@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.19.10 → 0.19.11

package/data/zeroday-lessons.json

@@ -7690,7 +7690,39 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-134",
+        "name": "DEVICE-MANAGEMENT-GATEWAY-CONFIG-ENDPOINT-AUTH-INPUT-NEUTRALIZATION",
+        "description": "Catalyst SD-WAN Manager is the management plane the packet names, and the defect sits on its API interface: improper file handling lets an uploaded file drive a privileged API into overwriting arbitrary files on the system, ending in vmanage user privileges. Bound to this product, the control means every file-accepting API endpoint on SD-WAN Manager authorizes its caller before the upload is processed at all, and normalizes and validates the destination path before the privileged write executes, so a caller-supplied name cannot select which file gets overwritten; and no SD-WAN Manager instance is left with that API interface reachable from a segment with no operational need to reach it. The packet's own summary describes the path as reachable by an unauthenticated attacker, which is why the endpoint's own authorization decision — not the surrounding account model — is the only thing standing between an untrusted caller and a privileged file write. This is also why the cited least-privilege gap does not close this path: the attacker never holds a vManage operator account, so per-account privilege scoping is never consulted and an AC-6 attestation passes cleanly while the path stays open. Distinguishing test: on a staging SD-WAN Manager, send each file-accepting API endpoint an unauthenticated upload whose destination path resolves outside the intended upload directory, and confirm it is refused before anything is written. Precondition: the endpoint-side authorization and path validation are properties the vendor update establishes — this control states what to verify, it does not implement it. Until that update and its restart land, restricting which segments can reach the API interface bounds who can send the upload but leaves the endpoint fully exploitable to anything inside the permitted segment, and it is unavailable where the API interface must stay reachable for normal operation.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager contains an incorrect use of privileged APIs vulnerability due to improper file handling on the API interface of an affected system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by uploading a malicious file on the local file system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to overwrite arbitrary files on the affected system and gain vmanage user privileges.' Packet attack_vector: 'an incorrect use of privileged APIs (CWE-648) reachable by an unauthenticated attacker, enabling privileged actions on the management plane.' Citing gaps record NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) against this entry. patch_available true; live_patch_available false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-078",
+        "name": "ENDPOINT-MGMT-DEPLOYMENT-CHANNEL-INTEGRITY",
+        "description": "The primitive the packet records is an arbitrary file overwrite on the SD-WAN Manager host carried out with vmanage privileges — so the exposed asset is not one upload directory but every file that management plane holds. Applied to this product, the control means treating the SD-WAN Manager installation as privileged content rather than as application data: file-integrity-monitor the installation and the directories its API writes into, and alert on any write that does not correspond to a sanctioned administrator action or a vendor update. This is the control that still has value after the update lands, because the fix closes the write path but removes nothing already written through it — a file overwritten or planted before remediation survives the upgrade and the restart. With exploitation confirmed and a public exploit recorded in the packet, an instance whose API interface was reachable before remediation needs forensic triage of what was written rather than being closed on the patch. Precondition: integrity monitoring is a detection and triage control, not a preventive one — it does not stop the overwrite, and it only yields an answer where a known-good baseline of the installation predates the exposure window. Where no such baseline exists, the honest position is that the overwritten set is unknown and the instance is a rebuild candidate, not a patched-and-cleared one.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: a successful exploit 'could allow the attacker to overwrite arbitrary files on the affected system and gain vmanage user privileges.' Packet: active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, CISA KEV listed 2026-04-20, RWEP 77, CVSS 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "This entry is KEV-listed with confirmed exploitation and a public exploit recorded, and the packet gives a vendor patch, no live-patch path, and a fix that per the KEV requiredAction typically requires a service restart or system reboot. For this CVE the SLA's completion criterion is therefore each SD-WAN Manager instance running the fixed build after that restart has been taken — not 'update staged', 'change request raised', or a KEV due-date row marked closed on the management console. Where the restart cannot be taken inside the window, the documented compensating control this SLA permits is restricting reachability of the API interface to the operator segments with an operational need for it, and that restriction has to be written down as the active mitigation with a dated action item tied to the restart, not silently counted as remediation. Precondition: the reachability restriction bounds who can send the upload the packet describes; it does not repair the file-handling defect. Any host inside the permitted segment still reaches the vulnerable endpoint with the full primitive, so the restriction is a holding measure for the window before the restart, never a substitute for it.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV listed 2026-04-20, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 77, CVSS 8.8, patch_available true, live_patch_available false. live_patch_notes: 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2026-20133": {
     "name": "Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Vulnerability",
@@ -13645,7 +13677,40 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-118",
+        "name": "OT-DEFAULT-CREDENTIAL-ELIMINATION",
+        "description": "The packet states this exploit's only access requirement outright: an unauthorized user would require network access to the controller. So on this entry the segmentation half of this control is the load-bearing half, and the credential-elimination half is not a lever the operator holds — the key that authenticates design software to Logix controllers is discoverable from Studio 5000 itself rather than set per site, so there is no vendor-default or blank administrative account for the operator to rotate away. Applied here, it means the Logix controllers' network interfaces answer only from a segmented engineering and management plane — the engineering workstations and servers with an operational need to program them — and not from a flat plant network, a general business VLAN, or any routable path from outside. Distinguishing test: from a segment with no programming role, attempt to open a connection to a Logix controller on a staging cell; anything that answers is within reach of the published exploit, because past that point the attacker supplies the key from the design software rather than obtaining anything from the target. Precondition: segmentation bounds the population that can reach the controller, it does not repair the key handling. The packet's stated requirement is only network access to the controller, so any compromised engineering workstation, contractor laptop or jump host already inside the permitted segment satisfies that precondition in full, and the segmentation does nothing against an unauthorized application running on a host that legitimately talks to the controller. It is a holding measure for the window before the vendor update, not a closure.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'This key is used to verify Logix controllers are communicating with Rockwell Automation design software. If successfully exploited, this vulnerability could allow an unauthorized application to connect with Logix controllers. To leverage this vulnerability, an unauthorized user would require network access to the controller.' Packet: CISA KEV listed 2026-03-05, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 77, CVSS 8.8.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security",
+          "UK-CAF-B2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-124",
+        "name": "FRAMEWORK-DEFAULT-SECRET-DETECTION",
+        "description": "The packet puts the secret inside the product: Studio 5000 Logix Designer 'may allow a key to be discovered', and that key is what verifies Logix controllers are communicating with Rockwell design software. Because the constant an attacker needs is obtainable from the design software rather than from the target site, no amount of operator-side credential hygiene reduces the exposure — which is exactly why the least-privilege and identity-and-access-control gaps are recorded against this entry: the attacker never authenticates as any engineer, so per-account privilege scoping is never consulted and the account model an identity attestation examines is bypassed rather than abused. The control's requirement here is to inventory every Studio 5000 installation and every Logix controller in the estate as depending on a product-shipped verification key, gate each of those deployments on the vendor update rather than on a password or account policy, and re-run that check after any engineering-workstation rebuild, image restore or controller replacement, since those are the operations that quietly reintroduce an unpatched pairing at a site that had been remediated. Distinguishing test: produce, per cell, the Studio 5000 version and the controller firmware actually in service and show each is at or above the vendor's fixed level — an attestation that every engineer holds a unique Studio 5000 account passes cleanly while this flaw stays fully exploitable. Precondition: the vendor update is what removes the dependence on the discoverable key; this control is the inventory and the gate that ensure every installation reaches it, and it gives nothing on its own to a site that has not yet taken the update. It also does not detect a controller an unauthorized application has already connected to, so a cell that was reachable during the exposure window needs its controller configuration and control logic compared against a known-good copy rather than being closed on the patch.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'Studio 5000 Logix Designer software may allow a key to be discovered. This key is used to verify Logix controllers are communicating with Rockwell Automation design software.' CWE-522. Citing gaps record NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) and UK-CAF-B2 (Identity and access control) against this entry. patch_available true; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "UK-CAF-B2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-038",
+        "name": "MITIGATION-ACTIVE-PATCH-PENDING-VERDICT-CLASS",
+        "description": "The packet records a vendor patch, no live-patch path, and a fix that per the KEV requiredAction typically requires a service restart or system reboot. On Logix controllers driving a live process, that restart is scheduled against the process rather than against the 2026-03-05 KEV clock, which produces a long interval in which the estate's real state is 'reachability restricted, patch pending' — not remediated. This control requires that state to be recorded distinctly for each affected cell: the compensating control actually in force (the controller-reachability restriction), the residual risk it leaves (any host already inside the permitted segment still meets the exploit's only stated precondition, network access to the controller), and a dated action item tied to the next outage window in which the restart can be taken. It must not be reported as 'patched per SLA' and the KEV row must not be closed on the basis of the update having been obtained. Precondition and limit: this is a reporting-integrity control, not a technical mitigation — it changes what the audit sees, not what the attacker can reach, and it is only honest if the compensating control it records has been tested against a staging cell rather than asserted from a network diagram.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: patch_available true, live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes: 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' CISA KEV listed 2026-03-05, active_exploitation confirmed. Packet vector: 'To leverage this vulnerability, an unauthorized user would require network access to the controller.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2023-43000": {
     "name": "Apple Multiple products Use-After-Free Vulnerability",
@@ -15631,7 +15696,23 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-145",
+        "name": "ACTIVELY-EXPLOITED-OS-LPE-REMEDIATION-WINDOW-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The packet's vector places this in Windows Remote Desktop Services and describes an authorized attacker elevating privileges locally (CWE-269) — the account is already legitimate, so no account model is being abused; a privilege boundary inside the service is failing. For this CVE the control means the Windows update carrying the fix is driven across every affected host on the KEV clock that opened 2026-02-10 rather than folded into the next monthly rollup, with completion measured by each host's installed build against the fixed build for its SKU rather than by 'approved' or 'downloaded' in the management console. Hosts running the Remote Desktop Services role are the population to enumerate first, because a machine where many non-administrative users hold interactive sessions is a machine where the precondition this flaw needs — an already-authorized local user — is the normal operating state rather than an anomaly. The packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and a fix that typically requires a service restart or system reboot, so a host that has taken the update but not restarted still carries the vulnerable code and must be counted as exposed; on a session host that restart is also the step most likely to be deferred, because taking it evicts logged-on users, and a deferral recorded as 'patched' is the specific way this remediation goes wrong. The control's second half is the load-bearing one here: since the attacker is already authorized, tightening account privilege does not contain the escalation, which is exactly why the least-privilege and identity-and-access controls cited on this entry can pass their attestations while the flaw stays fully exploitable. Priority follows the packet rather than the CVSS band: a public PoC, confirmed exploitation, and the packet's own note that LPEs of this class are routinely paired with an initial-access flaw by ransomware operators make this the containment step for a chain, not a standalone endpoint item.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: 'Microsoft Windows Improper Privilege Management Vulnerability', CWE-269; vector 'Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Services contains an improper privilege management vulnerability that could allow an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.' CISA KEV-listed 2026-02-10, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77, poc_available true. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' attack_vector adds that 'LPEs of this class are routinely paired with an initial-access flaw by ransomware operators.' The entry cites AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIS2-Art21-patch-management, NIST-800-53-SI-2, UK-CAF-B2 and NIST-800-53-AC-6 as insufficient.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2026-21519": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Type Confusion Vulnerability",
@@ -19228,7 +19309,32 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-030",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-DEVICE-ZERODAY-SLA-TIER",
+        "description": "FortiWeb is a web application firewall — it sits on the trust boundary and is the thing other systems are protected by, which is the device class this control is written for. The packet's vector puts administrative command execution on the appliance in the hands of an unauthenticated attacker sending crafted HTTP or HTTPS requests, so the remediation clock has to run from the 2025-11-14 KEV listing, not from the next appliance maintenance window under a 14- or 30-day vulnerability-management SLA. Completion must be measured per unit by the firmware actually running after restart: the packet records patch_available true but live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes stating no live-patch tool and that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — so a FortiWeb where the image is staged but the service has not been restarted is still running the vulnerable code and must be counted as exposed, not as remediated. The isolation half of this tier has a precondition that must be stated rather than assumed: restricting which networks can reach a unit's HTTP/HTTPS listeners bounds who can send the crafted request, but a FortiWeb deployed to front internet-facing applications has to keep HTTP/HTTPS reachable from untrusted clients to do its job, so for those units isolation is not available at all and only the restarted vendor update closes the path — those units must be sequenced first rather than treated as covered by a network control. Distinguishing test: on a staging FortiWeb, send crafted HTTP/HTTPS requests carrying relative-traversal sequences to the same listeners production units expose and confirm no administrative command runs; then report fleet remediation as the number of units whose running firmware is the fixed build post-restart. An attestation of 'critical patches applied within SLA' passes cleanly while an unauthenticated administrative-command path stays reachable for the whole SLA period.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2025-64446 (Fortinet FortiWeb Path Traversal Vulnerability): cwe_refs CWE-23; vector 'Fortinet FortiWeb contains a relative path traversal vulnerability that may allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute administrative commands on the system via crafted HTTP or HTTPS requests'; cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-11-14; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; cvss 7.5; rwep_score 77; patch_available true; live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Citing gaps recorded on this entry include AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIST-800-53-SI-2 and NIS2-Art21-network-security.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet records active_exploitation as confirmed and poc_available as true for a path that needs no credentials and executes administrative commands on the FortiWeb itself, so for any unit whose HTTP/HTTPS listeners were reachable before the fixed firmware was running, the working assumption has to be that administrative commands may already have run — and installing the vendor update does not undo them. Applied to this appliance, the runbook default is to capture and examine the configuration off the box, rebuild onto the fixed firmware, and rotate every credential and certificate the unit held or could observe, rather than to record the upgrade as closure. Preconditions, stated plainly: this does not apply to units that were never reachable by an untrusted client during the exposure window, and rebuilding does not by itself remove anything — restoring the rebuilt unit's configuration from a backup taken during the exposure window reintroduces any administrative account, policy change or scheduled task an attacker created, so the restored configuration has to be diffed against a known-good baseline before it is loaded, and credential rotation has to extend to anything the appliance authenticated to, because rotation on the device alone leaves harvested secrets valid elsewhere. Distinguishing test: take a production FortiWeb and compare its current administrator list, and its configuration change record, against a baseline captured before the exposure window. If no such pre-exposure baseline exists, the organization cannot distinguish an untouched appliance from a modified one, and 'patched per SLA' is being recorded as remediation on faith — which is exactly what the patch-shaped framework controls cited against this entry accept as sufficient.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2025-64446: active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-11-14; rwep_score 77; vector states an unauthenticated attacker may 'execute administrative commands on the system via crafted HTTP or HTTPS requests'; patch_available true and live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes recording no live-patch tool and a vendor patch that typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. Citing gaps on this entry include AU-Essential-8-Patch, NIST-800-53-SI-2 and UK-CAF-B4.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-12480": {
     "name": "Gladinet Triofox Improper Access Control Vulnerability",
@@ -19762,7 +19868,32 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-145",
+        "name": "ACTIVELY-EXPLOITED-OS-LPE-REMEDIATION-WINDOW-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The packet's vector has a malicious local actor with non-administrative privileges escalating to root on the same VM, through VMware Tools and Aria Operations rather than through anything the guest's own account model governs. For this entry the control means the fixed VMware Tools and Aria Operations builds are driven across every managed guest on the clock that opened with the 2025-10-30 KEV listing, and that completion is measured per guest by the VMware Tools build actually installed and the Aria Operations version actually running — not by 'update approved' or 'package pushed' in the management console, and not by a hypervisor-level rollup that reports host currency while guests lag. Because the packet records patch_available true, live_patch_available false, and live_patch_notes stating no live-patch tool with a vendor patch that typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, a guest that has received the update but not restarted the affected components still carries the vulnerable path and has to be counted as exposed. The second half of the control is the load-bearing half here and is why NIST-800-53-AC-6 is cited as insufficient on this entry: the attacker is already a legitimate, non-administrative local user, so removing administrative rights from ordinary guest accounts — the thing a least-privilege attestation measures — does not stand between that account and root. Distinguishing test: on a staging guest running the same VMware Tools version, managed by Aria Operations with SDMP enabled, attempt the escalation from an ordinary non-administrative account and confirm root is not reached; then report fleet coverage as guests at the fixed build post-restart. A least-privilege attestation and a 'patch compliance' percentage both pass while this path stays open.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2025-41244 (Broadcom VMware Aria Operations and VMware Tools Privilege Defined with Unsafe Actions Vulnerability): cwe_refs CWE-267; vector 'A malicious local actor with non-administrative privileges having access to a VM with VMware Tools installed and managed by Aria Operations with SDMP enabled may exploit this vulnerability to escalate privileges to root on the same VM'; cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-10-30; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; cvss 8.8; rwep_score 77; patch_available true; live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Citing gaps recorded on this entry include AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIS2-Art21-patch-management, NIST-800-53-SI-2 and NIST-800-53-AC-6.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-135",
+        "name": "CONTROL-PANEL-PLUGIN-USER-SURFACE-MUST-NOT-REACH-ROOT-OPERATIONS",
+        "description": "CWE-267 (privilege defined with unsafe actions) plus a vector in which a non-administrative local account reaches root on the same VM is this control's pattern: an operation that carries root authority inside the managed guest is reachable from an account that holds no administrative privilege, so the only thing standing between an ordinary guest user and root is the correctness of that privileged path. Bound to this product, the control means the privileged work that Aria Operations and VMware Tools perform inside a guest authorizes what it acts on for itself, at its own boundary, instead of inheriting trust from the fact that the request or the state originated inside the guest it manages — and that this property is verified on the managed-guest configuration the packet names, not assumed from the guest OS's account model. Preconditions, stated plainly: the vendor update is what repairs the boundary — this control states the property to verify, it does not implement it. Until that update is installed and the affected components restarted (the packet records no live-patch path and a restart-or-reboot requirement), the only operator-side lever is the exploit condition the packet itself names — a VM with VMware Tools installed, managed by Aria Operations, with SDMP enabled — so guests outside that configuration are not in the described condition, but where SDMP is operationally required nothing short of the update closes the path, and changing that setting does not evict an attacker who already reached root or remove what root access created on a guest that was in the vulnerable configuration during the exposure window (active_exploitation is confirmed and a PoC is public). Distinguishing test: enumerate which guests are managed with SDMP enabled and, on a staging guest matching that configuration, confirm a non-administrative local account cannot drive the privileged path to root — an attestation that no ordinary guest user holds administrative rights never tests this path.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2025-41244: cwe_refs CWE-267 ('Privilege Defined with Unsafe Actions' per the entry name); vector names the exploit condition as a VM 'with VMware Tools installed and managed by Aria Operations with SDMP enabled' and the outcome as escalation 'to root on the same VM' by 'a malicious local actor with non-administrative privileges'; attack_vector adds that escalation flaws of this class form the second half of an intrusion chain; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-10-30; patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes recording no live-patch tool and a vendor patch that typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. Citing gaps on this entry include NIST-800-53-AC-6 and UK-CAF-B4.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-24893": {
     "name": "XWiki Platform Eval Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -20215,7 +20346,31 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-134",
+        "name": "DEVICE-MANAGEMENT-GATEWAY-CONFIG-ENDPOINT-AUTH-INPUT-NEUTRALIZATION",
+        "description": "LANSCOPE Endpoint Manager is the device-management platform itself, and CWE-940 places the defect precisely at the trust decision: the receiving component decides whether to act on a packet by judging where it appears to have come from rather than by verifying who sent it, so an unauthenticated attacker's crafted packets are processed as trusted commands and reach arbitrary code execution. Applied to this product, the control means every service on the LANSCOPE management agent and server that accepts commands authenticates its caller cryptographically before the command is parsed or executed — a verdict that cannot be satisfied by source address, network position, or any other property the sender controls — and that those listening services are not reachable from networks with no managed endpoints on them. The precondition on the network half has to be stated rather than left implied: managed endpoints must be able to reach the management server for the product to function, so restricting reachability shrinks the population that can send crafted packets to hosts inside the managed network but does not close the path — any compromised workstation in that population still has it, and for a deployment where agents span the whole estate the reduction is small. Closure is the vendor update, and the packet records no live-patch tool with a vendor patch that typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, so a server or agent that has taken the update without restarting is not remediated. Distinguishing test: on a staging LANSCOPE instance, send crafted command packets from an unauthenticated host and confirm refusal before execution — then repeat from a host inside the managed address range and confirm the command is still refused. If the second attempt succeeds, the product is still authenticating the channel rather than the caller, which is the defect itself; the least-privilege control cited against this entry is never consulted on this path because the attacker holds no LANSCOPE account to scope.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2025-61932 (Motex LANSCOPE Endpoint Manager Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel Vulnerability): cwe_refs CWE-940; vector 'Motex LANSCOPE Endpoint Manager contains an improper verification of source of a communication channel vulnerability allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code by sending specially crafted packets'; attack_vector describes an unauthenticated attacker sending trusted commands to the management agent/server for remote code execution; cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-10-22; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; cvss 9.8; rwep_score 77; patch_available true; live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Citing gaps recorded on this entry include NIST-800-53-AC-6, UK-CAF-B4 and NIS2-Art21-network-security.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-078",
+        "name": "ENDPOINT-MGMT-DEPLOYMENT-CHANNEL-INTEGRITY",
+        "description": "The packet puts arbitrary code execution on the LANSCOPE management agent and server — the component that holds the management relationship with the endpoints it administers — and records active_exploitation as confirmed with a public PoC. That makes the installation and, wherever the deployment uses it to distribute software or run commands on managed endpoints, the content it hands to its agents a privileged distribution channel rather than ordinary application data. Bound to this product, the control means file-integrity monitoring across the LANSCOPE installation and the directories it serves content from, with alerts on any write that does not correspond to a sanctioned administrator action or a vendor update, and holding the LANSCOPE server to KEV-priority patching as a management-plane asset in its own right. This is the control that retains value after the vendor update lands, which is why the update-shaped framework controls cited on this entry are insufficient on their own: the fix closes the path by which crafted packets became trusted commands, but it removes nothing that was already written or already executed through that path, and an artifact placed on the server before remediation survives the upgrade and keeps whatever reach the server has. Preconditions: monitoring neither prevents exploitation nor reconstructs the period before it was enabled — a monitor stood up after the exposure window has no baseline for what changed during it, so the comparison must be made against a record captured before that window or against vendor-shipped file state, and where neither exists the honest verdict is that server integrity is unestablished rather than clean. Distinguishing test: enumerate the content the LANSCOPE server would currently distribute or execute and reconcile it item by item against the change record of sanctioned administrator actions since before the exposure window; unreconciled items are the finding. An attestation that the LANSCOPE server is running the fixed build passes cleanly while a payload placed pre-update continues to reach managed endpoints.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2025-61932: attack_vector describes an unauthenticated attacker sending trusted commands to the LANSCOPE 'management agent/server' for remote code execution; vector confirms arbitrary code execution via specially crafted packets; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-10-22; cvss 9.8; rwep_score 77; patch_available true; live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes recording no live-patch tool and a vendor patch that typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. Citing gaps on this entry include AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 and NIST-800-53-SI-2.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2022-48503": {
     "name": "Apple Multiple Products Unspecified Vulnerability",
@@ -20701,7 +20856,31 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The packet's chain runs entirely below the operating system: igel-flash-driver mis-verifies the image signature, so a crafted root filesystem mounts from an unverified SquashFS image and the device runs an attacker's OS. Nothing inside the booted session can detect or contain that, so the vendor update is the only closure, driven across every IGEL OS endpoint on the clock that opened with the 2025-10-14 KEV listing rather than folded into the next scheduled image-refresh cycle. Completion must be measured by the build each device actually booted, not by 'update assigned' or 'update downloaded' in the management console: the packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and a fix that requires a service restart or system reboot, so a device that has taken the update but not rebooted is still running an image the unfixed verification path admitted and has to be counted as exposed, not remediated. Scope this to IGEL OS, which is the product the packet names; it gives no mapping from igel-flash-driver into any other boot chain.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-10-14, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 77 against CVSS 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Vector: 'IGEL OS contains a use of a key past its expiration date vulnerability that allows for Secure Boot bypass. The igel-flash-driver module improperly verifies a cryptographic signature. Ultimately, a crafted root filesystem can be mounted from an unverified SquashFS image.' (CWE-324).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-041",
+        "name": "PROTECTION-MECHANISM-FAILURE-CLASS-REGRESSION",
+        "description": "The mechanism that failed on this entry is boot-image signature verification itself: per the packet igel-flash-driver accepts a signature made with a key past its expiration date, so Secure Boot reports enforcement while an unverified SquashFS root filesystem mounts. A version-number attestation cannot separate 'verification restored' from 'verification still failing open', because the version string is exactly what the mechanism was already reporting while it admitted the image. For this CVE the control means the boot-verification path is re-tested as a class on every IGEL OS image deployment, keyed on the behaviour the packet documents: on a staging device, present the boot chain with a modified or unverified SquashFS root filesystem image and confirm it refuses to mount it — and keep that test in the battery for subsequent images instead of retiring it once this CVE is closed, since the defect is in the check rather than in one image. Precondition: the test needs a staging device the operator can attempt an unverified boot on and a way to observe the refusal. Where that does not exist the mechanism's state is unverified, and the device must be treated as exposed until it boots a build the vendor names as fixed rather than passing because a scanner read the version.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'The igel-flash-driver module improperly verifies a cryptographic signature. Ultimately, a crafted root filesystem can be mounted from an unverified SquashFS image', classed CWE-324 (use of a key past its expiration date) and described in the attack vector as a Secure Boot / boot-trust bypass letting an attacker boot a modified or unverified OS image. cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-10-14, active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true, so the failing check is being exercised rather than theoretical. patch_available true, live_patch_available false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-24990": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Untrusted Pointer Dereference Vulnerability",
@@ -22072,7 +22251,39 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-125",
+        "name": "SERVICE-INTERNAL-PROTOCOL-DESERIALIZATION-HARDENING",
+        "description": "The packet puts the sink in the GoAnywhere MFT license servlet and names the entry condition as a validly forged license response signature: the product's trust decision is that a signature-checked license response is safe to deserialize into an arbitrary actor-controlled object, and from there CWE-502 becomes the CWE-77 command injection the packet records. For this product the control means the license servlet is treated as an unauthenticated trust boundary rather than a vendor-to-product internal convenience. Two requirements follow. First, the servlet must constrain what an arriving license response is permitted to construct or evaluate — an allowlist of the concrete types the licensing flow legitimately carries — instead of inheriting safety from the signature check, which is precisely the check the packet says the actor forges. Second, the servlet path must answer only from the management segment rather than from arbitrary internet callers. Distinguishing test: against a staging instance, submit to the license servlet a response object of a type the licensing flow never legitimately conveys and confirm it is refused before any object is constructed — an instance that passes a patch-level audit while the servlet answers unauthenticated internet callers still carries the deserialization path the moment the next parsing defect lands. Precondition: the reachability half holds only where the deployment can separate the licensing and administrative surface from the partner-facing file-transfer listeners. Where partners and the servlet share one exposed surface, segmentation buys nothing and the vendor update is the only remediation — and the packet records that update as requiring a service restart or system reboot with no live-patch path, so an instance updated but not restarted is not yet remediated. Second precondition: on an instance that was internet-reachable on a vulnerable build this control does not remove what an operator with command execution already placed there; that is a separate disposition, not something the hardening covers.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: attack_vector records \"a deserialization-of-untrusted-data flaw (CWE-502/CWE-77) in the GoAnywhere MFT license servlet, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution on the managed-file-transfer server\"; the vector records \"an actor with a validly forged license response signature to deserialize an arbitrary actor-controlled object, possibly leading to command injection\". cwe_refs CWE-502 and CWE-77. cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-09-29, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 9.8, rwep_score 83. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" UK-CAF-B4 (System security) and ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet records this entry as mass-exploited in data-theft extortion campaigns with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, and the flaw yields unauthenticated command execution on the managed-file-transfer server itself — the host that holds and moves the organisation's files. Applying the Fortra update closes the deserialization path and says nothing about what ran on the box while it was open. Applied to this product: any GoAnywhere MFT instance that was reachable from an untrusted network on a vulnerable build is dispositioned as compromised regardless of what a post-update version check reports. Capture and diff the running configuration and the directories the service serves content from against known-good, rebuild from vendor media at the fixed version rather than updating in place, and rotate what the server held — the MFT service and administrative account credentials, the trading-partner keys and passwords it authenticated with, and any TLS private key stored on it. Then review which transferred files were exposed, because the campaign class the packet names is data-theft extortion: the files are the objective, not a side effect, and no amount of post-hoc patching un-exfiltrates them. The behaviour to hunt for is the one the packet's own chain produces — the MFT service process spawning a shell or interpreter child, which is what a deserialization sink reaching a command-injection sink looks like at execution time — rather than a generic malware signature, which is exactly what the anti-malware control this entry cites does not reliably produce for an in-process injection chain. Precondition: this disposition applies to instances whose exposure during the vulnerable window cannot be excluded; an instance that provably never answered an untrusted network on a vulnerable build takes the vendor update on the KEV clock instead. Rebuilding is not relief from the update — the rebuilt instance must come up on the fixed version, with the service restart or reboot the packet records as required.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: attack_vector records \"unauthenticated remote code execution on the managed-file-transfer server (mass-exploited in data-theft extortion campaigns)\" arising from the CWE-502/CWE-77 flaw in the GoAnywhere MFT license servlet. cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-09-29, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 9.8, rwep_score 83. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" CIS-Controls-v8-10.1 (Deploy and Maintain Anti-Malware Software) and NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-handling (Cybersecurity risk-management measures (vulnerability handling and disclosure)) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "CIS-Controls-v8-10.1",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-handling"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "For this entry the control's \"KEV listing or patch availability, whichever is later\" clause sets a clock the operator can actually run: the packet records patch_available true and a KEV listing dated 2025-09-29, and the flaw is a pre-authentication path to command execution on an internet-facing managed-file-transfer server at CVSS 9.8 and RWEP 83 that is already mass-exploited. A month-scale critical-patch window is exploitation acceptance against that profile, and an operating-system patch programme never reaches this server's application build at all — the vulnerable code is the GoAnywhere license servlet, not the host OS, so an estate can be fully current on OS updates while every MFT instance stays open. Applied here, the SLA governs the GoAnywhere application build specifically, and completion is measured by each instance reporting the fixed version after it has been restarted, not by \"update downloaded\" or \"change request raised\": the packet registers no live-patch path and states the vendor patch requires a service restart or system reboot, so the restart sits inside the clock rather than after it. Precondition for anything done inside the open window: narrowing who can reach the license servlet reduces exposure but does not remediate the entry, and it must be recorded as an interim compensating measure with the update date attached, not as satisfaction of the SLA. An instance that cannot be restarted inside the window is a named, dated exception carrying that restriction, not a silently open item.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: \"Fortra GoAnywhere MFT contains a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability allows an actor with a validly forged license response signature to deserialize an arbitrary actor-controlled object, possibly leading to command injection\"; attack_vector adds \"unauthenticated remote code execution on the managed-file-transfer server (mass-exploited in data-theft extortion campaigns)\". cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-09-29, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 9.8, rwep_score 83. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" AU-Essential-8-Patch (Patch operating systems) and NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-20352": {
     "name": "Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software SNMP Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution Vulnerability",
@@ -22297,7 +22508,41 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-030",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-DEVICE-ZERODAY-SLA-TIER",
+        "description": "The affected component per the packet is the VPN web server on Cisco Secure Firewall ASA and Secure Firewall Threat Defense — the device is the perimeter trust boundary, so a missing-authorization flaw letting an unauthenticated caller reach restricted URL endpoints cannot sit in an ordinary appliance-maintenance window. A 14- or 30-day remediation SLA applied here is being applied to the thing that enforces the boundary. For this CVE the tier means the fixed release is driven onto every ASA and FTD unit whose VPN web server is reachable, on a clock that opened with the 2025-09-25 KEV listing, or the VPN web-services interface is withdrawn from untrusted reachability until it is. The packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and a service-restart-or-reboot requirement, so the clock does not stop at 'image loaded' — it stops when the unit has reloaded onto the fixed release, because a unit staged but not reloaded still serves the vulnerable path. Precondition on the interim half: restricting reachability bounds exposure only where the VPN web server can actually be withdrawn from the untrusted side. A unit that must keep terminating remote-access VPN from the internet cannot use that lever at all and has only the expedited reload, and pairing it with a reachability restriction it cannot apply would record a mitigation it does not have.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: 'Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security (ASA) Appliance and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software VPN Web Server contain a missing authorization vulnerability. This vulnerability could be chained with CVE-2025-20333.' Attack vector: a missing-authorization flaw (CWE-862) allowing an unauthenticated attacker to reach restricted URL endpoints. cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-09-25, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 77 against CVSS 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet records confirmed in-the-wild exploitation from the 2025-09-25 KEV listing and states the flaw could be chained with CVE-2025-20333, so for any ASA or FTD unit whose VPN web server was reachable during that window the operative question is not whether it now runs the fixed release but whether it was already reached. Upgrading closes the missing-authorization path; the packet gives no basis for treating the upgrade as removing anything an attacker may have left on the box beforehand. The control means those units default to the compromise path rather than the patch path: capture the running and startup configuration and diff it against a known-good baseline before touching the unit, rebuild from vendor image instead of upgrading in place, and rotate every credential and key the device held or terminated — device administrative accounts, remote-access VPN credentials, and any shared secret configured on it. Precondition, and it decides which units this applies to: the default is for units whose VPN web server was actually reachable from an untrusted network during the exposure window. A unit that was never so exposed can take the ordinary expedited upgrade, but that determination has to come from configuration and network evidence rather than from assumption — an untested assumption of non-reachability is how a compromised unit gets upgraded in place and returned to service.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: active_exploitation confirmed with cisa_kev true and kev_date 2025-09-25, poc_available true. Vector: 'Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security (ASA) Appliance and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software VPN Web Server contain a missing authorization vulnerability. This vulnerability could be chained with CVE-2025-20333.' patch_available true, live_patch_available false. The packet establishes that the update closes the flaw; it records nothing indicating the update remediates a unit already reached through it.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "UK-CAF-B2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-031",
+        "name": "FIREWALL-EGRESS-TELEMETRY-SEPARATE-TRUST-ZONE",
+        "description": "Because the packet's path is an unauthenticated caller reaching restricted URL endpoints on the ASA/FTD VPN web server, the signal that a unit was touched is a web-services request to a restricted VPN web-server path with no successful prior authentication on that session — the exact behaviour the packet documents, and something an exploit doing only what the packet describes necessarily emits at the web-services layer. That record lives on the device an attacker reaching those endpoints is in a position to alter, so ASA/FTD web-services, syslog and authentication records must be forwarded as they are produced to a collector in a separate trust zone, with different credentials and a different management path from the firewall itself. Precondition, and the reason this is a standing posture rather than an incident action: forwarding only produces evidence for the period it was already running. A unit that logged locally through the window opened by the 2025-09-25 KEV listing cannot have its history reconstructed afterwards, and for that unit the compromise-assumption path is the answer instead of a log review. Forwarding also prevents nothing — it makes the access visible and makes the record survive the device; it is not a substitute for the reload onto the fixed release.",
+        "evidence": "Packet attack vector: a missing-authorization flaw (CWE-862) allowing an unauthenticated attacker to reach restricted URL endpoints on the ASA web-services chain, chainable with CVE-2025-20333 per the vector text. cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-09-25, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true. patch_available true with live_patch_available false and a restart-or-reboot requirement, so units carry the exposure until they reload.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-20333": {
     "name": "Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Buffer Overflow Vulnerability",
@@ -23580,7 +23825,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-057",
+        "name": "BROWSER-MANAGED-UPDATE-NO-DEFERRAL",
+        "description": "The vulnerable component is the browser itself and the delivery is an attacker-controlled web page — the packet describes the SetMouseCapture flaw used in watering-hole attacks, so the victim reaches the CWE-399 use-after-free by visiting a site: there is no attachment to strip, no file to inspect, and no user action to train against beyond browsing. Applied to this CVE the control means Internet Explorer's servicing is driven on its own accelerated channel rather than deferred into an enterprise update ring or folded into a monthly workstation rollup, and that completion is measured per host against the installed build rather than by 'update approved' in the management console. The packet records a vendor patch, no live-patch path, and a fix that requires a service restart or system reboot, so a host that has taken the update but has not restarted is still running the vulnerable renderer and must be counted as exposed rather than remediated. Precondition: an update-ring policy only reaches copies a managed channel can see and drive. The packet notes the impacted products could be end-of-life or end-of-service, so part of the exposed population sits outside managed servicing entirely; for those hosts the policy changes nothing and the exposure is closed only by applying the update by hand or by taking the product out of use, per the packet's own instruction that users should discontinue product utilization. Recording such a host as covered because a ring policy exists leaves it fully exploitable. The distinguishing test: take a host the update-ring report shows as compliant and read its installed Internet Explorer build and its last restart time — a fleet reporting 100% approved while hosts sit un-restarted has measured the console's state, not the renderer's.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-399 resource-management memory-corruption use-after-free in Internet Explorer, recorded as the SetMouseCapture flaw used in watering-hole attacks and exploitable by an attacker-controlled web page for code execution in the browser. CISA KEV-listed 2025-08-12 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; RWEP 77 against CVSS 9.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes stating the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. The packet also records that the impacted products could be end-of-life and/or end-of-service and that users should discontinue product utilization.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The KEV listing on this entry is dated 2025-08-12 against a CVE assigned in 2013, and that mismatch is the operative problem for a vulnerability-management program. Nothing here is newly disclosed, no advisory feed re-publishes it, and a program that opens work items from disclosure feeds — or that triages by CVE age — creates no ticket at all, while the packet records exploitation as confirmed now and a PoC as available. Applied to this CVE the control means the KEV listing date starts the remediation clock independently of the CVE's age: the estate is re-queried in 2025 for Internet Explorer installs still on a pre-fix build, rather than consulted for a 2013 remediation record asserting the flaw was closed against the estate that existed then. The verified-mitigation state the SLA demands is per-host — the packet gives a vendor patch, no live-patch path, and a restart-or-reboot requirement, so 'fixed build installed and the host restarted' is the only state that counts, not 'the bulletin was deployed'. Precondition: the clock is only meetable against hosts the estate can still enumerate and service. The packet's note that impacted products could be end-of-life or end-of-service means some of the exposed population has no patch pipeline pointed at it; for that population the SLA is satisfied by removing the exposure on a dated schedule, and carrying an unreachable host as perpetually 'pending' converts the clock into a record of the omission. The distinguishing test: query the vulnerability-management system for an open item on this CVE carrying a due date derived from 2025-08-12 — a program whose only record is a closed 2013 ticket has no active work item while KEV states the flaw is being exploited today.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-08-12 on CVE-2013-3893, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 77, CVSS 9.8. attack_vector records that the legacy re-listing exists because long-tail unpatched/end-of-life estates remain exposed. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes stating the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. Citing framework gaps include EU NIS2 vulnerability handling and NIST SP 800-53 SI-2 Flaw Remediation.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2020-25078": {
     "name": "D-Link DCS-2530L and DCS-2670L Devices Unspecified Vulnerability",
@@ -23783,7 +24051,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-132",
+        "name": "INDEPENDENT-INTEGRITY-VERIFICATION-OF-SIGNED-VENDOR-INSTALLERS",
+        "description": "The DNR-322L accepts and runs code it downloads without checking its integrity (CWE-494), so nothing on the device distinguishes a genuine D-Link image from one an attacker substitutes — the packet's path is precisely that: an attacker supplies a malicious update and obtains OS-level command execution on the device. Applied to this product the control means the operator, not the device, makes the integrity decision: obtain the DNR-322L firmware through a controlled path, verify it against a vendor-published integrity value obtained over a channel separate from the download itself, and load the verified image deliberately rather than letting the device pull and run whatever an update endpoint offers it. This is the harder form of the control's premise — the original case was a client trusting a signature it should not have, whereas this device performs no verification step at all, so an out-of-band check is the only thing standing between a substituted image and code execution on the box. Precondition, and it is load-bearing: operator-side verification governs only the images the operator supplies. The packet places the attack behind device authentication, so an attacker holding or obtaining a DNR-322L credential feeds the device an image directly, and no verification discipline applied to the operator's own images intercepts that path. Bounding who can authenticate to the device's management surface is the other half of the control, and it is not substituted for by loading a verified image. The distinguishing test: for the image you are about to load, confirm you can match it to a vendor-published integrity value obtained independently of the file you downloaded — the fact that the device accepted the image tells you nothing, because it accepts unverified code by construction.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-494, download of code without an integrity check, on the D-Link DNR-322L. vector states an authenticated attacker could execute OS-level commands on the device; attack_vector states an attacker can supply a malicious update for code execution. CISA KEV-listed 2025-08-05 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; RWEP 77, CVSS 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "Two things separate the KEV clock on this entry from an ordinary server patch item. First, the DNR-322L is not reached by the estate's operating-system patching program — the cited Essential Eight 'patch operating systems' control is measured against machines carrying a patch agent, and this device carries none, so the 2025-08-05 listing produces no work item at all unless the SLA is written against the named asset rather than against the pipeline that happens to cover it. Second, the remediation action itself travels the vulnerable path: the defect is in how the device ingests code, so every image the device takes — the remediation image included — is accepted without an integrity check. Meeting the clock therefore means loading an image the operator has verified out of band and then confirming the unit came back on the fixed version; the packet records a vendor patch, no live-patch path, and a fix requiring a service restart or system reboot, so a device handed the image but not restarted onto it is not yet remediated. Precondition: this is only actionable for units the operator can physically or administratively reach and re-verify. The packet notes the impacted products could be end-of-life or end-of-service, so where no reachable fixed image exists the clock is closed by removing the unit from service on a dated schedule, not by carrying it indefinitely as pending. The distinguishing test: pull the KEV-derived due date for this CVE and ask which named DNR-322L units it is tracked against — an SLA reporting 'no affected assets' because the patch console cannot see the device has measured the console, not the estate.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2025-08-05 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; RWEP 77, CVSS 8.8; CWE-494 with attack_vector recording that an attacker can supply a malicious update for code execution. Citing framework gaps include ASD Essential Eight 'Patch operating systems', ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.8 and EU NIS2 vulnerability handling. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes stating the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. The packet also records that the impacted products could be end-of-life and/or end-of-service.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2023-2533": {
     "name": "PaperCut NG/MF Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Vulnerability",
@@ -24697,7 +24988,40 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet supplies every precondition this control keys on: an unauthenticated attacker reaches remote code execution on Wing FTP Server, exploitation is confirmed in the wild, a PoC is available, and the injected Lua executes with the privileges of the FTP service — root or SYSTEM by default. That last fact is what makes patch-in-place the wrong default here: a successful exploit owns the host, not merely the FTP application, so the vendor update closes the null-byte injection path while leaving intact whatever was installed through it — added accounts, scheduled tasks, altered service configuration, or attacker Lua left in the session-file tree the product itself evaluates. Applied to this product, an exploited or suspected-exploited instance is dispositioned by exporting configuration, rebuilding the host, and rotating every credential the service held or handled: Wing FTP account passwords, any service or database credentials in its configuration, and any key material stored on the host — not by upgrading in place and closing the ticket. Precondition: this disposition is for instances that were reachable by untrusted clients during the exposure window, which the packet opens at the 2025-07-14 KEV listing and which closes only when the fix is actually in service. For an instance demonstrably unreachable across that window, the vendor update plus the restart it requires is sufficient; the packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and a service-restart-or-reboot requirement, so an instance updated but not restarted has not closed the window at all. Which case a host is in has to be established from reachability evidence — 'the server is internal' is a statement about topology, not a demonstration that no untrusted client could reach the listener. The distinguishing test: on a host that has taken the update, look for artefacts the update does not remove — accounts and session files created during the exposure window, and service-configuration changes not traceable to an administrator action; an upgrade record alone does not distinguish a clean host from an occupied one.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-158, improper neutralization of a null byte or NUL character, allowing injection of arbitrary Lua code into user session files, used to execute arbitrary system commands with the privileges of the FTP service (root or SYSTEM by default). attack_vector records an unauthenticated attacker achieving remote code execution, exploitable even via anonymous login. CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-14 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; RWEP 77, CVSS 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes stating the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-135",
+        "name": "CONTROL-PANEL-PLUGIN-USER-SURFACE-MUST-NOT-REACH-ROOT-OPERATIONS",
+        "description": "Wing FTP's pre-authentication login and session-file handling is the unprivileged user surface this control governs, and the packet has it wired straight to a root operation: a NUL character that is not neutralized carries attacker-controlled text into a user session file, that file is evaluated as Lua, and the interpreter runs as the FTP service — root or SYSTEM by default. Applied to this product the property to verify is that nothing arriving on the pre-authentication surface can reach an interpreter holding host authority: content the login path writes into a session file is consumed as data rather than evaluated, and the service's privileged operations sit behind their own boundary instead of being reachable by anything that can present a username. The vendor update is what repairs the neutralization — the control states the property to verify, it does not implement it. The operator-side lever in the meantime is the authority the interpreter inherits: where the product permits it, run Wing FTP under a dedicated account without host-level administrative rights, so injected Lua executes without root or SYSTEM authority. Two preconditions, and the first is the one most likely to be recorded as the mitigation when it is not one. Disabling anonymous login does not close this path: the packet states the attacker is unauthenticated and names anonymous login only as the easiest route, so the injection is reached before any account decision is made and an instance with anonymous access turned off remains exploitable. And the service-account change does not stop the injection — it bounds what the injected code can do, and it does nothing at all on a deployment that must retain root or SYSTEM. This is why the cited least-privilege gap is recorded against this entry: per-account privilege scoping is never consulted, because the attacker holds no account. The distinguishing test: on a staging instance with anonymous login disabled, submit NUL-bearing input to the pre-authentication surface and confirm nothing is written into a session file the Lua interpreter will later evaluate — an attestation that every Wing FTP account has a strong password tests the account model this attack never touches.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-158, improper neutralization of null byte or NUL character, allowing injection of arbitrary Lua code into user session files, which can be used to execute arbitrary system commands with the privileges of the FTP service (root or SYSTEM by default). attack_vector records an unauthenticated attacker and notes it is exploitable even via anonymous login. NIST SP 800-53 AC-6 (Least Privilege) is one of the framework control gaps citing this CVE. CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-14 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; RWEP 77, CVSS 8.8. patch_available true, live_patch_available false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "This entry pairs the three conditions that collapse a normal patch window: the packet records exploitation as confirmed, a PoC as available, and code execution at root or SYSTEM from an attacker holding no credential — so the interval between the 2025-07-14 KEV listing and the fix being in service is time during which any reachable instance can be taken at host level by anyone who can send it traffic. Applied to this product the control means Wing FTP is remediated on the KEV clock rather than in the next application-maintenance window, and that completion is measured per instance by the running version after restart. The packet gives a vendor patch, no live-patch path, and a fix requiring a service restart or system reboot, so an instance whose files were replaced but whose service still holds the old code in memory is exposed, not remediated — on a file-transfer service that is the common case, because restarting it interrupts transfers and gets deferred. Precondition: the clock covers only instances the operator knows about. Wing FTP is the kind of service that gets stood up by a business unit for a partner file exchange and never enters the application inventory, and a KEV SLA cannot be met against an instance nobody has listed — enumerating who is running it is the first action the clock demands, not the last. The distinguishing test: for each Wing FTP instance, compare the running service's version and its process start time against the time the fix was applied; a compliance record showing the package updated within the SLA, on a service that has not restarted since, records the file copy rather than the remediation.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-14 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; RWEP 77, CVSS 8.8. vector records that the injected Lua executes arbitrary system commands with the privileges of the FTP service (root or SYSTEM by default), and attack_vector records an unauthenticated attacker, exploitable even via anonymous login. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes stating the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. Citing framework gaps include ASD Essential Eight 'Patch operating systems', ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.8 and NIST SP 800-53 SI-2.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-5777": {
     "name": "Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability",
@@ -24852,7 +25176,21 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "This is a 2019-identified flaw that entered CISA KEV on 2025-07-07 with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and a public proof-of-concept, which is what makes an exploitation-driven SLA the operative control instead of the age- or score-ordered queue most vulnerability-management programs run: at CVSS 7.5 and six years old, this entry sorts near the bottom of a queue ordered by severity and disclosure date while being actively exploited, and the packet's RWEP of 77 against that CVSS is the size of the mis-ranking. Applied to this product, the clock runs from the KEV listing to a Zimbra Collaboration Suite instance actually running the fixed code, and the packet's remediation note is where that goes wrong: it records a vendor patch with no live-patch tool registered and states the patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, so a ZCS host where the package was applied but the services were never restarted is still serving the vulnerable ProxyServlet and must be counted as exposed rather than remediated. No compensating control is offered here that removes the path, and inventing one would be worse than saying so: the SSRF is reachable by an unauthenticated attacker through ProxyServlet on the ZCS web surface, and on a mail and collaboration server that surface is reachable by design. Source-restricting it is available only for an instance whose web client serves a bounded, known user population; for an internet-facing deployment it is not, and there the completed, restarted update is the only action that closes the path. Distinguishing test: query each ZCS host for the version of the running services rather than the installed package version, and confirm the restart has happened — a patch-deployment report that closes the ticket at package install leaves an actively exploited path open on a host that reports as patched.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability via the ProxyServlet component (CWE-918, CWE-807), letting an unauthenticated attacker coerce server-side requests — described as a known chain toward RCE on ZCS. CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-07; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; CVSS 7.5; RWEP 77. patch_available true; live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\"",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2019-5418": {
     "name": "Rails Ruby on Rails Path Traversal Vulnerability",
@@ -24912,7 +25250,29 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-021",
+        "name": "TIER-3-DEPENDENCY-INVENTORY",
+        "description": "The packet places the traversal in Action View, a component inside the Ruby on Rails framework rather than a dependency a deployed application declares for itself — an application declares Rails, or declares a gem that declares Rails, and Action View arrives underneath. That is why the framework control this entry cites, patching operating systems, cannot reach it: a host package inventory and an OS patch report can both read clean across the whole estate while every Rails application on it still renders arbitrary files in response to a crafted Accept header. Applied here, the inventory has to resolve to the framework-component level: enumerate the resolved Action View version behind every deployed application — internal tools, vendor-supplied Rails applications, and containers built from base images the platform team does not rebuild — from the application's own lockfile, and drive flaw-remediation tickets from that list instead of from the host patch report. Distinguishing test: ask the estate's inventory for the resolved Action View version behind each deployed Rails application; any application whose framework component version the inventory cannot produce is unremediated by default, not compliant, because nothing in the OS-scoped evidence would ever have shown otherwise. Precondition: this finds the exposure, it does not close it. The packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and a service restart requirement, so each application must be moved onto the fixed framework version and restarted before it counts as remediated. An application whose lockfile the operator does not control — a vendor-supplied appliance shipping its own Rails build — is remediated by the vendor's update or by removing its exposure, not by recording it as inventoried. And because the packet says the read reaches configuration and secrets, an application found exposed after the fact needs those secrets rotated; the framework update does not un-disclose what was already read.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: \"Rails Ruby on Rails contains a path traversal vulnerability in Action View. Specially crafted accept headers in combination with calls to `render file:` can cause arbitrary files on the target server to be rendered, disclosing the file contents\"; attack_vector adds that this lets \"an unauthenticated attacker read arbitrary files including configuration and secrets\". cwe_refs CWE-22. cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-07-07, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 7.5, rwep_score 77. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" AU-Essential-8-Patch (Patch operating systems) and NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-018",
+        "name": "SCANNER-PAPER-COMPLIANCE-TEST",
+        "description": "A vulnerability-management verdict of \"patched\" reached from a host package version is paper compliance for this entry twice over: the defect lives in the application's bundled framework rather than in a host package, and the attacker's input is somewhere most detection never looks. The packet is explicit that the crafted content rides in the Accept header, in combination with a `render file:` call — the request path and query string are unremarkable. So a scanner rule, WAF signature or SIEM query written against traversal sequences in URLs sees a clean request and stays silent through actual exploitation, and the resulting green report is the compliance-theater artefact. Operational test for this entry: from an unauthenticated client against a staging deployment, issue a request carrying a crafted Accept header to a route that reaches `render file:`, and confirm the response body does not contain a file from outside the application's view root — a real behavioural result, not a version comparison. Two supporting checks belong with it: confirm the request-logging pipeline actually retains the Accept header, since a pipeline that drops it cannot evidence exploitation afterwards; and write the detection against the behaviour the packet documents, which is inbound Accept header values carrying traversal sequences or absolute paths, together with the application returning file content of a type that route does not otherwise serve. Precondition and limit: a passing test proves this route is closed, nothing more — it does not survey the estate, and it does not undo disclosure. Because the packet records the read as reaching configuration and secrets, any application where the test fails or where exploitation is evidenced needs every secret reachable through that read rotated, and the vendor update applied with the service restart the packet requires, before the finding is closed.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: \"Specially crafted accept headers in combination with calls to `render file:` can cause arbitrary files on the target server to be rendered, disclosing the file contents\"; attack_vector records \"a path-traversal flaw (CWE-22) in Ruby on Rails Action View (crafted Accept header), letting an unauthenticated attacker read arbitrary files including configuration and secrets\". cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-07-07, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 7.5, rwep_score 77. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities) and NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management (Vulnerability handling) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2016-10033": {
     "name": "PHPMailer Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -25231,7 +25591,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-138",
+        "name": "VERIFY-MESSAGING-BACKEND-DATA-HANDLING-AGAINST-E2E-CLAIM",
+        "description": "TM SGNL is a messaging-archiving backend, and this defect is only catastrophic because of what that backend was holding. The packet describes a JSP application whose heap content is 'roughly equivalent to a core dump', states that a password previously sent over HTTP is included in that dump, and records the exposure as disclosing plaintext messages and credentials from the TeleMessage server. A memory-disclosure bug in an archive that genuinely could not read message contents would return ciphertext; here it returned the messages themselves, so what this CVE demonstrates is the end-to-end claim failing rather than the dump primitive being unusually powerful. Bound to this product, the control means the archiving tier is not accepted on the strength of its encryption datasheet: require evidence — independent cryptographic review, a documented key-custody model that excludes the vendor, or a controlled test — that the backend cannot produce the plaintext of a stored message without the endpoint's keys, and put the same question to the credentials the web tier receives, since the packet places a password submitted over HTTP inside the process heap. The distinguishing test is a procurement-and-onboarding test rather than a scan: ask the vendor to produce the plaintext of a message you stored, and ask whether the account credential you submitted is recoverable from the running process. If either answer is yes, any memory-exposure defect in the product is a full-content breach, and the multi-factor and identity-and-access attestations the estate carries do not reduce it — the credential leaves the server without any authentication event taking place, so a second factor is never presented and no access decision is ever consulted. This control governs whether the product is trusted with the data; it does not remediate the disclosure path itself. The packet records a vendor patch for that, and material already read out of an exposed instance stays valid until it is rotated.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-01 with active_exploitation 'confirmed'; CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77; poc_available true; patch_available true; live_patch_available false. Vector: 'TeleMessage TM SGNL contains an exposure of core dump file to an unauthorized control sphere Vulnerability. This vulnerability is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a \"core dump\" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump.' attack_vector: 'exposure of a core-dump file to an unauthorized control sphere (CWE-528), disclosing memory contents including plaintext messages and credentials from the TeleMessage server.' Citing gaps recorded against this entry include AU-Essential-8-MFA (multi-factor authentication) and UK-CAF-B2 (identity and access control).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-MFA",
+          "UK-CAF-B2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The packet records a vendor patch, no live-patch path, and live_patch_notes stating the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — so on this product remediation is not complete when the fixed build is installed, only when the archiving service has been restarted onto it. Until that restart the JSP application is still the process serving the heap-equivalent dump. For this entry the control means the fixed release lands on a KEV-tied clock opened 2025-07-01 rather than in the next maintenance window, and that completion is measured per instance by the version actually running after restart, not by 'update applied' in a change record. The second half is specific to a disclosure defect under confirmed in-the-wild exploitation with a public PoC: the patch stops the dump being served from that moment forward and does nothing about what was already read. Every instance that was reachable before the restart therefore has to be treated as having leaked the message content and the credentials the packet places in that dump, with those credentials rotated inside the same SLA rather than as a later follow-up — patching an information-disclosure flaw is not a containment step. Distinguishing test: for each TM SGNL instance, measure elapsed time from the KEV listing to the fixed build running post-restart, and check whether the remediation record carries a rotation decision for the credentials that were resident in the process heap. A vulnerability-management programme that closes the ticket at patch deployment reports this entry as remediated while the disclosed credentials remain usable.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-01, active_exploitation 'confirmed', poc_available true, CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77. patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' The vector places 'a password previously sent over HTTP' inside the dump, and the attack_vector describes 'disclosing memory contents including plaintext messages and credentials from the TeleMessage server' (CWE-528).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-48927": {
     "name": "TeleMessage TM SGNL Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default Vulnerability",
@@ -25291,7 +25674,31 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-129",
+        "name": "ENTERPRISE-ERP-MANAGEMENT-FUNCTION-AUTHENTICATION",
+        "description": "/heapdump is a framework diagnostic function, not part of the archiving product's user-facing surface, and the packet puts the defect exactly there: TM SGNL ships with the Spring Boot Actuator configured so the heap-dump endpoint is exposed at a /heapdump URI, and an unauthenticated caller retrieves a heap dump containing plaintext messages and credentials. Bound to this deployment, the control means each Actuator management endpoint on the TM SGNL server authorizes its own caller before the function runs rather than inheriting reachability from the shipped default; that every diagnostic endpoint with no operational need — the heap-dump path first — is turned off rather than merely fronted; and that the management surface is segmented so a caller from an untrusted network cannot present the request at all. The least-privilege gap cited against this entry does not touch this path: the attacker never authenticates as any TM SGNL user, so per-account privilege scoping is never consulted and an access-review attestation passes cleanly while the endpoint answers anyone who can route to it. Two preconditions have to be stated rather than assumed. First, the configuration-side fix requires the operator to control the instance's Actuator endpoint-exposure settings; on a vendor-hosted or vendor-managed instance that lever belongs to the vendor, and the operator's only available actions are written confirmation that the endpoint is closed plus the network restriction below. Second, a reverse-proxy or WAF rule that blocks the /heapdump path constrains only requests that traverse the proxy — it does nothing for a caller that reaches the application's listener directly, so the restriction must be enforced at the listener bind address or by a host/network ACL, not at a filtering layer that can be routed around. Neither measure evicts an attacker who already pulled a dump: the messages and credentials inside it stay readable and valid until rotated. Distinguishing test: from a segment with no operational need for TM SGNL diagnostics, request /heapdump unauthenticated against a staging instance both through the normal proxy path and directly against the application listener, and confirm both are refused before a dump is generated.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'TeleMessage TM SGNL contains an initialization of a resource with an insecure default vulnerability. This vulnerability relies on how the Spring Boot Actuator is configured with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI.' attack_vector: 'an insecure-default initialization (CWE-1188) that leaves a Spring Boot Actuator diagnostic endpoint (/heapdump) exposed, letting an unauthenticated attacker retrieve a heap dump containing plaintext messages and credentials.' CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-01 with active_exploitation 'confirmed'; CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77; poc_available true. Citing gaps recorded against this entry include AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening (user application hardening), NIST-800-53-AC-6 (least privilege), UK-CAF-B4 (system security) and NIS2-Art21-network-security.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B4",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and live_patch_notes stating that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — so an instance that has taken the fixed build but has not restarted is still running the process whose Actuator configuration exposes /heapdump, and must be counted as exposed rather than remediated. For this entry the control means the fix lands on a KEV-tied clock opened 2025-07-01, with completion measured per instance by the build actually running after restart. What makes the SLA unusual on this entry is that a configuration-side action exists ahead of the vendor build: the packet attributes the exposure to how the Actuator is configured, so removing the endpoint's exposure closes the path immediately on any instance whose configuration the operator controls, and that action belongs on the KEV clock. It is not a reason to defer the patch — a configuration change can be reverted by a redeploy, a template rebuild, or a vendor update that restores the shipped default, and on a vendor-managed instance the operator may not hold that lever at all. Distinguishing test: re-request /heapdump on each instance after the service restart and again after any redeploy or image rebuild, and confirm it is still refused. A vulnerability-management programme that verifies once at patch time will not notice the shipped default returning on the next deployment.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2025-07-01 with active_exploitation 'confirmed'; CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77; poc_available true; patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' The vector attributes the exposure to configuration: 'This vulnerability relies on how the Spring Boot Actuator is configured with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-6543": {
     "name": "Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway Buffer Overflow Vulnerability",
@@ -25675,7 +26082,40 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-145",
+        "name": "ACTIVELY-EXPLOITED-OS-LPE-REMEDIATION-WINDOW-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The packet's vector puts the defect in the Linux kernel's OverlayFS subsystem — a uid-mapping bug in how a user copies a capable file from a nosuid mount into another mount — and says a local user escalates privileges on the system, so the flaw executes below every account boundary the Linux estate is audited on. For this CVE the control means the distribution kernel carrying the fix is driven across the whole affected fleet on the KEV clock that opened 2025-06-17 rather than folded into the next quarterly kernel window, and that completion is measured by the kernel each host is actually running, not by the kernel package version the inventory reports as installed. That distinction is the load-bearing one on Linux: the packet records no live-patch path and a fix that requires a service restart or system reboot, so a host that has installed the fixed kernel package but is still booted on the old image carries the vulnerable OverlayFS code in memory and must be counted as exposed, not as remediated. A patch-compliance report built on installed-package version alone will show this fleet green while every un-rebooted host remains fully exploitable. The control's second half is why the least-privilege gap is cited against this entry: the attacker is already an ordinary local user by the packet's own description, so tightening account privilege, sudo policy or group membership does not contain the escalation to root — a least-privilege attestation passes cleanly while the flaw stays fully exploitable. With a public PoC and confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, the pre-reboot window is contested rather than theoretical, which is what makes the reboot part of the remediation rather than a scheduling detail.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV-listed 2025-06-17 with active_exploitation 'confirmed'; CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77; poc_available true. Vector: 'Linux Kernel contains an improper ownership management vulnerability, where unauthorized access to the execution of the setuid file with capabilities was found in the Linux kernel's OverlayFS subsystem in how a user copies a capable file from a nosuid mount into another mount. This uid mapping bug allows a local user to escalate their privileges on the system.' (CWE-282). patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Citing gaps recorded against this entry include NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-003",
+        "name": "KERNEL-EXPLOITATION-DETECTION",
+        "description": "With no live-patch path and a fix that only takes effect after reboot, every Linux host in the estate runs the vulnerable OverlayFS code until it restarts, and the packet records a public PoC alongside confirmed in-the-wild exploitation — so that window needs telemetry, not only a patch ticket. The auditd or eBPF rule has to key on what the packet says the exploit does rather than on what an exploit tool looks like: a non-root user assembling an overlay mount; a file carrying the setuid bit or file capabilities appearing in the writable upper layer after a copy-up from a nosuid lower mount; and then an execve of that file followed by the process transitioning to uid 0 while its audit login uid remains that of an ordinary user. Those three events are the mandatory emissions of the sequence the vector describes — mount, copy the capable file across, run it — so a rule built on them fires on any implementation of that sequence. Rules built on the usual alternatives do not fire at all here: this path completes successfully and produces no crash, so oops- or segfault-based kernel-exploit heuristics never trigger, and name- or hash-matching a published PoC binary misses a rebuild under any other name, which is the expected form given the packet records PoC availability. Alerting must be measured in seconds and routed as an active-intrusion signal rather than a hygiene finding, because the packet notes LPEs of this class are routinely paired with an initial-access primitive: by the time this rule fires the earlier step has already been missed, and the transition to root is the last observable event before the operator owns the host.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: poc_available true with active_exploitation 'confirmed'; CISA KEV-listed 2025-06-17; CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77. Vector describes 'unauthorized access to the execution of the setuid file with capabilities ... in the Linux kernel's OverlayFS subsystem in how a user copies a capable file from a nosuid mount into another mount. This uid mapping bug allows a local user to escalate their privileges on the system.' attack_vector: 'an improper-ownership-management flaw (CWE-282) in the Linux kernel OverlayFS, exploited by a local user to copy a SUID file across mounts and gain root ... LPEs of this class are routinely paired with an initial-access primitive.' live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes stating no live-patch tool is registered for this entry and that the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. UK-CAF-B4 (system security) is among the citing gaps.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-009",
+        "name": "KERNEL-MODULE-INVENTORY-AND-DISABLE",
+        "description": "The vulnerable code the packet names is the OverlayFS subsystem, so on hosts that do not use it the escalation path can be removed before the reboot the kernel fix requires — that is what this control buys on this CVE, and the precondition has to be stated precisely because it fails on a large share of a modern Linux estate. Where overlay is built as a loadable module and is not currently loaded, blacklisting it in modprobe configuration prevents the autoload that a user's mount attempt would otherwise trigger, and the escalation path is gone for that host. Where overlay is compiled into the kernel image rather than built as a module, a modprobe blacklist has no effect whatsoever, because there is no load to prevent. Where it is already loaded — any host whose container runtime uses an overlay filesystem for image layers, and any host with a live overlay mount — the blacklist changes nothing for the running kernel: the module cannot be unloaded while mounts reference it, and the host would have to reboot to come up without it, which is the same reboot the kernel fix needs, and on those hosts overlay usually cannot be removed at all because the runtime depends on it. Both of those cases fall back to the patch-and-reboot path plus kernel-escalation detection, and the blacklist must not be recorded as their mitigation. Verify per host rather than per policy: check the loaded-module list and the kernel's registered-filesystem list for overlay, and enumerate active overlay mounts. A non-empty result in any of the three means this control does not apply to that host — recording a fleet-wide blacklist as deployed would credit a mitigation that never took effect on exactly the hosts most likely to be running untrusted local workloads.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector locates the flaw 'in the Linux kernel's OverlayFS subsystem in how a user copies a capable file from a nosuid mount into another mount', with 'a local user' escalating privileges on the system (CWE-282). CISA KEV-listed 2025-06-17, active_exploitation 'confirmed', poc_available true, CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77. patch_available true; live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes 'No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' — that reboot requirement is what creates the window this least-functionality control covers. UK-CAF-B4 (system security) is among the citing gaps.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2023-33538": {
     "name": "TP-Link Multiple Routers Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -25735,7 +26175,30 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-030",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-DEVICE-ZERODAY-SLA-TIER",
+        "description": "On the small sites these units serve, the router is the trust boundary itself, and the packet's flaw is unauthenticated command execution reached through the /userRpm/WlanNetworkRpm component on the device's own web management surface — so the device that would enforce any network-layer control is the thing running the attacker's command. Scope the tier to the revisions the packet names and no further: TL-WR940N V2/V4, TL-WR841N V8/V10, TL-WR740N V1/V2. Nothing in the packet ties this component to other TP-Link models, so widening it to the vendor's line manufactures replacement work against hardware no evidence implicates. The tier requirement for this entry: firmware for the affected revision is deployed on the clock that opened with the 2025-06-16 KEV listing, not on the branch- or home-equipment cadence these devices normally sit on, and until it is, reachability of the HTTP management surface is the only lever an operator holds — the exploit needs nothing except the ability to put a request on that path, since the attacker never authenticates. Two preconditions have to be stated or the isolation gets recorded as the mitigation: restricting reach bounds who can send the request but leaves the vulnerable handler intact, and on a device whose LAN side is where its own users sit, \"internal only\" is a statement about topology rather than a demonstration that the surface is unreachable. It also does nothing for a unit already executing attacker commands. The distinguishing test: from every segment the device serves and from an external address, attempt to load its HTTP management surface — anything that answers is within reach of the published exploit. One caveat the packet forces: it records patch_available true while also stating the impacted products could be end-of-life and/or end-of-service with CISA advising users discontinue product utilization, so the per-revision support status decides whether fixed firmware exists for a given unit at all, and a revision for which it does not is replaced rather than carried forward on a patch report.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2023-33538 (TP-Link Multiple Routers Command Injection Vulnerability): cwe_refs CWE-77; cisa_kev true, kev_date 2025-06-16; active_exploitation confirmed; cvss 9.8; rwep_score 77; poc_available true; patch_available true; live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes \"No live-patch tool registered for this entry at bulk-import time. Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.\" Vector: \"TP-Link TL-WR940N V2/V4, TL-WR841N V8/V10, and TL-WR740N V1/V2 contain a command injection vulnerability via the component /userRpm/WlanNetworkRpm. The impacted products could be end-of-life (EoL) and/or end-of-service (EoS). Users should discontinue product utilization.\" attack_vector: \"a command-injection flaw (CWE-77) enabling unauthenticated remote command execution on the router.\" Citing gaps recorded on the entry include AU-Essential-8-Patch, ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8, NIST-800-53-SI-2, NIST-800-53-AC-6, UK-CAF-B4, NIS2-Art21-network-security.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "Applied to these routers: exploitation is confirmed in the wild and a PoC is public for a path that reaches command execution with no credential at all, so a TL-WR940N, TL-WR841N or TL-WR740N unit that was reachable on /userRpm/WlanNetworkRpm before its firmware was updated cannot be returned to service on the strength of a version string. The runbook for such a unit defaults to capturing the running configuration as evidence first, flashing the fixed firmware from vendor media rather than upgrading in place from the running system, re-entering settings by hand instead of restoring a backup taken after the exposure window opened, and rotating everything the device held — the administrative credential, the wireless pre-shared key, and any credential reused on it. The limit is the point of the control: the firmware update closes the injection path, it does not undo a configuration change made through that path, so the operator still has to diff the items command execution can reach — administrative accounts, DNS settings, forwarding rules — against a known-good record, and a configuration restore from the exposure window reinstates exactly those changes under the fixed firmware. The cited least-privilege gap stays open in both directions on this path and no operator-side account scoping closes it: the attacker never authenticates, so no per-account privilege decision is ever consulted, and an attestation that every router administrator holds a scoped account passes cleanly while the unauthenticated path runs.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for CVE-2023-33538: active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; cvss 9.8; rwep_score 77; cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-06-16. attack_vector: \"a command-injection flaw (CWE-77) enabling unauthenticated remote command execution on the router.\" Vector names the affected revisions TL-WR940N V2/V4, TL-WR841N V8/V10, TL-WR740N V1/V2 and the component /userRpm/WlanNetworkRpm. patch_available true; live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes recording no registered live-patch tool and a vendor patch that typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) and UK-CAF-B4 (System security) are both recorded as citing gaps on the entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-43200": {
     "name": "Apple Multiple Products Unspecified Vulnerability (variant: CVE-2025-43200)",
@@ -26383,7 +26846,32 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-126",
+        "name": "MOBILE-OS-MINIMUM-PATCH-LEVEL-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The defect is a use-after-free in the Qualcomm Adreno GPU driver, and the packet records the trigger as memory corruption while rendering graphics using Adreno GPU drivers in Chrome, with the attack path a local foothold escalating privilege on the device. That combination is what makes the access-condition half of this control the load-bearing half: the operator cannot patch the driver directly, because the fixed driver code reaches a device only inside the build its hardware vendor ships for that chipset. The fixed build therefore has to act as a condition of access — organizational mail, VPN and document access denied to any device below it — rather than as a row on a patch-compliance dashboard. Scope it to the population the packet establishes: devices carrying the affected Qualcomm chipsets and the Adreno GPU driver. The packet ties the flaw to that driver and provides no mapping into other GPU stacks or renderers, so extending this to every graphics-accelerated endpoint in the estate would manufacture findings and denial-of-access work against hardware no evidence implicates. Distinguishing test: enrol a device pinned below the fixed build and confirm the policy actually refuses it access to protected resources — an estate that surfaces the stale build on a report while the device keeps its mail and VPN has recorded the exposure rather than removed it. Preconditions, stated: a device whose hardware vendor has not shipped a build containing this fix cannot be remediated by this control at all, and for those units the remaining levers are constraining what code the device is permitted to run, withholding organizational data from it, and — where no fixed build is coming — replacement. Restricting what runs on a device also does not evict code already resident on one, so a device suspected of already holding the local foothold the packet describes belongs on the incident path, not the policy path. And because the packet records no live-patch path and a fix requiring service restart or system reboot, a device that has downloaded the vendor build but not restarted is still running the vulnerable driver.",
+        "evidence": "Packet facts: CWE-416 use-after-free affecting multiple Qualcomm chipsets; the recorded vector is memory corruption while rendering graphics using Adreno GPU drivers in Chrome, and the recorded attack path is a local foothold escalating privilege on the device, with the packet noting that LPEs of this class are routinely paired with an initial-access primitive. CISA KEV-listed 2025-06-03, active_exploitation=confirmed, poc_available=true, CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77. patch_available=true, live_patch_available=false, with the note that the vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. Citing gaps include ASD Essential Eight 'Patch operating systems', ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.8, NIST SP 800-53 SI-2 and UK CAF B4.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "For this CVE the KEV clock that opened 2025-06-03 runs against a fix the operator does not publish: the Adreno driver correction arrives inside a device-vendor build, so the SLA has to be written as 'fixed build installed and the device restarted, or a recorded time-bounded access restriction for that device', with the clock starting at the KEV listing or at availability of the build for that device model, whichever is later. Measuring the SLA as 'patches approved' or 'update pushed' is vacuous on this path, because the packet records no live-patch path and a fix requiring restart or reboot — a device that has taken the update and not restarted is still running the vulnerable driver and must be counted against the SLA as exposed. The state that has to be reported distinctly, rather than folded into a pass, is the device that is inside the window with no fixed build available for its model: that is not a deferral, it is an unremediated device, and the only lever left is the access restriction, which bounds what the device can reach and does not repair the driver.",
+        "evidence": "Packet facts: CISA KEV-listed 2025-06-03 with active_exploitation=confirmed and poc_available=true; CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77; CWE-416 in the Qualcomm Adreno GPU driver. patch_available=true, live_patch_available=false, with the recorded note 'Vendor patch typically requires service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.' Citing gaps include ASD Essential Eight 'Patch operating systems', NIST SP 800-53 SI-2 and EU NIS2 Art.21 vulnerability handling and disclosure.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2021-32030": {
     "name": "ASUS Routers Improper Authentication Vulnerability",
@@ -26563,7 +27051,31 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The primitive the packet records is a write, not a read: an unauthenticated client introduces arbitrary values — the packet names PHP code — into a known local file location on the Craft CMS server. That is the distinction this control exists for, because the vendor update repairs the parameter-handling path and reverts nothing already written through it. Applied to this product: any internet-reachable Craft install that was serving before the fixed release landed is triaged as a possibly-compromised host rather than closed out on the upgrade — the deployed tree is compared against the source of record for files the web server can execute but that no deployment put there, and the credentials and keys that install held are rotated. The packet also records this flaw as chainable with CVE-2024-58136 (as represented by CVE-2025-32432), so the exposure to assess is the chain's outcome on the host, not a single tampered parameter. Precondition, and it is the load-bearing one: this comparison only decides anything if the operator holds a reference the install can be diffed against — a version-controlled deployment or a known-good image from before the exposure window. A Craft install whose web root has been edited in place over its life has no such reference; inspection cannot clear it, and redeployment from the source of record is the remaining option rather than an optional stronger step. Distinguishing test: after upgrading a formerly exposed install, diff the deployed tree against the source of record and confirm no unaccounted PHP file — a flaw-remediation attestation recording that Craft was upgraded to the fixed release reads clean over a file written before the upgrade.",
+        "evidence": "The packet's vector states that the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated client to introduce arbitrary values, such as PHP code, to a known local file location on the server, and that it could be chained with CVE-2024-58136 as represented by CVE-2025-32432 (CWE-472). active_exploitation is confirmed and poc_available is true; the entry is CISA KEV-listed 2025-06-02 with CVSS 8.8 and RWEP 77. patch_available is true and live_patch_available is false, with live_patch_notes recording that no live-patch tool is registered for this entry and that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "A CVSS 8.8 web-application flaw normally enters a routine application-patch queue, but the packet pairs it with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and a public PoC against a path that needs no credential — which is the condition the compressed clock exists for. For Craft CMS the control means the fixed release is driven across every Craft install the organization operates, on the clock that opened with the 2025-06-02 KEV listing, and completion is measured by each site reporting the fixed Craft version rather than by 'update scheduled' on a release board. The installs that decide the outcome are the ones an application inventory tends not to hold — sites standing up under an agency or contractor deployment — because a copy nobody is tracking keeps serving the unauthenticated write path on the same schedule as one that is. The packet registers no live-patch path and notes the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, so a site whose files carry the fixed release but whose service has not been cycled is counted as exposed, not as remediated. Precondition on any interim measure: the packet records no vendor workaround or compensating mitigation for this flaw, so anything an operator puts in front of a site that cannot take the update inside the window — restricted reachability, a maintenance page, a filtering layer — is unvalidated against this specific parameter and reduces exposure rather than removing it; the site is still counted against the SLA until it reports the fixed version.",
+        "evidence": "CISA KEV-listed 2025-06-02 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; CVSS 8.8, RWEP 77. The vector describes an unauthenticated client introducing arbitrary values, such as PHP code, to a known local file location on the server. patch_available is true; live_patch_available is false, and live_patch_notes records that no live-patch tool is registered for this entry and that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction. The packet records no vendor-supplied workaround or compensating mitigation for this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-56145": {
     "name": "Craft CMS Code Injection Vulnerability (variant: CVE-2024-56145)",
@@ -27317,7 +27829,32 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-030",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-DEVICE-ZERODAY-SLA-TIER",
+        "description": "The packet puts remote code or command execution behind a crafted HTTP request to four named Fortinet appliances — FortiFone, FortiVoice, FortiNDR and FortiMail — with no credential and no user interaction anywhere in the path, so the appliance's own request-handling surface is what fails. That is the tier's premise, and it is why the standard 14/30-day appliance-patch window does not apply here: the fixed firmware has to be driven across every affected unit of those four product families on the clock that opened with the 2025-05-14 KEV listing. The packet registers no live-patch path and notes the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction, so completion is measured per unit as 'running the fixed build and restarted since', not as 'image pushed' or 'update approved' in a management console — a unit that has staged the firmware without restarting is still executing the vulnerable code. The tier's alternative branch, isolating the vulnerable interface, carries a precondition that must be stated rather than assumed: the packet says 'crafted HTTP requests' without distinguishing an administrative interface from a user-facing web surface, so any reachability restriction has to cover every HTTP listener each unit exposes, and on a unit that must answer HTTP from untrusted networks to perform its function isolation is not available at all — for those, the update plus the restart is the only path and no interim control substitutes for it. Distinguishing test: query each affected unit directly for its running firmware and its uptime since the update, rather than accepting a fleet report that lists the four product families as patched to policy.",
+        "evidence": "The packet's vector: 'Fortinet FortiFone, FortiVoice, FortiNDR and FortiMail contain a stack-based overflow vulnerability that may allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code or commands via crafted HTTP requests' (CWE-124). CISA KEV-listed 2025-05-14 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77. patch_available is true; live_patch_available is false, with live_patch_notes recording that no live-patch tool is registered for this entry and that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "Exploitation is confirmed and a PoC is public, so on these four Fortinet products the question the firmware update does not answer is what executed before it landed. The packet's outcome is arbitrary code or command execution on the appliance by a caller who never authenticated, which means anything left behind — an added administrative account, an altered configuration, a placed file — survives an in-place upgrade, because the upgrade replaces the vulnerable code and not the unit's configuration and stored state. For any FortiFone, FortiVoice, FortiNDR or FortiMail unit whose HTTP surface was reachable from an untrusted network between the 2025-05-14 KEV listing and its restart on the fixed build, the default response is to export and diff the configuration against a known-good baseline, rebuild the unit from that baseline rather than upgrading in place, and rotate every credential the unit held or that authenticated through it. Precondition, and it decides whether this is usable at all: the diff is only meaningful against a configuration baseline captured before the exposure window, and 'we found nothing on the appliance' is not evidence of anything when the only record of the unauthenticated HTTP requests sits on the same device that the packet says an attacker can execute code on. Where no pre-exposure baseline and no off-box record of what the unit served exist, the honest position is that the unit's state is undecidable and rebuilding is faster than proving it clean — not that the upgrade closed the matter.",
+        "evidence": "The packet's vector records a remote unauthenticated attacker executing arbitrary code or commands via crafted HTTP requests against FortiFone, FortiVoice, FortiNDR and FortiMail (CWE-124, stack-based overflow). active_exploitation is confirmed and poc_available is true; CISA KEV-listed 2025-05-14, CVSS 9.8, RWEP 77. patch_available is true and live_patch_available is false, with live_patch_notes recording that the vendor patch typically requires a service restart or system reboot per the KEV requiredAction — so the fixed build is reached through a restart, and it replaces the vulnerable code rather than the unit's configuration.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-32709": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Use-After-Free Vulnerability",
@@ -28880,7 +29417,34 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-030",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-DEVICE-ZERODAY-SLA-TIER",
+        "description": "CrushFTP is the file-transfer server that faces external counterparties, and the packet's defect is its authentication path failing open: a crafted HTTP Authorization header assumes crushadmin or another known account and hands over administrative control of the server. Nothing is stolen and no privilege is misused first, so the tier's premise holds exactly — a defect in the component that decides who is authenticated on an internet-reachable server does not belong in a standard application-patch window, and the fixed release has to land on the clock that opened with the 2025-04-07 KEV listing rather than at the next scheduled maintenance. The tier's second branch, isolating the vulnerable interface, has a precondition the packet states outright: the takeover grants administrative control unless the instance is fronted by a DMZ proxy instance. That deployment mode bounds this specific path and a directly exposed instance has no such buffer — so it is a per-instance condition to verify, not a control to record once for the product. It also does not hold retroactively: an instance that was directly exposed before a proxy was placed in front of it is an incident to work, not an instance the proxy has protected, and the proxy does not undo an administrative session an attacker already opened. Distinguishing test: enumerate every CrushFTP instance the organization runs and record, per instance, whether it answers HTTP directly from untrusted networks or only through the DMZ proxy instance, and whether it is on the fixed release — a patch-management attestation reporting the product as covered does not distinguish the two deployment shapes, and it is the directly exposed instances that carry the whole exposure.",
+        "evidence": "The packet's vector: a crafted HTTP Authorization header exploits a flaw in the authentication path to bypass authentication and assume the crushadmin (or other known) account, granting administrative control of the file-transfer server (CWE-305). The attack_vector adds that this holds 'unless fronted by a DMZ proxy instance', that it was exploited in the wild March-April 2025, and that the managed-file-transfer class is a proven ransomware/data-extortion initial-access vector (MOVEit lineage). CISA KEV-listed 2025-04-07 with active_exploitation confirmed and poc_available true; CVSS 9.8, RWEP 76. patch_available is true; live_patch_available is false and live_patch_notes is null, so the packet records the vendor update as the remediation and registers no live-patch path.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "PCI-DSS-4.0-6.3.3",
+          "AU-ISM-1546",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security",
+          "DORA-Art-9"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet records exploitation in the wild in March-April 2025 against a flaw that hands an unauthenticated caller the crushadmin account on a server whose purpose is holding and moving files with external counterparties, and it ties this product class to ransomware and data-extortion initial access through the MOVEit lineage. The update repairs the authentication path and reverts nothing done through it while it was open: accounts and permissions added or altered, server and job configuration changed, credentials readable from the administrative surface, and data already copied out. For any instance that answered HTTP from untrusted networks before the fixed release landed, the default is to treat the server as compromised until shown otherwise — diff the current account list and configuration against a copy captured before the exposure window, rotate every account the server holds including counterparty credentials, and scope the data-exposure question across everything the server could reach, because the packet's outcome is administrative control rather than a single file read. Precondition and scope limit: the packet describes administrative takeover, not code execution, so the justification for rebuilding is that the account and configuration state is untrustworthy — not that the binary is. Whether that is decidable turns on holding a pre-exposure configuration baseline and access records kept off the server; where neither exists, redeploying the fixed release onto a known-good configuration is the shorter path, and the absence of alerts is not a substitute for the diff. Distinguishing test: compare the current CrushFTP account list against the pre-exposure baseline and account for every difference.",
+        "evidence": "The packet's vector places the bypass in the authentication path via a crafted HTTP Authorization header, with the attacker assuming crushadmin or another known account and gaining administrative control of the file-transfer server (CWE-305). active_exploitation is confirmed, and the attack_vector records exploitation in the wild March-April 2025 plus the managed-file-transfer class as a proven ransomware/data-extortion initial-access vector (MOVEit lineage); poc_available is true. CISA KEV-listed 2025-04-07; CVSS 9.8, RWEP 76. patch_available is true, live_patch_available is false and live_patch_notes is null — the packet records the vendor update as the remediation, and that update addresses the authentication path rather than any account or configuration change made through it.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "PCI-DSS-4.0-6.3.3",
+          "AU-ISM-1546"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2009-3459": {
     "name": "Adobe Acrobat and Reader Heap-Based Buffer Overflow",
@@ -29123,7 +29687,28 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-144",
+        "name": "EMBEDDED-MEDIA-PARSER-LIBRARY-INVENTORY-AND-PATCH-PARITY",
+        "description": "The packet names the sink as the QuickTime parsing path inside Microsoft DirectShow and dates the fix to MS09-028 in 2009, while the KEV listing is dated 2026-05-20 — and that pairing is the whole finding. The remediation question here is not whether a fix exists but which hosts never received one that has been available for that long. On a real estate those hosts are precisely the ones a monthly update report does not describe: hosts built from an old image and never re-baselined, hosts restored from backup, hosts held offline, and hosts embedded in an appliance or process-control system whose vendor owns the Windows build. The control here means enumerating the hosts on which the DirectShow media stack is present and confirming each reports the MS09-028-fixed state of that component directly, rather than accepting a \"fully patched\" verdict from a scan whose baseline begins at a modern build and never asks about a 2009 bulletin. Scope it to what the packet establishes: the packet ties the CWE-787 sink to Microsoft DirectShow's QuickTime parsing path and provides no mapping from that code into Apple QuickTime Player or any other media application, so instructing operators to inventory and strip every media-handling binary on the estate manufactures findings and real removal work against software no evidence implicates — widen only where a verified source identifies another product carrying the same parser. Distinguishing test: select the hosts least likely to sit in the managed update channel — restored, imaged, appliance-embedded — and verify the DirectShow component's patch state on each directly; an estate whose flaw-remediation attestation reads clean because the scanner only reports on the updates it currently tracks still opens crafted QuickTime media straight into the sink. Precondition: this reaches only hosts the inventory can see and the operator can update. The packet records no live-patch path and states MS09-028 requires a reboot, so a host that has taken the update but not rebooted is not yet remediated, and a host whose build the operator cannot change — a vendor-owned appliance image — is remediated by the vendor or by removing its exposure to attacker-supplied media, not by recording it as patched.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: \"Parsing a maliciously crafted QuickTime media file in Microsoft DirectShow corrupts memory (NULL-byte overwrite class), allowing remote code execution when a user opens the file\"; attack_vector records \"a memory-corruption flaw (CWE-787) in the Windows DirectShow QuickTime parser, exploitable by an attacker-controlled media file for code execution when the victim opens it\". cwe_refs CWE-787. cisa_kev true, kev_date 2026-05-20, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 8.8, rwep_score 70. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"Microsoft patch MS09-028 (2009); requires reboot.\" ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities) and NIST-800-53-SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) are recorded as citing gaps against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The control's \"KEV listing or patch availability, whichever is later\" clause resolves unusually cleanly for this entry: the packet dates the vendor fix to MS09-028 in 2009 and the KEV listing to 2026-05-20, so the clock starts at the listing and there is no patch-development wait to absorb. The entire remediation window is the operator's own discovery-and-reboot time, which turns the SLA from a deployment obligation into a hunt-and-reboot obligation — find the hosts still missing MS09-028 and get them restarted onto the fix inside the clock, and measure completion by the DirectShow component's state on each host after restart rather than by \"update approved\" in a management console. The packet records the fix as reboot-required with no live-patch path, so the restart sits inside the window, not after it. Precondition and honest limit: the clock does not shorten the discovery problem — a host the estate does not know about cannot be counted against it, so this SLA only means anything when it is paired with the direct per-host enumeration this entry's inventory control describes. A host that genuinely cannot be rebooted inside the window — a production-control or vendor-owned appliance host — is a named, dated exception whose exposure to attacker-supplied media is restricted in the interim, not a silently open item. That restriction narrows the delivery path, since the packet requires a user to open the crafted file, but it does not remove the sink: the exception must carry a reboot date, or it is a risk acceptance wearing a mitigation's name.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields for this entry: the vector records remote code execution \"when a user opens the file\" after Microsoft DirectShow parses a maliciously crafted QuickTime media file (CWE-787). cisa_kev true, kev_date 2026-05-20, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 8.8, rwep_score 70. patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"Microsoft patch MS09-028 (2009); requires reboot.\" NIS2-Art21-patch-management (Vulnerability handling and disclosure) is recorded as a citing gap against this entry.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2008-4250": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Buffer Overflow (MS08-067)",
@@ -32443,7 +33028,31 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-056",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ENDPOINT-MDM-ENFORCED-KEV-SLA",
+        "description": "The delivery path in this packet removes every user-side gate: a crafted media file arrives over iMessage and CoreAudio decodes the embedded audio stream with no user interaction, so nothing the device holder does or declines to do changes their exposure, and an update ring that permits holder deferral is itself the exposure window. Push the Apple update carrying the CoreAudio fix across the iOS, iPadOS and macOS estate under declarative device management with deferral disallowed, on a clock started at the 2025-04-17 KEV listing, and measure completion by the build each device reports rather than by the update policy having been assigned. The packet records a vendor update and no live-patch path for this product class, so a device that has downloaded but not completed the update still runs the vulnerable CoreAudio parser and counts as exposed. Precondition: this reaches only devices the management channel actually controls — personal and unenrolled devices carrying organizational mail or messaging sit outside the push, and for those the fixed build has to become a condition of that access instead, because there is no user-behaviour guidance that helps against a path requiring no user interaction.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: vector states CoreAudio \"parses audio streams embedded in media files without adequate bounds checking (CWE-119)\" and that the crafted file is \"reachable with no user interaction via zero-click iMessage delivery\", triggering an out-of-bounds write during audio-stream decoding (network attack vector, no privileges, no UI: CVSS 9.8). CISA KEV 2025-04-17, active_exploitation confirmed, RWEP 81, patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch path for this product class; remediation is the vendor update plus the named compensating controls until it lands.\"",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-121",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ZERO-CLICK-HARDENING",
+        "description": "The packet places this bug inside a chain used in a spyware operation — the CoreAudio out-of-bounds write supplies code execution in the media-processing context and was paired with CVE-2025-31201 to defeat pointer-authentication and escalate toward fuller device compromise — which is a targeted profile rather than opportunistic exploitation. For the cohort plausibly inside that targeting set, the update alone is not fast enough: the packet gives no live-patch path, so every device has to be carried through the vendor update individually. Place that cohort in the platform's reduced-attack-surface mode so message attachments and other untrusted media are not decoded automatically on receipt, which narrows the no-interaction route into the CoreAudio parser during the window between the 2025-04-17 listing and the completed update. The preconditions are the substance of this control, not a footnote. The mode only helps if it was already enabled when the message arrived, so it has to be a standing posture assigned to the high-risk cohort ahead of the next disclosure rather than a response to this one. It constrains automatic decoding only — it does not make the parser unreachable, and a media file the holder deliberately opens from another channel still reaches it. And it evicts nothing already resident: a device suspected of having received this chain belongs on the incident path with the second-stage compromise the packet describes treated as assumed, since enabling the mode afterwards neither removes an implant nor disproves one.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: vector states the out-of-bounds write yields \"the primitive for arbitrary code execution in the media-processing context\" and that \"in observed in-the-wild use it was chained with CVE-2025-31201 (Pointer Authentication / RPAC bypass with arbitrary read-write) to defeat memory-safety mitigations and escalate toward fuller device compromise as part of a sophisticated spyware operation\"; zero-click iMessage delivery with no user interaction; CISA KEV 2025-04-17; active_exploitation confirmed; poc_available true; live_patch_available false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2021-20035": {
     "name": "SonicWall SMA100 Appliances OS Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -33304,7 +33913,32 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-131",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-VPN-GATEWAY-AUTH-BYPASS-EXPEDITED-REMEDIATION",
+        "description": "FortiOS and FortiProxy are the authentication enforcement point for the perimeter, and this defect is that enforcement failing open on a second channel: authentication is enforced on the primary path but not consistently on the Security Fabric (CSF) proxy path served by the Node.js websocket and CSF request handler, so a crafted CSF proxy request is processed with downstream-device super-admin authority. For this CVE the expedited clock runs from the KEV listing of 2025-03-18 through the completed vendor update of every affected FortiGate and FortiProxy unit. The packet records a vendor patch with no live-patch path and states that remediation is the vendor update plus the named compensating controls until it lands, so a unit not yet taken through that update is exposed regardless of how well its administrator accounts are governed. Precondition on the interim measure, stated plainly because it is the part that gets recorded as the mitigation: the packet makes reachability conditional on the Security Fabric being enabled and the HTTP/HTTPS admin interface (or the CSF proxy) being exposed, so the window can be bounded — bounded, not closed — by enumerating which units have Security Fabric enabled and restricting which sources can reach their administrative surfaces. It does not remove the path. A unit that must keep Security Fabric enabled to do its job, and any source already able to route to the admin interface or CSF proxy, still reaches the alternate channel; the packet's only other stated requirement is that the attacker know the upstream and downstream CSF device serial numbers. Distinguishing test: from a segment with no fabric role and no administrative role, attempt to reach the CSF proxy and the HTTP/HTTPS admin interface of a staging unit and confirm both are refused before any request is processed — a patch-compliance report showing the fleet on a supported release says nothing about which of those units still accept CSF proxy requests from arbitrary sources.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-288, authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel, on Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy. A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the FortiGate/FortiProxy management plane and who knows the serial numbers of the upstream and downstream Security Fabric (CSF) devices sends crafted CSF proxy requests over the Node.js websocket and CSF request handler; because authentication is enforced on the primary path but not consistently on this alternate channel, the request is processed with downstream-device super-admin authority. Reachability requires the Security Fabric to be enabled and the HTTP/HTTPS admin interface (or CSF proxy) to be exposed. CISA KEV-listed 2025-03-18, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 8.1, RWEP 59. patch_available true; live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes: \"No live-patch path for this product class; remediation is the vendor update plus the named compensating controls until it lands.\"",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SC-7"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet does not stop at the bypass — it records what the operator does with the super-admin authority it grants: creates persistent admin and SSL-VPN accounts, alters firewall policy, and pivots into the internal network, with exploitation confirmed in the wild. The vendor update undoes none of that. Applied to this device, the control means any FortiGate or FortiProxy unit that met the packet's reachability conditions during the exposure window — Security Fabric enabled and the admin interface or CSF proxy exposed — is handled as a compromised device rather than an unpatched one: export the configuration and diff it against a known-good baseline for administrator and SSL-VPN accounts and policy entries that no change record accounts for, rotate every credential the device holds or terminates, and restore from a verified baseline rather than patching in place. The flaw is an authentication bypass rather than code execution, so the persistence the packet documents is configuration-resident — accounts and policy — which is precisely what a configuration diff and credential rotation address and what a firmware upgrade preserves. Scope limit: this is the response for units whose stated reachability conditions held; a unit where the Security Fabric was never enabled does not meet the packet's precondition for the attack and belongs on the update path, not the rebuild path. The distinguishing test runs against account and policy state, not build number: on a unit already taken through the update, enumerate the administrator and SSL-VPN accounts and the policy table and confirm every entry maps to an authorized change — a fleet reporting the fixed build while carrying an attacker-created super-admin or SSL-VPN account is still under attacker control, and the flaw-remediation attestation reads clean the whole time.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: \"The bypass yields full super-admin on the downstream device, from which the operator creates persistent admin and SSL-VPN accounts, alters firewall policy, and pivots into the internal network.\" Reachability requires the Security Fabric to be enabled and the HTTP/HTTPS admin interface (or CSF proxy) to be exposed. active_exploitation confirmed; CISA KEV-listed 2025-03-18. patch_available true, live_patch_available false — remediation is the vendor update, which changes device code and not device configuration state.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B4",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2025-21590": {
     "name": "Juniper Junos OS Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization Vulnerability",
@@ -34060,7 +34694,40 @@
     },
     "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
     "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
-    "ai_assist_factor": "none"
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-134",
+        "name": "DEVICE-MANAGEMENT-GATEWAY-CONFIG-ENDPOINT-AUTH-INPUT-NEUTRALIZATION",
+        "description": "Ivanti EPM is the endpoint-management server itself, and this defect is an absolute path traversal (CWE-36) that a remote unauthenticated attacker uses to leak sensitive information — the file-read sink is reached before any authentication decision is taken, so the caller's identity is never consulted and no account-side control is in the path. Bound to this product the requirement is twofold: the EPM endpoint must authenticate the caller before it processes the request at all, and it must resolve a caller-supplied path to its canonical absolute form and confirm the result still sits inside the directory the endpoint is meant to serve, before any file handle is opened — rejecting absolute paths outright rather than filtering the request string. Preconditions: that repair lives in the vendor update — the 2024 January-2025 Security Update, or the 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update on the 2022 branch — so this control states the property to verify, it does not implement it. Until the update lands the operator's only lever is reachability: no EPM instance should present that endpoint to a network with no operational need to reach it. That bounds who can send the traversal; it does not close it for anyone who legitimately reaches the console, so it is a compensating restriction with an end date, not a fix. The packet records no live-patch path, so remediation is the vendor update plus those compensating controls until it lands. Distinguishing test: from an unauthenticated client on a staging instance, request an absolute path outside the served directory and confirm refusal before the file is opened.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cwe_refs CWE-36; vector 'Absolute path traversal in Ivanti EPM before the 2024 January-2025 Security Update and 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak sensitive information.' cvss 9.8, poc_available true, active_exploitation confirmed, kev_date 2025-03-10. live_patch_available false with live_patch_notes: 'No live-patch path for this product class; remediation is the vendor update (or, for end-of-life products, decommissioning) plus the named compensating controls until it lands.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "On this entry the fix predates the listing — the packet places the vulnerability in builds before the 2024 January-2025 Security Update and the 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update, while CISA listed on 2025-03-10 with a due date of 2025-03-31 — so the control's 'whichever is later' clock runs from the KEV listing, and the operator-visible question is what happens in the 21 days the KEV due date permits and the framework patch cadences permit on top of that. The packet's facts do not survive that window: a remote, unauthenticated, CVSS 9.8 disclosure flaw on a fleet-management server, with a public PoC and confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, needs no target-specific reconnaissance to fire. For this CVE the requirement is that the January-2025 Security Update (or 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update) is deployed within 4 hours of the 2025-03-10 listing, or that the reachability restriction is recorded as an active compensating mitigation with a bounded end date rather than as SLA compliance. Precondition on the measurement: 'deployed' means each EPM server's own reported version, not an approved or downloaded state in the update console — the packet gives no live-patch path, so nothing is remediated until the server is actually running the updated build.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: kev_date 2025-03-10, with attack_vector recording 'CISA KEV-listed 2025-03-10 (due 2025-03-31) with confirmed in-the-wild exploitation.' The vector places the fix in the 2024 January-2025 Security Update and the 2022 SU6 January-2025 Security Update. cvss 9.8, poc_available true, patch_available true, live_patch_available false, active_exploitation confirmed.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-037",
+        "name": "FLEET-COMPROMISE-IR-PLAYBOOK",
+        "description": "EPM administers the endpoint fleet, and the outcome the packet records is disclosure: an unauthenticated remote attacker leaking sensitive information off that server, with exploitation confirmed in the wild and a public PoC. Patching a disclosure flaw does not un-disclose it — an instance that was reachable and below the January-2025 Security Update during the exposure window has to be handled as having returned whatever an arbitrary-file read from that host would return, which on a fleet-management server is service-account and configuration material the rest of the estate trusts. The playbook for this product: enumerate what the EPM service account and the server's on-disk configuration can reach, rotate the secrets held there, and review agent and policy changes pushed through the console during the window — all before the vulnerability ticket closes. Preconditions and limits: the packet does not enumerate which files the traversal returns, so the rotation scope is derived from what the host holds rather than from confirmed exfiltration; and the packet records information disclosure with no code-execution outcome, so this is a disclosure-scoped response — credential rotation and change review are warranted, a rebuild is not implied by these facts alone. The playbook is also bounded by exposure evidence: an instance you cannot show was unreachable during the window is in scope by default.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: vector states 'a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak sensitive information'; active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cisa_kev true with kev_date 2025-03-10, rwep_score 73. The packet enumerates no specific files returned by the traversal and records no code-execution impact.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-13159": {
     "name": "Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) Absolute Path Traversal Vulnerability (GetHashForWildcardRecursive)",
@@ -37333,7 +38000,32 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Patch-operating-system control is necessarily reactive to a pre-disclosure zero-day exploitation window."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-145",
+        "name": "ACTIVELY-EXPLOITED-OS-LPE-REMEDIATION-WINDOW-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "CLFS is a kernel-mode driver of Windows itself, so the heap overflow the packet describes executes below every account boundary the endpoint estate is audited on: the attacker begins as a low-privileged local user who is legitimately entitled to be on the host and ends as SYSTEM. That is why AC-6 and UK-CAF-B2 are recorded as insufficient against this entry — constraining what the user's account may do never contains an escalation that does not consult the account model, and a least-privilege or identity-and-access attestation reads clean while the path stays fully open. The enforceable lever is the remediation window: drive the Windows update carrying the CLFS fix across the whole affected fleet on the clock that opened with the 2024-12-10 KEV listing rather than folding it into the next monthly rollup, and measure completion by each host's installed build rather than by \"approved\" or \"downloaded\" in the management console. The packet records a vendor patch and no live-patch path, so the fix does not reach the driver already resident in a running kernel — a host on which the update is pending completion still runs the vulnerable CLFS driver and counts as exposed, not remediated. Sequence the fleet by where a low-privileged foothold is most likely to already exist: the packet describes this escalation as a step commonly taken before ransomware deployment, so ordinary user endpoints where initial-access payloads land are the priority, not only servers.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CWE-122 heap-based buffer overflow in the Windows CLFS driver. attack_vector: \"A local attacker with low privileges triggers a heap-based buffer overflow in the CLFS kernel driver via crafted log-file structures, escalating to SYSTEM privileges — commonly used as a precursor step before ransomware deployment.\" CISA KEV 2024-12-10, active_exploitation confirmed, RWEP 81, CVSS 7.8, patch_available true, live_patch_available false. Citing gaps include NIST-800-53-AC-6 (Least Privilege) and UK-CAF-B2 (Identity and access control).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-003",
+        "name": "KERNEL-EXPLOITATION-DETECTION",
+        "description": "Because the escalation runs inside a kernel driver and never consults the account model, the transition itself is the only place it becomes visible — and the packet states precisely what an exploit doing this emits: a low-privileged local process driving the CLFS logging path with crafted log structures, and then that process or its lineage acting with SYSTEM authority. Build the rule on that pairing: CLFS log creation or manipulation by a process running as an ordinary user, followed within a short window by a SYSTEM-authority token on that process or a SYSTEM-integrity child in the same lineage. Explicitly do not key it on the driver or host faulting — a working exploit corrupts the heap without crashing, so a crash-derived rule is blind on exactly the runs that succeed — and do not key it on the name or hash of a known tool, because the packet records a public proof-of-concept and a recompiled binary defeats that on the first attempt. Distinguishing test: detonate the available proof-of-concept on an instrumented staging host and confirm the rule fires on the log-manipulation-then-SYSTEM sequence, rather than confirming only that kernel telemetry is being collected. Preconditions: this detects, it does not prevent — the escalation completes, and the value is the dwell time removed before the ransomware step the packet names; and the alert must leave the host, because a process that has just reached SYSTEM can stop a local agent and clear a local log, so a rule whose only evidence stays on the compromised endpoint is silent at the moment it fires.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: attack_vector describes a low-privileged local attacker triggering the CLFS heap overflow \"via crafted log-file structures, escalating to SYSTEM privileges — commonly used as a precursor step before ransomware deployment\"; poc_available true; active_exploitation confirmed; CISA KEV 2024-12-10; CWE-122.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-6",
+          "UK-CAF-B2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-51378": {
     "name": "CyberPanel Incorrect Default Permissions Vulnerability",
@@ -37908,7 +38600,30 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Least-privilege wasn't enforced at the Expedition database layer, which stored recoverable firewall credentials and API keys reachable via a single unauthenticated SQLi."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "Expedition is not itself a firewall, but the packet has its database holding PAN-OS password hashes, usernames, device configurations and device API keys — so an unauthenticated SQL-injection read against Expedition hands over the credentials to the perimeter, not merely to Expedition. The vendor update stops further extraction and does nothing about material already extracted, which is why patch-in-place is the wrong default here. Applied to this product: every PAN-OS credential and every device API key the instance held is treated as disclosed and rotated on the firewalls themselves, and the Expedition host is rebuilt rather than patched in place — the same flaw lets the attacker create arbitrary files on the Expedition system, and a file written before the update survives it. Scope the rotation to every device whose configuration was ever imported into that instance rather than to the current project only, because the packet describes disclosure of the database contents rather than of one record; where the import history cannot be reconstructed, the rotation scope is the whole estate the instance was ever used for. Precondition on the sequencing: rotating firewall credentials while the Expedition host is still standing and unrebuilt re-exposes the new material the moment the estate is re-imported, so rebuild precedes re-import. patch_available is true and no live-patch path is registered for this entry, so the instance goes through the vendor update — but an estate with rotated credentials and an unrebuilt Expedition host is half-remediated, not remediated.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: Palo Alto Networks Expedition SQL Injection Vulnerability, CWE-89, CISA KEV-listed 2024-11-14, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 9.1, RWEP 66, poc_available true. Vector: 'An SQL injection vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks Expedition allows an unauthenticated attacker to reveal Expedition database contents, such as password hashes, usernames, device configurations, and device API keys. With this, attackers can also create and read arbitrary files on the Expedition system.' The attack_vector identifies the dumped hashes as PAN-OS firewall password hashes and the keys as device API keys. patch_available is true; live_patch_available is false with no live-patch entry recorded for this CVE.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "UK-CAF-B2",
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-046",
+        "name": "PEN-TEST-SCOPE-INCLUDES-SECURITY-PRODUCTS",
+        "description": "Expedition is a security vendor's own product and, on the packet's description of what its database holds, it functions as a credential store for the firewall estate — the category this control says must be attacked rather than assumed to be a defense. The defect is a pre-authentication SQL injection in its web application: the single most-tested class of web finding, reachable by anyone who can route to the interface, sitting in a product that testing programs routinely classify as tooling and leave out of scope. For this CVE the control means the Expedition web application is named explicitly in test and red-team scope with its unauthenticated request surface in scope, and that the PCI-DSS software-engineering requirement cited against this entry is read for what it covers — the entity's own bespoke code. Expedition is purchased software, so no secure-coding attestation the operator signs ever inspects the query carrying this injection, and the requirement can be fully met while this path stays open. Distinguishing test: direct the same unauthenticated injection testing the programme applies to its bespoke applications at a staging Expedition instance; if the scope document contains no line item under which that test could be authorized, the product has been treated as a defense rather than as attack surface. Precondition and limit: this control changes when the operator finds such a defect, not whether it exists — it produces no remediation on its own, and the vendor update plus the credential rotation and host rebuild remain the remediation for this CVE.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: Palo Alto Networks Expedition SQL Injection Vulnerability, CWE-89, CISA KEV-listed 2024-11-14, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 9.1, RWEP 66, poc_available true. The vector states the attacker is unauthenticated and that the injection reveals Expedition database contents including password hashes, usernames, device configurations and device API keys, and permits creating and reading arbitrary files on the Expedition system — a security-vendor product holding the estate's privileged material. The citing gap PCI-DSS-4.0-6.2.4 is recorded in the packet as 'Software engineering techniques or other methods are defined and used by personnel to prevent or mitigate common software attacks'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "PCI-DSS-4.0-6.2.4",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-9463": {
     "name": "Palo Alto Networks Expedition OS Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -38799,7 +39514,32 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Authenticator-management guidance assumes operator-issued credentials that can be rotated; a compiled-in credential cannot be rotated by the operator at all."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-124",
+        "name": "FRAMEWORK-DEFAULT-SECRET-DETECTION",
+        "description": "SolarWinds Web Help Desk ships a developer login credential compiled into the application rather than read from configuration, so the authenticator an attacker needs comes out of the product itself and is identical on every install — the packet records it being recovered by decompilation. That is precisely why the identity controls cited against this entry cannot reduce the exposure: the account does not exist in the operator's account store, so account-management review, authenticator-strength policy and identity-assurance requirements never examine it, and no password rotation, MFA rollout or joiner-mover-leaver process an operator runs touches it. Gate the instance on the absence of that shipped authenticator instead: after applying the vendor update, attempt authentication to the WHD instance with the built-in credential and require refusal before the instance returns to service; then re-run the same check after any restore-from-image, template clone or appliance rebuild, since those are the operations that quietly reinstate a pre-update build on a host that had already been remediated. Preconditions: the check proves only that this one shipped credential is closed, on the instance you actually tested — it says nothing about other secrets embedded in the same build, and it cannot be run against an instance whose version you cannot establish. And because exploitation is confirmed and the credential grants read and write over help-desk ticket data, an instance that was reachable before the update also needs its ticket contents treated as disclosed — the packet notes tickets carrying reset passwords — rather than closed on the update alone.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cwe_refs CWE-798; attack_vector states WHD 'ships with a developer login credential hardcoded directly into application code rather than pulled from configuration; any remote attacker who knows the credential (recovered via decompilation, as Horizon3.ai did) can authenticate and read or modify all help-desk ticket data, including tickets carrying reset passwords.' vector: 'allowing remote unauthenticated user to access internal functionality and modify data.' cvss 9.1, poc_available true, active_exploitation confirmed, kev_date 2024-10-15, patch_available true; live_patch_notes is null, so the packet records no live-patch path and no reboot detail.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-2",
+          "NIST-800-63B-rev4",
+          "UK-CAF-B2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "Exposure on this entry is not gated on any target-specific work. The credential is a constant inside the shipped binary, so once it is recovered from any one copy — the packet records exactly that, by decompilation — every unpatched, reachable Web Help Desk instance is authenticable by anyone holding it: no brute force, no user interaction, no phishing step. The attacker also arrives as a valid built-in account, so the instance's authentication log records a successful login rather than a failure, and volumetric or lockout-based signals have nothing to fire on. A vulnerability-management cadence that schedules a 9.1 application flaw into the next maintenance window is therefore counting a window whose only precondition is reachability. The requirement for this CVE: the vendor update deployed within 4 hours of the 2024-10-15 KEV listing, or the WHD web surface withdrawn from any network the operator cannot vouch for until it is — with that withdrawal recorded as an active compensating mitigation carrying an end date, not as SLA compliance. Precondition on the interim step: restricting reachability bounds who can present the credential, it does not invalidate the credential, so anyone who still legitimately reaches the instance retains the path until the update is applied.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: cisa_kev true with kev_date 2024-10-15, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, cvss 9.1, rwep_score 70, patch_available true. attack_vector records the credential as hardcoded in application code and recovered via decompilation (Horizon3.ai), and the vector records access by a 'remote unauthenticated user to access internal functionality and modify data.' live_patch_notes is null.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "AU-ISM-1546"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-9380": {
     "name": "Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) OS Command Injection Vulnerability",
@@ -41146,7 +41886,31 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Malicious-code protection leans on SmartScreen/Protected View reputation checks that this bypass specifically defeats, so SI-3 controls that assume MotW is enforced are silently undermined."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-041",
+        "name": "PROTECTION-MECHANISM-FAILURE-CLASS-REGRESSION",
+        "description": "This CVE is the protection mechanism itself failing rather than a flaw in what it protects: the packet's path stages a payload on a WebDAV share and lures the user into copy-pasting it locally, and because the copied file lacks Mark-of-the-Web, opening it skips SmartScreen and Protected View and runs with no reputation check. Nothing about the file's content differs — only its origin metadata. For a Windows estate the control means the MOTW/SmartScreen class gets a standing regression battery re-run on every Windows update rather than a one-off check closed with this CVE's ticket: stage a benign marker file on a WebDAV share, bring it to a managed workstation by exactly the copy-paste path the packet describes, and confirm the resulting local file carries the zone marking and that opening it triggers the reputation check. The EDR half of the battery matters as much, because the packet's behaviour is quiet: a rule keyed on a suppressed SmartScreen prompt, a blocked-execution event, or a known tool signature will never fire here — there is no prompt to suppress and no unusual tooling, just an ordinary copy and an ordinary open. The signal that matches what the packet documents is the pairing of an outbound WebDAV mount to a host outside the estate with subsequent execution of a file copied from that mount carrying no zone marking; a battery that does not replay that pairing is validating a synthetic stand-in rather than the real bypass. Precondition: this is a verification control, not a fix — it tells you whether the mechanism holds on the build a host is currently running. The packet gives the vendor update as the remediation with a required reboot, so a host that installed the update but has not restarted must still be tested and counted as exposed.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'Windows Mark of the Web Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability' (CWE-693, Protection Mechanism Failure). Attack path per the packet: an attacker stages a payload on a WebDAV share and lures the user to copy-paste it locally; the copied file lacks Mark-of-the-Web, so opening it skips SmartScreen and Protected View, executing without reputation checks. CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-13, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available false, RWEP 57 / CVSS 6.5. live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes 'No live-patching primitive for this product; the vendor update requires a reboot and is the remediation.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-3",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.7",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-120",
+        "name": "DOWNLOAD-PROVENANCE-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "On a Windows build that has not yet taken the fix, the endpoint will not attach the untrusted-origin marking on this path at all — that omission is the vulnerability — so 'require Mark-of-the-Web' cannot be enforced from inside the endpoint and the enforceable expression of the control moves to the ingress path. The packet's staging path is a WebDAV share the user browses to and copies from, so restrict outbound WebDAV from managed workstations to hosts inside the estate, and route externally-sourced files through the mail-gateway and download paths that do apply and preserve the marking, so the SmartScreen and Protected View decision rests on provenance established at the boundary rather than on metadata the copy silently dropped. Precondition, and it is the load-bearing half: this removes the one staging path the packet documents. It does not cover a file reaching the workstation by another route that also loses the marking, it does not help where the estate legitimately mounts an external share, and it does nothing on a workstation where the copy and the open have already happened — active_exploitation is confirmed, so a host that copied and ran a file from an external WebDAV mount during the exposure window belongs on the incident path rather than on a configuration-change list. The vendor update, with the reboot the packet says it needs, remains the remediation; this is the measure that bounds exposure until the reboot lands. Distinguishing test: from a managed workstation, attempt to mount an external WebDAV share and copy a file from it — if the mount succeeds, the documented delivery path is open no matter what a user-application-hardening attestation says about macro and reputation settings, because those settings are never consulted for a file that arrives unmarked.",
+        "evidence": "Packet attack path: an attacker stages a payload on a WebDAV share and lures the user to copy-paste it locally; the copied file lacks Mark-of-the-Web, so opening it skips SmartScreen and Protected View, executing without reputation checks. Vector: 'Windows Mark of the Web Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability' (CWE-693). patch_available true, live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes 'No live-patching primitive for this product; the vendor update requires a reboot and is the remediation.' CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-13, active_exploitation confirmed, RWEP 57 / CVSS 6.5. Citing gaps include AU Essential Eight user application hardening and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.7 (Protection against malware).",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.7"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-38178": {
     "name": "Microsoft Windows Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability",
@@ -41183,7 +41947,31 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "App-hardening maturity leaves Edge IE mode / legacy WebView enabled by default, keeping the JScript9 engine reachable even on patched systems."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-001",
+        "name": "CISA-KEV-RESPONSE-SLA",
+        "description": "The exploited path needs the victim to be in Edge's Internet Explorer mode, where the JScript9 JIT performs the incorrect type optimization the packet describes; the fix is a Windows update and the packet records that no live-patching primitive exists and that the update requires a reboot to be the remediation. So for this CVE the KEV clock that opened 2024-08-13 runs to completed restart, not to 'update approved' or 'update installed' — a workstation that took the update and has not restarted still loads the vulnerable engine the next time a site opens in IE mode, and must be counted as exposed rather than done. The documented-compensating-control branch this control permits is the only lever for the interval before those restarts land, and for this CVE it is specific: cut the routes into IE mode by pruning the enterprise site list to sites with a current business need and disabling user-initiated reload-in-IE-mode, so attacker-controlled JavaScript arriving through a compromised ad service is rendered by the modern engine instead of JScript9. Precondition: that measure holds only where no legacy application genuinely requires IE mode — for the users who do require it, IE mode stays reachable and they remain exposed until the restart, so they are the population to sequence first rather than the population the site-list change covers. It also evicts nothing: the packet's exploitation outcome is RokRAT deployment, which survives both the site-list change and the update, so a host that browsed in IE mode during the exposure window belongs on the incident path, not on the patch dashboard.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: Microsoft Windows Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability, CWE-843, CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-13, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 7.5, RWEP 59. attack_vector: 'A victim using Edge in Internet Explorer mode loads attacker-controlled JavaScript (delivered via a compromised ad service); the JScript9 JIT performs an incorrect type optimization, producing a type confusion that leads to remote code execution and RokRAT deployment.' patch_available is true, live_patch_available is false, and the packet's live-patch note reads 'No live-patching primitive for this product; the vendor update requires a reboot and is the remediation.' poc_available is false, so exploitation is confirmed with no public exploit from which signature coverage could be derived. The cited AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening gap is recorded as 'User application hardening'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "AU-Essential-8-App-Hardening"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-038",
+        "name": "MITIGATION-ACTIVE-PATCH-PENDING-VERDICT-CLASS",
+        "description": "This entry produces exactly the middle state the control exists to name, and on an endpoint fleet it is the state most hosts occupy for the longest. Constraining IE mode — pruning the enterprise site list, disabling user-initiated reload-in-IE-mode — is a configuration mitigation with the vulnerable JScript9 code still present and still reachable through any site the list continues to admit; and because the packet's update requires a reboot, a host that has installed but not restarted is likewise mitigated-at-best rather than fixed. Both states have to appear in the compliance record as time-bound compensating states rather than as remediation. For this CVE that means the fleet report separates three populations: hosts on the fixed build and restarted, hosts updated and awaiting restart, and hosts still on the pre-fix build with IE mode constrained — the last two carrying dated action items. Distinguishing test: take a host the report marks compliant, confirm it has actually restarted since the update landed, then open a site the enterprise site list still routes to IE mode and confirm which engine renders it. A report that cannot separate the three states will show a fleet at full compliance while an ordinary reboot deferral leaves the type-confusion path live behind an ad service the operator does not control.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: Microsoft Windows Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability, CWE-843, CISA KEV-listed 2024-08-13, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 7.5, RWEP 59, poc_available false. patch_available is true with live_patch_available false and the note 'No live-patching primitive for this product; the vendor update requires a reboot and is the remediation' — establishing an installed-but-not-restarted state distinct from remediated. The attack_vector places the vulnerable code in the JScript9 JIT reached through Edge in Internet Explorer mode, which is a configuration-reachable surface, so restricting that reachability is a mitigation with the flawed code still resident. The gaps cited against this entry — ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities), EU NIS2 Art. 21 vulnerability handling, and NIST SP 800-53 SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) — are the process controls whose verdicts collapse these states into one.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-38189": {
     "name": "Microsoft Project Remote Code Execution Vulnerability",
@@ -42629,7 +43417,34 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Access enforcement fails at the endpoint: /getcfg.php returns sensitive account data without authenticating or authorizing the requester."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-122",
+        "name": "EOL-ASSET-DECOMMISSION",
+        "description": "The packet records no fix for this router — the affected DIR-605 hardware revisions are end-of-life/end-of-service and the recorded guidance is to retire and replace — so for this CVE remediation means taking the unit out of service, and every other measure is a holding action that needs a date on it. Applied to this device: each surviving DIR-605 goes onto a dated replacement schedule rather than an open-ended risk acceptance, and until it is pulled its HTTP surface must not be reachable from any position an untrusted party can occupy, because the whole exploit is one unauthenticated POST to /getcfg.php that returns the administrator user name and password in cleartext. Reachability is the entire precondition, and that is also where this control's limit sits: a DIR-605 acting as the gateway for the clients behind it cannot be segmented away from those clients, so a unit in that role is remediated only by replacement — an ACL is not available to it, and recording one is recording a control that does not exist on that path. Because exploitation is confirmed and a public exploit exists, treat the administrator credential the device hands out as already known: any password reused from that router on another system is rotated as part of the decommission rather than after it. The distinguishing test: from every segment that can route to the device, send an unauthenticated POST to /getcfg.php and see whether credentials come back — a vulnerability record that reads 'no patch available, risk accepted' with no removal date leaves a KEV-listed no-fix router in service indefinitely.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records patch_available: false and live_patch_available: false, with live_patch_notes 'No fix available — affected DIR-605 hardware revisions are end-of-life/end-of-service; CISA guidance is to retire and replace.' Attack path per the packet: an unauthenticated attacker forges a POST request to /getcfg.php requesting the device account service; the router returns the administrator credentials in cleartext, which are then reused to take over the device. Weakness CWE-863; product D-LINK-DIR-605 B2 Firmware Version 2.01MT. CISA KEV-listed 2024-05-16, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 79 / CVSS 7.5.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-AC-3",
+          "NIST-800-53-SC-7",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-127",
+        "name": "UNSUPPORTED-NETWORK-DEVICE-ENUMERATION-AND-RETIREMENT",
+        "description": "A vulnerability-management program keyed on whether a fix is installed has no state to record for this entry, because the packet says no fix exists and the affected DIR-605 revisions are end-of-life/end-of-service. The requirement this CVE demonstrates is that network-attached embedded devices carry an end-of-support date in the asset inventory, so a DIR-605 resolves to a replace-or-formally-decide finding with an owner rather than reappearing every cycle as an unresolvable scanner result. Precondition, and it is the half that decides whether this works: consumer-grade D-Link extender and router hardware of this class normally sits at branch and remote-worker sites that were never enrolled in managed inventory, so an inventory query alone will return nothing and read as clean. Discovery has to be an active sweep for the device's HTTP management surface across every segment the estate reaches, including remote-worker links, repeated after site changes — and the removal decision applies to the DIR-605 units that sweep surfaces, not to embedded devices the packet does not implicate. The distinguishing test: ask the inventory which network-attached devices have an end-of-support date recorded at all; if the field does not exist, the program cannot distinguish 'fix not yet applied' from 'no fix will ever exist', which is the exact state this KEV-listed, actively-exploited router is in.",
+        "evidence": "Packet records patch_available: false with live_patch_notes 'No fix available — affected DIR-605 hardware revisions are end-of-life/end-of-service; CISA guidance is to retire and replace.' The exposed surface is the device's HTTP interface: an unauthenticated forged POST to /getcfg.php returns the administrator user name and password (CWE-863, D-LINK-DIR-605 B2 Firmware Version 2.01MT). CISA KEV-listed 2024-05-16, active_exploitation confirmed, poc_available true, RWEP 79 / CVSS 7.5. Citing gaps include AU-Essential-8-Patch (Patch operating systems) and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities), both of which assume a vendor fix exists.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIS2-Art21-network-security",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2014-100005": {
     "name": "D-Link DIR-600 Router Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Vulnerability",
@@ -43847,7 +44662,32 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Essential-Eight patching targets do not specifically drive perimeter-appliance firmware updates, leaving a years-old ASA/FTD fix unapplied on exposed devices."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-030",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-DEVICE-ZERODAY-SLA-TIER",
+        "description": "The affected asset is a Cisco ASA / FTD unit terminating AnyConnect and WebVPN — a VPN concentrator sitting on the trust boundary — and the packet's primitive is reached with no credential: a crafted GET request carrying an invalid URL to the web services interface returns device memory contents through a buffer-tracking flaw. The isolation alternative this tier normally offers is largely unavailable here, and that is the precondition to state rather than skip: the web services interface carrying AnyConnect and WebVPN is reachable by remote users by design, so \"restrict the vulnerable interface\" means withdrawing remote access, not hardening it, and it is an option only for units whose remote-access population is small enough to source-restrict. What is left is the clock. The packet records a vendor fix and states there is no vendor live-patch mechanism — remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting — so the tier's requirement is that the fixed release and the reload are driven from the 2024-02-15 KEV listing rather than folded into the next maintenance window, and a unit that has taken the image but not reloaded is still running the vulnerable parser and counts as exposed, not as remediated. The packet also scopes the population for the operator: only specific AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations are affected, so the enumeration step is which units run those configurations — an asset inventory that lists ASA/FTD units without that configuration detail cannot say which are in scope. Distinguishing test: for each unit in the affected configuration set, compare the running image against the fixed release and confirm the reload has occurred; an \"update deployed\" entry in the management console is not evidence that the running device stopped serving the vulnerable web services parser.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: a vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco ASA and FTD Software allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to retrieve memory contents; the flaw is a buffer-tracking issue when the software parses invalid URLs requested from the web services interface, exploited by sending a crafted GET request. The packet states the vulnerability affects only specific AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations. CWE-200; CISA KEV-listed 2024-02-15; active_exploitation confirmed; CVSS 7.5; RWEP 60; poc_available false. patch_available true; live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes: \"No vendor live-patch mechanism; remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting.\"",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-vulnerability-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SC-7"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-032",
+        "name": "PERIMETER-COMPROMISE-REBUILD-NOT-PATCH",
+        "description": "The packet's outcome is a read primitive, not code execution: an unauthenticated crafted GET request returns ASA/FTD memory contents, which the packet says can include cleartext VPN credentials later used for ransomware entry. That makes one half of this control load-bearing here and the other inapplicable, and saying which is which matters. The packet documents no implant and no write to the device, so a rebuild is not what this CVE demands; credential rotation is — and it is exactly the step the fixed release does not perform. Applied to these units: every credential that could have been resident in the memory of an affected AnyConnect/WebVPN unit during the exposure window is treated as disclosed and rotated — remote-access VPN user credentials, the upstream directory or RADIUS accounts those users authenticate against, administrator credentials used on the device, and any shared secret the device holds — and the remote-access session and account history is reviewed for logins that used credentials valid before the rotation. Precondition: rotation reaches only credentials the operator can enumerate and change. A credential held by a third party, or embedded in a partner or appliance configuration outside the operator's control, keeps working after the fixed release lands, and that residual belongs in the record rather than assumed closed. The distinguishing test is not on the device: after the fixed release and reload, confirm that remote-access authentication for the affected units rejects the pre-remediation credential set — an identity-and-access attestation showing every VPN user authenticating correctly passes cleanly while an attacker holds a credential that also authenticates correctly.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: \"An unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted GET request with an invalid URL to the ASA/FTD web services interface; a buffer-tracking flaw returns device memory contents, which can include cleartext VPN credentials later used for ransomware entry.\" active_exploitation confirmed; CISA KEV-listed 2024-02-15. patch_available true; live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes: \"No vendor live-patch mechanism; remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting.\" The packet describes retrieval of memory contents only — no code execution, implant, or device write.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2024-21410": {
     "name": "Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2024-21410)",
@@ -46108,7 +46948,32 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Advisory-driven vulnerability management cannot prioritize an unknown zero-day used to leak memory and defeat mitigations like ASLR."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-056",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ENDPOINT-MDM-ENFORCED-KEV-SLA",
+        "description": "For this CVE the control means the iOS, iPadOS, macOS and Safari update carrying the fix is driven across the whole Apple estate on the KEV clock that opened 2023-12-04 with user deferral disabled, and completion measured by each device's running build after the restart the packet says the fix requires — a device that has downloaded the update but not restarted is still executing the vulnerable WebKit and is counted as exposed, not as remediated. The reason this entry needs the compressed tier rather than the estate's ordinary update ring is that its own numbers argue for deferring it: CVSS 6.5 and 'processing web content may disclose sensitive information' read as a medium-severity information leak, while the packet's actual exploitation path is a memory disclosure used to defeat ASLR and stabilise a companion code-execution exploit. The value of the bug to an attacker sits in the chain, not in this CVE's impact score, and the packet records a report of exploitation against versions before iOS 16.7.1. Precondition: management-enforced updates reach only enrolled devices — personally-owned and unenrolled devices that touch organizational data sit outside this control entirely and are covered, if at all, by the access-condition control paired with it here. Enforcement is also forward-looking only: the update does not make clean a device that ran a vulnerable build through the exposure window, and because exploitation is confirmed for this CVE a device with reason to suspect it belongs on the incident path rather than the compliance report.",
+        "evidence": "Packet gives patch_available true, live_patch_available false, with live_patch_notes 'No live patch; requires the iOS/iPadOS/macOS/Safari update (17.1.2 / 14.1.2, backported to 16.7.2) and a device restart.' Vector: 'An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 17.1.2 and iPadOS 17.1.2, macOS Sonoma 14.1.2, Safari 17.1.2. Processing web content may disclose sensitive information. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited against versions of iOS before iOS 16.7.1.' Attack path: crafted web content triggers an out-of-bounds read in WebKit (CWE-125) that leaks process memory, typically used to defeat ASLR and stabilize a companion code-execution exploit. CISA KEV-listed 2023-12-04, active_exploitation confirmed, RWEP 57 / CVSS 6.5, poc_available false.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-126",
+        "name": "MOBILE-OS-MINIMUM-PATCH-LEVEL-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The fixed build has to act as an access condition on this flaw, not as a row on a patch-compliance dashboard: an iPhone, iPad or Mac below 17.1.2 / 14.1.2 — or below the 16.7.2 backport on the older track — is refused organizational mail, VPN and document access until it is at or above the fix and has taken the restart the packet says the update needs. The delivery path is why the access-condition half is the load-bearing one here: the trigger is crafted web content processed by WebKit, which is the engine behind every browser and in-app web view on the device, so there is no setting the operator can apply that keeps the vulnerable parser away from attacker-controlled content while the device stays in service on an old build. Withholding the data is the only remaining lever for a device that has not yet updated and restarted. The distinguishing test is to enrol a device pinned below the fixed build and confirm the policy actually denies it mail, VPN and document access — an estate that shows the stale build on a report while the device keeps working has recorded the exposure rather than removed it. Precondition: the gate binds only where the resource consults device state at access time, so a service reachable from a browser session or an app that does not check device compliance stays reachable from a device below the fixed build. And it is a containment measure, not a cleanup one — it does not evict an attacker already resident on a device exploited before the update, which matters because the packet records confirmed exploitation and a report of use against versions before iOS 16.7.1.",
+        "evidence": "Packet live_patch_notes: 'No live patch; requires the iOS/iPadOS/macOS/Safari update (17.1.2 / 14.1.2, backported to 16.7.2) and a device restart.' Vector states the issue is fixed in iOS 17.1.2 and iPadOS 17.1.2, macOS Sonoma 14.1.2, Safari 17.1.2, that processing web content may disclose sensitive information, and that Apple is aware of a report that the issue may have been exploited against versions of iOS before iOS 16.7.1. Attack path: crafted web content triggers an out-of-bounds read in WebKit (CWE-125) leaking process memory. CISA KEV-listed 2023-12-04, active_exploitation confirmed, RWEP 57 / CVSS 6.5.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2023-6345": {
     "name": "Google Skia Integer Overflow Vulnerability",
@@ -49230,7 +50095,41 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "Response and recovery planning is not scoped for targeted commercial-spyware zero-click intrusions that leave little evidence and demand vendor-assisted forensics."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-056",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ENDPOINT-MDM-ENFORCED-KEV-SLA",
+        "description": "The packet's fix is a whole OS build, and it lands on five separate release trains at once: iOS/iPadOS 16.6.1, iOS/iPadOS 15.7.9, macOS Ventura 13.5.2, macOS Monterey 12.6.9 and macOS Big Sur 11.7.10. For this CVE the control means the update is driven across the Apple estate from the management plane on the KEV clock that opened 2023-09-11, with user deferral disallowed, and that completion is measured per device as the build it actually reports against the fixed build for its own train — a device held on the 15.x train is remediated at 15.7.9, and an estate that measures 'latest major OS installed' will read that whole population as stale or unknown rather than as fixed. Preconditions: the packet records no vendor live-patch mechanism, so remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting — a device that has downloaded the update but not restarted still runs the vulnerable ImageIO and must be counted as exposed, not as patched. And management-plane enforcement reaches only enrolled devices; an unenrolled personal device belonging to someone in the targeted population is not covered by this control at all, which is why the standing posture below is assigned per user rather than per enrollment.",
+        "evidence": "Packet fields: patch_available true, live_patch_available false, live_patch_notes 'No vendor live-patch mechanism; remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting.' The vector names the fixed releases (iOS 16.6.1 and iPadOS 16.6.1, macOS Monterey 12.6.9, macOS Ventura 13.5.2, iOS 15.7.9 and iPadOS 15.7.9, macOS Big Sur 11.7.10). cisa_kev true with kev_date 2023-09-11; active_exploitation confirmed.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-121",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ZERO-CLICK-HARDENING",
+        "description": "Delivery for this CVE is a crafted image arriving as a PassKit attachment over iMessage and parsed by ImageIO with no user interaction — there is no click to withhold and no user decision to train, so awareness controls and attachment-handling guidance have nothing to act on. Between the 2023-09-11 KEV listing and the completed restart of every device, the only remaining lever is narrowing what the device parses automatically: place the plausibly targeted cohort — executives, journalists, legal and security staff — into Apple's reduced-attack-surface mode for at-risk users so message attachments and untrusted web content are not processed on arrival. This has to be a standing assignment made before the next disclosure, because the mode only helps if it was already on when the message landed. Preconditions, stated plainly: it narrows the delivery path, it does not repair the ImageIO overflow and does not remove the surface outright — any other route that reaches the same parser is unaffected; and it does nothing for a device on which the chain has already run, which belongs on the incident path rather than the hardening path. It is a holding measure for the window before the fixed build and its reboot land, not a substitute for them.",
+        "evidence": "Packet attack_vector: 'A maliciously crafted image sent as a PassKit attachment over iMessage is processed by ImageIO with no user interaction, overflowing a buffer and executing code; combined with CVE-2023-41061 (BLASTPASS) to install Pegasus.' active_exploitation confirmed; kev_date 2023-09-11; live_patch_available false with remediation recorded as the fixed release plus a reboot.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-043",
+        "name": "NATION-STATE-INITIAL-ACCESS-IR-ESCALATION",
+        "description": "The packet records a confirmed chain — this overflow combined with CVE-2023-41061 (BLASTPASS) — whose end state is a Pegasus implant delivered with no user interaction. Commodity-malware IR under-escalates that outcome by treating a phone as clean once it takes an update, and the packet's own remediation shows why that is wrong: the fix is applying the fixed release and rebooting, and a build upgrade evicts nothing that executed before it. For this CVE the escalation path triggers on the chain and implant outcome, not on an actor attribution — the packet names no threat group — so the operational rule is that any device in the plausibly targeted population that was below the fixed build during the exposure window is handled as a suspected targeted-implant case: preserved for forensic examination, and the accounts, tokens and mail/VPN sessions reachable from it rotated, before the vulnerability ticket is closed. This is also the substitute for the system-monitoring gap cited on this entry: the affected Apple platforms give the estate no endpoint telemetry that would emit on a zero-click ImageIO parse, so the trigger has to be build-state during the window plus forensic examination rather than a detection rule keyed on process or crash behaviour, which for this delivery path would fire on nothing. Precondition: it covers only the devices whose build history during the window you can establish; a device with no such history cannot be cleared by this path and stays in scope until evidence says otherwise.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: active_exploitation confirmed, cisa_kev true, kev_date 2023-09-11; attack_vector records the combination with CVE-2023-41061 (BLASTPASS) to install Pegasus, processed with no user interaction. live_patch_notes: 'No vendor live-patch mechanism; remediation requires applying the fixed release and rebooting.' poc_available false. The packet names no threat-actor group, so the trigger asserted here is the confirmed chain and its implant outcome, not an attribution.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIS2-Art21-incident-handling",
+          "UK-CAF-D1",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2023-41061": {
     "name": "Apple iOS, iPadOS, and watchOS Wallet Code Execution Vulnerability",
@@ -51866,7 +52765,39 @@
         "adequate": false,
         "gap": "A.8.8 technical-vulnerability management depends on a published fix to prioritize; for a kernel integer overflow used as an in-the-wild zero-day the control had nothing to act on until Apple's 2023-06-21 releases, so the exposure preceded any compliant handling cycle."
       }
-    }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-056",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ENDPOINT-MDM-ENFORCED-KEV-SLA",
+        "description": "On the Apple estate this CVE affects, the fix ships only as an OS build and the build differs per platform and per generation — the packet names iOS/iPadOS 16.5.1 and 15.7.7, macOS Ventura 13.4.1, macOS Monterey 12.6.7, macOS Big Sur 11.7.8, and watchOS 9.5.2 and 8.8.1. The enforcement object therefore has to be a per-SKU target build, not a generic 'latest update installed' policy, because a device sitting on the newest build for its generation can still be below the listed fix for a different generation in the same fleet. The packet records no live-patch mechanism and states the update requires a device restart, so the SLA's completion criterion is the restart having been taken, not 'update pushed', 'update downloaded' or 'update approved' in the management console. Precondition: this control's enforcement channel covers enrolled iOS, iPadOS and macOS devices, while the packet's fix list also carries watchOS 9.5.2 and 8.8.1 — those devices fall outside that enforcement scope and have to be tracked and driven to the listed build explicitly, or the estate will report full compliance while a build named in the fix list stays behind. Distinguishing test: after the enforcement window closes, read the actually-installed build from enrolled devices at each OS generation in the packet's fix list; any device below its generation's listed build, or above it but not yet restarted, is the finding.",
+        "evidence": "Packet: CISA KEV listed 2023-06-23, active_exploitation confirmed, CVSS 7.8, RWEP 51, patch_available true, live_patch_available false. live_patch_notes: 'No live-patch mechanism for the affected kernel; remediation requires the Apple OS update (iOS/iPadOS 16.5.1 or 15.7.7, macOS Ventura 13.4.1, macOS Monterey 12.6.7, macOS Big Sur 11.7.8, watchOS 9.5.2/8.8.1), which requires a device restart.'",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch",
+          "NIS2-Art21-patch-management",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-126",
+        "name": "MOBILE-OS-MINIMUM-PATCH-LEVEL-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "The packet's trigger is an application on the device reaching arbitrary code execution with kernel privileges, so once that application runs, no account-level boundary on the device contains it — the defect executes below every boundary the endpoint estate is audited on. For this entry the control means the per-generation fixed build named in the packet functions as an access condition: a device below its generation's listed build is denied mail, VPN and document access, rather than appearing as a stale row on a patch-compliance report while keeping its access. Because the packet records a required device restart and no live-patch path, the bar is the restarted state — a device that has installed the update but not restarted is still running the vulnerable kernel and must be counted below the bar, not as remediated. Distinguishing test: hold an enrolled device at a build below its generation's listed fix and confirm the policy actually refuses it access to protected resources; an estate that surfaces the stale build on a dashboard while the device keeps its access has recorded the exposure rather than removed it. Precondition: restricting which applications may be installed raises the bar for getting the attacker's application onto the device, but it does not evict an application already installed, and the packet places this CVE inside a zero-click chain, so an install-policy is not the containment for a device suspected of having already run the chain — that device belongs on the incident path, not the install-policy path.",
+        "evidence": "Packet vector: 'An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.' CWE-190; active_exploitation confirmed. live_patch_available false; live_patch_notes names the per-generation fixed builds and states the update 'requires a device restart'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "AU-Essential-8-Patch"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-121",
+        "name": "MOBILE-ZERO-CLICK-HARDENING",
+        "description": "The packet places this CVE as the kernel-execution stage of the Operation Triangulation zero-click chain, and Apple's own note in the packet is that the issue may have been actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7 — a delivery path that requires no user action, so no amount of user-awareness training or click-discipline is in the loop. For the high-risk cohort this control governs, the reboot-gated OS update is not fast enough on its own: place those devices in a reduced-attack-surface mode so message attachments, web content, fonts and link previews are not processed automatically, narrowing the delivery path for the chain stage that precedes this one during the window between the 2023-06-23 KEV listing and the completed fleet restart. Precondition, and this is the load-bearing sentence: the posture narrows delivery of the chain, it does not touch the integer overflow itself. The packet's trigger is an application already executing on the device, so once the chain has landed the mode changes nothing, it does not evict anything already resident, and a device suspected of having run the chain goes to the incident path rather than being closed on a posture change. It also only helps if it was already enabled when the chain arrived. Distinguishing test: confirm the posture is assigned as a standing profile to the named cohort ahead of the next disclosure — a mode switched on in reaction to a KEV listing was, by construction, off during the in-the-wild exploitation the packet records.",
+        "evidence": "Packet attack_vector: 'An application triggers an integer overflow in the Apple kernel to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges; in the wild it was the kernel-execution stage of the Operation Triangulation zero-click chain.' Packet vector: 'Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.' CISA KEV 2023-06-23, active_exploitation confirmed; live_patch_notes records that remediation 'requires a device restart'.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "UK-CAF-B4"
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
   },
   "CVE-2023-32435": {
     "name": "Apple Multiple Products WebKit Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2023-32435)",