@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.16.25 → 0.16.29

package/skills/threat-modeling-methodology/skill.md

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ forward_watch:
   - Unified Kill Chain successor revision (Pols, post-v3.0)
   - LINDDUN-GO and LINDDUN-PRO updates incorporating LLM privacy threats
   - PASTA v2 updates incorporating AI/ML application threats
-last_threat_review: "2026-05-11"
+last_threat_review: "2026-06-10"
 discovery_mode: "standalone"  # operator-reached via `exceptd brief threat-modeling-methodology` or `exceptd ask`; not chained into any playbook's direct.skill_chain by design
 ---
 
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ Threat-modelling methodologies are *consumers* of the TTP catalog, not contribut
 | Cyber Kill Chain | Linear 7-stage intrusion timeline | Per stage: ATT&CK TTPs | Cloud-native / serverless / AI-pipeline scenarios fit the timeline poorly; lateral movement assumptions break in ephemeral compute. |
 | Diamond Model | Adversary–capability–infrastructure–victim diamond | Per intrusion event: TTPs become adversary capabilities; pivot to other diamonds | Built for IR / SOC, not for design-phase threat modelling — pair with STRIDE/PASTA during design and Diamond during operate phase. |
 | MITRE Unified Kill Chain (v3.0, 2024) | 18 phases spanning initial access through objectives | Per phase: ATLAS and ATT&CK TTPs assigned to phases that cover both classical and AI-augmented attacks | Most comprehensive single methodology, but weak on privacy threats — pair with LINDDUN. |
-| AI-system threat modeling (composite) | Augmented DFD with AI actors and AI trust boundaries | Full ATLAS v5.6.0 catalogue (every `AML.T*` key in `data/atlas-ttps.json`) | Methodology not yet standardised — this skill operationalises it. |
+| AI-system threat modeling (composite) | Augmented DFD with AI actors and AI trust boundaries | Full ATLAS v2026.05 catalogue (every `AML.T*` key in `data/atlas-ttps.json`) | Methodology not yet standardised — this skill operationalises it. |
 | Agent-based threat modeling | Actor graph with autonomous agents, MCP plugins, tool-call boundaries | CVE-2026-30615 (MCP RCE), CVE-2025-53773 (prompt-injection RCE), AML.T0051, AML.T0096 | Methodology not yet standardised — this skill operationalises it. |
 
 The truth set for any composite model is: every `AML.T*` key in `data/atlas-ttps.json`, plus every `attack_refs` entry across every CVE in `data/cve-catalog.json`, plus the CWE root-cause classes in `data/cwe-catalog.json`. A model that does not address each, or document a reasoned exclusion for each, is non-current by construction (and should be re-run through `threat-model-currency`).

package/skills/webapp-security/skill.md

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ d3fend_refs:
   - D3-MFA
 forward_watch:
   - NGINX Rift CVE-2026-42945 (disclosed 2026-05-13, source depthfirst) — KEV-watch predicted CISA KEV listing by 2026-05-29; AI-assisted discovery angle; track for active-exploitation confirmation and patch advisory affecting front-door web app deployments
-last_threat_review: "2026-05-11"
+last_threat_review: "2026-06-10"
 discovery_mode: "standalone"  # operator-reached via `exceptd brief webapp-security` or `exceptd ask`; not chained into any playbook's direct.skill_chain by design
 ---
 
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ Webapps still ship CWE-79 (Cross-Site Scripting), CWE-89 (SQL Injection), and CW
 
 ---
 
-## TTP Mapping (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise + ATLAS v5.6.0)
+## TTP Mapping (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise + ATLAS v2026.05)
 
 | TTP ID | Technique | Webapp Manifestation | CWE Root-Causes | Framework Coverage |
 |---|---|---|---|---|

package/skills/zeroday-gap-learn/skill.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ forward_watch:
   - New ATLAS TTP additions in each ATLAS release
   - Framework updates that close previously open gaps
   - Vendor advisories for MCP/AI tool supply chain CVEs
-last_threat_review: "2026-05-18"
+last_threat_review: "2026-06-10"
 discovery_mode: "standalone"  # operator-reached via `exceptd brief zeroday-gap-learn` or `exceptd ask`; not chained into any playbook's direct.skill_chain by design
 ---
 
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ This skill is meta — it does not pin to a single TTP class. The learning loop
 | Input Catalog | Role in the Learning Loop |
 |---|---|
 | `data/cve-catalog.json` | The CVE-level corpus: each entry is a candidate lesson input. New entries trigger a new loop run. |
-| `data/atlas-ttps.json` (MITRE ATLAS v5.6.0) | The AI/ML TTP taxonomy. Attack-vector extraction maps the CVE's mechanism to an ATLAS ID (e.g., AML.T0096 for SesameOp AI-as-C2). |
+| `data/atlas-ttps.json` (MITRE ATLAS v2026.05) | The AI/ML TTP taxonomy. Attack-vector extraction maps the CVE's mechanism to an ATLAS ID (e.g., AML.T0096 for SesameOp AI-as-C2). |
 | `data/framework-control-gaps.json` | The control-gap corpus. Framework-coverage assessment writes into this file via new entries or `status` updates. |
 | `data/zeroday-lessons.json` | The output corpus. Each completed loop produces one entry here — the durable artifact of the lesson. |
 
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ Run through each applicable framework:
 - CIS Controls v8 (which control?)
 - ASD Essential 8 (which mitigation?)
 - ISO 27001:2022 (which control?)
-- MITRE ATLAS v5.6.0 (which TTP? Is it covered?)
+- MITRE ATLAS v2026.05 (which TTP? Is it covered?)
 
 For each: Covered (adequate) / Covered (insufficient) / Missing entirely
 

package/sources/validators/cve-validator.js

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ const NVD_API = 'https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=';
 const KEV_FEED = 'https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json';
 const EPSS_API = 'https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=';
 const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+
+const { selectNvdCvss, cvssVersionOf } = require('../../lib/cvss');
 const EPSS_DRIFT_THRESHOLD = 0.05; // |Δscore| or |Δpercentile| > 0.05 flags drift
 const USER_AGENT = 'exceptd-security/cve-validator (+https://exceptd.com)';
 
@@ -93,22 +95,19 @@ function resetKevCache() {
 }
 
 function extractNvdCvss(nvdJson) {
-  // NVD response: vulnerabilities[0].cve.metrics.cvssMetricV31[0].cvssData
+  // NVD response: vulnerabilities[0].cve.metrics.cvssMetricV3x/V2[].cvssData.
+  // Prefer the newest CVSS version present (Primary within it) and normalize a
+  // bare v2 vector to its canonical prefix — NVD tags the legacy v2 metric
+  // "Primary" on pre-v3 CVEs over a v3.1 "Secondary", so selecting by type
+  // alone would report a stale v2 score as the upstream value.
   const vuln = nvdJson?.vulnerabilities?.[0]?.cve;
   if (!vuln) return null;
-  const metrics = vuln.metrics || {};
-  const ordered = [
-    ...(metrics.cvssMetricV31 || []),
-    ...(metrics.cvssMetricV30 || []),
-    ...(metrics.cvssMetricV2 || []),
-  ];
-  // Prefer Primary type if present
-  const primary = ordered.find(m => m.type === 'Primary') || ordered[0];
-  if (!primary?.cvssData) return null;
+  const up = selectNvdCvss(vuln.metrics);
+  if (!up) return null;
   return {
-    score: typeof primary.cvssData.baseScore === 'number' ? primary.cvssData.baseScore : null,
-    vector: primary.cvssData.vectorString || null,
-    source: primary.source || null,
+    score: up.baseScore,
+    vector: up.vector,
+    source: up.source,
   };
 }
 
@@ -270,13 +269,23 @@ async function validateCve(cveId, localEntry) {
   }
 
   // --- Compare CVSS (only if NVD reachable & has data) ---
-  if (cveFoundInNvd && fetched.cvss_score !== null && local.cvss_score !== null) {
-    if (Math.abs(fetched.cvss_score - local.cvss_score) > 0.05) {
+  // Guard against cross-version downgrades: NVD often carries only a legacy v2
+  // metric for older CVEs while the catalog is curated to CVSS:3.1. Surfacing
+  // (and, on `refresh --apply`, writing) the lower v2 score/vector over a
+  // curated v3.x value is a downgrade, not a drift. Mirror the cache path's
+  // suppression (lib/refresh-external.js nvdDiffFromCache) so the live and
+  // cache refresh paths converge; a same-version re-score still flows through.
+  const localCvssVersion = cvssVersionOf(local.cvss_vector);
+  const fetchedCvssVersion = cvssVersionOf(fetched.cvss_vector);
+  const cvssIsDowngrade =
+    fetchedCvssVersion != null && localCvssVersion != null && fetchedCvssVersion < localCvssVersion;
+  if (cveFoundInNvd && !cvssIsDowngrade) {
+    if (fetched.cvss_score !== null && local.cvss_score !== null &&
+        Math.abs(fetched.cvss_score - local.cvss_score) > 0.05) {
       pushDiscrepancy(discrepancies, 'cvss_score', local.cvss_score, fetched.cvss_score, 'high');
     }
-  }
-  if (cveFoundInNvd && fetched.cvss_vector && local.cvss_vector) {
-    if (fetched.cvss_vector !== local.cvss_vector) {
+    if (fetched.cvss_vector && local.cvss_vector &&
+        fetched.cvss_vector !== local.cvss_vector) {
       pushDiscrepancy(discrepancies, 'cvss_vector', local.cvss_vector, fetched.cvss_vector, 'medium');
     }
   }