@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.14.12 → 0.14.14

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,30 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 0.14.14 — 2026-05-27
+
+Attestation durability and verification:
+- Attestations are now written atomically. The body and its Ed25519 `.sig` sidecar are written to fsync'd temporary files and placed together (the body via an atomic create that still detects a session-id collision, the sidecar alongside it), so a crash or out-of-space mid-write can no longer leave a truncated `attestation.json` or a body without its signature. A failed write also leaves no partial file at the slot.
+- `attest verify` now flags a deleted `.sig` sidecar as tampering (exit 6) when a signature was expected — i.e. when a signing key is present or a sibling attestation in the same session is signed — instead of accepting it as a benign "unsigned" attestation (exit 0). This makes the default `attest verify` agree with `reattest`, which already refused. A genuinely unsigned attestation on a keyless host stays benign.
+- A `run` now blocks (`blocked_by: "mutex"`) when a live concurrent process holds the run lock, rather than proceeding without the lock after losing the acquire race. Same-process reentrancy and filesystem quirks are unaffected.
+
+## 0.14.13 — 2026-05-27
+
+Security: a collector scanning a hostile repository no longer hangs on a crafted file. Three workflow/Dockerfile/manifest scanners (`library-author`, `cicd-pipeline-compromise`, `containers`) had a regex that backtracked catastrophically on a long whitespace line — a single planted file could wedge the scan for minutes. The regexes are fixed and a per-line length cap bounds any future regression.
+
+Deeply-nested evidence is now rejected with an actionable message instead of crashing with an opaque "internal error". The submission canonicalizer (which runs on every `run` to compute the evidence hash) recursed without bound; it now refuses a submission nested beyond 200 levels.
+
+`run --strict-preconditions` now fails (exit 1) when a `skip_phase` precondition is false. Previously such a run skipped the detect phase and exited 0, so a CI gate relying on the flag silently passed despite the detection never running.
+
+Detection no longer silently loses or buries a result:
+- A `signal_overrides` value that isn't a recognized result (e.g. `"maybe"`, a number) now surfaces a `signal_override_unrecognized` runtime error instead of being dropped as if the signal were never supplied.
+- A `not_detected` / `clean` classification override is refused when it would bury a deterministic indicator hit (a deterministic hit is too strong to downgrade to "nothing found"); the run stays inconclusive with an explanatory error. Probabilistic hits remain overridable for the legitimate "I confirmed these are benign" workflow. A refused override is no longer reported as applied.
+
+`run --all` / `run-all` now exits 7 (session-id collision) when a reused `--session-id` collides across the batch, matching the single-run behavior — previously a batch that persisted nothing exited 0 and reported success.
+
+`watch --help` prints usage and exits instead of starting the blocking daemon and hanging the terminal; `collect --help` now prints its synopsis. The `--help` synopsis for the spawned verbs (`watch`, `watchlist`, `report`, `scan`, `dispatch`, `currency`, `validate-cves`, `validate-rfcs`) is filled in.
+
+README corrects the `watch` / `watchlist` documentation (the one-shot aggregator with `--alerts` / `--org-scan` is `watchlist`; `watch` is the long-running daemon) and the `refresh --prefetch` description (it warms the cache by fetching, the opposite of the report-only `--no-network`).
+
 ## 0.14.12 — 2026-05-27
 
 Structured-bundle accuracy:

package/README.md

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ npx @blamejs/exceptd-skills path
 That prints the absolute path of the installed package. Point your AI assistant at:
 
 - `<path>/AGENTS.md` — canonical project rules + ground truth for every skill
-- `<path>/data/_indexes/summary-cards.json` — 100-word abstract per skill (12 KB)
+- `<path>/data/_indexes/summary-cards.json` — 100-word abstract per skill (~95 KB)
 - `<path>/data/_indexes/recipes.json` — curated multi-skill chains for common use cases
 
 No clone, no signing keys, no Node 24 required for assistants that read directly from disk. If your assistant needs a local copy as a regular checkout, use `npx degit blamejs/exceptd-skills my-skills` instead.
@@ -156,9 +156,9 @@ Fresh-disclosure workflow (v0.12.0): the nightly auto-PR job pulls KEV / NVD / E
 
 Primary-source advisory polling: `exceptd refresh --check-advisories` polls 15 vendor and coordinated-disclosure feeds — 8 advisory/coordinated-disclosure venues (Qualys TRU, Red Hat RHSA, Ubuntu USN, Zero Day Initiative, kernel.org commits, oss-security mailing list, JFrog SecOps, CISA current advisories), 4 vendor security research blogs added in v0.13.14 (Microsoft Security Blog, Sysdig, Trail of Bits, Embrace the Red), and 3 additions in v0.13.17 (BleepingComputer security, The Hacker News, and a GitLab activity-feed tracker for the Nightmare-Eclipse researcher handle that anchors NEW-CTRL-073). Combined coverage publishes CVE IDs at T+0 to T+1 — typically 3–14 days ahead of NVD enrichment. The command is report-only: it returns a structured `diffs[]` listing each newly-seen CVE ID with its source attributions and advisory URLs, but does not mutate the catalog. v0.13.17 also adds a complementary detection method (NEW-CTRL-074 / `lib/cve-regression-watcher.js`): the watcher cross-checks poller diffs for historical-CVE references (year ≤ currentYear − 2) and surfaces candidate silent-regression cases — the class anchored by MiniPlasma (a 2026 PoC drop that re-broke CVE-2020-17103 without any new ID being assigned). Operators triage the output and route promising IDs through `exceptd refresh --advisory <CVE-ID> --apply`. Pairs naturally with the daily scheduled remote agent below.
 
-CVE-class alert surfacing: `exceptd watch --alerts` matches the live `cve-catalog.json` against five operational patterns (`kernel_lpe_with_poc`, `supply_chain_family`, `ai_discovered_kev`, `active_exploitation_unpatched`, `recent_poc_no_kev_yet`) and returns the matches sorted critical-severity-first, then by RWEP. Use as a fast operational triage on a refreshed catalog without scanning every entry by hand.
+CVE-class alert surfacing: `exceptd watchlist --alerts` matches the live `cve-catalog.json` against five operational patterns (`kernel_lpe_with_poc`, `supply_chain_family`, `ai_discovered_kev`, `active_exploitation_unpatched`, `recent_poc_no_kev_yet`) and returns the matches sorted critical-severity-first, then by RWEP. Use as a fast operational triage on a refreshed catalog without scanning every entry by hand.
 
-GitHub repo-pattern monitoring: `exceptd watch --org-scan --org <login>` probes GitHub Search for repositories matching known threat-actor naming patterns ("A Gift From TeamPCP", "Shai-Hulud", "TeamPCP") scoped to one org. Custom patterns via repeatable `--pattern <s>`. Implements the canonical detection for the Shai-Hulud / TeamPCP supply-chain framework class — the attacker uses GitHub itself as the exfil channel. Set `GITHUB_TOKEN` for private-repo coverage and rate-limit headroom; public-repo search works without auth.
+GitHub repo-pattern monitoring: `exceptd watchlist --org-scan --org <login>` probes GitHub Search for repositories matching known threat-actor naming patterns ("A Gift From TeamPCP", "Shai-Hulud", "TeamPCP") scoped to one org. Custom patterns via repeatable `--pattern <s>`. Implements the canonical detection for the Shai-Hulud / TeamPCP supply-chain framework class — the attacker uses GitHub itself as the exfil channel. Set `GITHUB_TOKEN` for private-repo coverage and rate-limit headroom; public-repo search works without auth.
 
 AI-assistant config-file audit: `exceptd doctor --ai-config` walks `~/.claude`, `~/.cursor`, `~/.codeium`, `~/.aider`, and `~/.continue`, flagging sensitive files (`settings.json`, `mcp.json`, `*.mcp_config.json`, `api_key*`, `*.token`, `*.credentials`) not at mode 0600 on POSIX. On Windows the mode bits aren't load-bearing; each finding is surfaced with an info-level "manual ACL review" note. Catches the AI-config-credential-exfil class that the Shai-Hulud framework targets. Opt-in — does not run as part of the default no-flag `doctor` pass.
 
@@ -329,6 +329,21 @@ exceptd doctor                        One-shot health check.
                                       note for each sensitive file on Windows.
                                       Opt-in; not part of the default doctor
                                       pass.
+  --fix                               Auto-remediate signing gaps: regenerate
+                                      the local Ed25519 private key when
+                                      keys/public.pem exists but .keys/private.pem
+                                      is absent. No-op when the key is present.
+  --registry-check                    Probe the npm registry for the latest
+                                      published version + days-since-publish.
+                                      Off by default; --air-gap suppresses it.
+  --collectors                        Enumerate the per-playbook collector layer:
+                                      which playbooks ship a collector, which are
+                                      policy-skipped, and which are unwired.
+  --shipped-tarball                   Run the pack + extract + verify round-trip
+                                      against the tarball operators receive, not
+                                      just the source tree.
+  --exit-codes                        Print the canonical exit-code table as
+                                      JSON for CI / scripting consumers.
 
 exceptd ci                            One-shot CI gate. Exit codes: 0 PASS,
                                       1 framework error, 2 detected/escalate
@@ -382,8 +397,12 @@ exceptd refresh                       Refresh upstream catalogs + indexes.
                                       Replaces prefetch + refresh + build-indexes.
   --apply                             Write diffs back + rebuild indexes.
   --from-cache [<dir>]                Read from prefetch cache.
-  --prefetch                          Populate the offline cache (alias for
-                                      --no-network).
+  --prefetch                          Warm the offline cache by fetching every
+                                      upstream artifact now (network required).
+                                      Run on a connected host, then point
+                                      --from-cache at the result on the air-gap.
+  --no-network                        Report-only dry-run: list what would be
+                                      fetched without touching the network.
   --network                           (v0.11.14) Fetch latest signed catalog
                                       snapshot from npm tarball, verify against
                                       local public.pem, swap data/ in place.
@@ -417,9 +436,10 @@ Packages dataset (`MAL-*` keys). New IDs land as drafts that the catalog
 validator treats as warnings, not errors — editorial review (framework
 gaps, IoCs, ATLAS/ATT&CK refs) is still required.
 
-exceptd watch                         Default mode: aggregate every skill's
+exceptd watchlist                     Default mode: aggregate every skill's
                                       forward_watch entries (upcoming standards,
-                                      RFC publications, new TTPs to monitor).
+                                      RFC publications, new TTPs to monitor) in
+                                      one shot.
                                       `--by-skill` inverts the grouping.
   --alerts                            Switch to CVE-catalog pattern alerts.
                                       Five patterns ship:
@@ -448,6 +468,15 @@ exceptd watch                         Default mode: aggregate every skill's
                                       limit; without it, public-repo search
                                       only.
 
+exceptd watch                         Long-running forward-watch daemon. Blocks
+                                      and listens for KEV additions, ATLAS
+                                      updates, CVE drops, and framework
+                                      amendments, with scheduled currency /
+                                      validation checks. Ctrl-C (or SIGTERM /
+                                      SIGHUP / SIGBREAK) to stop. For one-shot
+                                      aggregation, pattern alerts, or org-scan,
+                                      use `exceptd watchlist`.
+
 exceptd skill <name>                  Show context for one skill.
 exceptd framework-gap <FW> <ref>      One framework + one CVE/scenario, JSON
                                       or human. (Operates outside the seven-
@@ -455,7 +484,8 @@ exceptd framework-gap <FW> <ref>      One framework + one CVE/scenario, JSON
 exceptd path                          Absolute path to the installed package.
 exceptd version                       Package version.
 exceptd help                          This help.
-exceptd <verb> --help                 Per-verb usage with flag descriptions.
+exceptd <verb> --help                 Most verbs print per-verb usage with flag
+                                      descriptions.
 ```
 
 ### Legacy v0.10.x verbs

package/bin/exceptd.js

@@ -761,6 +761,16 @@ function main() {
     "framework-gap-analysis": "exceptd framework-gap <framework> <cve-or-scenario>   One-framework gap analysis.",
     cve: "exceptd cve <CVE-ID> [--json] [--air-gap|--no-network]   Resolve a CVE: published/rejected/disputed/fabricated/nonexistent (catalog -> cache -> NVD). Exit 2 when the citation won't stand up (rejected/fabricated/nonexistent/withdrawn).",
     rfc: "exceptd rfc <number> [--check \"<title>\"] [--json] [--air-gap]   Resolve an RFC number -> title + status (local index, offline). Exit 2 when nonexistent or --check title MISMATCH.",
+    // watch MUST be here: without the interception `watch --help` falls through
+    // to spawning the blocking daemon, hanging the operator's terminal.
+    watch: "exceptd watch          Long-running forward-watch daemon (blocks; Ctrl-C to stop). For a one-shot aggregator use `exceptd watchlist`.",
+    watchlist: "exceptd watchlist [--alerts] [--org-scan --org <login>] [--by-skill] [--json]   One-shot forward-watch aggregator across skills.",
+    report: "exceptd report [executive] [--json]   Structured posture report.",
+    scan: "exceptd scan [--json]          [legacy] Working-directory CVE/KEV scan (orchestrator). See `exceptd discover`.",
+    dispatch: "exceptd dispatch [--json]      [legacy] Scan + route findings to skills (orchestrator). See `exceptd discover`.",
+    currency: "exceptd currency [--json]      [legacy] Skill threat-currency report. See `exceptd doctor --currency`.",
+    "validate-cves": "exceptd validate-cves [--offline|--air-gap] [--json]   Validate the CVE catalog against upstream (offline-first).",
+    "validate-rfcs": "exceptd validate-rfcs [--offline|--air-gap] [--json]   Validate the RFC index against upstream (offline-first).",
   };
   if ((effectiveRest.includes("--help") || effectiveRest.includes("-h")) && SPAWN_HELP_USAGE[effectiveCmd]) {
     process.stdout.write(SPAWN_HELP_USAGE[effectiveCmd] + "\n  Full reference: exceptd help\n");
@@ -2314,6 +2324,20 @@ Exit codes:
 Output: verb, session_id, playbooks_run, summary{total, detected,
 max_rwep_observed, jurisdiction_clocks_started, verdict, fail_reasons[]},
 results[].`,
+    collect: `collect <playbook> [--cwd <dir>] [--resolve] [--air-gap] [--json]
+
+Scan the working directory (or --cwd <dir>) and emit an evidence submission
+for <playbook>, ready to pipe into \`run\`:
+
+  exceptd collect <playbook> | exceptd run <playbook> --evidence -
+
+Flags:
+  --cwd <dir>             Scan <dir> instead of the current directory.
+  --resolve               (citation-hygiene) resolve uncatalogued CVE/RFC
+                          citations found during the scan.
+  --air-gap               Do not touch the network during collection.
+  --json                  Raw JSON (default when piped; collect output is the
+                          submission, not a human digest).`,
     brief: `brief [playbook] — unified info doc (v0.11.0).
 
 Collapses the three info-only phases plan + govern + direct + look into a
@@ -3553,8 +3577,13 @@ function cmdRun(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
   // behavior where warn-level issues stay informational. CI gates wanting
   // "fail on any unverified precondition" pass this flag.
   if (args["strict-preconditions"] && result && Array.isArray(result.preflight_issues)) {
+    // precondition_skip MUST be included: a false skip_phase precondition
+    // means detect never ran, so a CI gate relying on --strict-preconditions
+    // ("any precondition_check returning false fails the run", per --help) would
+    // otherwise silently pass (verdict:skipped, exit 0) — the exact gap the
+    // flag exists to close.
     const warnIssues = result.preflight_issues.filter(i =>
-      i.kind === "precondition_unverified" || i.kind === "precondition_warn"
+      i.kind === "precondition_unverified" || i.kind === "precondition_warn" || i.kind === "precondition_skip"
     );
     if (warnIssues.length > 0) {
       // v0.12.12: surface the contract violation in the emitted body so
@@ -4303,9 +4332,19 @@ function cmdRunMulti(runner, ids, args, runOpts, pretty, meta) {
   // remediation without parsing the body.
   const anyLockBusy = results.some(r => r.attestation_persist && r.attestation_persist.lock_contention === true);
   const anyStorageExhausted = results.some(r => r.attestation_persist && r.attestation_persist.storage_exhausted === true);
+  // A persist failure that is neither lock-contention nor storage-exhaustion is
+  // a session-id collision (the single-run path exits 7 for the same
+  // condition). Pre-fix a batch where every attestation refused to overwrite
+  // exited 0, so a re-run with a reused --session-id silently persisted nothing
+  // while reporting success. Surface it with the same code as the single-run
+  // path so a CI gate sees it.
+  const anySessionCollision = results.some(r =>
+    r.attestation_persist && r.attestation_persist.ok === false
+    && !r.attestation_persist.lock_contention && !r.attestation_persist.storage_exhausted);
   const anyBlocked = results.some(r => r.ok === false);
   if (anyLockBusy) { process.exitCode = EXIT_CODES.LOCK_CONTENTION; return; }
   if (anyStorageExhausted) { process.exitCode = EXIT_CODES.STORAGE_EXHAUSTED; return; }
+  if (anySessionCollision) { process.exitCode = EXIT_CODES.SESSION_ID_COLLISION; return; }
   if (anyBlocked) { process.exitCode = EXIT_CODES.GENERIC_FAILURE; return; }
 }
 
@@ -4525,23 +4564,68 @@ function persistAttestation(args) {
         prior_evidence_hash: priorEvidenceHash,
         prior_captured_at: priorCapturedAt,
       };
-      // Atomic-create via O_EXCL ('wx' flag) eliminates the TOCTOU window
-      // between existsSync and writeFileSync. Two concurrent run-with-same-
-      // session-id invocations now produce one winner + one EEXIST loser,
-      // not silent last-write-wins.
+      // Atomic write: the body and its .sig are written to fsync'd tmp files,
+      // then placed with linkSync (create) / rename (force-overwrite) so a
+      // crash mid-write can never leave a TRUNCATED attestation.json, and the
+      // body never appears partially written. linkSync preserves the O_EXCL
+      // collision guarantee the old "wx" flag gave: it throws EEXIST when the
+      // slot is taken (one winner + one EEXIST loser on concurrent same-
+      // session-id runs), and the placed file has the full content instantly.
       //
-      // v0.12.38 (cycle 18 P1 F2): mode 0o600 + Windows ACL hardening.
-      // Pre-fix attestations were written world-readable (umask-derived
-      // 0o644). On multi-tenant shared hosts a different user could read
-      // the operator's evidence submission, jurisdiction obligations,
-      // and consent records. Mirrors the existing private-key handling
-      // in lib/sign.js (mode 0o600 + restrictWindowsAcl).
-      fs.writeFileSync(filePath, JSON.stringify(attestation, null, 2), { flag, mode: 0o600 });
+      // v0.12.38: mode 0o600 + Windows ACL hardening — attestations carry the
+      // operator's evidence, jurisdiction obligations, and consent records and
+      // must not be world-readable on multi-tenant hosts.
+      const crypto = require("crypto");
+      const jsonStr = JSON.stringify(attestation, null, 2);
+      const sigPath = filePath + ".sig";
+      const suffix = `.${process.pid}.${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}.tmp`;
+      const jsonTmp = filePath + suffix;
+      const sigTmp = sigPath + suffix;
+      const writeFsync = (p, data) => {
+        const fd = fs.openSync(p, "w", 0o600);
+        try { fs.writeFileSync(fd, data); fs.fsyncSync(fd); }
+        finally { fs.closeSync(fd); }
+      };
+      // Sidecar is computed over the SAME normalized bytes that will land, so
+      // the sig always matches the placed body.
+      const sidecarBytes = computeSidecarBytes(normalizeAttestationBytes(jsonStr));
+      writeFsync(jsonTmp, jsonStr);
+      writeFsync(sigTmp, sidecarBytes);
+      try {
+        if (flag === "wx") {
+          // Atomic create + collision detection.
+          try {
+            fs.linkSync(jsonTmp, filePath);
+          } catch (linkErr) {
+            if (linkErr.code === "EEXIST") throw linkErr; // collision — outer handler decides
+            // Filesystems without hard-link support (EPERM/EXDEV/ENOSYS): fall
+            // back to an existsSync collision check + atomic rename. Narrow
+            // TOCTOU window, only on such filesystems.
+            if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) { const e = new Error("EEXIST"); e.code = "EEXIST"; throw e; }
+            fs.renameSync(jsonTmp, filePath);
+          }
+          // Slot won — place the sidecar (sigPath is fresh on a create).
+          fs.renameSync(sigTmp, sigPath);
+          try { fs.unlinkSync(jsonTmp); } catch { /* hard-link path leaves a second name */ }
+        } else {
+          // Force-overwrite, under the persist lock: atomic replace of both.
+          // Both tmps are fully written + fsync'd, so the new body and its
+          // matching new sidecar are placed back-to-back.
+          fs.renameSync(jsonTmp, filePath);
+          fs.renameSync(sigTmp, sigPath);
+        }
+      } catch (placeErr) {
+        // Clean up tmps on any placement failure (incl. EEXIST collision) so
+        // a failed/refused write never leaves orphan tmp files at the slot.
+        try { fs.unlinkSync(jsonTmp); } catch { /* may already be linked/renamed */ }
+        try { fs.unlinkSync(sigTmp); } catch { /* may already be renamed */ }
+        throw placeErr;
+      }
       try {
         const { restrictWindowsAcl } = require(path.join(PKG_ROOT, "lib", "sign.js"));
         restrictWindowsAcl(filePath);
+        restrictWindowsAcl(sigPath);
       } catch { /* sign.js not loadable in some test paths — best-effort */ }
-      maybeSignAttestation(filePath);
     };
 
     try {
@@ -4714,40 +4798,18 @@ function normalizeAttestationBytes(input) {
   return s.replace(/\r\n/g, "\n");
 }
 
-function maybeSignAttestation(filePath) {
+// Compute the `.sig` sidecar bytes for an attestation's (already-normalized)
+// content. Pure — does NOT write any file; the persist path writes the
+// returned string to a tmp and atomically renames it into place alongside the
+// attestation body, so the body never lands without its sidecar bytes ready.
+// Emits the one-time-per-process unsigned warning.
+function computeSidecarBytes(contentNormalized) {
   const crypto = require("crypto");
-  const sigPath = filePath + ".sig";
-  // v0.12.9 (P2 #3 from production smoke + codex P1 PR #4 review): keep the
-  // sign key aligned with the VERIFY key. `attest verify` checks signatures
-  // against PKG_ROOT/keys/public.pem; if we sign with cwd/.keys/private.pem
-  // (e.g. the maintainer's repo-local keypair) the resulting `.sig` will
-  // verify INVALID and report a false tamper signal on every freshly-written
-  // attestation. PKG_ROOT-only resolution is the right answer; the original
-  // smoke report's "doctor finds key, run does not" gap is fixed in `doctor`
-  // (reporting only PKG_ROOT now), not by making `run` follow a cwd key the
-  // verifier doesn't trust.
+  // v0.12.9: keep the sign key aligned with the VERIFY key. `attest verify`
+  // checks signatures against PKG_ROOT/keys/public.pem; signing with a
+  // cwd-local key would verify INVALID. PKG_ROOT-only resolution is correct.
   const privKeyPath = path.join(PKG_ROOT, ".keys", "private.pem");
-  // Normalize attestation bytes before sign — strip leading UTF-8 BOM +
-  // collapse CRLF to LF. Mirrors lib/sign.js / lib/verify.js /
-  // lib/refresh-network.js / scripts/verify-shipped-tarball.js. The
-  // attestation file lives on disk under .exceptd/ and can pick up CRLF
-  // through git-attribute / editor round-trips on Windows; without
-  // normalization the sign/verify pair diverges on the same logical content.
-  // The byte-stability contract spans five sites; tests/normalize-contract
-  // .test.js enforces byte-identical output across all of them.
-  const rawContent = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8");
-  const content = normalizeAttestationBytes(rawContent);
   // One-time-per-process unsigned warning so cron jobs don't spam stderr.
-  // Operators who set `.keys/private.pem` get tamper-evident attestations;
-  // operators without the keypair get a single nudge per session telling them
-  // exactly how to enable signing.
-  //
-  // Consumer installs (`npm install -g`) land PKG_ROOT under
-  // node_modules/ where the operator typically can't write to
-  // .keys/. For those installs the multi-line nudge prescribes a
-  // remediation (doctor --fix) the operator doesn't own — surface a
-  // single-line marker so the unsigned attestation isn't silent, but
-  // skip the call-to-action that doesn't apply.
   if (!fs.existsSync(privKeyPath) && !process.env.EXCEPTD_UNSIGNED_WARNED) {
     const pkgRootSegments = PKG_ROOT.split(/[\\/]/);
     const isConsumerInstall =
@@ -4768,37 +4830,45 @@ function maybeSignAttestation(filePath) {
   try {
     if (fs.existsSync(privKeyPath)) {
       const privateKey = fs.readFileSync(privKeyPath, "utf8");
-      const sig = crypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(content, "utf8"), {
+      const sig = crypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(contentNormalized, "utf8"), {
         key: privateKey,
         dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363",
       });
-      // The sidecar's Ed25519 signature covers ONLY the attestation file
-      // bytes. Fields that travel inside the .sig but are NOT in the signed
-      // message are replay-rewrite trivial: an attacker who can write the
-      // directory can mutate them without invalidating the signature. The
-      // sidecar therefore carries only the algorithm tag, the Ed25519
-      // signature payload, and an explanatory note — no `signed_at`,
-      // `signs_path`, or `signs_sha256`. Operators reading freshness use
-      // filesystem mtime; the attestation file's `captured_at` field is
-      // what's signed.
-      fs.writeFileSync(sigPath, JSON.stringify({
+      // The Ed25519 signature covers ONLY the attestation file bytes; no
+      // replay-rewritable metadata travels in the sidecar.
+      return JSON.stringify({
         algorithm: "Ed25519",
         signature_base64: sig.toString("base64"),
         note: "Ed25519 signature covers the attestation file bytes only. Use filesystem mtime for freshness; use the attestation's `captured_at` for the signed timestamp.",
-      }, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
-      // Mirror the v0.12.38 attestation.json hardening: 0o600 on POSIX +
-      // icacls inheritance strip on win32. The sidecar carries the
-      // signature payload; multi-tenant hosts shouldn't leak it.
-      try { require("./../lib/sign.js").restrictWindowsAcl(sigPath); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
-    } else {
-      fs.writeFileSync(sigPath, JSON.stringify({
-        algorithm: "unsigned",
-        signed: false,
-        note: "No private key at .keys/private.pem — attestation is hash-stable but unsigned. Run `exceptd doctor --fix` to enable signing.",
-      }, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
-      try { require("./../lib/sign.js").restrictWindowsAcl(sigPath); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+      }, null, 2);
     }
-  } catch { /* non-fatal — signing failure shouldn't block the run */ }
+    return JSON.stringify({
+      algorithm: "unsigned",
+      signed: false,
+      note: "No private key at .keys/private.pem — attestation is hash-stable but unsigned. Run `exceptd doctor --fix` to enable signing.",
+    }, null, 2);
+  } catch {
+    // Signing failure must not block the run — fall back to an unsigned marker
+    // so the sidecar always exists alongside the body.
+    return JSON.stringify({
+      algorithm: "unsigned",
+      signed: false,
+      note: "Signing failed at write time; attestation is hash-stable but unsigned.",
+    }, null, 2);
+  }
+}
+
+// Sign an already-written file in place by computing + writing its `.sig`
+// sidecar. The main attestation-persist path writes the sidecar atomically
+// alongside the body (via computeSidecarBytes); this helper serves the
+// replay-record path, which writes a uniquely-named file and so needs no
+// atomic-collision handling. Best-effort: a sign-time failure leaves the
+// record unsigned (still a valid audit entry) rather than aborting.
+function maybeSignAttestation(filePath) {
+  const content = normalizeAttestationBytes(fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8"));
+  const sidecar = computeSidecarBytes(content);
+  fs.writeFileSync(filePath + ".sig", sidecar, { mode: 0o600 });
+  try { require(path.join(PKG_ROOT, "lib", "sign.js")).restrictWindowsAcl(filePath + ".sig"); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5754,6 +5824,22 @@ function cmdAttest(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
     // tampered attestation.json and overwrote .sig with the unsigned stub).
     const privKeyPath = path.join(PKG_ROOT, ".keys", "private.pem");
     const hasPrivKey = fs.existsSync(privKeyPath);
+    // Does any sidecar in this session dir carry a real Ed25519 signature? If
+    // so, a sibling attestation with NO sidecar is suspicious (a sig was
+    // expected). Combined with hasPrivKey, this lets default `attest verify`
+    // treat a deleted sidecar as tamper — agreeing with `reattest`, which
+    // already refuses. The keyless case (no key, all-unsigned peers) stays
+    // benign so keyless CI is unaffected.
+    let anyPeerEd25519Signed = false;
+    try {
+      for (const sf of fs.readdirSync(dir)) {
+        if (!sf.endsWith(".sig")) continue;
+        try {
+          const sd = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, sf), "utf8"));
+          if (sd && sd.algorithm === "Ed25519") { anyPeerEd25519Signed = true; break; }
+        } catch { /* skip unparseable sidecar */ }
+      }
+    } catch { /* dir unreadable — fall through */ }
 
     // Sidecar-verify helper shared by both the attestations[] and
     // replay-records[] partitions. Centralising the per-file verify
@@ -5761,7 +5847,16 @@ function cmdAttest(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
     // instead of two parallel branches.
     const verifySidecar = (f) => {
       const sigPath = path.join(dir, f + ".sig");
-      if (!fs.existsSync(sigPath)) return { file: f, signed: false, verified: false, reason: "no .sig sidecar" };
+      if (!fs.existsSync(sigPath)) {
+        // A missing sidecar is benign ONLY when none was ever expected (the
+        // attestation was written on a keyless host and no peer is signed).
+        // When a sig SHOULD exist, an absent one is a deletion-to-evade-tamper
+        // signal — flag it so default verify matches reattest's refusal.
+        if (hasPrivKey || anyPeerEd25519Signed) {
+          return { file: f, signed: false, verified: false, reason: "no .sig sidecar, but one was expected (signing key present or a signed peer attestation exists) — sidecar deletion suspected", tamper_class: "sidecar-missing" };
+        }
+        return { file: f, signed: false, verified: false, reason: "no .sig sidecar" };
+      }
       let sigDoc;
       try { sigDoc = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(sigPath, "utf8")); }
       catch (e) {
@@ -5837,7 +5932,8 @@ function cmdAttest(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
       (r.signed && !r.verified)
       || r.tamper_class === "sidecar-corrupt"
       || r.tamper_class === "unsigned-substitution"
-      || r.tamper_class === "algorithm-unsupported";
+      || r.tamper_class === "algorithm-unsupported"
+      || r.tamper_class === "sidecar-missing";
     const attTampered = attResults.some(tamperPredicate);
     const replayTampered = replayResults.some(tamperPredicate);
 

package/data/_indexes/_meta.json

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.1.0",
-  "generated_at": "2026-05-27T21:30:21.745Z",
+  "generated_at": "2026-05-27T23:08:52.304Z",
   "generator": "scripts/build-indexes.js",
   "source_count": 54,
   "source_hashes": {
-    "manifest.json": "9dfc540e93aa24c5c61de5a568ac4ed94a21c04cddea458bb647c17ee3a4ec48",
+    "manifest.json": "008292f92fc956004d340bf314748a28ab03a6f14c88ddf7f5deabdab8b14b4d",
     "data/atlas-ttps.json": "d24bc02859d40ccf1615db75cca68c077585904e41e0d8f6de448121e9b1abb0",
     "data/attack-techniques.json": "fa193f0d2d248176a8beddb641e9fe56ba4faa9e15dc253ff876dbf0c5d58a77",
     "data/cve-catalog.json": "3d451dda7ac0c7d57a4075ae4bafd3148c6184b35dc1bc59d8b81d1f2641e430",

package/lib/collectors/cicd-pipeline-compromise.js

@@ -180,7 +180,12 @@ function scanWorkflow(content, rel) {
   // composite actions (`uses: ./`).
   const lines2 = content.split(/\r?\n/);
   for (let i = 0; i < lines2.length; i++) {
-    const m = lines2[i].match(/^\s*-?\s*uses:\s*['"]?([^'"\s#]+)['"]?/);
+    // A real `uses:` line is never multiple KB. Skip overlong lines so a
+    // crafted whitespace run can't drive regex backtracking.
+    if (lines2[i].length > 4096) continue;
+    // `^[ \t]*(?:-[ \t]*)?` anchors the indentation once, then an optional
+    // `- ` list marker — no overlapping `\s*` runs that backtrack.
+    const m = lines2[i].match(/^[ \t]*(?:-[ \t]*)?uses:\s*['"]?([^'"\s#]+)['"]?/);
     if (!m) continue;
     const refStr = m[1];
     if (refStr.startsWith("./") || refStr.startsWith("docker://")) continue;

package/lib/collectors/containers.js

@@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ function scanCompose(content, rel) {
 
   for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
     const line = lines[i];
+    // A real compose line is never multiple KB. Skip overlong lines so a
+    // crafted whitespace run can't drive regex backtracking.
+    if (line.length > 4096) continue;
     if (/^\s*#/.test(line)) continue;
     if (/^\s*privileged:\s*true\b/i.test(line)) hits["compose-privileged"].push({ file: rel, line: i + 1, snippet: line.trim() });
     // compose-host-network: per playbook, fires on any of
@@ -268,6 +271,9 @@ function scanK8s(content, rel) {
 
   for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
     const line = lines[i];
+    // A real manifest line is never multiple KB. Skip overlong lines so a
+    // crafted whitespace run can't drive regex backtracking.
+    if (line.length > 4096) continue;
     if (/^\s*#/.test(line)) continue;
     if (/^\s*privileged:\s*true\b/i.test(line)) hits["k8s-privileged"].push({ file: rel, line: i + 1, snippet: line.trim() });
     if (/^\s*(hostNetwork|hostPID|hostIPC):\s*true\b/.test(line)) hits["k8s-host-namespaces"].push({ file: rel, line: i + 1, snippet: line.trim() });
@@ -287,7 +293,9 @@ function scanK8s(content, rel) {
     }
     // image: ...:latest OR image: ... (no tag, defaults to latest)
     // Allow optional leading `-` from a YAML list item: `- image: ...`.
-    const imageMatch = line.match(/^\s*-?\s*image:\s*['"]?([^'"@\s]+)(?:@[^'"]+)?['"]?\s*$/);
+    // `^[ \t]*(?:-[ \t]*)?` anchors the indentation once, then an optional
+    // `- ` list marker — no overlapping `\s*` runs that backtrack.
+    const imageMatch = line.match(/^[ \t]*(?:-[ \t]*)?image:\s*['"]?([^'"@\s]+)(?:@[^'"]+)?['"]?\s*$/);
     if (imageMatch) {
       const ref = imageMatch[1];
       const tagMatch = ref.match(/:([^/]+)$/);

package/lib/collectors/library-author.js

@@ -157,8 +157,13 @@ function scanPublishWorkflow(content, rel) {
   const lines = content.split(/\r?\n/);
   for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
     const line = lines[i];
+    // A real `uses:` line is never multiple KB. Skip overlong lines so a
+    // crafted whitespace run can't drive regex backtracking.
+    if (line.length > 4096) continue;
     // Allow optional leading `-` from a YAML list item: `- uses: ...`.
-    const m = line.match(/^\s*-?\s*uses:\s*['"]?([^'"\s]+)['"]?\s*$/);
+    // `^[ \t]*(?:-[ \t]*)?` anchors the indentation once, then an optional
+    // `- ` list marker — no overlapping `\s*` runs that backtrack.
+    const m = line.match(/^[ \t]*(?:-[ \t]*)?uses:\s*['"]?([^'"\s]+)['"]?\s*$/);
     if (!m) continue;
     const ref = m[1];
     if (ref.startsWith("./") || ref.startsWith("./.github/")) continue; // local

package/lib/playbook-runner.js

@@ -691,15 +691,26 @@ function detect(playbookId, directiveId, agentSubmission = {}, runOpts = {}) {
         }
       }
     } else {
-      // Without an explicit override, treat any captured artifact as evidence
+      // An override WAS supplied for this indicator but its value didn't
+      // canonicalize to hit/miss/inconclusive (e.g. "maybe", "present", a
+      // number). Pre-fix this was silently dropped — the operator believed
+      // they'd asserted a result but the signal vanished, yielding a false
+      // not_detected. Surface it as a runtime_error (mirrors the
+      // classification_override_invalid signal) so the drop is visible.
+      if (rawOverride !== undefined && runOpts && Array.isArray(runOpts._runErrors)) {
+        pushRunError(runOpts._runErrors, {
+          kind: 'signal_override_unrecognized',
+          indicator_id: ind.id,
+          supplied_value: (typeof rawOverride === 'object') ? JSON.stringify(rawOverride).slice(0, 80) : String(rawOverride).slice(0, 80),
+          message: `signal_overrides["${ind.id}"] value was not recognized (expected hit/miss/inconclusive or a boolean); the signal was ignored.`,
+        }, { dedupeKey: e => e.indicator_id || '' });
+      }
+      // Without a usable override, treat any captured artifact as evidence
       // the indicator could be evaluated. Mark inconclusive if any artifact
       // was captured (engine doesn't pattern-match raw artifact content; the
       // host AI is responsible for that). With NO captured artifacts, this is
       // a clean empty submission — emit 'miss' so the run can reach
       // classification:'not_detected' rather than getting stuck inconclusive.
-      // A clean empty run with no captured artifacts must emit 'miss' so
-      // classification can reach 'not_detected'; otherwise theater_verdict
-      // stays 'pending_agent_run' indefinitely.
       const anyCaptured = Object.values(artifacts).some(a => a && a.captured);
       verdict = anyCaptured ? 'inconclusive' : 'miss';
     }
@@ -765,12 +776,16 @@ function detect(playbookId, directiveId, agentSubmission = {}, runOpts = {}) {
   const anyFpDowngrade = indicatorResults.some(r => Array.isArray(r.fp_checks_unsatisfied) && r.fp_checks_unsatisfied.length > 0);
 
   let classification;
+  // Track whether the override was actually honored, so we don't report a
+  // refused override as "applied" (L6).
+  let overrideEffective = !!override;
   if (override) {
     classification = override === 'clean' ? 'not_detected' : override;
     if (anyFpDowngrade) {
       const substituted = 'inconclusive';
       const attempted = override; // record what the operator submitted, not the mapped form
       classification = substituted;
+      overrideEffective = false;
       if (runOpts && Array.isArray(runOpts._runErrors)) {
         pushRunError(runOpts._runErrors, {
           kind: 'classification_override_blocked',
@@ -782,6 +797,24 @@ function detect(playbookId, directiveId, agentSubmission = {}, runOpts = {}) {
             .map(r => ({ id: r.id, fp_checks_unsatisfied_count: r.fp_checks_unsatisfied.length })),
         }, { dedupeKey: e => String(e.attempted) });
       }
+    } else if (classification === 'not_detected' && hasDeterministicHit) {
+      // A not_detected/clean override must not silently bury a DETERMINISTIC
+      // hit. A deterministic indicator firing is high-signal evidence; hiding
+      // it as not_detected is a strictly worse false-negative than leaving the
+      // run inconclusive. (Probabilistic hits remain overridable — that's the
+      // legitimate "I confirmed these are benign" workflow.) Substitute
+      // inconclusive and surface why.
+      classification = 'inconclusive';
+      overrideEffective = false;
+      if (runOpts && Array.isArray(runOpts._runErrors)) {
+        pushRunError(runOpts._runErrors, {
+          kind: 'classification_override_masks_deterministic_hit',
+          attempted: override,
+          substituted: 'inconclusive',
+          reason: 'A not_detected/clean classification override was refused because one or more deterministic indicators fired. A deterministic hit cannot be downgraded to not_detected.',
+          deterministic_hit_indicators: hits.filter(r => r.deterministic).map(r => r.id),
+        }, { dedupeKey: e => String(e.attempted) });
+      }
     }
   } else if (hasDeterministicHit || hasHighConfHit) {
     classification = 'detected';
@@ -818,7 +851,11 @@ function detect(playbookId, directiveId, agentSubmission = {}, runOpts = {}) {
       from_observation: agentSubmission._signal_origins?.[i.id] || null,
     })),
     indicators_evaluated_count: indicatorResults.length,
-    classification_override_applied: override ? (override === 'clean' ? 'not_detected' : override) : null,
+    // Only report the override as applied when it was actually honored — a
+    // refused override (FP-downgrade or deterministic-hit masking) left
+    // `classification` as inconclusive, so reporting the attempted value here
+    // would contradict the verdict.
+    classification_override_applied: (override && overrideEffective) ? (override === 'clean' ? 'not_detected' : override) : null,
     submission_shape_seen: agentSubmission._original_shape || (agentSubmission.artifacts ? 'nested (v0.10.x)' : 'empty'),
     // Pass through any flat-shape observation collisions detected at
     // normalize time so analyze() can publish them under
@@ -3148,10 +3185,38 @@ function run(playbookId, directiveId, agentSubmission = {}, runOpts = {}) {
     };
   }
 
+  // Cross-process mutex lock for this run. Use the diagnostic variant so a
+  // CONFIRMED live foreign holder BLOCKS the run. The bare acquireLock returned
+  // null on a lost race (the TOCTOU window between preflight's check and the
+  // acquire) and the run then proceeded UNLOCKED, defeating the mutex. Block
+  // only on `held_by_live_pid` — same-PID reentrancy and FS quirks still
+  // proceed best-effort (lockPath null), so no legitimate nested/edge case
+  // regresses. Released in the finally block.
+  const lockResult = acquireLockDiagnostic(playbookId);
+  // Block ONLY on a confirmed live foreign holder with a real numeric pid.
+  // acquireLockDiagnostic also returns reason:'held_by_live_pid' with
+  // holder_pid:null for a MALFORMED/truncated lockfile (it can't parse a pid to
+  // probe). Blocking on that would let one corrupted lockfile left by a crash
+  // deny every future run forever. A null-pid (malformed) lock instead falls
+  // through to proceed best-effort (lockPath null) — matching how the preflight
+  // mutex check treats unparsable lockfiles as stale.
+  if (!lockResult.ok && lockResult.reason === 'held_by_live_pid'
+      && Number.isInteger(lockResult.holder_pid) && lockResult.holder_pid > 0) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      playbook_id: playbookId,
+      directive_id: directiveId,
+      verdict: 'blocked',
+      summary_line: `${playbookId}: blocked — a concurrent run holds the mutex (pid ${lockResult.holder_pid})`.slice(0, 240),
+      phase: 'preflight',
+      blocked_by: 'mutex',
+      reason: `A concurrent run of "${playbookId}" holds the run lock (live pid ${lockResult.holder_pid}). Retry after it completes.`,
+      remediation: 'Wait for the in-flight run to finish, then retry.',
+      evidence_completeness: 'not-evaluated'
+    };
+  }
+  const lockPath = lockResult.ok ? lockResult.path : null;
   _activeRuns.add(playbookId);
-  // Cross-process mutex lock for this run. preflight verified no other lock
-  // exists; we acquire ours and release in the finally block.
-  const lockPath = acquireLock(playbookId);
   // Parse the playbook once at run() entry and thread the parsed object
   // through each phase via runOpts._playbookCache. Each phase otherwise
   // calls loadPlaybook() independently; for a single run that's seven
@@ -3377,11 +3442,22 @@ function run(playbookId, directiveId, agentSubmission = {}, runOpts = {}) {
  * through directly. Avoids JSON.stringify's replacer indirection because
  * a top-level array would otherwise miss the canonicalization recursion.
  */
-function canonicalStringify(v) {
+const CANONICAL_MAX_DEPTH = 200;
+function canonicalStringify(v, _depth = 0) {
   if (v === null || typeof v !== 'object') return JSON.stringify(v);
-  if (Array.isArray(v)) return '[' + v.map(canonicalStringify).join(',') + ']';
+  // Bounded recursion: adversarial (or accidental) deeply-nested evidence
+  // would otherwise overflow the stack with an opaque "internal error". This
+  // runs on every run() (evidence_hash + session_id derivation), so the guard
+  // turns a crash into an actionable rejection. 200 levels is far beyond any
+  // legitimate submission.
+  if (_depth > CANONICAL_MAX_DEPTH) {
+    const e = new Error(`evidence nesting exceeds the maximum depth of ${CANONICAL_MAX_DEPTH} — flatten the submission`);
+    e.code = 'EVIDENCE_TOO_DEEP';
+    throw e;
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(v)) return '[' + v.map(x => canonicalStringify(x, _depth + 1)).join(',') + ']';
   const keys = Object.keys(v).sort();
-  return '{' + keys.map(k => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + canonicalStringify(v[k])).join(',') + '}';
+  return '{' + keys.map(k => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + canonicalStringify(v[k], _depth + 1)).join(',') + '}';
 }
 
 /**

package/manifest.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "exceptd-security",
-  "version": "0.14.12",
+  "version": "0.14.14",
   "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation",
   "homepage": "https://exceptd.com",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "lXhZgoIrrVloO3XaTvo/43AxZn4mwErstd7DR0O/oVhD3AOGODM4HqrageYEou9WKOdMEGP5mJNTjJsXdP5NDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.633Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.125Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-125",
         "CWE-362",
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-17",
       "signature": "ztSKk/zFMFbT12qRcEeBKpydBn7fTT86KxMmor0DTCoKQWk5fJ0fSInfP1XMSB6rFk4/SuSjKVxQRMKVJ5a+Cg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.635Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.127Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1039",
         "CWE-1426",
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-17",
       "signature": "K6QdPHNK5c4K5QFjrW0QsUhjp71D7SOisSoulwPNSvKRdi2rY+yg0kdckijBMkLMsVPyUvcC9giu93mKJ1OZDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.635Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.127Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-22",
         "CWE-345",
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "Qd3SBWmUAaaT++e1Ry2wBIz/dCBmNBMl0+4Rb0etvJLES0fIBEAkU1mTbgNZnT5XOg9J5twdUpymWtmKnDDQCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.635Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.127Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "compliance-theater",
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "F2Shxae0ua0gPtvwzTRVzzHaIgJcFDRT3/akLUAZ4aaMQhkleKkcTaTpkjp+pTVEdPfLeLGNCeAOMs+whVYOBg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.636Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.128Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "exploit-scoring",
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "NA1hoQycvQhSUoG5rwlXX0mOVmGxoXRVezkELGEA2nZOdGis4gXkHT3O6Sfw7zxE4JuMrsCb65TEeOWk9WEPDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.636Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.128Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "rag-pipeline-security",
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "W3pS8lnaCP96TQzsJpG5d5yv5IwgaQyS4Z2Ctcz5BOJf6LbajSIgeDgTZ4f4Bhr5m4E7KsgWGjZS4x7Fwd33BQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.637Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.129Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1395",
         "CWE-1426"
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-17",
       "signature": "/WDGygh1Ck4yWlBWDGtEUVCqKB8d+UaJXoAoBXujtt+GAl8JbMNpaN1TvI0WkEltQ9dTxaAzSn20/eVDqv8iDQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.637Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.129Z",
       "d3fend_refs": [
         "D3-CA",
         "D3-CSPP",
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "za1NKBpy9LC91F/ESO/qhUfmvVr8GNItQOjR5OJLeHm+2dQ9HHiFWQK2eo53V/n/0uhubuggURA3yS6kJuWwBg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.637Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.129Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1188"
       ],
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "xiHAhhdufm9hCKU8PLiPE0MX65ej2F4OZwtlWLGLCiie9/km+Kiqbt192LcMvr94v83C98pb9wIaqFsFWft6AQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.638Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.130Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "New AI attack classes as ATLAS v6 publishes",
         "Post-quantum adversary capability timeline",
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "oYsSk35N2Uzq7MRofACykylcVwkgPhI4luWZ14vmQT+gUKLyZiKVOUJbe1+7lGl6BYPRN0sUDQ0f7S5Eu5w2Ag==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.638Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.130Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "zeroday-gap-learn",
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "igRqYyU1unRFH40BsPyAR62SPrk8QZv8dPGb8S9O9EvLCNOZAzm3t+HdT/NKqzWHwrpomOzkkkyLfYI/0qTUDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.638Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.131Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "New CISA KEV entries",
         "New ATLAS TTP additions in each ATLAS release",
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "i/17u4kJiSpcZAz7LnTyRePFugQOstQ1P4kVoe0oGf4E2/j8oIN9U9DccjUn/YHZhKWIJ2AILG/DMhvMrr3bBg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.639Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.131Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-327"
       ],
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "QuOVaQ4E2Sl39TClbhZ7HA9XrYAyRrDL44HY3RTE7aWLue0hV2cxaBt40ALGmHS++631QGFDlZTLZI77Tr6nAA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.639Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.131Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "security-maturity-tiers",
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "8Px1s2lDj10/Q6erwEQlXgUHM1+OTruUR8qAHPX7Oo3k/l69N6P9sm0PsafS9wDFtj9l5C/OiLiFgzMlMt6vBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.639Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.132Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1188"
       ]
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "urRcataVWg6/utyEkSiOWoNxTL8sABRjPR7ShyDfZGnAozFph/yDktSoaPVxQDXwu9EfJE+qhUW5OYR/yJECBQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.640Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.132Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "attack-surface-pentest",
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@
         "Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — Microsoft Edge 4-bug sandbox escape by Orange Tsai (DEVCORE); forward-watch only (browser sandbox, out of current playbook scope); track Microsoft Edge security advisory and KEV add"
       ],
       "signature": "C7lv65/Ecm8JJgSKxrX5lxx0YFzKWtrIQSKp+vy50I5e8945s1JmifGUUrnQwRQhq/Pkv7EmfiH5XSO8h75bDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.640Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.132Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "fuzz-testing-strategy",
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@
         "OSS-Fuzz-Gen / AI-assisted harness generation becoming the default expectation for OSS maintainers"
       ],
       "signature": "Z7ypCUnXx8JpLtgxxB6RHNi39w74AmrGY1N4ofAGCXhkuM2EaFVm1AU0dvl9UQ1bVLfHKEDGqMO/TwlIY7RABg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.640Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.133Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "dlp-gap-analysis",
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@
         "Quebec Law 25, India DPDPA, KSA PDPL enforcement actions naming AI-tool prompt data as in-scope personal information"
       ],
       "signature": "IgEnpHOhCftAyfUNdKsjbrd169T9pJkk/rRM2ZEna+H18y7p5x48+1kME2sJMZjJuyAdQFBJi8PJXZFwLGI+DQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.640Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.133Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "supply-chain-integrity",
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@
         "Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — NVIDIA Megatron Bridge path traversal by haehae; AI training-stack file-system trust boundary; track patch and SBOM-attestation impact"
       ],
       "signature": "pcLrM98A3vUSZRjwNAk0aZ9umvOwB41XCLLsCOy/IebB2F/06oIrGUKkMHtHwm4pTVPShMMcKdZQQ3jz30FnCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.641Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.133Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "defensive-countermeasure-mapping",
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "G5q5elh7Q7eu2xcwTVQJGDTGfvZR0OGQaLSLJPb2wjzCHFF8PWuZfCHZdjjqisiRzRWPyLlzgfHeMJqOdy7cBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.641Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.133Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "identity-assurance",
@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "Wv5hGMeHjlaQK1zwicVCA7AvdKgJBgvcjdpGM9Ywahh9tagAKhbkOjybowDQZzu7OZ3bDkbh6pBYc1Sdwr6NAA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.641Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.134Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ot-ics-security",
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "8t5qKHd3yWi57dvG36YQkLN/X9bQWqtEiYjay4IfSmqhJpM/xXPaQVKNGz3wscrO8OLKUZ0OaX7Mj5kzpgBKBQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.642Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.134Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "coordinated-vuln-disclosure",
@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 amendments potentially adding explicit CVD program requirements"
       ],
       "signature": "GDGt4UPqBa04PjlpSmpyihGzd3OgfBN7jaAK5tfwp+LRSs3ygKOdbeivUCCHNagTY1hE6hG2Ou40ADfBFuXeAg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.642Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.135Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "threat-modeling-methodology",
@@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@
         "PASTA v2 updates incorporating AI/ML application threats"
       ],
       "signature": "rFBpOQEJUPpl+v88Lw/WqVJRhTl80vy0VbPAbzQj3Q0suJRRrJg368I9uKu5LXIBKFDvKxnGIcIzbGg9NUtaCA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.642Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.135Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "webapp-security",
@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "ux85YI4t2mVHOyt744Yin1HHy+z11JIFygjKfFfQOBBl5QVV3A267jeIy7utix85irMcpZm/T3yx/ooqiK2tBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.643Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.135Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "NGINX Rift CVE-2026-42945 (disclosed 2026-05-13, source depthfirst) — KEV-watch predicted CISA KEV listing by 2026-05-29; AI-assisted discovery angle; track for active-exploitation confirmation and patch advisory affecting front-door web app deployments"
       ]
@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "IIXnkZ5ZNqFwOto5KfytADTLLZLoyXNZACD1ORZ40P1HUAQxe6u2uyXFzzsfuob4Uy06jNkRGr2FFgCphUH1Cw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.643Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.136Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-healthcare",
@@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "AhF9KF8ZBlDteciV+F8IBSmFVYCvQOn44GmD4rZjgLoPxfIv/QE1/vSkK32zyqDKtHWkLSXExbkkPkxA/V6dDw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.644Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.136Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-financial",
@@ -1560,7 +1560,7 @@
         "TIBER-EU framework v2.0 alignment with DORA TLPT RTS (JC 2024/40); cross-recognition with CBEST and iCAST"
       ],
       "signature": "HQgZvb4ReziEz5rNFr8i/O8/rJEZR+iHRROT7m/D2QUqhrcNISPkYXENsUZlG8xapzy/Ik92ehkseyj4hdmhCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.644Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.137Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-federal-government",
@@ -1629,7 +1629,7 @@
         "Australia PSPF 2024 revision and ISM quarterly updates — track for Essential Eight Maturity Level requirements for federal entities"
       ],
       "signature": "linxmsXZiOYtcs71sSWgGCrvb8xQfmxmtTY5PRvZJ0/8FgJulo0tQtejzexYG775s7XhjAmGsDP238BQTQ8ADA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.644Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.137Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-energy",
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@
         "ICS-CERT advisory feed (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/ics-advisories) for vendor CVEs in Siemens, Rockwell, Schneider Electric, ABB, GE Vernova, Hitachi Energy, AVEVA / OSIsoft PI"
       ],
       "signature": "JjBfc0ovta560Clk0x3QGRM5osFJDwcvpy3rT7QEGdCIL827jzE8QCow1C8deXq+4JhY2sA/d7/8IsxikdlkCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.645Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.137Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-telecom",
@@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@
         "O-RAN SFG / WG11 security specifications"
       ],
       "signature": "JWVxKFoKrbX4d+Tko1d4OBdwyg25MfFFKn4CT6E/CzH+YwnU3T6Y76uBQIKg3+gIGTvPduqyvQwQQ5FxKDuPBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.645Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.138Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "api-security",
@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "BmCRCestWqr55+fCynEhtAl5NWLT+xLTkpwS0Icp3SaoZOw/ce3Y6TtqjHRSKn4CBJq7YDiLRWxmhO3MStvOAA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.645Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.138Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "NGINX Rift CVE-2026-42945 (disclosed 2026-05-13, source depthfirst) — KEV-watch predicted CISA KEV listing by 2026-05-29; track for active-exploitation confirmation and patch advisory affecting API gateway / reverse-proxy deployments",
         "Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — LiteLLM 3-bug SSRF + Code Injection chain by k3vg3n; LLM-proxy API surface; track upstream patch and CVE assignments",
@@ -1935,7 +1935,7 @@
         "CISA KEV additions for cloud-control-plane CVEs (IMDSv1 abuses, federation token mishandling, cross-tenant boundary failures); CISA Cybersecurity Advisories for cross-cloud advisories"
       ],
       "signature": "/DV3pmZwrRySrk1OCbyI+0BQESacjupJfUX3eC2NGtXuYOBro0vndIP+z27heFxumnjU3a9sfla7/U9X+pqnDw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.646Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.138Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "container-runtime-security",
@@ -1997,7 +1997,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "E2UGSf9ATyYgzBr8uM/0ubOUmDqo1jVA7f9mVxv6LHfWGCNuQNXDyuNou9VAmUCeeXEeUYIi3AFjXkJqpOkxDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.646Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.139Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — NVIDIA Container Toolkit container escape ($50K award) by chompie / IBM X-Force XOR; high-severity container/hypervisor boundary break; track patch and KEV add post-embargo"
       ]
@@ -2071,7 +2071,7 @@
         "MITRE ATLAS v5.6.0 (released May 2026) shipped the AML.T0010 sub-technique expansion this forecast tracked plus new techniques (\"Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool\", \"Escape to Host\"); inventory now 16 tactics, 84 techniques, 56 sub-techniques. Forward watch: subsequent ATLAS minor and major releases — track next-cadence updates to agentic-AI TTPs and MLOps-pipeline-specific techniques"
       ],
       "signature": "IL+DlRCDJN/p08iiJCFkasKcoyjcB0uWrJ6ORLjQcS1HrUa5Xt62QxVjYPHzaevlm5y36ZdmfESqsZJmzK3lCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.646Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.139Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "incident-response-playbook",
@@ -2133,7 +2133,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.17 amendments tightening ransom-payment 24h disclosure operationalization"
       ],
       "signature": "MmjLjlmOMLjhJJ4ZfR8MYlHam+ZB+eSqfh6Nv+DecaG4O5zeo9DBP/iL3cbyDVZxmhnhivgJild2ccYeWTeZAg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.647Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.139Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ransomware-response",
@@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "ssueL03g9fWlhXpTe+IiY5l7RqQkunN4DTN5QETKE+VOX+qggdjAR8PONxk77ol4xWYmHrM/VcH8CNtXUEvgBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.647Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.140Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "email-security-anti-phishing",
@@ -2266,7 +2266,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "rK+WnuS+9tqEABmwc0jO/PEmxcLjG1/tmUb897HsClQeKzf+TQOlwBE+OsbtuKxpjYNwur62Xxs3TxObkwm8Cw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.647Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.140Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "age-gates-child-safety",
@@ -2334,7 +2334,7 @@
         "US state adult-site age-verification laws — 19+ states by mid-2026 (TX HB 18 upheld by SCOTUS June 2025 in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton); track ongoing challenges in remaining states"
       ],
       "signature": "Rgho5TOFUL1txOzcVR0kASCNdovSU4yt99JlGilJlJRyg0A+BdeeQYrZrhPF6Vx2reUAVG0BeHfcZtSbi+cwCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.648Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.141Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "cloud-iam-incident",
@@ -2414,7 +2414,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "e/kij7GtKaytROyIj7V5RH+FC9WtmVFzrmG2kIlNDNn29ep/CRNlIQKwXLpzo/81AIf634pmdr1qy/+vwIuUDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.648Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.141Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "AWS IAM Identity Center session-policy refresh and step-up-on-admin enforcement (anticipated 2026-H2 release)",
         "GCP Workload Identity Federation principal-set attribute mapping tightening (post-2026 Q3 Federation hardening guide)",
@@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "ew9Kglc9fAZzbn0ZIfGP7WSK/j4eV2VhSvpy+s5bEfNEVYIMa2kZjnGBapgUsyGDLes9H9K2ovjQyX17+GKiBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T21:28:58.648Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-27T22:43:04.141Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "Entra ID conditional access evolution post-Midnight Blizzard — Microsoft's 2025-2026 commitments on legacy-tenant MFA enforcement and OAuth-app consent gating",
         "Okta IPSIE (Interoperability Profile for Secure Identity in the Enterprise) OpenID Foundation working-group output and adoption timeline",
@@ -2526,6 +2526,6 @@
   ],
   "manifest_signature": {
     "algorithm": "Ed25519",
-    "signature_base64": "XXpEWoGHaLyKnh3mclNAnbJVrnzeFrsAimxLIf5rxzxOrlcVJ2eVB4+gkRbbRU0J0T52S2ODDAiE+qWnEdhOBA=="
+    "signature_base64": "VaHQUp8N+B8LWN2cE5Ma/r5QUuCeeXd1qQZRVdxMsZuywrBbCgET5iiP8miDXVAVw6I/bKVxUeBQzPDzbgTCBQ=="
   }
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/exceptd-skills",
-  "version": "0.14.12",
+  "version": "0.14.14",
   "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation. 42 skills, 11 catalogs (406 CVEs / 171 CWEs / 805 ATT&CK + ICS / 170 ATLAS / 468 D3FEND / 8888 RFCs), 35 jurisdictions, 10-class catalog gap detector + budget gate, real XML parser + canonical-form diff + content-pattern regression detection, Ed25519-signed.",
   "keywords": [
     "ai-security",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 {
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.6",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:3c3dcfa9-3a0d-41e3-ba8b-fc9074eb6c91",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:09ce22ed-cf4c-428a-b4ce-4ed39f08cf46",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2058-01-10T17:30:17.000Z",
+    "timestamp": "2031-03-19T23:38:21.000Z",
     "tools": [
       {
         "vendor": "blamejs",
         "name": "scripts/refresh-sbom.js",
-        "version": "0.14.12"
+        "version": "0.14.14"
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "pkg:npm/@blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.14.12",
+      "bom-ref": "pkg:npm/@blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.14.14",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "@blamejs/exceptd-skills",
-      "version": "0.14.12",
+      "version": "0.14.14",
       "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation. 42 skills, 11 catalogs (406 CVEs / 171 CWEs / 805 ATT&CK + ICS / 170 ATLAS / 468 D3FEND / 8888 RFCs), 35 jurisdictions, 10-class catalog gap detector + budget gate, real XML parser + canonical-form diff + content-pattern regression detection, Ed25519-signed.",
       "licenses": [
         {
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
           }
         }
       ],
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.14.12",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.14.14",
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "0c93edb6886bb6d399d389a24226d4baa22f7779ae3996d4d7fbcf0a6e5114d6"
+          "content": "c662ffd7c9591378303810e656ef236bc95461441b0e100888fe51590f04a81e"
         }
       ],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
           "type": "distribution",
-          "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills/v/0.14.12"
+          "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills/v/0.14.14"
         },
         {
           "type": "vcs",
@@ -116,11 +116,11 @@
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "ddd5c86511d4ea2e2fa500a67bd5cb5e1111e1fb678d6715500f3ab8729ca2e1"
+          "content": "35200404f3ec807af037296532675b3b89d4edfde5be7906f8f51de79e64b9c1"
         },
         {
           "alg": "SHA3-512",
-          "content": "7a0dfecb42ade2ab79c7e5286c2612b644a5d044b22a9f662aaef40e9793c68d9d019ae93ba8a0f52ac9134e694b00216890bc430362561fbe5757ca31d19e0c"
+          "content": "791909b843163e1295f359e24b1928c2f592f33a99795a1cb0fc73c8282715b78eb4696e30b48a61f63cb5651da945fd11b1707c91a53cea80723fab7553bcec"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -176,11 +176,11 @@
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "ae39088caf4e044bf0449b97c99acfe76ad30b8a9d8e008b438f1cbda0dc16d5"
+          "content": "7ec3434f017d0f634d64518178cb0fbe051450e180ae91335f951bfc1901d5ff"
         },
         {
           "alg": "SHA3-512",
-          "content": "21a01dee170f40b3b5d77360fb209c89b60a8decbbf4c0a871d72176fed03cfb7b45698830741802a903deee84c601ab25a47db6d600679e259368a4ce4c171d"
+          "content": "ec79b55f86aa52f266f6bbcf3f62132bd8a55f853fec892158996deaa495f6776d406efd2945910e8ff61b297d0fb4b3713904d97d3080a8b33fb3e462293fc7"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -281,11 +281,11 @@
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "3d755197adfee59c67dafc46dc19636a491e59986fa088d8b51daee75dfab19b"
+          "content": "447e6ba93e05120de060cca6636c8419c465034744d93606bbe6c7175be1a844"
         },
         {
           "alg": "SHA3-512",
-          "content": "cc3309521915ada4277a09dbe9c33c13510f0508e0e710b8b9a877ebcd5a2a79c3448a08aa8d96286ade6c2dc3ef357794afdbbfb62f8d2531d4bf46e2ee7d58"
+          "content": "23f28a5eefab97d5ad447033826279f34424a728123a2a2c6e551fea601504f06fd9b2860b718e515a7e31bfa1a9cb349bffb926a91c63682753c0c979826db6"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -926,11 +926,11 @@
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "dc02ee2b01a753f70b8812f38d7999c3ca666d0a3e4a1255f6d0d21f7faa629c"
+          "content": "e8ab11fa2f22bfac303b39cec8226ee61f9eb638a38bb91d38ed31e5f245e036"
         },
         {
           "alg": "SHA3-512",
-          "content": "918ae3acdbbebc2764e6eac82229b20448300bf8d26b2d79850b9137f48e41cf98ed11b129b328cf2c433553edc31997fa2af3297848f8867217326e0a3f1dcd"
+          "content": "206ccebd277a7da70a8ad26d9bd6fa2ebf39b7deee02f04de70031dce3a36b1ef7f7c3c8c3af080afa86b00e094dc88000ef42b424cb28a0cc52a7f96ba7db36"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -956,11 +956,11 @@
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "73fca55e2330e73529d06eb8944114d2f18b483294d373719356dce0556a831d"
+          "content": "bbf451e8828b34b6dfad052a80bb41d6d41c823d0896b7b0af88adc1bc3d0363"
         },
         {
           "alg": "SHA3-512",
-          "content": "d1deb64457f7be99a4dd5fcc504cffdc6b4ddec26d778946af93c5ea60ee399f9c6bb82de1a4cb0165e7708914a7a56e1b61f4f443e6c83b62ece23ceff2d11b"
+          "content": "3cc1ae78ab1fd3995140adf5daad3a276c5c191e37f12183ea4cd1d05faed9b3f52bf7cc028dad36d5bfc347b081ff69f7311b91a70f9f5f235e13297e84846a"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -1046,11 +1046,11 @@
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "f8a32293e9a8707e05846bbc0c07336d9f5f31a3551ec9df9c146386005cba7c"
+          "content": "adacaf29b1359d15de4974508b06f41da7811aa9602fc56b724ddc01b9211938"
         },
         {
           "alg": "SHA3-512",
-          "content": "b4859aec9f78d53ce82a871eba0069714a6cee8c2b1ce043dc3389fad6ee3e17127c8f5e3e5ae901737410be5491df016412cd1b00954278a768a446252b5b1e"
+          "content": "c4d98ecbc6bc8a897a37e0ae7d5883c71816b3665e2c20a313955b3e0917f81657851c61790dc793c28bf85937d07be2623311a54cfa1c5823bcdaf9d9221c2f"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -1316,11 +1316,11 @@
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "ce4e0915fd4a758891e1799055d7f21bfeb1c283950668fe125533008c551547"
+          "content": "9c32c19d0d16a52b1d2d9e44f5f74f27b0c68f7869373b63d1b29c9ed43c36a8"
         },
         {
           "alg": "SHA3-512",
-          "content": "e81350df04396a41caaa15f810011fecb50c7efc25dbd3b48133337295948d9c8e5839e9d744891e330b607e9c776710daea7ed1a7b04ff66b9b7b4330f5a15e"
+          "content": "d711a870f6b4a91b78efd2d883df0c1df8cd82547aedd3affce2c7ab4a16832c67a6c40b9dc478dc55cd932cde1105de42231f560f7580ba881fecd3f488945c"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -1751,11 +1751,11 @@
       "hashes": [
         {
           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "9dfc540e93aa24c5c61de5a568ac4ed94a21c04cddea458bb647c17ee3a4ec48"
+          "content": "008292f92fc956004d340bf314748a28ab03a6f14c88ddf7f5deabdab8b14b4d"
         },
         {
           "alg": "SHA3-512",
-          "content": "30f7961d052a1c680d5eb52afa18a85a669e69591f6dabd19da3c795a4dab4f87c786d852ec08020262c742001abec1c03a45194c9c81077f263749927e6ece6"
+          "content": "99f7d34bc0516df27402740184eb99a961e3d8db7929187df1bab453f0a9356029753246d8efcf003bda0ccd57caa29a51c04c8e4fe2f20a6e385f743dc6f9cc"
         }
       ]
     },