@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.13.95 → 0.13.96

package/data/atlas-ttps.json

@@ -676,6 +676,8 @@
     "cve_refs": [
       "CVE-2023-51449",
       "CVE-2024-1561",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2026-42208",
       "MAL-2026-3083"
     ],
@@ -1727,6 +1729,8 @@
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2025-30202",
       "CVE-2025-32444",
       "CVE-2025-64496",

package/data/attack-techniques.json

@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
       "CVE-2024-21576",
       "CVE-2024-37032",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
       "CVE-2025-1094",
       "CVE-2025-11837",
@@ -871,9 +872,11 @@
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
       "CVE-2024-43468",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
       "CVE-2024-56145",
       "CVE-2024-57726",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2024-7694",
       "CVE-2024-8069",
       "CVE-2025-10035",
@@ -1529,6 +1532,7 @@
     "name": "Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files",
     "version": "v19",
     "cve_refs": [
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2025-21085",
       "CVE-2026-30615",
       "MAL-2026-3083",

package/data/cve-catalog.json

@@ -14542,6 +14542,214 @@
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
     "_kev_short_description": "LlamaIndex's CLI builds a shell command from the --files argument and runs it unsanitized (CWE-78), executing arbitrary OS commands; fixed by adding shlex escaping."
   },
+  "CVE-2024-6587": {
+    "name": "BerriAI LiteLLM api_base SSRF API-Key Interception",
+    "type": "INFO-DISCLOSURE",
+    "cvss_score": 7.5,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
+    "cvss_note": "NVD/NIST CVSS v3.1 base 7.5 (HIGH, confidentiality-only); huntr.dev CNA scored the same. Server-side request forgery via the user-supplied api_base parameter (CWE-918).",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Documented in the huntr.dev advisory and demonstrated at Pwn2Own as the SSRF link of a full-chain RCE: a request with a crafted api_base causes the proxy to forward the provider API key to the attacker.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed via huntr.dev. LiteLLM is a widely used LLM proxy/gateway that holds provider API keys for many models; the abused surface is its request/secret-management plane.",
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "ai_assisted_notes": "No AI-assisted weaponization; SSRF in the LLM gateway.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Advisory disclosure with a coordinated fix; no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation reported as of curation (CVE-2024-6587 was demonstrated at Pwn2Own as a research chain).",
+    "affected": "BerriAI LiteLLM before 1.44.8 (the api_base handling on POST /chat/completions); reported against 1.38.10, vulnerable range < 1.44.8 per GHSA-g26j-5385-hhw3, patched in 1.44.8.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "BerriAI LiteLLM < 1.44.8"
+    ],
+    "vector": "LiteLLM lets a user specify the api_base parameter on POST /chat/completions, and the proxy sends the request - including the configured provider API key - to that attacker-chosen domain (CWE-918 SSRF). A malicious user thereby intercepts the LLM provider API key the gateway holds. This SSRF was the first link in a Pwn2Own full-chain RCE against LiteLLM.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "NVD AV:N / AC:L. PR:N - unauthenticated request parameter.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is upgrading LiteLLM to 1.44.8 or later (validates api_base); redeploy, no host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Upgrade BerriAI LiteLLM to 1.44.8 or later. Restrict who can set request/config parameters, allow-list permitted api_base / provider endpoints, isolate the proxy's credential store, and do not expose the LiteLLM admin/config surface to untrusted users."
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": "Authenticator (API key) management does not isolate the LLM gateway's stored provider keys from request-controlled egress; an SSRF exfiltrates them.",
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track the LLM proxy/gateway as managed, credential-bearing software.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates the LLM gateway's request/secret-management plane as an SSRF / code-injection surface.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-patch-management": "Article 21 measures do not reach the LLM gateway as a privileged credential-holding control plane.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT protection measures do not model API-key exfiltration / code execution in an LLM gateway as an ICT-risk event.",
+      "UK-CAF-B2": "Identity and Access Control objective has no requirement to isolate the LLM gateway's provider credentials from request-controlled flows.",
+      "AU-ISM-1546": "Patch-application control does not single out LLM proxy/gateway software.",
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": "No framework treats the LLM gateway as a high-value credential store whose request/config plane must be isolated; SSRF or config code-injection there yields mass key theft or proxy RCE."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [
+      "AML.T0049",
+      "AML.T0055"
+    ],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1552.001"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 29,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 24,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "Standard (RWEP 29, \"patch within 30 days\" band per lib/scoring.js timeline). Not KEV, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, patched at/after disclosure (Hard Rule #3). poc_available=20 + blast_radius=24 (LiteLLM is a widely used LLM gateway holding provider keys) minus patch 15.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "epss_note": "EPSS not pulled for this entry; retrieve via FIRST EPSS API in a future refresh.",
+    "epss_source": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2024-6587",
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-918"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "POST /chat/completions requests to LiteLLM carrying a user-supplied api_base pointing at a non-provider / attacker domain.",
+        "Outbound requests from the LiteLLM proxy (carrying provider API keys) to domains not on the approved provider allow-list.",
+        "Provider API keys appearing in traffic to unexpected endpoints.",
+        "BerriAI LiteLLM at BerriAI LiteLLM < 1.44.8 exposed to untrusted request/config input - the exposed precondition."
+      ],
+      "_ioc_source_note": "Behavioral signatures anchored to the huntr.dev advisory and the GitHub Security Advisory (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g26j-5385-hhw3), plus NVD CVE-2024-6587 (CWE-918). The user-supplied api_base egress carrying the provider key is the indicator anchor."
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-05-25",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6587",
+      "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g26j-5385-hhw3"
+    ],
+    "vendor_advisories": [
+      {
+        "vendor": "GitHub Security Advisory",
+        "advisory_id": "GHSA-g26j-5385-hhw3",
+        "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g26j-5385-hhw3",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "published_date": "2024-09-13"
+      },
+      {
+        "vendor": "NVD",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2024-6587",
+        "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6587",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "published_date": "2024-09-13"
+      }
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-05-25",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Manually curated from NVD (CWE-918; NIST CVSS 7.5) + the huntr.dev / GitHub advisory. BerriAI LiteLLM gateway flaw; same gateway credential-plane class as CVE-2026-42208 (shares NEW-CTRL-013).",
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
+    "_kev_short_description": "BerriAI LiteLLM honors a user-supplied api_base on /chat/completions and forwards the configured provider API key to the attacker's domain (CWE-918 SSRF), leaking the gateway's keys."
+  },
+  "CVE-2024-4889": {
+    "name": "BerriAI LiteLLM Config Code Injection via UI_LOGO_PATH / KMS",
+    "type": "RCE",
+    "cvss_score": 7.2,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
+    "cvss_note": "NVD/NIST CVSS v3.1 base 7.2 (HIGH, PR:H); huntr.dev CNA scored the same. Code injection through unvalidated input in the secret-management dynamic-evaluation path (CWE-94).",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Documented in the huntr.dev advisory: an admin-influenced UI_LOGO_PATH drives the secret-management code into evaluating attacker content.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed via huntr.dev. LiteLLM is a widely used LLM proxy/gateway that holds provider API keys for many models; the abused surface is its request/secret-management plane.",
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "ai_assisted_notes": "No AI-assisted weaponization; code injection in the LLM gateway.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Advisory disclosure with a coordinated fix; no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation reported as of curation (CVE-2024-6587 was demonstrated at Pwn2Own as a research chain).",
+    "affected": "BerriAI LiteLLM before 1.44.16.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "BerriAI LiteLLM < 1.44.16"
+    ],
+    "vector": "With Google KMS and SAVE_CONFIG_TO_DB configured, an admin-controlled UI_LOGO_PATH pointing at a remote server lets unvalidated input reach a dynamic-evaluation path in LiteLLM's secret-management code (CWE-94), allowing code execution on the proxy that holds the deployment's provider credentials.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "NVD AV:N / AC:L. PR:H - requires admin-level config influence.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is upgrading LiteLLM to 1.44.16 or later; redeploy, no host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Upgrade BerriAI LiteLLM to a patched release (1.44.16+). Restrict who can set request/config parameters, allow-list permitted api_base / provider endpoints, isolate the proxy's credential store, and do not expose the LiteLLM admin/config surface to untrusted users."
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": "Authenticator (API key) management does not isolate the LLM gateway's stored provider keys from request-controlled egress; an SSRF exfiltrates them.",
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track the LLM proxy/gateway as managed, credential-bearing software.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates the LLM gateway's request/secret-management plane as an SSRF / code-injection surface.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-patch-management": "Article 21 measures do not reach the LLM gateway as a privileged credential-holding control plane.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT protection measures do not model API-key exfiltration / code execution in an LLM gateway as an ICT-risk event.",
+      "UK-CAF-B2": "Identity and Access Control objective has no requirement to isolate the LLM gateway's provider credentials from request-controlled flows.",
+      "AU-ISM-1546": "Patch-application control does not single out LLM proxy/gateway software.",
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": "No framework treats the LLM gateway as a high-value credential store whose request/config plane must be isolated; SSRF or config code-injection there yields mass key theft or proxy RCE."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [
+      "AML.T0049",
+      "AML.T0055"
+    ],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1059"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 27,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 22,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "Standard (RWEP 27, \"patch within 30 days\" band per lib/scoring.js timeline). Not KEV, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, patched at/after disclosure (Hard Rule #3). poc_available=20 + blast_radius=22 (LiteLLM is a widely used LLM gateway holding provider keys) minus patch 15.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "epss_note": "EPSS not pulled for this entry; retrieve via FIRST EPSS API in a future refresh.",
+    "epss_source": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2024-4889",
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-94"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "LiteLLM admin config changes setting UI_LOGO_PATH to a remote/attacker-controlled URL with KMS + SAVE_CONFIG_TO_DB enabled.",
+        "Code/process execution on the LiteLLM proxy host during config load or secret-management operations.",
+        "Outbound fetches from the LiteLLM proxy to unexpected hosts during configuration.",
+        "BerriAI LiteLLM at BerriAI LiteLLM < 1.44.16 exposed to untrusted request/config input - the exposed precondition."
+      ],
+      "_ioc_source_note": "Behavioral signatures anchored to the huntr.dev advisory and the GitHub Security Advisory (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-423v-966v-frxg), plus NVD CVE-2024-4889 (CWE-94). The UI_LOGO_PATH/KMS dynamic-evaluation path is the indicator anchor."
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-05-25",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4889",
+      "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-423v-966v-frxg"
+    ],
+    "vendor_advisories": [
+      {
+        "vendor": "GitHub Security Advisory",
+        "advisory_id": "GHSA-423v-966v-frxg",
+        "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-423v-966v-frxg",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "published_date": "2024-06-06"
+      },
+      {
+        "vendor": "NVD",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2024-4889",
+        "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4889",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "published_date": "2024-06-06"
+      }
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-05-25",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Manually curated from NVD (CWE-94; NIST CVSS 7.2) + the huntr.dev / GitHub advisory. BerriAI LiteLLM gateway flaw; same gateway credential-plane class as CVE-2026-42208 (shares NEW-CTRL-013).",
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
+    "_kev_short_description": "BerriAI LiteLLM's secret-management path evaluates unvalidated input (UI_LOGO_PATH + KMS config, CWE-94), allowing an admin-influenced value to execute code on the credential-bearing proxy; fixed in 1.44.16."
+  },
   "CVE-2026-41091": {
     "name": "Microsoft Defender (Malware Protection Engine) Link-Following LPE to SYSTEM",
     "type": "LPE",

package/data/cwe-catalog.json

@@ -379,6 +379,7 @@
       "CVE-2024-21513",
       "CVE-2024-21576",
       "CVE-2024-27132",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-56145",
       "CVE-2025-11837",
       "CVE-2025-1550",
@@ -1849,6 +1850,7 @@
       "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2023-51449",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2025-61884"
     ],
     "framework_controls_partially_addressing": [

package/data/framework-control-gaps.json

@@ -51,7 +51,9 @@
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2025-1550",
       "CVE-2025-1753",
       "CVE-2025-23254",
@@ -1410,11 +1412,13 @@
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
       "CVE-2024-43468",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
       "CVE-2024-54085",
       "CVE-2024-56145",
       "CVE-2024-57726",
       "CVE-2024-57728",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2024-7399",
       "CVE-2024-7694",
       "CVE-2024-8068",
@@ -1828,7 +1832,9 @@
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2025-10585",
       "CVE-2025-1094",
       "CVE-2025-14174",
@@ -2463,11 +2469,13 @@
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
       "CVE-2024-43468",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
       "CVE-2024-54085",
       "CVE-2024-56145",
       "CVE-2024-57726",
       "CVE-2024-57728",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2024-7399",
       "CVE-2024-7694",
       "CVE-2024-8068",
@@ -3729,6 +3737,8 @@
       "CVE-2022-1471",
       "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2026-24206",
       "CVE-2026-24207"
     ],
@@ -4958,7 +4968,9 @@
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2025-1550",
       "CVE-2025-1753",
       "CVE-2025-23254",
@@ -5585,7 +5597,9 @@
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2025-1550",
       "CVE-2025-1753",
       "CVE-2025-23254",
@@ -5895,6 +5909,8 @@
       "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2024-1709",
+      "CVE-2024-4889",
+      "CVE-2024-6587",
       "CVE-2026-20182",
       "CVE-2026-24206",
       "CVE-2026-24207"

package/data/zeroday-lessons.json

@@ -4111,6 +4111,106 @@
     "_auto_imported": false,
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
   },
+  "CVE-2024-6587": {
+    "name": "BerriAI LiteLLM api_base SSRF API-Key Interception",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "BerriAI LiteLLM (CWE-918 SSRF via user-supplied api_base) on the LLM proxy/gateway forwards the gateway's configured provider API key to an attacker-supplied api_base, leaking the keys it holds.",
+      "privileges_required": "none (NVD PR:N) - a request parameter",
+      "complexity": "low (NVD AC:L)",
+      "ai_factor": "The abused surface is the LLM proxy/gateway - the shared chokepoint that holds provider API keys for many models and teams. The lesson: an LLM gateway is a high-value credential store, so its request and config planes must be isolated from the secrets (allow-list egress, no dynamic evaluation of config), or a single SSRF / config flaw becomes mass key theft or proxy RCE. CVE-2024-6587 was the SSRF link of a Pwn2Own full-chain RCE against LiteLLM."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Authenticator (API key) management does not isolate the gateway's stored provider keys from request-controlled egress."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Does not track the LLM proxy/gateway as managed, credential-bearing software."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats the LLM gateway as a high-value credential store whose request/config plane must be isolated from the secrets."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 70,
+      "basis": "LLM gateways concentrate provider keys but are deployed as convenience infrastructure; their request/config planes are not isolated from the credential store.",
+      "theater_pattern": "ai_supply_chain_trust"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-013",
+        "name": "AI-GATEWAY-CREDENTIAL-STORE-ISOLATION",
+        "description": "The LLM proxy/gateway must isolate its stored provider credentials from request- and config-controlled flows: allow-list permitted provider endpoints (reject attacker-supplied api_base), never forward stored keys to unvalidated destinations, disable dynamic evaluation of configuration, and keep the admin/config surface off untrusted networks. Upgrade BerriAI LiteLLM to a patched release (1.44.8+). The distinguishing test: send a /chat/completions request with an attacker api_base, and an admin config with a remote UI_LOGO_PATH, to a staging gateway and confirm no key egress and no code execution.",
+        "evidence": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g26j-5385-hhw3",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
+  "CVE-2024-4889": {
+    "name": "BerriAI LiteLLM Config Code Injection via UI_LOGO_PATH / KMS",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "BerriAI LiteLLM (CWE-94 code injection via the secret-management config path) on the LLM proxy/gateway lets admin-influenced config reach a dynamic-evaluation path and execute code on the credential-bearing proxy.",
+      "privileges_required": "admin-level config influence (NVD PR:H)",
+      "complexity": "low (NVD AC:L)",
+      "ai_factor": "The abused surface is the LLM proxy/gateway - the shared chokepoint that holds provider API keys for many models and teams. The lesson: an LLM gateway is a high-value credential store, so its request and config planes must be isolated from the secrets (allow-list egress, no dynamic evaluation of config), or a single SSRF / config flaw becomes mass key theft or proxy RCE. CVE-2024-6587 was the SSRF link of a Pwn2Own full-chain RCE against LiteLLM."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Authenticator (API key) management does not isolate the gateway's stored provider keys from request-controlled egress."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Does not track the LLM proxy/gateway as managed, credential-bearing software."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats the LLM gateway as a high-value credential store whose request/config plane must be isolated from the secrets."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 70,
+      "basis": "LLM gateways concentrate provider keys but are deployed as convenience infrastructure; their request/config planes are not isolated from the credential store.",
+      "theater_pattern": "ai_supply_chain_trust"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-013",
+        "name": "AI-GATEWAY-CREDENTIAL-STORE-ISOLATION",
+        "description": "The LLM proxy/gateway must isolate its stored provider credentials from request- and config-controlled flows: allow-list permitted provider endpoints (reject attacker-supplied api_base), never forward stored keys to unvalidated destinations, disable dynamic evaluation of configuration, and keep the admin/config surface off untrusted networks. Upgrade BerriAI LiteLLM to a patched release (1.44.16+). The distinguishing test: send a /chat/completions request with an attacker api_base, and an admin config with a remote UI_LOGO_PATH, to a staging gateway and confirm no key egress and no code execution.",
+        "evidence": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-423v-966v-frxg",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
   "CVE-2023-44467": {
     "name": "LangChain-Experimental PALChain dunder-import Code Execution (CVE-2023-36258 bypass)",
     "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",