@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.16.8 → 0.16.10

package/data/cve-catalog.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "_meta": {
     "schema_version": "1.0.0",
-    "last_updated": "2026-05-30",
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
     "source": "NVD + CISA KEV + vendor advisories — see sources/index.json",
     "required_fields": [
       "type",
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
     "ai_discovery_methodology": {
       "field_added": "2026-05-15",
       "agents_md_target": "Hard Rule #7 — '41% of 2025 zero-days were AI-discovered'. Catalog target rate floor: 0.40.",
-      "current_rate": 0.0279,
+      "current_rate": 0.0273,
       "current_floor_enforced_by_test": 0.027,
       "ladder_to_target": [
         0.027,
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
         0.3,
         0.4
       ],
-      "floor_correction_note": "v0.13.4: floor dropped from 0.15 → 0.13 after the v0.13.4 cleanup removed two stuck-draft CVEs (MAL-2026-ANTHROPIC-MCP-STDIO duplicate of CVE-2026-30623 + CVE-2026-GTIG-AI-2FA embargoed placeholder). The GTIG entry was the only ai_discovered=true of the two; catalog observed rate fell from 6/40 (0.15) to 5/38 (0.132). Floor is reset below the new observed rate to keep the test honest, and a new 0.13 rung is prepended to the ladder so monotonic non-decreasing is preserved without rewriting prior rungs. Prior correction note: v0.12.31 floor dropped 0.20 → 0.15 after the cycle-11 intake added six ai_discovered=false entries. v0.13.17: catalog grew 68 -> 72 with 4 non-AI Nightmare-Eclipse entries; observed rate falls from 12/68 (0.176) to 12/72 (0.208). Floor unchanged at 0.13 — still under observed. v0.13.17: catalog grew 72 -> 232 via CISA KEV bulk import; observed rate drops from 0.208 (15/72) to 0.065 (15/232) because KEV records lack AI-attribution metadata. Floor reset to 0.05 with new prepended ladder rung; existing rungs preserved. v0.13.17 round-2: catalog grew further to 312 via additional KEV bulk import; observed rate 0.038 (12/312). Floor lowered to 0.03 with a new prepended ladder rung to keep the test honest under bulk-import dilution. Prior rungs preserved; the 0.40 target ladder is unchanged. AI-attribution backfill for the 240 bulk-imported entries is operator-curation work in future cycles. v0.13.113: catalog grew to 402; observed rate 12/402 (0.0299) fell just under the 0.03 floor, so the floor was lowered to 0.029 with a prepended 0.029 ladder rung (prior rungs and the 0.40 target preserved). v0.13.122: AI-ecosystem CVE tranches grew the catalog to 414; observed rate 12/414 (0.0290) fell just under the 0.029 floor, so the floor was lowered to 0.028 with a prepended 0.028 ladder rung (prior rungs and the 0.40 target preserved). v0.14.27: three non-AI CI/CD supply-chain entries grew the catalog to 423; observed rate 12/423 (0.0284), current_rate updated 0.029 -> 0.028; floor unchanged at 0.028 (still under observed). v0.15.51: three non-AI supply-chain entries (CVE-2022-23812 node-ipc protestware + MAL-2026-TRAPDOOR-CROSS-ECOSYSTEM + MAL-2026-MOIKA-DEPCONFUSION) grew the catalog to 430; observed rate 12/430 (0.0279) fell just under the 0.028 floor, so the floor was lowered to 0.027 with a prepended 0.027 ladder rung (prior rungs and the 0.40 target preserved).",
+      "floor_correction_note": "v0.13.4: floor dropped from 0.15 → 0.13 after the v0.13.4 cleanup removed two stuck-draft CVEs (MAL-2026-ANTHROPIC-MCP-STDIO duplicate of CVE-2026-30623 + CVE-2026-GTIG-AI-2FA embargoed placeholder). The GTIG entry was the only ai_discovered=true of the two; catalog observed rate fell from 6/40 (0.15) to 5/38 (0.132). Floor is reset below the new observed rate to keep the test honest, and a new 0.13 rung is prepended to the ladder so monotonic non-decreasing is preserved without rewriting prior rungs. Prior correction note: v0.12.31 floor dropped 0.20 → 0.15 after the cycle-11 intake added six ai_discovered=false entries. v0.13.17: catalog grew 68 -> 72 with 4 non-AI Nightmare-Eclipse entries; observed rate falls from 12/68 (0.176) to 12/72 (0.208). Floor unchanged at 0.13 — still under observed. v0.13.17: catalog grew 72 -> 232 via CISA KEV bulk import; observed rate drops from 0.208 (15/72) to 0.065 (15/232) because KEV records lack AI-attribution metadata. Floor reset to 0.05 with new prepended ladder rung; existing rungs preserved. v0.13.17 round-2: catalog grew further to 312 via additional KEV bulk import; observed rate 0.038 (12/312). Floor lowered to 0.03 with a new prepended ladder rung to keep the test honest under bulk-import dilution. Prior rungs preserved; the 0.40 target ladder is unchanged. AI-attribution backfill for the 240 bulk-imported entries is operator-curation work in future cycles. v0.13.113: catalog grew to 402; observed rate 12/402 (0.0299) fell just under the 0.03 floor, so the floor was lowered to 0.029 with a prepended 0.029 ladder rung (prior rungs and the 0.40 target preserved). v0.13.122: AI-ecosystem CVE tranches grew the catalog to 414; observed rate 12/414 (0.0290) fell just under the 0.029 floor, so the floor was lowered to 0.028 with a prepended 0.028 ladder rung (prior rungs and the 0.40 target preserved). v0.14.27: three non-AI CI/CD supply-chain entries grew the catalog to 423; observed rate 12/423 (0.0284), current_rate updated 0.029 -> 0.028; floor unchanged at 0.028 (still under observed). v0.15.51: three non-AI supply-chain entries (CVE-2022-23812 node-ipc protestware + MAL-2026-TRAPDOOR-CROSS-ECOSYSTEM + MAL-2026-MOIKA-DEPCONFUSION) grew the catalog to 430; observed rate 12/430 (0.0279) fell just under the 0.028 floor, so the floor was lowered to 0.027 with a prepended 0.027 ladder rung (prior rungs and the 0.40 target preserved). v0.16.9: 9 non-AI catalog-hygiene entries grew the catalog to 439; observed AI rate 12/439 (0.0273) remains at or above the 0.027 floor (was 0.0279).",
       "ladder_note": "Test floor advances when each rung is exceeded with a margin (>= floor + 0.05). Surfaces incremental tightening without coincidence-passing failures.",
       "gap_explanation": "Catalog skews toward 2024 vendor-disclosed CVEs (xz-utils, runc, CRI-O, MLflow, containerd, SolarWinds, Citrix, ConnectWise) and Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 entries (Synacktiv, DEVCORE, Summoning Team, CyCraft) where AI-tooling involvement was either not used or not credited in the public disclosure. The 41% figure in AGENTS.md Hard Rule #7 reflects the broader 2025 zero-day population reported by Google Threat Intelligence Group; catalog membership is curated against a different sampling frame (operational impact + framework-coverage need) and so will lag the population-level rate.",
       "discovery_source_enum": [
@@ -45059,5 +45059,686 @@
     "_auto_imported": false,
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
     "_kev_short_description": "n8n's Git node lets an authenticated user write a dangerous file to an arbitrary path for RCE and full instance compromise (CWE-434/CWE-94); fixed in 1.121.3."
+  },
+  "CVE-2023-51764": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "Postfix SMTP smuggling (non-standard end-of-data sequence enables sender spoofing past SPF/DKIM/DMARC)",
+    "type": "smtp-smuggling-message-injection",
+    "cvss_score": 5.3,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Public technique + tooling from SEC Consult's December 2023 disclosure (smtp-smuggling) demonstrating spoofed, authentication-passing mail against Postfix.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed by Timo Longin / SEC Consult (December 2023) as part of the coordinated SMTP-smuggling research affecting Postfix, Sendmail and Exim.",
+    "active_exploitation": "suspected",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "No confirmed mass-exploitation campaign attributed to the smuggling primitive itself, but it is a published, tooled technique that delivers spoofed mail passing SPF/DKIM/DMARC — a high-value phishing/BEC delivery channel. Treated as suspected: demonstrated and weaponizable, observed exploitation unconfirmed.",
+    "affected": "Postfix SMTP server (smtpd) accepting inbound mail with default end-of-data handling.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "postfix < 3.5.23",
+      "postfix 3.6.x < 3.6.13",
+      "postfix 3.7.x < 3.7.9",
+      "postfix 3.8.x < 3.8.5"
+    ],
+    "vector": "Postfix accepts the non-standard end-of-data sequences <LF>.<LF> and <LF>.<CR><LF> in DATA, where RFC 5321 mandates <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>. An attacker who controls one envelope can embed a second, smuggled message that inherits the outer connection's SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass, delivering a spoofed sender. Fix: smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipelining=yes + smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords=chunking on pre-3.8.5, or upgrade.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "Single inbound connection; public tooling. Requires the receiver to use a vulnerable end-of-data interpretation relative to the sender path.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Postfix 3.8.5+ / 3.7.9+ / 3.6.13+ / 3.5.23+",
+      "Interim: smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipelining=yes and smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords=chunking"
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "The 30-day flaw-remediation SLA leaves a perimeter MTA accepting forged, SPF/DMARC-passing mail for weeks; the fix for the smuggling class is often a configuration change (strict end-of-data handling) the standard patch process does not surface.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "'Appropriate timescales' is undefined; a mail server that delivers spoofed mail past sender-authentication is an active phishing-delivery channel, not a routine patch.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-network-security": "Treats mail infrastructure as essential-function but assumes SPF/DKIM/DMARC are sufficient anti-spoofing controls; SMTP smuggling bypasses all three on the outer envelope, a gap the framework does not name.",
+      "PCI-DSS-4.0-6.3.3": "A spoofing-capable MTA in front of CDE personnel is a business-email-compromise delivery vector; the 30-day window is acceptance of a phishing channel."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1071.003"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 35,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 10,
+      "blast_radius": 20,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 35. poc_available (+20) + active_exploitation suspected (+10) + blast_radius 20 (Postfix is the most widely deployed open-source MTA; every inbound surface is a potential spoofing-delivery channel) - patch_available (-15). Not KEV; impact is integrity (sender spoofing/phishing-enablement), not RCE.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-345",
+      "CWE-93"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "Postfix smtpd reachable on inbound 25/465/587 at a version below 3.8.5 / 3.7.9 / 3.6.13 / 3.5.23 (or below 3.9).",
+        "A SMTP DATA probe terminated with <LF>.<LF> or <LF>.<CR><LF> is accepted as end-of-message instead of being rejected.",
+        "An inbound message whose DATA body contains a smuggled second envelope (MAIL FROM / RCPT TO / DATA) that is delivered as a distinct message inheriting the outer connection's SPF/DKIM/DMARC verdict.",
+        "smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipelining unset (or =no) on a pre-3.8.5 Postfix accepting unauthenticated mail."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51764",
+      "https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/smtp-smuggling-spoofing-e-mails-worldwide/",
+      "https://www.postfix.org/smtp-smuggling.html"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Disclosed December 2023 by Timo Longin (SEC Consult) in the coordinated SMTP-smuggling research spanning Postfix, Sendmail and Exim. Human protocol-parsing-differential research; no AI tooling credited."
+  },
+  "CVE-2023-51765": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "Sendmail SMTP smuggling (non-standard end-of-data sequence enables sender spoofing past SPF/DKIM/DMARC)",
+    "type": "smtp-smuggling-message-injection",
+    "cvss_score": 5.3,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "SEC Consult's December 2023 SMTP-smuggling research demonstrated spoofed authentication-passing mail against Sendmail.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Part of Timo Longin / SEC Consult December 2023 SMTP-smuggling disclosure.",
+    "active_exploitation": "suspected",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Published, tooled spoofing technique; no confirmed dedicated campaign. Suspected — demonstrated and weaponizable.",
+    "affected": "Sendmail MTA accepting inbound mail.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "sendmail <= 8.17.2 (fixed in 8.18.0.2 with the 'o' srv_features flag)"
+    ],
+    "vector": "Sendmail accepts <LF>.<CR><LF> as end-of-data where other MTAs require <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>, letting an attacker smuggle a second message that inherits the outer envelope's sender-authentication pass and spoof the sender. Fix: 8.18.0.2 and set the 'o' flag in srv_features.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "Single inbound connection; public technique.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Sendmail 8.18.0.2+ with the 'o' flag in srv_features"
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "The 30-day flaw-remediation SLA leaves a perimeter MTA accepting forged, SPF/DMARC-passing mail for weeks; the fix for the smuggling class is often a configuration change (strict end-of-data handling) the standard patch process does not surface.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "'Appropriate timescales' is undefined; a mail server that delivers spoofed mail past sender-authentication is an active phishing-delivery channel, not a routine patch.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-network-security": "Treats mail infrastructure as essential-function but assumes SPF/DKIM/DMARC are sufficient anti-spoofing controls; SMTP smuggling bypasses all three on the outer envelope, a gap the framework does not name.",
+      "PCI-DSS-4.0-6.3.3": "A spoofing-capable MTA in front of CDE personnel is a business-email-compromise delivery vector; the 30-day window is acceptance of a phishing channel."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1071.003"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 29,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 10,
+      "blast_radius": 14,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 29. poc_available (+20) + active_exploitation suspected (+10) + blast_radius 14 (Sendmail install base is large but declining relative to Postfix) - patch_available (-15). Integrity-impact spoofing, not KEV, not RCE.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-345",
+      "CWE-93"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "Sendmail reachable on inbound SMTP at a version at or below 8.17.2.",
+        "A DATA probe terminated with <LF>.<CR><LF> is accepted as end-of-message.",
+        "A smuggled second message-envelope inside DATA is delivered inheriting the outer connection sender-authentication verdict.",
+        "srv_features lacks the 'o' flag on a Sendmail below 8.18.0.2."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51765",
+      "https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/smtp-smuggling-spoofing-e-mails-worldwide/"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Disclosed December 2023 by Timo Longin (SEC Consult) as the Sendmail case of the coordinated SMTP-smuggling research. Human research; no AI tooling credited."
+  },
+  "CVE-2023-51766": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "Exim SMTP smuggling (non-standard end-of-data sequence enables sender spoofing past SPF/DKIM/DMARC)",
+    "type": "smtp-smuggling-message-injection",
+    "cvss_score": 5.3,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "SEC Consult December 2023 SMTP-smuggling research demonstrated spoofed authentication-passing mail against Exim.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Part of Timo Longin / SEC Consult December 2023 SMTP-smuggling disclosure.",
+    "active_exploitation": "suspected",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Published, tooled spoofing technique; Exim is the default MTA on many cPanel hosts, broadening the spoofing surface. No confirmed dedicated campaign — suspected.",
+    "affected": "Exim MTA (notably in PIPELINING/CHUNKING configurations) accepting inbound mail.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "exim < 4.97.1"
+    ],
+    "vector": "Exim accepts <LF>.<CR><LF> as end-of-data in PIPELINING/CHUNKING configurations, differing from the RFC 5321 <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>, enabling a smuggled second message that inherits the outer SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass. Fix: upgrade to 4.97.1.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "Single inbound connection; public technique. Exim's cPanel ubiquity widens reach.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Exim 4.97.1+"
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "The 30-day flaw-remediation SLA leaves a perimeter MTA accepting forged, SPF/DMARC-passing mail for weeks; the fix for the smuggling class is often a configuration change (strict end-of-data handling) the standard patch process does not surface.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "'Appropriate timescales' is undefined; a mail server that delivers spoofed mail past sender-authentication is an active phishing-delivery channel, not a routine patch.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-network-security": "Treats mail infrastructure as essential-function but assumes SPF/DKIM/DMARC are sufficient anti-spoofing controls; SMTP smuggling bypasses all three on the outer envelope, a gap the framework does not name.",
+      "PCI-DSS-4.0-6.3.3": "A spoofing-capable MTA in front of CDE personnel is a business-email-compromise delivery vector; the 30-day window is acceptance of a phishing channel."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1071.003"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 33,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 10,
+      "blast_radius": 18,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 33. poc_available (+20) + active_exploitation suspected (+10) + blast_radius 18 (Exim is the default MTA on a very large hosting/cPanel install base) - patch_available (-15). Integrity-impact spoofing, not KEV, not RCE.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-345",
+      "CWE-93"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "Exim reachable on inbound SMTP at a version below 4.97.1.",
+        "A DATA probe terminated with <LF>.<CR><LF> is accepted as end-of-message in a PIPELINING/CHUNKING configuration.",
+        "A smuggled second message-envelope inside DATA delivered inheriting the outer connection sender-authentication verdict.",
+        "Exim below 4.97.1 advertising CHUNKING (BDAT) to unauthenticated peers."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51766",
+      "https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/smtp-smuggling-spoofing-e-mails-worldwide/"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Disclosed December 2023 by Timo Longin (SEC Consult) as the Exim case of the coordinated SMTP-smuggling research. Human research; no AI tooling credited."
+  },
+  "CVE-2021-38371": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "Exim STARTTLS response injection (pre-handshake buffer not drained on the sending MTA path)",
+    "type": "starttls-response-injection",
+    "cvss_score": 7.5,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "The NO STARTTLS research (nostarttls.secvuln.info / USENIX Security 2021) published test tooling demonstrating STARTTLS injection against affected MTAs including Exim.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Part of the \"NO STARTTLS\" research (Poddebniak, Ising, Böck, Schinzel, 2021) cataloguing STARTTLS injection across MTAs and mail clients.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Exploitation requires an on-path/MITM position; no confirmed in-wild campaign. Real, tooled, and vendor-patched.",
+    "affected": "Exim through 4.94.2 on the MTA SMTP sending path.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "exim <= 4.94.2"
+    ],
+    "vector": "The STARTTLS feature in Exim does not discard data buffered before the TLS handshake, so an on-path attacker can inject responses (response injection / buffering) that the client applies after STARTTLS completes. Fix: upgrade past 4.94.2 (4.95+).",
+    "complexity": "high",
+    "complexity_notes": "Requires an adversary-in-the-middle position on the SMTP path; once positioned, injection is reliable.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Exim 4.95+"
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Patch SLA assumes opportunistic-TLS protects the session; a STARTTLS command/response injection executes attacker plaintext after the handshake, so an unpatched server silently trusts pre-TLS bytes regardless of the cipher negotiated.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Standard 30-day reading is unsafe for a flaw that lets an on-path attacker inject authenticated mail commands; cryptographic controls (A.8.24) are present but defeated by the buffering defect, not the cipher.",
+      "UK-CAF-B4": "System security principle treats TLS as the boundary; the STARTTLS receive-buffer defect means the boundary is crossed before TLS applies, which the principle does not model."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1557",
+      "T1071.003"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 21,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 16,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 21. poc_available (+20) + blast_radius 16 (large Exim install base) - patch_available (-15). active_exploitation none (MITM-positioned, no observed campaign); the poc factor carries the real-world-exploitability signal.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-74"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "Exim reachable on the SMTP sending/receiving path at a version at or below 4.94.2.",
+        "STARTTLS handshake on the connection does not discard bytes buffered before the handshake (plaintext bytes received pre-TLS are processed post-TLS).",
+        "On-path injection of SMTP responses observed crossing the STARTTLS boundary."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38371",
+      "https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Disclosed in the 2021 NO STARTTLS research (Poddebniak, Ising, Böck, Schinzel; USENIX Security 2021) cataloguing STARTTLS injection across MTAs and mail clients. Human academic research; no AI involvement."
+  },
+  "CVE-2021-33515": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "Dovecot lib-smtp STARTTLS command injection (submission service)",
+    "type": "starttls-command-injection",
+    "cvss_score": 4.8,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "STARTTLS-injection family tooling (NO STARTTLS research lineage) demonstrates the pre-handshake command-injection class against lib-smtp.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed against Dovecot's submission service / lib-smtp, in the STARTTLS-injection family.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "MITM-positioned; no confirmed in-wild campaign. Real, vendor-patched in 2.3.15.",
+    "affected": "Dovecot submission service (lib-smtp) before 2.3.15.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "dovecot < 2.3.15"
+    ],
+    "vector": "The submission service in Dovecot before 2.3.15 allows STARTTLS command injection in lib-smtp: a prebuilt sequence of commands sent before the TLS handshake is executed after the handshake, allowing an on-path attacker to redirect sensitive data to an attacker-controlled destination. Fix: upgrade to 2.3.15.",
+    "complexity": "high",
+    "complexity_notes": "Requires an on-path position (AC:H); the injected commands then execute post-TLS.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Dovecot 2.3.15+"
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Patch SLA assumes opportunistic-TLS protects the session; a STARTTLS command/response injection executes attacker plaintext after the handshake, so an unpatched server silently trusts pre-TLS bytes regardless of the cipher negotiated.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Standard 30-day reading is unsafe for a flaw that lets an on-path attacker inject authenticated mail commands; cryptographic controls (A.8.24) are present but defeated by the buffering defect, not the cipher.",
+      "UK-CAF-B4": "System security principle treats TLS as the boundary; the STARTTLS receive-buffer defect means the boundary is crossed before TLS applies, which the principle does not model."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1557",
+      "T1071.003"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 19,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 14,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 19. poc_available (+20) + blast_radius 14 (Dovecot is a very common IMAP/submission server) - patch_available (-15). active_exploitation none (MITM-required).",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-77"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "Dovecot submission service reachable at a version below 2.3.15.",
+        "A prebuilt command sequence sent before STARTTLS is buffered and executed after the TLS handshake completes.",
+        "Submission commands that redirect mail to an unexpected destination appearing immediately after a STARTTLS upgrade."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33515",
+      "https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Disclosed in the STARTTLS-injection research lineage (NO STARTTLS, 2021) against Dovecot lib-smtp / the submission service. Human research; no AI involvement."
+  },
+  "CVE-2011-0411": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "Postfix STARTTLS plaintext command injection (I/O buffering not reset across TLS handshake)",
+    "type": "starttls-command-injection",
+    "cvss_score": 4.8,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
+    "cvss_note": "NVD published only CVSSv2 6.8 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) for this 2011 CVE; the v3.1 vector is an operator estimate aligning it with the equivalent Dovecot/Exim STARTTLS-injection class (AiTM-required plaintext command injection). NVD CWE is the deprecated CWE-264; the precise mechanism is CWE-77.",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Demonstrated in the original 2011 Postfix STARTTLS disclosure (plaintext command injection across the TLS boundary).",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "The original STARTTLS plaintext-command-injection class (Wietse Venema / Postfix), the canonical 2011 disclosure that the 2021 NO STARTTLS work generalized.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "MITM-positioned; legacy and broadly patched. Real, vendor-patched in the 2.x maintenance releases.",
+    "affected": "Postfix SMTP server STARTTLS implementation (2.4.x–2.7.x maintenance branches).",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "postfix 2.4.x < 2.4.16",
+      "postfix 2.5.x < 2.5.12",
+      "postfix 2.6.x < 2.6.9",
+      "postfix 2.7.x < 2.7.3"
+    ],
+    "vector": "Postfix's STARTTLS implementation does not properly restrict I/O buffering, so plaintext SMTP commands inserted by a man-in-the-middle before the TLS handshake are executed within the encrypted session afterward. Fix: upgrade to the patched 2.x maintenance release.",
+    "complexity": "high",
+    "complexity_notes": "Requires an on-path position; the foundational STARTTLS-injection defect.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Postfix 2.4.16+ / 2.5.12+ / 2.6.9+ / 2.7.3+"
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Patch SLA assumes opportunistic-TLS protects the session; a STARTTLS command/response injection executes attacker plaintext after the handshake, so an unpatched server silently trusts pre-TLS bytes regardless of the cipher negotiated.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Standard 30-day reading is unsafe for a flaw that lets an on-path attacker inject authenticated mail commands; cryptographic controls (A.8.24) are present but defeated by the buffering defect, not the cipher.",
+      "UK-CAF-B4": "System security principle treats TLS as the boundary; the STARTTLS receive-buffer defect means the boundary is crossed before TLS applies, which the principle does not model."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1557",
+      "T1071.003"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 17,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 12,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 17. poc_available (+20) + blast_radius 12 (legacy Postfix branches, largely patched; low residual population) - patch_available (-15). active_exploitation none (MITM-required, legacy).",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-77",
+      "CWE-264"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "Postfix at a 2.4.x/2.5.x/2.6.x/2.7.x version below the patched maintenance release.",
+        "Plaintext SMTP commands injected before STARTTLS are processed inside the encrypted session.",
+        "I/O buffer not reset at the STARTTLS upgrade on a legacy Postfix."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-0411",
+      "https://www.postfix.org/CVE-2011-0411.html"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "The original 2011 STARTTLS plaintext-command-injection disclosure (Wietse Venema / Postfix) that the 2021 NO STARTTLS work later generalized. Human research; no AI involvement."
+  },
+  "CVE-2023-50387": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "KeyTrap — DNSSEC validating-resolver CPU exhaustion via crafted DNSKEY/RRSIG combinations",
+    "type": "dnssec-validation-cpu-exhaustion",
+    "cvss_score": 7.5,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "KeyTrap PoC zones and analysis published with the Feb 2024 coordinated disclosure; ISC/NLnet Labs/PowerDNS advisories document the attack and the work-bounding fixes.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "academic_ai_fuzzing",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Discovered by the ATHENE / Goethe University Frankfurt research group (KeyTrap, disclosed Feb 2024). Academic protocol research, not AI-attributed by the disclosers; ai_discovered remains false.",
+    "active_exploitation": "suspected",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "High-profile coordinated disclosure (BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS, Knot, Dnsmasq patched in lockstep Feb 2024). Single crafted DNSSEC response can stall a validating resolver for an extended period. Internet-scale concern; observed scanning but no confirmed sustained campaign — suspected.",
+    "affected": "DNSSEC-validating resolvers evaluating DNSKEY/RRSIG record combinations.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "BIND 9.0.0-9.16.46 / 9.18.0-9.18.22 / 9.19.0-9.19.20",
+      "Unbound < 1.19.1",
+      "PowerDNS Recursor 4.8.0-4.8.5 / 4.9.0-4.9.2 / 5.0.0-5.0.1",
+      "Knot Resolver < 5.7.1",
+      "Dnsmasq < 2.90"
+    ],
+    "vector": "A validating resolver must evaluate all combinations of DNSKEY and RRSIG records when a zone presents many of them (colliding key tags). An attacker hosting (or spoofing responses for) such a zone forces worst-case O(n*m) signature evaluations, consuming CPU and stalling the resolver for all clients. Fix: vendor patches cap the validation work.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "Single crafted DNSSEC response; the resolver does the expensive work. No auth.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "BIND 9.16.47+ / 9.18.23+ / 9.19.21+",
+      "Unbound 1.19.1+",
+      "PowerDNS Recursor 4.8.6+ / 4.9.3+ / 5.0.2+",
+      "Knot Resolver 5.7.1+",
+      "Dnsmasq 2.90+"
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "A resolver/server CPU-exhaustion DoS is mass-triggerable from a single crafted response/stream; the 30-day patch window is far longer than the time to take a validating resolver or HTTP/2 front-door offline.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "'Appropriate timescales' undefined; an availability flaw on shared infrastructure (DNS resolver, web front-door) warrants a compressed SLA the standard reading does not require.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-network-security": "Availability of essential-function infrastructure is in scope, but the framework lacks a compressed SLA for a single-packet/single-connection amplification DoS against shared resolvers or web tiers.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT availability protection presumes capacity headroom; an algorithmic-complexity DoS defeats headroom because cost is asymmetric (one cheap request → unbounded server work)."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1499",
+      "T1498"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 39,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 10,
+      "blast_radius": 24,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 39. poc_available (+20) + active_exploitation suspected (+10) + blast_radius 24 (every DNSSEC-validating resolver across all major implementations — foundational internet infrastructure) - patch_available (-15). Availability impact (A:H); not KEV.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-770"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "A validating resolver (BIND/Unbound/PowerDNS Recursor/Knot/Dnsmasq) at a version below the KeyTrap-fixed release.",
+        "Resolver CPU saturates and query latency spikes when resolving names in a zone that presents many DNSKEY/RRSIG records with colliding key tags.",
+        "Validation work per response is not bounded (no cap on DNSKEY*RRSIG evaluation combinations) on a pre-patch resolver."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50387",
+      "https://www.athene-center.de/en/keytrap",
+      "https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2023-50387"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Disclosed February 2024 by the ATHENE / Goethe University Frankfurt research group (KeyTrap) via coordinated multi-vendor DNSSEC disclosure (BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS, Knot, Dnsmasq). Academic protocol research; no AI involvement."
+  },
+  "CVE-2023-50868": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "DNSSEC NSEC3 closest-encloser proof CPU exhaustion (excessive SHA-1 iterations)",
+    "type": "dnssec-nsec3-cpu-exhaustion",
+    "cvss_score": 7.5,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Published with the Feb 2024 coordinated DNSSEC disclosure; ISC/NLnet Labs/PowerDNS advisories document the NSEC3 work-bounding fix.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "academic_ai_fuzzing",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed alongside KeyTrap by the ATHENE / Goethe University Frankfurt group (Feb 2024). Academic protocol research; ai_discovered false.",
+    "active_exploitation": "suspected",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Coordinated multi-vendor disclosure and patching (Feb 2024). Crafted NSEC3 responses force excessive hashing; internet-scale concern. Observed scanning, no confirmed sustained campaign — suspected.",
+    "affected": "DNSSEC-validating resolvers performing NSEC3 closest-encloser denial-of-existence proofs.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "BIND 9.0.0-9.16.47 / 9.18.0-9.18.23 / 9.19.0-9.19.20",
+      "Unbound < 1.19.1",
+      "PowerDNS Recursor 4.8.x<4.8.5 / 4.9.0-4.9.2 / 5.0.0-5.0.1",
+      "Knot Resolver < 5.7.1"
+    ],
+    "vector": "Validating an NSEC3 closest-encloser proof for a crafted response forces the resolver to perform a large number of SHA-1 hash iterations (the NSEC3 iteration count and closest-encloser candidate enumeration), consuming CPU. Fix: vendor patches bound the NSEC3 iteration/closest-encloser work.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "Single crafted DNSSEC response targeting random subdomains; resolver bears the cost.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "BIND 9.16.48+ / 9.18.24+ / 9.19.21+",
+      "Unbound 1.19.1+",
+      "PowerDNS Recursor 4.8.5+ / 4.9.3+ / 5.0.2+",
+      "Knot Resolver 5.7.1+"
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "A resolver/server CPU-exhaustion DoS is mass-triggerable from a single crafted response/stream; the 30-day patch window is far longer than the time to take a validating resolver or HTTP/2 front-door offline.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "'Appropriate timescales' undefined; an availability flaw on shared infrastructure (DNS resolver, web front-door) warrants a compressed SLA the standard reading does not require.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-network-security": "Availability of essential-function infrastructure is in scope, but the framework lacks a compressed SLA for a single-packet/single-connection amplification DoS against shared resolvers or web tiers.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT availability protection presumes capacity headroom; an algorithmic-complexity DoS defeats headroom because cost is asymmetric (one cheap request → unbounded server work)."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1499",
+      "T1498"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 37,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 10,
+      "blast_radius": 22,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 37. poc_available (+20) + active_exploitation suspected (+10) + blast_radius 22 (every DNSSEC-validating resolver doing NSEC3 proofs) - patch_available (-15). Availability impact (A:H); not KEV.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-400"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "A validating resolver at a version below the NSEC3-fixed release.",
+        "Resolver CPU saturates when resolving names that trigger NSEC3 closest-encloser proofs with high iteration counts.",
+        "NSEC3 iteration/closest-encloser work is not capped on a pre-patch resolver."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50868",
+      "https://www.athene-center.de/en/keytrap",
+      "https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2023-50868"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Disclosed February 2024 alongside KeyTrap by the ATHENE / Goethe University Frankfurt group as the NSEC3 closest-encloser CPU-exhaustion case. Academic protocol research; no AI involvement."
+  },
+  "CVE-2023-44487": {
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "name": "HTTP/2 Rapid Reset — stream open-then-RST_STREAM flood (record-breaking DDoS)",
+    "type": "http2-stream-reset-ddos",
+    "cvss_score": 7.5,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
+    "cisa_kev": true,
+    "cisa_kev_date": "2023-10-10",
+    "cisa_kev_due_date": "2023-10-31",
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Public technique with widely available exploit tooling published immediately after the October 2023 co-disclosure; demonstrated at internet scale by the disclosing CDNs.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Co-disclosed October 2023 by Google, Cloudflare and AWS after absorbing the largest-recorded HTTP/2 DDoS to that date. Vendor research; not AI-attributed.",
+    "active_exploitation": "confirmed",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Actively exploited at scale August–October 2023; Cloudflare/Google/AWS reported record-breaking DDoS (hundreds of millions of rps). CISA KEV-listed 2023-10-10 with a 2023-10-31 federal remediation deadline. Hundreds of HTTP/2 server, proxy and CDN implementations affected.",
+    "affected": "HTTP/2 server, proxy and CDN implementations that allow a client to open a stream and immediately send RST_STREAM without a per-connection cap (Apache, Nginx, Node.js, Go net/http, gRPC, Envoy, Microsoft .NET/IIS, and many more).",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "Implementation-specific — any HTTP/2 endpoint without rapid-reset accounting; remediate per the vendor advisory for each server/proxy."
+    ],
+    "vector": "HTTP/2 multiplexing lets a client open a stream (HEADERS) and immediately cancel it (RST_STREAM) before the server responds. Because cancellation is cheap for the client but the server still does per-stream setup/teardown work, an attacker cycles open-then-reset at high rate to exhaust the server with minimal cost — a record-breaking DDoS primitive. Fix: cap the rate of client-initiated stream resets per connection and close abusive connections.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "Single HTTP/2 connection; trivially scriptable; mass-exploited in the wild.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a software update (and, for the smuggling/STARTTLS classes, a server configuration change); no live-patch primitive applies. Service restart, not host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Per-implementation patches that add rapid-reset accounting (e.g. Nginx keepalive_requests limits, Go MaxConcurrentStreams + reset accounting, Node.js stream-reset caps, Envoy overload manager) — apply the vendor advisory for each affected server/proxy."
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "A resolver/server CPU-exhaustion DoS is mass-triggerable from a single crafted response/stream; the 30-day patch window is far longer than the time to take a validating resolver or HTTP/2 front-door offline.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "'Appropriate timescales' undefined; an availability flaw on shared infrastructure (DNS resolver, web front-door) warrants a compressed SLA the standard reading does not require.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-network-security": "Availability of essential-function infrastructure is in scope, but the framework lacks a compressed SLA for a single-packet/single-connection amplification DoS against shared resolvers or web tiers.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT availability protection presumes capacity headroom; an algorithmic-complexity DoS defeats headroom because cost is asymmetric (one cheap request → unbounded server work)."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1499.001",
+      "T1498"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 80,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 25,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 20,
+      "blast_radius": 30,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "RWEP 80. cisa_kev (+25) + poc_available (+20) + active_exploitation confirmed (+20) + blast_radius 30 (effectively every HTTP/2 server, proxy and CDN — internet-wide) - patch_available (-15). The highest-RWEP entry in this batch: KEV-listed, mass-exploited availability flaw against shared web infrastructure.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": null,
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-400"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "An HTTP/2 endpoint (server/proxy/CDN) without a per-connection cap on client-initiated stream resets.",
+        "A burst of HEADERS-then-immediate-RST_STREAM frames on a single HTTP/2 connection at a rate far exceeding legitimate cancellation.",
+        "Server CPU/worker exhaustion correlated with high stream-open/reset churn rather than response throughput.",
+        "HTTP/2 server/proxy version below the rapid-reset-fixed release named in the vendor advisory."
+      ]
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-06-01",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-44487",
+      "https://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-breakdown-http2-rapid-reset-ddos-attack/",
+      "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/10/10/http2-rapid-reset-vulnerability-cve-2023-44487"
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-06-01",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Co-disclosed October 2023 by Google, Cloudflare and AWS after absorbing the largest-recorded HTTP/2 DDoS to that date; CISA KEV-listed 2023-10-10. Vendor research; no AI involvement."
   }
 }