@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.19.9 → 0.19.10

package/data/zeroday-lessons.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "_meta": {
     "schema_version": "1.1.0",
-    "last_updated": "2026-08-09",
+    "last_updated": "2026-08-10",
     "last_threat_review": "2026-05-17",
     "purpose": "Zero-day learning loop output. Each entry maps a CVE to: attack vector, defense chain analysis, framework coverage, new control requirements generated, and exposure scoring. v1.1.0 (2026-05-15): every entry now carries ai_discovered_zeroday boolean + ai_discovery_source enum + ai_discovery_date + ai_assist_factor ladder, per AGENTS.md Hard Rule #7.",
     "note": "Never delete entries. Closed gaps are marked status: closed. History is data.",
@@ -2944,7 +2944,20 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "low"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "low",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-054",
+        "name": "BACKUP-TIER-NETWORK-ISOLATION",
+        "description": "Bound to this appliance: the QTS / QuTS hero web management surface on a TS-453E-class NAS answers only from an operator subnet or an authenticated VPN — not from a general user VLAN, and not from the internet via a UPnP mapping or a router port-forward, which is how small-office NAS hardware normally acquires exposure — and the appliance's outbound path is constrained so a NAS running attacker code cannot reach arbitrary destinations with the data it holds. State the precondition plainly: this bounds who can present input to the CWE-78 command-injection sink, it does not remove the sink. It does nothing for an attacker already holding a foothold on the operator subnet or on the NAS itself, nothing for the later components of the demonstrated chain once the first stage has landed, and because the packet records no live-patch path (live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes null) the appliance still has to be taken through the vendor firmware update to remediate. Where the business genuinely needs the web UI reachable from user segments, the isolation does not hold and the firmware update is the only remaining action. Distinguishing test: from a general user VLAN and from an external address, attempt to load the appliance's web management surface; anything that answers is within reach of the demonstrated chain, and 'the NAS is on the internal network' is a statement about topology, not evidence that the management surface is unreachable from untrusted segments.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records CWE-78, CVSS 9.8, RWEP 40, poc_available true, patch_available true, live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes null, cisa_kev false and active_exploitation 'unknown'. Attack vector: component 1/3 of the DEVCORE Research Team chain on the QNAP TS-453E appliance at Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 — a chained injection plus format-string bug demonstrated as part of the three-CVE chain that earned $40,000 and 4 Master of Pwn points. Citing gaps are all patch-cadence / system-security controls (AU-Essential-8-Patch, NIST-800-53-SI-2, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management, UK-CAF-B4) plus EU-CRA-Art13.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-62848": {
     "name": "QNAP QTS/QuTS hero RCE (Pwn2Own Ireland 2025, chain 2/3)",
@@ -3077,7 +3090,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "low"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "low",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-054",
+        "name": "BACKUP-TIER-NETWORK-ISOLATION",
+        "description": "The TS-453E is a NAS, so the box that this chain lands privileged execution on is the box holding the data. The packet places this CVE as the elevation step that converts the unauthenticated RCE foothold from the chain's earlier components into appliance-level privileged execution, which means the operator-side lever is the network position of the appliance rather than anything about the elevation primitive itself. Applied to this product the control means the QTS/QuTS hero management and service surfaces answer only from an operator subnet or an authenticated VPN — not from a general user VLAN, and not from the internet through a router port-forward or a UPnP mapping, which is how small-site and remote-worker NAS hardware normally acquires exposure — and that the appliance's outbound path is constrained so a rooted unit cannot ship the data it holds to arbitrary destinations. The precondition is exact and has to be stated rather than implied: isolation removes the chain's entry point only for callers outside the permitted segment. It does nothing once an attacker already holds the foothold this CVE elevates from, nothing against a caller inside the operator subnet or a compromised administrator host, and nothing about an implant placed before the restriction was applied. The packet records an available vendor patch with no live-patch path, so the appliance still has to be taken through the firmware update to remediate; a unit left isolated and unpatched is a deferral with an expiry date attached, not a closed finding. Distinguishing test: from a general user VLAN and from an external address, attempt to load the appliance's management surface — anything that answers is within reach of the published chain, and 'the NAS is on the internal network' is a claim about topology rather than a demonstration that the surface is unreachable from untrusted segments.",
+        "evidence": "Packet attack_vector: 'Component 3/3 of the DEVCORE Research Team chain on the QNAP TS-453E appliance at Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 — post-auth elevation (CWE-269, T1068). Used by the chain to convert the unauth RCE foothold from CVE-2025-62847/62848 into appliance-level privileged execution.' poc_available true; cisa_kev false with kev_date null and active_exploitation unknown; patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes null.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-018",
+        "name": "SCANNER-PAPER-COMPLIANCE-TEST",
+        "description": "The gaps recorded against this entry are patch-and-vulnerability-management controls, and the paper-compliance failure they permit here is specific to appliance firmware: an estate can hold a green 'patch operating systems' attestation covering its servers and workstations while the QNAP appliance's firmware build was never enumerated by the scan at all, because appliance firmware is not an OS package and the unit is not a managed host. The operational test for this CVE therefore has two halves. First, does the scan report a running firmware build read from the appliance itself, rather than treating absence of data as absence of findings? Second, does the build it reports carry the fixes for the chain's other links and not this CVE alone — the packet places this defect as component 3/3 and attributes the unauthenticated RCE foothold to CVE-2025-62847/62848, so a unit remediated only for the elevation step leaves the chain's entry point standing as an independently exploitable unauthenticated path. A verdict derived from a model name, a purchase record or a support-contract entry instead of the running build is the paper-compliance case this control exists to catch.",
+        "evidence": "Packet citing gaps: AU-Essential-8-Patch ('Patch operating systems'), ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 ('Management of technical vulnerabilities') and NIST-800-53-SI-2 ('Flaw Remediation') are recorded as insufficient for this entry. Packet attack_vector identifies the defect as component 3/3 of the chain and names 'the unauth RCE foothold from CVE-2025-62847/62848'; the packet gives the affected product as the QNAP TS-453E appliance running QTS/QuTS hero, with patch_available true.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-59389": {
     "name": "QNAP Hyper Data Protector critical RCE (Pwn2Own Ireland 2025)",
@@ -8049,7 +8085,42 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-036",
+        "name": "FLEET-CONTROL-PLANE-ADMIN-PRIVILEGE-TIER",
+        "description": "This flaw's entire precondition is a low-privileged local account on the SD-WAN Manager appliance: the packet has an authenticated, local attacker reading a credential file for the DCA user from the filesystem and thereby gaining DCA privileges. Bound here, privilege tiering means the appliance carries no general-purpose local accounts at all — every operator who can obtain shell or filesystem-level access on vManage sits in a distinct tier above application and network admins, reached only through a PAM jumphost with FIDO2 step-up, just-in-time elevation, an identity used for nothing else, and per-session attribution. State the precondition honestly rather than claiming the surface is removed: this shrinks the population that can reach the credential file, it does not make the stored password unrecoverable. Any principal that does obtain low-privileged local access on the appliance — through an operational account, a support process, or any other local-access defect on the same host — still recovers the DCA credential, and the control has no effect at all on a credential that was already read. The cited least-privilege and identity-and-access-control gaps are recorded here because the escalation runs from one local account to another via a file read, so an attestation that vManage roles are least-privileged passes cleanly while the recoverable credential file sits on disk. Distinguishing test: from a deliberately low-privileged local account on a staging appliance, attempt to read the DCA credential file and confirm the account cannot exist in the first place under the tiering policy.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2026-20128: cwe_refs CWE-257; vector 'Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager contains a storing passwords in a recoverable format vulnerability that allows an authenticated, local attacker to gain DCA user privileges by accessing a credential file for the DCA user on the filesystem as a low-privileged user.'; cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-04-20; active_exploitation confirmed; rwep_score 77; cvss 8.8; poc_available true; patch_available true; live_patch_available false. NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege), UK-CAF-B2 (Identity and access control) and NIS2-Art21-network-security are among the citing framework gaps.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-037",
+        "name": "FLEET-COMPROMISE-IR-PLAYBOOK",
+        "description": "A recoverable-format password disclosure is not closed by the code fix: the update changes how the DCA credential is stored, but a password an attacker has already read stays valid until it is changed. With the packet recording confirmed in-the-wild exploitation from the 2026-04-20 KEV listing on a controller whose own filesystem held the credential, the response half of this control is the load-bearing half — rotate the DCA credential and any other credential recoverable from the appliance filesystem as part of the update rather than as a follow-up ticket, audit what that account was used for across the exposure window, and invalidate device-trust state established through the controller where the account's use cannot be accounted for. Two preconditions decide whether the rotation is worth anything. It has to happen after the fixed build is running: rotating first simply writes a fresh password back into the recoverable format, leaving the operator with a rotation record and an unchanged exposure. And it only covers credentials the operator knows the appliance stores, so an inventory of what the controller holds on disk has to precede the rotation. This is a response control — it does not reduce the likelihood of the initial low-privileged local foothold that the flaw requires.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2026-20128: vector states an 'authenticated, local attacker' can 'gain DCA user privileges by accessing a credential file for the DCA user on the filesystem as a low-privileged user'; attack_vector records 'storage of passwords in a recoverable format (CWE-257), allowing an attacker with access to recover credentials'; cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-04-20; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; rwep_score 77; patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' UK-CAF-B2 (Identity and access control), NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) and NIS2-Art21-network-security are among the citing framework gaps.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The KEV listing of 2026-04-20 with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation puts this controller on the KEV clock rather than in the standard appliance patch window, and two packet details decide how the SLA is measured. There is no live-patch tool recorded for this entry, and the packet states the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV required action — so the SLA is satisfied when each controller has restarted onto the fixed build, not when the package is staged or installed, and the restart outage has to be scheduled inside the clock rather than deferred to the next maintenance window. The limit belongs in the control statement: meeting the SLA does not close this entry on its own, because the credential file was readable for the whole pre-patch window on every affected controller. A patch-currency attestation showing the fixed build installed fleet-wide is fully consistent with an attacker still holding a valid DCA password, which is why the clock has to be paired with rotation of the exposed credential rather than recorded as the remediation.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2026-20128: cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-04-20; active_exploitation confirmed; rwep_score 77; cvss 8.8; poc_available true; patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.'; vector describes an authenticated local attacker gaining DCA user privileges by accessing a credential file for the DCA user on the filesystem. AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 and NIST-800-53-SI-2 are among the citing framework gaps.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-32975": {
     "name": "Quest KACE Systems Management Appliance (SMA) Improper Authentication Vulnerability",
@@ -8109,7 +8180,40 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The KACE SMA entry is KEV-listed with confirmed exploitation and a public PoC, so the clock for this appliance runs from the listing date rather than the next appliance-maintenance window. The packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and notes that the patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, which fixes how completion must be measured: by each appliance actually running the fixed build after that restart, not by 'update approved' or 'update staged' in a change record. An appliance that holds the update but has not been restarted is still serving the vulnerable authentication path and must be counted as exposed. Because no live-patch primitive exists for this product, any interval the operator cannot compress has to be carried as a documented compensating control (restricting which network segments may reach the appliance's authentication surface) recorded as a compensating state with a dated action, not reported as remediated.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-04-20, active_exploitation confirmed, rwep_score 77, cvss 9.1, poc_available true. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and live_patch_notes: 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-129",
+        "name": "ENTERPRISE-ERP-MANAGEMENT-FUNCTION-AUTHENTICATION",
+        "description": "KACE SMA takes an authentication decision in front of an endpoint-management console, and this CVE is that decision failing open: the packet has an attacker impersonating legitimate users without valid credentials, reaching functionality behind the gate without ever presenting an account. Bound to this appliance the control means each administrative and API function on the SMA authorizes its own caller instead of inheriting a verdict from the front-door authentication, and the appliance's management surface is segmented so a caller with no operational need cannot present a request to that front door at all. This is precisely why the packet's cited multi-factor, identity-and-access and least-privilege gaps do not help here: the attacker never authenticates, so no second factor is demanded and no role is consulted, and an attestation that every KACE operator uses MFA passes cleanly while the path stays open. The precondition on the segmentation half must be stated rather than implied — it bounds who can reach the bypass, not whether the bypass works. A request originating from a permitted management segment, from an already-compromised administrator workstation, or from access obtained before the restriction was applied still reaches it, so segmentation buys time until the appliance is restarted onto the fixed build and never substitutes for that restart. Distinguishing test: from a segment with no operational need for the SMA console, issue unauthenticated requests to each administrative endpoint on a staging appliance and confirm each is refused before the function runs.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: the appliance 'contains an improper authentication vulnerability that could allow attackers to impersonate legitimate users without valid credentials'; attack_vector records an improper-authentication flaw (CWE-287) letting an unauthenticated attacker bypass authentication on the endpoint-management appliance. The entry's citing gaps name AU-Essential-8-MFA (Multi-factor authentication), UK-CAF-B2 (Identity and access control) and NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) as the framework controls that do not cover it.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-MFA",
+          "UK-CAF-B2",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-037",
+        "name": "FLEET-COMPROMISE-IR-PLAYBOOK",
+        "description": "The packet pairs confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and a public PoC with a fix that the vendor notes typically requires a restart or reboot, which means every affected appliance had an exposure window and the update closes the authentication path without touching anything already done through it. Because the compromised asset is an endpoint-management appliance, the playbook has to cover what that appliance can reach and not just the appliance itself: review what it was configured to distribute to managed endpoints across the window running from first plausible exposure to the restart onto the fixed build, rotate the credentials the appliance holds for reaching those endpoints along with any operator account used through it during that window, invalidate device-trust state, and set quarantine criteria for endpoints that received anything from it in that period. The precondition worth naming is that the playbook must already exist and be rehearsed before the next disclosure, because the detection an operator would reach for first will not fire: the packet's own words are that the attacker impersonates legitimate users without valid credentials, so the activity presents as a legitimate operator and authentication-failure monitoring has nothing to surface. Patching alone answers the vulnerability question and leaves the compromise question unasked.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: active_exploitation confirmed, cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-04-20, poc_available true, against what the attack_vector describes as an endpoint-management appliance. patch_available true but live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes stating the vendor patch 'typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction'. Packet vector: attackers 'impersonate legitimate users without valid credentials'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-27199": {
     "name": "JetBrains TeamCity Relative Path Traversal Vulnerability",
@@ -8473,7 +8577,29 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-120",
+        "name": "DOWNLOAD-PROVENANCE-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The sink on this entry is reached only when a user opens an attacker-controlled document that causes VBA to resolve a library from a path the attacker controls, so on any workstation not yet on the fixed and restarted build the ingress path is the surface an operator can actually enforce. Require the untrusted-origin mark on every VBA-bearing Office document arriving by mail, web download or untrusted file share, and require marked documents to open in an isolated reduced-privilege render instead of the full load path that resolves the hijacked library at the user's own privilege. The mark has to be applied at the ingress boundary and survive the container the document travels in — extraction from an archive, mount of an ISO or VHD, rename — because a search-order hijack needs the substitute library to sit in a directory the opening process searches, which is typically the same container that carried the document; a provenance scheme that tags the document but not its sibling files leaves the payload sitting where the loader will find it. Precondition: this constrains delivery only, and it holds only where the mark is applied and preserved. A document reaching the user over an internal share, a sync client or any channel that strips the tag, or a policy that lets the user click through to full editing, restores the vulnerable path in one step; and once an attacker already has write access to a searched directory on the host, provenance enforcement contributes nothing. Those cases close only with the vendor fix, and the packet records no live-patch tool for this entry with the fix typically requiring a service restart or system reboot — so hosts that have taken the update but not restarted must be counted as exposed rather than remediated.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: CWE-426 insecure library loading in Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications; attack_vector records an attacker-controlled document loading a malicious DLL from an unexpected path (search-order hijacking) for code execution. cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-04-13, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 9.8, rwep_score 77. patch_available true and live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening (User application hardening) and NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) are both recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-074",
+        "name": "CVE-REGRESSION-WATCHER",
+        "description": "This entry carries a 2012 CVE identifier alongside a 2026-04-13 KEV listing, confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and an available PoC — precisely the historical-identifier-resurfacing signal this control asks a threat-intake pipeline to raise. Applied here, intake must treat exploitation reports and PoC publications that name an identifier years older than the current advisory stream as a candidate re-exposure and force the affected-asset question back open for the VBA-bearing estate, because a vulnerability-management queue driven by current-year advisories will never revisit an identifier of this age on its own — the hosts get scoped only if something pushes the old ID back into the queue. Precondition: this is an intake and detection control and nothing more. It shortens time-to-notice; it does not remediate, it fires only where the pipeline covers the source that names the old identifier, and it gives no coverage on hosts compromised before the listing. The action it must hand off to is the vendor fix plus the restart or reboot the packet records as required, since no live-patch path is registered for this entry.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: the identifier is CVE-2012-1854, while cisa_kev is true with kev_date 2026-04-13 and active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true, rwep_score 77, cvss 9.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities) and NIS2-Art21-patch-management (Vulnerability handling and disclosure) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-60710": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Link Following Vulnerability",
@@ -8937,7 +9063,29 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-120",
+        "name": "DOWNLOAD-PROVENANCE-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "Exploitation of this entry requires a user to open a crafted PDF, so until every Acrobat and Reader install in the estate is on the fixed build and has been restarted, the delivery path is the enforceable surface. Require the untrusted-origin mark on PDFs arriving by mail, web download and untrusted file share, applied at the ingress boundary rather than derived from metadata travelling with the file, and require marked PDFs to open in the reader's isolated reduced-privilege render instead of the full parsing path that carries the CWE-1321 prototype-pollution sink at the user's own privilege. The mark must survive the container, so a PDF extracted from an archive or mounted from an image still reaches the reader marked untrusted. Precondition: this narrows the path to the sink, it does not remove the sink. A PDF arriving over an internal share, a sync client or a chat client that writes the file locally reaches the parser unmarked, and a policy that permits the user to leave the protected render restores the full path in one click — neither case has compensating coverage and both need the vendor update plus the application or system restart the packet records as required. If the estate additionally disables document scripting, record that as unverified coverage for this entry rather than as a substitute for the update: the packet does not identify which component the prototype-pollution sink sits behind, so the operator cannot assert the scripting toggle covers it.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: CWE-1321 prototype pollution in Adobe Acrobat and Reader; vector and attack_vector both record arbitrary code execution when a crafted PDF is opened. cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-04-13, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 8.8, rwep_score 77. patch_available true and live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening (User application hardening) and NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-144",
+        "name": "EMBEDDED-MEDIA-PARSER-LIBRARY-INVENTORY-AND-PATCH-PARITY",
+        "description": "The packet names the affected product as Adobe Acrobat and Reader, which on a real estate is never one install: Reader and Acrobat ship as separate products on separate update tracks, and per-user copies land outside managed software distribution. The control here means enumerating every installed Acrobat and Reader copy across those tracks and confirming each reports the fixed build, rather than closing the flaw-remediation ticket when the single inventoried Reader package updates. Scope it to those products: the packet ties the CWE-1321 sink to Acrobat and Reader and provides no mapping from the vulnerable code into other PDF-handling software, so instructing operators to treat every PDF-capable binary in the estate as an instance of this CVE manufactures findings and removal work against renderers no evidence implicates. Widen the inventory only where a verified source identifies another product carrying the same component. The distinguishing test: after the managed update lands, enumerate the Acrobat and Reader installs on the estate and confirm none still report a pre-fix version — an estate that patches the inventoried Reader while a second Acrobat track keeps the old build still opens crafted PDFs into the sink, with a flaw-remediation attestation that reads clean. Precondition: this reaches only copies the inventory can see and the operator can update; an unmanaged per-user install is remediated by removing it, not by recording it as patched. The packet registers no live-patch path, so each copy carries the service restart or system reboot the vendor fix requires, and a copy updated but not restarted is not yet remediated.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: the affected product is recorded as \"Adobe Acrobat and Reader\" with a CWE-1321 prototype-pollution flaw reached by opening a crafted PDF; cisa_kev true, kev_date 2026-04-13, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 8.8, rwep_score 77. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities) and NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2026-1340": {
     "name": "Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) Code Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -12351,7 +12499,29 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-056",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ENDPOINT-MDM-ENFORCED-KEV-SLA",
+        "description": "The packet's affected surface spans watchOS, iOS, iPadOS, macOS, visionOS and tvOS, and the fix is a full OS build with no live-patch path — so for this entry the control means the KEV clock that opened 2026-03-20 drives the update across the managed Apple estate on a declared short SLA with user deferral disallowed, not on the estate's normal OS-upgrade cadence. Completion must be measured by each device's installed build against the fixed build for its product, and because the packet records that the vendor fix typically requires a service restart or system reboot, a device that has downloaded or staged the update but not restarted is still running the vulnerable code and counts as exposed rather than remediated. Precondition: the declarative-management lever exists for enrolled iPhone, iPad and Mac. The watchOS, tvOS and visionOS units named in the same packet are commonly updated through a paired device or are not enrolled at all, so no-deferral enforcement does not reach them — those must be enumerated separately and driven manually or held outside the trust boundary until their build is confirmed. Omitting them makes the SLA report read complete while the devices nobody enrolled are the ones still carrying the flaw.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: the vector states that Apple watchOS, iOS, iPadOS, macOS, visionOS and tvOS contain an improper locking vulnerability (CWE-667) that could allow a malicious application to cause unexpected changes in memory shared between processes. cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-03-20, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 8.8, rwep_score 77. patch_available true and live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) and NIS2-Art21-patch-management (Vulnerability handling and disclosure) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-126",
+        "name": "MOBILE-OS-MINIMUM-PATCH-LEVEL-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The trigger the packet records is a malicious application causing unexpected changes in memory shared between processes, so for this entry the control's access-condition half is the load-bearing one: on any Apple device that cannot yet take the fixed build, the operator's remaining levers are constraining what code is allowed to run at all and withholding organizational data from the device until its build is at or above the fix. The fixed build must function as an access condition — mail, VPN and document access denied to a device below it — not as a row on a patch-compliance dashboard. The distinguishing test is to enrol a device pinned below the fixed build and confirm the policy actually denies it access to protected resources; an estate that surfaces the stale build on a report while the device keeps its access has recorded the exposure rather than removed it. Precondition: restricting untrusted or side-loaded application installation raises the bar for getting the attacker's application onto the device, but it does not evict an application already installed, and it does not cover one that arrived through the normal store channel. A device suspected of already running the malicious application belongs on the incident path, not the install-policy path. This is a holding measure for the window before the fixed build and its required restart land, not a substitute for them.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: CWE-667 improper locking across Apple watchOS, iOS, iPadOS, macOS, visionOS and tvOS, with the vector stating it could allow a malicious application to cause unexpected changes in memory shared between processes. cisa_kev true, kev_date 2026-03-20, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 8.8, rwep_score 77. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" AU-Essential-8-Patch (Patch operating systems) and ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-43520": {
     "name": "Apple Multiple Products Classic Buffer Overflow Vulnerability",
@@ -13070,7 +13240,31 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-103",
+        "name": "AI-APP-BUILDER-EXECUTION-ENDPOINT-AUTH-AND-SANDBOX",
+        "description": "n8n is the visual workflow/agent builder class this control governs, and the defect sits in exactly the sink the control names: the workflow expression evaluation system, a dynamic-evaluation path that turns workflow-supplied content into executable code. For an n8n deployment the requirement is that every surface which can reach expression evaluation authenticates the caller before the expression is evaluated — the editor API, workflow import, and any trigger whose fields are expression-evaluated — and that the n8n execution process runs confined rather than with host privileges, so a successful evaluation cannot reach filesystem, network or process operations beyond what the workflows legitimately need. Preconditions, all of which must be recorded rather than assumed: this bounds who can reach the evaluator, it does not repair the evaluator, so the vendor update remains the only fix for the flaw itself. Anyone already holding an editor-capable account is inside the authentication boundary and the control does nothing against them. Confinement added after the fact does not evict an attacker resident from an earlier execution on that host. And where a trigger must stay reachable by untrusted callers for the workflow to do its job, that path cannot be closed by authentication at all — for it, the update is the only remedy and the interim state is exposure, not mitigation.",
+        "evidence": "The packet records CWE-913, described as an improper control of dynamically managed code resources vulnerability in n8n's workflow expression evaluation system that allows for remote code execution, at CVSS 9.8 with rwep_score 77 and poc_available true. cisa_kev is true with kev_date 2026-03-11 and active_exploitation confirmed. The entry cites NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) and UK-CAF-B4 (System security) among the framework controls that are insufficient here, which is the privilege-and-boundary half this control addresses. patch_available is true and live_patch_available is false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "For this entry the clock opens at the 2026-03-11 KEV listing, and what has to be measured is the n8n build actually running, not the release pulled. The packet records no live-patch tool for this entry and notes the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot, so an instance that has fetched the fixed release but has not restarted the n8n service is still executing the vulnerable expression evaluator and must be counted as exposed rather than remediated. The second requirement follows from active_exploitation being confirmed with a public exploit available: an instance whose editor or trigger surface was reachable during the exposure window needs forensic review of the workflows present on it and rotation of any credential the n8n process could reach, because code execution on that host precedes the update and is not undone by it — patch-and-close is the wrong verdict for an instance that was reachable, and the compliance record must distinguish 'updated and restarted' from 'updated, restarted, and triaged'.",
+        "evidence": "cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-03-11, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77 against cvss 9.8. patch_available is true and live_patch_available is false; live_patch_notes states that no live-patch tool is registered for this entry at bulk-import time and that the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. The four cited patch-and-vulnerability-handling gaps — AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIST-800-53-SI-2 and NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management — are the risk-based-timeframe controls that carry no KEV-triggered clock.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2021-22054": {
     "name": "Omnissa Workspace ONE Server-Side Request Forgery",
@@ -13911,7 +14105,38 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-135",
+        "name": "CONTROL-PANEL-PLUGIN-USER-SURFACE-MUST-NOT-REACH-ROOT-OPERATIONS",
+        "description": "The Cisco SD-WAN application CLI is the constrained user surface this control governs. The packet's vector describes an authenticated local attacker gaining elevated privileges via improper access controls on commands within the application CLI, with a successful exploit allowing arbitrary commands as the root user — a user-facing surface wired straight to a root operation, which is the pattern the control forbids. Applied to this device, it means the SD-WAN privileged operations sit behind their own authorization boundary that the application CLI can only request through a constrained, validated interface, so that the CLI's own command-and-path handling is not the single thing standing between a non-root operator account and root. Preconditions: the vendor update is what repairs that boundary — the control states the property to verify, it does not implement it. Until the update is applied, the only operator-side lever is limiting which accounts can open a CLI session, which bounds the population that can attempt the escalation but does not close it, because any account that legitimately reaches the CLI still reaches root. And because active_exploitation is confirmed, a device whose CLI was reachable by a non-root account during the exposure window needs forensic triage and credential rotation; an update applied to a device that already granted root does not remove what the attacker left behind.",
+        "evidence": "The packet's vector states that the Cisco SD-WAN CLI contains a path traversal vulnerability that could allow an authenticated local attacker to gain elevated privileges via improper access controls on commands within the application CLI, and that a successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands as the root user. cwe_refs are CWE-25 and CWE-282. cvss 7.5, rwep_score 77, poc_available true, cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-02-25 and active_exploitation confirmed. UK-CAF-B4 (System security) is cited as an insufficient framework control on this entry. patch_available is true, live_patch_available is false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-036",
+        "name": "FLEET-CONTROL-PLANE-ADMIN-PRIVILEGE-TIER",
+        "description": "An SD-WAN device CLI programs the WAN fabric that every site depends on, so the identities that can open a session on it belong in the fleet-control-plane tier this control defines rather than in a general network-operations account pool. For this CVE the tier is load-bearing on one half specifically: the packet's vector places the attacker at an authenticated CLI session, so routing every CLI path through a PAM jumphost with per-session step-up and just-in-time elevation shrinks the set of identities that can reach the vulnerable command handling at all, and makes each attempt attributable. The preconditions are where this control is usually recorded as holding when it does not. It only holds if every path to the device CLI is behind the same gate — console and out-of-band or serial access, recovery and break-glass accounts, and any automation or monitoring service account that logs into the device all bypass a jumphost by default and re-open the full path unless they are enumerated and brought under it. And the tier does not fix the escalation itself: an identity that legitimately passes the gate still reaches root through the flaw. This is a blast-radius and attribution measure that runs alongside the vendor update, never a substitute for it.",
+        "evidence": "The packet's vector places the attacker at an authenticated local session on the application CLI of a Cisco SD-WAN device, escalating to arbitrary commands as root. cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-02-25, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77. NIS2-Art21-network-security (Security of network and information systems) is cited as an insufficient framework control on this entry. patch_available is true, live_patch_available is false. Note the packet is internally inconsistent on the privilege precondition: the attack_vector summary line instead describes the flaw as reachable by an unauthenticated attacker, contradicting the vector field this description relies on.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The clock for this entry opens at the 2026-02-25 KEV listing, and for an SD-WAN estate it has to be measured per device against the software actually running, not against the change record. The packet records no live-patch tool for this entry and notes the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot, so a device with the fixed image staged but not reloaded still runs the vulnerable CLI command handling and is counted as exposed. Because these devices are updated fleet-wide in waves, the SLA has to be evidenced by the count of devices confirmed running the fixed version rather than by the update being approved or pushed, which is the measurement that lets a partially-completed rollout be reported as within SLA. Where a site's reload window cannot be taken inside the clock, that device is recorded as an open exposure with the restriction of who can open a CLI session on it as the named interim measure — not as patched.",
+        "evidence": "cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-02-25, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77 against cvss 7.5. patch_available is true and live_patch_available is false; live_patch_notes states that no live-patch tool is registered for this entry at bulk-import time and that the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. The cited AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 and NIST-800-53-SI-2 gaps are the risk-based-timeframe patching controls carrying no KEV-triggered clock.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2026-20127": {
     "name": "Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and Manager Authentication Bypass Vulnerability",
@@ -14604,7 +14829,20 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "For this entry the clock runs from the 2026-02-17 KEV listing, and completion has to be measured on the endpoint rather than in the management console: the packet records no live-patch path and a vendor patch that typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, so a workstation that has taken the update but not restarted still hosts the vulnerable Microsoft Video ActiveX control (msvidctl) and remains exposed to a crafted web page rendered in Internet Explorer. Two things this SLA must not be allowed to substitute for on this path, and both are why the corresponding gaps are recorded against the entry: the flaw yields the same rights as the logged-on user, so running users as non-administrators narrows the blast radius but does not stop the drive-by execution; and a user-application-hardening attestation covering macro, plugin and advertisement settings does not enumerate the browser-invocable ActiveX control the bug lives in. Until the restart completes on a given host, the only remaining levers are keeping that host away from untrusted web content and recording it as exposed — neither privilege posture nor the hardening baseline closes the path, so an SLA measured on 'update approved' or 'update downloaded' records the exposure instead of removing it.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records CWE-94 in the Microsoft Video ActiveX control (msvidctl), CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77, cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-02-17, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Vector: an attacker constructs a specially crafted Web page; when a user views it the vulnerability could allow remote code execution, giving the attacker the same user rights as the logged-on user; the attack_vector field places this in Internet Explorer for drive-by remote code execution. Citing gaps include NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) and AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening (User application hardening).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2026-2441": {
     "name": "Google Chromium CSS Use-After-Free Vulnerability",
@@ -15234,7 +15472,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "For this entry the KEV clock opens 2026-02-10 and the unit of completion is a restarted host, not an approved update. The packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch tool registered and a fix that typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, so a Windows host that has installed the update but has not taken the restart is still running the pre-patch Remote Access Connection Manager image and has to be counted as exposed rather than as remediated. Scope the rollout to every host carrying the component rather than to a subset chosen from an assumed reachability model: the packet's vector describes an unauthorized attacker denying service locally, while the packet's own summary line describes the flaw conservatively as network-reachable pending Microsoft's component detail — the two framings do not agree, and narrowing the rollout to whichever one is cheaper is how a KEV-listed defect with confirmed exploitation survives the SLA on paper. The distinguishing test: query the fleet for hosts whose installed build carries the fix AND whose RasMan service has restarted since installation; a management-console report of 'update deployed' does not answer that question.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-02-10, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77 against cvss 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Vector: 'Microsoft Windows Remote Access Connection Manager contains a NULL pointer dereference that could allow an unauthorized attacker to deny service locally' (CWE-476). The packet's attack_vector line instead reads 'a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) in a network-reachable Windows component ... described conservatively as a network-reachable memory-safety flaw pending Microsoft's component detail.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-038",
+        "name": "MITIGATION-ACTIVE-PATCH-PENDING-VERDICT-CLASS",
+        "description": "The state this entry forces a framework to name is 'update installed, restart deferred'. Because the packet gives no live-patch tool and a fix that typically needs a service restart or system reboot, a host in that state has not eliminated the defect — it holds a time-bound compensating position, and the audit record has to surface it as one instead of as 'patched per SLA'. The deferral pressure here is structural rather than incidental: the impact the packet describes is denial of service, and the remediation itself costs a RasMan restart or a reboot, so the operators most motivated to defer are running exactly the workloads whose interruption the cited availability gap is about. Two preconditions bound the compensating state and both belong in the record. It is valid only while a dated restart is scheduled — an open-ended deferral is exposure, not mitigation. And the packet says 'service restart or system reboot' without settling which applies to a given build, so the operator has to establish that for their estate and count only hosts where the action actually completed; a host credited on the assumption that a service restart sufficed, when the build needed a reboot, is recorded as remediated while still vulnerable. Where neither has happened and no date exists, the entry is full exposure and should be scored as such.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Vector: Remote Access Connection Manager NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) allowing an unauthorized attacker to deny service locally; active_exploitation confirmed, kev_date 2026-02-10, rwep_score 77. The entry's citing gaps include NIS2 Art. 21 'Availability and resilience risk-management measures' and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.8 'Management of technical vulnerabilities'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-availability",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2026-21510": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Shell Protection Mechanism Failure Vulnerability",
@@ -16503,7 +16764,38 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-119",
+        "name": "ARCHIVE-CONTENT-TYPE-PROVENANCE",
+        "description": "CWE-807 on this entry is Office deciding whether content is trusted from input the attacker supplies, so the durable operator-side control is to move the origin determination off the document and onto a boundary the organization operates: the mail gateway, the managed file share and the web download path apply and preserve the untrusted-origin marking themselves, and that marking survives archives, disk-image containers and renames, so the Office host is told the file is externally sourced instead of deriving it from metadata travelling with the file. This matters more than usual here because the packet does not name which Office security feature the bypass defeats — no in-product setting can be assumed to be the intact one, which is exactly why the control that is worth attaching is the one whose input is established outside the vulnerable decision. The precondition has to be written down rather than assumed: boundary-applied marking only covers files that cross a boundary you run. A document arriving on removable media, through a personal cloud-sync client, or on any unmanaged path never passes a marking point and reaches Office unmarked, so those ingress paths must be blocked or brought under the same marking; where that is not done, this control does not cover them and the vulnerable decision is still reached with attacker-supplied input. The distinguishing test: send an externally-sourced document through each ingress path in turn and confirm it arrives at the Office host already marked untrusted, rather than confirming that a hardening policy shows as enabled in the management console.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'Microsoft Office contains a security feature bypass vulnerability in which reliance on untrusted inputs in a security decision in Microsoft Office could allow an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally' (CWE-807). cisa_kev true, kev_date 2026-01-26, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77 against cvss 8.8. The packet does not name the specific Office security feature that is bypassed. Citing gaps on this entry include ASD Essential Eight 'User application hardening' and UK NCSC CAF B4 'System security'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-041",
+        "name": "PROTECTION-MECHANISM-FAILURE-CLASS-REGRESSION",
+        "description": "This entry is the case that makes a configured-and-enabled attestation worthless: the packet's flaw is the bypass of an Office security feature, so the setting is on and the check returns the wrong answer. Treat Office document handling as a protection-mechanism class and hold a regression battery of the known bypass primitives for that class, re-run on every Office patch deployment rather than once against this CVE, with the fixed build validated by detonating the battery on a representative managed image instead of by reading a version number off an inventory. The packet's own note that some impacted products may be end-of-life or end-of-service makes the recurring form of the test the load-bearing half: those installs will not receive the next fix, so the battery is the only mechanism that tells an operator whether the posture built around them still blocks. State the limit plainly instead of recording the battery as coverage — it exercises only the primitives already known to it and says nothing about the next bypass in the class, so it establishes that this fix landed and that the surrounding controls still hold, not that Office is immune to the class.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: Microsoft Office security feature bypass (CWE-807) that 'could allow an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally', carrying the note 'Some of the impacted product(s) could be end-of-life (EoL) and/or end-of-service (EoS).' active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, kev_date 2026-01-26, rwep_score 77. Citing gap on this entry: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.8 'Management of technical vulnerabilities'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The KEV clock on this entry opens 2026-01-26 with exploitation confirmed and a PoC available, and the packet splits the estate into two populations that need different completion criteria. For supported Office builds the mitigation is the vendor update driven across the fleet with the restart the packet says the fix typically requires, since no live-patch tool is registered — an install that has not restarted is not a closed item. For the installs the packet flags as end-of-life or end-of-service, no update is coming, and the packet's stated action is to discontinue use or transition to a supported version; for that population the 'verified mitigation' leg of this control is a dated transition or removal plan, and there is no patch task to track. Naming that split is the point of attaching this control here: a patch-compliance report that files the EoL/EoS installs under 'no update available' drops them out of the SLA permanently, and on an entry with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation that is exactly the population an attacker keeps.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true, kev_date 2026-01-26, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77 against cvss 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Vector: 'Some of the impacted product(s) could be end-of-life (EoL) and/or end-of-service (EoS). Users are advised to discontinue use and/or transition to a supported version.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-37079": {
     "name": "Broadcom VMware vCenter Server Out-of-bounds Write Vulnerability",
@@ -16646,7 +16938,29 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The KEV clock on this entry opens 2026-01-22 against a mail server, and the scoping unit that matters is the endpoint, not the host count: every ZCS instance whose /h/rest endpoint answers remote callers is in the exploited population, which is why the ordinary multi-week application-patch cadence that mail platforms are usually audited under is the gap this entry demonstrates. The packet records a vendor patch, no live-patch tool, and a fix that typically requires a service restart or system reboot, so completion is per-instance and is only real once ZCS services come back on the fixed build — an update staged on a mailbox node that has not been restarted is still serving the vulnerable dispatch path. The SLA record for this entry should also capture the exposure window it closes, per instance, from the 2026-01-22 KEV listing to the completed restart, because that window is the input to the compromise-assessment decision the rebuild runbook depends on; an SLA that records only a completion date destroys the information needed to decide whether patching was sufficient.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true, kev_date 2026-01-22, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77 against cvss 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Vector: crafted requests to the /h/rest endpoint 'influence internal request dispatching, allowing inclusion of arbitrary files from the WebRoot directory' (CWE-98). attack_vector: 'a PHP remote file inclusion flaw (CWE-98) on ZCS, enabling remote code execution on the mail server.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "Zimbra ZCS sits on the internet mail boundary and the packet puts remote code execution on that server, so this entry belongs to the class this runbook exists for: the update repairs the request-dispatch defect but removes nothing that was placed on, or read from, the server through it beforehand, and patch-in-place closes the ticket over whatever is already resident. The default for an affected instance is therefore capture configuration and forensic evidence, rebuild from a known-good image onto the fixed build, and rotate the credentials and tokens the server held, rather than update-and-close. Two preconditions have to be stated or the runbook is mis-scoped. First, the trigger is exposure during the window between the 2026-01-22 KEV listing and the completed update, not the CVE in the abstract: where per-request logs covering that window exist and show no exploitation against the /h/rest path, patch-and-verify is the proportionate response — but where those logs were never collected, absence of alerts is not evidence of absence, and the instance belongs in the rebuild path rather than being cleared by default. Second, the packet does not state whether the /h/rest request path requires authentication, so exposure cannot be narrowed to unauthenticated reachability; an instance reachable only by authenticated users stays in scope until vendor detail settles that, and 'the endpoint is behind login' is not a basis for skipping the assessment.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: active_exploitation confirmed, cisa_kev true with kev_date 2026-01-22, poc_available true, rwep_score 77. Vector: 'remote attackers to craft requests to the /h/rest endpoint to influence internal request dispatching, allowing inclusion of arbitrary files from the WebRoot directory'. attack_vector: 'a PHP remote file inclusion flaw (CWE-98) on ZCS, enabling remote code execution on the mail server.' patch_available true, live_patch_available false. The packet does not state whether the /h/rest request path requires authentication. Citing gap on this entry: UK NCSC CAF B4 'System security'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-34026": {
     "name": "Versa Concerto Improper Authentication Vulnerability",
@@ -19809,7 +20123,39 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "WSUS is the host the rest of the estate takes its updates from, so this entry inverts the usual remediation ordering: the clock that opened with the 2025-10-24 KEV listing has to be run on the update server itself ahead of the endpoints it serves, because an unauthenticated deserialization path to remote code execution on WSUS sits upstream of every patch decision those endpoints make. The packet records no live-patch path and a vendor patch that typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, so completion is measured by the WSUS host's state after that restart — a server that has installed the update and not restarted is still running the vulnerable service and must be counted as exposed, not as remediated. Because active exploitation is confirmed and a public PoC exists, an instance that stayed reachable through the window before that restart needs triage rather than a 'patched per SLA' verdict.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records CWE-502 deserialization of untrusted data in Windows Server Update Service (WSUS), reachable by an unauthenticated attacker for remote code execution; CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77, cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-10-24, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-125",
+        "name": "SERVICE-INTERNAL-PROTOCOL-DESERIALIZATION-HARDENING",
+        "description": "The WSUS listener accepts content from a peer that never authenticates and hands it to a deserializer — the packet puts remote code execution ahead of any authentication decision — so that listener has to be treated as a trust boundary rather than as an internal convenience. For this deployment the requirement is that the WSUS service endpoints accept connections only from the managed clients and administrative hosts that legitimately speak to them, enforced by host firewall or network ACL rather than inherited from the assumption that WSUS sits on a trusted network, and that content arriving there is constrained to what the update protocol legitimately conveys instead of being permitted to construct arbitrary objects. The precondition has to be stated rather than implied: WSUS must remain reachable by every endpoint it services, so this narrows the caller set and cannot close the path for anything inside it — a compromised managed client, or any host that can place itself in that set, still reaches the deserializer. It bounds exposure during the remediation window and is not a substitute for taking the server through the update and its restart. This is also why the cited least-privilege gap is recorded here: the attacker never authenticates, so no account-privilege scoping is consulted on this path and an access-control attestation passes cleanly while it stays open.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records CWE-502, vector 'Microsoft Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) contains a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability that allows for remote code execution', and an attack_vector stating the flaw is 'reachable by an unauthenticated attacker for remote code execution'. CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true. Citing gaps include NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) and UK-CAF-B4 (System security).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-078",
+        "name": "ENDPOINT-MGMT-DEPLOYMENT-CHANNEL-INTEGRITY",
+        "description": "Code execution on WSUS lands inside the software-distribution channel every managed endpoint already trusts, so the WSUS installation and the content it serves have to be governed as a privileged distribution channel rather than as application data: file-integrity-monitor the installation and the directories it serves artifacts from, alert on writes that do not correspond to a sanctioned administrator action or a vendor synchronization, and hold the server to KEV-priority patching as a management-plane asset in its own right rather than as one more Windows server in the general fleet. This is the half of the response that still has value after the vendor update lands, because the fix closes the deserialization sink but removes nothing an attacker wrote through it — and with exploitation confirmed from the 2025-10-24 listing, an instance that was reachable before remediation needs forensic triage rather than patch-and-close. The precondition: integrity monitoring detects, it does not prevent, and it is only meaningful where the baseline predates the exposure window. Where no pre-exposure baseline exists, the content the server distributes has to be re-established from vendor-sourced material instead of being trusted from the server's present state.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records active_exploitation confirmed with cisa_kev true and kev_date 2025-10-24, poc_available true, and an unauthenticated deserialization path (CWE-502) to remote code execution on the WSUS server. patch_available is true with live_patch_available false, so the deserialization sink is closed only once the vendor update and its restart are taken. NIS2-Art21-supply-chain (Supply chain security measures) is recorded as a citing gap for this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-supply-chain"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-61932": {
     "name": "Motex LANSCOPE Endpoint Manager Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel Vulnerability",
@@ -20632,7 +20978,32 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "This flaw lets an unauthenticated attacker read arbitrary local files on the Grafana host, including its own configuration and secrets, so time on the vulnerable build is continuing disclosure rather than only continuing risk — which is what distinguishes it from the ordinary patch-cadence item the cited controls treat it as. Run the clock from the 2025-10-09 KEV listing rather than the next maintenance window, and define 'mitigated' for this product as the Grafana service restarted onto the fixed build: the packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and a restart-or-reboot requirement, so an instance whose package was replaced but whose process was never restarted has not met the SLA no matter what the change record says. Where the restart genuinely cannot be taken inside the window, the documented compensating control this SLA permits is removing untrusted reachability to the instance for the duration — and that substitution carries two conditions that must be stated rather than assumed. It holds only where the instance's exposure is actually controllable at the network boundary, which is not true of a Grafana deployment published for external users; and it does nothing about files already read, so any credential, datasource secret or key material readable through this flaw during the exposure window must be treated as disclosed and rotated, since patching closes the read path but does not revoke what the path already returned.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records a path-traversal flaw (CWE-22) letting an unauthenticated attacker read arbitrary files including configuration and secrets; product described as Grafana with a path traversal vulnerability allowing access to local files. CISA KEV-listed 2025-10-09 with active_exploitation 'confirmed'; poc_available true; RWEP 77, CVSS 7.5. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and the live-patch note states the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-018",
+        "name": "SCANNER-PAPER-COMPLIANCE-TEST",
+        "description": "The paper-compliance failure for this CVE is specific and mechanical: the packet records a fix with no live-patch path that requires a service restart, so a scanner reading the installed Grafana package version reports the instance remediated while the process still listening continues to serve the vulnerable traversal handler from the code it loaded at start. The distinguishing test is to exercise the flaw against the running instance rather than compare version strings — issue a traversal request that attempts to reach a local file outside the served root and confirm the listening process refuses it — and to cross-check that the process start time is later than the update. This matters more than usual on Grafana because the asset being read is the instance's own configuration and secrets: a version-only inventory cannot separate an instance that restarted from one that did not, so the vulnerability-management attestation passes for hosts that are still disclosing credentials to any unauthenticated caller.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and a live-patch note stating the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction; the flaw is a CWE-22 path traversal permitting an unauthenticated attacker to read arbitrary local files including configuration and secrets. CISA KEV-listed 2025-10-09, active_exploitation 'confirmed', poc_available true, RWEP 77, CVSS 7.5.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-27915": {
     "name": "Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability (variant: CVE-2025-27915)",
@@ -21371,7 +21742,33 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-121",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ZERO-CLICK-HARDENING",
+        "description": "The packet places this out-of-bounds write inside Samsung's image-parsing library libimagecodec.quram.so and describes zero-click code execution from a malicious image forming the initial-access half of a mobile-spyware chain, so no user decision and no application-privilege boundary stands between delivery and the vulnerable parser — the reboot-gated firmware update is the only real fix and it is not fast enough on its own for the population this class targets. For the plausibly targeted cohort — executives, journalists, legal and security staff — place devices in a reduced-attack-surface posture that stops untrusted images, message attachments and link previews from being fetched and rendered automatically, narrowing the delivery path into the CWE-787 write during the window between the 2025-10-02 KEV listing and completed fleet restart. This is also the only substitute available for the least-privilege control cited against this entry, which never engages on this path: the write happens inside the platform codec before any account or app privilege decision is consulted, so scoping privilege leaves the flaw fully reachable and constraining what content reaches the codec is the remaining lever. Three preconditions must be stated rather than assumed. The posture only helps if it was already standing for that cohort before the disclosure, since it does nothing if switched on after the image arrived. It narrows the messaging delivery path but does not remove the parser surface — any application that fetches and renders an image still reaches the same codec — so it is a narrowing measure, not elimination. And it does not evict an attacker already resident: a cohort device that was reachable during the exposure window needs forensic triage and credential revocation, not a settings change.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in libimagecodec.quram.so on Samsung mobile devices, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary code, exploitable by a malicious image for zero-click code execution on the device, and characterizes the class as the initial-access half of a mobile-spyware chain. CISA KEV-listed 2025-10-02 with active_exploitation 'confirmed'; poc_available true; RWEP 77, CVSS 9.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and the live-patch note states the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) is recorded among the framework controls citing this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-126",
+        "name": "MOBILE-OS-MINIMUM-PATCH-LEVEL-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "Treat the Samsung firmware build that carries this codec fix as a condition of access to organizational data rather than a figure on a patch-compliance report: a handset below it is denied or quarantined from mail, VPN and documents. The packet gives no live-patch path and a fix requiring a restart or reboot, which makes the restart the completion criterion — a handset that has downloaded the firmware but not restarted still loads the vulnerable libimagecodec.quram.so and must be counted exposed rather than remediated. One half of this control's usual shape does not carry on this path and should not be recorded as though it does: because the trigger is a zero-click malicious image rather than a malicious installed application, restricting side-loaded or untrusted app installs does not reduce reachability here, so the levers are the build and the content path only. Preconditions: the gate is meaningful only where Samsung has published a build carrying the fix for that exact model and the device is enrolled in management; until such a build exists the correct state is quarantine, and any unenrolled or BYOD population is outside the control entirely and has to be denied access to organizational data rather than assumed compliant. Distinguishing test: enrol a handset pinned below the fixed build and confirm access to protected resources is actually refused — an estate that surfaces the stale build on a dashboard while the device keeps its mail and VPN has recorded the exposure, not removed it.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) in libimagecodec.quram.so on Samsung mobile devices allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary code, exploitable by a malicious image for zero-click code execution. CISA KEV-listed 2025-10-02, active_exploitation 'confirmed', poc_available true, RWEP 77, CVSS 9.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and the live-patch note states the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-4008": {
     "name": "Smartbedded Meteobridge Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -21818,7 +22215,29 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "Adminer is a database-administration front end and the packet's path needs no credential at all: an unauthenticated caller coerces the instance into issuing requests to internal resources, so the exposed asset is the whole set of destinations the hosting web server can reach from where it sits, including the database hosts the tool exists to talk to. The KEV listing here dates from 2025-09-29 for a defect published years earlier, so the work item never arrives through new-CVE inflow — it arrives only if the vulnerability-management program re-scans the deployed estate against the KEV catalogue on a schedule. Applied to this product the SLA needs an explicit completion definition, because the packet records patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and a fix that typically requires a service restart or reboot per the KEV requiredAction: remediation is the replaced Adminer build plus the restart of the process serving it, not an entry in a package inventory. The enumeration step is what a generic patch SLA misses on this product class — every deployed copy has to be located, including copies dropped under a web root by hand and copies baked into an application or container image, because a copy no package manager owns is a copy no patch cycle will ever update, and one forgotten instance is sufficient to keep the primitive live.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'Adminer contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that, when exploited, allows a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information.' attack_vector: a server-side request forgery flaw (CWE-918) 'letting an unauthenticated attacker coerce the server into making requests to internal resources'. CVSS 7.5, RWEP 77, poc_available true, CISA KEV-listed 2025-09-29 with active_exploitation confirmed. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-038",
+        "name": "MITIGATION-ACTIVE-PATCH-PENDING-VERDICT-CLASS",
+        "description": "The lever operators actually reach for first on this flaw is not the build — it is reachability and egress, because the packet's primitive is the server issuing requests on the attacker's behalf, so restricting who can reach the instance or what the web host may connect outbound to blunts the impact immediately. That response puts the entry in this control's state (b): a compensating control is active while the vulnerable code is still deployed, and it must be recorded as that distinct state with a dated action item to take the vendor build and the service restart the packet says it needs, not rolled into a patched-per-SLA count. The precondition is the whole point and has to be written down next to the mitigation: a network or egress restriction bounds the SSRF only for as long as the specific route it blocks stays blocked, so a new internal service, a security-group or routing change, a move of the host into a segment with broader reach, or simply a valuable destination inside the still-permitted set reopens the identical primitive with no change to the application and no alert. It also does nothing for an attacker who can still reach the instance and probe whatever remains permitted, and nothing about information already retrieved before the restriction went in — so an instance that was reachable while the PoC the packet records was public warrants a review of what it could have reached during that window, not only a forward-looking block. Where the restriction cannot be verified route by route, the entry stays in state (c) and should be reported as full exposure.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-918 server-side request forgery in Adminer; attack_vector states an unauthenticated attacker coerces the server into making requests to internal resources, and the vector states the result is disclosure of potentially sensitive information. poc_available true, CISA KEV-listed 2025-09-29, active_exploitation confirmed, RWEP 77, CVSS 7.5. patch_available true with live_patch_available false, and live_patch_notes recording that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — so the interval between mitigation and remediation is real and has to be tracked.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-20362": {
     "name": "Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security (ASA) Appliance and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Missing Authorization Vulnerability",
@@ -23840,7 +24259,31 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-057",
+        "name": "BROWSER-MANAGED-UPDATE-NO-DEFERRAL",
+        "description": "The packet states this ANGLE/GPU flaw affects multiple browsers that use Chromium — Chrome, Edge and Opera are named and the list is explicitly not exhaustive — so the ring that matters is the union of every Chromium-derived browser on the estate, not the single browser the organization treats as standard. Holding the security channel for a validation week here means holding a fix for a bug being exploited in the wild through a crafted web page: the delivery is a page visit, so there is no attachment to strip, no macro to block and no user action to police between the page and the GPU process. Applied here the control also has to count remediation at the right moment — the packet records no live-patch path and a fix that takes effect only after a restart, so a device that has downloaded the update but has not relaunched the browser is still running the vulnerable ANGLE and GPU-process code, and an update dashboard that counts 'version downloaded' overstates coverage. Precondition and limit: fast updating closes the entry path, it does not evict an attacker who already landed. Because exploitation is confirmed, a device that browsed while unpatched needs triage on its own merits — updating a compromised host removes the bug, not the implant. Second-string Chromium builds that no enterprise update policy governs (kiosk browsers, embedded webviews, developer channels, bundled runtimes) have to be enumerated and either brought under the same ring or removed; where such a build has no managed update channel at all, the no-deferral rule cannot be applied to it and removal is the only honest disposition.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector, verbatim: 'Google Chromium contains an improper input validation vulnerability in ANGLE and GPU. This vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. This vulnerability could affect multiple web browsers that utilize Chromium, including, but not limited to, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Opera.' CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-22 (kev_date) with active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 8.8, rwep_score 77. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and live_patch_notes records no registered live-patch tool with the vendor patch typically requiring a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — the basis for counting remediation at relaunch rather than at download. Citing gaps include ASD Essential Eight 'User application hardening' and NIST 800-53 SI-2, both of which an estate can attest to while its update ring still defers the security channel and while non-standard Chromium builds sit outside the policy.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-018",
+        "name": "SCANNER-PAPER-COMPLIANCE-TEST",
+        "description": "For this CVE the paper-compliance failure takes two distinct shapes and a version-based scan catches neither. Coverage first: the packet says the defect affects browsers that utilize Chromium including but not limited to Chrome, Edge and Opera, so a scan scoped to the organization's standard browser reports the estate clean while Edge and Opera installs, embedded Chromium webviews and bundled runtimes still carry the vulnerable ANGLE/GPU code. State second: the packet records no live-patch path and a fix that takes effect after a restart, so the version on disk can be the fixed one while the still-running browser process — the one hosting the GPU process a crafted page reaches — is the old build. The operational test: on a sample of workstations, enumerate every Chromium-derived binary present rather than only the managed browser, and compare the version of the running process against the version installed on disk; a scanner that declares the estate remediated without answering both questions has produced a compliance artifact, not a statement about whether a crafted page can still reach the sandbox-escape path. Precondition: where the scanner cannot read running-process versions, the substitute is a forced relaunch or reboot campaign with per-device confirmation, and until that confirmation exists the estate's status is unknown rather than remediated — treating 'update deployed' as the completion signal is the exact assumption this test exists to break.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector states the improper input validation is in ANGLE and GPU and that it 'could affect multiple web browsers that utilize Chromium, including, but not limited to, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Opera'; attack_vector describes an attacker-controlled web page escaping the browser sandbox (CWE-20). CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-22, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77. live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes recording that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — the basis for distinguishing the installed build from the running one. ISO 27001 A.8.8, NIST 800-53 SI-2 and UK CAF B4 are the cited gaps; each is routinely evidenced with precisely the version-based scan report this test invalidates.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-54309": {
     "name": " CrushFTP Unprotected Alternate Channel Vulnerability",
@@ -25546,7 +25989,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-040",
+        "name": "OWA-PER-REQUEST-SIEM-INGESTION",
+        "description": "Roundcube's mailbox surface has to be logged at the per-request level, shipped off the webmail host, because the theft this flaw enables never produces a failed or unusual authentication event — the same webmail per-request telemetry requirement the inventory entry states for Exchange OWA, applied to a Roundcube estate. The packet's path is a crafted email that hits a desanitization issue in message_body() in program/actions/mail/show.php, so the injected script runs when the victim opens the message, inside a session the victim authenticated normally, and the attacker's mail reads and outbound sends are issued by the victim's own browser over the victim's own session. Applied here: forward the Roundcube HTTP access log and the mailbox-side (IMAP/webmail application) request log for every mailbox operation — not just the login events — to a collector the webmail host cannot write to, retain it long enough to cover the span between the KEV listing of 2025-06-09 and the day each instance was actually restarted onto the fixed code, and review it for read/send patterns rather than authentication failures. The distinguishing test: ask the SIEM to reconstruct every message a chosen account opened and sent on a chosen day; a source that can only answer 'the user logged in at 09:14' cannot see this attack at all. Precondition and limit: this is detection, not prevention — it does not stop the script from executing, and it only yields evidence if per-request logging was already shipping before the crafted message arrived. If the deployment sits behind a reverse proxy that logs only at the proxy, mailbox-side actions over the authenticated session will not appear, and the webmail application/IMAP log must be added as its own source. Where per-request logging was absent during the exposure window, retrospective review cannot answer the question and the mailboxes have to be treated as potentially read and their stored credentials as potentially taken.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-06-09, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 77 against CVSS 6.1 — the in-the-wild status rather than the base score is what makes the pre-restart window worth reconstructing. The vector records that the flaw 'could allow a remote attacker to steal and send emails of a victim via a crafted e-mail message that abuses a Desanitization issue in message_body() in program/actions/mail/show.php'; the attack_vector records script running 'in a victim's authenticated session via a crafted email (exploited in espionage credential-theft campaigns)'. patch_available true but live_patch_available false, and live_patch_notes records that no live-patch tool is registered for this entry and that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — so every deployment carried a window between listing and restart. The citing gaps NIST 800-53 SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) and NIS2 Art. 21 vulnerability handling are both remediation-side and close at 'patched', leaving session-borne theft that already happened unrecorded.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "For this entry the clock starts at the KEV listing of 2025-06-09 with a public PoC already available and exploitation confirmed, and what decides whether an operator can meet it is not the package — it is the restart. The packet records a vendor patch but no registered live-patch tool, and states the fix typically requires a service restart or system reboot, so a Roundcube instance is not remediated when the upgrade lands on disk; it is remediated when the webmail service and the PHP worker serving program/actions/mail/show.php have been recycled and a request actually executes the fixed message_body(). Applied here: schedule that recycle inside the response window rather than at the next maintenance weekend, and where a shared-hosting or multi-tenant webmail platform genuinely cannot be recycled that fast, book the delay as a dated, named exception with the compensating measure written down — not as 'patch scheduled', which reads as compliant on a report while every mailbox on the instance stays reachable through a single crafted message. Precondition: the compressed clock only covers instances the operator knows about. A KEV-triggered SLA applied over an inventory that omits departmental, hosted or legacy Roundcube instances silently exempts exactly the instances nobody restarts, so the enumeration of webmail instances is part of the control rather than a prerequisite assumed to hold.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-06-09, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, rwep_score 77, cvss 6.1. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and live_patch_notes states that no live-patch tool is registered for this entry at bulk-import time and that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — the restart, not the package upgrade, is the step that ends the exposure. The vector places the defect in message_body() in program/actions/mail/show.php, reached by a crafted email. The citing gaps NIST 800-53 SI-2, ISO 27001 A.8.8 and NIS2 Art. 21 vulnerability handling all impose an obligation to remediate but none carries a KEV-triggered deadline, which is the gap this control fills.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-32433": {
     "name": "Erlang Erlang/OTP SSH Server Missing Authentication for Critical Function Vulnerability",
@@ -26637,7 +27103,41 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-134",
+        "name": "DEVICE-MANAGEMENT-GATEWAY-CONFIG-ENDPOINT-AUTH-INPUT-NEUTRALIZATION",
+        "description": "This is the authentication half of the EPMM chain. The packet places the flaw in EPMM's API component, where crafted API requests reach protected resources without proper credentials because of an insecure implementation of the Spring Framework open-source library, and states that chained with the code-injection flaw it yields unauthenticated remote code execution on the device-management gateway itself. Bound to this product, the control means every EPMM API endpoint authorizes its own caller before it processes the request rather than inheriting a verdict from the framework layer that fronts it, and that no EPMM instance is left with those endpoints reachable from an untrusted network. The two identity gaps cited against this entry are cited precisely because they never engage: the attacker presents no credentials at all, so per-account privilege scoping (AC-6) is never consulted, and the account and credential model a UK-CAF-B2 identity-and-access attestation examines is bypassed rather than abused — an estate where every EPMM operator authenticates with strong MFA passes that attestation cleanly while this path stays wide open. The precondition on the network half: restricting reachability bounds who can present the crafted request, but it cannot be complete for an instance that has to answer devices enrolling from outside the corporate network, which is a deployment fact the operator must establish per instance rather than one the packet supplies. Reachability limits are therefore a bound on exposure, not a substitute for endpoint-level authorization. Distinguishing test: from an unauthenticated client on a staging EPMM, request each protected API resource and confirm each is refused before the resource is served.",
+        "evidence": "The packet states that Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the API component that allows an attacker to access protected resources without proper credentials via crafted API requests, and that this results from an insecure implementation of the Spring Framework open-source library. Its attack vector records an authentication bypass (CWE-288) that, chained with the code-injection flaw, yields unauthenticated remote code execution. Entry facts: CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77, poc_available true, CISA KEV-listed 2025-05-19 with active_exploitation confirmed. UK-CAF-B2 (Identity and access control) and NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) are both among the framework control gaps citing this CVE.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B2",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "For this entry the KEV clock opens at the 2025-05-19 listing, and what makes the clock specific to EPMM is where it has to stop. The packet records no live-patch tool registered for this entry and notes that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — so an EPMM instance whose update is installed but whose service has not been restarted is still running the vulnerable API component and must be counted as exposed, not as remediated. Completion is therefore measured by restarted instances, not by patch-applied counts in a deployment console. The compensating-control branch of the SLA has to name its precondition rather than imply coverage: the only interim lever is restricting who can reach the EPMM API surface, and for any instance that must answer devices enrolling from outside the corporate network that restriction cannot be complete — it narrows the caller population but does not remove the crafted-request path, and it does not stop the clock. Nothing in the interim branch reduces the exposure to a caller already inside the permitted segment, because the flaw needs no credentials at all.",
+        "evidence": "The packet records CISA KEV listing 2025-05-19 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true, CVSS 9.8 and RWEP 77 for an authentication bypass (CWE-288) in the EPMM API component that, chained with the code-injection flaw, yields unauthenticated remote code execution. patch_available is true; live_patch_available is false, and the live-patch notes state that no live-patch tool is registered for this entry at bulk-import time and that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-037",
+        "name": "FLEET-COMPROMISE-IR-PLAYBOOK",
+        "description": "EPMM is the gateway that manages an enrolled device population, so an instance that was reachable while this bypass was live is a fleet-control-plane exposure rather than a single-server one, and patch-and-close does not address it. The playbook this CVE demands covers: certificate revocation pushed to enrolled devices, device-trust-state invalidation, an audit of configuration profiles pushed during the exposure window, quarantine criteria for downstream devices, and rotation of credentials for any account that authenticated through the EPMM instance during that window. The reason it is needed here specifically is that the packet's chain ends in unauthenticated remote code execution on the management gateway — an attacker at that position acts as the fleet's own control plane, and every profile, certificate and credential it handled during the window is suspect, none of which the vendor patch reverses. Two preconditions, both stated rather than assumed. The playbook is only actionable if the exposure window can be bounded from EPMM logs that predate the suspected compromise; where it cannot be bounded, the whole enrolled population is in scope rather than out. And the packet establishes confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of this CVE, not that any particular instance was compromised — the trigger for invoking the playbook is evidence that the instance's API was reachable during the window, not the existence of the CVE.",
+        "evidence": "The packet identifies the product as Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) and places the flaw in its API component: crafted API requests reach protected resources without proper credentials (CWE-288), and chained with the code-injection flaw this yields unauthenticated remote code execution. It records CISA KEV listing 2025-05-19, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77. patch_available is true; live_patch_available is false, with notes that no live-patch tool is registered and the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "UK-CAF-B2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-42999": {
     "name": "SAP NetWeaver Deserialization Vulnerability",
@@ -28683,7 +29183,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The KEV listing on this entry lands nearly two decades after the vendor fix the packet names, so the clock that matters here is the listing date, not patch availability, and a vulnerability-management program keyed to newly published CVE inflow never generates a work item for it at all. The population still exploitable is by definition the hosts the original update never reached, which is exactly the population a patch-management console cannot report on because it does not manage them. Applied to this flaw the SLA therefore has two non-standard requirements: enumeration must start from what actually answers Server Service RPC on the network rather than from the console's asset list, and completion must be measured as installed build plus a completed reboot, because the packet records live_patch_available false and a fix that requires a reboot, so a host that has taken the update but not restarted is still running the vulnerable service and counts as exposed rather than remediated. The distinguishing test: sweep each segment for hosts answering Server Service RPC and compare each responder's build against the fixed build; a KEV-SLA attestation driven off the management console's patch inventory reports full compliance while the unmanaged responders that carry this CVE are never in the denominator.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2026-05-20, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 9.3, RWEP 70, poc_available true. patch_available true and live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes recording 'Microsoft patch MS08-067 (2008); requires reboot. No live-patch primitive.' — a KEV listing dated many years after the vendor patch. The vector records a crafted RPC request to the Windows Server service triggering a buffer overflow (CWE-119) allowing unauthenticated remote code execution, described as wormable.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-128",
+        "name": "APPSERVER-REMOTING-PROTOCOL-RESTRICTION",
+        "description": "This is the remoting-protocol class exactly: a non-HTTP RPC listener that parses an attacker's request before any credential is presented, where the parser is itself the vulnerable code, so web-tier hardening and the perimeter firewall never touch the path. For this flaw the requirement is that the Windows Server service's RPC listener accept connections only from the management and file/print peers that legitimately need it, enforced per segment by host firewall rule and network ACL rather than inherited from an assumption that the host sits on an internal network — which is the assumption a wormable defect defeats, since a worm's requests originate inside the trusted segment and not at the edge. The limit has to be stated rather than left implied: this bounds which hosts can present the crafted request, it does not remove the defect from any host that must keep answering Server Service RPC to its own segment, and it does nothing once a host inside the permitted segment is already compromised or once an infected laptop, contractor machine or removable-media host is introduced behind the ACL. Where the listener cannot be restricted because the host's function depends on it, the only remaining lever is the update and the reboot it requires, since the packet records no live-patch primitive. The distinguishing test: from a general user VLAN on a staging network, send Server Service RPC traffic at a representative host and confirm it is dropped before reaching the service; an estate that blocks this protocol at the perimeter while every internal segment can reach every host still carries the propagation path intact.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'A crafted RPC request to the Windows Server service triggers a buffer overflow allowing unauthenticated remote code execution — wormable.' attack_vector names it as the MS08-067 flaw exploited by Conficker, CISA KEV-listed 2026-05-20 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true. live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes state the patch requires reboot and that there is no live-patch primitive.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2022-23812": {
     "name": "node-ipc geo-targeted file-wiper protestware (RU/BY heart-emoji overwrite; peacenotwar dropper in 11.0.0+)",
@@ -31103,7 +31626,31 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The unit of remediation for this flaw is the JCE extension, not the Joomla platform, so the clock that opened with the 2026-06-16 KEV listing has to be measured against the installed JCE build on every site in the estate. A site whose Joomla core is current still answers index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import if the extension itself was not updated, and estates whose sites are operated by an agency or reseller need the count taken there rather than inferred. The packet records a vendor update with no live-patch path, so there is no way to close the endpoint short of taking each site through the extension update. Nothing about a site's configuration buys time: the path needs no account and no user interaction, only a CSRF token scrapable from any public page, so every publicly reachable install is exposed for exactly the interval between the listing and the update landing on the last site. The distinguishing test is to query each site for its installed JCE version instead of accepting a platform-level 'Joomla is up to date' attestation, and to re-check after any restore from a pre-update backup, which silently reinstates the vulnerable extension on a site that was already remediated.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-284 improper access control; CISA KEV-listed 2026-06-16 with active_exploitation confirmed; CVSS 9.8, RWEP 70, poc_available true. patch_available true with live_patch_available false and live_patch_notes 'No live-patch path for this product class; remediation is the vendor update plus the named compensating controls until it lands.' The packet's vector names index.php?option=com_jce&task=profiles.import as reachable by any unauthenticated visitor, requiring only a CSRF token scrapable from any public page. The citing gaps AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIST-800-53-SI-2 and NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management are the patch-timing controls the packet's own remediation note points back at.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-025",
+        "name": "CONFIGURATION-SIDE-LIVE-PATCH-INVENTORY",
+        "description": "The packet's remediation note says the vendor update 'plus the named compensating controls' is the remediation, and for this product the compensating path lives in the web-server configuration rather than in the application. Two rules are deployable without waiting on the extension update: refuse to hand any file under the JCE upload root to the PHP handler, so the write the attacker obtains through File::upload(..., false, true) cannot become execution, and reject requests carrying task=profiles.import at the reverse proxy so the crafted profile that whitelists executable uploads is never imported. Both have to be inventoried and rehearsed before the next disclosure, because authoring a deny-execute rule for the first time during an active exploitation window is where sites get broken or missed. The preconditions have to be recorded alongside the rules rather than left implicit: the deny-execute rule covers only the directories it names — the packet places the shell in the web root's default images/ folder, so an install whose upload root has been relocated, or that permits writes to any other docroot path, is untouched by it — and the request filter holds only for the request shapes it matches, so an alternate encoding or an alias reaching the same task goes around it. Neither rule evicts a shell already written, so a site that was publicly reachable before the rules went in needs its docroot audited against a known-good source tree, not merely the rules applied. This is also why the cited least-privilege gap does not close on its own: the attacker never authenticates, so per-account privilege scoping is never consulted, and the code runs as the web-server user — constraining what that account's writable directories are permitted to execute is the half that actually bites.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'File::makeSafe() sanitizes the filename but never restricts the extension, and File::upload(..., false, true) is called with unsafe handling enabled, bypassing Joomla's extension blacklist,' letting the attacker 'write a .php web shell into the web root (default images/ folder), yielding unauthenticated remote code execution and a persistent backdoor running as the web-server user.' patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: 'No live-patch path for this product class; remediation is the vendor update plus the named compensating controls until it lands.' NIST-800-53-AC-6 and UK-CAF-B4 are recorded as citing gaps on this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2026-54420": {
     "name": "LiteSpeed cPanel Plugin UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following Vulnerability",
@@ -31660,7 +32207,29 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-054",
+        "name": "BACKUP-TIER-NETWORK-ISOLATION",
+        "description": "The packet's opening fact about this deployment is that the Commvault Web Server is internet-reachable, and reachability is what makes the rest of the path available: an attacker holding any valid low-privilege Commvault account sends crafted requests to that web surface to create and execute a webshell. Applied to this product, the control means the Commvault Web Server's HTTP surface answers only from an operator subnet or an authenticated VPN rather than from the open internet, and that the host's outbound path is constrained so a webshell running in the web-application context cannot freely reach arbitrary destinations with what the same host holds. Two preconditions have to be stated rather than assumed. First, restricting reachability bounds who can present the crafted request; it does not repair the upload primitive, and it gives nothing against a caller who already has a foothold on a permitted host or against a webshell planted before the restriction was applied. Second, the egress constraint only limits what the webshell itself can reach — the packet records that the stored Azure/M365 application client secrets were read, and once those secrets are off the host they are replayable from any address, so egress filtering does not contain the cross-tenant half at all. The distinguishing test: from an external address and from a general user VLAN, attempt to load the Commvault Web Server's HTTP surface; anything that answers is within reach of a caller holding any valid low-privilege account, and 'the server is behind our firewall' is a claim about topology, not a demonstration that the surface is unreachable from untrusted networks.",
+        "evidence": "The packet states the Commvault Web Server is internet-reachable and that an attacker holding valid (low-privilege) authenticated user credentials can send crafted requests that create and execute a webshell, yielding remote code execution within the web-application context; it states unauthenticated access is not exploitable, so the primitive requires a prior valid-account foothold. It records that in the observed Metallic SaaS breach this foothold was used to read Commvault-stored Azure/M365 application credentials (client secrets), allowing impersonation of customer service principals and lateral movement into downstream M365 tenants. Entry facts: CWE-434, CVSS 8.8, RWEP 72, poc_available true, CISA KEV-listed 2025-04-28 with active exploitation confirmed. patch_available is true; live_patch_available is false, with live-patch notes stating there is no live-patch path for this product class and that remediation is the vendor update plus the named compensating controls until it lands.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "For an internet-reachable Commvault Web Server under confirmed exploitation, the IR default has to be configuration capture, rebuild and credential rotation rather than patch-in-place, because the packet's outcome is a webshell running on the host and the vendor update does not evict it. The rotation scope is the part that is specific to this product and larger than the host: the packet records the observed Metallic SaaS breach reading Commvault-stored Azure/M365 application credentials (client secrets) and impersonating customer service principals into downstream M365 tenants, so every application credential the server held must be rotated in the tenants that trust it and the sessions those secrets minted revoked — rebuilding the Commvault host alone leaves the attacker holding credentials that work from anywhere, with no dependency on the rebuilt server. Two preconditions, stated rather than implied. This control's usual trigger is a pre-auth RCE, and this path is not pre-auth — the packet is explicit that unauthenticated access is not exploitable and a prior valid low-privilege account is required — so the runbook trigger for this CVE is evidence that any account could have reached the web server during the exposure window, and an instance whose access logs cannot establish that is treated as in scope rather than out. And the packet establishes confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of the CVE, not that a given instance was compromised; the rebuild decision is driven by unbounded exposure, not by the CVE alone.",
+        "evidence": "The packet states the Commvault Web Server is internet-reachable, that exploitation requires an attacker holding valid low-privilege authenticated credentials (unauthenticated access is not exploitable), and that crafted requests let the attacker create and execute a webshell for remote code execution in the web-application context, providing persistent code execution. It records that in the observed Metallic SaaS breach the foothold was used to read Commvault-stored Azure/M365 application credentials (client secrets), allowing impersonation of customer service principals and lateral movement into downstream M365 tenants — turning a single web-server compromise into cross-tenant cloud access. CISA KEV-listed 2025-04-28, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, CVSS 8.8, RWEP 72, CWE-434. patch_available true; live_patch_available false, with notes recording no live-patch path for this product class and remediation as the vendor update plus the named compensating controls until it lands.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-24054": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows NTLM Hash Disclosure Spoofing Vulnerability",
@@ -32933,7 +33502,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "This entry has the profile a severity-threshold patch policy defers: CVSS 5.5, no public PoC, and the packet's own statement that there is no direct privilege escalation from the bug alone. The control's requirement for this CVE is that the clock is driven by the 2025-03-11 KEV listing and the confirmed exploitation, not by the score — and that the co-patched NTFS/FAT flaws the packet names (CVE-2025-24993 RCE and CVE-2025-24985) are remediated as one unit with it, because the value of this out-of-bounds read is what it hands those memory-corruption bugs: heap contents including cached credentials, cryptographic key material, and addresses useful for defeating ASLR. Treating an information-disclosure primitive as a lower tier than the RCE it is chained with is what leaves the chain viable after a partial rollout. The packet records no live-patch path for this product class, so there is no way to shorten the window other than the fleet's own update cadence, and remediation state must be read per host rather than from an update-approval record. Until the update lands, the only exploit precondition the packet actually names is user interaction — the victim must mount a specially crafted VHD/VHDX, delivered by phishing or inside a bundled archive — so refusing untrusted disk images at the mail and file-share boundary, plus user guidance not to mount them, is the interim lever. State its limit: that lever holds only where mounting disk images is not part of a routine workflow and where the image is recognizable as externally sourced; an image nested inside an archive or dropped on an internal share does not present as untrusted, and it does nothing on a host where a malicious image has already been mounted and the memory contents already read.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-125; attack_vector — reachability \"requires local presence plus user interaction (CVSS UI:R): an attacker must get a victim to mount a specially crafted VHD/VHDX, typically delivered through phishing or a bundled archive\"; the primitive \"discloses small portions of heap memory, which can leak secrets such as cached credentials, cryptographic key material, or addresses useful for defeating ASLR\"; \"There is no direct privilege escalation from this bug alone, but the leaked data is commonly chained with the co-patched NTFS/FAT memory-corruption flaws (CVE-2025-24993 RCE, CVE-2025-24985) to harden an exploit chain into code execution.\" CISA KEV-listed 2025-03-11, active_exploitation confirmed; CVSS 5.5, RWEP 59, poc_available false; patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes \"No live-patch path for this product class; remediation is the vendor update plus the named compensating controls until it lands.\" citing_gaps: AU-Essential-8-Patch, NIST-800-53-SI-2, NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-018",
+        "name": "SCANNER-PAPER-COMPLIANCE-TEST",
+        "description": "The paper-compliance shape on this entry is the vulnerability report itself. A scan that grades endpoints by their highest-severity finding shows a Windows host as clean of criticals while this KEV-listed CVSS 5.5 out-of-bounds read in the NTFS driver stays unremediated, and a management-console row reading \"update approved\" or \"update downloaded\" is not evidence that a given host's NTFS driver carries the fix. The operational test for this CVE: query each endpoint's installed Windows build against the build that fixes this entry and its co-patched siblings (CVE-2025-24993, CVE-2025-24985) treated as one remediation unit, and close the finding against that build check rather than against the scanner's severity ranking or the absence of a critical on the host. The verification must also cover the estate's real shape — hosts held back by a deferred update ring, and re-imaged or restored hosts that were rebuilt from a pre-fix image, are where a build check finds exposure that a fleet-level compliance percentage hides. Precondition and limit: this control proves remediation state, it does not reduce exposure on a host that is still unpatched; and because the packet records no public PoC, the absence of exploitation signal in scanner or endpoint telemetry is not evidence a host is unaffected — the leak is a read, so a successful exploitation of this primitive leaves little for a scanner to find.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CVSS 5.5, RWEP 59, poc_available false, CISA KEV-listed 2025-03-11 with active_exploitation confirmed; patch_available true, live_patch_available false; attack_vector names the co-patched NTFS/FAT flaws CVE-2025-24993 (RCE) and CVE-2025-24985 as the bugs this leak is chained with, and states the primitive is an out-of-bounds read disclosing heap memory rather than a privilege escalation. citing_gaps record ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities) and AU-Essential-8-Patch (Patch operating systems) as insufficient for this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-24985": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Fast FAT File System Driver Integer Overflow Vulnerability",
@@ -33912,7 +34504,38 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The KEV clock means different work depending on where a Pentaho deployment sits, because this entry names fixed builds on two branches only — 9.4.0.1 and 9.3.0.2 — while explicitly including 8.3.x among the affected releases. A 9.3.x or 9.4.x server takes a point upgrade and can meet a short window; an 8.3.x server has no in-branch fix named here and has to be carried onto a fixed branch, which is a migration with report, schedule and plugin compatibility work behind it, not a maintenance-window task. Programmes that measure this SLA as days-to-apply-the-vendor-patch will show the 8.3.x estate as perpetually pending while it is in fact fully exposed against a public exploit, so those instances need a dated migration commitment plus a documented interim restriction running from the KEV listing (2025-03-03), not an open counter. No live-patch path exists for this product class, so the analytics outage the upgrade requires belongs inside the KEV window rather than in the next quarterly release train.",
+        "evidence": "KEV-listed 2025-03-03 (due 2025-03-24), active_exploitation \"confirmed\", poc_available true; CVSS 8.8, RWEP 65; patch_available true with the vector naming the fixed versions as 9.4.0.1 and 9.3.0.2 and listing 8.3.x among the affected releases; live_patch_available false — \"No live-patch path for this product class; remediation is the vendor update (or, for end-of-life products, decommissioning) plus the named compensating controls until it lands.\"",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-018",
+        "name": "SCANNER-PAPER-COMPLIANCE-TEST",
+        "description": "A version-string verdict is unusually unsafe on this CVE because the affected set is not one ordered range: the fixes land at 9.4.0.1 and 9.3.0.2 while 8.3.x is separately called out as affected. Any scanner rule shaped as \"below 9.4.0.1 is vulnerable\" or \"only the current branch is in scope\" mis-verdicts the 8.3.x and 9.3.x estates in opposite directions — the first marks a patched 9.3.0.2 server as vulnerable, the second quietly drops the 8.3.x servers that are exposed. The operational test for a Pentaho estate: stand up a staging server on each branch actually in production use and confirm the scanner marks the 9.3.x server clean only at or above 9.3.0.2 (not merely above 9.3.0.0), and never marks an 8.3.x server clean; then confirm the check reaches every Pentaho instance, including analytics servers stood up by business units outside the platform team's inventory. This control changes exploitability not at all — it exists so the remediation percentage a compliance report shows corresponds to servers that were actually upgraded, which matters here precisely because the entry carries confirmed exploitation and a public PoC.",
+        "evidence": "The vector names the fixed versions as 9.4.0.1 and 9.3.0.2 and states the flaw affects releases \"prior to\" those \"including 8.3.x\"; patch_available true; KEV-listed 2025-03-03 with active_exploitation \"confirmed\" and poc_available true.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-129",
+        "name": "ENTERPRISE-ERP-MANAGEMENT-FUNCTION-AUTHENTICATION",
+        "description": "The defect sits in the gap between two components that trust each other: web services accept a property value, and something downstream interprets that stored value as a Spring template — so the write side never treats the value as code, and the interpreting side never re-checks who supplied it. Bound to a Pentaho BA Server deployment the control means each web service that can set a server property authorises the caller for that specific action before storing the value, rather than accepting the write from any caller that can reach the endpoint, and that the property-setting surface is routable only from the administrative segment rather than from wherever analytics consumers and embedded dashboards sit. The limit has to be stated plainly: this narrows who can plant the template, it does not stop the template from being interpreted. Any caller with a legitimate route to those services, and any integration account wired into them, still lands on the same sink — so the 9.4.0.1 / 9.3.0.2 upgrade remains the only closure, and this control only bounds exposure until that upgrade is scheduled. Distinguishing test: on a staging BA Server, call each property-setting web service as an unauthenticated client and again as an ordinary report consumer, and confirm the write is refused before the value is stored.",
+        "evidence": "The vector states the server allows \"certain web services to set property values which contain Spring templates that are interpreted downstream\"; cwe_refs CWE-74 and CWE-94; CVSS 8.8, RWEP 65; KEV-listed 2025-03-03 with active_exploitation \"confirmed\".",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2022-43939": {
     "name": "Hitachi Vantara Pentaho BA Server Authorization Bypass Vulnerability",
@@ -35284,7 +35907,30 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Unauthenticated SQL injection against the WebAdmin login endpoint bypasses access enforcement entirely at the authentication layer itself, before any access-control policy is evaluated."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet does not stop at 'unauthenticated SQL injection' — it records the observed outcome as the creation of unauthorized administrative accounts on the appliance, which is an implant built out of the product's own account model rather than a file dropped on disk. Applying the December 2020 hotfix closes the injection point at the WebAdmin authentication endpoint and removes nothing an attacker already created through it, so for any CyberoamOS unit that was reachable before the hotfix landed the default disposition is export-config, rebuild or replace, and rotate every credential the appliance holds or terminates — not hotfix-in-place followed by closing the ticket. The audit that decides this cannot be run against the appliance's own account list on its own terms: an attacker-created administrator is indistinguishable from a legitimate one by privilege alone, so the list has to be reconciled against an authoritative roster of who is supposed to hold WebAdmin access, and any account that cannot be attributed to a person is the finding. State the limit rather than recording this as remediation: it is a detection-and-recovery control, not a fix. It tells the operator whether the box is trustworthy today, and on a platform that will receive no further updates a clean answer has a short shelf life.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-89; CISA KEV-listed 2025-02-06 with active_exploitation confirmed; CVSS 9.8, RWEP 73, poc_available true. attack_vector: 'An unauthenticated remote attacker submits crafted SQL injection payloads to the CyberoamOS WebAdmin login/authentication endpoint, executing arbitrary SQL statements against the backend database — in observed cases used to create unauthorized administrative accounts on the appliance.' live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes record a hotfix distributed December 4, 2020 (including to EOL versions 10.6.2+). NIST-800-53-SI-2 and NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management are recorded as citing gaps.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-127",
+        "name": "UNSUPPORTED-NETWORK-DEVICE-ENUMERATION-AND-RETIREMENT",
+        "description": "The packet's live_patch_notes carry the whole decision: a hotfix was distributed December 4, 2020, including to EOL versions 10.6.2+, but CyberoamOS is now fully end-of-life/end-of-service per CISA's required action and no further updates will be issued for remaining deployments. That makes the hotfix worth applying to any unit that never took it, and worthless as a posture — it settles this defect and leaves the next WebAdmin defect with no fix path at all. Applied to this product, the control means every surviving CyberoamOS unit carries an end-of-support date in the asset inventory together with a dated replacement decision, because the packet's exploitation path is an unauthenticated remote request to the appliance's web management surface, so reachability is the entire precondition and the inventory is what tells the operator where reachability exists. Until replacement lands, the WebAdmin surface comes off every untrusted segment. Name the precondition instead of claiming the surface is gone: that restriction holds only while it is enforced from every segment an attacker can occupy; it does not cover a unit whose WebAdmin must stay reachable for remote administration, which has to be moved behind an authenticated gateway performing its own enforcement, since the appliance's own authentication is precisely what the injection bypasses; and it does nothing for a unit that already carries an attacker-created administrator. The distinguishing test: from each untrusted segment, attempt to load WebAdmin on every inventoried unit — anything that answers is reachable by the exact request the packet describes, and a risk-acceptance record with no replacement date leaves a KEV-listed device on a retired platform in service indefinitely.",
+        "evidence": "Packet live_patch_notes, verbatim: 'A hotfix was distributed December 4, 2020 (including to EOL versions 10.6.2+), but CyberoamOS is now fully end-of-life/end-of-service per CISA's required action — no further updates will be issued for remaining deployments.' live_patch_available false. Vector: 'An SQL injection vulnerability in the WebAdmin of Cyberoam OS through 2020-12-04 allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL statements remotely.' CISA KEV-listed 2025-02-06, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 9.8, RWEP 73. NIST-800-53-AC-3, AU-ISM-1546 and UK-CAF-B4 are recorded as citing gaps.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-3",
+          "AU-ISM-1546",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2020-15069": {
     "name": "Sophos XG Firewall Buffer Overflow Vulnerability",
@@ -35326,7 +35972,31 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Essential Eight patch-applications timelines (days, not years) were not met for a large population of still-exploited XG units."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-030",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-DEVICE-ZERODAY-SLA-TIER",
+        "description": "The XG Firewall is the trust boundary, and the packet's path reaches code execution on the appliance itself from an unauthenticated crafted HTTP/S request to the User Portal's clientless-access Bookmarks feature — no credential is presented at any point. For this product the control means the v17.x estate is driven onto Hotfix HF062020.1 on a perimeter clock measured in hours from the 2025-02-06 KEV listing, not on the operating-system patch cadence the cited Essential Eight and ISO A.8.8 attestations are measured against: a 14- or 30-day window applied to the device that terminates remote access is a window with the boundary open. The cited NIST SC-7 Boundary Protection gap is the reason this needs its own tier — the boundary-protection control an operator would point at is the firewall, and here the firewall is the vulnerable asset, so SC-7 evidence cannot serve as the compensating control for its own defect. The isolation alternative this tier permits carries a precondition that must be stated rather than assumed: the User Portal clientless-access surface is a remote-access feature, so withdrawing it is available only where remote users do not depend on it. Where they do, restricting the portal to known source ranges narrows the caller set but does not remove the unauthenticated overflow path — HF062020.1 is the only thing that closes it, and the packet records no live-patch path, so the hotfix has to be taken on the unit rather than deferred. Distinguishing test: from an address outside any administrative or VPN range, request the User Portal on each v17.x unit; anything that answers is reachable by the unauthenticated overflow, and a patch-compliance report listing the firewall as 'within the current cycle' has recorded the exposure rather than removed it.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-120 buffer overflow; attack_vector states an unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted HTTP/S request to the XG Firewall's clientless-access User Portal Bookmarks feature, triggering a buffer overflow that yields remote code execution on the firewall appliance itself. Vector: 'Sophos XG Firewall 17.x through v17.5 MR12 allows a Buffer Overflow and remote code execution via the HTTP/S Bookmarks feature for clientless access. Hotfix HF062020.1 was published for all firewalls running v17.x.' CVSS 9.8, RWEP 58, CISA KEV-listed 2025-02-06, active_exploitation 'confirmed', poc_available false. patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes null. Citing gaps include NIST-800-53-SC-7 (Boundary Protection), AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 and NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SC-7",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet pairs a pre-auth RCE on the appliance with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, which makes 'hotfix applied' an incomplete disposition for this device class: HF062020.1 closes the Bookmarks overflow and removes nothing an attacker wrote to the firewall before it landed. Applied to this product, any v17.x unit whose User Portal was reachable from untrusted networks during the exposure window is triaged as potentially compromised rather than closed out — preserve and review the appliance configuration, rebuild the unit from vendor media, and rotate every credential the firewall held or brokered (administrator accounts, User Portal and VPN user credentials, and any authentication secrets carried in its configuration), because code execution on the appliance reaches all of them. The precondition bounds the scope honestly: this escalation is warranted for units whose clientless-access surface was exposed during the window, and a unit that can be shown never to have presented that surface to an untrusted network is remediated by the hotfix alone — the two cases must be separated by evidence, not by assumption. Distinguishing test: on a unit that has taken HF062020.1, compare the running configuration against the last known-good administrative baseline and enumerate administrative accounts and portal users created or modified before the hotfix date; a firewall closed out on version evidence alone has verified the flaw is gone without verifying the attacker is.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: active_exploitation 'confirmed' and CISA KEV listing 2025-02-06 on a flaw whose attack_vector yields remote code execution on the firewall appliance itself from an unauthenticated HTTP/S request. Remediation recorded is the vendor hotfix — 'Hotfix HF062020.1 was published for all firewalls running v17.x' — with live_patch_available false and live_patch_notes null. Cited gaps NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management (Vulnerability handling) and UK-CAF-B4 (System security) are the handling/assurance controls this entry records as insufficient.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-53104": {
     "name": "Linux Kernel Out-of-Bounds Write Vulnerability",
@@ -35800,7 +36470,32 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "A public PoC (Exploit-DB 52436) exists for this confirmed-exploited kernel flaw, meaning routine patch-cycle SLAs left an exposure window during which attackers had both an exploit and evidence of active use."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-145",
+        "name": "ACTIVELY-EXPLOITED-OS-LPE-REMEDIATION-WINDOW-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The packet puts a local low-privilege attacker at a heap-based buffer overflow in the Hyper-V NT Kernel Integration VSP, reached by supplying malformed or oversized data through the integration-service path and corrupting kernel heap memory to reach SYSTEM. That is a kernel-mode component, so the defect executes below every account-level boundary the Windows estate is audited on. For this CVE the control means the Windows update carrying the fix is driven across every affected host on the clock that opened with the 2025-01-14 KEV listing rather than folded into the next monthly rollup cycle, and that completion is measured per host by the installed build against the fixed build for its SKU — not by 'update approved' or 'update downloaded' in the management console. The packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path registered for this entry, so there is no in-memory remediation to fall back on: a host that cannot take the update inside the window is exposed, not mitigated, and must be tracked and named as such rather than counted compliant. The second half of the control is the load-bearing half on this path. Because the attacker already holds a local low-privilege account, tightening account privilege does not contain the escalation to SYSTEM — a least-privilege attestation passes cleanly while the flaw remains fully exploitable, which is exactly why the AC-6 gap is recorded against this entry.",
+        "evidence": "The packet's attack vector states that a local low-privilege attacker triggers a heap-based buffer overflow in the Hyper-V NT Kernel Integration VSP component by supplying malformed/oversized data through the integration-service path, corrupting kernel heap memory to escalate to SYSTEM; the entry's vector line is 'Windows Hyper-V NT Kernel Integration VSP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability'. Entry facts: CWE-122, CVSS 7.8, RWEP 74, poc_available true, CISA KEV-listed 2025-01-14, active_exploitation confirmed. patch_available is true; live_patch_available is false and the packet records no live-patch notes for this entry. NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) is among the framework control gaps citing this CVE.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-068",
+        "name": "HYPERVISOR-VM-ESCAPE-TENANCY-ASSUMPTION",
+        "description": "The affected component sits in the Hyper-V virtualization stack, and the packet's path is a local low-privilege user reaching SYSTEM through the integration-service path. State the limit precisely rather than blurring it: the packet describes local privilege escalation, not a guest-to-host escape, and the risk write-up should say so. What the packet does defeat is the tenancy assumption operators use to exempt virtualization hosts from expedited patching — 'only trusted administrators have local access to this host' is an assumption, not a control, and the packet's precondition is any local low-privilege account, which on a virtualization host includes service accounts, management agents and any identity permitted to run code there. Applied to this CVE, the control means a KEV-listed defect in a Hyper-V component runs on a compressed clock from the 2025-01-14 listing regardless of whether the host is single-tenant or multi-tenant and regardless of what guests it carries, which is precisely the exemption a quarterly virtualization maintenance window encodes. The precondition that must be stated: the compressed clock only helps where the host can actually absorb the update inside it, and the packet records no live-patch path for this entry, so hosts whose guests cannot be moved inside the window are named individually as accepted exposure with a dated completion — they are not compliant, and the compressed SLA does not make them so.",
+        "evidence": "The packet names the entry 'Microsoft Windows Hyper-V NT Kernel Integration VSP Heap-based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability' and describes the attack as a local low-privilege attacker corrupting kernel heap memory via the integration-service path to escalate to SYSTEM; it does not describe a guest-to-host escape. CISA KEV-listed 2025-01-14 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; CWE-122, CVSS 7.8, RWEP 74. patch_available is true, live_patch_available is false, and no live-patch notes are recorded for this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-55591": {
     "name": "Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy Authentication Bypass Vulnerability",
@@ -35921,7 +36616,38 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "EU operators running Qlik Sense as BI infrastructure face ransomware-grade impact from an incomplete vendor fix; vulnerability handling must include bypass verification, not just patch application."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-042",
+        "name": "INCOMPLETE-PATCH-SEQUENCE-SEVERITY-MULTIPLIER",
+        "description": "This entry states outright that the flaw exists because the fix for CVE-2023-41265 was incomplete, which makes it the second defect on the same Qlik Sense header-validation primitive rather than an independent finding — and vulnerability programmes that score each CVE discretely miss exactly that. Two consequences for a Qlik estate. First, an operator who applied the CVE-2023-41265 fix and recorded the header-tunneling risk as remediated is still exposed, so that earlier remediation evidence cannot be carried forward against this CVE and any attestation that reuses it is false. Second, because the same primitive has now failed twice, a third bypass of the Proxy's header validation should be treated as likely rather than hypothetical: the Proxy warrants standing detection for repository-service requests that did not originate from an authenticated front-end session, kept in place beyond the patch rather than retired with the ticket. Prioritisation should follow the sequence position, not the CVE in isolation — this is an unauthenticated remote code execution path at RWEP 72 with confirmed exploitation and a public PoC.",
+        "evidence": "The vector states \"NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-41265\", and describes unauthenticated remote code execution arising from improper validation of HTTP headers (cwe_refs CWE-444); CVSS 9.6, RWEP 72; KEV-listed 2025-01-13 with active_exploitation \"confirmed\" and poc_available true.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-handling"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-129",
+        "name": "ENTERPRISE-ERP-MANAGEMENT-FUNCTION-AUTHENTICATION",
+        "description": "The Qlik Sense Proxy is where this product makes its authentication decision, and the repository application behind it acts on what the Proxy forwards. This CVE is a caller reaching those internal-only repository endpoints by crafting headers the Proxy mis-parses, so the repository never learns the request arrived unauthenticated. Bound to this deployment the control means the repository application authorises each administrative operation on its own evidence rather than inheriting the Proxy's verdict, and that the two highest-consequence operations the entry names — registering a new administrative user, and scheduling an external task — are not reachable by a request whose only claim to identity is a forwarded header. Distinguishing test: on a staging Qlik Sense node, issue a request directly at a repository-service endpoint carrying forged forwarding headers and confirm it is refused before the operation runs. The precondition matters: this bounds the tunneling route only while the repository service is reachable from the Proxy alone. If it also answers on an interface other hosts can route to, the Proxy's header validation is not on that path at all, and neither this control nor the patch to the Proxy addresses that second route — reachability of the repository service has to be verified, not assumed from the deployment being internal.",
+        "evidence": "The attack path in the entry: \"An unauthenticated attacker sends a specially-crafted HTTP request with manipulated headers to the Qlik Sense Proxy, tunneling the request through to internal-only repository service endpoints; the elevated internal session is then used to register a new admin user or schedule an external task, achieving remote code execution.\" cwe_refs CWE-444; CVSS 9.6; KEV-listed 2025-01-13 with active_exploitation \"confirmed\".",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "This entry names eight distinct fixed patch levels — August 2023 Patch 2, May 2023 Patch 6, February 2023 Patch 10, November 2022 Patch 12, August 2022 Patch 14, May 2022 Patch 16, February 2022 Patch 15 and November 2021 Patch 17 — one per release train, so \"Qlik Sense is patched\" is not a statement an estate can make centrally. Each node has to be measured against the fixed patch level of the train it actually runs, and a node on an older train gains nothing from a fix existing on a newer one. Because exploitation is confirmed and the path needs no credentials, the interval that counts runs from the KEV listing (2025-01-13) to the moment each node reaches its train's fixed patch level, not to the moment a change record is raised. No live-patch path is recorded for this entry, so reaching that patch level is the remediation. Where a node cannot get there inside the window, the compensating position is to remove untrusted-network reachability of that node's Proxy and to hunt for the artefacts the entry names — an administrative user nobody provisioned, or a scheduled external task — because those persist through the upgrade and the patch removes neither.",
+        "evidence": "The vector lists the fixed versions as August 2023 Patch 2, May 2023 Patch 6, February 2023 Patch 10, November 2022 Patch 12, August 2022 Patch 14, May 2022 Patch 16, February 2022 Patch 15, and November 2021 Patch 17, and describes the outcome as registering a new admin user or scheduling an external task; patch_available true, live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes null; KEV-listed 2025-01-13 with active_exploitation \"confirmed\" and poc_available true; CVSS 9.6, RWEP 72.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-55550": {
     "name": "Mitel MiCollab Path Traversal Vulnerability (CVE-2024-55550)",
@@ -36164,7 +36890,32 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "EU-equivalent public-sector operators of niche vertical software need vendor attestation that cryptographic key material is unique per deployment, which standard vulnerability management processes rarely verify."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-124",
+        "name": "FRAMEWORK-DEFAULT-SECRET-DETECTION",
+        "description": "USAHERDS ships the same ASP.NET MachineKey (ValidationKey/DecryptionKey) in every install, so the secret an attacker needs to forge material the server will trust comes from the product rather than from the target — and the packet records that APT41 already holds the value. That inverts the usual remediation order: no amount of account hygiene, password policy or session management on the operator's side reduces this exposure, because the forged __VIEWSTATE passes MAC validation before any account is consulted, which is exactly why the cited ISO A.5.15 access-control and NIST IA-2 user-authentication attestations pass cleanly while the path stays open. Gate the deployment on key uniqueness instead: after moving the instance off the affected build (the packet places the flaw in USAHERDS through 7.4.0.1), verify that the instance's machineKey validation and decryption values are unique to that instance and match neither the product-shipped constant nor any other instance you operate, and hold the server out of service until they do. Re-run the check after every restore-from-image, VM template clone or server rebuild, since those are the operations that quietly reintroduce the shipped key onto a host that was previously remediated. The precondition that must be stated: rotating the key closes the forgery path forward only — it does not evict an attacker who already achieved code execution through a forged __VIEWSTATE before rotation, so an instance exposed while carrying the shipped key needs forensic triage of the web application's process and content in addition to the key change. Distinguishing test: read the machineKey values from two independently deployed instances and from a freshly restored image; identical values on any pair means the deserialization path is still forgeable by anyone holding the constant.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-798 use of hard-coded credentials; vector 'Acclaim USAHERDS through 7.4.0.1 uses hard-coded credentials.' attack_vector states USAHERDS ships with a static, product-wide ASP.NET MachineKey (ValidationKey/DecryptionKey), that an attacker who obtains the key value — 'APT41 acquired it through undisclosed means' — can forge a __VIEWSTATE payload that passes MAC validation, and that the server deserializes it, executing attacker code. CVSS 8.1, RWEP 42, CISA KEV-listed 2024-12-23, active_exploitation 'confirmed', poc_available false. patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes null. Cited gaps include ISO-27001-2022-A.5.15 (Access control), NIST-800-53-IA-2 (Identification and Authentication, Organizational Users) and NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.5.15",
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The clock on this entry opened with the 2024-12-23 KEV listing against confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, and the remediation shape leaves no shortcut: the packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path, so the only way the fix reaches a USAHERDS instance is by taking it off the affected build (through 7.4.0.1) and through the vendor update, with the service interruption that implies. For this application the control means that upgrade is scheduled against the KEV clock rather than against the general application-patching cadence the cited AU ISM 1546 and NIST SI-2 attestations are measured on — a line-of-business web application inside a periodic patch cycle is precisely the population that carried this flaw into a KEV listing years after the affected build was identified. The condition to state plainly: meeting the SLA on version alone is not sufficient remediation here, because the vulnerable primitive is a shipped secret rather than a code defect the update independently guarantees to re-key; the version move is the SLA-bearing action and the key-uniqueness verification recorded alongside it is what makes the instance actually non-forgeable. Distinguishing test: for each USAHERDS instance, compare the deployed build against the affected range and the completion date against the 2024-12-23 listing; an instance recorded as 'scheduled in the next maintenance cycle' is an accepted exposure on an actively exploited path, not a remediation.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2024-12-23, active_exploitation 'confirmed', RWEP 42, CVSS 8.1. Vector places the flaw in 'Acclaim USAHERDS through 7.4.0.1'. patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes null, so no live-patch path is recorded for this entry. Cited gaps include NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation), AU-ISM-1546 (Patch operating systems and applications), NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management (Vulnerability handling) and UK-CAF-B4 (System security).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "AU-ISM-1546",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-12356": {
     "name": "BeyondTrust Privileged Remote Access (PRA) and Remote Support (RS) Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -39530,7 +40281,28 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Essential Eight application hardening relies on macro-execution restrictions in Office, exactly the enforcement this flaw defeats, so the mitigation is silently bypassed."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-041",
+        "name": "PROTECTION-MECHANISM-FAILURE-CLASS-REGRESSION",
+        "description": "The mechanism that fails on this entry is Office's macro-blocking of untrusted content: the packet has a user lured into opening a malicious Publisher file and the security-feature bypass causing embedded macros to run even though policy would normally stop them. That is why a user-application-hardening attestation passes cleanly while the estate is exposed — the attestation is read off the policy setting, and the policy setting is not what failed; the handler enforcing it is. For this CVE the control means the macro-blocking policy is regression-tested by detonating a Publisher document on a managed image, not only Word and Excel samples, and that the Publisher case stays in the battery permanently instead of being retired once this CVE is patched, because CWE-693 bypasses recur against the same primitive and each Office handler enforces the policy separately. The same specificity applies to the endpoint side: application-control and EDR policies written around Office-borne execution must name the Publisher handler explicitly rather than assuming the Word/Excel process images cover the suite. Precondition, stated plainly: this is a verification and detection control, not containment. It proves whether the enforcement path holds for the cases tested and produces telemetry when it does not; it does nothing for a host that has not yet taken the vendor update, and because the packet puts execution in the user's own context, nothing here stops the code from running once the document is opened on an unpatched host.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-693, entry name \"Microsoft Publisher Protection Mechanism Failure Vulnerability\"; attack_vector — \"A user is lured into opening a malicious Publisher file; the security-feature bypass causes Office to run embedded macros even though macro-blocking policy would normally stop untrusted content, giving the attacker code execution in the user's context.\" CISA KEV-listed 2024-09-10 with active_exploitation confirmed; CVSS 7.3, RWEP 46, poc_available false. citing_gaps record AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening (User application hardening) and ISO-27001-2022-A.8.7 (Protection against malware) as insufficient for this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.7"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "Remediation on this entry is the vendor update, and the packet removes the standard reason for deferring it — there is no live-patching primitive for the product and the update requires no reboot, so the fix reaches an endpoint without an outage and the KEV clock that opened 2024-09-10 is the governing deadline. The measurement problem is specific to this CVE: the packet's own vector places the bypass in Office's macro-blocking, so the vulnerable component is an application inside the productivity suite rather than the OS, and an estate that tracks OS patch compliance while treating the suite as self-updating cannot say which endpoints still carry the vulnerable Publisher handler. Completion has to be measured per host against the installed suite build on every endpoint where Publisher is present, which first requires knowing where it is installed — Publisher is routinely absent from application inventories because it is rarely used deliberately, and an endpoint nobody counts is an endpoint nobody patches. Hosts held on a deferred update channel remain exposed for the full deferral length after the fix has shipped, so that deferral is the exposure window and should be recorded as one. Precondition on the closure claim: this control governs how fast the fix lands and how completion is proven; it does not reduce risk on a host still awaiting the update, where the only remaining lever is the delivery path and the detonation-tested enforcement covered by the regression control above. The packet records no public PoC, which lowers commodity-exploitation likelihood but does not move the clock — exploitation is already confirmed.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes \"No live-patching primitive for this product; the vendor update (no reboot required) is the remediation.\" CISA KEV-listed 2024-09-10 with active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available false; CVSS 7.3, RWEP 46. attack_vector places the bypass in Office's macro-blocking of untrusted content. citing_gaps record NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) as insufficient for this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-40766": {
     "name": "SonicWall SonicOS Improper Access Control Vulnerability",
@@ -39826,7 +40598,31 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Access enforcement is bypassed because authorization is checked on requestUri while rendering follows overrideViewUri — the control assumes a single consistent decision point, which this split defeats."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-129",
+        "name": "ENTERPRISE-ERP-MANAGEMENT-FUNCTION-AUTHENTICATION",
+        "description": "OFBiz takes its authorization decision against the requestUri but renders the screen named by overrideViewUri, so the function that actually runs — ProgramExport, which evaluates a Base64-encoded Groovy program as the OFBiz process user — never authorizes its own caller. Bound to this product, the control means every OFBiz screen and export/scripting endpoint authorizes the caller at the point of execution rather than inheriting a verdict taken on the routing key, and the views that can reach a code-evaluation path are refused for any request whose entry point was an unauthenticated public endpoint. The cited access-enforcement control is precisely what fails here: the attacker prefixes a public endpoint (the packet names forgotPassword) so the request never reaches OFBiz's user/role permission model at all — a deployment can pass an access-enforcement review of its permission matrix while this path stays fully open, which is why AC-3 is recorded against this entry rather than credited. The second half of the control, keeping the OFBiz admin/scripting surface off untrusted networks, carries a precondition that must be stated: it bounds exposure only for instances that have no business serving untrusted users, so an internet-facing OFBiz storefront or partner portal cannot rely on it and must take the vendor update; and neither measure evicts a Groovy payload already executed as the process user on an instance that was reachable during the exposure window. Distinguishing test: on a staging instance, request a public endpoint with the view overridden to ProgramExport and confirm the request is refused before the screen renders.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-863; attack_vector — \"OFBiz checks authorization against the requestUri but renders the screen named by overrideViewUri. An unauthenticated attacker prefixes a public endpoint (e.g. forgotPassword) and overrides the view to ProgramExport, then posts a Base64-encoded Groovy program that executes as the OFBiz process user.\" CVSS 9.8, RWEP 67, poc_available true; CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-27 with active_exploitation confirmed. citing_gaps record NIST-800-53-AC-3 (Access Enforcement) and UK-CAF-B4 (System security) as insufficient for this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-3",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The packet records a vendor fix, a public PoC and confirmed in-the-wild exploitation on an unauthenticated code-execution path, so the OFBiz upgrade off the affected 18.12.14-and-earlier line to 18.12.15 runs on the clock that opened with the 2024-08-27 KEV listing, not in the next ERP change window. The usual deferral argument does not exist on this entry: the packet states there is no live-patching primitive for this product and that the vendor update requires no reboot, so the only remaining constraint is the application's own restart/change process — an ERP change-freeze is a scheduling preference here, not a technical blocker, and recording one as a compensating control leaves an unauthenticated Groovy-execution path open. Measure completion from the deployed webapp's reported version rather than from a patch-management row saying \"OFBiz updated\": these deployments are commonly customized builds where the inventory record and the running instance diverge. Precondition on the closure claim: applying the update ends new exploitation of this path but does nothing about an instance that was reachable while unpatched — anything already executed as the OFBiz process user survives the upgrade, so an instance exposed during the window needs forensic triage rather than a patch-and-close.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: patch_available true; vector — \"This issue affects Apache OFBiz: through 18.12.14. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 18.12.15, which fixes the issue.\" live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes \"No live-patching primitive for this product; the vendor update (no reboot required) is the remediation.\" CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-27, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 67, CVSS 9.8. citing_gaps: AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIST-800-53-SI-2, NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-handling.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-handling"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-7971": {
     "name": "Google Chromium V8 Type Confusion Vulnerability (CVE-2024-7971)",
@@ -39863,7 +40659,30 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Malicious-code protection at the endpoint did not stop a memory-corruption chain that escaped the browser sandbox and loaded a kernel rootkit (FudModule)."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-057",
+        "name": "BROWSER-MANAGED-UPDATE-NO-DEFERRAL",
+        "description": "The packet gives a clean remediation and a precise boundary: the vendor update, no reboot required, no live-patching primitive, with builds prior to 128.0.6613.84 affected. The control for this CVE is therefore that the browser's security channel is not held behind an enterprise update ring's validation cycle, and that completion is measured per host against the installed browser build rather than against 'auto-update is enabled in policy' — the latter is the state a managed fleet is usually attested on, and it is satisfied while version-pinned, kiosk, and long-uptime roaming hosts sit behind the fixed build. The urgency here is not carried by exploit availability, which is the second half of why this needs enforcing: the packet records poc_available false alongside a 2024-08-26 KEV listing with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, so a prioritization pipeline that ranks on public-PoC presence will under-rank a bug a named actor was already running in a full chain. The precondition to state is a measurement one: the fleet number has to be the build each host is actually running, not the build the management console reports as approved or downloaded, because an approved-but-not-running update leaves the host exposed on the same terms as one that never received it.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 128.0.6613.84 allowed a remote attacker to exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)'. CWE-843; CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-26 with active_exploitation confirmed; CVSS 9.6, RWEP 56; poc_available false. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: 'No live-patching primitive for this product; the vendor update (no reboot required) is the remediation.' Citing gaps AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIST-800-53-SI-2 and UK-CAF-B4.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-043",
+        "name": "NATION-STATE-INITIAL-ACCESS-IR-ESCALATION",
+        "description": "The packet describes this bug as the opening stage of a chain rather than as a standalone browser fault: a victim visits an attacker-controlled page, crafted JavaScript triggers the V8 type confusion, the resulting heap corruption yields renderer code execution, and Citrine Sleet chained that with a Windows sandbox escape to deploy the FudModule rootkit. Commodity incident response handles only the visible half — a browser anomaly on a user's workstation — and resolves it with a browser reset or a decision scoped to the browser, which is exactly the under-escalation this control exists to stop, because the terminal state of the chain is kernel-level persistence that outlives anything done to the browser. For this CVE the runbook needs a trigger a responder can act on in the moment: renderer-level compromise indicators on a host that browsed externally during the exposure window escalate to full host triage and to the explicit question of whether the second-stage escape ran, rather than being closed out by confirming the browser has since been updated — the update closes the entry point and says nothing about a host already through it. The precondition worth naming is that the actor attribution in this packet was available only after the fact, so the escalation criterion has to be the chain shape (browser renderer execution followed by evidence of privilege escalation or kernel-level persistence), not an actor name the responder will not hold on day one.",
+        "evidence": "Packet attack_vector: 'A victim visits an attacker-controlled page that runs crafted JavaScript triggering a V8 type confusion; the resulting heap corruption yields renderer RCE, which Citrine Sleet chained with a Windows sandbox escape to deploy the FudModule rootkit.' CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-26 with active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available false. NIS2-Art21-incident-handling is recorded as a citing gap on this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-incident-handling"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-39717": {
     "name": "Versa Director Dangerous File Type Upload Vulnerability",
@@ -40230,7 +41049,30 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Standard endpoint monitoring rarely flags a race-condition kernel EoP; without behavioral SYSTEM-token-theft detection the escalation step is invisible, and no patch existed to remediate during the zero-day window."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-145",
+        "name": "ACTIVELY-EXPLOITED-OS-LPE-REMEDIATION-WINDOW-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The defect is in the Windows kernel itself, so it executes below every account-level boundary the endpoint estate is audited on, and the packet's path — low-privilege code execution first (its example is a Chromium renderer sandbox escape), then a kernel race corrupting kernel state to reach SYSTEM — means the attacker is already an ordinary user when the escalation begins. For this CVE the control means the Windows update carrying the fix is driven across the whole affected endpoint fleet on the KEV clock that opened 2024-08-13 rather than folded into the next monthly rollup, and that completion is measured per host as installed build against the fixed build for its SKU, not as 'update approved' or 'update downloaded' in the management console. The packet records no live-patching primitive and an update that requires a reboot, so a host that has taken the update but not restarted is still running the vulnerable kernel and must be counted as exposed rather than remediated — the pending-reboot population is the real residual, and it is exactly the population a patch-compliance dashboard reports as green. Tightening account privilege does not contain this path: the escalation begins in whatever context the initial low-privilege execution landed in and terminates at SYSTEM, so a least-privilege attestation passes cleanly while the flaw stays fully exploitable. Distinguishing test: query the fleet for hosts whose installed build carries the fix but whose uptime predates that installation, and confirm those hosts are still counted against the KEV clock rather than reported as patched.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-13, active_exploitation 'confirmed', RWEP 59, CVSS 7.0. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No live-patching primitive for this product; the vendor update requires a reboot and is the remediation.' Attack vector: 'After gaining initial low-privilege code execution (e.g. via a Chromium renderer sandbox escape), the attacker triggers a Windows Kernel race condition to corrupt kernel state and elevate to SYSTEM.' CWE-591.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-handling",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-003",
+        "name": "KERNEL-EXPLOITATION-DETECTION",
+        "description": "Between the 2024-08-13 KEV listing and the completed reboot of every affected host, detection is the only thing standing between a low-privilege foothold and SYSTEM on this path. Anchor it on what the packet actually documents: the attacker already holds low-privilege code execution, repeatedly attempts a kernel race to corrupt kernel state, and ends holding a SYSTEM token. The durable observable is therefore the privilege transition itself — a sandboxed or low-integrity process acquiring a SYSTEM token or having its integrity level raised — together with the repeated kernel-object access the race requires from a process that has no reason to make it. Do not build the rule on process crashes or respawns: an exploit that retries the race in a tight loop inside one process never crashes, so a crash-correlated rule reports clean through the real attempt, and the packet establishes no crash signal to key on. Do not build it on tool signatures either — the packet records no public PoC, so there is no stable IoC set and a signature-shaped rule reports clean while the behaviour is present. Alert on the transition within 60 seconds. Two preconditions bound this control and must be stated rather than assumed. It detects, it does not prevent: the kernel race stays reachable until the rebooted fixed build lands, so it never substitutes for the update window. And it holds only where telemetry leaves the host continuously — once the race is won the attacker holds SYSTEM and can stop or blind a local agent, so on hosts with no reporting agent, or where telemetry is merely pulled on a schedule, this contributes nothing and the reboot window is the entire defence. Distinguishing test: on a staging host, have a low-integrity process acquire a SYSTEM token and confirm the alert reaches the off-host collector inside 60 seconds — validate the privilege transition, not a synthetic crash.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: attack vector states 'Exploitation depends on repeatedly winning the race' and that escalation follows initial low-privilege code execution, ending at SYSTEM. poc_available false. CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-13, active_exploitation 'confirmed'. live_patch_available false with the vendor update requiring a reboot. NIST-800-53-SI-4 (System Monitoring) is recorded as a citing framework gap on this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-38193": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Privilege Escalation Vulnerability",
@@ -42718,7 +43560,30 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Application-hardening guidance is desktop-browser-centric and does not address Android app-permission/foreground-service abuse that this notification-hiding flaw enables."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-126",
+        "name": "MOBILE-OS-MINIMUM-PATCH-LEVEL-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The packet pins this to Android-13 and to a Framework rendering path, and the trigger is an application already running on the device, so both halves of this control bind. First: the Android build carrying the fix is an access condition for organizational data — a device below it is quarantined from mail, VPN and document access rather than surfaced as a row on a patch-compliance dashboard — and because the packet says remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting with no vendor live-patch mechanism, a device that has downloaded the update but not restarted sits below the line and must be treated as exposed. Second, and load-bearing for the interval where a device is waiting on an OEM or carrier build it cannot obtain, the exploit needs a malicious app to be running at all, so the remaining lever is constraining what code gets installed: restrict installation to vetted sources and disallow unknown-source and side-loaded installs on any device holding organizational data. The precondition to state is that neither half is retroactive. Enforcing the build stops future suppression of the notification; it does not evict an app already present, does not revoke the background access that app already holds, and does not reconstruct what ran while the indicator was hidden — so a device suspected of carrying such an app needs an installed-app and permission review, not a build check alone. The distinguishing test: enrol a device pinned below the fixed build and confirm the policy actually denies it protected resources; an estate that lists the stale build on a report while the device keeps its mail and VPN access has recorded the exposure rather than removed it.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'In applyRemoteView of NotificationContentInflater.java, there is a possible way to hide foreground service notification due to misleading or insufficient UI. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-13 Android ID: A-251586912.' attack_vector: a malicious app hides the foreground-service notification Android normally forces, so background sensor/data access runs without the persistent status-bar indicator. CWE-200, CVSS 5.5, RWEP 47, poc_available false, CISA KEV-listed 2024-03-05 with active_exploitation confirmed. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: 'No vendor live-patch mechanism; remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-041",
+        "name": "PROTECTION-MECHANISM-FAILURE-CLASS-REGRESSION",
+        "description": "Android's forced foreground-service notification is a protection mechanism in the sense this control governs: the platform mandates a persistent visible indicator precisely so background service execution cannot be silent, and the packet describes a Framework path that defeats it through misleading or insufficient UI. That makes the mechanism, not the individual CVE, the thing that needs testing — any detection or user-transparency posture that keys off the presence of the status-bar indicator is only as good as the mechanism producing it, and this entry is proof the mechanism can fail without the monitoring above it noticing anything at all. Applied to a managed mobile estate, the requirement is that every accepted OS build be validated against the known indicator-suppression primitives for this class before it is treated as the fixed build, and that mobile-threat-defense detections which infer background activity from the visible notification be regression-tested on the same schedule rather than assumed to carry forward. State the limits: class regression only covers primitives already known, so it does not detect a novel way of hiding the notification, and passing the battery on a build is not evidence that no app already on the estate used this one — it validates the mechanism going forward, it does not produce history. Because of that, this control complements an app-inventory and permission review rather than substituting for it, and where an operator cannot run the battery at all, the honest position is that indicator-derived monitoring on that build is unvalidated rather than sound.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: the flaw is 'a possible way to hide foreground service notification due to misleading or insufficient UI', with 'no additional execution privileges needed' and 'User interaction is not needed for exploitation'. attack_vector: the malicious app's background sensor/data access runs 'without the persistent status-bar indicator that would alert the user'. CISA KEV-listed 2024-03-05, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available false. The entry cites NIST-800-53-SI-4 (System Monitoring) among the framework controls that were insufficient.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2021-36380": {
     "name": "Sunhillo SureLine OS Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -45300,7 +46165,31 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Advisory-driven vulnerability management cannot pre-empt an unknown browser zero-day used specifically to break out of the renderer sandbox."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-057",
+        "name": "BROWSER-MANAGED-UPDATE-NO-DEFERRAL",
+        "description": "For this CVE the update ring must place Chrome/Chromium on 119.0.6045.199 or later within the 24-hour bound rather than holding it for a validation window, because the packet pairs a 2023-11-30 KEV listing with confirmed exploitation on a sandbox escape — the component that is supposed to contain a compromised renderer is the component that fails. The precondition that decides whether this control actually works is in the packet's own remediation note: the fix requires updating and relaunching the browser. A managed fleet that reports the update as delivered while long-lived browser sessions keep running still has the vulnerable Skia mapped in those processes, so compliance has to be measured on the build the process is actually executing — enforced with a restart deadline or forced relaunch policy — not on the version staged on disk. State the other limit too: this control reaches only software that takes the browser vendor's update channel, so Chromium embedded inside other applications is outside it entirely and is handled by the inventory control rather than counted as covered here. Distinguishing test: query managed-browser reporting for the running build on each host after the ring completes; any host reporting a pre-119.0.6045.199 running build, or a stale process start time against a completed update, is still exposed to the escape.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-190 integer overflow in Skia; vector 'Integer overflow in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 119.0.6045.199 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a malicious file.' live_patch_notes: 'No live patch; requires updating Chrome/Chromium to 119.0.6045.199+ and relaunching the browser (downstream products must rebuild against the fixed Skia).' CVSS 9.6, RWEP 55, CISA KEV-listed 2023-11-30, active_exploitation 'confirmed', poc_available false. patch_available true; live_patch_available false. Cited gaps include NIS2-Art21-patch-management, NIST-800-53-SI-2 and UK-CAF-B4.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-144",
+        "name": "EMBEDDED-MEDIA-PARSER-LIBRARY-INVENTORY-AND-PATCH-PARITY",
+        "description": "Skia is a graphics library that ships inside far more than the browser the advisory names, and the packet makes the consequence explicit — downstream products must rebuild against the fixed Skia. So the estate has to be inventoried for every binary that bundles its own Chromium/Skia copy (Chromium-derived browsers, Electron applications, embedded webviews and desktop apps with in-process browser components) and each one held to a build rebuilt against fixed Skia, rather than treating the Chrome fleet reaching 119.0.6045.199+ as closing the CWE-190 primitive across the estate. This is also why the cited Essential Eight user-application-hardening gap is recorded here: that control describes the browser's configuration, while the packet's path begins from an already-compromised renderer, so no content-blocking setting is consulted, and a hardened browser configuration on a host running an application with an unpatched vendored Skia still carries the escape. The precondition has to be stated rather than glossed: an inventory produces a fix only where the embedding vendor has shipped a rebuild — where it has not, there is no build to move to, and the remaining levers are constraining what untrusted content that application is allowed to render and scheduling its withdrawal, not recording it as covered by the browser update. Distinguishing test: after the Chrome/Chromium fleet reports 119.0.6045.199+, enumerate installed applications that ship their own Chromium/Skia and confirm each reports a version its vendor rebuilt against fixed Skia; any that cannot is an open instance of the same overflow, and any that has no such build is an exposure needing a dated decision rather than a passing patch report.",
+        "evidence": "Packet live_patch_notes states verbatim: 'No live patch; requires updating Chrome/Chromium to 119.0.6045.199+ and relaunching the browser (downstream products must rebuild against the fixed Skia).' attack_vector: 'From an already-compromised renderer, an attacker feeds a malicious graphics primitive that overflows an integer in Skia's size calculation, producing an undersized buffer whose subsequent writes corrupt adjacent memory to escape the sandbox.' CWE-190, CVSS 9.6, RWEP 55, CISA KEV-listed 2023-11-30, active_exploitation 'confirmed', patch_available true, live_patch_available false. Cited gaps include AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening (User application hardening), ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 and NIST-800-53-SI-2.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2023-49103": {
     "name": "ownCloud graphapi Information Disclosure Vulnerability",
@@ -47509,7 +48398,41 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "System security relies on kernel integrity that this improper-check flaw directly violates, invalidating the control until patched."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-056",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ENDPOINT-MDM-ENFORCED-KEV-SLA",
+        "description": "The packet names the exact builds carrying the fix — macOS Monterey 12.7, iOS 16.7 and iPadOS 16.7, macOS Ventura 13.6 — so the SLA has a concrete per-platform target rather than a vague 'current' state, and the entry is KEV-listed 2023-09-25 with confirmed exploitation. Apple estates fail this differently from server estates: the update is offered and the user defers it indefinitely, so the requirement here is that declarative device management installs and enforces the fixed build on a KEV clock with user deferral disallowed, across iPhone, iPad and Mac alike since all three platforms appear in the packet's fix list. Because the packet records no vendor live-patch mechanism and a remediation that requires applying the fixed release and rebooting, the SLA must be measured to completed restart on the fixed build — a device that has downloaded and staged the update is still running the vulnerable kernel and cannot be counted as remediated. The precondition is enrolment: this reaches only supervised or MDM-enrolled devices and does nothing for unenrolled personal devices holding organizational data, which is why it has to be paired with an access condition that quarantines any device below the fixed build rather than left as the whole answer. Distinguishing test: set a deferral on a managed test device, confirm the platform installs regardless inside the window, and confirm the compliance record only flips to remediated once the device reports the fixed build after restart.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'This issue is fixed in macOS Monterey 12.7, iOS 16.7 and iPadOS 16.7, macOS Ventura 13.6. A local attacker may be able to elevate their privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited against versions of iOS before iOS 16.7.' CISA KEV-listed 2023-09-25, active_exploitation 'confirmed', RWEP 59, CVSS 7.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No vendor live-patch mechanism; remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-126",
+        "name": "MOBILE-OS-MINIMUM-PATCH-LEVEL-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "Treat the builds the packet names — macOS Monterey 12.7, iOS 16.7 and iPadOS 16.7, macOS Ventura 13.6 — as an access condition rather than a dashboard metric: a device below its platform's fixed build is denied or quarantined from organizational mail, VPN and documents rather than listed as non-compliant while retaining all of it. That distinction is what matters for this flaw because the outcome the packet records is kernel privileges and full device control by spyware; once the chain completes, every credential and data set that device can reach belongs to the attacker, so leaving access in place while the build catches up grants precisely the reach a quarantine would have removed. Unlike other Apple kernel-memory cases, restricting untrusted or side-loaded application installation is not the covering lever here — the packet places the local process as arriving via a chained WebKit stage, so an app-install restriction leaves the delivery path open and must not be recorded as the mitigation for this entry. The precondition is that the build assertion is enforced at the resource rather than on the device: a device-side self-report is not a control against an attacker who, per the packet, already holds kernel privileges, so the gate has to sit on the identity or management attestation the service trusts before it releases data. Distinguishing test: enrol a device pinned below the fixed build for its platform and confirm it is actually refused organizational data rather than merely flagged on a report.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector names the fixed releases: macOS Monterey 12.7, iOS 16.7 and iPadOS 16.7, macOS Ventura 13.6, with exploitation reported against versions of iOS before iOS 16.7. Attack vector: 'A local process (delivered via the chained WebKit stage) abuses a kernel improper-check flaw to elevate to kernel privileges, giving the spyware full device control.' CWE-754. CISA KEV-listed 2023-09-25, active_exploitation 'confirmed'. patch_available true; live_patch_available false with remediation requiring the fixed release and a reboot.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-121",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ZERO-CLICK-HARDENING",
+        "description": "The packet places this kernel flaw as the escalation step of a chain whose delivery stage is WebKit, with the end state being spyware holding full device control — which is the targeting profile this control's cohort exists for: executives, journalists, legal and security staff. For that cohort, place devices in Apple's reduced-attack-surface mode so untrusted web content and message-borne content (attachments, fonts, link previews) is not processed automatically, narrowing the WebKit stage that delivers the local process into this CWE-754 kernel check during the window between the 2023-09-25 KEV listing and completed fleet restart. Two preconditions bound the claim and neither may be softened. The mode narrows a delivery path; it does not remove the kernel flaw, so the fixed build plus reboot the packet requires remains the remediation and this cannot be recorded as closing the exposure. And it only helps if it was already enabled when the chain arrived — a device compromised before the mode was turned on stays compromised, and must be handled as an incident (restore to the fixed build, rotate every credential that device held) rather than as a hardening item. It follows that the cohort roster is a standing posture assigned ahead of the next disclosure; switching the mode on in reaction to a KEV listing protects nobody already inside the targeting set. Distinguishing test: on a cohort device, confirm untrusted web and message content is refused automatic processing, and separately confirm the roster was assigned before the disclosure date rather than after it.",
+        "evidence": "Packet attack vector: 'A local process (delivered via the chained WebKit stage) abuses a kernel improper-check flaw to elevate to kernel privileges, giving the spyware full device control.' CWE-754. CISA KEV-listed 2023-09-25, active_exploitation 'confirmed', RWEP 59, CVSS 7.8, poc_available false. live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes 'No vendor live-patch mechanism; remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2023-41993": {
     "name": "Apple Multiple Products WebKit Code Execution Vulnerability",
@@ -49344,7 +50267,21 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "A.8.8 technical-vulnerability management typically triages by CVSS confidentiality/integrity impact, but this is availability-only (C:N/I:N/A:H) and can be de-prioritised, leaving the exploitable .NET runtime unpatched despite confirmed in-the-wild DoS."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "This entry is KEV-listed 2023-08-09 with confirmed exploitation and an available vendor fix, and none of the frameworks cited against it carries a KEV-tied clock — so the control supplies the missing deadline: verified mitigation within 4 hours of the KEV listing or patch availability, whichever is later. What 'verified' has to mean here is fixed by the packet's own remediation note — installing the August 2023 .NET 6.0/7.0 runtime and Visual Studio updates and restarting the affected applications, with no live-patch mechanism available — so a long-running Kestrel worker that has taken the runtime package but has not restarted is still executing the vulnerable code and the clock runs to process restart, not to package installation. Package-inventory evidence on its own will report this remediated while the unauthenticated crafted-traffic path still exhausts CPU and memory. The clock also has to span two estates normally on separate patch programs, both named by the packet's remediation: internet-reachable ASP.NET Core services and the Visual Studio installs on developer workstations. The 'documented compensating controls' branch of this SLA is usable only where the service has an enumerable client population whose reachability can be restricted for the window; a publicly reachable endpoint has no such population, and for those the restart is the only lever — restricting reachability narrows who can send the crafted traffic, it does not remove the resource-consumption defect, and it must be recorded as a bounded interim state with the restart still owed. This matters more than the RWEP of 38 suggests, because an availability-only impact is exactly the shape that slips a patch queue despite confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. Distinguishing test: on a staging service, apply the runtime update without restarting the worker and confirm the compliance record does not read remediated until the process itself reports the fixed runtime.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2023-08-09, active_exploitation 'confirmed', RWEP 38, CVSS 7.5, poc_available false, CWE-400. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No vendor live-patch mechanism exists; remediation is installing the August 2023 .NET 6.0/7.0 runtime and Visual Studio updates and restarting the affected applications.' Attack vector: 'An unauthenticated remote attacker sends crafted traffic to an ASP.NET Core / Kestrel or .NET application that triggers uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400), exhausting CPU/memory and denying service.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2017-18368": {
     "name": "Zyxel P660HN-T1A Routers Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -50719,7 +51656,34 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "A.8.8 technical-vulnerability management struggles to track this on BYOD/managed handsets where firmware version visibility is limited, so the SMR May-2021 fix may not be verifiable as applied across the fleet."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-145",
+        "name": "ACTIVELY-EXPLOITED-OS-LPE-REMEDIATION-WINDOW-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The defect sits in the Samsung MFC charger driver — kernel-mode code, so it executes below every account boundary a mobile estate is audited on. For this CVE the control means the SMR May-2021 Release 1 firmware build is driven across every affected handset on the KEV clock that opened 2023-06-29, not folded into whatever OEM update cadence the fleet happens to follow, and completion is measured per handset by the installed SMR build level rather than by 'update pushed' or 'update available' in the management console. The packet records no live-patch mechanism for this driver and an update that reboots the device, so a handset that has downloaded the firmware but not restarted still runs the vulnerable driver and must be counted as exposed rather than remediated. Two limits belong in the control statement rather than being assumed away. First, the operator can only reach the fixed level where Samsung and the carrier still ship SMR releases for that model; where the model no longer receives them, this control cannot be satisfied at all and the remaining lever is holding the device outside the trust boundary. Second, the packet's precondition is an attacker who already holds compromised radio privileges, so tightening the app-level or user-level privilege model does not contain the escalation — a least-privilege attestation over the handset's user and app accounts passes cleanly while the race to a kernel write and signature-check bypass stays reachable, which is exactly why the AC-6 gap is recorded against this entry.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2021-25395: cwe_refs CWE-362; cisa_kev true with kev_date 2023-06-29; active_exploitation confirmed; rwep_score 46; cvss 6.4; poc_available false; patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes 'No live-patch mechanism for the mobile kernel driver; remediation requires installing Samsung's SMR May-2021 Release 1 firmware update, which reboots the device.' Vector: 'A race condition in MFC charger driver prior to SMR MAY-2021 Release 1 allows local attackers to bypass signature check given a radio privilege is compromised.' Attack vector adds that the race produces a use-after-free and the attacker 'wins the race to obtain a kernel write and bypass the signature check, escalating to kernel-level control.' NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) is among the citing framework gaps.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-126",
+        "name": "MOBILE-OS-MINIMUM-PATCH-LEVEL-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "Bound to this flaw, minimum-patch-level enforcement means SMR May-2021 Release 1 is an access condition for the handset rather than a line on a patch-compliance report: a device below that SMR level is denied or quarantined from organizational mail, VPN and document access until it has taken the firmware update and rebooted. This is the control that still has an answer where the remediation-window control cannot be met — a model for which the fixed SMR build is not offered can never reach the required level, and holding it outside the trust boundary is then the only remaining lever. Two preconditions have to be stated rather than assumed. First, the gate must be enforced at the resource by conditional access; a console that surfaces the stale SMR level while the handset keeps its live mail and VPN sessions has recorded the exposure, not removed it. Second, this is containment for a handset that is still clean — it does not evict an attacker who already won the race on that device, because the packet puts the outcome at kernel-level control, beneath the management agent that would enforce the policy; a handset with any indication of compromise needs a wipe and re-provision, not a policy flag. Distinguishing test: enrol a handset pinned below SMR May-2021 Release 1 and confirm the policy actually refuses it access to protected resources.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2021-25395: vector states the race condition exists in the MFC charger driver 'prior to SMR MAY-2021 Release 1' and that local attackers can bypass the signature check 'given a radio privilege is compromised'; attack_vector records escalation 'to kernel-level control'; cisa_kev true with kev_date 2023-06-29 and active_exploitation confirmed; patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes stating remediation 'requires installing Samsung's SMR May-2021 Release 1 firmware update, which reboots the device.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2021-25371": {
     "name": "Samsung Mobile Devices Unspecified Vulnerability",