@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.16.13 → 0.16.14

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/AGENTS.md CHANGED
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ Cross-cutting playbook `framework` is the natural correlation layer — many pla
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  | Verb | What it does |
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  |---|---|
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- | `exceptd brief --all` | Grouped-by-scope summary of all 27 playbooks. `--scope <type>` filters. `--directives` expands directive IDs/titles per playbook. `--flat` for non-grouped. `exceptd plan` was removed in v0.13.0; invoking it returns a structured `ok:false` refusal pointing at this command. |
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+ | `exceptd brief --all` | Grouped-by-scope summary of all 28 playbooks. `--scope <type>` filters. `--directives` expands directive IDs/titles per playbook. `--flat` for non-grouped. `exceptd plan` was removed in v0.13.0; invoking it returns a structured `ok:false` refusal pointing at this command. |
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  | `exceptd brief <pb>` | Phase 2 threat-context briefing — threat context, RWEP thresholds, skill chain, token budget, jurisdiction obligations. |
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  | `exceptd run <pb> --evidence <file>` | Phases 5-7 (analyze + validate + close) from agent evidence. Auto-detect cwd when no playbook positional. `--vex <file>` drops CycloneDX/OpenVEX `not_affected` CVEs. `--diff-from-latest` for drift mode. `--force-stale` overrides currency hard-block. |
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  | `exceptd ai-run <pb>` | Streaming variant of `run` for AI agents; emits phase-by-phase NDJSON. |
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ When in doubt, ship the playbook without a collector and open the gap as a follo
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  | verifiable credential, digital wallet, sd-jwt-vc, oid4vp, mdoc, eudi wallet, eidas 2.0, did:web, status list, credential verifier | vc-wallet-trust |
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  | mail server hardening, smtp smuggling, starttls injection, open relay, imap command injection, managesieve, sieve redirect, mailbox dav, pop3, mx hardening | mail-server-hardening |
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  | network trust, adversary in the middle, aitm, dnssec, dane, tlsa, tsig, mtls pinning, http message signature, dns rebinding, nts, authenticated time | network-trust |
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+ | audit log integrity, tamper evident logging, hash chain, worm, object lock, legal hold, honeytoken, break glass, dual control, anti forensics, separation of duties | audit-log-integrity |
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  | ot security, ics security, scada, plc, iec 62443, nist 800-82, nerc cip | ot-ics-security |
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  | cvd, vdp, bug bounty, iso 29147, iso 30111, csaf, security.txt | coordinated-vuln-disclosure |
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  | threat model, stride, pasta, linddun, kill chain, diamond model, unified kill chain | threat-modeling-methodology |
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
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  # Changelog
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+ ## 0.16.14 — 2026-06-02
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+
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+ New `audit-log-integrity` playbook and skill audit whether the system-of-record audit trail survives the privileged or insider attacker most likely to tamper with it: a hash chain that is written but never verified on read, audit entries unsigned or signed with a key co-located with the log writer, WORM storage in governance/override mode (a privileged role can still delete) rather than compliance mode, legal holds that annotate but do not block the retention purge, the log-writing identity also able to delete its own log, and missing or untriaged honeytokens plus unwitnessed break-glass access. It maps to NIST 800-53 SI-2, ISO 27001 A.8.15, NIS2 Art.21, and SOC 2 CC7. Run it with `exceptd brief audit-log-integrity` or `exceptd run audit-log-integrity`. The recently added `vc-wallet-trust`, `mail-server-hardening`, and `network-trust` playbooks now also map UK CAF and AU ISM, so their framework-gap output is complete on multi-jurisdiction runs.
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+
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  ## 0.16.13 — 2026-06-02
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  New `network-trust` playbook and skill audit the trust-anchor validation beneath TLS that adversary-in-the-middle attacks exploit: DNSSEC not validated end-to-end, DANE/TLSA not checked on capable peers, zone operations without TSIG, mTLS trusting a broad CA bundle instead of a pinned private CA, RFC 9421 HTTP message signatures unverified or under-scoped, DNS rebinding unguarded (SSRF into internal addresses), and unauthenticated NTP whose clock shift can revive expired certificates or shift TOTP windows. It maps to the DNSSEC resolver-DoS catalog entries (KeyTrap, NSEC3) and to NIST 800-53 SC-8, ISO 27001 A.8.21, NIS2 Art.21, and UK-CAF B4. Run it with `exceptd brief network-trust` or `exceptd run network-trust`.
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
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  [![CI](https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/blamejs/exceptd-skills/ci.yml?branch=main&label=CI)](https://github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
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  [![OpenSSF Scorecard](https://api.scorecard.dev/projects/github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills/badge)](https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills)
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  [![License: Apache 2.0](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-Apache_2.0-blue.svg)](https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0)
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- [![Skills](https://img.shields.io/badge/skills-45-d946ef)](#skill-inventory)
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+ [![Skills](https://img.shields.io/badge/skills-46-d946ef)](#skill-inventory)
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  [![ATLAS](https://img.shields.io/badge/MITRE%20ATLAS-v5.6.0-d946ef)](https://atlas.mitre.org)
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  [![ATT&CK](https://img.shields.io/badge/MITRE%20ATT%26CK-v19.0-d946ef)](https://attack.mitre.org)
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  [![Ed25519-signed](https://img.shields.io/badge/skills-Ed25519--signed-2ea043)](AGENTS.md)
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ This platform surfaces what is actually happening right now. Every skill explici
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  ## Status
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- Pre-1.0. Latest release lives on [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills/releases) and on npm as [`@blamejs/exceptd-skills`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills) with signed npm provenance attestation and Ed25519-signed skill bodies. The package ships 45 skills across kernel LPE, MCP supply chain, AI-as-C2, prompt injection, post-quantum crypto, SBOM integrity, identity-incident response, and 35 other AI/security domains, plus 11 intelligence catalogs (CVE / ATLAS / ATT&CK / CWE / D3FEND / DLP / RFC / framework gaps / global frameworks / zero-day lessons / exploit availability) covering 35 jurisdictions; the CVE catalog holds 439 actively-exploited and high-priority entries, each carrying behavioral indicators, an ATT&CK technique mapping, and a defense-chain zero-day lesson. 27 investigation playbooks (kernel, MCP, AI-API, framework, SBOM, runtime, hardening, secrets, cred-stores, containers, crypto, plus `webhook-callback-abuse`, `cicd-pipeline-compromise`, `identity-sso-compromise`, `llm-tool-use-exfil`, `post-quantum-migration`, `ai-discovered-cve-triage`, `supply-chain-recovery`, `citation-hygiene`, `vc-wallet-trust`, `mail-server-hardening`, `network-trust`, and more), a CLI for discovery and investigation built around `discover → brief → run → attest` (each run executes the playbook's seven-phase contract), and a nightly auto-refresh job that pulls KEV / NVD / EPSS / GHSA / OSV / IETF deltas plus 15 primary-source advisory, research-blog, and tech-press feeds (Qualys TRU, Red Hat RHSA, Ubuntu USN, ZDI, kernel.org, oss-security, JFrog, CISA, Microsoft Security Blog, Sysdig, Trail of Bits, Embrace the Red, BleepingComputer security, and The Hacker News) into auto-PRs for editorial review, alongside a silent-regression watcher that flags historical CVEs re-broken without a new identifier.
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+ Pre-1.0. Latest release lives on [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/blamejs/exceptd-skills/releases) and on npm as [`@blamejs/exceptd-skills`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills) with signed npm provenance attestation and Ed25519-signed skill bodies. The package ships 46 skills across kernel LPE, MCP supply chain, AI-as-C2, prompt injection, post-quantum crypto, SBOM integrity, identity-incident response, and 35 other AI/security domains, plus 11 intelligence catalogs (CVE / ATLAS / ATT&CK / CWE / D3FEND / DLP / RFC / framework gaps / global frameworks / zero-day lessons / exploit availability) covering 35 jurisdictions; the CVE catalog holds 439 actively-exploited and high-priority entries, each carrying behavioral indicators, an ATT&CK technique mapping, and a defense-chain zero-day lesson. 28 investigation playbooks (kernel, MCP, AI-API, framework, SBOM, runtime, hardening, secrets, cred-stores, containers, crypto, plus `webhook-callback-abuse`, `cicd-pipeline-compromise`, `identity-sso-compromise`, `llm-tool-use-exfil`, `post-quantum-migration`, `ai-discovered-cve-triage`, `supply-chain-recovery`, `citation-hygiene`, `vc-wallet-trust`, `mail-server-hardening`, `network-trust`, `audit-log-integrity`, and more), a CLI for discovery and investigation built around `discover → brief → run → attest` (each run executes the playbook's seven-phase contract), and a nightly auto-refresh job that pulls KEV / NVD / EPSS / GHSA / OSV / IETF deltas plus 15 primary-source advisory, research-blog, and tech-press feeds (Qualys TRU, Red Hat RHSA, Ubuntu USN, ZDI, kernel.org, oss-security, JFrog, CISA, Microsoft Security Blog, Sysdig, Trail of Bits, Embrace the Red, BleepingComputer security, and The Hacker News) into auto-PRs for editorial review, alongside a silent-regression watcher that flags historical CVEs re-broken without a new identifier.
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  ---
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@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ exceptd help
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  First run — verify the signing chain and pin the public-key fingerprint for out-of-band checks:
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  ```bash
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- exceptd doctor --signatures # verify Ed25519 chains (45/45 expected)
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+ exceptd doctor --signatures # verify Ed25519 chains (46/46 expected)
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  cat $(exceptd path)/keys/EXPECTED_FINGERPRINT # pin fingerprint for OOB verify
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  ```
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@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ GitHub repo-pattern monitoring: `exceptd watchlist --org-scan --org <login>` pro
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  AI-assistant config-file audit: `exceptd doctor --ai-config` walks `~/.claude`, `~/.cursor`, `~/.codeium`, `~/.aider`, and `~/.continue`, flagging sensitive files (`settings.json`, `mcp.json`, `*.mcp_config.json`, `api_key*`, `*.token`, `*.credentials`) not at mode 0600 on POSIX. On Windows the mode bits aren't load-bearing; each finding is surfaced with an info-level "manual ACL review" note. Catches the AI-config-credential-exfil class that the Shai-Hulud framework targets. Opt-in — does not run as part of the default no-flag `doctor` pass.
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- Evidence-collection layer: `exceptd collect <playbook>` invokes a companion script under `lib/collectors/<playbook>.js` that walks cwd, applies the catalogued regex set, stats permissions, and emits the submission JSON in the same shape `exceptd run --evidence -` accepts. 14 of 27 playbooks have collectors today (`ai-api`, `cicd-pipeline-compromise`, `citation-hygiene`, `containers`, `cred-stores`, `crypto`, `crypto-codebase`, `hardening`, `kernel`, `library-author`, `mcp`, `runtime`, `sbom`, `secrets`); the remaining 13 are policy-skipped per AGENTS.md (judgement-shaped incident / governance / pure-analyze playbooks where AI-driven evidence collection is the design). Canonical operator pipe: `exceptd collect <pb> | exceptd run <pb> --evidence -`. `exceptd doctor --collectors` enumerates the layer; `exceptd discover` tags applicable playbooks with `[collector]` when one ships. `cicd-pipeline-compromise` requires `--attest-ownership` on the collect call (the playbook's `operator-owns-ci-fleet` precondition is opt-in to prevent unauthorized CI assessments).
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+ Evidence-collection layer: `exceptd collect <playbook>` invokes a companion script under `lib/collectors/<playbook>.js` that walks cwd, applies the catalogued regex set, stats permissions, and emits the submission JSON in the same shape `exceptd run --evidence -` accepts. 14 of 28 playbooks have collectors today (`ai-api`, `cicd-pipeline-compromise`, `citation-hygiene`, `containers`, `cred-stores`, `crypto`, `crypto-codebase`, `hardening`, `kernel`, `library-author`, `mcp`, `runtime`, `sbom`, `secrets`); the remaining 14 are policy-skipped per AGENTS.md (judgement-shaped incident / governance / pure-analyze playbooks where AI-driven evidence collection is the design). Canonical operator pipe: `exceptd collect <pb> | exceptd run <pb> --evidence -`. `exceptd doctor --collectors` enumerates the layer; `exceptd discover` tags applicable playbooks with `[collector]` when one ships. `cicd-pipeline-compromise` requires `--attest-ownership` on the collect call (the playbook's `operator-owns-ci-fleet` precondition is opt-in to prevent unauthorized CI assessments).
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  Daily scheduled threat intake: a `routine: exceptd-threat-intake` (claude.ai remote agent) runs daily at 14:00 UTC. Sequence: `npm install` → `refresh --check-advisories` → `watchlist --alerts` → `refresh --apply` → `refresh --advisory <CVE-ID>` for up to 5 new CVE IDs from the primary-source feeds → re-sign + rebuild-indexes if the catalog mutated → commit on `intake/<YYYY-MM-DD>` branch with the full diff in the report. Closes the cadence gap that previously left fresh disclosures dependent on operator-triggered intake. Operator-managed at <https://claude.ai/code/routines>.
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@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ exceptd collect <playbook> Walk cwd + invoke the companion collector
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  under lib/collectors/<playbook>.js. Emits
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  a submission JSON ready to pipe into
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  `exceptd run <playbook> --evidence -`.
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- 14/27 playbooks have collectors; the rest
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+ 14/28 playbooks have collectors; the rest
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  are AI-driven by design (incident /
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  governance / pure-analyze — see
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  AGENTS.md).
package/bin/exceptd.js CHANGED
@@ -3118,6 +3118,7 @@ function refuseNoDirectives(verb, playbookId, pretty) {
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  // supply the precondition themselves.
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  const POLICY_SKIPPED_PLAYBOOKS = new Set([
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  "ai-discovered-cve-triage",
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+ "audit-log-integrity",
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  "cloud-iam-incident",
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  "idp-incident",
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  "post-quantum-migration", "webhook-callback-abuse",
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  "vc-wallet-trust", "mail-server-hardening", "network-trust",
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  ];
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  const playbookFiles = fs.readdirSync(playbookDir)
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  .filter(f => f.endsWith(".json") && !f.startsWith("_"))
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  {
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  "schema_version": "1.1.0",
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- "generated_at": "2026-06-02T17:08:31.041Z",
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+ "generated_at": "2026-06-02T17:43:25.965Z",
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  "generator": "scripts/build-indexes.js",
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- "source_count": 57,
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+ "source_count": 58,
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  "source_hashes": {
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- "manifest.json": "1aa03bd9897ddbaefef7593f21f0683e5cfb97b3d45e4d062880c7f1f9bed36d",
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+ "manifest.json": "ea32d11918b9e9429c3ced5e07f667a755a2ad50aee090b71d3aa0196af3accb",
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  "data/atlas-ttps.json": "f66b456cf82a3c20575d8479de41f7b11b7ee5693eb1fcf64a67e162ae1b88a2",
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  "data/attack-techniques.json": "c39f28e3402ef13ad9b7076819f63fda67a22f97e3e375cfe01c4a4e0beff7c9",
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  "data/cve-catalog.json": "8264da4534d39c9493cfcd18acf7e38ed47ce2a81be15afd5a3f4baf1d504929",
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- "data/cwe-catalog.json": "91d29027802d04bfd20f0ffd41c13f529f8bc005af50847832d5960c5a11fbf6",
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+ "data/cwe-catalog.json": "4762ef6f4d1cfe6eb9abff5f4539037294f18ded6feb3176161a4bb35fe85d32",
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  "data/d3fend-catalog.json": "9a54bccb9f24f84b32024216cc3f53819a053721ac8ab43c326859e68fc0ffaf",
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  "data/dlp-controls.json": "d2406c482dddd30e49203879999dc4b3a7fd4d0494d6a61d86b91ee76415df19",
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  "data/exploit-availability.json": "ec2656f0d9a893610e27b43eb6035fe9b18e057c9f6dfaac7e7d4959bbcbb795",
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  "skills/idp-incident-response/skill.md": "cb2f2c5b90de4592bfd66dcd55f9bf2004f370746d519cad577fcbaf36125878",
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  "skills/vc-wallet-trust/skill.md": "802dada75d934c9ab322246f650eb2eac9e2f72c1f094b0cebcfa605b56108a5",
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  "skills/mail-server-hardening/skill.md": "0554e23457851ac1cdb3b8217fae902789798db1bbc67c5f4cf1df6fd265cf15",
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- "skills/network-trust/skill.md": "d1c2fd6ce0bd74e508a41a61c8618cc5c979eaea2702ca97003ce46ba8c9dfa8"
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+ "skills/network-trust/skill.md": "d1c2fd6ce0bd74e508a41a61c8618cc5c979eaea2702ca97003ce46ba8c9dfa8",
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+ "skills/audit-log-integrity/skill.md": "72485e8df55dea8df80b675f04f32de2d32b8ee17d5e0aa96e61cd9bcb831193"
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  },
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- "skill_count": 45,
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+ "skill_count": 46,
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  "catalog_count": 11,
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  "index_stats": {
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  "xref_entries": {
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- "cwe_refs": 41,
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+ "cwe_refs": 42,
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  "d3fend_refs": 21,
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- "framework_gaps": 84,
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+ "framework_gaps": 85,
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  "atlas_refs": 10,
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+ "attack_refs": 47,
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  "rfc_refs": 23,
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  "dlp_refs": 0
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  },
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- "trigger_table_entries": 591,
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+ "trigger_table_entries": 607,
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  "chains_cve_entries": 426,
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  "chains_cwe_entries": 174,
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  "jurisdictions_indexed": 29,
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- "handoff_dag_nodes": 45,
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- "summary_cards": 45,
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- "section_offsets_skills": 45,
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- "token_budget_total_approx": 424405,
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+ "handoff_dag_nodes": 46,
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+ "summary_cards": 46,
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+ "section_offsets_skills": 46,
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+ "token_budget_total_approx": 426319,
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  "recipes": 8,
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  "jurisdiction_clocks": 29,
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  "did_ladders": 8,
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  "theater_fingerprints": 7,
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  "currency_action_required": 0,
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  "frequency_fields": 7,
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+ "activity_feed_events": 58,
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  "catalog_summaries": 11,
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  "schema_version": "1.0.0",
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  "note": "Network-layer trust and adversary-in-the-middle resistance for mid-2026 — DNSSEC validation, DANE/TLSA pinning, TSIG, mTLS private-CA pinning, RFC 9421 HTTP message signatures, DNS-rebinding/SSRF guarding, and authenticated time (NTS) and its effect on certificate validity and TOTP"
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+ {
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+ "date": "2026-06-02",
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+ "type": "skill_review",
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+ "artifact": "audit-log-integrity",
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+ "path": "skills/audit-log-integrity/skill.md",
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+ "note": "Audit-log integrity for mid-2026 — tamper-evident hash-chaining, off-host signing, compliance-mode WORM immutability, legal-hold-vs-retention enforcement, writer/custodian separation, and deception (honeytoken) coverage that resist the privileged attacker most likely to tamper with the trail"
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+ },
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  {
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  "date": "2026-06-01",
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  "artifact": "manifest.json",
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  "path": "manifest.json",
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+ "note": "manifest threat_review_date — 46 skills, 11 catalogs"
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  },
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  {
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  "date": "2026-05-11",