most affected products 'this update does not require a restart. The installer stops the required services, applies the update, and then restarts the services. However, if the required services cannot be stopped for any reason or if required files are in use, this update will require a restart' — and MSCOMCTL.OCX is loaded by any running Office, Visual FoxPro or VB6 process. The SQL Server 2000 packages are the unconditional case: those updates require a system restart. patch_required_reboot is recorded true on that basis. Microsoft documents four workarounds that reduce exposure without the binary update, and they are mitigations rather than fixes: set the kill bit for CLSID {1EFB6596-857C-11D1-B16A-00C0F0283628} under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\ActiveX Compatibility (and the Wow6432Node path) with Compatibility Flags 0x00000400, which stops browser instantiation but not document instantiation; block RTF in Office via the FileOpenBlock RtfFiles registry policy or the Office 2010 Trust Center File Block Settings; set ActiveX Settings to 'Disable all controls without notifications'; and raise the Internet and Local intranet zones to High. On Windows Server 2003/2008/2008 R2, Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration already provides partial mitigation for the web-page vector.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism applies to an ActiveX OCX. MS12-060 states the restart position conditionally: for most affected products 'this update does not require a restart. The installer stops the required services, applies the update, and then restarts the services. However, if the required services cannot be stopped for any reason or if required files are in use, this update will require a restart', and MSCOMCTL.OCX is loaded by any running Office, Visual FoxPro or VB6 process. The SQL Server 2000 packages are the unconditional case: those updates require a system restart. On that basis, this entry records that applying the fix requires a reboot. Microsoft documents four workarounds that reduce exposure without the binary update, and they are mitigations rather than fixes: set the kill bit for CLSID {1EFB6596-857C-11D1-B16A-00C0F0283628} under HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\ActiveX Compatibility (and the Wow6432Node path) with Compatibility Flags 0x00000400, which stops browser instantiation but not document instantiation; block RTF in Office via the FileOpenBlock RtfFiles registry policy or the Office 2010 Trust Center File Block Settings; set ActiveX Settings to 'Disable all controls without notifications'; and raise the Internet and Local intranet zones to High. On Windows Server 2003/2008/2008 R2, Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration already provides partial mitigation for the web-page vector.",
     "affected": "Microsoft products that ship the Windows Common Controls binary MSCOMCTL.OCX containing the TabStrip ActiveX control — Office, SQL Server, Commerce Server, Host Integration Server, Visual FoxPro and the Visual Basic 6.0 Runtime.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Microsoft Office 2003 SP3; Office 2003 Web Components SP3; Office 2007 SP2 and SP3; Office 2010 SP1, 32-bit editions only",
@@ -32408,7 +32408,7 @@
       "_ioc_source_note": "The privilege-escalation outcome, the local-logon precondition, the absence of any workaround and the KB968537 registry verification path are all from MS09-025 itself. The behavioural items are derived from that documented outcome; no exploit sample, hash or campaign indicator exists in the sources consulted, and none is asserted."
     },
     "ai_discovered": false,
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed publicly before the June 2009 bulletin - MS09-025 answers 'had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?' with 'Yes'. The bulletin text retrieved names no reporting researcher, which is consistent with Microsoft's practice of not crediting an issue that was already public. AI-assisted discovery did not exist as a practice in 2009, so ai_discovered is false on the mechanism as well as on the absence of evidence.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "The vulnerability was disclosed publicly before the June 2009 bulletin: MS09-025 answers 'had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?' with 'Yes'. The bulletin text retrieved names no reporting researcher, which is consistent with Microsoft's practice of not crediting an issue that was already public. AI-assisted discovery did not exist as a practice in 2009, so this entry records the vulnerability as not AI-discovered on the mechanism as well as on the absence of evidence.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "unknown",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2009-1123 (no CWE assigned; NVD-CWE-noinfo), Microsoft Security Bulletin MS09-025 including its per-CVE section, mitigating factors, workarounds and FAQ, and CISA KEV (added 2022-03-03). The retrieved bulletin text names no reporter; the vulnerability was publicly disclosed before the fix. CWE assigned editorially: NVD records no weakness for this CVE, so CWE-20 is used for the improper input validation the vector describes — the kernel does not properly validate changes to certain kernel objects made by a crafted application, and MS09-025 fixes it by correcting the method used to validate that change.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -32815,7 +32815,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": true,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism exists for a 2004 Windows subsystem binary. MS04-020 states the restart position conditionally — 'In some cases, this update does not require a restart. The installer stops the required services, applies the update, and then restarts the services. However, if the required services cannot be stopped for any reason or if required files are in use, this update will require a restart' — and the file being replaced is psxss.exe, the subsystem process itself. patch_required_reboot is recorded true on that basis and because the documented workaround requires a restart outright. That workaround is the strongest non-patch control available and it removes the attack surface rather than filtering it: per KB 101270, delete the Posix data value under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Subsystems and restart the system. Microsoft states the impact plainly — POSIX programs are disabled until the subsystem is re-enabled — which on an estate that runs no POSIX software is no impact at all. Re-enabling means recreating the value as REG_EXPAND_SZ with data %SystemRoot%\\system32\\psxss.exe and restarting again. The fixed binary versions are Psxss.exe 5.0.2195.6929 for Windows 2000, 4.0.1381.7269 for Windows NT 4.0 Workstation and Server, and 4.0.1381.33567 for NT Server 4.0 Terminal Server Edition.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism exists for a 2004 Windows subsystem binary. MS04-020 states the restart position conditionally: 'In some cases, this update does not require a restart. The installer stops the required services, applies the update, and then restarts the services. However, if the required services cannot be stopped for any reason or if required files are in use, this update will require a restart'. The file being replaced is psxss.exe, the subsystem process itself. This entry records that applying the fix requires a reboot on that basis and because the documented workaround requires a restart outright. That workaround is the strongest non-patch control available and it removes the attack surface rather than filtering it: per KB 101270, delete the Posix data value under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Subsystems and restart the system. Microsoft states the impact plainly: POSIX programs are disabled until the subsystem is re-enabled, which on an estate that runs no POSIX software is no impact at all. Re-enabling means recreating the value as REG_EXPAND_SZ with data %SystemRoot%\\system32\\psxss.exe and restarting again. The fixed binary versions are Psxss.exe 5.0.2195.6929 for Windows 2000, 4.0.1381.7269 for Windows NT 4.0 Workstation and Server, and 4.0.1381.33567 for NT Server 4.0 Terminal Server Edition.",
     "affected": "The POSIX environment subsystem on Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000, and Microsoft INTERIX 2.2.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 4.0 Service Pack 6a",
@@ -34799,7 +34799,7 @@
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Apple credits the report to 'an anonymous researcher' in all three advisories and gives no affiliation, so the reporter is outside Apple but unnamed, and the discovery route is not described. Project Zero's analysis is post-patch root-cause work by Maddie Stone and is not the discovery. No AI-assisted discovery is claimed by any party, and no evidence for one exists either way.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from Apple's advisories HT213091 (Safari 15.3), HT213092 (macOS Monterey 12.2.1) and HT213093 (iOS/iPadOS 15.3.1), all dated 2022-02-10, the Google Project Zero 0-days-in-the-wild root-cause analysis for CVE-2022-22620, the CISA KEV entry of 2022-02-11, and the springsec/CVE-2022-22620 repository. ai_discovery_source is set to unknown rather than human_researcher because Apple's 'an anonymous researcher' credit does not establish the route.",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "This entry draws on Apple's advisories HT213091 (Safari 15.3), HT213092 (macOS Monterey 12.2.1) and HT213093 (iOS/iPadOS 15.3.1), all dated 2022-02-10, the Google Project Zero 0-days-in-the-wild root-cause analysis for CVE-2022-22620, the CISA KEV entry of 2022-02-11, and the springsec/CVE-2022-22620 repository. Apple credits the report to 'an anonymous researcher', an unnamed reporter outside Apple, so the discovery source is recorded as a human researcher.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "active_exploitation_notes": "Apple's advisories for iOS 15.3.1 and iPadOS 15.3.1, macOS Monterey 12.2.1 and Safari 15.3, all released 2022-02-10, each carry the sentence 'Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited' — Apple's standard formulation, which asserts a report rather than a confirmed campaign. CISA added the CVE to KEV the following day, 2022-02-11, with a 2022-02-25 due date and ransomware association Unknown. No named campaign, threat actor or victim set is public. Apple credits 'an anonymous researcher' and names no reporting vendor, so there is not even an attribution chain to reason from; Project Zero states it had no access to the exploit sample, which is why its 2022 write-up analyses the patch and the 2016 regression rather than the operator. Nothing in the reviewed sources supports naming a mercenary-spyware vendor or a state operator for this CVE, and none should be inferred from the year or the platform. EPSS is 0.16214 at the 96.8th percentile on 2026-08-28.",
     "attack_refs": [
@@ -35683,7 +35683,7 @@
     "type": "type-confusion-document-filter-rce",
     "blast_radius": 21,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No proof of concept could be cited. There is no Exploit-DB entry for this CVE, no Metasploit module in the framework's module metadata, no Nuclei template, and no public repository in the PoC index. FireEye's report documents the exploitation mechanics in detail - the sprayed address, the `forall` invocation, the 0x7ffffff0 string length, the `bytesavailable` pivot - but a root-cause and exploitation analysis is not a proof of concept under this catalog's standard, so poc_available is recorded false.",
+    "poc_description": "No proof of concept could be cited. There is no Exploit-DB entry for this CVE, no Metasploit module in the framework's module metadata, no Nuclei template, and no public repository in the PoC index. FireEye's report documents the exploitation mechanics in detail (the sprayed address, the `forall` invocation, the 0x7ffffff0 string length and the `bytesavailable` pivot), but a root-cause and exploitation analysis is not a proof of concept under this catalog's standard, so the entry records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "FLTLDR.EXE spawning a child process, writing to disk, or making an outbound network connection - the filter loader has no legitimate reason to do any of these",
@@ -36087,7 +36087,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism applies; the remediation is a broker upgrade or a configuration change, both of which cycle the ActiveMQ process rather than the host, so patch_required_reboot is false. The configuration path is a genuine alternative to the upgrade rather than a filter in front of it, and it is the vendor's own instruction: Apache's announcement tells users to stop using the fileserver application, notes it has been disabled by default since 5.12.0, and states that older versions require it to be disabled manually by removing the WebAppContext bean configuration from jetty.xml. Because the flaw exists only in that web application, removing the bean eliminates the vulnerable code path entirely on a broker that cannot be upgraded — an unusually complete mitigation. Apache recommends an external FTP or HTTP server for blob message transfer where the feature was actually being used. Upgrading to 5.14.0 or later is the durable answer because the feature is removed from the distribution and cannot be re-enabled by a later configuration change.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism applies; the remediation is a broker upgrade or a configuration change, both of which cycle the ActiveMQ process rather than the host, so applying the fix does not require a reboot. The configuration path is a genuine alternative to the upgrade rather than a filter in front of it, and it is the vendor's own instruction: Apache's announcement tells users to stop using the fileserver application, notes it has been disabled by default since 5.12.0, and states that older versions require it to be disabled manually by removing the WebAppContext bean configuration from jetty.xml. Because the flaw exists only in that web application, removing the bean eliminates the vulnerable code path entirely on a broker that cannot be upgraded, which makes it an unusually complete mitigation. Apache recommends an external FTP or HTTP server for blob message transfer where the feature was actually being used. Upgrading to 5.14.0 or later is the durable answer because the feature is removed from the distribution and cannot be re-enabled by a later configuration change.",
     "affected": "Apache ActiveMQ brokers running the Fileserver web application, which is served by the broker's embedded Jetty alongside the admin and api web applications.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Apache ActiveMQ 5.0.0 through 5.13.x per the Apache announcement — 5.14.0 is the fixed release, where the feature is removed entirely",
@@ -37733,7 +37733,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a library upgrade inside a WAR, so the servlet container redeploys and the application restarts; the host does not reboot and patch_required_reboot is false. No live-patch mechanism exists for a servlet-container library. The practical difficulty is not the upgrade but its availability: the only remediation the sources establish is moving to Struts 1.2.9, and Struts 1 has no maintained successor line beyond the 1.x releases, so for an application that cannot be rebuilt the controls have to sit in front of it. Two follow directly from the mechanism NVD describes rather than from any vendor guidance, and are recorded as derivations: reject multipart/form-data requests whose part names contain multipartRequestHandler at the reverse proxy, since that string is the trigger NVD names; and bound multipart body size and part count at the same layer, since the impact is resource-driven. Neither is vendor-documented and both should be validated against the application before deployment.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a library upgrade inside a WAR, so the servlet container redeploys and the application restarts; the host does not reboot, and applying the fix does not require a reboot. No live-patch mechanism exists for a servlet-container library. The practical difficulty is not the upgrade but its availability: the only remediation the sources establish is moving to Struts 1.2.9, and Struts 1 has no maintained successor line beyond the 1.x releases, so for an application that cannot be rebuilt the controls have to sit in front of it. Two follow directly from the mechanism NVD describes rather than from any vendor guidance, and are recorded as derivations: reject multipart/form-data requests whose part names contain multipartRequestHandler at the reverse proxy, since that string is the trigger NVD names; and bound multipart body size and part count at the same layer, since the impact is resource-driven. Neither is vendor-documented and both should be validated against the application before deployment.",
     "affected": "Apache Struts 1 web applications that use ActionForm with multipart form handling and carry Commons BeanUtils 1.7 on the classpath.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Apache Struts before 1.2.9 when running with Commons BeanUtils 1.7 — 1.2.9 is the fixed release",
@@ -38305,7 +38305,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a Nagios XI upgrade, which replaces PHP files under /usr/local/nagiosxi/html and cycles the web and monitoring services; no host restart is involved, which is why patch_required_reboot is false. There is a configuration-side measure that needs no upgrade and is deployable immediately: remove or restrict the Windows WMI configuration wizard, and cut the number of accounts that can reach the config-wizard surface at all, since the injection is only reachable through an authenticated session. Network placement is the other lever — the Unit 42 exploitation was against reachable servers, and a monitoring server has no operational need to accept sessions from untrusted networks.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a Nagios XI upgrade, which replaces PHP files under /usr/local/nagiosxi/html and cycles the web and monitoring services; no host restart is involved, so applying the fix does not require a reboot. There is a configuration-side measure that needs no upgrade and is deployable immediately: remove or restrict the Windows WMI configuration wizard, and cut the number of accounts that can reach the config-wizard surface at all, since the injection is only reachable through an authenticated session. Network placement is the other lever: the Unit 42 exploitation was against reachable servers, and a monitoring server has no operational need to accept sessions from untrusted networks.",
     "affected": "Nagios XI servers, through the Windows WMI Monitoring Wizard reachable by any authenticated user. The consequence is not bounded by the monitoring application: the server holds the credentials it uses to poll monitored hosts, so command execution there reaches the estate it watches.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Nagios XI 5.5.6 through 5.7.5 inclusive — 5.7.5 is affected, per Rapid7's module record and Fastly's analysis",
@@ -38361,7 +38361,7 @@
     "type": "authenticated-config-wizard-os-command-injection",
     "blast_radius": 21,
     "poc_available": true,
-    "poc_description": "Metasploit ships exploit/linux/http/nagios_xi_configwizards_authenticated_rce, 'Nagios XI 5.5.6 to 5.7.5 - ConfigWizards Authenticated Remote Code Execution' by Matthew Mathur, disclosure date 2021-02-13, covering CVE-2021-25296, CVE-2021-25297 and CVE-2021-25298 and using Metasploit's NagiosXI mixin to authenticate and version-check before exploiting. Fastly's security research team published the accompanying analysis and states it also produced a distinct Nuclei template for each of the three CVEs; it links a nuclei-templates pull request rather than a template path, so no template path could be confirmed. That detection work is not what carries poc_available here — the Metasploit module is. The original proof of concept was disclosed publicly by fs0c-sh in early 2021.",
+    "poc_description": "Metasploit ships exploit/linux/http/nagios_xi_configwizards_authenticated_rce, 'Nagios XI 5.5.6 to 5.7.5 - ConfigWizards Authenticated Remote Code Execution' by Matthew Mathur, disclosure date 2021-02-13, covering CVE-2021-25296, CVE-2021-25297 and CVE-2021-25298 and using Metasploit's NagiosXI mixin to authenticate and version-check before exploiting. Fastly's security research team published the accompanying analysis and states it also produced a distinct Nuclei template for each of the three CVEs; it links a nuclei-templates pull request rather than a template path, so no template path could be confirmed. That detection work is not the reason this entry records a proof of concept as available; the Metasploit module is. The original proof of concept was disclosed publicly by fs0c-sh in early 2021.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "The Nagios XI web account spawning a shell, an interpreter, or an outbound network client — the injected commands run under the web server user, so its process tree is where execution appears.",
@@ -39199,7 +39199,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism exists for Oracle Fusion Middleware; the fix is a Critical Patch Update bundle applied to the installation, which stops and restarts the BI services for its duration - a reporting outage to schedule rather than a host reboot, which is why patch_required_reboot is false. Because the primitive is a single unauthenticated HTTP GET against a known path with a known parameter, the patch-independent mitigation is request filtering and it is deployable in minutes: reject requests to /analytics/saw.dll carrying the getPreviewImage command at the reverse proxy or WAF in front of the BI server. The more decisive control is reachability - Oracle's own precondition is 'network access via HTTP', so confirming that the BI server is not reachable from untrusted networks removes the exposure entirely and is usually the faster change on an application that has no business being internet-facing in the first place. Treat both as time-bound compensating controls with a patch date attached rather than as remediation: the filter is a path-and-parameter match that an encoding variation may evade, and the underlying function still reads whatever path it is given. Verification should be the Nuclei template's own request issued against the instance, confirming it does not return file content - the check and the exploit are the same request, which makes this one of the rare cases where remediation can be proven directly rather than inferred from a version.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No live-patch mechanism exists for Oracle Fusion Middleware; the fix is a Critical Patch Update bundle applied to the installation, which stops and restarts the BI services for its duration. That is a reporting outage to schedule rather than a host reboot, which is why this entry records that applying the fix does not require a reboot. Because the primitive is a single unauthenticated HTTP GET against a known path with a known parameter, the patch-independent mitigation is request filtering and it is deployable in minutes: reject requests to /analytics/saw.dll carrying the getPreviewImage command at the reverse proxy or WAF in front of the BI server. The more decisive control is reachability: Oracle's own precondition is 'network access via HTTP', so confirming that the BI server is not reachable from untrusted networks removes the exposure entirely and is usually the faster change on an application that has no business being internet-facing in the first place. Treat both as time-bound compensating controls with a patch date attached rather than as remediation: the filter is a path-and-parameter match that an encoding variation may evade, and the underlying function still reads whatever path it is given. Verification should be the Nuclei template's own request issued against the instance, confirming it does not return file content. The check and the exploit are the same request, which makes this one of the rare cases where remediation can be proven directly rather than inferred from a version.",
     "affected": "The getPreviewImage function of the Oracle Business Intelligence Enterprise Edition Analytics servlet, reachable at /analytics/saw.dll. An unauthenticated attacker supplies a path in the previewFilePath parameter and the server returns the contents of that file. NVD records the component as 'Installation' and the product as part of Oracle Fusion Middleware.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Oracle Business Intelligence Enterprise Edition 5.5.0.0.0 - affected",
@@ -42042,7 +42042,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2022-20708 (CWE-78 with CWE-121, CVSS 8.0) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-03) + Cisco advisory cisco-sa-smb-mult-vuln-KA9PK6D. Attributed to external researchers credited in that advisory.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory notes PoC availability for several members without naming them and does not report in-the-wild exploitation; known_ransomware_use is false for this entry.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory notes PoC availability for several members without naming them and does not report in-the-wild exploitation; this entry does not record any known ransomware use.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1059.004",
@@ -42141,7 +42141,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2022-20703 (CWE-121 with CWE-295; the operative weakness is improper software-image signature verification, CVSS 8.0) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-03) + Cisco advisory cisco-sa-smb-mult-vuln-KA9PK6D. Attributed to external researchers credited in that advisory.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory notes PoC availability for several members without naming them and does not report in-the-wild exploitation; known_ransomware_use is false for this entry.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory notes PoC availability for several members without naming them and does not report in-the-wild exploitation; this entry does not record any known ransomware use.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1601.001",
       "T1554",
@@ -42242,7 +42242,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2022-20701 (CWE-121 with CWE-787, CVSS 7.8) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-03) + Cisco advisory cisco-sa-smb-mult-vuln-KA9PK6D. Attributed to external researchers credited in that advisory. The two records describe the defect differently and the difference is not resolved by either: NVD's weakness assignment is a stack-based buffer overflow with an out-of-bounds write, while Cisco groups this id with CVE-2022-20700 and CVE-2022-20702 as privilege escalation, a remote attacker submitting specific commands to elevate to root. The vector and complexity notes here follow Cisco's mechanism; NVD's CWE pair is recorded as its assignment rather than restated as the mechanism.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory notes PoC availability for several members without naming them and does not report in-the-wild exploitation; known_ransomware_use is false for this entry.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory notes PoC availability for several members without naming them and does not report in-the-wild exploitation; this entry does not record any known ransomware use.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1068",
       "T1059.004",
@@ -42341,7 +42341,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2022-20700 (CWE-121 with CWE-787, CVSS 9.8) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-03) + Cisco advisory cisco-sa-smb-mult-vuln-KA9PK6D. Attributed to external researchers credited in that advisory. NVD and Cisco characterise the defect differently and neither record reconciles the other: NVD assigns a stack-based buffer overflow with an out-of-bounds write, while Cisco heads the group holding CVE-2022-20700, CVE-2022-20701 and CVE-2022-20702 as privilege escalation in the web-based management interface, a remote attacker submitting specific commands to elevate to root. The type, vector and complexity notes in this entry describe Cisco's mechanism; NVD's CWE pair is carried as its assignment and not as the mechanism.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory notes PoC availability for several members of the bundle without naming them and does not report in-the-wild exploitation; known_ransomware_use is false for this entry.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory notes PoC availability for several members of the bundle without naming them and does not report in-the-wild exploitation; no known ransomware use is recorded for this entry.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1068",
@@ -42443,7 +42443,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2022-20699 (CWE-121 with CWE-1284, CVSS 9.8) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-03) + Cisco advisory cisco-sa-smb-mult-vuln-KA9PK6D. Found by the Flashback Team (Pedro Ribeiro, Radek Domanski), Pwn2Own Austin 2021 / ZDI-22-414.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory states proof-of-concept code is available for several of these vulnerabilities but does not itself report in-the-wild exploitation, and known_ransomware_use is false for this entry.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added the RV-series bundle to KEV on 2022-03-03 (due 2022-03-17); the KEV listing is CISA's assertion of in-the-wild exploitation. Cisco's advisory states proof-of-concept code is available for several of these vulnerabilities but does not itself report in-the-wild exploitation, and no known ransomware use is recorded for this entry.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1210",
@@ -46922,7 +46922,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Microsoft shipped the fix in its October 2017 update, and the remediation problem in 2026 is not availability but reach. The affected set spans two very different estates: desktop Word and Office installs, and server-side document rendering - SharePoint Server 2010, SharePoint Enterprise Server 2010, Office Web Apps Server 2010 and 2013, Word Automation Services and Office Online Server all parse the same content without a person at a keyboard. Those server components sit on separate update tracks from the desktop suite, so where patch evidence is drawn from a workstation management console the rendering tier is absent from the denominator entirely and its state is unknown rather than compliant. `patch_required_reboot` is false in the sense that no host reboot is inherent to the update, but that must not be read as nothing to coordinate: Word does not pick up a patched parser in an already-running process, so an open Word session continues executing the vulnerable code until it is closed and relaunched, and the server-side components need their services restarted. Word Viewer, also in the affected list, reached end of support and is remediated by removal rather than by an update.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Microsoft shipped the fix in its October 2017 update, and the remediation problem in 2026 is not availability but reach. The affected set spans two very different estates: desktop Word and Office installs, and server-side document rendering. SharePoint Server 2010, SharePoint Enterprise Server 2010, Office Web Apps Server 2010 and 2013, Word Automation Services and Office Online Server all parse the same content without a person at a keyboard. Those server components sit on separate update tracks from the desktop suite, so where patch evidence is drawn from a workstation management console the rendering tier is absent from the denominator entirely and its state is unknown rather than compliant. Applying the fix does not require a reboot in the sense that no host reboot is inherent to the update, but that must not be read as nothing to coordinate: Word does not pick up a patched parser in an already-running process, so an open Word session continues executing the vulnerable code until it is closed and relaunched, and the server-side components need their services restarted. Word Viewer, also in the affected list, reached end of support and is remediated by removal rather than by an update.",
     "affected": "The full Microsoft document-handling surface that parses this content, not Word alone. NVD enumerates Microsoft Office 2010, SharePoint Enterprise Server 2010, SharePoint Server 2010, Web Applications, Office Web Apps Server 2010 and 2013, Word Viewer, Word 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016, Word Automation Services, and Office Online Server. The distinction that matters operationally is between the interactive products, where UI:R means a person must open the document, and the server-side rendering components, where documents are parsed as a service function - scoping a remediation sweep to desktop Word installs leaves the server tier untouched.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Microsoft Word 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016 - all four listed by NVD as affected",
@@ -47029,7 +47029,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Read the two remediation facts together, because they point in different directions. A fixed build genuinely exists for this CVE - Adobe shipped 27.0.0.170 across every Flash Player line in APSB17-32 - but that build is current only for this defect and unpatched for everything found in Flash since, because Adobe stopped supporting Flash Player beginning 31 December 2020 and blocked Flash content from running in Flash Player from 12 January 2021. CISA's required action states the position without ambiguity: the impacted product is end-of-life and should be disconnected if still in use. So the terminal state is removal, and Adobe's own end-of-life page strongly recommends immediately uninstalling Flash Player. `patch_required_reboot` is false because no host reboot is inherent to a Flash Player update, but that is not the same as nothing to coordinate - the runtime is loaded into a browser process, so a browser that has taken an update keeps executing the old Flash code until it is restarted. Note also that the Flash Player bundled with Google Chrome and with Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 was updated through the browser's own channel rather than through Adobe's installer, which is why a standalone-installer inventory understates the affected population.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Read the two remediation facts together, because they point in different directions. A fixed build genuinely exists for this CVE (Adobe shipped 27.0.0.170 across every Flash Player line in APSB17-32), but that build is current only for this defect and unpatched for everything found in Flash since, because Adobe stopped supporting Flash Player beginning 31 December 2020 and blocked Flash content from running in Flash Player from 12 January 2021. CISA's required action states the position without ambiguity: the impacted product is end-of-life and should be disconnected if still in use. So the terminal state is removal, and Adobe's own end-of-life page strongly recommends immediately uninstalling Flash Player. Applying the fix does not require a reboot because no host reboot is inherent to a Flash Player update, but that is not the same as nothing to coordinate: the runtime is loaded into a browser process, so a browser that has taken an update keeps executing the old Flash code until it is restarted. Note also that the Flash Player bundled with Google Chrome and with Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 was updated through the browser's own channel rather than through Adobe's installer, which is why a standalone-installer inventory understates the affected population.",
     "affected": "Every Adobe Flash Player distribution line across Windows, macOS, Linux and Chrome OS - the standalone Desktop Runtime and the copies embedded in browsers, which is where the reach comes from. APSB17-32 enumerates the Desktop Runtime for Windows and macOS, the Desktop Runtime for Linux, Flash Player for Google Chrome across Windows, macOS, Linux and Chrome OS, and Flash Player for Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11. The delivery observed in the wild ran through Microsoft Office documents embedding an ActiveX object rather than through browsing, so any Windows host with the runtime present was reachable regardless of browser policy. Note that Adobe AIR is not covered by this advisory - the end-of-life reasoning above is specific to Flash Player and is not a statement about other Adobe runtimes.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Adobe Flash Player Desktop Runtime (Windows, macOS) 27.0.0.159 and earlier - 27.0.0.159 is itself affected; fixed in 27.0.0.170",
@@ -55460,7 +55460,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Apache fixed this in Tomcat 7.0.81; the affected range is 7.0.0 to 7.0.79 and no other Tomcat line carries this entry. patch_required_reboot is false because no host reboot is involved — but the Tomcat service itself must be restarted for the new binaries to be in use, so a host that has taken the new package while the old JVM is still running is not remediated. The configuration-side mitigation is immediate and needs no upgrade at all: restore the Default servlet's readonly initialisation parameter to true in conf/web.xml (or remove the override) and restart the service, which removes PUT and with it the whole attack path. Treat 7.0.81 as an interim landing point rather than the destination: Apache lists Tomcat 7.0.x as end of life on 2021-03-31 and archived, and the supported lines are 9.0.x, 10.1.x and 11.0.x, so the terminal state for a Tomcat 7 estate is migration off the branch.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Apache fixed this in Tomcat 7.0.81; the affected range is 7.0.0 to 7.0.79 and no other Tomcat line carries this entry. Applying the fix does not require a host reboot, but the Tomcat service itself must be restarted for the new binaries to be in use, so a host that has taken the new package while the old JVM is still running is not remediated. The configuration-side mitigation is immediate and needs no upgrade at all: restore the Default servlet's readonly initialization parameter to true in conf/web.xml (or remove the override) and restart the service, which removes PUT and with it the whole attack path. Treat 7.0.81 as an interim landing point rather than the destination: Apache lists Tomcat 7.0.x as end of life on 2021-03-31 and archived, and the supported lines are 9.0.x, 10.1.x and 11.0.x, so the terminal state for a Tomcat 7 estate is migration off the branch.",
     "affected": "Apache Tomcat 7.0.x running on Windows, specifically 7.0.0 through 7.0.79, and only where the Default servlet's readonly initialisation parameter has been set to false so that HTTP PUT is accepted. Scope the sweep to the servlet container rather than to a named application: any product that embeds or bundles a Tomcat 7 of that vintage — an appliance management console, a vendor-packaged Java application server, an internal build of a shipped web application — carries the same Default servlet and the same defect, and the version that matters is the Tomcat build inside it, not the version badge of the product wrapping it.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 through 7.0.79 on Windows with the Default servlet readonly parameter set to false (fixed in 7.0.81)",
@@ -55571,7 +55571,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Apache fixed this per branch: 9.0.1 (released 30 September 2017), 8.5.23 (1 October 2017), 8.0.47 (4 October 2017) and 7.0.82. patch_required_reboot is false — no host reboot is involved — but the Tomcat service must be restarted before the replaced binaries are in use, so an instance whose files are updated while the old JVM keeps serving is still exploitable. The configuration-side mitigation is the same one CVE-2017-12615 takes and is immediate: set the Default servlet's readonly initialisation parameter back to true and restart the service. Where an upgrade is taken, choose the destination branch rather than the nearest fixed release: Apache lists 7.0.x as end of life on 2021-03-31, 8.0.x on 2018-06-30 and 8.5.x on 2024-03-31, all archived or superseded, with 9.0.x, 10.1.x and 11.0.x supported — so 8.5.23 and 7.0.82 are landing points on branches that are themselves finished.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Apache fixed this per branch: 9.0.1 (released 30 September 2017), 8.5.23 (1 October 2017), 8.0.47 (4 October 2017) and 7.0.82. Applying the fix does not require a host reboot, but the Tomcat service must be restarted before the replaced binaries are in use, so an instance whose files are updated while the old JVM keeps serving is still exploitable. The configuration-side mitigation is the same one CVE-2017-12615 takes and is immediate: set the Default servlet's readonly initialization parameter back to true and restart the service. Where an upgrade is taken, choose the destination branch rather than the nearest fixed release: Apache lists 7.0.x as end of life on 2021-03-31, 8.0.x on 2018-06-30 and 8.5.x on 2024-03-31, all archived or superseded, with 9.0.x, 10.1.x and 11.0.x supported, so 8.5.23 and 7.0.82 are landing points on branches that are themselves finished.",
     "affected": "Apache Tomcat across four release lines with no operating-system restriction: 9.0.0.M1 through 9.0.0, 8.5.0 through 8.5.22, 8.0.0.RC1 through 8.0.46, and 7.0.0 through 7.0.81 — wherever the Default servlet's readonly initialisation parameter has been set to false. Because the exposure is the servlet container rather than any one application, it reaches every product that embeds a Tomcat of those vintages: appliance and management consoles, vendor-packaged Java application stacks, and internal builds that bundle their own container. Scope the sweep by the Tomcat build in the deployment, not by the version of the product wrapping it, and treat Windows and Linux alike here — Metasploit ships targets for both.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 through 9.0.0 (fixed in 9.0.1, released 30 September 2017)",
@@ -55886,7 +55886,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed firmware is identified in NVD's reference set or in the CISA KEV record, and CISA's required action for this CVE is not the usual patch instruction but 'The impacted product is end-of-life and should be disconnected if still in use.' Remediation is therefore removal: replace the unit with a supported gateway rather than searching for an update. patch_required_reboot is false because there is nothing to install, not because remediation is disruption-free — replacing the gateway drops every connection behind it. Two interim measures are available on a unit that cannot be replaced today, and neither is a fix: change the administrative credential away from the shipped default, which removes the trivial path through the PR:L precondition, and disable remote (WAN-side) management, which removes internet reachability of the administration interface. Neither helps against a client already on the LAN — every host behind the router reaches /dnslookup.cgi — so a unit that stays in service should be treated as an untrusted device on its own isolated segment until it is gone.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed firmware is identified in NVD's reference set or in the CISA KEV record, and CISA's required action for this CVE is not the usual patch instruction but 'The impacted product is end-of-life and should be disconnected if still in use.' Remediation is therefore removal: replace the unit with a supported gateway rather than searching for an update. No reboot is recorded as required because there is nothing to install, not because remediation is disruption-free; replacing the gateway drops every connection behind it. Two interim measures are available on a unit that cannot be replaced today, and neither is a fix: change the administrative credential away from the shipped default, which removes the trivial path through the PR:L precondition, and disable remote (WAN-side) management, which removes internet reachability of the administration interface. Neither helps against a client already on the LAN (every host behind the router reaches /dnslookup.cgi), so a unit that stays in service should be treated as an untrusted device on its own isolated segment until it is gone.",
     "affected": "NETGEAR DGN2200 wireless ADSL modem routers, hardware revisions v1, v2, v3 and v4, with firmware through 10.0.0.50 — the version bound and the four revisions come from NVD's configuration set. The exposed surface is the router's own web administration interface, reachable by every client on the LAN it serves and, where remote management was enabled, from the WAN side as well. Scope this as a device replacement exercise rather than a patch sweep: a DGN2200 carries no enterprise management agent, so it appears in a software inventory only where something outside the device enrolled it, and where the unit provides home-office, remote-worker or small-branch connectivity it sits on a network a corporate scanner does not reach.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "NETGEAR DGN2200v1, DGN2200v2, DGN2200v3 and DGN2200v4 with firmware through 10.0.0.50 (NVD configuration set)",
@@ -58709,7 +58709,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2020-1956 (CWE-78, CVSS 8.8) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-25) + Apache Kylin user-list advisory r1332ef34; root cause detailed by RIPS/SonarSource, migrate-endpoint sink confirmed against the Nuclei template.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-1956 to KEV on 2022-03-25; that listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The KEV record carries no ransomware association (known_ransomware_use false). EPSS 0.97337 (99.9th percentile) reflects a mature, weaponized exploit path rather than any single named campaign in the sources reviewed.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-1956 to KEV on 2022-03-25; that listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The KEV record carries no ransomware association (no known ransomware use is recorded). EPSS 0.97337 (99.9th percentile) reflects a mature, weaponized exploit path rather than any single named campaign in the sources reviewed.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1059.004"
@@ -58811,7 +58811,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2020-2021 (CWE-347, CVSS 10.0) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-25, ransomware: Known) + Palo Alto Networks advisory CVE-2020-2021; reported by Salman Khan and Cameron Duck, Monash University.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "Palo Alto Networks stated at the 2020-06-29 disclosure it was not aware of malicious exploitation. CISA subsequently added CVE-2020-2021 to KEV on 2022-03-25, and the KEV record marks known ransomware-campaign use (known_ransomware_use true); the KEV listing is the in-the-wild evidence and the vendor's original 'not aware' note predates it, so the two are consistent in time rather than contradictory.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Palo Alto Networks stated at the 2020-06-29 disclosure it was not aware of malicious exploitation. CISA subsequently added CVE-2020-2021 to KEV on 2022-03-25, and the KEV record marks known ransomware-campaign use; the KEV listing is the in-the-wild evidence and the vendor's original 'not aware' note predates it, so the two are consistent in time rather than contradictory.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1133",
@@ -58916,7 +58916,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2020-2506 (CWE-284, CVSS 9.8) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-25) + QNAP advisory QSA-20-08 (published 2020-10-07, revised 2021-03-11); reported by Jose Antonio Pérez Piedra.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-2506 to KEV on 2022-03-25; that listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The KEV record carries no ransomware association (known_ransomware_use false), and QNAP's QSA-20-08 names no campaign, actor or incident — it states only that 'Two vulnerabilities have been reported to affect earlier versions of QTS'. The KEV entry is the exploitation evidence for this CVE.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-2506 to KEV on 2022-03-25; that listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The KEV record carries no ransomware association, and QNAP's QSA-20-08 names no campaign, actor or incident; it states only that 'Two vulnerabilities have been reported to affect earlier versions of QTS'. The KEV entry is the exploitation evidence for this CVE.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1078"
@@ -59023,7 +59023,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2020-25223 (CWE-78, CVSS 9.8) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-25) + Sophos advisory community.sophos.com/.../advisory-resolved-rce-in-sg-utm-webadmin-cve-2020-25223; mechanism reconstructed by Atredis Partners (Justin Kennedy, 2021-08-18).",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-25223 to KEV on 2022-03-25; the KEV listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The record carries no ransomware association (known_ransomware_use false). EPSS 0.96693 (99.9th percentile) reflects the mature, publicly weaponized exploit path; no single named campaign appears in the sources reviewed.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-25223 to KEV on 2022-03-25; the KEV listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The record carries no ransomware association (no known ransomware use is recorded for it). EPSS 0.96693 (99.9th percentile) reflects the mature, publicly weaponized exploit path; no single named campaign appears in the sources reviewed.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1059.004"
@@ -59229,7 +59229,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2020-5410 (CWE-22/CWE-23, CVSS 7.5) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-25) + VMware Tanzu/Spring advisory cve-2020-5410 (published 2020-06-01), which credits Fei Lu and a second reporter it lists only by an obfuscated email address.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-5410 to KEV on 2022-03-25; the KEV listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The record carries no ransomware association (known_ransomware_use false). EPSS 0.95586 (99.9th percentile) reflects the widely available scanner/template tooling; no single named campaign appears in the sources reviewed.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-5410 to KEV on 2022-03-25; the KEV listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The record carries no ransomware association (no known ransomware use is recorded for it). EPSS 0.95586 (99.9th percentile) reflects the widely available scanner/template tooling; no single named campaign appears in the sources reviewed.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1083"
@@ -59331,7 +59331,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Curated from NVD CVE-2020-7247 (CWE-78/CWE-755, CVSS 9.8) + CISA KEV (added 2022-03-25) + OpenBSD advisory (errata 6.6 019, 2020-01-30); root cause and exploitation published by the Qualys Security Advisory team.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
-    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-7247 to KEV on 2022-03-25; the KEV listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The record carries no ransomware association (known_ransomware_use false). EPSS 0.98946 (99.9th percentile) sits in the top tenth of a percent and matches the multiple public weaponized exploits; no single named campaign appears in the sources reviewed.",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "CISA added CVE-2020-7247 to KEV on 2022-03-25; the KEV listing is CISA's evidence of in-the-wild use. The record carries no ransomware association, and this entry records no known ransomware use. EPSS 0.98946 (99.9th percentile) sits in the top tenth of a percent and matches the multiple public weaponized exploits; no single named campaign appears in the sources reviewed.",
     "attack_refs": [
       "T1190",
       "T1059.004"
@@ -60096,7 +60096,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": true,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Mitel PSA 22-0001 as published lists affected versions — MiCollab 'Prior to and including R9.4SP1' and MiVoice Business Express 'Prior to and including R8.1' — and records 'N/A' under Mitigation / Recommended Action, so it names neither a fixed release nor a restart requirement. The fixed build comes from NVD, which sets the boundary at MiCollab before 9.4 SP1 FP1. Cloudflare's contemporaneous account records that Mitel's 2022-02-22 advisory recommended 'customers to block exploitation attempts using a firewall, until a software patch is made available', and gives the boundary expression as (udp.dstport eq 10074); that block lands immediately and needs no appliance change. patch_required_reboot is set true against the appliance software upgrade being the remediation path, not against any vendor statement about a restart — no Mitel document consulted carries one.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Mitel PSA 22-0001 as published lists affected versions (MiCollab 'Prior to and including R9.4SP1' and MiVoice Business Express 'Prior to and including R8.1') and records 'N/A' under Mitigation / Recommended Action, so it names neither a fixed release nor a restart requirement. The fixed build comes from NVD, which sets the boundary at MiCollab before 9.4 SP1 FP1. Cloudflare's contemporaneous account records that Mitel's 2022-02-22 advisory recommended 'customers to block exploitation attempts using a firewall, until a software patch is made available', and gives the boundary expression as (udp.dstport eq 10074); that block lands immediately and needs no appliance change. This entry records that applying the fix requires a reboot because the remediation path is an appliance software upgrade, not because of any vendor statement about a restart; no Mitel document consulted carries one.",
     "affected": "Mitel MiCollab before 9.4 SP1 FP1 and MiVoice Business Express through 8.1, via the embedded TP-240 (tp240dvr) VoIP interface-card driver used for analog and digital trunk interfaces.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Mitel MiCollab < 9.4 SP1 FP1 (fixed in 9.4 SP1 FP1)",
@@ -60862,7 +60862,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "OpenSSL 1.0.1g, released 2014-04-07, fixes the 1.0.1 line; 1.0.2-beta2 fixes the beta line; distributions backported the change into their own 1.0.1 packages. The advisory's own alternative for anyone who could not upgrade was recompiling with -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS, which removes the code path outright. patch_required_reboot is false, and that is precisely where this remediation goes wrong: upgrading the package does not change the code already mapped into a running process, so every daemon linked against libssl — web servers, mail servers, VPN concentrators, load balancers, database front ends, appliance firmware — keeps serving the vulnerable handler until that process restarts. Verify against the live listener, not the package version. And because the primitive is memory disclosure, restarting is still not remediation for an exposed service: private keys must be regenerated with certificates reissued and the old ones revoked, sessions invalidated, and every credential that transited the service rotated, because whatever leaked before the restart remains valid afterwards.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "OpenSSL 1.0.1g, released 2014-04-07, fixes the 1.0.1 line; 1.0.2-beta2 fixes the beta line; distributions backported the change into their own 1.0.1 packages. The advisory's own alternative for anyone who could not upgrade was recompiling with -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS, which removes the code path outright. Applying the fix does not require a reboot, and that is precisely where this remediation goes wrong: upgrading the package does not change the code already mapped into a running process, so every daemon linked against libssl (web servers, mail servers, VPN concentrators, load balancers, database front ends, appliance firmware) keeps serving the vulnerable handler until that process restarts. Verify against the live listener, not the package version. And because the primitive is memory disclosure, restarting is still not remediation for an exposed service: private keys must be regenerated with certificates reissued and the old ones revoked, sessions invalidated, and every credential that transited the service rotated, because whatever leaked before the restart remains valid afterwards.",
     "affected": "OpenSSL itself, and therefore every product that links an affected build: Apache httpd and nginx, mail servers, OpenVPN and SSL VPN concentrators, load balancers and reverse proxies, database servers, embedded and appliance firmware, Android 4.1.1, and client software that terminates TLS. The defect is in the library, so a sweep scoped to the named server packages misses the appliance and firmware population — and the appliance case is exactly where the first confirmed exploitation landed, against an SSL VPN concentrator whose vendor-supplied OpenSSL no operator could upgrade independently of a vendor image.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "OpenSSL 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f — affected (fixed in 1.0.1g, released 2014-04-07)",
@@ -61081,7 +61081,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "InduSoft Web Studio v7.1 + SP2 + Patch 4 is the fixed level; anything below it on the 7.1 line is exploitable. patch_required_reboot is false in the host-reboot sense, and that flag understates the operational cost here: the service-pack install stops NTWebServer and in practice the HMI runtime on that node goes down with it, so this is a plant maintenance window scheduled against production, not a background update — which is why these nodes sit at old patch levels for years. The stronger remediation is the vendor's own guidance rather than the patch. InduSoft states NTWebServer is intended for demonstration and training and should not be used in a production environment, so on a production node the terminal state is disabling or removing the component and serving any thin-client requirement from a hardened web server instead. Where it must stay for now, restrict it to the engineering segment. Any node that was reachable while exposed needs its project .APP passwords rotated — the entire point of the defect is that those passwords left the site.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "InduSoft Web Studio v7.1 + SP2 + Patch 4 is the fixed level; anything below it on the 7.1 line is exploitable. This entry records that applying the fix does not require a host reboot, and that record understates the operational cost here: the service-pack install stops NTWebServer and in practice the HMI runtime on that node goes down with it, so this is a plant maintenance window scheduled against production, not a background update, which is why these nodes sit at old patch levels for years. The stronger remediation is the vendor's own guidance rather than the patch. InduSoft states NTWebServer is intended for demonstration and training and should not be used in a production environment, so on a production node the terminal state is disabling or removing the component and serving any thin-client requirement from a hardened web server instead. Where it must stay for now, restrict it to the engineering segment. Any node that was reachable while exposed needs its project .APP passwords rotated: the entire point of the defect is that those passwords left the site.",
     "affected": "InduSoft Web Studio, the HMI/SCADA development and runtime product, specifically the bundled NTWebServer component. Exposure sits on whichever node runs NTWebServer with a project loaded — typically an engineering workstation or an HMI runtime server — and reaches every file that process can read, so one exposed node discloses the project credentials for the application it hosts and, through them, the process that application controls. InduSoft Web Studio has historically been OEM-rebadged under other vendors' names, and CISA's earlier ICS-ALERT-13-004-01 covered an NTWebServer traversal under the Advantech Studio name; an estate scoped only to installations labelled InduSoft can therefore miss rebadged builds, so confirm build lineage per installation rather than reading it off the splash screen.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "InduSoft Web Studio 7.1 before SP2 Patch 4 — affected (fixed in v7.1 + SP2 + P4)",
@@ -61156,7 +61156,7 @@
     "type": "kernel-null-pointer-dereference-lpe",
     "blast_radius": 22,
     "poc_available": true,
-    "poc_description": "Metasploit ships exploit/windows/local/ms14_058_track_popup_menu (modules/exploits/windows/local/ms14_058_track_popup_menu.rb in rapid7/metasploit-framework), mirrored as Exploit-DB 35101 'Microsoft Windows - TrackPopupMenu Win32k Null Pointer Dereference (MS14-058) (Metasploit)', with a standalone version at Exploit-DB 39666 'Microsoft Windows Kernel - win32k.sys Local Privilege Escalation (MS14-058)'. Blue Frost Security published a technical write-up on exploiting this CVE on Windows 8.1, where the original NULL-page technique no longer applies, but labs.bluefrostsecurity.de no longer resolves and that material is analysis rather than shipped exploit code — poc_available stands on the Metasploit module and the two Exploit-DB entries alone.",
+    "poc_description": "Metasploit ships exploit/windows/local/ms14_058_track_popup_menu (modules/exploits/windows/local/ms14_058_track_popup_menu.rb in rapid7/metasploit-framework), mirrored as Exploit-DB 35101 'Microsoft Windows - TrackPopupMenu Win32k Null Pointer Dereference (MS14-058) (Metasploit)', with a standalone version at Exploit-DB 39666 'Microsoft Windows Kernel - win32k.sys Local Privilege Escalation (MS14-058)'. Blue Frost Security published a technical write-up on exploiting this CVE on Windows 8.1, where the original NULL-page technique no longer applies, but labs.bluefrostsecurity.de no longer resolves and that material is analysis rather than shipped exploit code. This entry records a proof of concept as available on the strength of the Metasploit module and the two Exploit-DB entries alone.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "A process running as a standard user account whose token changes to SYSTEM without a service start, a scheduled task, or an authorised elevation event — the escalation's whole signature is the token, since nothing crashes and nothing is installed",
@@ -68660,7 +68660,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Fixed versions are Office 2013 SP1 below 15.0.5381.1000 (KB5001958, 32- and 64-bit) and Office 2016 below 16.0.5215.1000; Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise and Office 2019 update through their own servicing channels rather than to a single build. patch_required_reboot is false because this is an application update and not a host reboot — but do not read that as 'nothing to coordinate': every Office process on the machine must exit and relaunch before the fixed engine binaries are loaded, and an MSI-based Office 2013 or 2016 install can still ask for a restart when the files are locked, so a workstation that took the update while Outlook stayed open is not remediated. Office 2013 reached end of support in April 2023 and Office 2016 and 2019 in October 2025, so for those lines the update is a historical fix and the terminal state is migration to a supported release. There is no live-patch or hot-patch path for the Office data engine.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "Fixed versions are Office 2013 SP1 below 15.0.5381.1000 (KB5001958, 32- and 64-bit) and Office 2016 below 16.0.5215.1000; Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise and Office 2019 update through their own servicing channels rather than to a single build. This entry records that applying the fix does not require a reboot, because this is an application update and not a host reboot. But do not read that as 'nothing to coordinate': every Office process on the machine must exit and relaunch before the fixed engine binaries are loaded, and an MSI-based Office 2013 or 2016 install can still ask for a restart when the files are locked, so a workstation that took the update while Outlook stayed open is not remediated. Office 2013 reached end of support in April 2023 and Office 2016 and 2019 in October 2025, so for those lines the update is a historical fix and the terminal state is migration to a supported release. There is no live-patch or hot-patch path for the Office data engine.",
     "affected": "Every Office installation carrying the Access Connectivity Engine, which is far wider than the Access application: Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise (16.0.1 and later on the affected channels), Microsoft Office 2013 Service Pack 1, Microsoft Office 2016 and Microsoft Office 2019. The engine is a shared data-access component rather than an Access-only feature, so scoping remediation to machines with Access installed under-counts the estate — any Office install on those product lines is in scope until its version is verified.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "Microsoft Office 2013 Service Pack 1 15.0.0 <= 15.0.5380.x (fixed 15.0.5381.1000, KB5001958 32-bit and 64-bit); product reached end of support April 2023 — migrate",
@@ -73146,7 +73146,7 @@
     "type": "legacy-file-format-converter-buffer-overflow-rce",
     "blast_radius": 19,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code found. Exploit-DB returns no entry for CVE-2010-2572, and no Metasploit module targets it — the Office file-format modules of that era cover neighbouring bulletins, not MS10-088's PowerPoint 95 parsing bug. What exists is a detection signature: Microsoft publishes a threat description for Exploit:Win32/CVE-2010-2572.A covering specially-crafted PowerPoint files that exploit this vulnerability (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit%3AWin32%2FCVE-2010-2572.A). That is evidence that weaponized samples reached Microsoft's telemetry, not evidence of obtainable exploit code, so this entry is recorded as poc_available false.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was found. Exploit-DB returns no entry for CVE-2010-2572, and no Metasploit module targets it. The Office file-format modules of that era cover neighboring bulletins, not MS10-088's PowerPoint 95 parsing bug. What exists is a detection signature: Microsoft publishes a threat description for Exploit:Win32/CVE-2010-2572.A covering specially-crafted PowerPoint files that exploit this vulnerability (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit%3AWin32%2FCVE-2010-2572.A). That is evidence that weaponized samples reached Microsoft's telemetry, not evidence of obtainable exploit code, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "POWERPNT.EXE loading a converter from the Office Xlators directory — PP7X32.DLL on PowerPoint 2002 — while opening a file that arrived by mail or from an untrusted share",
@@ -80272,7 +80272,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Fixed in Photo Station 6.0.3 (QTS 4.4.1), 5.7.10 (QTS 4.3.4-4.4.0), 5.4.9 (QTS 4.3.0-4.3.3) and 5.2.11 (QTS 4.2.6), alongside QTS builds 20190918 (4.4.1) / 20190919 (4.3.6). No live-patch path. The Photo Station app update lands via App Center and restarts the app rather than the whole NAS, so patch_required_reboot is false for the app itself; a paired QTS firmware update does require a reboot. Because ransomware targeted WAN-reachable QNAP NAS, a device that was internet-exposed while unpatched must be treated as compromised — rebuild config, rotate credentials, disable or remove Photo Station, and take the NAS off the public internet rather than only updating the app.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "The flaw is fixed in Photo Station 6.0.3 (QTS 4.4.1), 5.7.10 (QTS 4.3.4-4.4.0), 5.4.9 (QTS 4.3.0-4.3.3) and 5.2.11 (QTS 4.2.6), alongside QTS builds 20190918 (4.4.1) / 20190919 (4.3.6). No live patch is available. The Photo Station app update is installed through App Center and restarts the app rather than the whole NAS, so applying the fix does not require a reboot for the app itself; a paired QTS firmware update does require a reboot. Because ransomware targeted WAN-reachable QNAP NAS, a device that was internet-exposed while unpatched must be treated as compromised: rebuild config, rotate credentials, disable or remove Photo Station, and take the NAS off the public internet rather than only updating the app.",
     "affected": "QNAP NAS running Photo Station on QTS. The traversal is in the Photo Station application, so any QTS NAS with a vulnerable Photo Station build installed and reachable is affected regardless of hardware model.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "QTS 4.2.6: Photo Station before 5.2.11 (fixed in 5.2.11)",
@@ -80377,7 +80377,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "Fixed in the same Photo Station builds as CVE-2019-7194 — 6.0.3 (QTS 4.4.1), 5.7.10 (QTS 4.3.4-4.4.0), 5.4.9 (QTS 4.3.0-4.3.3), 5.2.11 (QTS 4.2.6) — with QTS builds 20190918/20190919. No live-patch path; the app update restarts Photo Station rather than rebooting the NAS, so patch_required_reboot is false for the app fix while a paired QTS firmware update does need a reboot. A NAS that was WAN-exposed while unpatched must be treated as compromised: isolate, rebuild config, rotate credentials, and remove Photo Station / take the appliance off the public internet.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "The flaw is fixed in the same Photo Station builds as CVE-2019-7194: 6.0.3 (QTS 4.4.1), 5.7.10 (QTS 4.3.4-4.4.0), 5.4.9 (QTS 4.3.0-4.3.3) and 5.2.11 (QTS 4.2.6), with QTS builds 20190918/20190919. There is no live-patch path; the app update restarts Photo Station rather than rebooting the NAS, so applying the app fix does not require a reboot, while a paired QTS firmware update does need a reboot. A NAS that was WAN-exposed while unpatched must be treated as compromised: isolate, rebuild config, rotate credentials, and remove Photo Station / take the appliance off the public internet.",
     "affected": "QNAP NAS running Photo Station on QTS — any QTS model with a vulnerable Photo Station build installed and reachable.",
     "affected_versions": [
       "QTS 4.2.6: Photo Station before 5.2.11 (fixed in 5.2.11)",
@@ -80709,7 +80709,7 @@
     "type": "kernel-memory-corruption-lpe",
     "blast_radius": 18,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code or weaponized template for CVE-2020-9907 was found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, or a resolvable public repository. The finder (08Tc3wBB / ZecOps) is credited in Apple HT211288, but no PoC artifact for this specific CVE was located; treating it as poc_available:false is the honest state.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code or weaponized template for CVE-2020-9907 was found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, or a resolvable public repository. The finder (08Tc3wBB / ZecOps) is credited in Apple HT211288, but no PoC artifact for this specific CVE was located; this entry therefore records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "An installed app opening the AVEVideoEncoder user client and issuing malformed video-encode requests, followed by a kernel fault",
@@ -80817,7 +80817,7 @@
     "type": "browser-policy-enforcement-bypass-navigation",
     "blast_radius": 26,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No weaponized exploit repo, Nuclei template, or Metasploit module for CVE-2021-30533 was located; the crbug for this CVE (1145553) is access-restricted per Chromium's disclosure policy. The forced-redirect/malvertising technique class it enables is described publicly by Confiant (Eliya Stein's team), but a specific resolvable exploit artifact for this CVE was not found, so poc_available is false.",
+    "poc_description": "No weaponized exploit repo, Nuclei template, or Metasploit module for CVE-2021-30533 was located; the crbug for this CVE (1145553) is access-restricted per Chromium's disclosure policy. The forced-redirect/malvertising technique class it enables is described publicly by Confiant (Eliya Stein's team), but a specific resolvable exploit artifact for this CVE was not found, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Chromium browsers performing navigations or popups that should have been blocked, originating from pages hosting crafted nested iframes",
@@ -80916,7 +80916,7 @@
     "type": "kernel-buffer-overflow-lpe",
     "blast_radius": 19,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code or weaponized template for CVE-2021-30983 was found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, or a resolvable public repository. It was found by the Pangu team at the Tianfu Cup competition, where exploits are reported privately to the vendor and not published; treating it as poc_available:false is the honest state.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code or weaponized template for CVE-2021-30983 was found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, or a resolvable public repository. It was found by the Pangu team at the Tianfu Cup competition, where exploits are reported privately to the vendor and not published; treating it as having no available proof of concept is the honest state.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "An installed app opening the IOMobileFrameBuffer user client with malformed parameters, followed by a kernel fault",
@@ -81668,7 +81668,7 @@
     "type": "preauth-memcache-crlf-injection-credential-theft",
     "blast_radius": 21,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No weaponized public exploit code was resolvable: no GitHub repository under CVE-2022-27924 with working code, no Exploit-DB entry, and the ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template http/cves/2022/CVE-2022-27924.yaml is version-detection only (it fetches /js/zimbraMail/share/model/ZmSettings.js and matches on the 8.8.15/9.0 banner, not the memcache injection). The memcache-CRLF-injection technique was documented publicly by SonarSource, but that write-up was not resolvable at fetch time and no copy-paste exploit was confirmed, so poc_available is recorded honestly as false.",
+    "poc_description": "No weaponized public exploit code was resolvable: no GitHub repository under CVE-2022-27924 with working code, no Exploit-DB entry, and the ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template http/cves/2022/CVE-2022-27924.yaml is version-detection only (it fetches /js/zimbraMail/share/model/ZmSettings.js and matches on the 8.8.15/9.0 banner, not the memcache injection). The memcache-CRLF-injection technique was documented publicly by SonarSource, but that write-up was not resolvable at fetch time and no copy-paste exploit was confirmed, so this entry honestly records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Anomalous memcached set/overwrite activity on the Zimbra route cache not originating from legitimate mailbox provisioning",
@@ -83707,7 +83707,7 @@
     "type": "preauth-dos",
     "blast_radius": 8,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No reliable public exploit or PoC is documented. CISA KEV lists in-the-wild denial-of-service activity against .NET / ASP.NET Core (Kestrel) endpoints, but no reproducible weaponized PoC has been published, so poc_available is kept false rather than guessed true.",
+    "poc_description": "No reliable public exploit or PoC is documented. CISA KEV lists in-the-wild denial-of-service activity against .NET / ASP.NET Core (Kestrel) endpoints, but no reproducible weaponized PoC has been published, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available rather than guessing that one is.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Addressed by Microsoft in the August 2023 Patch Tuesday. No AI tooling credited with discovery.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
@@ -93211,7 +93211,7 @@
     "type": "use-after-free-rce",
     "blast_radius": 15,
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "The upstream Chromium bug (crbug.com/1340253) remained access-restricted and no reliable public exploit/PoC is documented. CISA KEV asserts in-the-wild exploitation of this Network Service use-after-free, but without a reproducible published PoC poc_available is kept false rather than guessed true.",
+    "poc_description": "The upstream Chromium bug (crbug.com/1340253) remained access-restricted and no reliable public exploit/PoC is documented. CISA KEV asserts in-the-wild exploitation of this Network Service use-after-free, but without a reproducible published PoC, this entry records no proof of concept as available rather than guessing that one exists.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Reported by Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero. No AI tooling credited.",
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
@@ -124408,12 +124408,12 @@
     "cvss_correction_note": "NVD-assigned 9.8 CRITICAL (published 2022-03-16). Vector verbatim from NVD / GHSA-97m3-w2cp-4xx6. RWEP (below) captures the geo-gating that the worst-case CVSS base score does not. NVD scopes the bundled peacenotwar protestware (11.0.0+) under this same CVE id.",
     "cisa_kev": false,
     "cisa_kev_date": null,
-    "kev_scope_note": "Local grep of .cache/upstream/kev/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (catalogVersion 2026.05.13, 1590 entries) for CVE-2022-23812 returned 0 matches (cross-checked against 130 CVE-2022 entries present, so the 0 is a true absence). CISA KEV historically excludes npm-ecosystem malicious-package events lacking a federally-deployable product; cisa_kev:false is correct.",
+    "kev_scope_note": "Local grep of .cache/upstream/kev/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (catalogVersion 2026.05.13, 1590 entries) for CVE-2022-23812 returned 0 matches (cross-checked against 130 CVE-2022 entries present, so the 0 is a true absence). CISA KEV historically excludes npm-ecosystem malicious-package events lacking a federally-deployable product; the entry correctly records that CVE-2022-23812 is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.",
     "poc_available": true,
     "poc_description": "Live malicious payload — node-ipc 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 (published 2022-03-07/08 by maintainer RIAEvangelist) shipped the file-overwrite logic to the public npm registry and were installable before npm removal. The malicious build IS the PoC; source preserved in archival mirrors and analyzed by Snyk (SNYK-JS-NODEIPC-2426370) and Orca (2022).",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "Community / vendor analysis of the published versions within hours (Snyk, GitHub Security Lab, Vue CLI consumers). No AI tool credited; with ai_discovered:false the schema prescribes human_researcher.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Community and vendor analysis of the published versions took place within hours (Snyk, GitHub Security Lab, Vue CLI consumers). No AI tool is credited; because the entry records that it was not AI-discovered, the schema prescribes human_researcher.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "ai_assisted_notes": "Hand-authored JavaScript by the package maintainer (geo-IP check + recursive file overwrite). No AI-generated-code fingerprint reported.",
     "active_exploitation": "suspected",
@@ -124461,7 +124461,7 @@
       "live_patch_available": 0,
       "reboot_required": 0
     },
-    "rwep_rationale": "Sum = 0+20+0+10+12-15+0+0 = 27 (Shape-B, verified vs lib/scoring.js). poc_available=20 (live payload). active_exploitation=10 ('suspected' ladder x0.5x20 — presence documented, victim impact not confirmed). blast_radius=12 — broad download EXPOSURE (~1M weekly, transitive via Vue CLI) but the DESTRUCTIVE payload is geo-gated to RU/BY, narrowing real blast vs the global MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER's 28. patch_available=-15 (10.1.3 removed it). live_patch_available=0 (no registry-side live-patch tooling for a 2022 incident). Below the 2026 stealer's 43, reflecting geo-gated impact and no confirmed exploitation.",
+    "rwep_rationale": "The sum is 0+20+0+10+12-15+0+0 = 27 (Shape-B, verified against lib/scoring.js). A proof of concept is available, which adds 20 (live payload). Active exploitation is suspected, which adds 10 ('suspected' ladder x0.5x20; presence is documented and victim impact is not confirmed). The blast-radius factor is 12: download EXPOSURE is broad (~1M weekly, transitive via Vue CLI), but the DESTRUCTIVE payload is geo-gated to RU/BY, which narrows the real blast radius compared with the global MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER's 28. A fixed release is available, which subtracts 15 (10.1.3 removed it). No live patch is available, so that factor is 0 (no registry-side live-patch tooling exists for a 2022 incident). The score is below the 2026 stealer's 43, reflecting geo-gated impact and no confirmed exploitation.",
     "epss_score": null,
     "epss_date": "2026-05-30",
     "epss_note": "EPSS coverage is not carried for this 2022 npm malicious-package CVE; null.",
@@ -124541,7 +124541,7 @@
     "cvss_correction_note": "No NVD CVE assigned as of 2026-05-30; CVSS synthesized per OSSF Malicious-Packages convention. AV:N (payload reaches victim via npm/PyPI/crates.io registry channel); UI:R (developer/CI runs install, import, or `cargo build`); S:C (exfiltrated AWS/GitHub/SSH/wallet material + AI-assistant prompt-injection extends blast radius beyond the consuming process). A:L rather than A:H — this is a stealer, not a wiper/ransom payload. Synthesized, marked UNVERIFIED-as-formal-CVSS.",
     "cisa_kev": false,
     "cisa_kev_date": null,
-    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV scope excludes ecosystem malicious-package campaigns without an assigned NVD CVE. Local grep of known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (catalogVersion 2026.05.13) for MAL-2026-4207, GHSA-7r6r-hqg7-f6mq, and 'trapdoor' returned 0. cisa_kev:false is correct; active_exploitation:confirmed reflects live registry payloads. Consume OpenSSF MAL feed + Socket/Amazon Inspector advisories for this class.",
+    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV scope excludes ecosystem malicious-package campaigns without an assigned NVD CVE. Local grep of known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (catalogVersion 2026.05.13) for MAL-2026-4207, GHSA-7r6r-hqg7-f6mq, and 'trapdoor' returned 0. Recording the campaign as absent from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is correct; the confirmed active-exploitation status reflects live registry payloads. Consume OpenSSF MAL feed + Socket/Amazon Inspector advisories for this class.",
     "poc_available": true,
     "poc_description": "Live payload. trap-core.js (48,485 bytes / 1,149 lines) shipped across the campaign (19 npm packages per The Hacker News; the GHSA-7r6r-hqg7-f6mq anchor cluster covers 10 npm packages by maintainer ddjidd5640, published 2026-05-19..21); PyPI variants auto-execute on import via `node -e` pulling JS from ddjidd564.github.io; crates.io variants run via build.rs at compile time, XOR-encrypting keystores with hardcoded key 'cargo-build-helper-2026' and exfiltrating to GitHub Gists. The malicious build IS the PoC. [Socket, 2026-05; OSV MAL-2026-4207, 2026-05-26]",
     "ai_discovered": false,
@@ -124604,7 +124604,7 @@
       "live_patch_available": -10,
       "reboot_required": 0
     },
-    "rwep_rationale": "Shape-B stored sum = 0+20+15+20+25-15-10+0 = 55 (verified against lib/scoring.js RWEP_WEIGHTS). poc_available=20 (live payload). ai_factor=15 (AI-assistant prompt-injection weaponization via .cursorrules/CLAUDE.md — ai_assisted_weaponization=true). active_exploitation=20 ('confirmed' ladder; live installable packages observed). blast_radius=25 (34+ packages / 384+ versions / 3 ecosystems — broad campaign, but lure packages carry low individual download counts, so below node-ipc's 28 which sat on a single 3.35M-download core dependency). patch_available=-15 + live_patch_available=-10 (registry removals + Socket/Inspector blocking). Higher than node-ipc's 43 — the AI-assistant poisoning vector (+15 ai_factor that node-ipc lacked) is the delta and the entry's differentiator.",
+    "rwep_rationale": "Shape-B stored sum = 0+20+15+20+25-15-10+0 = 55 (verified against lib/scoring.js RWEP_WEIGHTS). Proof-of-concept availability contributes 20 (live payload). The AI factor contributes 15 (AI-assistant prompt-injection weaponization via .cursorrules/CLAUDE.md; the entry records the weaponization as AI-assisted). Active exploitation contributes 20 ('confirmed' ladder; live installable packages observed). The blast-radius factor contributes 25 (34+ packages / 384+ versions / 3 ecosystems: a broad campaign, but lure packages carry low individual download counts, so it is below node-ipc's 28, which sat on a single 3.35M-download core dependency). Patch availability contributes -15 and live-patch availability contributes -10 (registry removals + Socket/Inspector blocking). The score is higher than node-ipc's 43: the AI-assistant poisoning vector (the +15 AI factor that node-ipc lacked) is the delta and the entry's differentiator.",
     "epss_score": null,
     "epss_date": "2026-05-30",
     "epss_note": "EPSS coverage does not extend to non-CVE OSSF-MAL identifiers as of 2026-05-30.",
@@ -124709,7 +124709,7 @@
     "cvss_correction_note": "No NVD CVE assigned as of 2026-05-30; OSV tracks the campaign as per-package MAL-* records (e.g. MAL-2026-4952 / MAL-2026-4978 / MAL-2026-5032), each aliased to an unscored GHSA malicious-package advisory. CVSS synthesized per OSSF Malicious-Packages convention: unauthenticated code execution on `npm install` when a victim's private internal package name resolves to the attacker's inflated-version public scoped package. AV:N (payload reaches the victim over the npm registry channel); UI:R (a developer / CI must run `npm install` against a project referencing the squatted scope); S:C (full process.env exfil including AWS / NPM / GITHUB tokens extends blast radius beyond the install process); C:H/I:N/A:N — observed payload is reconnaissance/exfiltration only (Microsoft: server-side RECON_ONLY toggle), so no confirmed integrity/availability impact yet. The I:N/A:N is conservative and will move if the toggle is flipped to full exploitation.",
     "cisa_kev": false,
     "cisa_kev_date": null,
-    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm malicious-package events) with no assigned CVE — its scope is federally-deployable products with CVE identifiers. Local KEV snapshot (catalogVersion 2026.05.13) grepped for `moika` / `cloudplatform-single-spa` / `t-in-one` / `dependency confusion` returned 0 hits; the snapshot also predates the 2026-05-27 campaign. `cisa_kev: false` is correct. Consume KEV-equivalent guidance from the OSV MAL feed + GitHub Advisory Database + ecosystem reporting (SafeDep, Microsoft Security).",
+    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm malicious-package events) with no assigned CVE; its scope is federally-deployable products with CVE identifiers. Local KEV snapshot (catalogVersion 2026.05.13) grepped for `moika` / `cloudplatform-single-spa` / `t-in-one` / `dependency confusion` returned 0 hits; the snapshot also predates the 2026-05-27 campaign. Recording the campaign as absent from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is correct. Consume KEV-equivalent guidance from the OSV MAL feed + GitHub Advisory Database + ecosystem reporting (SafeDep, Microsoft Security).",
     "poc_available": true,
     "poc_description": "Live payload — ~164 (escalated to ~179) malicious scoped packages were published to the public npm registry across two waves (2026-05-27 21:15–21:37 UTC; 2026-05-29 09:01–09:02 UTC) by attacker-controlled accounts mr.4nd3r50n / pik-libs / t-in-one (ce-rwb in the Microsoft cluster). The installable malicious build + obfuscated scripts/postinstall.js stager IS the PoC. Source: OSV MAL-2026-4978; SafeDep 2026-05-29; Microsoft Security 2026-05-29.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
@@ -124780,7 +124780,7 @@
       "live_patch_available": -10,
       "reboot_required": 0
     },
-    "rwep_rationale": "RWEP, not CVSS-alone. Sum = 0+20+0+20+28-15-10+0 = 43 (Shape-B, verified vs lib/scoring.js). poc_available=20 (live malicious packages, two waves). active_exploitation=20 (installable + auto-firing postinstall during the windows; Microsoft confirms a deployed-and-running stage). blast_radius=28 (full process.env on a CI runner = total deployment-secret compromise; ~164-179 packages across 8-9 scopes incl. a bank impersonation). patch_available=-15 + live_patch_available=-10 (registry removal + scope->registry pinning structural fix + scanner/Harden-Runner blocking). Matches the MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER exemplar shape (43).",
+    "rwep_rationale": "The score is RWEP, not CVSS alone. Sum = 0+20+0+20+28-15-10+0 = 43 (Shape-B, verified vs lib/scoring.js). Proof-of-concept availability contributes 20 (live malicious packages, two waves). Active exploitation contributes 20 (installable + auto-firing postinstall during the windows; Microsoft confirms a deployed-and-running stage). The blast-radius factor contributes 28 (full process.env on a CI runner = total deployment-secret compromise; ~164-179 packages across 8-9 scopes incl. a bank impersonation). Patch availability contributes -15 and live-patch availability contributes -10 (registry removal + scope->registry pinning structural fix + scanner/Harden-Runner blocking). The score matches the MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER exemplar shape (43).",
     "epss_score": null,
     "epss_date": "2026-05-30",
     "epss_note": "EPSS does not cover non-CVE OSV-MAL identifiers as of 2026-05-30.",
@@ -124870,7 +124870,7 @@
       "forensic_note": "The structural defense is scope→registry pinning, not yank — yanking individual packages does not prevent the NEXT inflated-version publish under the same scope. Audit every internal scope for a public-registry counterpart and pin it. Pull DNS + proxy logs for oob.moika.tech across both exposure windows; the POST to /report is the proof the payload fired AND exfil succeeded (postinstall execution alone does not prove successful exfil)."
     },
     "last_updated": "2026-05-30",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "Concurrent ecosystem detection: SafeDep published the consolidated campaign analysis (https://safedep.io/oob-moika-tech-dependency-confusion-campaign/) OSV cites as the canonical reference; Microsoft Security published independent analysis 2026-05-29. OSV.dev / GitHub Advisory Database assigned per-package MAL-*/GHSA identifiers. No single human researcher credited; no AI-tool credit on the defender side. Discovery class: ecosystem-detection (telemetry/registry-monitoring driven). Source-count ambiguity: package count reported as 164 (SafeDep initial), 179 (SafeDep escalation by 2026-05-29), 45 (Microsoft article body: 26 mr.4nd3r50n + 7 ce-rwb + 12 t-in-one; the \"33\" in the URL slug is superseded by the body); the SafeDep figure is carried in `affected`, the Microsoft figure retained here for audit reconciliation. Scope sets differ between the two reports (8 vs 9 named scopes) — both retained.",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Concurrent ecosystem detection: SafeDep published the consolidated campaign analysis (https://safedep.io/oob-moika-tech-dependency-confusion-campaign/) OSV cites as the canonical reference; Microsoft Security published independent analysis 2026-05-29. OSV.dev / GitHub Advisory Database assigned per-package MAL-*/GHSA identifiers. No single human researcher credited; no AI-tool credit on the defender side. Discovery class: ecosystem-detection (telemetry/registry-monitoring driven). Source-count ambiguity: package count reported as 164 (SafeDep initial), 179 (SafeDep escalation by 2026-05-29), 45 (Microsoft article body: 26 mr.4nd3r50n + 7 ce-rwb + 12 t-in-one; the \"33\" in the URL slug is superseded by the body); the entry's affected-product text gives the SafeDep figure, and this note keeps the Microsoft figure for audit reconciliation. Scope sets differ between the two reports (8 vs 9 named scopes) — both retained.",
     "_editorial_note": "MOIKA (oob.moika.tech) intake: NOVEL attack class for this catalog — first dependency-confusion / internal-scope-squat entry (catalog previously had zero). Distinct from MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER (account-recovery, main-module payload, DNS-TXT exfil): MOIKA is namespace-confusion, postinstall stager, HTTPS-POST exfil, --ignore-scripts-mitigable. Likely warrants a new zeroday-lessons control (PACKAGE-INTERNAL-SCOPE-REGISTRY-PINNING). RWEP 43 (exemplar convention: live_patch_available credited -10).js (would be 43 under the exemplar's -10 convention).",
     "remediation_status": "partially_removed_from_registry",
     "remediation_note": "Malicious packages were reported and are being removed from npm; OSV/GHSA records published 2026-05-28/29. Removal is per-package and reactive — the structural risk (any attacker can re-publish an inflated version under an unpinned internal scope) persists until consuming orgs pin internal scopes to their private registry. UNVERIFIED: whether all ~179 packages were removed and whether all four publisher accounts were deactivated as of 2026-05-30 (no source confirms complete takedown).",
@@ -125681,7 +125681,7 @@
     "poc_description": "Published by Johann Rehberger (Embrace the Red, August 2025). Hidden instructions in any agent-readable content (source comments, README, GitHub issues, tool-call responses) coerce Copilot agent mode to write \"chat.tools.autoApprove\": true to .vscode/settings.json, flipping the agent into 'YOLO mode' where every subsequent shell tool call auto-approves without user confirmation. Demo executes calc.exe / Calculator.app via the autoapproved run_in_terminal tool.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "unknown",
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosure provenance for the original bug discovery is unattributed in published references. Distinct from ai_assisted_weaponization (set true) — ai_assisted_weaponization=AI used to develop the exploit; ai_discovered=AI found the bug. The two fields are NOT interchangeable; clarified here to reconcile with data/exploit-availability.json's ai_discovery_confirmed=false + ai_tool_enabled=true on this CVE.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosure provenance for the original bug discovery is unattributed in published references. This is distinct from the AI-assisted weaponization flag (set true): that flag records that AI was used to develop the exploit, while the AI-discovered flag records that AI found the bug. The two fields are NOT interchangeable; this note clarifies them to reconcile with data/exploit-availability.json's ai_discovery_confirmed=false + ai_tool_enabled=true on this CVE.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": true,
     "ai_assisted_notes": "The vulnerability IS in an AI tool (Copilot agent mode). Attack chain bottlenecks on a structural settings-file write — converts the 'any text could be injection' fuzzy detection problem into a one-line filesystem IoC.",
     "active_exploitation": "suspected",
@@ -125791,7 +125791,7 @@
     "attack_class": "mcp-supply-chain",
     "cvss_score": 8,
     "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
-    "cvss_correction_note": "v0.12.9 (2026-05-13): catalog previously stored CVSS 9.8 / AV:N. NVD authoritative is 8.0 / AV:L (local attack vector; attacker must control HTML content the Windsurf MCP client processes — not a network-vector zero-interaction RCE as initially cataloged). Source: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30615 (published 2026-04-15, last_modified 2026-04-27, vulnStatus: Deferred). Recompute RWEP with blast_radius reduced from 30→20 to reflect local-vector + Scope:U.",
+    "cvss_correction_note": "v0.12.9 (2026-05-13): catalog previously stored CVSS 9.8 / AV:N. NVD authoritative is 8.0 / AV:L (local attack vector; attacker must control HTML content the Windsurf MCP client processes; the vulnerability is not a network-vector zero-interaction RCE as initially cataloged). Source: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30615 (published 2026-04-15, last_modified 2026-04-27, vulnStatus: Deferred). Recompute RWEP with the blast-radius factor reduced from 30→20 to reflect local-vector + Scope:U.",
     "cisa_kev": false,
     "cisa_kev_date": null,
     "poc_available": true,
@@ -126046,7 +126046,7 @@
         "Unprivileged process holding open file descriptor to /proc/self/mem or /proc/<other_pid>/mem in write mode"
       ],
       "livepatch_gap": [
-        "Kernel version in affected_versions range AND /sys/kernel/livepatch/*/cve-ids does NOT contain CVE-2026-31431 — treat as EXPOSED regardless of generic livepatch-active flag",
+        "Kernel version in the affected version range listed for this entry AND /sys/kernel/livepatch/*/cve-ids does NOT contain CVE-2026-31431: treat as EXPOSED regardless of generic livepatch-active flag",
         "RHEL: kpatch-livepatch-*-CVE-2026-31431 RPM installed but not in `kpatch list` Loaded patch modules section (package-installed-without-load silent exposure)",
         "Ubuntu: `canonical-livepatch status --verbose` 'fixes:' list does not include CVE-2026-31431 while kernel in affected range"
       ],
@@ -126426,7 +126426,7 @@
       ]
     },
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "RWEP bump:v0.12.29 ai-discovery audit re-attributed to ai_discovered=true; ai_factor advanced from 0 to 15; rwep raised by 15 from 38 to 53.",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "RWEP bump: the v0.12.29 AI-discovery audit re-attributed this vulnerability as AI-discovered. The AI factor advanced from 0 to 15, and the RWEP score rose by 15, from 38 to 53.",
     "last_verified": "2026-08-08"
   },
   "CVE-2026-43500": {
@@ -126584,7 +126584,7 @@
     },
     "pairing_note": "CVE-2026-43500 only realizes its full primitive when chained with CVE-2026-43284. Detection of either subsystem being exercised on a host that should have neither is itself the chain-detection signal. Simultaneous match of esp-module-loaded-no-policy AND rxrpc-active-call-no-afs-config should escalate to a deterministic paired finding.",
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "RWEP bump:v0.12.29 ai-discovery audit re-attributed to ai_discovered=true; ai_factor advanced from 0 to 15; rwep raised by 15 from 32 to 47.",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "RWEP bump: the v0.12.29 AI-discovery audit re-attributed this vulnerability as AI-discovered. The AI factor advanced from 0 to 15, and the RWEP score rose by 15, from 32 to 47.",
     "last_verified": "2026-08-08"
   },
   "CVE-2026-45321": {
@@ -126596,7 +126596,7 @@
     "cisa_kev_date": "2026-05-27",
     "cisa_kev_pending": true,
     "cisa_kev_pending_reason": "Attack disclosed 2026-05-11. Active in-the-wild exploitation of 42 @tanstack/* packages with combined ~150M weekly downloads. CISA KEV listing expected within standard review window.",
-    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV historically excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm/PyPI worms, malicious-package backdoors) — its scope is federally-deployable products with CVE assignments. The Mini Shai-Hulud parent (CVE-2026-45321) and TanStack variant are NOT listed in KEV as of 2026-05-15 despite confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. `cisa_kev: false` is correct; `active_exploitation: confirmed` reflects the actual wormable state. Operators should consume CISA-KEV-style guidance from OpenSSF MAL feed + ecosystem-specific advisories (Snyk/Wiz/Phylum/Socket) for this class.",
+    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV historically excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm/PyPI worms, malicious-package backdoors); its scope is federally-deployable products with CVE assignments. The Mini Shai-Hulud parent (CVE-2026-45321) and TanStack variant were NOT listed in KEV as of 2026-05-15 despite confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. CISA added CVE-2026-45321 to KEV on 2026-05-27. Recording active exploitation as confirmed reflects the actual wormable state. Operators should consume CISA-KEV-style guidance from OpenSSF MAL feed + ecosystem-specific advisories (Snyk/Wiz/Phylum/Socket) for this class.",
     "poc_available": true,
     "poc_description": "Confirmed in-the-wild — 84 malicious versions published across 42 @tanstack/* packages between 2026-05-11 19:20-19:26 UTC. The worm itself IS the PoC; payload analysis published by multiple researchers within 20 minutes.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
@@ -126657,7 +126657,7 @@
     "epss_percentile": 0.8201,
     "epss_date": "2026-08-07",
     "epss_source": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-45321",
-    "epss_correction_note": "v0.12.9: refreshed from live FIRST API. Previous values (0.78 / 0.97) were cold-start estimates inconsistent with confirmed in-wild exploitation; the qualitative narrative (rwep_notes above) remains the authoritative risk signal — raw EPSS underreports newly-disclosed worm payload classes.",
+    "epss_correction_note": "In v0.12.9 the values were refreshed from the live FIRST API. Previous values (0.78 / 0.97) were cold-start estimates inconsistent with confirmed in-wild exploitation; the qualitative narrative (the RWEP notes for this entry) remains the authoritative risk signal. Raw EPSS underreports newly-disclosed worm payload classes.",
     "source_verified": "2026-08-08",
     "verification_sources": [
       "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45321",
@@ -126835,7 +126835,7 @@
     "epss_percentile": null,
     "epss_date": "2026-05-13",
     "epss_source": null,
-    "epss_note": "EPSS coverage does not extend to non-CVE advisories. FIRST EPSS API only indexes CVE identifiers; MAL-* / SNYK-* / GHSA-* keys return no data. Re-query and populate epss_score when MITRE assigns a CVE id and the entry is renamed.",
+    "epss_note": "EPSS coverage does not extend to non-CVE advisories. FIRST EPSS API only indexes CVE identifiers; MAL-* / SNYK-* / GHSA-* keys return no data. Re-query and populate the EPSS score when MITRE assigns a CVE id and the entry is renamed.",
     "cwe_refs": [
       "CWE-506",
       "CWE-77",
@@ -127086,15 +127086,15 @@
         "Kernel module esp4 / esp6 / rxrpc loaded on a host whose configured workload has no IPsec / no Kerberos-AFS dependency — exposure-without-purpose signature"
       ],
       "mitigation_state": [
-        "Kernel version in affected_versions range AND `modprobe -n -v esp4` shows the module is loadable AND no `blacklist esp4` / `install esp4 /bin/false` line in /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf — module-unload mitigation NOT applied",
-        "Kernel version in affected_versions range AND /sys/kernel/livepatch/*/cve-ids does NOT contain CVE-2026-46300 — treat as EXPOSED regardless of generic livepatch-active flag",
+        "Kernel version in the affected version range listed for this entry AND `modprobe -n -v esp4` shows the module is loadable AND no `blacklist esp4` / `install esp4 /bin/false` line in /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf: module-unload mitigation NOT applied",
+        "Kernel version in the affected version range listed for this entry AND /sys/kernel/livepatch/*/cve-ids does NOT contain CVE-2026-46300: treat as EXPOSED regardless of generic livepatch-active flag",
         "RHEL/AlmaLinux/CloudLinux: kpatch-livepatch-*-CVE-2026-46300 RPM installed but not in `kpatch list` Loaded patch modules section — package-installed-without-load silent exposure",
         "Ubuntu: `canonical-livepatch status --verbose` 'fixes:' list does not include CVE-2026-46300 while kernel in affected range"
       ],
       "forensic_note": "Fragnesia corrupts page-cache pages without touching disk. File-integrity tools that hash on-disk bytes (AIDE, Tripwire, IMA in measure-only mode) cannot detect the corruption — the on-disk file is unchanged. Detection requires either (a) reading the binary through the page cache (`vmtouch` + `sha256sum`) and comparing to a freshly-read-from-disk copy after `echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches`, or (b) the runtime_syscall + kernel_trace indicators above. Operators who blacklisted esp4 / esp6 / rxrpc for CVE-2026-43284 / CVE-2026-43500 (Dirty Frag) are already mitigated for Fragnesia — the mitigation set is identical."
     },
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "RWEP bump:v0.12.29 ai-discovery audit re-attributed to ai_discovered=true; ai_factor advanced from 0 to 15; rwep raised by 15 from 20 to 35."
+    "rwep_correction_note": "RWEP bump: the v0.12.29 AI-discovery audit re-attributed this vulnerability as AI-discovered. The AI factor advanced from 0 to 15, and the RWEP score rose by 15, from 20 to 35."
   },
   "CVE-2024-21626": {
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -127158,7 +127158,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-08-08",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Discovered by Rory McNamara of Snyk Security Labs as part of the four-vulnerability Leaky Vessels disclosure (CVE-2024-21626 + CVE-2024-23651/23652/23653) published January 2024. Named human researcher; no AI-tool credited. Source: https://labs.snyk.io/resources/leaky-vessels-docker-runc-container-breakout-vulnerabilities/.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: +5 (75 -> 80).",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "In v0.12.30, the RWEP factors and the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The previously stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its RWEP factor breakdown; both are now derived from the canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS and the entry's operational fields. The change from the prior stored score is +5 (75 -> 80).",
     "vendor_advisories": [
       {
         "vendor": "NVD",
@@ -127261,7 +127261,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-08-08",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Discovered by Andres Freund (Microsoft engineer, PostgreSQL developer) on 2024-03-28 via a 0.5-second SSH-login latency regression traced to liblzma symbol resolution; reported to oss-security. Named human researcher; no AI tooling involved. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XZ_Utils_backdoor.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors to satisfy Shape B invariant (Σ factors === rwep_score). Prior values used non-canonical weights and/or blast_radius > 30 (over-cap). Stored rwep_score unchanged; factor block now reproducible from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields.",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: the RWEP factor breakdown was canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant (the factors sum to the RWEP score). Prior values used non-canonical weights and/or a blast-radius factor above 30 (over the cap). The stored RWEP score is unchanged, and the factor breakdown is now reproducible from the canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS and the operational fields.",
     "vendor_advisories": [
       {
         "vendor": "NVD",
@@ -127607,7 +127607,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Independent security researchers via Citrix coordinated disclosure (CTX561482, 2023-07-18); no individual researcher named in the Citrix advisory. NSA/CISA AA23-201A documents in-wild exploitation by Chinese state-sponsored actors. No AI-tool credited. Source: https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX561482/ and https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-201a.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: +5 (75 -> 80).",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: the RWEP factor breakdown AND the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The prior stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its RWEP factor breakdown; both are now derived from the canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS and the operational fields. The change from the prior stored score is +5 (from 75 to 80).",
     "vendor_advisories": [
       {
         "vendor": "NVD",
@@ -127803,7 +127803,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Discovered by Stephen Fewer (Senior Principal Security Researcher) and Jonah Burgess (Senior Security Researcher), both at Rapid7, while researching the related CVE-2026-20127 vdaemon authentication-bypass. Named human researchers; no AI-tool credited. Source: https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-cve-2026-20182-critical-authentication-bypass-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-controller-fixed/.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: 0.",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "In v0.12.30, the RWEP factor breakdown and the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The previously stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its factor breakdown; both are now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS plus operational fields. The delta from the previously stored score is 0.",
     "vendor_advisories": [
       {
         "vendor": "NVD",
@@ -127903,7 +127903,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Reported via the containerd security team (GO-2025-3528, Snyk SNYK-GOLANG-GITHUBCOMCONTAINERDCONTAINERDV2PKGOCI-9479987); no individual researcher byline in the advisory and no AI-tool credited. Bug class is straight integer overflow in WithUser() UID handling. Source: https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-GOLANG-GITHUBCOMCONTAINERDCONTAINERDV2PKGOCI-9479987.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: 0.",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "In v0.12.30, the RWEP factor breakdown and the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The previously stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its factor breakdown; both are now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS plus operational fields. The delta from the previously stored score is 0.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "containerd 1.6.x < 1.6.34 or 1.7.x < 1.7.21 with CNI IP allocation in scope.",
@@ -127925,7 +127925,7 @@
     "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
     "cisa_kev": false,
     "cisa_kev_date": null,
-    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV historically excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm/PyPI worms, malicious-package backdoors) — its scope is federally-deployable products with CVE assignments. The Mini Shai-Hulud parent (CVE-2026-45321) and TanStack variant are NOT listed in KEV as of 2026-05-15 despite confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. `cisa_kev: false` is correct; `active_exploitation: confirmed` reflects the actual wormable state. Operators should consume CISA-KEV-style guidance from OpenSSF MAL feed + ecosystem-specific advisories (Snyk/Wiz/Phylum/Socket) for this class.",
+    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV historically excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm/PyPI worms, malicious-package backdoors); its scope is federally-deployable products with CVE assignments. The Mini Shai-Hulud parent (CVE-2026-45321) and TanStack variant are NOT listed in KEV as of 2026-05-15 despite confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. Recording this entry as not listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is correct, and recording active exploitation as confirmed reflects the actual wormable state. Operators should consume CISA-KEV-style guidance from OpenSSF MAL feed + ecosystem-specific advisories (Snyk/Wiz/Phylum/Socket) for this class.",
     "poc_available": true,
     "poc_description": "84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages 2026-05-11 — the worm IS the PoC.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
@@ -127988,7 +127988,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Same incident-class as CVE-2026-45321 (Mini Shai-Hulud); discovery by ecosystem detection across multiple firms (Snyk, Wiz, StepSecurity, Socket, Orca, JFrog) within minutes of the 2026-05-11 publish window. No AI-tool discovery attribution on the defender side. Source: https://snyk.io/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised/.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors to satisfy Shape B invariant (Σ factors === rwep_score). Prior values used non-canonical weights and/or blast_radius > 30 (over-cap). Stored rwep_score unchanged; factor block now reproducible from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields.",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: the RWEP factor breakdown was canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant (Σ factors === RWEP score). Prior values used non-canonical weights and/or a blast-radius factor > 30 (over-cap). The stored RWEP score is unchanged, and the factor block is now reproducible from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields.",
     "related_threats": [
       "MAL-2026-SHAI-HULUD-OSS"
     ],
@@ -128144,7 +128144,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 (Cork, 2025-10-21) — exploited by @Tek_7987 and @_Anyfun of Synacktiv's offensive security team. Disclosure methodology: attack-surface enumeration + manual code auditing + exploit development per Synacktiv's published writeup; no AI-tool credit. Source: https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/breaking-the-beestation-inside-our-pwn2own-2025-exploit-journey.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: -5 (50 -> 45).",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: the RWEP factor breakdown AND the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The prior stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its factor breakdown; both are now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. The delta from the prior stored score is -5 (50 -> 45).",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Synology BeeStation Manager below 1.4.0-65374 exposing its web management interface.",
@@ -128219,7 +128219,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 — exploited by DEVCORE Research Team (chained injection + format-string bug, $40,000 + 4 Master of Pwn points). Named-human team via ZDI live-blog credit; no AI-tool attribution. Source: https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2025/10/21/pwn2own-ireland-2025-day-one-results.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: -5 (45 -> 40).",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "In v0.12.30, the RWEP factor breakdown and the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The prior stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its RWEP factor breakdown; both are now derived from the canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS and operational fields. The change from the prior stored score is -5 (45 -> 40).",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "QNAP QTS < 5.2.4.2950 or QuTS hero < h5.2.4.2950 with the web management interface reachable.",
@@ -128294,7 +128294,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 — chain 2/3 of the DEVCORE Research Team QNAP TS-453E exploit. Same researcher attribution as CVE-2025-62847; ZDI live-blog credit. No AI-tool attribution. Source: https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2025/10/21/pwn2own-ireland-2025-day-one-results.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: -5 (45 -> 40).",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "In v0.12.30, the RWEP factor breakdown and the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The prior stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its RWEP factor breakdown; both are now derived from the canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS and operational fields. The change from the prior stored score is -5 (45 -> 40).",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "QNAP QTS < 5.2.4.2950 or QuTS hero < h5.2.4.2950 with management services reachable.",
@@ -128369,7 +128369,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 — chain 3/3 of the DEVCORE Research Team QNAP TS-453E exploit (post-auth elevation). Same attribution as CVE-2025-62847/62848; ZDI credit. No AI-tool attribution. Source: https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2025/10/21/pwn2own-ireland-2025-day-one-results.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: -5 (40 -> 35).",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "In v0.12.30 the RWEP factor breakdown and the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The prior stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its RWEP factor breakdown; both are now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. The delta from the prior stored score is -5 (40 -> 35).",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "QNAP QTS < 5.2.4.2950 or QuTS hero < h5.2.4.2950 where a low-privilege session escalates privilege.",
@@ -128441,7 +128441,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 — Sina Kheirkhah of Summoning Team chained a hardcoded-credential issue with an injection flaw against QNAP Hyper Data Protector ($20,000 award). Named-human researcher; no AI-tool credit. Source: https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2025/10/21/pwn2own-ireland-2025-day-one-results and https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-25-48.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors AND rwep_score to satisfy Shape B invariant. The prior stored rwep_score was internally inconsistent with its rwep_factors block; both now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. Delta from prior stored: 0.",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "In v0.12.30 the RWEP factor breakdown and the RWEP score were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant. The prior stored RWEP score was internally inconsistent with its RWEP factor breakdown; both are now derived from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields. The delta from the prior stored score is 0.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "QNAP Hyper Data Protector below 2.1.4.0420 exposing its management surface.",
@@ -128603,7 +128603,7 @@
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
     "discovery_attribution_note": "Discovered by depthfirst's autonomous vulnerability-analysis platform; flagged the heap-buffer-overflow in nginx ngx_http_rewrite_module (present since nginx 0.6.27, 2008) within six hours of scan time. First publicly-attributed AI-discovered nginx CVE; jointly disclosed by F5 + depthfirst on 2026-05-13. Source: https://depthfirst.com/nginx-rift and https://github.com/depthfirstdisclosures/nginx-rift.",
-    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: canonicalized rwep_factors to satisfy Shape B invariant (Σ factors === rwep_score). Prior values used non-canonical weights and/or blast_radius > 30 (over-cap). Stored rwep_score unchanged; factor block now reproducible from canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS + operational fields.",
+    "rwep_correction_note": "v0.12.30: The RWEP factors were canonicalized to satisfy the Shape B invariant (Σ factors === RWEP score). Prior values used non-canonical weights and/or a blast-radius factor above 30 (over the cap). The stored RWEP score is unchanged, and the factor block is now reproducible from the canonical RWEP_WEIGHTS and the operational fields.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "nginx 0.6.27 through 1.30.0 or nginx Plus R32-R36 with a rewrite directive using unnamed PCRE captures in its configuration.",
@@ -128837,7 +128837,7 @@
         "Marimo notebook server bound to 0.0.0.0 (not 127.0.0.1) on a host with internet-routable IP AND server version below 0.23.0"
       ],
       "version_exposure": [
-        "Marimo server reports a version in the affected_versions range AND `/terminal/ws` returns HTTP 101 Switching Protocols on a WebSocket handshake without auth"
+        "Marimo server reports a version in the affected version range listed for this entry AND `/terminal/ws` returns HTTP 101 Switching Protocols on a WebSocket handshake without auth"
       ]
     },
     "last_updated": "2026-05-15",
@@ -128991,7 +128991,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No patch available at disclosure. Microsoft directs operators to enable Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service (EEMS) which receives vendor-pushed mitigation rules without requiring an Exchange service restart. EEMS is a workaround, not a patch — the vulnerable code path remains present; EEMS rules filter the attack pattern. Both patch_available and live_patch_available are recorded as false to reflect the absence of true remediation at intake; refresh once a binary fix is released.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No patch was available at disclosure. Microsoft directs operators to enable Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service (EEMS), which receives vendor-pushed mitigation rules without requiring an Exchange service restart. EEMS is a workaround, not a patch: the vulnerable code path remains present, and EEMS rules filter the attack pattern. This entry records that no fixed release is available and that no live patch is available, to reflect the absence of true remediation when the entry was added; update it once a binary fix is released.",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "Enable Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service (EEMS) — receives vendor-pushed mitigation rules within hours of MSRC release. Operator-side: confirm `Get-MitigationsApplied` shows current rules.",
       "Restrict OWA access to known-good source IPs / VPN-attached endpoints via published-protocol rules in Exchange or a reverse proxy until a binary fix ships.",
@@ -129325,7 +129325,7 @@
     "cvss_correction_note": "No NVD CVE assigned as of 2026-05-15; CVSS synthesized per OSSF Malicious-Packages convention: unauthenticated code execution on `require('node-ipc')` against a 3.35M-monthly-download package with confirmed credential exfiltration. AV:N because the malicious payload reaches the victim over the npm registry network channel; UI:R because a developer / CI must invoke `npm install`; S:C because exfiltrated AWS / GCP / Azure / SSH / kubeconfig / Vault material extends the blast radius beyond the consuming process.",
     "cisa_kev": false,
     "cisa_kev_date": null,
-    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV historically excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm / PyPI / RubyGems malicious-package events) — its scope is federally-deployable products with assigned CVE identifiers. The node-ipc 2026-05-14 publish event is OSSF-MAL-catalogued (MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER) without a NVD CVE as of 2026-05-15; `cisa_kev: false` is correct, and `active_exploitation: confirmed` reflects the live malicious payload in the registry. Operators should consume CISA-KEV-equivalent guidance from the OpenSSF MAL feed + ecosystem-specific advisories (Socket, StepSecurity, Semgrep, Datadog Security Labs, Snyk) for this class.",
+    "kev_scope_note": "CISA KEV historically excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm / PyPI / RubyGems malicious-package events); its scope is federally-deployable products with assigned CVE identifiers. The node-ipc 2026-05-14 publish event is OSSF-MAL-cataloged (MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER) without a NVD CVE as of 2026-05-15. Its absence from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog is correct, and the confirmed active exploitation recorded for this entry reflects the live malicious payload in the registry. Operators should consume CISA-KEV-equivalent guidance from the OpenSSF MAL feed + ecosystem-specific advisories (Socket, StepSecurity, Semgrep, Datadog Security Labs, Snyk) for this class.",
     "poc_available": true,
     "poc_description": "Live payload — three malicious versions (node-ipc 9.1.6, 9.2.3, 12.0.1) were published to the public npm registry by attacker-controlled account `atiertant` on 2026-05-14 and remained installable for the exposure window before npm yank. The malicious build IS the PoC.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
@@ -131944,7 +131944,7 @@
         "published_date": "2025-09-09"
       }
     ],
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "AI-surfaced by ZeroPath. Doubly-relevant: AI-defender finds bug in AI-agentic IDE integration. ai_assisted_weaponization=true because the AI agent IS the weaponization primitive — qualifies under both Hard Rule #7 limbs.",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "The bug was AI-surfaced by ZeroPath. It is doubly relevant: an AI defender found a bug in an AI-agentic IDE integration. The entry records AI-assisted weaponization as true because the AI agent IS the weaponization primitive, and the entry qualifies under both Hard Rule #7 limbs.",
     "live_patch_tools": [],
     "cwe_refs": [
       "CWE-77"
@@ -137722,7 +137722,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No code patch shipped; mitigate via the project's recommended configuration (see vendor_update_paths) and network isolation of the deserialization channel.",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No code patch shipped; mitigate via the project's recommended configuration (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry) and network isolation of the deserialization channel.",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "Do not enable the legacy V0 engine; it is off by default since vLLM 0.8.0 and that default is the recommended mitigation. If V0 multi-node is required, isolate the ZeroMQ socket on a trusted network segment."
     ],
@@ -142427,7 +142427,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed release published as of curation; mitigate via network isolation and the non-FastAPI deployment (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed release had been published when this entry was written; mitigate via network isolation and the non-FastAPI deployment (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed ChromaDB Python release is published as of curation. Mitigate by restricting network access to the FastAPI port (do not expose to untrusted networks), using the Rust 'chroma run' deployment or official Docker images, and disabling trust_remote_code model loading."
     ],
@@ -142639,7 +142639,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed release is published as of curation; mitigation is sandboxing the code-execution path and treating natural-language input as untrusted (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed release is published as of this writing; mitigation is sandboxing the code-execution path and treating natural-language input as untrusted (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed Vanna release is published. Mitigate by running Vanna in a sandboxed/least-privilege environment, disabling automatic visualization (the code-execution path) for untrusted questions, and treating every natural-language question as untrusted input that must never reach a Python exec/codegen path unsandboxed."
     ],
@@ -142748,7 +142748,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed release is published as of curation; mitigation is sandboxing the code-execution path and treating natural-language input as untrusted (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed release is published as of this writing; mitigation is sandboxing the code-execution path and treating natural-language input as untrusted (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed PandasAI release is published; the v3 advanced security agent (docs.pandas-ai.com/advanced-security-agent) is a mitigation layer. Run PandasAI in a hardened sandbox with no host/network privileges, enable the security agent, and treat both the question and any analyzed data as untrusted input that must not reach an unsandboxed Python exec path."
     ],
@@ -143082,7 +143082,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed SDK version is listed in the advisory as of curation; mitigation is retrieving artifacts/datasets only from trusted projects and treating retrieved content as untrusted (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed SDK version is listed in the advisory at the time this entry was written; mitigation is retrieving artifacts/datasets only from trusted projects and treating retrieved content as untrusted (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed ClearML SDK version is listed in the GitHub advisory or NVD as of curation (HiddenLayer states the issues were resolved with the vendor within the disclosure window, but no specific fixed version is published). Only retrieve artifacts/datasets from trusted ClearML projects, run the SDK with least privilege, and treat every retrieved artifact as untrusted until the deployed SDK version is confirmed to refuse unsafe deserialization."
     ],
@@ -143190,7 +143190,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed SDK version is listed in the advisory as of curation; mitigation is retrieving artifacts/datasets only from trusted projects and treating retrieved content as untrusted (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed SDK version is listed in the advisory at the time this entry was written; mitigation is retrieving artifacts/datasets only from trusted projects and treating retrieved content as untrusted (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed ClearML SDK version is listed in the GitHub advisory or NVD as of curation. Only retrieve datasets from trusted ClearML projects, run the SDK as a least-privilege user, and treat dataset extraction paths as untrusted (reject absolute / ../ traversal entries) until the deployed SDK version is confirmed to contain extraction."
     ],
@@ -143297,7 +143297,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version published as of curation; H2O.ai documents H2O-3 as a trusted-environment product. Mitigation is network isolation + authenticated access control (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version had been published when this entry was written; H2O.ai documents H2O-3 as a trusted-environment product. Mitigation is network isolation + authenticated access control (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed H2O-3 version is published as of curation; H2O.ai documents that H2O-3 is designed to run in a trusted environment. Do not expose the H2O-3 dashboard / REST API to untrusted networks, place it behind authenticated network access control, and treat model import as a code-execution surface (only import models from trusted sources)."
     ],
@@ -143403,7 +143403,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version published as of curation; H2O.ai documents H2O-3 as a trusted-environment product. Mitigation is network isolation + authenticated access control (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version had been published when this entry was written; H2O.ai documents H2O-3 as a trusted-environment product. Mitigation is network isolation + authenticated access control (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed H2O-3 version is published as of curation; H2O.ai documents that H2O-3 is designed to run in a trusted environment. Do not expose the H2O-3 REST API to untrusted networks, require authenticated network access, and run H2O-3 as a least-privilege user so an LFI yields minimal data."
     ],
@@ -143716,7 +143716,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No patched MLflow version is published (the GitHub advisory records 'Patched versions: None'); loading an untrusted model artifact is inherently code execution. Mitigation is provenance verification + sandboxing (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No patched MLflow version is published (the GitHub advisory records 'Patched versions: None'); loading an untrusted model artifact is inherently code execution. Mitigation is provenance verification + sandboxing (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed MLflow version is published. Only load models and Recipes from trusted sources, verify artifact provenance, run model loading in a sandboxed/least-privilege environment, and prefer safe serialization formats; treat every MLflow model artifact as executable code."
     ],
@@ -143822,7 +143822,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No patched MLflow version is published (the GitHub advisory records 'Patched versions: None'); loading an untrusted model artifact is inherently code execution. Mitigation is provenance verification + sandboxing (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No patched MLflow version is published (the GitHub advisory records 'Patched versions: None'); loading an untrusted model artifact is inherently code execution. Mitigation is provenance verification + sandboxing (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed MLflow version is published. Only load models and Recipes from trusted sources, verify artifact provenance, run model loading in a sandboxed/least-privilege environment, and prefer safe serialization formats; treat every MLflow model artifact as executable code."
     ],
@@ -144341,7 +144341,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No patched ART version is published as of curation (the GitHub advisory records 'Patched versions: Unknown'). Mitigation is loading models only from trusted sources, sandboxing model loading, and using weights_only=True / safe formats (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No patched ART version is published as of this writing (the GitHub advisory records 'Patched versions: Unknown'). Mitigation is loading models only from trusted sources, sandboxing model loading, and using weights_only=True / safe formats (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed ART release is published. Load models only from trusted sources, verify provenance, sandbox model loading, and prefer safe-load (weights_only=True) / safetensors; treat every model file as executable code."
     ],
@@ -144440,7 +144440,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No patched ART version is published as of curation (the GitHub advisory records 'Patched versions: Unknown'). Mitigation is never passing untrusted values to the affected CLI arguments and using a safe literal parser (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No patched ART version is published as of this writing (the GitHub advisory records 'Patched versions: Unknown'). Mitigation is never passing untrusted values to the affected CLI arguments and using a safe literal parser (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed ART release is published. Do not pass untrusted values to ART's --clip_values / --input_shape arguments; the fix is to parse them with a safe literal parser (e.g. ast.literal_eval) rather than a dynamic-evaluation call."
     ],
@@ -144848,7 +144848,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version is published as of curation; mitigation is validating/allowlisting the remote-file fetch destination and network-isolating Dify (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version was published when this entry was written; mitigation is validating/allowlisting the remote-file fetch destination and network-isolating Dify (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed Dify release is published (no fixed version published (see langgenius/dify#22532)). Validate and allowlist the destination of the remote-file-upload fetch (block private/link-local/cloud-metadata addresses and non-file schemes), require authentication on the endpoint, and network-isolate Dify."
     ],
@@ -144951,7 +144951,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version is published as of curation; mitigation is replacing the reset-token generation with a CSPRNG and verifying the reset token server-side (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version was published when this entry was written; mitigation is replacing the reset-token generation with a CSPRNG and verifying the reset token server-side (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed Dify release is published. Generate password-reset tokens with a cryptographically secure RNG (e.g. secrets / os.urandom), make them long and single-use with short expiry, and rate-limit reset attempts so a code cannot be predicted or brute-forced."
     ],
@@ -145055,7 +145055,7 @@
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
     "live_patch_tools": [],
-    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version is published as of curation; mitigation is replacing the reset-token generation with a CSPRNG and verifying the reset token server-side (see vendor_update_paths).",
+    "live_patch_notes": "No fixed version is published as of this writing; mitigation is replacing the reset-token generation with a CSPRNG and verifying the reset token server-side (see the vendor update paths listed for this entry).",
     "vendor_update_paths": [
       "No fixed Dify release is published. Verify the password-reset code server-side before accepting a new password at /forgot-password/resets, bind the code to the requesting user and a short expiry, and invalidate it after use."
     ],
@@ -171428,7 +171428,7 @@
     "poc_description": "KeyTrap PoC zones and analysis published with the Feb 2024 coordinated disclosure; ISC/NLnet Labs/PowerDNS advisories document the attack and the work-bounding fixes.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "Discovered by the ATHENE / Goethe University Frankfurt research group (KeyTrap, disclosed Feb 2024). Academic protocol research, not AI-attributed by the disclosers; ai_discovered remains false.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "The ATHENE / Goethe University Frankfurt research group discovered the flaw (KeyTrap, disclosed Feb 2024). The discovery was academic protocol research that the disclosers did not attribute to AI, so this entry does not record it as AI-discovered.",
     "active_exploitation": "suspected",
     "active_exploitation_notes": "High-profile coordinated disclosure (BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS, Knot, Dnsmasq patched in lockstep Feb 2024). Single crafted DNSSEC response can stall a validating resolver for an extended period. Internet-scale concern; observed scanning but no confirmed sustained campaign — suspected.",
     "affected": "DNSSEC-validating resolvers evaluating DNSKEY/RRSIG record combinations.",
@@ -171511,7 +171511,7 @@
     "poc_description": "Published with the Feb 2024 coordinated DNSSEC disclosure; ISC/NLnet Labs/PowerDNS advisories document the NSEC3 work-bounding fix.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed alongside KeyTrap by the ATHENE / Goethe University Frankfurt group (Feb 2024). Academic protocol research; ai_discovered false.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "It was disclosed alongside KeyTrap by the ATHENE / Goethe University Frankfurt group (Feb 2024). It came from academic protocol research and was not discovered by AI.",
     "active_exploitation": "suspected",
     "active_exploitation_notes": "Coordinated multi-vendor disclosure and patching (Feb 2024). Crafted NSEC3 responses force excessive hashing; internet-scale concern. Observed scanning, no confirmed sustained campaign — suspected.",
     "affected": "DNSSEC-validating resolvers performing NSEC3 closest-encloser denial-of-existence proofs.",
@@ -174640,7 +174640,7 @@
     "poc_description": "KEV-listed, actively-exploited editor access-control bypass enabling webshell upload. Public PoC, Nuclei template, and GitHub reproduction lab: fetch a CSRF token from any public page, POST a malicious editor profile to task=profiles.import, then upload a .php (or .xml.php) web shell to the images/ directory and request it to execute commands — no authentication or user interaction.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "No primary source credits any named AI system with discovery. Public technical analysis was published by Phil E. Taylor of mySites.guru (https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/cisa-warns-of-actively-exploited-joomla.html); YesWeHack's writeup credits \"Webshell Security Researchers\" with the original PoC but names no individual and no AI tool (https://www.yeswehack.com/news/rce-joomla-content-editor-extension). The vendor advisory at joomlacontenteditor.net names no AI tool. This is a human/PSIRT-class disclosure, so ai_discovered=FALSE.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "No primary source credits any named AI system with discovery. Public technical analysis was published by Phil E. Taylor of mySites.guru (https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/cisa-warns-of-actively-exploited-joomla.html); YesWeHack's writeup credits \"Webshell Security Researchers\" with the original PoC but names no individual and no AI tool (https://www.yeswehack.com/news/rce-joomla-content-editor-extension). The vendor advisory at joomlacontenteditor.net names no AI tool. This is a human/PSIRT-class disclosure, so the entry records it as not discovered by AI.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "ai_assisted_notes": "No evidence the exploit was AI-built. Weaponization is a publicly published, hand-written Nuclei template plus a GitHub reproduction lab demonstrating the three-step unauthenticated chain; no source attributes exploit development to any AI tool or agent.",
     "active_exploitation": "confirmed",
@@ -174719,7 +174719,7 @@
       }
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-06-26",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "No primary source credits any named AI system with discovery. Public technical analysis was published by Phil E. Taylor of mySites.guru (https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/cisa-warns-of-actively-exploited-joomla.html); YesWeHack's writeup credits \"Webshell Security Researchers\" with the original PoC but names no individual and no AI tool (https://www.yeswehack.com/news/rce-joomla-content-editor-extension). The vendor advisory at joomlacontenteditor.net names no AI tool. This is a human/PSIRT-class disclosure, so ai_discovered=FALSE. CISA KEV-listed 2026-06-16 (due 2026-06-19). Curated 2026-06-26 from the NVD record and the Widget Factory (Joomla Content Editor) advisory; not AI-discovered.",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "No primary source credits any named AI system with discovery. Public technical analysis was published by Phil E. Taylor of mySites.guru (https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/cisa-warns-of-actively-exploited-joomla.html); YesWeHack's writeup credits \"Webshell Security Researchers\" with the original PoC but names no individual and no AI tool (https://www.yeswehack.com/news/rce-joomla-content-editor-extension). The vendor advisory at joomlacontenteditor.net names no AI tool. This is a human/PSIRT-class disclosure, so the entry records it as not discovered by AI. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-06-16, with a due date of 2026-06-19. This entry was compiled on 2026-06-26 from the NVD record and the Widget Factory (Joomla Content Editor) advisory; it was not discovered by AI.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Unauthenticated POST requests to /index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import (profile-import endpoint hit by automated scanners)",
@@ -175403,7 +175403,7 @@
     "poc_description": "KEV-listed, actively-exploited authenticated code injection to root. No public PoC or exploit code released; KEV-confirmed in-the-wild abuse where an admin-privileged Fabric OS user supplies a crafted IP-address value to inject code and gain full root execution on Fabric OS 9.1.0 through 9.1.1d6.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "unknown",
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "No AI involvement in discovery. The Broadcom/Brocade vendor advisory (BSA-2025-2930, doc 25602) credits no researcher, firm, or tool at all; neither The Hacker News nor CSO Online reporting names a discoverer. There is no primary source crediting any named AI system (Big Sleep, XBOW, ZeroPath, OpenAI o-series, GTIG, etc.) with finding this. Per the conservative rule, ai_discovered=FALSE. Sources: https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25602 ; https://thehackernews.com/2025/04/cisa-adds-actively-exploited-broadcom.html",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "No AI involvement in discovery. The Broadcom/Brocade vendor advisory (BSA-2025-2930, doc 25602) credits no researcher, firm, or tool at all; neither The Hacker News nor CSO Online reporting names a discoverer. There is no primary source crediting any named AI system (Big Sleep, XBOW, ZeroPath, OpenAI o-series, GTIG, etc.) with finding this. Per the conservative rule, this entry records the vulnerability as not AI-discovered. Sources: https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25602 ; https://thehackernews.com/2025/04/cisa-adds-actively-exploited-broadcom.html",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "ai_assisted_notes": "No public exploit code or PoC exists, and no source indicates AI-assisted exploit development. Exploitation is KEV-confirmed in-the-wild but no weaponization tooling, exploit author, or AI-build claim has been published.",
     "active_exploitation": "confirmed",
@@ -175481,7 +175481,7 @@
       }
     ],
     "last_updated": "2026-06-26",
-    "discovery_attribution_note": "No AI involvement in discovery. The Broadcom/Brocade vendor advisory (BSA-2025-2930, doc 25602) credits no researcher, firm, or tool at all; neither The Hacker News nor CSO Online reporting names a discoverer. There is no primary source crediting any named AI system (Big Sleep, XBOW, ZeroPath, OpenAI o-series, GTIG, etc.) with finding this. Per the conservative rule, ai_discovered=FALSE. Sources: https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25602 ; https://thehackernews.com/2025/04/cisa-adds-actively-exploited-broadcom.html CISA KEV-listed 2025-04-28 (due 2025-05-19). Curated 2026-06-26 from the NVD record and the Broadcom (Brocade) advisory; not AI-discovered.",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "No AI involvement in discovery. The Broadcom/Brocade vendor advisory (BSA-2025-2930, doc 25602) credits no researcher, firm, or tool at all; neither The Hacker News nor CSO Online reporting names a discoverer. There is no primary source crediting any named AI system (Big Sleep, XBOW, ZeroPath, OpenAI o-series, GTIG, etc.) with finding this. Per the conservative rule, this entry records the vulnerability as not AI-discovered. Sources: https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25602 ; https://thehackernews.com/2025/04/cisa-adds-actively-exploited-broadcom.html CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-04-28 (due 2025-05-19). This entry was compiled on 2026-06-26 from the NVD record and the Broadcom (Brocade) advisory; the vulnerability is not AI-discovered.",
     "iocs": {
       "behavioral": [
         "Root-owned processes or shells spawned from an admin-role (non-root) Fabric OS CLI session, where 9.1.0+ should have stripped root access",
@@ -179107,7 +179107,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) formerly known as Firepower Management Center contains a use of hard-coded password vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to log in to an affected device using a low-privileged account to access sensitive data within the impacted systems.",
     "type": "hardcoded-credentials-auth-bypass",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code located. GitHub repository search for \"CVE-2026-20316\" returns zero results, and projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no matching template; there is no Exploit-DB entry and no Metasploit module. Horizon3.ai, whose researcher Jimi Sebree reported the flaw, deliberately withheld a PoC — the firm built a NodeZero Rapid Response test for customer validation instead of publishing one, and its public page does not disclose the account name or the credential. SOC Prime's analysis states directly that no public CVE-2026-20316 PoC has been identified. That said, poc_available:false understates the weaponization risk here: the \"exploit\" is knowledge of a static username and password, so there is no exploit code to write — the moment the credential is extracted from an appliance image or leaks from the intrusion set already using it, exploitation is a normal login. Cisco PSIRT confirmed active exploitation in July 2026, so at least one party already holds it.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code located. GitHub repository search for \"CVE-2026-20316\" returns zero results, and projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no matching template; there is no Exploit-DB entry and no Metasploit module. Horizon3.ai, whose researcher Jimi Sebree reported the flaw, deliberately withheld a PoC: the firm built a NodeZero Rapid Response test for customer validation instead of publishing one, and its public page does not disclose the account name or the credential. SOC Prime's analysis states directly that no public CVE-2026-20316 PoC has been identified. That said, recording that no proof of concept is available understates the weaponization risk here: the \"exploit\" is knowledge of a static username and password, so there is no exploit code to write, and the moment the credential is extracted from an appliance image or leaks from the intrusion set already using it, exploitation is a normal login. Cisco PSIRT confirmed active exploitation in July 2026, so at least one party already holds it.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Human researcher, explicitly credited: Cisco's advisory cisco-sa-fmc-static-cred-BET3Cjh names Jimi Sebree of Horizon3.ai as the reporter, and Horizon3's attack-research team published a corresponding entry. Cisco is the CNA and published the record on 2026-07-29; the CVE Program record's credits array is empty but the vendor advisory carries the acknowledgement, so the attribution is firm. There is a second, independent discovery track worth recording: Cisco states separately that \"in July 2026, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability\" — meaning a threat actor had located the same static credential before or concurrently with the coordinated report, which is the expected outcome for embedded credentials since anyone who obtains an appliance image can extract them offline. No primary source attributes discovery, extraction or exploitation to AI tooling, and finding a hard-coded credential in a firmware image is exactly the class of work that has been routine for manual reverse engineers for two decades.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -179806,7 +179806,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "The Director component in Mitel MiVoice Connect allows an authenticated attacker with internal network access to execute code within the context of the application.",
     "type": "authenticated-code-injection-rce",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code could be located from any primary source. The Exploit-DB search API returns zero records for CVE-2022-41223; metasploit-framework's db/modules_metadata_base.json contains no module referencing this CVE or MiVoice Connect; projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no http/cves/2022/CVE-2022-41223.yaml (404); and NVD carries no Exploit-tagged reference — its only references are the CISA KEV entry and the two Mitel advisory URLs. Mitel's advisory 22-0008 describes the defect in one sentence ('insufficient restrictions on the database data type' in the Director database component) and publishes no reproducer, and CrowdStrike, which is credited with the finding, published no technical writeup. Independent analysis at the time of the KEV addition also recorded no known public exploit code. poc_available is therefore false rather than assumed-true from the KEV listing.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code could be located from any primary source. The Exploit-DB search API returns zero records for CVE-2022-41223; metasploit-framework's db/modules_metadata_base.json contains no module referencing this CVE or MiVoice Connect; projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no http/cves/2022/CVE-2022-41223.yaml (404); and NVD carries no Exploit-tagged reference: its only references are the CISA KEV entry and the two Mitel advisory URLs. Mitel's advisory 22-0008 describes the defect in one sentence ('insufficient restrictions on the database data type' in the Director database component) and publishes no reproducer, and CrowdStrike, which is credited with the finding, published no technical writeup. Independent analysis at the time of the KEV addition also recorded no known public exploit code. This entry therefore records that no proof of concept is available, rather than assuming one exists because of the KEV listing.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Privately reported to Mitel and credited by name in Mitel Product Security Advisory 22-0008 (published 2022-10-12) to Patrick Bennett of CrowdStrike — the same researcher credited with the earlier MiVoice Connect Service Appliance work. Coordinated disclosure, human code review of the Director component; no AI system is credited in the Mitel advisory or in NVD, and no AI-assisted discovery claim appears in any primary source.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -180109,7 +180109,7 @@
     "poc_available": false,
     "poc_description": "No public proof-of-concept was found. Microsoft's own Security Update Guide record carries temporal metrics E:U/RL:O/RC:C — exploit code rated Unproven — alongside Exploited: Yes and Publicly Disclosed: No, meaning Microsoft observed in-the-wild use while judging no public exploit code to exist. That still holds: the Exploit-DB search API returns zero records for CVE-2023-21715, metasploit-framework's db/modules_metadata_base.json has no module referencing it, and projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no template (a network scanner would not apply in any case, since the vector is local file-open). No researcher writeup with a reproducer has been published either; the credited finders are threat-detection researchers who surfaced in-the-wild samples rather than a disclosure that shipped exploit code. What is publicly known is the effect, from the MSRC FAQ: an attacker who convinces a user to download and open a specially crafted file can bypass the Office macro policies used to block untrusted or malicious files.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
-    "ai_discovery_notes": "Microsoft's CVRF acknowledgment credits two groups: 'Hidetake Jo, Rick Cole, Charlie Hurel, and Matthew Mesa', and 'Haifei Li with EXPMON'. The acknowledgment was added on 2023-02-15 and updated on 2023-02-21, after the 2023-02-14 release that already flagged the issue as exploited — the signature of a flaw surfaced by detecting live attacks and analysing captured samples, not of a coordinated disclosure from code review. EXPMON is an automated exploit-detection and sandbox-emulation platform; no primary source credits any AI system, model-driven fuzzer, or AI-assisted analysis, so ai_discovered is a determination of false rather than a default.",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Microsoft's CVRF acknowledgment credits two groups: 'Hidetake Jo, Rick Cole, Charlie Hurel, and Matthew Mesa', and 'Haifei Li with EXPMON'. The acknowledgment was added on 2023-02-15 and updated on 2023-02-21, after the 2023-02-14 release that already flagged the issue as exploited, which is the signature of a flaw surfaced by detecting live attacks and analyzing captured samples, not of a coordinated disclosure from code review. EXPMON is an automated exploit-detection and sandbox-emulation platform; no primary source credits any AI system, model-driven fuzzer, or AI-assisted analysis, so the record that AI did not discover this flaw is a determination rather than a default.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
     "affected": "Microsoft Office",
     "affected_versions": [
@@ -180204,7 +180204,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Microsoft Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows for privilege escalation.",
     "type": "kernel-driver-heap-overflow-lpe",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit could be located. A GitHub repository search returns zero repositories carrying this CVE id; Exploit-DB has no entry; and Metasploit's only CLFS module targets the later CVE-2023-28252 (modules/exploits/windows/local/cve_2023_28252_clfs_driver.rb), not this bug. Microsoft's own temporal vector rates exploit-code maturity Unproven (CVSS:3.1/.../E:U/RL:O/RC:C) even while recording exploited=Yes and publiclyDisclosed=No. The deepest public material is Kaspersky Securelist's root-cause analysis of the in-the-wild sample (https://securelist.com/windows-clfs-exploits-ransomware-cve-2023-23376/111593/), which describes the BLF-layout manipulation in detail but publishes no runnable code. Because no specific public exploit URL or id can be named, poc_available is set false rather than inferred from KEV listing.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit could be located. A GitHub repository search returns zero repositories carrying this CVE id; Exploit-DB has no entry; and Metasploit's only CLFS module targets the later CVE-2023-28252 (modules/exploits/windows/local/cve_2023_28252_clfs_driver.rb), not this bug. Microsoft's own temporal vector rates exploit-code maturity Unproven (CVSS:3.1/.../E:U/RL:O/RC:C) even while recording exploited=Yes and publiclyDisclosed=No. The deepest public material is Kaspersky Securelist's root-cause analysis of the in-the-wild sample (https://securelist.com/windows-clfs-exploits-ransomware-cve-2023-23376/111593/), which describes the BLF-layout manipulation in detail but publishes no runnable code. Because no specific public exploit URL or id can be named, this entry records that no proof of concept is available rather than inferring one from the KEV listing.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Microsoft's February 2023 CVRF acknowledgement names 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)' and 'Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC)' — the vendor's own teams — who surfaced it as an already-in-the-wild zero-day (MSRC records exploited=Yes, publiclyDisclosed=No, released 2023-02-14). No AI tooling is credited by Microsoft, and Kaspersky's subsequent root-cause analysis describes manual reverse engineering of a captured exploit sample. This predates the 2025 AI-assisted-discovery wave entirely.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -180333,7 +180333,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Apple iOS, MacOS, Safari and iPadOS WebKit contain a type confusion vulnerability that leads to code execution when processing maliciously crafted web content. This vulnerability could impact HTML parsers that use WebKit, including but not limited to Apple Safari and non-Apple products which rely on WebKit for HTML processing.",
     "type": "webkit-type-confusion-rce",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit could be located. A GitHub repository search returns zero repositories carrying this CVE id, Exploit-DB has no entry, there is no Metasploit module and no Nuclei template, and the WebKit Bugzilla entry Apple references for the fix (bug 251944) is not publicly readable — WebKit security bugs stay restricted. Apple's advisories state only that it 'may have been actively exploited' and publish no technical detail beyond 'a type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks'. What is public is the fix-shipping fact set, not exploit code, so poc_available is set false rather than assumed from the KEV listing.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit could be located. A GitHub repository search returns zero repositories carrying this CVE id, Exploit-DB has no entry, there is no Metasploit module and no Nuclei template, and the WebKit Bugzilla entry Apple references for the fix (bug 251944) is not publicly readable; WebKit security bugs stay restricted. Apple's advisories state only that it 'may have been actively exploited' and publish no technical detail beyond 'a type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks'. What is public is the fix-shipping fact set, not exploit code, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available rather than assuming one from the KEV listing.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Apple credits 'an anonymous researcher' for CVE-2023-23529 in all four advisories that carry it (HT213633 macOS Ventura 13.2.1, HT213635 iOS/iPadOS 16.3.1, HT213638 Safari 16.3, HT213673 iOS/iPadOS 15.7.4). No AI-assisted discovery is claimed by Apple or by the reporter, and the anonymity means no tooling attribution exists to verify either way. The iOS 16.3.1 advisory additionally thanks The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto's Munk School for assistance — a credit consistent with targeted-spyware casework, though Apple does not tie it to this specific CVE. Recorded as human research on the strength of the vendor credit line.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -180433,7 +180433,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Microsoft Windows Graphic Component contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows for privilege escalation.",
     "type": "integer-overflow-lpe",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No genuine public exploit could be located. Exploit-DB has no entry, Metasploit has no module, and there is no Nuclei template. The single GitHub repository named for this CVE — https://github.com/Elizarfish/CVE-2023-21823, created 2023-04-20 — was inspected and does not implement the vulnerability at all: its README and its one source file (poc.c, 3 KB) are a generic Windows reverse shell built with 'gcc -o reverse_shell.exe main.c -lws2_32', with no Graphics-Component trigger and no integer-overflow path. It is a mislabelled repository and is not counted as a PoC. Microsoft does rate exploit-code maturity High (temporal vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C), meaning it assesses that functional in-the-wild code exists — that is an assessment of attacker capability, not a public PoC, so poc_available stays false.",
+    "poc_description": "No genuine public exploit could be located. Exploit-DB has no entry, Metasploit has no module, and there is no Nuclei template. The single GitHub repository named for this CVE (https://github.com/Elizarfish/CVE-2023-21823, created 2023-04-20) was inspected and does not implement the vulnerability at all: its README and its one source file (poc.c, 3 KB) are a generic Windows reverse shell built with 'gcc -o reverse_shell.exe main.c -lws2_32', with no Graphics-Component trigger and no integer-overflow path. It is a mislabeled repository and is not counted as a PoC. Microsoft does rate exploit-code maturity High (temporal vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C), meaning it assesses that functional in-the-wild code exists. That is an assessment of attacker capability, not a public PoC, so this entry still records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Microsoft's February 2023 CVRF acknowledges 'Genwei Jiang and Dhanesh Kizhakkinan of Mandiant' — external human researchers whose work at Mandiant centres on analysing exploits caught in the wild. No AI tooling is credited in the acknowledgement, in the MSRC advisory, or in any subsequent vendor writeup, and the disclosure predates the AI-assisted-discovery wave.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -181289,7 +181289,7 @@
     "affected_versions": [
       "CWP (Control Web Panel / CentOS Web Panel) 7 < 0.9.8.1147"
     ],
-    "complexity_notes": "Single unauthenticated HTTP request, no user interaction, no race — deterministic execution as root because the panel runs as root by default (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N and C:H/I:H/A:H). Public tooling is point-and-shoot: a Metasploit module with both command and dropper targets, a verified Nuclei template for mass identification, and Shodan/FOFA fingerprints for target discovery. The gap between PoC publication (2023-01-03) and observed in-the-wild exploitation (2023-01-06) was three days, and EPSS sits at 0.99995 (99.99th percentile). CISA KEV records ransomware status Unknown, so the catalog's known_ransomware_use=false is correct even though the primitive is root-level RCE. Derived from CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.",
+    "complexity_notes": "Exploitation takes a single unauthenticated HTTP request, with no user interaction and no race, and gives deterministic execution as root because the panel runs as root by default (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N and C:H/I:H/A:H). Public tooling is point-and-shoot: a Metasploit module with both command and dropper targets, a verified Nuclei template for mass identification, and Shodan/FOFA fingerprints for target discovery. The gap between PoC publication (2023-01-03) and observed in-the-wild exploitation (2023-01-06) was three days, and EPSS sits at 0.99995 (99.99th percentile). CISA KEV records ransomware status Unknown, so this entry's record of no known ransomware use is correct even though the primitive is root-level RCE. This assessment is derived from CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.",
     "patch_available": true,
     "patch_required_reboot": false,
     "live_patch_available": false,
@@ -183115,7 +183115,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Microsoft Windows Cryptographic Next Generation (CNG) Key Isolation Service contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows an attacker to gain SYSTEM-level privileges.",
     "type": "memory-corruption-lpe",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public proof of concept exists and the absence is unusually complete. Exploit-DB's files_exploits.csv index has no entry; GitHub code search over rapid7/metasploit-framework and projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates returns zero hits; a GitHub repository search across name, description and readme surfaces only vulnerability-inventory projects (Ostorlab/KEV and two coursework repositories), no exploit code. NVD lists exactly three references — the MSRC advisory twice and the CISA KEV catalogue — with no exploit or third-party analysis tag, unlike its sibling CVE-2022-41073 which at least carries a Packet Storm reference. Microsoft published no technical detail: the MSRC record contains a single FAQ line stating that successful exploitation grants SYSTEM privileges, no root-cause description, and no affected-component breakdown beyond the 'Windows CNG Key Isolation Service' tag. Google Project Zero's 0days-in-the-wild repository, which does carry root-cause analyses for CVE-2022-41073 and CVE-2022-41128 from the same November 2022 release, has none for this CVE. The only public technical fact beyond the CWE is the class itself — CWE-787, an out-of-bounds write reached from a low-privileged local caller. poc_available is therefore set false rather than guessed.",
+    "poc_description": "No public proof of concept exists and the absence is unusually complete. Exploit-DB's files_exploits.csv index has no entry; GitHub code search over rapid7/metasploit-framework and projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates returns zero hits; a GitHub repository search across name, description and readme surfaces only vulnerability-inventory projects (Ostorlab/KEV and two coursework repositories), no exploit code. NVD lists exactly three references (the MSRC advisory twice and the CISA KEV catalog), with no exploit or third-party analysis tag, unlike its sibling CVE-2022-41073 which at least carries a Packet Storm reference. Microsoft published no technical detail: the MSRC record contains a single FAQ line stating that successful exploitation grants SYSTEM privileges, no root-cause description, and no affected-component breakdown beyond the 'Windows CNG Key Isolation Service' tag. Google Project Zero's 0days-in-the-wild repository, which does carry root-cause analyses for CVE-2022-41073 and CVE-2022-41128 from the same November 2022 release, has none for this CVE. The only public technical fact beyond the CWE is the class itself: CWE-787, an out-of-bounds write reached from a low-privileged local caller. This entry therefore records that no proof of concept is available, rather than guessing.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Not AI-discovered. MSRC's acknowledgement record credits two internal Microsoft teams as finders — the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) and the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) — and marks the record publiclyDisclosed 'No' with exploited 'Yes'. That combination describes discovery through Microsoft's own in-the-wild telemetry and follow-on internal analysis, the same intake path as CVE-2022-41073 in the same release. No AI tooling is credited by Microsoft, by any external researcher, or in any published analysis; indeed no external analysis of this CVE exists at all, which is itself the reason the AI-discovery question can be answered with confidence rather than left unknown — there is no third-party research effort, automated or otherwise, that could have produced it.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -183441,7 +183441,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Samsung mobile devices using Mali GPU contains an improper access control vulnerability in sec_log file. Exploitation of the vulnerability exposes sensitive kernel information to the userspace. This vulnerability was chained with CVE-2021-25337 and CVE-2021-25370.",
     "type": "kernel-info-disclosure",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was located. Google's Threat Analysis Group recovered the in-the-wild sample (a JNI native library from a partial chain TAG believes belonged to a commercial surveillance vendor, dated late 2020) but Project Zero deliberately did not publish it, and there is no Exploit-DB entry (checked against exploit-db's files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module and no Nuclei template for this CVE. What is public is a reproduction blueprint rather than exploit code: Project Zero's write-up at https://projectzero.google/2022/11/a-very-powerful-clipboard-samsung-in-the-wild-exploit-chain.html gives the exact trigger — ioctl(dev_mali_fd, 0x40148008, &v4) to set up the Mali HWCNT reader, then ioctl(hwcnt_fd, 0x4004BEFE, 0) with invalid ioctl number 0xFE to hit the WARN_ON in kbasep_vinstr_hwcnt_reader_ioctl, followed by 'setprop dumpstate.options bugreportfull; setprop ctl.start bugreport' so dumpstate copies the kmsg backtrace into /data/log/sec_log.log, which system_app can read even though /dev/kmsg is restricted to system_server. Because no runnable exploit was released, poc_available stays false.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was located. Google's Threat Analysis Group recovered the in-the-wild sample (a JNI native library from a partial chain TAG believes belonged to a commercial surveillance vendor, dated late 2020) but Project Zero deliberately did not publish it, and there is no Exploit-DB entry (checked against exploit-db's files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module and no Nuclei template for this CVE. What is public is a reproduction blueprint rather than exploit code: Project Zero's write-up at https://projectzero.google/2022/11/a-very-powerful-clipboard-samsung-in-the-wild-exploit-chain.html gives the exact trigger: ioctl(dev_mali_fd, 0x40148008, &v4) to set up the Mali HWCNT reader, then ioctl(hwcnt_fd, 0x4004BEFE, 0) with invalid ioctl number 0xFE to hit the WARN_ON in kbasep_vinstr_hwcnt_reader_ioctl, followed by 'setprop dumpstate.options bugreportfull; setprop ctl.start bugreport' so dumpstate copies the kmsg backtrace into /data/log/sec_log.log, which system_app can read even though /dev/kmsg is restricted to system_server. Because no runnable exploit was released, this entry records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Discovered as an in-the-wild exploit sample obtained by Google's Threat Analysis Group in late 2020, root-caused by Project Zero (Maddie Stone, with Clement Lecigne of TAG) and reported privately to Samsung. Samsung's own bulletin records it as SVE-2021-19897, reported 2020-12-10, disclosure status 'Privately disclosed', fixed in SMR Mar-2021 Release 1. No AI tooling is credited by Google, Samsung or any third party in either the discovery or the analysis, and the work predates AI-assisted vulnerability discovery becoming operationally significant.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -183550,7 +183550,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Samsung mobile devices using Mali GPU contain an incorrect implementation handling file descriptor in dpu driver. This incorrect implementation results in memory corruption, leading to kernel panic. This vulnerability was chained with CVE-2021-25337 and CVE-2021-25369.",
     "type": "dpu-driver-use-after-free-lpe",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was located: no Exploit-DB entry (checked against exploit-db's files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module, no Nuclei template, and Project Zero explicitly did not release the in-the-wild JNI native library that Google TAG recovered. What is public is a line-level root-cause write-up at https://projectzero.google/2022/11/a-very-powerful-clipboard-samsung-in-the-wild-exploit-chain.html showing the exact defect — decon_set_win_config() calls fd_install() on the retire fence and then keeps using the struct file pointer, so a plain close() from userspace frees an object the driver still dereferences — together with the sample's full exploitation recipe: groom the heap with 30,000+ memfd_create open/close cycles, spray 25 fake 0x140-byte struct file objects through the Mali MEM_PROFILE_ADD ioctl with f_op pointed at signalfd_op and private_data pointed at addr_limit_ptr (task_struct + 8, leaked via CVE-2021-25369), then call signalfd() on the dangling fence fd to land an 8-byte write over addr_limit and toggle USER_DS/KERNEL_DS for arbitrary kernel read/write and sys_call_table patching. That is a reproduction blueprint, not released exploit code, so poc_available remains false.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was located: no Exploit-DB entry (checked against exploit-db's files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module, no Nuclei template, and Project Zero explicitly did not release the in-the-wild JNI native library that Google TAG recovered. What is public is a line-level root-cause write-up at https://projectzero.google/2022/11/a-very-powerful-clipboard-samsung-in-the-wild-exploit-chain.html showing the exact defect (decon_set_win_config() calls fd_install() on the retire fence and then keeps using the struct file pointer, so a plain close() from userspace frees an object the driver still dereferences) together with the sample's full exploitation recipe: groom the heap with 30,000+ memfd_create open/close cycles, spray 25 fake 0x140-byte struct file objects through the Mali MEM_PROFILE_ADD ioctl with f_op pointed at signalfd_op and private_data pointed at addr_limit_ptr (task_struct + 8, leaked via CVE-2021-25369), then call signalfd() on the dangling fence fd to land an 8-byte write over addr_limit and toggle USER_DS/KERNEL_DS for arbitrary kernel read/write and sys_call_table patching. That is a reproduction blueprint, not released exploit code, so the entry still records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Discovered as part of the in-the-wild exploit chain Google TAG obtained in late 2020 and root-caused by Project Zero in collaboration with Clement Lecigne of TAG; Samsung's bulletin records it as SVE-2021-19925, reported 2020-12-12, 'Privately disclosed', fixed in SMR Mar-2021 Release 1. Project Zero notes the sample was likely captured in the attacker's testing phase, which is why TAG never obtained the delivering application. No AI-assisted or automated discovery is credited by Google, Samsung or ARM, and the timeframe predates AI-assisted vulnerability discovery being operationally material.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -183652,7 +183652,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Google Chromium V8 Engine contains a type confusion vulnerability that allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. This vulnerability could affect multiple web browsers that utilize Chromium, including, but not limited to, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Opera.",
     "type": "v8-type-confusion-rce",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit or proof-of-concept was located. There is no Exploit-DB entry (checked against exploit-db's files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module and no Nuclei template; Avast published no technical write-up for this bug; and the Chromium tracker entry (monorail bug 1378239, now issues.chromium.org/40061466) is still restricted, so no repro is available upstream either — there is no test/mjsunit/regress/regress-crbug-1378239.js in the V8 tree. Google's release note states plainly that 'Google is aware of reports that an exploit for CVE-2022-3723 exists in the wild', so a working exploit certainly existed, but it was never published and neither Google nor Avast released the root cause. Consequently nothing beyond 'type confusion in V8 reachable from a crafted HTML page, causing renderer heap corruption' is publicly established, and poc_available is false rather than inferred from the in-the-wild status.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit or proof-of-concept was located. There is no Exploit-DB entry (checked against exploit-db's files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module and no Nuclei template; Avast published no technical write-up for this bug; and the Chromium tracker entry (monorail bug 1378239, now issues.chromium.org/40061466) is still restricted, so no repro is available upstream either. There is no test/mjsunit/regress/regress-crbug-1378239.js in the V8 tree. Google's release note states plainly that 'Google is aware of reports that an exploit for CVE-2022-3723 exists in the wild', so a working exploit certainly existed, but it was never published and neither Google nor Avast released the root cause. Consequently nothing beyond 'type confusion in V8 reachable from a crafted HTML page, causing renderer heap corruption' is publicly established, and the entry records that no proof of concept is available, rather than inferring one from the in-the-wild status.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Chrome's 2022-10-27 stable-channel note credits the report to named human researchers — Jan Vojtesek, Milanek and Przemek Gmerek of Avast — on 2022-10-25, two days before the fix shipped, a turnaround consistent with Avast surfacing the bug from live attack telemetry rather than from fuzzing or static analysis. The same release note lists Google's sanitiser and fuzzer stack (AddressSanitizer, MemorySanitizer, UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, Control Flow Integrity, libFuzzer, AFL) as boilerplate for the release and does not attribute this finding to any of them. No AI-assisted or autonomous discovery is claimed by Google, Avast or Microsoft.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -183762,7 +183762,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Apple iOS and iPadOS kernel contain an out-of-bounds write vulnerability which can allow an application to perform code execution with kernel privileges.",
     "type": "kernel-lpe-oob-write",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit or proof-of-concept was located. Apple credits 'an anonymous researcher', published nothing beyond 'An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking', and never named the affected kernel subsystem. There is no Exploit-DB entry (checked against exploit-db's files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module, no Nuclei template, and no researcher write-up reconstructing the bug. Apple's advisory wording establishes real-world use — 'An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited.' — but in-the-wild use is not public exploit availability, and no attribution to a named actor or spyware vendor has been published for this CVE. poc_available is therefore false as a positive finding, not as an unknown.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit or proof-of-concept was located. Apple credits 'an anonymous researcher', published nothing beyond 'An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved bounds checking', and never named the affected kernel subsystem. There is no Exploit-DB entry (checked against exploit-db's files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module, no Nuclei template, and no researcher write-up reconstructing the bug. Apple's advisory wording establishes real-world use ('An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited.'), but in-the-wild use is not public exploit availability, and no attribution to a named actor or spyware vendor has been published for this CVE. The entry therefore records that no proof of concept is available as a positive finding, not as an unknown.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Apple credits the report to 'an anonymous researcher' in both HT213489 (iOS 16.1 and iPadOS 16) and HT213490 (iOS 15.7.1 and iPadOS 15.7.1); no organisation, tool or methodology is named. The report reached Apple as an already-exploited in-the-wild issue and Apple published no discovery detail. Neither Apple nor any third party has claimed AI-assisted or automated discovery, and the October 2022 timeframe predates AI-assisted vulnerability discovery being an operational reality — treating this as anything other than human discovery would be unsupported by the primary sources.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -186139,7 +186139,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Apple kernel, which is included in iOS, iPadOS, and macOS, contains an unspecified vulnerability where an application may be able to execute code with kernel privileges.",
     "type": "kernel-memory-corruption-lpe",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was found, and none is claimed. Apple's advisories HT213443 (macOS Big Sur 11.7), HT213444 (macOS Monterey 12.6), HT213445 (iOS 15.7 / iPadOS 15.7) and HT213446 (iOS 16) carry only the single-line Kernel entry — \"Impact: An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited. Description: The issue was addressed with improved bounds checks. CVE-2022-32917: an anonymous researcher\" — with no bug-report identifier, no affected-subsystem name and no sample. Searches turned up no Exploit-DB record (checked the exploitdb files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module (rapid7/metasploit-framework returns zero hits for this CVE), no ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template, and no researcher root-cause writeup reconstructing the out-of-bounds write. Apple has never released the in-the-wild sample, a hash, or any indicator set, so poc_available is recorded false rather than assumed from the actively-exploited status.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was found, and none is claimed. Apple's advisories HT213443 (macOS Big Sur 11.7), HT213444 (macOS Monterey 12.6), HT213445 (iOS 15.7 / iPadOS 15.7) and HT213446 (iOS 16) carry only the single-line Kernel entry (\"Impact: An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited. Description: The issue was addressed with improved bounds checks. CVE-2022-32917: an anonymous researcher\"), with no bug-report identifier, no affected-subsystem name and no sample. Searches turned up no Exploit-DB record (checked the exploitdb files_exploits.csv index), no Metasploit module (rapid7/metasploit-framework returns zero hits for this CVE), no ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template, and no researcher root-cause writeup reconstructing the out-of-bounds write. Apple has never released the in-the-wild sample, a hash, or any indicator set, so the entry records that no proof of concept is available rather than assuming one from the actively-exploited status.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Apple credits \"an anonymous researcher\" in the Kernel entry of HT213443/HT213444/HT213445/HT213446, all published 2022-09-12, and states it \"is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited\" — the phrasing Apple uses when a report arrives with evidence of exploitation rather than from an internal audit. No discovery method, tooling or attribution was published, and no AI-assisted discovery is credited by Apple or by any third party. NVD assigned CWE-787 (out-of-bounds write) on 2022-09-20, eight days after Apple's advisory and six days after CISA added the CVE to KEV.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -186234,7 +186234,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Google Chromium Mojo contains an insufficient data validation vulnerability that allows a remote attacker, who has compromised the renderer process, to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. This vulnerability could affect multiple web browsers that utilize Chromium, including, but not limited to, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Opera.",
     "type": "browser-sandbox-escape",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was found. The Chromium tracker issue behind the fix, crbug.com/1358134, is still access-restricted — NVD tags that reference \"Permissions Required\" — and Google's Stable Channel Update for Desktop of 2022-09-02 carries only the single line \"[$TBD][1358134] High CVE-2022-3075: Insufficient data validation in Mojo. Reported by Anonymous on 2022-08-30\", followed by \"Google is aware of reports that an exploit for CVE-2022-3075 exists in the wild.\" Google never named the vulnerable Mojo interface or released the sample. There is no Exploit-DB entry for this CVE (checked the exploitdb files_exploits.csv index — the only Mojo IPC sandbox-escape record there is EDB 52403 for the unrelated CVE-2025-2783), no Metasploit module (rapid7/metasploit-framework returns zero hits), no ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template, and no researcher root-cause writeup reconstructing the message-validation failure. The in-the-wild exploit was never published, so poc_available is false.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was found. The Chromium tracker issue behind the fix, crbug.com/1358134, is still access-restricted (NVD tags that reference \"Permissions Required\"), and Google's Stable Channel Update for Desktop of 2022-09-02 carries only the single line \"[$TBD][1358134] High CVE-2022-3075: Insufficient data validation in Mojo. Reported by Anonymous on 2022-08-30\", followed by \"Google is aware of reports that an exploit for CVE-2022-3075 exists in the wild.\" Google never named the vulnerable Mojo interface or released the sample. There is no Exploit-DB entry for this CVE (a search of the exploitdb files_exploits.csv index shows that the only Mojo IPC sandbox-escape record there is EDB 52403 for the unrelated CVE-2025-2783), no Metasploit module (rapid7/metasploit-framework returns zero hits), no ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template, and no researcher root-cause writeup reconstructing the message-validation failure. The in-the-wild exploit was never published, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Google's release note credits an external reporter identified only as \"Anonymous\", reporting on 2022-08-30, with the bounty amount withheld ($TBD). The three-day turnaround from report to a single-fix stable release on 2022-09-02, combined with Google's simultaneous statement that an exploit already existed in the wild, is the pattern of an in-the-wild sample being handed to the Chrome security team rather than a fuzzing or code-audit discovery. Chrome's automated discovery stack — AddressSanitizer, MemorySanitizer, UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, Control Flow Integrity, libFuzzer and AFL — is thanked generically in the same post for bugs caught before stable, which this one explicitly was not. No AI-assisted discovery tooling is credited by Google or by any third party.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -187991,7 +187991,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Delta Electronics DOPSoft 2 lacks proper validation of user-supplied data when parsing specific project files (improper input validation) resulting in an out-of-bounds write that allows for code execution.",
     "type": "out-of-bounds-write-rce",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit could be located. The vulnerability was reported by the researcher kimiya through Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative and disclosed to defenders only through CISA ICS advisory ICSA-21-252-02, which describes the sink (\"lacks proper validation of user-supplied data when parsing specific project files ... multiple out-of-bounds write instances\") without publishing a crafted project file, a crash reproducer or an offset. Searches across Exploit-DB, the Metasploit module tree and the ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template set return nothing for CVE-2021-38406, and no vendor or researcher writeup with a reproducer is public. CISA's KEV entry asserts exploitation but publishes no sample, hash or indicator set, so poc_available stays false rather than being inferred from the KEV listing.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit could be located. The vulnerability was reported by the researcher kimiya through Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative and disclosed to defenders only through CISA ICS advisory ICSA-21-252-02, which describes the sink (\"lacks proper validation of user-supplied data when parsing specific project files ... multiple out-of-bounds write instances\") without publishing a crafted project file, a crash reproducer or an offset. Searches across Exploit-DB, the Metasploit module tree and the ProjectDiscovery Nuclei template set return nothing for CVE-2021-38406, and no vendor or researcher writeup with a reproducer is public. CISA's KEV entry asserts exploitation but publishes no sample, hash or indicator set, so this entry continues to record that no proof of concept is available rather than inferring one from the KEV listing.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Reported by the researcher kimiya working with Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative, credited by name in section 4.4 of CISA ICS advisory ICSA-21-252-02 (published 2021-09-09, later reissued as Update A). This is manual file-format reverse engineering of the DOPSoft project parser — the ZDI submission economics of the era make targeted fuzzing plus manual triage the likely method — and no AI-assisted discovery is credited by CISA, ZDI or Delta Electronics.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -188122,7 +188122,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "In affected versions of Apple iOS, macOS, and watchOS, a sandboxed process may be able to circumvent sandbox restrictions.",
     "type": "deserialization-sandbox-escape",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit can be named for this CVE ID. There is no Exploit-DB entry (the exploit-db files_exploits.csv index has no CoreTelephony/Core Telephony record), no Metasploit module, and the trickest/cve GitHub-search aggregate lists zero PoC repositories for CVE-2021-31010 — only KEV-detector mirrors (Ostorlab/KEV, Ostorlab/known_exploited_vulnerbilities_detectors). Google Project Zero's 'FORCEDENTRY: Sandbox Escape' analysis (Ian Beer and Samuel Gross, 2022-03-31, projectzero.google/2022/03/forcedentry-sandbox-escape.html) publishes the NSPredicate-over-NSXPC technique against CommCenter's com.apple.commcenter.xpc CoreTelephonyClient interface and gives pseudo-Objective-C reconstructions rather than runnable code — but that post carries no CVE ID and describes restrictions Apple added in iOS 15.1, whereas CVE-2021-31010 was fixed in iOS 14.8. Citing it as this CVE's reproducer would overstate a link neither Apple nor Project Zero makes, so poc_available is false. Apple's advisory text ('a deserialization issue was addressed through improved validation') remains the only technical description tied to this identifier.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit can be named for this CVE ID. There is no Exploit-DB entry (the exploit-db files_exploits.csv index has no CoreTelephony/Core Telephony record), no Metasploit module, and the trickest/cve GitHub-search aggregate lists zero PoC repositories for CVE-2021-31010 and lists only KEV-detector mirrors (Ostorlab/KEV, Ostorlab/known_exploited_vulnerbilities_detectors). Google Project Zero's 'FORCEDENTRY: Sandbox Escape' analysis (Ian Beer and Samuel Gross, 2022-03-31, projectzero.google/2022/03/forcedentry-sandbox-escape.html) publishes the NSPredicate-over-NSXPC technique against CommCenter's com.apple.commcenter.xpc CoreTelephonyClient interface and gives pseudo-Objective-C reconstructions rather than runnable code. However, that post carries no CVE ID and describes restrictions Apple added in iOS 15.1, whereas CVE-2021-31010 was fixed in iOS 14.8. Citing it as this CVE's reproducer would overstate a link neither Apple nor Project Zero makes, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available. Apple's advisory text ('a deserialization issue was addressed through improved validation') remains the only technical description tied to this identifier.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Apple's Security Update 2021-005 Catalina and macOS Big Sur 11.6 advisories credit the Core Telephony entry to 'Citizen Lab and Google Project Zero' — two named human research organisations, no AI tooling mentioned. The entry was added retroactively on May 25, 2022, roughly eight months after the fix shipped, and sits in the same advisory as CVE-2021-30860 (FORCEDENTRY, credited to The Citizen Lab), placing it in the same mercenary-spyware forensic investigation of in-the-wild samples. 2021 predates the AI-assisted discovery wave; nothing in Apple's, Citizen Lab's or Project Zero's published material attributes this finding to a model or automated analysis system.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -188642,7 +188642,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Apple iOS and macOS contain an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could allow an application to execute code with kernel privileges.",
     "type": "kernel-lpe-oob-write",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was located, and the search was deliberate rather than cursory. GitHub repository search for \"CVE-2022-32894\" returns zero repositories (contrast CVE-2022-21971, which returns 0vercl0k's PoC, and CVE-2022-26923, which returns nine). projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no matching template, rapid7/metasploit-framework has no matching module, and Exploit-DB carries no entry. The closest thing to a public reproducer is the Jamf Threat Labs technical paper \"The Mystery Behind ColdIntro (CVE-2022-32894) and ColdInvite\", which reverse-engineered the in-the-wild path — the attacker used the Display Co-Processor (DCP) as a trampoline into the AP kernel — but Jamf explicitly withheld code, stating \"In accordance with our responsible disclosure policy, we will release the proof of concept for CVE-2023-27930 after Apple issues a patch\" and publishing nothing for ColdIntro itself. Apple credits only \"an anonymous researcher\" and never described the vulnerable subsystem. Aggregator sites claiming \"2 public PoCs on GitHub\" are counting generic CVE-listing repositories, not working exploits, so poc_available is recorded false.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was located, and the search was deliberate rather than cursory. GitHub repository search for \"CVE-2022-32894\" returns zero repositories (contrast CVE-2022-21971, which returns 0vercl0k's PoC, and CVE-2022-26923, which returns nine). projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no matching template, rapid7/metasploit-framework has no matching module, and Exploit-DB carries no entry. The closest thing to a public reproducer is the Jamf Threat Labs technical paper \"The Mystery Behind ColdIntro (CVE-2022-32894) and ColdInvite\", which reverse-engineered the in-the-wild path, in which the attacker used the Display Co-Processor (DCP) as a trampoline into the AP kernel. Jamf explicitly withheld code, however, stating \"In accordance with our responsible disclosure policy, we will release the proof of concept for CVE-2023-27930 after Apple issues a patch\" and publishing nothing for ColdIntro itself. Apple credits only \"an anonymous researcher\" and never described the vulnerable subsystem. Aggregator sites claiming \"2 public PoCs on GitHub\" are counting generic CVE-listing repositories, not working exploits, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "APPLE-SA-2022-08-17-1 (iOS 15.6.1 / iPadOS 15.6.1) and APPLE-SA-2022-08-17-2 (macOS Monterey 12.5.1) both credit the Kernel entry verbatim as \"CVE-2022-32894: an anonymous researcher\", with the impact line \"Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited.\" No primary source — Apple, NVD, CISA KEV, or the Jamf Threat Labs ColdIntro paper — attributes any part of the discovery to fuzzing harnesses driven by machine learning, LLM-assisted triage, or any other AI tooling; in August 2022 no vendor was making such claims. Source is recorded as human_researcher because the credit line names a researcher report, though the anonymity combined with Apple's \"may have been actively exploited\" hedge is the pattern Apple uses when a bug arrives from forensic analysis of a live intrusion rather than from proactive research. No primary source states which, so that distinction is left unasserted. No AI-assisted weaponization has been reported for this chain either.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -188756,7 +188756,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Apple iOS and macOS contain an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could allow for remote code execution when processing malicious crafted web content.",
     "type": "webkit-out-of-bounds-write-rce",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was located. GitHub repository search for \"CVE-2022-32893\" returns zero repositories, projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no matching template, rapid7/metasploit-framework has no matching module, and Exploit-DB carries no entry. Apple credits \"an anonymous researcher\" and published only the standard one-line description; the upstream WebKit bug is tracked as WebKit Bugzilla 243557, which — like all WebKit security bugs — stays restricted, so the fixing commit was never usable as a public root-cause reference at disclosure time. The WebKitGTK and WPE WebKit advisory WSA-2022-0008 (2022-08-25, posted to oss-security) reproduces Apple's wording without adding technical detail, and Red Hat's tracker for the downstream webkitgtk package likewise carries no reproducer. Confirmed exploitation exists (Apple's own \"may have been actively exploited\" note plus the CISA KEV listing), but the working exploit has never been published, so poc_available is recorded false rather than guessed true from the KEV status.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code was located. GitHub repository search for \"CVE-2022-32893\" returns zero repositories, projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no matching template, rapid7/metasploit-framework has no matching module, and Exploit-DB carries no entry. Apple credits \"an anonymous researcher\" and published only the standard one-line description; the upstream WebKit bug is tracked as WebKit Bugzilla 243557, which, like all WebKit security bugs, stays restricted, so the fixing commit was never usable as a public root-cause reference at disclosure time. The WebKitGTK and WPE WebKit advisory WSA-2022-0008 (2022-08-25, posted to oss-security) reproduces Apple's wording without adding technical detail, and Red Hat's tracker for the downstream webkitgtk package likewise carries no reproducer. Confirmed exploitation exists (Apple's own \"may have been actively exploited\" note plus the CISA KEV listing), but the working exploit has never been published, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available rather than inferring one from the KEV status.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Three separate Apple advisories credit this identically and verbatim — APPLE-SA-2022-08-17-1 (iOS 15.6.1 / iPadOS 15.6.1), APPLE-SA-2022-08-17-2 (macOS Monterey 12.5.1) and APPLE-SA-2022-08-18-1 (Safari 15.6.1) — each reading \"WebKit Bugzilla: 243557 / CVE-2022-32893: an anonymous researcher\", with the impact line noting Apple is aware of a report that the issue may have been actively exploited. The backport advisory APPLE-SA-2022-08-31-1 (iOS 12.5.6) repeats the same anonymous credit. No primary source attributes the find to AI-assisted fuzzing, ML-guided triage or an autonomous agent; in 2022 the browser-security field's automated discovery was conventional coverage-guided fuzzing, and neither Apple nor the WebKitGTK project made any tooling claim. Recorded as human_researcher on the strength of the researcher credit line. As with the paired kernel bug, the anonymity plus the active-exploitation hedge is consistent with an incident-derived report, but no primary source says so and the distinction is left unasserted.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -188863,7 +188863,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "Google Chromium Intents contains an insufficient validation of untrusted input vulnerability that allows a remote attacker to browse to a malicious website via a crafted HTML page. This vulnerability could affect multiple web browsers that utilize Chromium, including, but not limited to, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Opera.",
     "type": "input-validation-forced-navigation",
     "poc_available": false,
-    "poc_description": "No public exploit code exists. GitHub repository search for \"CVE-2022-2856\" returns zero repositories, projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no matching template, rapid7/metasploit-framework has no matching module, and Exploit-DB carries no entry. The one technical reference NVD lists and tags \"Exploit\" is the Chromium bug tracker entry 1345630 (now issues.chromium.org/issues/40057494), which still requires sign-in and has not been opened to the public, so the root cause of the Intent input-validation failure has never been published. The Chrome Releases post of 2022-08-16 states only \"High CVE-2022-2856: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Intents. Reported by Ashley Shen and Christian Resell of Google Threat Analysis Group on 2022-07-19\" followed by \"Google is aware that an exploit for CVE-2022-2856 exists in the wild.\" A working exploit demonstrably exists in an adversary's hands; none is public, so poc_available is recorded false.",
+    "poc_description": "No public exploit code exists. GitHub repository search for \"CVE-2022-2856\" returns zero repositories, projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates has no matching template, rapid7/metasploit-framework has no matching module, and Exploit-DB carries no entry. The one technical reference NVD lists and tags \"Exploit\" is the Chromium bug tracker entry 1345630 (now issues.chromium.org/issues/40057494), which still requires sign-in and has not been opened to the public, so the root cause of the Intent input-validation failure has never been published. The Chrome Releases post of 2022-08-16 states only \"High CVE-2022-2856: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Intents. Reported by Ashley Shen and Christian Resell of Google Threat Analysis Group on 2022-07-19\" followed by \"Google is aware that an exploit for CVE-2022-2856 exists in the wild.\" A working exploit demonstrably exists in an adversary's hands; none is public, so this entry records that no proof of concept is available.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "The Chrome Releases stable-channel post for 2022-08-16 credits the report verbatim to \"Ashley Shen and Christian Resell of Google Threat Analysis Group on 2022-07-19\", with no bounty amount ($NA), which is Google's convention for internally-reported issues. Recorded as incident_response rather than vendor_internal because TAG's discovery method is threat hunting against live intrusions, not code audit: TAG tracks government-backed attackers and commercial surveillance vendors, and Google's accompanying statement that an exploit already existed in the wild means the bug was recovered from observed attacker tooling and reported inward, twenty-eight days before the fix shipped. No primary source — Google, NVD, CISA KEV or the restricted Chromium bug — attributes any part of the discovery or the exploit's construction to AI tooling. Chrome's ClusterFuzz infrastructure is conventional coverage-guided fuzzing and is credited separately in the same post under internal audit findings; this CVE is not among them.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
@@ -189200,7 +189200,7 @@
     "_kev_short_description": "JetBrains TeamCity contains a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability that could allow unauthenticated remote code execution via the agent polling protocol.",
     "type": "deserialization-rce",
     "poc_available": true,
-    "poc_description": "poc_available: a weaponized public PoC exists. Rapid7's Stephen Fewer published a working Python exploit at github.com/sfewer-r7/CVE-2026-63077 (CVE-2026-63077.py, 446 lines) that registers a synthetic agent at /app/agents/v1/register, posts an XStream 1.4.20.3 gadget-chain payload to /app/agents/v1/commands/error to write a JSP polyglot into ../webapps/ROOT/<hex>.jspws via an in-memory HSQLDB SCRIPT command, then GETs the dropped file to run an arbitrary OS command (default notepad.exe) as the TeamCity server process. Rapid7 published a matching root-cause analysis and BoredHackerBlog published a corroborating exploitation PCAP (github.com/BoredHackerBlog/teamcity-CVE-2026-63077-pcap) captured against TeamCity 2025.11.3. At curation time no Metasploit module (checked rapid7/metasploit-framework) and no Nuclei template (checked projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates) was present, and Exploit-DB had no entry - the public artifact set is the sfewer-r7 exploit script plus the PCAP.",
+    "poc_description": "A weaponized public PoC exists. Rapid7's Stephen Fewer published a working Python exploit at github.com/sfewer-r7/CVE-2026-63077 (CVE-2026-63077.py, 446 lines) that registers a synthetic agent at /app/agents/v1/register, posts an XStream 1.4.20.3 gadget-chain payload to /app/agents/v1/commands/error to write a JSP polyglot into ../webapps/ROOT/<hex>.jspws via an in-memory HSQLDB SCRIPT command, then GETs the dropped file to run an arbitrary OS command (default notepad.exe) as the TeamCity server process. Rapid7 published a matching root-cause analysis and BoredHackerBlog published a corroborating exploitation PCAP (github.com/BoredHackerBlog/teamcity-CVE-2026-63077-pcap) captured against TeamCity 2025.11.3. When this entry was written, no Metasploit module (checked rapid7/metasploit-framework) and no Nuclei template (checked projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates) was present, and Exploit-DB had no entry. The public artifact set is the sfewer-r7 exploit script plus the PCAP.",
     "ai_discovered": false,
     "ai_discovery_notes": "Reported privately to JetBrains by external researcher Antoni Tremblay on 2026-07-10; JetBrains disclosed and fixed it on 2026-07-27. The public PoC was authored by Rapid7's Stephen Fewer. No AI tooling is credited in the JetBrains advisory, the JetBrains active-exploitation update, the Rapid7 analysis, or the PoC - this is a human-researcher finding.",
     "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,