@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.14.5 → 0.14.7
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +12 -0
- package/bin/exceptd.js +126 -6
- package/data/_indexes/_meta.json +2 -2
- package/lib/flag-suggest.js +1 -1
- package/manifest.json +44 -44
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/sbom.cdx.json +16 -16
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
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# Changelog
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## 0.14.7 — 2026-05-27
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The deprecated-alias help is now honest about behavior. `scan`, `dispatch`, `currency`, `validate-cves`, and `validate-rfcs` still run their original (legacy orchestrator) implementation and emit that older output shape — they are not transparent aliases of the canonical verbs listed as their replacements, and the help no longer implies otherwise.
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`attest diff --against <sid>` validates the comparison session-id with the same gate as the primary one, so a path-traversal or malformed value returns an explicit "invalid session-id" error instead of a misleading "no session dir found".
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## 0.14.6 — 2026-05-27
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`attest verify --require-signed` makes an unsigned or sidecar-stripped attestation a failure (exit 1) instead of accepting it as "unsigned, exit 0". An audit gate can now require a valid Ed25519 signature, closing the path where deleting the `.sig` downgraded a tampered attestation to a passing verify. Default `attest verify` stays lenient — an unsigned attestation is reported but not failed (the common keyless-CI case).
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New `attest prune --all-older-than <ISO> [--dry-run]` garbage-collects attestation sessions older than a cutoff. One attestation is written per `run` with no prior cleanup, so the store grew unboundedly; `--dry-run` previews the deletions, and removal is confined to the resolved attestation roots.
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## 0.14.5 — 2026-05-27
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`reattest` no longer reports a false "drifted" on an unchanged session. It now replays the original recorded submission instead of a hardcoded empty one, so unchanged evidence reproduces its prior hash and only a genuine change in the evidence (or the way it canonicalizes) shows as drift. The `attest diff` path was already correct; this fixes the replay-based `reattest`/`attest diff <sid>` verb, which previously emitted "drifted" — and wrote that bogus verdict into the audit trail — on every unchanged session.
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package/bin/exceptd.js
CHANGED
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@@ -421,7 +421,10 @@ Canonical verbs
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421
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attest list inventory all sessions
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attest export redacted bundle (--format csaf)
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attest verify Ed25519 signature check
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(--require-signed: unsigned → exit 1)
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attest diff drift vs prior or --against <other-sid>
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attest prune GC: delete sessions older than
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--all-older-than <ISO> (--dry-run to preview)
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discover Scan cwd → recommend playbooks. Replaces scan + dispatch.
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430
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@@ -503,9 +506,12 @@ here so old scripts know where each moved:
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Deprecated aliases (still work — prefer the canonical verb)
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───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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-
These still run
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-
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-
verb
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These still run their original implementation — they are NOT transparent
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aliases, and several (scan, dispatch, currency, validate-cves, validate-rfcs)
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emit the older orchestrator output shape, not the canonical verb's. Migrate to
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the canonical replacement listed (whose output may differ); the [DEPRECATED]
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prefix keeps them out of the active-verbs list \`exceptd help | grep '^ [a-z]'\`
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surfaces.
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[DEPRECATED] scan → discover --scan-only
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[DEPRECATED] dispatch → discover
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@@ -4933,6 +4939,92 @@ function verifyAttestationSidecar(attFile) {
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}
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}
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/**
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* `attest prune --all-older-than <ISO>` — GC for attestation growth.
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*
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* One attestation is written per `run`, with no cleanup, so the store grows
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* monotonically (tests alone pile up thousands). This removes whole session
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* directories whose attestation `captured_at` predates the cutoff. `--dry-run`
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* previews without deleting. Deletion is confined to direct child dirs of the
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* resolved attestation roots — never traverses outside them.
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*/
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function cmdPruneAttestations(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
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const cutoffRaw = args["all-older-than"];
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if (!cutoffRaw) {
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return emitError(
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"attest prune: --all-older-than <ISO-8601 date> is required (e.g. attest prune --all-older-than 2026-01-01). Add --dry-run to preview.",
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{ verb: "attest prune" },
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pretty,
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);
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}
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const isoErr = validateIsoSince(cutoffRaw);
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if (isoErr) return emitError(`attest prune: ${isoErr}`, { verb: "attest prune" }, pretty);
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const cutoffMs = Date.parse(cutoffRaw);
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const dryRun = !!args["dry-run"];
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const roots = [...new Set([resolveAttestationRoot(runOpts), path.join(process.cwd(), ".exceptd", "attestations")])];
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const pruned = [];
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let kept = 0;
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let scanned = 0;
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for (const root of roots) {
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let sessions;
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try { sessions = fs.readdirSync(root, { withFileTypes: true }).filter(d => d.isDirectory()).map(d => d.name); }
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catch { continue; }
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for (const sid of sessions) {
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const sdir = path.join(root, sid);
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scanned++;
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// Determine the session's captured_at from its newest non-replay
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// attestation. A session with no parseable captured_at is left alone
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// (never delete something we can't date).
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let captured = null;
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try {
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for (const f of fs.readdirSync(sdir)) {
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if (!f.endsWith(".json") || f.endsWith(".sig")) continue;
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let j; try { j = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(sdir, f), "utf8")); } catch { continue; }
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if (!j || j.kind === "replay") continue;
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if (typeof j.captured_at === "string" && (!captured || j.captured_at > captured)) captured = j.captured_at;
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}
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} catch { continue; }
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const ts = captured ? Date.parse(captured) : NaN;
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if (!Number.isFinite(ts)) { kept++; continue; }
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if (ts < cutoffMs) {
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pruned.push({ session_id: sid, captured_at: captured, dir: sdir });
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if (!dryRun) {
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// Confinement: resolve and confirm sdir is a direct child of root
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// before removing, so a crafted session name can't escape the root.
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try {
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const realRoot = fs.realpathSync(root);
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const realDir = fs.realpathSync(sdir);
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if (path.dirname(realDir) === realRoot) fs.rmSync(realDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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} catch { /* skip undeletable */ }
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}
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} else {
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kept++;
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}
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}
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}
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emit({
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ok: true,
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verb: "attest prune",
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dry_run: dryRun,
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cutoff: cutoffRaw,
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scanned,
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pruned_count: pruned.length,
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kept,
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pruned: pruned.map(p => ({ session_id: p.session_id, captured_at: p.captured_at })),
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roots_searched: roots,
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}, pretty, (obj) => {
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const lines = [];
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lines.push(`attest prune${obj.dry_run ? " (DRY-RUN)" : ""}: cutoff ${obj.cutoff}`);
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lines.push(` scanned ${obj.scanned} session(s) | ${obj.dry_run ? "would prune" : "pruned"} ${obj.pruned_count} | kept ${obj.kept}`);
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for (const p of obj.pruned.slice(0, 20)) lines.push(` ${obj.dry_run ? "[would-delete]" : "[deleted]"} ${p.session_id} (${(p.captured_at || "").slice(0, 19)})`);
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if (obj.pruned_count > 20) lines.push(` … ${obj.pruned_count - 20} more`);
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if (obj.dry_run && obj.pruned_count > 0) lines.push(` → re-run without --dry-run to delete.`);
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return lines.join("\n");
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});
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}
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function cmdReattest(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
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const crypto = require("crypto");
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// Validate --since as ISO-8601, mirroring `attest list --since`. An
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@@ -5324,14 +5416,14 @@ function cmdAttest(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
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const subverb = args._[0];
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const sessionId = args._[1];
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if (!subverb) {
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return emitError("attest: missing subverb. Usage: attest list | show <sid> | export <sid> | verify <sid> | diff <sid>", null, pretty);
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return emitError("attest: missing subverb. Usage: attest list | show <sid> | export <sid> | verify <sid> [--require-signed] | diff <sid> | prune --all-older-than <ISO> [--dry-run]", null, pretty);
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}
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// Validate subverb membership BEFORE the session-id branch so a typo
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// (`attest verfy sid`) gets the did-you-mean response, not the
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// misleading "no session dir for sid" downstream. Pre-fix the
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// session-id resolution ran first and a valid-but-unrecognized
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// subverb collapsed into a session-lookup failure.
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const ATTEST_SUBVERBS = ["list", "show", "export", "verify", "diff"];
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const ATTEST_SUBVERBS = ["list", "show", "export", "verify", "diff", "prune"];
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if (!ATTEST_SUBVERBS.includes(subverb)) {
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const dym = suggestVerb(subverb, ATTEST_SUBVERBS);
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const hint = dym.length > 0
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if (subverb === "list") {
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return cmdListAttestations(runner, args, runOpts, pretty);
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}
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// `prune` is the GC for attestation growth — also no session-id positional.
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if (subverb === "prune") {
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return cmdPruneAttestations(runner, args, runOpts, pretty);
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}
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if (!sessionId) {
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return emitError(
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`attest ${subverb}: missing <session-id> positional argument. Inventory prior sessions with \`exceptd attest list\`; or pass \`--latest\` to operate on the most recent.`,
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5493
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// session (= reattest). With --against, compares two sessions A vs B
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// by evidence_hash + artifact-level field diff.
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if (args.against) {
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// Validate the --against id with the same gate as the primary sid, so a
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// traversal/garbage value (`../../etc/passwd`) gets the explicit "invalid
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// session-id" message rather than a misleading "no session dir found".
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try { validateSessionIdForRead(args.against); }
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catch (e) {
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return emitError(`attest diff --against: ${e.message}`, { against_input: typeof args.against === "string" ? args.against.slice(0, 80) : typeof args.against }, pretty);
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}
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const otherDir = findSessionDir(args.against, runOpts);
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if (!otherDir) {
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5505
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return emitError(`attest diff --against ${args.against}: no session dir found.`, null, pretty);
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@@ -5668,6 +5771,23 @@ function cmdAttest(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
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body.replay_tamper = true;
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5772
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body.warnings = ["one or more replay records failed Ed25519 verification — audit-trail corruption suspected, regenerate via reattest"];
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5773
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}
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// --require-signed: in an audit context an UNSIGNED or sidecar-stripped
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// attestation is not acceptable, even though it isn't tamper per se.
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// Without this, `attest verify` returns exit 0 for an unsigned attestation
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// — so an attacker who tampers the body AND deletes the .sig evades the
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// exit-6 tamper signal. Strict mode makes "not Ed25519-verified" a failure
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// (exit 1 via the ok:false contract, distinct from tamper's exit 6).
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if (!attTampered && args["require-signed"] && (attResults.length === 0 || !attResults.every(r => r.verified))) {
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body.ok = false;
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body.require_signed = true;
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// attResults.length === 0 → the session dir has no attestation at all
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// (only replay records, or the JSON was deleted); `[].every()` is
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// vacuously true, so without the length check an empty session would
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// pass strict mode. A strict audit gate must reject "nothing to verify".
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body.error = attResults.length === 0
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? "attest verify --require-signed: no signed attestation present for this session — refusing under strict mode"
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: "attest verify --require-signed: one or more attestations are not Ed25519-verified (unsigned or missing .sig sidecar) — refusing under strict mode";
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}
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5791
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// Human renderer for `attest verify` — one-line answer to "did
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5792
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// anyone tamper with my evidence since I ran it?" so the operator
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// doesn't have to parse the JSON envelope.
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@@ -5688,7 +5808,7 @@ function cmdAttest(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
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5808
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// failures (tamper_class present) so the next-step block still fires.
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const noTamper = att.every(r => !r.tamper_class) && rep.every(r => !r.tamper_class);
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const allVerified = att.every(r => r.verified) && rep.every(r => r.verified);
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5691
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-
const icon = obj.ok === false ? "[!! TAMPERED]" : (obj.replay_tamper ? "[i REPLAY_TAMPER]" : (allVerified ? "[ok]" : "[i UNSIGNED]"));
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const icon = obj.ok === false ? (obj.require_signed ? "[!! UNSIGNED-REJECTED]" : "[!! TAMPERED]") : (obj.replay_tamper ? "[i REPLAY_TAMPER]" : (allVerified ? "[ok]" : "[i UNSIGNED]"));
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lines.push(`\n${icon} ${att.filter(r => r.verified).length}/${att.length} attestation(s) verified, ${rep.filter(r => r.verified).length}/${rep.length} replay record(s) verified`);
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// Status icon precedence: verified → [ok]. tamper_class set →
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5694
5814
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// [!! <CLASS>] (real tamper signal). signed=false AND no
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package/data/_indexes/_meta.json
CHANGED
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{
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"schema_version": "1.1.0",
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"generated_at": "2026-05-
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"generated_at": "2026-05-27T17:12:16.726Z",
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"generator": "scripts/build-indexes.js",
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"source_count": 54,
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"source_hashes": {
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7
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"manifest.json": "
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"manifest.json": "fc1bd0402f7dde08b22ae283910749ddbeed4ce1b11b8dc6c37b96656ec23951",
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"data/atlas-ttps.json": "d24bc02859d40ccf1615db75cca68c077585904e41e0d8f6de448121e9b1abb0",
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"data/attack-techniques.json": "fa193f0d2d248176a8beddb641e9fe56ba4faa9e15dc253ff876dbf0c5d58a77",
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"data/cve-catalog.json": "3d451dda7ac0c7d57a4075ae4bafd3148c6184b35dc1bc59d8b81d1f2641e430",
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package/lib/flag-suggest.js
CHANGED
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@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ const VERB_FLAG_ALLOWLIST = Object.freeze({
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|
|
107
107
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ask: [],
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108
108
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attest: [
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109
109
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'against', 'playbook', 'since', 'latest', 'format', 'force', 'dry-run',
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110
|
-
'all-older-than', 'limit',
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|
110
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+
'all-older-than', 'limit', 'require-signed',
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111
111
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],
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112
112
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reattest: [
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113
113
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'playbook', 'since', 'latest', 'force-replay', 'attestation-root',
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package/manifest.json
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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1
1
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{
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2
2
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"name": "exceptd-security",
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"description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation",
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"signature": "lXhZgoIrrVloO3XaTvo/43AxZn4mwErstd7DR0O/oVhD3AOGODM4HqrageYEou9WKOdMEGP5mJNTjJsXdP5NDA==",
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"signature": "ztSKk/zFMFbT12qRcEeBKpydBn7fTT86KxMmor0DTCoKQWk5fJ0fSInfP1XMSB6rFk4/SuSjKVxQRMKVJ5a+Cg==",
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"signature": "K6QdPHNK5c4K5QFjrW0QsUhjp71D7SOisSoulwPNSvKRdi2rY+yg0kdckijBMkLMsVPyUvcC9giu93mKJ1OZDg==",
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"signature": "Qd3SBWmUAaaT++e1Ry2wBIz/dCBmNBMl0+4Rb0etvJLES0fIBEAkU1mTbgNZnT5XOg9J5twdUpymWtmKnDDQCQ==",
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"signature": "NA1hoQycvQhSUoG5rwlXX0mOVmGxoXRVezkELGEA2nZOdGis4gXkHT3O6Sfw7zxE4JuMrsCb65TEeOWk9WEPDg==",
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"signature": "W3pS8lnaCP96TQzsJpG5d5yv5IwgaQyS4Z2Ctcz5BOJf6LbajSIgeDgTZ4f4Bhr5m4E7KsgWGjZS4x7Fwd33BQ==",
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-17",
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"signature": "/WDGygh1Ck4yWlBWDGtEUVCqKB8d+UaJXoAoBXujtt+GAl8JbMNpaN1TvI0WkEltQ9dTxaAzSn20/eVDqv8iDQ==",
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"framework_gaps": [],
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
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"signature": "za1NKBpy9LC91F/ESO/qhUfmvVr8GNItQOjR5OJLeHm+2dQ9HHiFWQK2eo53V/n/0uhubuggURA3yS6kJuWwBg==",
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"framework_gaps": [],
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
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"signature": "xiHAhhdufm9hCKU8PLiPE0MX65ej2F4OZwtlWLGLCiie9/km+Kiqbt192LcMvr94v83C98pb9wIaqFsFWft6AQ==",
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"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.197Z",
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"forward_watch": [
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"New AI attack classes as ATLAS v6 publishes",
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"Post-quantum adversary capability timeline",
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"framework_gaps": [],
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
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"signature": "oYsSk35N2Uzq7MRofACykylcVwkgPhI4luWZ14vmQT+gUKLyZiKVOUJbe1+7lGl6BYPRN0sUDQ0f7S5Eu5w2Ag==",
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"framework_gaps": [],
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
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"signature": "igRqYyU1unRFH40BsPyAR62SPrk8QZv8dPGb8S9O9EvLCNOZAzm3t+HdT/NKqzWHwrpomOzkkkyLfYI/0qTUDA==",
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"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.198Z",
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"forward_watch": [
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"New CISA KEV entries",
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"New ATLAS TTP additions in each ATLAS release",
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@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@
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],
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
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"signature": "i/17u4kJiSpcZAz7LnTyRePFugQOstQ1P4kVoe0oGf4E2/j8oIN9U9DccjUn/YHZhKWIJ2AILG/DMhvMrr3bBg==",
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"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.198Z",
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"cwe_refs": [
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],
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
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"signature": "QuOVaQ4E2Sl39TClbhZ7HA9XrYAyRrDL44HY3RTE7aWLue0hV2cxaBt40ALGmHS++631QGFDlZTLZI77Tr6nAA==",
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"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.199Z"
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{
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"name": "security-maturity-tiers",
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],
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
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"signature": "8Px1s2lDj10/Q6erwEQlXgUHM1+OTruUR8qAHPX7Oo3k/l69N6P9sm0PsafS9wDFtj9l5C/OiLiFgzMlMt6vBw==",
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"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.199Z",
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"cwe_refs": [
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]
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
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"signature": "urRcataVWg6/utyEkSiOWoNxTL8sABRjPR7ShyDfZGnAozFph/yDktSoaPVxQDXwu9EfJE+qhUW5OYR/yJECBQ==",
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},
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"name": "attack-surface-pentest",
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@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@
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"Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — Microsoft Edge 4-bug sandbox escape by Orange Tsai (DEVCORE); forward-watch only (browser sandbox, out of current playbook scope); track Microsoft Edge security advisory and KEV add"
|
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],
|
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|
"signature": "C7lv65/Ecm8JJgSKxrX5lxx0YFzKWtrIQSKp+vy50I5e8945s1JmifGUUrnQwRQhq/Pkv7EmfiH5XSO8h75bDg==",
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@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@
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"OSS-Fuzz-Gen / AI-assisted harness generation becoming the default expectation for OSS maintainers"
|
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],
|
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"signature": "Z7ypCUnXx8JpLtgxxB6RHNi39w74AmrGY1N4ofAGCXhkuM2EaFVm1AU0dvl9UQ1bVLfHKEDGqMO/TwlIY7RABg==",
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"name": "dlp-gap-analysis",
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@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@
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"Quebec Law 25, India DPDPA, KSA PDPL enforcement actions naming AI-tool prompt data as in-scope personal information"
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],
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"signature": "IgEnpHOhCftAyfUNdKsjbrd169T9pJkk/rRM2ZEna+H18y7p5x48+1kME2sJMZjJuyAdQFBJi8PJXZFwLGI+DQ==",
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"name": "supply-chain-integrity",
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@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@
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"Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — NVIDIA Megatron Bridge path traversal by haehae; AI training-stack file-system trust boundary; track patch and SBOM-attestation impact"
|
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],
|
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"signature": "pcLrM98A3vUSZRjwNAk0aZ9umvOwB41XCLLsCOy/IebB2F/06oIrGUKkMHtHwm4pTVPShMMcKdZQQ3jz30FnCg==",
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
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"signature": "G5q5elh7Q7eu2xcwTVQJGDTGfvZR0OGQaLSLJPb2wjzCHFF8PWuZfCHZdjjqisiRzRWPyLlzgfHeMJqOdy7cBw==",
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
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"signature": "Wv5hGMeHjlaQK1zwicVCA7AvdKgJBgvcjdpGM9Ywahh9tagAKhbkOjybowDQZzu7OZ3bDkbh6pBYc1Sdwr6NAA==",
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
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"signature": "8t5qKHd3yWi57dvG36YQkLN/X9bQWqtEiYjay4IfSmqhJpM/xXPaQVKNGz3wscrO8OLKUZ0OaX7Mj5kzpgBKBQ==",
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{
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@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@
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"NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 amendments potentially adding explicit CVD program requirements"
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],
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"signature": "GDGt4UPqBa04PjlpSmpyihGzd3OgfBN7jaAK5tfwp+LRSs3ygKOdbeivUCCHNagTY1hE6hG2Ou40ADfBFuXeAg==",
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@@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@
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"PASTA v2 updates incorporating AI/ML application threats"
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],
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"signature": "rFBpOQEJUPpl+v88Lw/WqVJRhTl80vy0VbPAbzQj3Q0suJRRrJg368I9uKu5LXIBKFDvKxnGIcIzbGg9NUtaCA==",
|
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@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@
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"last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
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"signature": "ux85YI4t2mVHOyt744Yin1HHy+z11JIFygjKfFfQOBBl5QVV3A267jeIy7utix85irMcpZm/T3yx/ooqiK2tBA==",
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"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.203Z",
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"forward_watch": [
|
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1371
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"NGINX Rift CVE-2026-42945 (disclosed 2026-05-13, source depthfirst) — KEV-watch predicted CISA KEV listing by 2026-05-29; AI-assisted discovery angle; track for active-exploitation confirmation and patch advisory affecting front-door web app deployments"
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|
"last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
|
|
1421
1421
|
"signature": "IIXnkZ5ZNqFwOto5KfytADTLLZLoyXNZACD1ORZ40P1HUAQxe6u2uyXFzzsfuob4Uy06jNkRGr2FFgCphUH1Cw==",
|
|
1422
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
1422
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.203Z"
|
|
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1423
|
},
|
|
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1424
|
{
|
|
1425
1425
|
"name": "sector-healthcare",
|
|
@@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@
|
|
|
1479
1479
|
"d3fend_refs": [],
|
|
1480
1480
|
"last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
|
|
1481
1481
|
"signature": "AhF9KF8ZBlDteciV+F8IBSmFVYCvQOn44GmD4rZjgLoPxfIv/QE1/vSkK32zyqDKtHWkLSXExbkkPkxA/V6dDw==",
|
|
1482
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
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|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.204Z"
|
|
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1483
|
},
|
|
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|
{
|
|
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|
"name": "sector-financial",
|
|
@@ -1560,7 +1560,7 @@
|
|
|
1560
1560
|
"TIBER-EU framework v2.0 alignment with DORA TLPT RTS (JC 2024/40); cross-recognition with CBEST and iCAST"
|
|
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|
],
|
|
1562
1562
|
"signature": "HQgZvb4ReziEz5rNFr8i/O8/rJEZR+iHRROT7m/D2QUqhrcNISPkYXENsUZlG8xapzy/Ik92ehkseyj4hdmhCQ==",
|
|
1563
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
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|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.204Z"
|
|
1564
1564
|
},
|
|
1565
1565
|
{
|
|
1566
1566
|
"name": "sector-federal-government",
|
|
@@ -1629,7 +1629,7 @@
|
|
|
1629
1629
|
"Australia PSPF 2024 revision and ISM quarterly updates — track for Essential Eight Maturity Level requirements for federal entities"
|
|
1630
1630
|
],
|
|
1631
1631
|
"signature": "linxmsXZiOYtcs71sSWgGCrvb8xQfmxmtTY5PRvZJ0/8FgJulo0tQtejzexYG775s7XhjAmGsDP238BQTQ8ADA==",
|
|
1632
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
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|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.204Z"
|
|
1633
1633
|
},
|
|
1634
1634
|
{
|
|
1635
1635
|
"name": "sector-energy",
|
|
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@
|
|
|
1694
1694
|
"ICS-CERT advisory feed (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/ics-advisories) for vendor CVEs in Siemens, Rockwell, Schneider Electric, ABB, GE Vernova, Hitachi Energy, AVEVA / OSIsoft PI"
|
|
1695
1695
|
],
|
|
1696
1696
|
"signature": "JjBfc0ovta560Clk0x3QGRM5osFJDwcvpy3rT7QEGdCIL827jzE8QCow1C8deXq+4JhY2sA/d7/8IsxikdlkCg==",
|
|
1697
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
1697
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.205Z"
|
|
1698
1698
|
},
|
|
1699
1699
|
{
|
|
1700
1700
|
"name": "sector-telecom",
|
|
@@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@
|
|
|
1780
1780
|
"O-RAN SFG / WG11 security specifications"
|
|
1781
1781
|
],
|
|
1782
1782
|
"signature": "JWVxKFoKrbX4d+Tko1d4OBdwyg25MfFFKn4CT6E/CzH+YwnU3T6Y76uBQIKg3+gIGTvPduqyvQwQQ5FxKDuPBw==",
|
|
1783
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
1783
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.205Z"
|
|
1784
1784
|
},
|
|
1785
1785
|
{
|
|
1786
1786
|
"name": "api-security",
|
|
@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@
|
|
|
1849
1849
|
"d3fend_refs": [],
|
|
1850
1850
|
"last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
|
|
1851
1851
|
"signature": "BmCRCestWqr55+fCynEhtAl5NWLT+xLTkpwS0Icp3SaoZOw/ce3Y6TtqjHRSKn4CBJq7YDiLRWxmhO3MStvOAA==",
|
|
1852
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
1852
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.205Z",
|
|
1853
1853
|
"forward_watch": [
|
|
1854
1854
|
"NGINX Rift CVE-2026-42945 (disclosed 2026-05-13, source depthfirst) — KEV-watch predicted CISA KEV listing by 2026-05-29; track for active-exploitation confirmation and patch advisory affecting API gateway / reverse-proxy deployments",
|
|
1855
1855
|
"Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — LiteLLM 3-bug SSRF + Code Injection chain by k3vg3n; LLM-proxy API surface; track upstream patch and CVE assignments",
|
|
@@ -1935,7 +1935,7 @@
|
|
|
1935
1935
|
"CISA KEV additions for cloud-control-plane CVEs (IMDSv1 abuses, federation token mishandling, cross-tenant boundary failures); CISA Cybersecurity Advisories for cross-cloud advisories"
|
|
1936
1936
|
],
|
|
1937
1937
|
"signature": "/DV3pmZwrRySrk1OCbyI+0BQESacjupJfUX3eC2NGtXuYOBro0vndIP+z27heFxumnjU3a9sfla7/U9X+pqnDw==",
|
|
1938
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
1938
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.206Z"
|
|
1939
1939
|
},
|
|
1940
1940
|
{
|
|
1941
1941
|
"name": "container-runtime-security",
|
|
@@ -1997,7 +1997,7 @@
|
|
|
1997
1997
|
"d3fend_refs": [],
|
|
1998
1998
|
"last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
|
|
1999
1999
|
"signature": "E2UGSf9ATyYgzBr8uM/0ubOUmDqo1jVA7f9mVxv6LHfWGCNuQNXDyuNou9VAmUCeeXEeUYIi3AFjXkJqpOkxDA==",
|
|
2000
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
2000
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.206Z",
|
|
2001
2001
|
"forward_watch": [
|
|
2002
2002
|
"Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — NVIDIA Container Toolkit container escape ($50K award) by chompie / IBM X-Force XOR; high-severity container/hypervisor boundary break; track patch and KEV add post-embargo"
|
|
2003
2003
|
]
|
|
@@ -2071,7 +2071,7 @@
|
|
|
2071
2071
|
"MITRE ATLAS v5.6.0 (released May 2026) shipped the AML.T0010 sub-technique expansion this forecast tracked plus new techniques (\"Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool\", \"Escape to Host\"); inventory now 16 tactics, 84 techniques, 56 sub-techniques. Forward watch: subsequent ATLAS minor and major releases — track next-cadence updates to agentic-AI TTPs and MLOps-pipeline-specific techniques"
|
|
2072
2072
|
],
|
|
2073
2073
|
"signature": "IL+DlRCDJN/p08iiJCFkasKcoyjcB0uWrJ6ORLjQcS1HrUa5Xt62QxVjYPHzaevlm5y36ZdmfESqsZJmzK3lCg==",
|
|
2074
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
2074
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.206Z"
|
|
2075
2075
|
},
|
|
2076
2076
|
{
|
|
2077
2077
|
"name": "incident-response-playbook",
|
|
@@ -2133,7 +2133,7 @@
|
|
|
2133
2133
|
"NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.17 amendments tightening ransom-payment 24h disclosure operationalization"
|
|
2134
2134
|
],
|
|
2135
2135
|
"signature": "MmjLjlmOMLjhJJ4ZfR8MYlHam+ZB+eSqfh6Nv+DecaG4O5zeo9DBP/iL3cbyDVZxmhnhivgJild2ccYeWTeZAg==",
|
|
2136
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
2136
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.207Z"
|
|
2137
2137
|
},
|
|
2138
2138
|
{
|
|
2139
2139
|
"name": "ransomware-response",
|
|
@@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@
|
|
|
2213
2213
|
],
|
|
2214
2214
|
"last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
|
|
2215
2215
|
"signature": "ssueL03g9fWlhXpTe+IiY5l7RqQkunN4DTN5QETKE+VOX+qggdjAR8PONxk77ol4xWYmHrM/VcH8CNtXUEvgBA==",
|
|
2216
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
2216
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.207Z"
|
|
2217
2217
|
},
|
|
2218
2218
|
{
|
|
2219
2219
|
"name": "email-security-anti-phishing",
|
|
@@ -2266,7 +2266,7 @@
|
|
|
2266
2266
|
"d3fend_refs": [],
|
|
2267
2267
|
"last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
|
|
2268
2268
|
"signature": "rK+WnuS+9tqEABmwc0jO/PEmxcLjG1/tmUb897HsClQeKzf+TQOlwBE+OsbtuKxpjYNwur62Xxs3TxObkwm8Cw==",
|
|
2269
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
2269
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.207Z"
|
|
2270
2270
|
},
|
|
2271
2271
|
{
|
|
2272
2272
|
"name": "age-gates-child-safety",
|
|
@@ -2334,7 +2334,7 @@
|
|
|
2334
2334
|
"US state adult-site age-verification laws — 19+ states by mid-2026 (TX HB 18 upheld by SCOTUS June 2025 in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton); track ongoing challenges in remaining states"
|
|
2335
2335
|
],
|
|
2336
2336
|
"signature": "Rgho5TOFUL1txOzcVR0kASCNdovSU4yt99JlGilJlJRyg0A+BdeeQYrZrhPF6Vx2reUAVG0BeHfcZtSbi+cwCg==",
|
|
2337
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
2337
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.208Z"
|
|
2338
2338
|
},
|
|
2339
2339
|
{
|
|
2340
2340
|
"name": "cloud-iam-incident",
|
|
@@ -2414,7 +2414,7 @@
|
|
|
2414
2414
|
],
|
|
2415
2415
|
"last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
|
|
2416
2416
|
"signature": "e/kij7GtKaytROyIj7V5RH+FC9WtmVFzrmG2kIlNDNn29ep/CRNlIQKwXLpzo/81AIf634pmdr1qy/+vwIuUDA==",
|
|
2417
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
2417
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.208Z",
|
|
2418
2418
|
"forward_watch": [
|
|
2419
2419
|
"AWS IAM Identity Center session-policy refresh and step-up-on-admin enforcement (anticipated 2026-H2 release)",
|
|
2420
2420
|
"GCP Workload Identity Federation principal-set attribute mapping tightening (post-2026 Q3 Federation hardening guide)",
|
|
@@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@
|
|
|
2508
2508
|
],
|
|
2509
2509
|
"last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
|
|
2510
2510
|
"signature": "ew9Kglc9fAZzbn0ZIfGP7WSK/j4eV2VhSvpy+s5bEfNEVYIMa2kZjnGBapgUsyGDLes9H9K2ovjQyX17+GKiBw==",
|
|
2511
|
-
"signed_at": "2026-05-
|
|
2511
|
+
"signed_at": "2026-05-27T17:11:12.209Z",
|
|
2512
2512
|
"forward_watch": [
|
|
2513
2513
|
"Entra ID conditional access evolution post-Midnight Blizzard — Microsoft's 2025-2026 commitments on legacy-tenant MFA enforcement and OAuth-app consent gating",
|
|
2514
2514
|
"Okta IPSIE (Interoperability Profile for Secure Identity in the Enterprise) OpenID Foundation working-group output and adoption timeline",
|
|
@@ -2526,6 +2526,6 @@
|
|
|
2526
2526
|
],
|
|
2527
2527
|
"manifest_signature": {
|
|
2528
2528
|
"algorithm": "Ed25519",
|
|
2529
|
-
"signature_base64": "
|
|
2529
|
+
"signature_base64": "5bgCpmkd8C9UHuNxZlDtJmE+8NfPX0b5Myr2eWcPVqOBcoGLZE8i+CS8r4v2BUz6y8pp+uHJHBjMUBco0VdQAg=="
|
|
2530
2530
|
}
|
|
2531
2531
|
}
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@blamejs/exceptd-skills",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.14.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.14.7",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation. 42 skills, 11 catalogs (406 CVEs / 171 CWEs / 805 ATT&CK + ICS / 170 ATLAS / 468 D3FEND / 8888 RFCs), 35 jurisdictions, 10-class catalog gap detector + budget gate, real XML parser + canonical-form diff + content-pattern regression detection, Ed25519-signed.",
|
|
5
5
|
"keywords": [
|
|
6
6
|
"ai-security",
|
package/sbom.cdx.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
|
|
3
3
|
"specVersion": "1.6",
|
|
4
|
-
"serialNumber": "urn:uuid:
|
|
4
|
+
"serialNumber": "urn:uuid:02febec9-154a-4044-b88c-de2f287fa855",
|
|
5
5
|
"version": 1,
|
|
6
6
|
"metadata": {
|
|
7
|
-
"timestamp": "
|
|
7
|
+
"timestamp": "2027-08-05T14:10:17.000Z",
|
|
8
8
|
"tools": [
|
|
9
9
|
{
|
|
10
10
|
"vendor": "blamejs",
|
|
11
11
|
"name": "scripts/refresh-sbom.js",
|
|
12
|
-
"version": "0.14.
|
|
12
|
+
"version": "0.14.7"
|
|
13
13
|
}
|
|
14
14
|
],
|
|
15
15
|
"component": {
|
|
16
|
-
"bom-ref": "pkg:npm/@blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.14.
|
|
16
|
+
"bom-ref": "pkg:npm/@blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.14.7",
|
|
17
17
|
"type": "application",
|
|
18
18
|
"name": "@blamejs/exceptd-skills",
|
|
19
|
-
"version": "0.14.
|
|
19
|
+
"version": "0.14.7",
|
|
20
20
|
"description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation. 42 skills, 11 catalogs (406 CVEs / 171 CWEs / 805 ATT&CK + ICS / 170 ATLAS / 468 D3FEND / 8888 RFCs), 35 jurisdictions, 10-class catalog gap detector + budget gate, real XML parser + canonical-form diff + content-pattern regression detection, Ed25519-signed.",
|
|
21
21
|
"licenses": [
|
|
22
22
|
{
|
|
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
|
|
|
25
25
|
}
|
|
26
26
|
}
|
|
27
27
|
],
|
|
28
|
-
"purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.14.
|
|
28
|
+
"purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.14.7",
|
|
29
29
|
"hashes": [
|
|
30
30
|
{
|
|
31
31
|
"alg": "SHA-256",
|
|
32
|
-
"content": "
|
|
32
|
+
"content": "9393859a939fea499b00aee2cee91e1779da3fd89a0e8535dff37f747632d68f"
|
|
33
33
|
}
|
|
34
34
|
],
|
|
35
35
|
"externalReferences": [
|
|
36
36
|
{
|
|
37
37
|
"type": "distribution",
|
|
38
|
-
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills/v/0.14.
|
|
38
|
+
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills/v/0.14.7"
|
|
39
39
|
},
|
|
40
40
|
{
|
|
41
41
|
"type": "vcs",
|
|
@@ -116,11 +116,11 @@
|
|
|
116
116
|
"hashes": [
|
|
117
117
|
{
|
|
118
118
|
"alg": "SHA-256",
|
|
119
|
-
"content": "
|
|
119
|
+
"content": "9631107ccce0ba2e91c49cc461ac8b08027e9846c44fcc554d9285757a40d997"
|
|
120
120
|
},
|
|
121
121
|
{
|
|
122
122
|
"alg": "SHA3-512",
|
|
123
|
-
"content": "
|
|
123
|
+
"content": "afcabfcacb539d823e20b9a3d52e3c8758465b8b2e7a3c3c0d5d21bfc8e485a79f5eda2c56a1b3e1aff66889b71c8c527a7e19d78e76502d33c85cbe20a075a7"
|
|
124
124
|
}
|
|
125
125
|
]
|
|
126
126
|
},
|
|
@@ -281,11 +281,11 @@
|
|
|
281
281
|
"hashes": [
|
|
282
282
|
{
|
|
283
283
|
"alg": "SHA-256",
|
|
284
|
-
"content": "
|
|
284
|
+
"content": "86fafb59d29675231590513d2058e29728a8afd8e687022e657bd03cb023a44e"
|
|
285
285
|
},
|
|
286
286
|
{
|
|
287
287
|
"alg": "SHA3-512",
|
|
288
|
-
"content": "
|
|
288
|
+
"content": "a22d43d83ac7cfbb66e68e4739efea6819e145b80d856571d8e444358e3d7507a9097d4cb8f20800295b5da3a799cde05dba6c1b5f3c3ca1ac873ef492d6038b"
|
|
289
289
|
}
|
|
290
290
|
]
|
|
291
291
|
},
|
|
@@ -1226,11 +1226,11 @@
|
|
|
1226
1226
|
"hashes": [
|
|
1227
1227
|
{
|
|
1228
1228
|
"alg": "SHA-256",
|
|
1229
|
-
"content": "
|
|
1229
|
+
"content": "b10a9554dcc262a85ecd46745e310860afe530afbbcfaa62c9ddb8fa0c497cc2"
|
|
1230
1230
|
},
|
|
1231
1231
|
{
|
|
1232
1232
|
"alg": "SHA3-512",
|
|
1233
|
-
"content": "
|
|
1233
|
+
"content": "39ef1bf1ce48119193c306be741cc6706b0c13661ac9154c37bacd1e552811e3900caeaf41edc40698787a8cf1b8164ef49c534fe05c7415f2500a8c5e73eef5"
|
|
1234
1234
|
}
|
|
1235
1235
|
]
|
|
1236
1236
|
},
|
|
@@ -1751,11 +1751,11 @@
|
|
|
1751
1751
|
"hashes": [
|
|
1752
1752
|
{
|
|
1753
1753
|
"alg": "SHA-256",
|
|
1754
|
-
"content": "
|
|
1754
|
+
"content": "fc1bd0402f7dde08b22ae283910749ddbeed4ce1b11b8dc6c37b96656ec23951"
|
|
1755
1755
|
},
|
|
1756
1756
|
{
|
|
1757
1757
|
"alg": "SHA3-512",
|
|
1758
|
-
"content": "
|
|
1758
|
+
"content": "41fd2baf27759a7513e77b85137171a94d29961d58cff87433b26830cabf686f7c8f12f032816378be16da90fb9a1301918775bea11c85ce59724fb8a36c9ae7"
|
|
1759
1759
|
}
|
|
1760
1760
|
]
|
|
1761
1761
|
},
|