@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.13.72 → 0.13.74

package/data/atlas-ttps.json

@@ -1037,7 +1037,10 @@
     ],
     "reference_url": "https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0104",
     "stix_id": "attack-pattern--04842d98-bb69-586e-9765-6ff1f56ef722",
-    "is_subtechnique": false
+    "is_subtechnique": false,
+    "cve_refs": [
+      "CVE-2025-54136"
+    ]
   },
   "AML.T0105": {
     "id": "AML.T0105",
@@ -2379,7 +2382,10 @@
       "ATLAS"
     ],
     "stix_id": "attack-pattern--b1b2cc5a-7312-5f26-93d3-8b8ee1baf97d",
-    "is_subtechnique": false
+    "is_subtechnique": false,
+    "cve_refs": [
+      "CVE-2025-54136"
+    ]
   },
   "AML.T0111": {
     "id": "AML.T0111",

package/data/attack-techniques.json

@@ -272,7 +272,9 @@
       "CVE-2025-1094",
       "CVE-2025-11837",
       "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2025-53773",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "CVE-2025-55319",
       "CVE-2025-68664",
       "CVE-2026-22778",
@@ -877,6 +879,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-48927",
       "CVE-2025-48928",
       "CVE-2025-49113",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2025-49704",
       "CVE-2025-49844",
       "CVE-2025-5086",
@@ -1001,6 +1004,9 @@
     "description": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.",
     "tactic": [
       "Initial Access"
+    ],
+    "cve_refs": [
+      "CVE-2025-54136"
     ]
   },
   "T1195.001": {

package/data/cve-catalog.json

@@ -9592,6 +9592,219 @@
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
     "_kev_short_description": "Microsoft Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin path traversal enabling arbitrary file write and, via prompt injection, host remote code execution."
   },
+  "CVE-2025-49596": {
+    "name": "MCP Inspector Missing Authentication — Unauthenticated RCE via the Inspector Proxy",
+    "type": "RCE",
+    "cvss_score": 8.3,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
+    "cvss_note": "Operator v3.1 estimate (NVD has not assessed v3.1; the GitHub CNA published CVSS v4.0 9.4 CRITICAL). Exploitation lures a victim's browser to reach the locally-bound, unauthenticated MCP Inspector proxy (the 0.0.0.0-day / DNS-rebinding class), hence AC:H / UI:R; once reached, commands run over stdio with no auth.",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Publicly documented by Oligo Security (the 0.0.0.0-day / MCP Inspector RCE research): a malicious web page a developer visits can reach the Inspector proxy bound on the loopback/0.0.0.0 and issue unauthenticated requests that launch MCP commands over stdio, yielding RCE on the developer's machine. Technique is fully public; no separate exploit repository required.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed by Oligo Security via conventional web/SSRF-class research. The affected component is core AI-developer tooling (Anthropic's official MCP Inspector), placing it on the AI/MCP supply-chain surface.",
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "ai_assisted_notes": "No AI-assisted weaponization; the exploit is a browser-driven cross-origin request chain.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Research disclosure with a coordinated fix (0.14.1); no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation reported as of curation. The public technique and the ubiquity of MCP Inspector in agent-developer workflows elevate the watch posture.",
+    "affected": "Anthropic MCP Inspector (the official Model Context Protocol server-testing tool, @modelcontextprotocol/inspector) prior to 0.14.1.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "@modelcontextprotocol/inspector < 0.14.1"
+    ],
+    "vector": "The MCP Inspector client and its proxy have no authentication between them, so any unauthenticated request that reaches the proxy can launch MCP commands over stdio — remote code execution on the host running Inspector. Because the proxy is browser-reachable (loopback / 0.0.0.0 binding), a malicious web page a developer visits can drive the requests cross-origin (the 0.0.0.0-day + DNS-rebinding class), with no developer interaction beyond visiting the page.",
+    "complexity": "high",
+    "complexity_notes": "Requires luring the developer's browser to a malicious page and the cross-origin/DNS-rebinding setup (AC:H, UI:R); the missing-auth flaw itself (CWE-306) imposes no further barrier once a request reaches the proxy.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a tool upgrade to @modelcontextprotocol/inspector 0.14.1+ (which adds a session-token auth between client and proxy and origin checks); no reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/inspector to 0.14.1 or later (adds proxy auth + origin validation). Until then, do not run MCP Inspector on a machine where a browser may visit untrusted pages, and bind it to loopback only with a firewall."
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track AI-developer tooling (MCP Inspector and similar) as managed, RCE-bearing software on developer workstations.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates locally-run AI/MCP developer tools as in-scope assets.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-patch-management": "Article 21 measures do not reach developer-workstation AI tooling whose loopback services are browser-reachable.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT protection measures seldom model a developer's locally-bound MCP tooling as an attacker-reachable RCE surface via the browser.",
+      "UK-CAF-B4": "System Security objective has no objective for hardening locally-bound developer AI services against cross-origin / DNS-rebinding access.",
+      "AU-ISM-1546": "Patch-application control does not single out AI/MCP developer tooling, whose RCE flaws compromise the developer's machine and credentials.",
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": "MCP — the connective tissue of the agent ecosystem — concentrates RCE risk in its tooling; no framework treats the MCP toolchain (inspector, proxy, servers) as a supply-chain control plane whose compromise reaches every connected agent and credential."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1059"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 30,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 25,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "P3 (RWEP 30 per lib/scoring.js). Not KEV-listed, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, patched at disclosure (Hard Rule #3 — the 9.4 CNA CVSS does not by itself drive priority). poc_available=20 (public Oligo technique) + blast_radius=25 (MCP Inspector is the official, widely-used MCP debug tool) − patch 15. Escalates on observed exploitation; representative of the MCP-toolchain RCE class.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "epss_note": "EPSS not pulled for this entry; retrieve via FIRST EPSS API in a future refresh.",
+    "epss_source": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2025-49596",
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-306",
+      "CWE-352",
+      "CWE-346"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "The MCP Inspector proxy (default port 6277) receiving requests whose Origin / Referer is an external web page rather than the local Inspector client — the cross-origin driver of the exploit.",
+        "MCP Inspector launching MCP server commands over stdio that were not initiated from the local Inspector UI session.",
+        "An MCP Inspector / Node proxy process spawning unexpected child processes (shell, interpreter) on a developer workstation.",
+        "Deployed @modelcontextprotocol/inspector below 0.14.1 reachable on 0.0.0.0 / loopback while a browser is in use — the exposed precondition."
+      ],
+      "supply_chain_entry_vectors": [
+        "Delivery is a malicious or attacker-controlled web page visited by a developer running MCP Inspector; the developer's browser is the cross-origin entry point, no direct host authentication required."
+      ],
+      "_ioc_source_note": "Behavioral signatures derived from NVD CVE-2025-49596 (CWE-306 missing authentication between Inspector client and proxy enabling stdio command execution) and the Oligo Security primary-source writeup at https://www.oligo.security/blog/critical-rce-vulnerability-in-anthropic-mcp-inspector-cve-2025-49596 (the 0.0.0.0-day / DNS-rebinding MCP Inspector RCE research)."
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-05-25",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49596",
+      "https://www.oligo.security/blog/critical-rce-vulnerability-in-anthropic-mcp-inspector-cve-2025-49596",
+      "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/security/advisories"
+    ],
+    "vendor_advisories": [
+      {
+        "vendor": "GitHub Security Advisory",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2025-49596",
+        "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/security/advisories",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "published_date": "2025-06-13"
+      },
+      {
+        "vendor": "NVD",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2025-49596",
+        "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49596",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "published_date": "2025-06-13"
+      }
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-05-25",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Manually curated from NVD (CWE-306; CNA CVSS v4.0 9.4, v3.1 N/A) + Oligo Security 0.0.0.0-day / MCP Inspector RCE research. Missing authentication between the Inspector client and proxy allows browser-driven, unauthenticated RCE over stdio; fixed in @modelcontextprotocol/inspector 0.14.1. Part of the broader 2026 MCP-toolchain RCE advisory class.",
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
+    "_kev_short_description": "Anthropic MCP Inspector lacks authentication between its client and proxy, allowing browser-driven unauthenticated remote code execution over stdio."
+  },
+  "CVE-2025-54136": {
+    "name": "Cursor MCPoison — Persistent RCE via Modified Already-Trusted MCP Config",
+    "type": "RCE",
+    "cvss_score": 8.8,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
+    "cvss_note": "NVD CVSS v3.1 base 8.8 (HIGH). The 'trust-on-first-use, never-re-validated' design lets a one-time approval become silent persistent code execution.",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Check Point Research ('MCPoison') publicly documented the technique: after a user approves an MCP server entry in a project's .cursor/mcp.json, Cursor does not re-validate the config on subsequent edits, so an attacker who later modifies that already-trusted entry (e.g. in a shared / pulled repository) gets their command executed silently each time the project is opened — persistent RCE with no re-prompt.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed by Check Point Research. The affected component is a leading AI coding IDE (Cursor) and the abused trust boundary is its MCP tool configuration — squarely AI-agent-tool-poisoning territory.",
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "ai_assisted_notes": "No AI-assisted weaponization; the attack is a configuration-trust bypass.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Research disclosure with a coordinated fix (Cursor 1.3); no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation reported as of curation. The shared-repo persistence and Cursor's large install base elevate the watch posture.",
+    "affected": "Cursor (AI code editor) versions 1.2.4 and below; fixed in 1.3.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "Cursor <= 1.2.4"
+    ],
+    "vector": "Cursor establishes trust in an MCP server entry when the user first approves it, but does not re-validate the .cursor/mcp.json entry when it is subsequently modified. An attacker who can change that already-trusted entry — by committing to a shared repository the victim pulls, or with local access — substitutes malicious commands (CWE-78 OS command injection via the MCP launch command) that Cursor then executes silently and persistently on every project open. The vulnerability class is AI-agent tool poisoning (ATLAS AML.T0110): a previously-approved tool is mutated into a malicious one with no fresh consent.",
+    "complexity": "low",
+    "complexity_notes": "NVD AC:L / PR:L. Requires the victim to have approved an MCP entry once and the attacker to modify it (shared-repo collaboration or local access); no further interaction is needed thereafter.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is an application upgrade to Cursor 1.3 or later (which re-validates MCP config changes); no reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Upgrade Cursor to 1.3 or later. Until then, treat .cursor/mcp.json as untrusted in shared repositories, review MCP entries on every pull, and avoid auto-approving MCP servers."
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track the AI IDE / agent tooling on developer workstations as managed, RCE-bearing software.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates AI coding assistants and their tool-config trust model as in-scope.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-patch-management": "Article 21 measures do not reach the trust-on-first-use model of an AI IDE's MCP configuration.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT protection measures do not model an approved-once-then-mutated tool config as a persistent code-execution channel.",
+      "UK-CAF-B4": "System Security objective has no objective for re-validating AI-tool configurations after first approval.",
+      "AU-ISM-1546": "Patch-application control does not address the AI-IDE tool-trust class.",
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": "No framework treats an AI agent's tool-approval state as a control plane requiring re-validation on change; trust-on-first-use turns a shared-repo config edit into silent persistent RCE across every developer who pulls it."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [
+      "AML.T0110",
+      "AML.T0104"
+    ],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1059",
+      "T1195"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 30,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 25,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "P3 (RWEP 30 per lib/scoring.js). Not KEV-listed, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, patched at disclosure (Hard Rule #3). poc_available=20 (public Check Point technique) + blast_radius=25 (Cursor is a leading AI IDE; shared-repo persistence reaches every developer who pulls) − patch 15. Escalates on observed exploitation; representative of the AI-agent tool-poisoning class.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "epss_note": "EPSS not pulled for this entry; retrieve via FIRST EPSS API in a future refresh.",
+    "epss_source": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2025-54136",
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-78",
+      "CWE-829"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "A change to a project's .cursor/mcp.json MCP server `command` / `args` between commits or pulls, especially in a shared repository, without a corresponding fresh in-IDE approval prompt.",
+        "Cursor (or its MCP host process) spawning a command from an MCP entry that differs from the command the user originally approved.",
+        "An MCP server entry whose launch command invokes a shell, downloader, or interpreter rather than a legitimate MCP server binary.",
+        "Cursor version 1.2.4 or below in use on a developer machine that opens shared/untrusted repositories — the exposed precondition."
+      ],
+      "supply_chain_entry_vectors": [
+        "Delivery is a modification to an already-approved .cursor/mcp.json in a shared repository (a malicious commit / PR the victim pulls) or via local file access; the trust was established at first approval and never re-checked."
+      ],
+      "_ioc_source_note": "Behavioral signatures derived from NVD CVE-2025-54136 (CWE-78) and Check Point Research's 'MCPoison' disclosure describing persistent RCE via modification of an already-trusted Cursor MCP configuration."
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-05-25",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54136",
+      "https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-mcpoison-cve-2025-54136/"
+    ],
+    "vendor_advisories": [
+      {
+        "vendor": "Check Point Research",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2025-54136",
+        "url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-mcpoison-cve-2025-54136/",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "published_date": "2025-08-05"
+      },
+      {
+        "vendor": "NVD",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2025-54136",
+        "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54136",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "published_date": "2025-08-05"
+      }
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-05-25",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Manually curated from NVD (CWE-78, CVSS 8.8) + Check Point Research 'MCPoison'. Cursor does not re-validate an MCP config entry after first approval, so a later modification of the trusted entry yields persistent silent RCE (ATLAS AML.T0110 AI Agent Tool Poisoning); fixed in Cursor 1.3.",
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
+    "_kev_short_description": "Cursor does not re-validate a previously-approved MCP configuration entry, so modifying the trusted entry yields persistent silent remote code execution."
+  },
   "CVE-2026-41091": {
     "name": "Microsoft Defender (Malware Protection Engine) Link-Following LPE to SYSTEM",
     "type": "LPE",

package/data/cwe-catalog.json

@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-11953",
       "CVE-2025-12686",
       "CVE-2025-48703",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "CVE-2025-54948",
       "CVE-2025-58034",
       "CVE-2025-59389",
@@ -707,6 +708,7 @@
       "CVE-2020-24363",
       "CVE-2025-32433",
       "CVE-2025-4008",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2025-61757",
       "CVE-2026-0300",
       "CVE-2026-24423",
@@ -1036,7 +1038,8 @@
     ],
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2023-2533",
-      "CVE-2025-34291"
+      "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596"
     ],
     "framework_controls_partially_addressing": [
       "NIST-800-53-SC-23",
@@ -1645,6 +1648,7 @@
     ],
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2025-32463",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER",
       "MAL-2026-SHAI-HULUD-OSS"
     ],
@@ -2974,7 +2978,8 @@
     ],
     "related_weaknesses": [],
     "evidence_cves": [
-      "CVE-2025-34291"
+      "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596"
     ],
     "last_verified": "2026-05-19",
     "notes": "Bulk-imported v0.13.18 from the canonical MITRE Top 25 + commonly-referenced-class expansion.",

package/data/framework-control-gaps.json

@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-01-01",
     "evidence_cves": [
-      "CVE-2025-34291"
+      "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
+      "CVE-2025-54136"
     ],
     "atlas_refs": [
       "AML.T0018",
@@ -1433,6 +1435,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-48928",
       "CVE-2025-49113",
       "CVE-2025-4919",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2025-49704",
       "CVE-2025-49706",
       "CVE-2025-5086",
@@ -1441,6 +1444,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-53690",
       "CVE-2025-53770",
       "CVE-2025-54068",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "CVE-2025-5419",
       "CVE-2025-54236",
       "CVE-2025-54253",
@@ -1723,6 +1727,8 @@
       "CVE-2025-34291",
       "CVE-2025-38352",
       "CVE-2025-43300",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "CVE-2026-25592",
       "CVE-2026-31431",
       "CVE-2026-34926",
@@ -2361,6 +2367,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-48928",
       "CVE-2025-49113",
       "CVE-2025-4919",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2025-49704",
       "CVE-2025-49706",
       "CVE-2025-5086",
@@ -2369,6 +2376,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-53690",
       "CVE-2025-53770",
       "CVE-2025-54068",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "CVE-2025-5419",
       "CVE-2025-54236",
       "CVE-2025-54253",
@@ -4713,6 +4721,8 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2024-21762",
       "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "CVE-2026-0300",
       "CVE-2026-20182",
       "CVE-2026-25592",
@@ -5210,6 +5220,8 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2024-21762",
       "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "CVE-2026-25592",
       "CVE-2026-34926",
       "CVE-2026-41091",
@@ -5249,6 +5261,8 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2024-21762",
       "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
+      "CVE-2025-54136",
       "CVE-2026-25592",
       "CVE-2026-34926",
       "CVE-2026-41091",

package/data/zeroday-lessons.json

@@ -5983,6 +5983,106 @@
     "_auto_imported": false,
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
   },
+  "CVE-2025-49596": {
+    "name": "MCP Inspector Missing Authentication — Unauthenticated RCE via the Inspector Proxy",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "Anthropic's official MCP Inspector has no authentication between its client and proxy; because the proxy is browser-reachable (loopback / 0.0.0.0), a malicious web page a developer visits can issue unauthenticated cross-origin requests that launch MCP commands over stdio — RCE on the developer's machine (the 0.0.0.0-day / DNS-rebinding class).",
+      "privileges_required": "none on the host — the developer need only run MCP Inspector and visit an attacker-controlled web page",
+      "complexity": "high (browser lure + cross-origin/DNS-rebinding setup), but the missing-auth flaw itself imposes no barrier once a request reaches the proxy",
+      "ai_factor": "The compromised component is core AI/MCP developer tooling. The lesson: MCP — the connective tissue of the agent ecosystem — concentrates RCE risk in its toolchain (inspector, proxy, servers); locally-bound AI dev services are browser-reachable and must authenticate and origin-validate. Surfaced via the MCP supply-chain advisory + GHSA feeds."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track AI/MCP developer tooling on workstations as managed, RCE-bearing software."
+      },
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates locally-run AI/MCP developer tools as in-scope assets."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats the MCP toolchain as a supply-chain control plane whose compromise reaches every connected agent and credential."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 70,
+      "basis": "Developer-workstation AI/MCP tooling is almost never in the managed vulnerability program; loopback services are assumed unreachable, ignoring browser-driven cross-origin / DNS-rebinding access.",
+      "theater_pattern": "ai_supply_chain_trust"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-081",
+        "name": "MCP-TOOLCHAIN-LOCALHOST-AUTH",
+        "description": "Locally-bound AI/MCP developer services (Inspector, proxies, dev servers) must authenticate their own client↔service channel and validate request Origin, never trusting loopback / 0.0.0.0 reachability as an access-control boundary (browsers can reach it cross-origin via the 0.0.0.0-day and DNS rebinding). Track MCP toolchain packages (e.g. @modelcontextprotocol/inspector >= 0.14.1) as managed, patch-prioritized software on developer workstations.",
+        "evidence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49596",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
+  "CVE-2025-54136": {
+    "name": "Cursor MCPoison — Persistent RCE via Modified Already-Trusted MCP Config",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "Cursor trusts an MCP server entry when the user first approves it but never re-validates the .cursor/mcp.json entry on later edits. An attacker who modifies that already-trusted entry (via a shared repo the victim pulls, or local access) substitutes malicious commands (CWE-78) that Cursor runs silently and persistently on every project open — AI-agent tool poisoning (ATLAS AML.T0110).",
+      "privileges_required": "low — the victim must have approved an MCP entry once; the attacker then modifies it (shared-repo collaboration or local access)",
+      "complexity": "low (NVD AC:L); no re-prompt after the first approval",
+      "ai_factor": "The trust boundary is an AI IDE's MCP tool configuration. The lesson: an AI agent's tool-approval is not a one-time decision — the approved artifact can be mutated, so tool configs must be re-validated on change. Surfaced via Check Point Research + GHSA/MCP advisory feeds."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Does not track AI IDE / agent tooling on workstations as managed, RCE-bearing software."
+      },
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Does not enumerate AI coding assistants and their tool-config trust model as in-scope."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats an AI agent's tool-approval state as a control plane requiring re-validation on change; trust-on-first-use turns a shared-repo config edit into silent persistent RCE."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 70,
+      "basis": "Developer AI IDEs and their MCP tool configs are almost never in the managed vulnerability program, and tool-approval trust is treated as a one-time event; shared-repo config edits are not reviewed as code-execution changes.",
+      "theater_pattern": "ai_supply_chain_trust"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-082",
+        "name": "AI-AGENT-TOOL-APPROVAL-REVALIDATION",
+        "description": "An AI agent / IDE must re-validate a tool configuration (MCP server entry, plugin command) whenever its definition changes, not trust it indefinitely after first approval. Treat tool-config files (e.g. .cursor/mcp.json) as untrusted in shared repositories, diff and re-approve MCP entries on every change, disable auto-approval of tool servers, and track the AI IDE itself (e.g. Cursor >= 1.3) as managed, patch-prioritized software.",
+        "evidence": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-mcpoison-cve-2025-54136/",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
   "CVE-2025-34291": {
     "name": "Langflow Account Takeover + RCE (CORS / refresh-token chain)",
     "lesson_date": "2026-05-24",