@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.13.84 → 0.13.85

package/data/atlas-ttps.json

@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
     "maturity": "high",
     "last_verified": "2026-05-19",
     "cve_refs": [
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2025-1550",
       "CVE-2025-8747",
       "CVE-2026-22778",
@@ -1701,6 +1702,7 @@
     "stix_id": "attack-pattern--ebeed0c7-c5de-5049-8f27-efcae5f88b00",
     "is_subtechnique": false,
     "cve_refs": [
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
@@ -2793,6 +2795,7 @@
     "stix_id": "attack-pattern--a5cc5062-f672-510a-8a4f-a8d1aa7f5024",
     "is_subtechnique": true,
     "cve_refs": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
       "CVE-2025-1550",
       "CVE-2025-8747"
     ]

package/data/attack-techniques.json

@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@
       "DS0017"
     ],
     "cve_refs": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2024-42479",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
@@ -823,6 +825,7 @@
       "CVE-2020-25079",
       "CVE-2021-22681",
       "CVE-2021-26828",
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
       "CVE-2022-37055",
       "CVE-2022-40799",
       "CVE-2022-48503",
@@ -832,6 +835,7 @@
       "CVE-2023-33538",
       "CVE-2023-3519",
       "CVE-2023-39780",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2023-52163",
       "CVE-2024-12987",

package/data/cve-catalog.json

@@ -12347,6 +12347,216 @@
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
     "_kev_short_description": "llama.cpp's RPC backend deserialize_tensor() still skips bounds checks via GRAPH_COMPUTE (buffer=0) — the GRAPH_COMPUTE path the b3561 fix missed — giving unauthenticated RCE; fixed in b8492."
   },
+  "CVE-2023-43654": {
+    "name": "PyTorch TorchServe Management API SSRF to Remote Code Execution (ShellTorch)",
+    "type": "RCE",
+    "cvss_score": 9.8,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
+    "cvss_note": "NVD CVSS v3.1 base 9.8 (CRITICAL). The TorchServe management interface accepts model-configuration uploads from any domain (SSRF, CWE-918), and with the default all-interfaces bind and no authentication this becomes unauthenticated remote code execution.",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Documented by Oligo Security's ShellTorch research (and the vendor advisory): an unauthenticated request to the TorchServe management API registers a malicious model from a remote URL, leading to code execution.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed by Oligo Security (ShellTorch) against PyTorch's TorchServe model server (maintained by Amazon and Meta).",
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "ai_assisted_notes": "No AI-assisted weaponization; SSRF-to-RCE on an AI model server.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Oligo found thousands of exposed TorchServe instances (including at major organizations); research disclosure with a coordinated fix, no confirmed adversary in-the-wild exploitation reported as of curation.",
+    "affected": "PyTorch TorchServe 0.1.0 through 0.8.1 (fixed 0.8.2). The management API binds to all interfaces by default and has no built-in authentication.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "PyTorch TorchServe >= 0.1.0, <= 0.8.1"
+    ],
+    "vector": "TorchServe's management API allows registering a model from a remote URL the server then fetches and writes to disk (SSRF, CWE-918). Because the management console binds to all interfaces by default and TorchServe has no authentication, an unauthenticated remote attacker uploads a malicious model configuration and achieves remote code execution — the core of the ShellTorch chain (Oligo).",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "NVD AV:N / AC:L. PR:N — the default-configured management API is unauthenticated and network-exposed.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is an upgrade to TorchServe 0.8.2 or later; redeploy, no host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Upgrade TorchServe to 0.8.2 or later, bind the management API to loopback only, enable authentication / a token, and restrict allowed_urls so model configs cannot be fetched from arbitrary domains."
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": "Authentication is not enforced on the AI model server's management API; the default deployment is open and network-exposed.",
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track AI model servers and their config/deserialization paths as managed, RCE-bearing software.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates the model server's management API / YAML config parsing as a code-execution surface.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-patch-management": "Article 21 measures do not reach the AI model server's management plane as a privileged, unauthenticated control plane.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT protection measures do not model an unauthenticated model-server takeover as an ICT-risk event.",
+      "UK-CAF-B2": "Identity and Access Control objective has no requirement to authenticate the AI model server's management API.",
+      "AU-ISM-1546": "Patch-application control does not single out AI model servers and their bundled deserialization libraries.",
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": "No framework treats the model server's management API + config deserialization as an untrusted, RCE-bearing surface; default-open management plus unsafe YAML turns config upload into full takeover."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [
+      "AML.T0049",
+      "AML.T0010"
+    ],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1059"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 31,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 26,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "Standard (RWEP 31, \"patch within 30 days\" band per lib/scoring.js timeline). Not KEV, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, patched at/after disclosure (Hard Rule #3). poc_available=20 + blast_radius=26 minus patch 15. Note: thousands of TorchServe instances were found exposed, raising operational urgency beyond the RWEP number.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "epss_note": "EPSS not pulled for this entry; retrieve via FIRST EPSS API in a future refresh.",
+    "epss_source": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2023-43654",
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-918"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "TorchServe management API (default port 8081) reachable from untrusted networks without authentication.",
+        "Model-register requests to TorchServe referencing a remote URL (model archive / config) controlled by an external party.",
+        "TorchServe fetching and writing files from attacker-supplied URLs, or spawning processes after a model registration.",
+        "TorchServe 0.1.0–0.8.1 with the management API bound to all interfaces — the exposed precondition."
+      ],
+      "_ioc_source_note": "Behavioral signatures derived from Oligo Security's ShellTorch research (https://www.oligo.security/blog/shelltorch-explained-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-pytorch-model-server), the vendor advisory (https://github.com/pytorch/serve/security/advisories/GHSA-8fxr-qfr9-p34w), and NVD CVE-2023-43654 (CWE-918)."
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-05-25",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43654",
+      "https://www.oligo.security/blog/shelltorch-explained-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-pytorch-model-server",
+      "https://github.com/pytorch/serve/security/advisories/GHSA-8fxr-qfr9-p34w"
+    ],
+    "vendor_advisories": [
+      {
+        "vendor": "GitHub Security Advisory (pytorch/serve)",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2023-43654",
+        "url": "https://github.com/pytorch/serve/security/advisories/GHSA-8fxr-qfr9-p34w",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "published_date": "2023-09-28"
+      },
+      {
+        "vendor": "NVD",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2023-43654",
+        "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43654",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "published_date": "2023-09-28"
+      }
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-05-25",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Manually curated from NVD (CWE-918; NIST CVSS 9.8) + Oligo Security's ShellTorch research + the pytorch/serve advisory. Part of the ShellTorch TorchServe takeover chain.",
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
+    "_kev_short_description": "PyTorch TorchServe's unauthenticated, all-interfaces management API fetches and writes remote model configs (SSRF, CWE-918), giving unauthenticated RCE; the core of ShellTorch; fixed in 0.8.2."
+  },
+  "CVE-2022-1471": {
+    "name": "SnakeYAML Constructor Unsafe Deserialization RCE (ShellTorch chain)",
+    "type": "RCE",
+    "cvss_score": 9.8,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
+    "cvss_note": "NVD CVSS v3.1 base 9.8 (CRITICAL); the CNA (Google) scored 8.3 (HIGH, PR:L). SnakeYAML's Constructor does not restrict instantiable types, so parsing attacker-controlled YAML yields arbitrary object instantiation and code execution (CWE-502 / CWE-20). In ShellTorch this is the deserialization leg reached via the TorchServe model config.",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Documented by Oligo Security's ShellTorch research (and the vendor advisory): parsing attacker-controlled YAML with the default SnakeYAML Constructor instantiates arbitrary types and executes code.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed by Oligo Security (ShellTorch) as the deserialization leg of the TorchServe chain; SnakeYAML itself is a widely used Java YAML library.",
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "ai_assisted_notes": "No AI-assisted weaponization; classic unsafe deserialization.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Oligo found thousands of exposed TorchServe instances (including at major organizations); research disclosure with a coordinated fix, no confirmed adversary in-the-wild exploitation reported as of curation.",
+    "affected": "SnakeYAML before 2.0 (fixed in 2.0, which defaults to SafeConstructor). Reached in ShellTorch through TorchServe's YAML model-config parsing.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "SnakeYAML < 2.0"
+    ],
+    "vector": "SnakeYAML's default Constructor instantiates arbitrary Java types named in the YAML, so deserializing attacker-controlled YAML executes code (CWE-502). Any service that parses untrusted YAML with the unsafe Constructor is exposed; in the ShellTorch chain TorchServe parses an attacker-supplied model configuration, turning the SSRF into full RCE.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "NVD AV:N / AC:L. NVD assesses PR:N (CNA Google assessed PR:L).",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is an upgrade to SnakeYAML 2.0 or later (SafeConstructor default); redeploy, no host reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Upgrade SnakeYAML to 2.0 or later, or construct YAML parsers with SafeConstructor. For TorchServe, also apply CVE-2023-43654 mitigations so untrusted model configs never reach the parser."
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": "Authentication is not enforced on the AI model server's management API; the default deployment is open and network-exposed.",
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track AI model servers and their config/deserialization paths as managed, RCE-bearing software.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates the model server's management API / YAML config parsing as a code-execution surface.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-patch-management": "Article 21 measures do not reach the AI model server's management plane as a privileged, unauthenticated control plane.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT protection measures do not model an unauthenticated model-server takeover as an ICT-risk event.",
+      "UK-CAF-B2": "Identity and Access Control objective has no requirement to authenticate the AI model server's management API.",
+      "AU-ISM-1546": "Patch-application control does not single out AI model servers and their bundled deserialization libraries.",
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": "No framework treats the model server's management API + config deserialization as an untrusted, RCE-bearing surface; default-open management plus unsafe YAML turns config upload into full takeover."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [
+      "AML.T0011.000"
+    ],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1059"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 29,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 24,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "Standard (RWEP 29, \"patch within 30 days\" band per lib/scoring.js timeline). Not KEV, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, patched at/after disclosure (Hard Rule #3). poc_available=20 + blast_radius=24 minus patch 15. Note: thousands of TorchServe instances were found exposed, raising operational urgency beyond the RWEP number.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "epss_note": "EPSS not pulled for this entry; retrieve via FIRST EPSS API in a future refresh.",
+    "epss_source": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2022-1471",
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-502",
+      "CWE-20"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "A service parsing untrusted YAML with SnakeYAML's default Constructor instantiating unexpected Java types (e.g. ScriptEngine, URLClassLoader) during load.",
+        "YAML payloads containing !!javax / !!java type tags or remote class-loading constructs reaching a YAML parser.",
+        "Process or class-loading activity triggered by YAML deserialization of externally supplied content.",
+        "SnakeYAML < 2.0 on the classpath of a service that parses untrusted YAML — the exposed precondition."
+      ],
+      "_ioc_source_note": "Behavioral signatures derived from Oligo Security's ShellTorch research (https://www.oligo.security/blog/shelltorch-explained-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-pytorch-model-server), the vendor advisory (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2), and NVD CVE-2022-1471 (CWE-502/CWE-20)."
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-05-25",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1471",
+      "https://www.oligo.security/blog/shelltorch-explained-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-pytorch-model-server",
+      "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2"
+    ],
+    "vendor_advisories": [
+      {
+        "vendor": "SnakeYAML / NVD",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2022-1471",
+        "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "published_date": "2022-12-01"
+      },
+      {
+        "vendor": "NVD",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2022-1471",
+        "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1471",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "published_date": "2022-12-01"
+      }
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-05-25",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Manually curated from NVD (CWE-502/CWE-20; NIST CVSS 9.8) + Oligo Security's ShellTorch research + the SnakeYAML advisory. Part of the ShellTorch TorchServe takeover chain.",
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
+    "_kev_short_description": "SnakeYAML's default Constructor deserializes arbitrary types from untrusted YAML (CWE-502), enabling RCE; fixed in 2.0 (SafeConstructor default). The deserialization leg of the ShellTorch TorchServe chain."
+  },
   "CVE-2026-41091": {
     "name": "Microsoft Defender (Malware Protection Engine) Link-Following LPE to SYSTEM",
     "type": "LPE",

package/data/cwe-catalog.json

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
       "fuzz-testing-strategy"
     ],
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
       "CVE-2024-3154",
       "CVE-2025-20393",
       "CVE-2025-54236",
@@ -1303,6 +1304,7 @@
       "webapp-security"
     ],
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
       "CVE-2023-21529",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
       "CVE-2024-8069",
@@ -1828,6 +1830,7 @@
       "CVE-2021-22054",
       "CVE-2021-22175",
       "CVE-2021-39935",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2025-61884"
     ],

package/data/framework-control-gaps.json

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-01-01",
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
@@ -1346,6 +1348,7 @@
       "CVE-2021-39935",
       "CVE-2021-43226",
       "CVE-2021-43798",
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
       "CVE-2022-20775",
       "CVE-2022-37055",
       "CVE-2022-40799",
@@ -1360,6 +1363,7 @@
       "CVE-2023-39780",
       "CVE-2023-41974",
       "CVE-2023-43000",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-50224",
       "CVE-2023-52163",
       "CVE-2024-0769",
@@ -1767,6 +1771,8 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-03-15",
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
@@ -2336,6 +2342,7 @@
       "CVE-2021-39935",
       "CVE-2021-43226",
       "CVE-2021-43798",
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
       "CVE-2022-20775",
       "CVE-2022-37055",
       "CVE-2022-40799",
@@ -2351,6 +2358,7 @@
       "CVE-2023-39780",
       "CVE-2023-41974",
       "CVE-2023-43000",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-50224",
       "CVE-2023-52163",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
@@ -3623,6 +3631,8 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-05-13",
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2026-24206",
       "CVE-2026-24207"
@@ -4833,6 +4843,8 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-05-15",
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-21762",
@@ -5420,6 +5432,8 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-05-17",
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-21762",
@@ -5725,6 +5739,8 @@
     "opened_date": "2026-05-18",
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2020-10148",
+      "CVE-2022-1471",
+      "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2024-1709",
       "CVE-2026-20182",

package/data/zeroday-lessons.json

@@ -7333,6 +7333,106 @@
     "_auto_imported": false,
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
   },
+  "CVE-2023-43654": {
+    "name": "PyTorch TorchServe Management API SSRF to Remote Code Execution (ShellTorch)",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "PyTorch TorchServe Management API SSRF to Remote Code Execution (ShellTorch): CWE-918 SSRF in the management API. In the ShellTorch chain, an unauthenticated, network-exposed TorchServe management API accepts a remote model configuration and parses it with an unsafe YAML deserializer, yielding full remote code execution on the model server.",
+      "privileges_required": "none (NVD PR:N) — default-configured TorchServe is open and unauthenticated",
+      "complexity": "low (NVD AC:L)",
+      "ai_factor": "The abused surface is an AI model server (TorchServe, maintained by Amazon and Meta) and the libraries it bundles. The lesson: a model server's management API is a privileged control plane that must authenticate, bind to loopback, and never deserialize untrusted config unsafely — Oligo found thousands of exposed instances at major organizations, so the default-open posture is the real-world exposure."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Authentication is not enforced on the model server's management API; the default deployment is open and network-exposed."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Does not track AI model servers and their bundled deserialization libraries as managed, RCE-bearing software."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats the model server's management API + config deserialization as an untrusted, RCE-bearing surface."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 74,
+      "basis": "Model servers are deployed with default-open management planes on trusted-network assumptions; bundled YAML/deserialization libraries are not tracked.",
+      "theater_pattern": "default_open_management_plane"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-093",
+        "name": "AI-MODEL-SERVER-MANAGEMENT-API-HARDENING",
+        "description": "An AI model server's management API must authenticate every caller, bind to loopback (not all interfaces) by default, restrict model sources to an allow-list (no fetching configs/archives from arbitrary URLs), and parse configuration with safe deserializers (SafeConstructor / no arbitrary type instantiation). Upgrade TorchServe 0.8.2+ and bind the management API to loopback with authentication. The distinguishing test: from an unauthenticated remote client, attempt to register a model from an attacker URL against a staging model server and confirm it is refused and no remote content is fetched or deserialized.",
+        "evidence": "https://github.com/pytorch/serve/security/advisories/GHSA-8fxr-qfr9-p34w",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
+  "CVE-2022-1471": {
+    "name": "SnakeYAML Constructor Unsafe Deserialization RCE (ShellTorch chain)",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "SnakeYAML Constructor Unsafe Deserialization RCE (ShellTorch chain): CWE-502 unsafe YAML deserialization. In the ShellTorch chain, an unauthenticated, network-exposed TorchServe management API accepts a remote model configuration and parses it with an unsafe YAML deserializer, yielding full remote code execution on the model server.",
+      "privileges_required": "none for services parsing untrusted YAML (NVD PR:N; CNA Google PR:L)",
+      "complexity": "low (NVD AC:L)",
+      "ai_factor": "The abused surface is an AI model server (TorchServe, maintained by Amazon and Meta) and the libraries it bundles. The lesson: a model server's management API is a privileged control plane that must authenticate, bind to loopback, and never deserialize untrusted config unsafely — Oligo found thousands of exposed instances at major organizations, so the default-open posture is the real-world exposure."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Authentication is not enforced on the model server's management API; the default deployment is open and network-exposed."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Does not track AI model servers and their bundled deserialization libraries as managed, RCE-bearing software."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats the model server's management API + config deserialization as an untrusted, RCE-bearing surface."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 70,
+      "basis": "Model servers are deployed with default-open management planes on trusted-network assumptions; bundled YAML/deserialization libraries are not tracked.",
+      "theater_pattern": "default_open_management_plane"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-093",
+        "name": "AI-MODEL-SERVER-MANAGEMENT-API-HARDENING",
+        "description": "An AI model server's management API must authenticate every caller, bind to loopback (not all interfaces) by default, restrict model sources to an allow-list (no fetching configs/archives from arbitrary URLs), and parse configuration with safe deserializers (SafeConstructor / no arbitrary type instantiation). Upgrade SnakeYAML 2.0+ (SafeConstructor default) or construct parsers with SafeConstructor. The distinguishing test: from an unauthenticated remote client, attempt to register a model from an attacker URL against a staging model server and confirm it is refused and no remote content is fetched or deserialized.",
+        "evidence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1471",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
   "CVE-2025-34291": {
     "name": "Langflow Account Takeover + RCE (CORS / refresh-token chain)",
     "lesson_date": "2026-05-24",