@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.13.72 → 0.13.73

package/data/cve-catalog.json

@@ -9592,6 +9592,112 @@
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
     "_kev_short_description": "Microsoft Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin path traversal enabling arbitrary file write and, via prompt injection, host remote code execution."
   },
+  "CVE-2025-49596": {
+    "name": "MCP Inspector Missing Authentication — Unauthenticated RCE via the Inspector Proxy",
+    "type": "RCE",
+    "cvss_score": 8.3,
+    "cvss_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
+    "cvss_note": "Operator v3.1 estimate (NVD has not assessed v3.1; the GitHub CNA published CVSS v4.0 9.4 CRITICAL). Exploitation lures a victim's browser to reach the locally-bound, unauthenticated MCP Inspector proxy (the 0.0.0.0-day / DNS-rebinding class), hence AC:H / UI:R; once reached, commands run over stdio with no auth.",
+    "cisa_kev": false,
+    "poc_available": true,
+    "poc_description": "Publicly documented by Oligo Security (the 0.0.0.0-day / MCP Inspector RCE research): a malicious web page a developer visits can reach the Inspector proxy bound on the loopback/0.0.0.0 and issue unauthenticated requests that launch MCP commands over stdio, yielding RCE on the developer's machine. Technique is fully public; no separate exploit repository required.",
+    "ai_discovered": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_discovery_notes": "Disclosed by Oligo Security via conventional web/SSRF-class research. The affected component is core AI-developer tooling (Anthropic's official MCP Inspector), placing it on the AI/MCP supply-chain surface.",
+    "ai_assisted_weaponization": false,
+    "ai_assisted_notes": "No AI-assisted weaponization; the exploit is a browser-driven cross-origin request chain.",
+    "active_exploitation": "none",
+    "active_exploitation_notes": "Research disclosure with a coordinated fix (0.14.1); no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation reported as of curation. The public technique and the ubiquity of MCP Inspector in agent-developer workflows elevate the watch posture.",
+    "affected": "Anthropic MCP Inspector (the official Model Context Protocol server-testing tool, @modelcontextprotocol/inspector) prior to 0.14.1.",
+    "affected_versions": [
+      "@modelcontextprotocol/inspector < 0.14.1"
+    ],
+    "vector": "The MCP Inspector client and its proxy have no authentication between them, so any unauthenticated request that reaches the proxy can launch MCP commands over stdio — remote code execution on the host running Inspector. Because the proxy is browser-reachable (loopback / 0.0.0.0 binding), a malicious web page a developer visits can drive the requests cross-origin (the 0.0.0.0-day + DNS-rebinding class), with no developer interaction beyond visiting the page.",
+    "complexity": "high",
+    "complexity_notes": "Requires luring the developer's browser to a malicious page and the cross-origin/DNS-rebinding setup (AC:H, UI:R); the missing-auth flaw itself (CWE-306) imposes no further barrier once a request reaches the proxy.",
+    "patch_available": true,
+    "patch_required_reboot": false,
+    "live_patch_available": false,
+    "live_patch_tools": [],
+    "live_patch_notes": "Remediation is a tool upgrade to @modelcontextprotocol/inspector 0.14.1+ (which adds a session-token auth between client and proxy and origin checks); no reboot.",
+    "vendor_update_paths": [
+      "Upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/inspector to 0.14.1 or later (adds proxy auth + origin validation). Until then, do not run MCP Inspector on a machine where a browser may visit untrusted pages, and bind it to loopback only with a firewall."
+    ],
+    "framework_control_gaps": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track AI-developer tooling (MCP Inspector and similar) as managed, RCE-bearing software on developer workstations.",
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates locally-run AI/MCP developer tools as in-scope assets.",
+      "NIS2-Art21-patch-management": "Article 21 measures do not reach developer-workstation AI tooling whose loopback services are browser-reachable.",
+      "DORA-Art-9": "ICT protection measures seldom model a developer's locally-bound MCP tooling as an attacker-reachable RCE surface via the browser.",
+      "UK-CAF-B4": "System Security objective has no objective for hardening locally-bound developer AI services against cross-origin / DNS-rebinding access.",
+      "AU-ISM-1546": "Patch-application control does not single out AI/MCP developer tooling, whose RCE flaws compromise the developer's machine and credentials.",
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": "MCP — the connective tissue of the agent ecosystem — concentrates RCE risk in its tooling; no framework treats the MCP toolchain (inspector, proxy, servers) as a supply-chain control plane whose compromise reaches every connected agent and credential."
+    },
+    "atlas_refs": [],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1190",
+      "T1059"
+    ],
+    "rwep_score": 30,
+    "rwep_factors": {
+      "cisa_kev": 0,
+      "poc_available": 20,
+      "ai_factor": 0,
+      "active_exploitation": 0,
+      "blast_radius": 25,
+      "patch_available": -15,
+      "live_patch_available": 0,
+      "reboot_required": 0
+    },
+    "rwep_notes": "P3 (RWEP 30 per lib/scoring.js). Not KEV-listed, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, patched at disclosure (Hard Rule #3 — the 9.4 CNA CVSS does not by itself drive priority). poc_available=20 (public Oligo technique) + blast_radius=25 (MCP Inspector is the official, widely-used MCP debug tool) − patch 15. Escalates on observed exploitation; representative of the MCP-toolchain RCE class.",
+    "epss_score": null,
+    "epss_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "epss_note": "EPSS not pulled for this entry; retrieve via FIRST EPSS API in a future refresh.",
+    "epss_source": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2025-49596",
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-306",
+      "CWE-352",
+      "CWE-346"
+    ],
+    "iocs": {
+      "behavioral": [
+        "The MCP Inspector proxy (default port 6277) receiving requests whose Origin / Referer is an external web page rather than the local Inspector client — the cross-origin driver of the exploit.",
+        "MCP Inspector launching MCP server commands over stdio that were not initiated from the local Inspector UI session.",
+        "An MCP Inspector / Node proxy process spawning unexpected child processes (shell, interpreter) on a developer workstation.",
+        "Deployed @modelcontextprotocol/inspector below 0.14.1 reachable on 0.0.0.0 / loopback while a browser is in use — the exposed precondition."
+      ],
+      "supply_chain_entry_vectors": [
+        "Delivery is a malicious or attacker-controlled web page visited by a developer running MCP Inspector; the developer's browser is the cross-origin entry point, no direct host authentication required."
+      ],
+      "_ioc_source_note": "Behavioral signatures derived from NVD CVE-2025-49596 (CWE-306 missing authentication between Inspector client and proxy enabling stdio command execution) and the Oligo Security primary-source writeup at https://www.oligo.security/blog/critical-rce-vulnerability-in-anthropic-mcp-inspector-cve-2025-49596 (the 0.0.0.0-day / DNS-rebinding MCP Inspector RCE research)."
+    },
+    "source_verified": "2026-05-25",
+    "verification_sources": [
+      "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49596",
+      "https://www.oligo.security/blog/critical-rce-vulnerability-in-anthropic-mcp-inspector-cve-2025-49596",
+      "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/security/advisories"
+    ],
+    "vendor_advisories": [
+      {
+        "vendor": "GitHub Security Advisory",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2025-49596",
+        "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/security/advisories",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "published_date": "2025-06-13"
+      },
+      {
+        "vendor": "NVD",
+        "advisory_id": "CVE-2025-49596",
+        "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49596",
+        "severity": "critical",
+        "published_date": "2025-06-13"
+      }
+    ],
+    "last_updated": "2026-05-25",
+    "discovery_attribution_note": "Manually curated from NVD (CWE-306; CNA CVSS v4.0 9.4, v3.1 N/A) + Oligo Security 0.0.0.0-day / MCP Inspector RCE research. Missing authentication between the Inspector client and proxy allows browser-driven, unauthenticated RCE over stdio; fixed in @modelcontextprotocol/inspector 0.14.1. Part of the broader 2026 MCP-toolchain RCE advisory class.",
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation",
+    "_kev_short_description": "Anthropic MCP Inspector lacks authentication between its client and proxy, allowing browser-driven unauthenticated remote code execution over stdio."
+  },
   "CVE-2026-41091": {
     "name": "Microsoft Defender (Malware Protection Engine) Link-Following LPE to SYSTEM",
     "type": "LPE",

package/data/cwe-catalog.json

@@ -707,6 +707,7 @@
       "CVE-2020-24363",
       "CVE-2025-32433",
       "CVE-2025-4008",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2025-61757",
       "CVE-2026-0300",
       "CVE-2026-24423",
@@ -1036,7 +1037,8 @@
     ],
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2023-2533",
-      "CVE-2025-34291"
+      "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596"
     ],
     "framework_controls_partially_addressing": [
       "NIST-800-53-SC-23",
@@ -2974,7 +2976,8 @@
     ],
     "related_weaknesses": [],
     "evidence_cves": [
-      "CVE-2025-34291"
+      "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596"
     ],
     "last_verified": "2026-05-19",
     "notes": "Bulk-imported v0.13.18 from the canonical MITRE Top 25 + commonly-referenced-class expansion.",

package/data/framework-control-gaps.json

@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-01-01",
     "evidence_cves": [
-      "CVE-2025-34291"
+      "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596"
     ],
     "atlas_refs": [
       "AML.T0018",
@@ -1433,6 +1434,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-48928",
       "CVE-2025-49113",
       "CVE-2025-4919",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2025-49704",
       "CVE-2025-49706",
       "CVE-2025-5086",
@@ -1723,6 +1725,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-34291",
       "CVE-2025-38352",
       "CVE-2025-43300",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2026-25592",
       "CVE-2026-31431",
       "CVE-2026-34926",
@@ -2361,6 +2364,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-48928",
       "CVE-2025-49113",
       "CVE-2025-4919",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2025-49704",
       "CVE-2025-49706",
       "CVE-2025-5086",
@@ -4713,6 +4717,7 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2024-21762",
       "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2026-0300",
       "CVE-2026-20182",
       "CVE-2026-25592",
@@ -5210,6 +5215,7 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2024-21762",
       "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2026-25592",
       "CVE-2026-34926",
       "CVE-2026-41091",
@@ -5249,6 +5255,7 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2024-21762",
       "CVE-2025-34291",
+      "CVE-2025-49596",
       "CVE-2026-25592",
       "CVE-2026-34926",
       "CVE-2026-41091",

package/data/zeroday-lessons.json

@@ -5983,6 +5983,56 @@
     "_auto_imported": false,
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
   },
+  "CVE-2025-49596": {
+    "name": "MCP Inspector Missing Authentication — Unauthenticated RCE via the Inspector Proxy",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "Anthropic's official MCP Inspector has no authentication between its client and proxy; because the proxy is browser-reachable (loopback / 0.0.0.0), a malicious web page a developer visits can issue unauthenticated cross-origin requests that launch MCP commands over stdio — RCE on the developer's machine (the 0.0.0.0-day / DNS-rebinding class).",
+      "privileges_required": "none on the host — the developer need only run MCP Inspector and visit an attacker-controlled web page",
+      "complexity": "high (browser lure + cross-origin/DNS-rebinding setup), but the missing-auth flaw itself imposes no barrier once a request reaches the proxy",
+      "ai_factor": "The compromised component is core AI/MCP developer tooling. The lesson: MCP — the connective tissue of the agent ecosystem — concentrates RCE risk in its toolchain (inspector, proxy, servers); locally-bound AI dev services are browser-reachable and must authenticate and origin-validate. Surfaced via the MCP supply-chain advisory + GHSA feeds."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Flaw-remediation cadence does not track AI/MCP developer tooling on workstations as managed, RCE-bearing software."
+      },
+      "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Vulnerability management rarely enumerates locally-run AI/MCP developer tools as in-scope assets."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats the MCP toolchain as a supply-chain control plane whose compromise reaches every connected agent and credential."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 70,
+      "basis": "Developer-workstation AI/MCP tooling is almost never in the managed vulnerability program; loopback services are assumed unreachable, ignoring browser-driven cross-origin / DNS-rebinding access.",
+      "theater_pattern": "ai_supply_chain_trust"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-081",
+        "name": "MCP-TOOLCHAIN-LOCALHOST-AUTH",
+        "description": "Locally-bound AI/MCP developer services (Inspector, proxies, dev servers) must authenticate their own client↔service channel and validate request Origin, never trusting loopback / 0.0.0.0 reachability as an access-control boundary (browsers can reach it cross-origin via the 0.0.0.0-day and DNS rebinding). Track MCP toolchain packages (e.g. @modelcontextprotocol/inspector >= 0.14.1) as managed, patch-prioritized software on developer workstations.",
+        "evidence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49596",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "ISO-27001-2022-A.8.8",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
   "CVE-2025-34291": {
     "name": "Langflow Account Takeover + RCE (CORS / refresh-token chain)",
     "lesson_date": "2026-05-24",

package/manifest.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "exceptd-security",
-  "version": "0.13.72",
+  "version": "0.13.73",
   "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation",
   "homepage": "https://exceptd.com",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "lXhZgoIrrVloO3XaTvo/43AxZn4mwErstd7DR0O/oVhD3AOGODM4HqrageYEou9WKOdMEGP5mJNTjJsXdP5NDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.445Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.146Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-125",
         "CWE-362",
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-17",
       "signature": "ztSKk/zFMFbT12qRcEeBKpydBn7fTT86KxMmor0DTCoKQWk5fJ0fSInfP1XMSB6rFk4/SuSjKVxQRMKVJ5a+Cg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.447Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.147Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1039",
         "CWE-1426",
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-17",
       "signature": "K6QdPHNK5c4K5QFjrW0QsUhjp71D7SOisSoulwPNSvKRdi2rY+yg0kdckijBMkLMsVPyUvcC9giu93mKJ1OZDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.447Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.148Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-22",
         "CWE-345",
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "Qd3SBWmUAaaT++e1Ry2wBIz/dCBmNBMl0+4Rb0etvJLES0fIBEAkU1mTbgNZnT5XOg9J5twdUpymWtmKnDDQCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.447Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.148Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "compliance-theater",
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "F2Shxae0ua0gPtvwzTRVzzHaIgJcFDRT3/akLUAZ4aaMQhkleKkcTaTpkjp+pTVEdPfLeLGNCeAOMs+whVYOBg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.448Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.149Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "exploit-scoring",
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "NA1hoQycvQhSUoG5rwlXX0mOVmGxoXRVezkELGEA2nZOdGis4gXkHT3O6Sfw7zxE4JuMrsCb65TEeOWk9WEPDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.449Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.149Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "rag-pipeline-security",
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "W3pS8lnaCP96TQzsJpG5d5yv5IwgaQyS4Z2Ctcz5BOJf6LbajSIgeDgTZ4f4Bhr5m4E7KsgWGjZS4x7Fwd33BQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.449Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.149Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1395",
         "CWE-1426"
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-17",
       "signature": "/WDGygh1Ck4yWlBWDGtEUVCqKB8d+UaJXoAoBXujtt+GAl8JbMNpaN1TvI0WkEltQ9dTxaAzSn20/eVDqv8iDQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.450Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.149Z",
       "d3fend_refs": [
         "D3-CA",
         "D3-CSPP",
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "za1NKBpy9LC91F/ESO/qhUfmvVr8GNItQOjR5OJLeHm+2dQ9HHiFWQK2eo53V/n/0uhubuggURA3yS6kJuWwBg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.450Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.150Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1188"
       ],
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "xiHAhhdufm9hCKU8PLiPE0MX65ej2F4OZwtlWLGLCiie9/km+Kiqbt192LcMvr94v83C98pb9wIaqFsFWft6AQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.450Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.150Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "New AI attack classes as ATLAS v6 publishes",
         "Post-quantum adversary capability timeline",
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "oYsSk35N2Uzq7MRofACykylcVwkgPhI4luWZ14vmQT+gUKLyZiKVOUJbe1+7lGl6BYPRN0sUDQ0f7S5Eu5w2Ag==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.451Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.150Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "zeroday-gap-learn",
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "igRqYyU1unRFH40BsPyAR62SPrk8QZv8dPGb8S9O9EvLCNOZAzm3t+HdT/NKqzWHwrpomOzkkkyLfYI/0qTUDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.451Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.151Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "New CISA KEV entries",
         "New ATLAS TTP additions in each ATLAS release",
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "i/17u4kJiSpcZAz7LnTyRePFugQOstQ1P4kVoe0oGf4E2/j8oIN9U9DccjUn/YHZhKWIJ2AILG/DMhvMrr3bBg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.452Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.151Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-327"
       ],
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "QuOVaQ4E2Sl39TClbhZ7HA9XrYAyRrDL44HY3RTE7aWLue0hV2cxaBt40ALGmHS++631QGFDlZTLZI77Tr6nAA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.452Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.151Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "security-maturity-tiers",
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "8Px1s2lDj10/Q6erwEQlXgUHM1+OTruUR8qAHPX7Oo3k/l69N6P9sm0PsafS9wDFtj9l5C/OiLiFgzMlMt6vBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.452Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.152Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1188"
       ]
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "urRcataVWg6/utyEkSiOWoNxTL8sABRjPR7ShyDfZGnAozFph/yDktSoaPVxQDXwu9EfJE+qhUW5OYR/yJECBQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.453Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.152Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "attack-surface-pentest",
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@
         "Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — Microsoft Edge 4-bug sandbox escape by Orange Tsai (DEVCORE); forward-watch only (browser sandbox, out of current playbook scope); track Microsoft Edge security advisory and KEV add"
       ],
       "signature": "C7lv65/Ecm8JJgSKxrX5lxx0YFzKWtrIQSKp+vy50I5e8945s1JmifGUUrnQwRQhq/Pkv7EmfiH5XSO8h75bDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.453Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.152Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "fuzz-testing-strategy",
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@
         "OSS-Fuzz-Gen / AI-assisted harness generation becoming the default expectation for OSS maintainers"
       ],
       "signature": "Z7ypCUnXx8JpLtgxxB6RHNi39w74AmrGY1N4ofAGCXhkuM2EaFVm1AU0dvl9UQ1bVLfHKEDGqMO/TwlIY7RABg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.453Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.153Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "dlp-gap-analysis",
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@
         "Quebec Law 25, India DPDPA, KSA PDPL enforcement actions naming AI-tool prompt data as in-scope personal information"
       ],
       "signature": "IgEnpHOhCftAyfUNdKsjbrd169T9pJkk/rRM2ZEna+H18y7p5x48+1kME2sJMZjJuyAdQFBJi8PJXZFwLGI+DQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.454Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.153Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "supply-chain-integrity",
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@
         "Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — NVIDIA Megatron Bridge path traversal by haehae; AI training-stack file-system trust boundary; track patch and SBOM-attestation impact"
       ],
       "signature": "pcLrM98A3vUSZRjwNAk0aZ9umvOwB41XCLLsCOy/IebB2F/06oIrGUKkMHtHwm4pTVPShMMcKdZQQ3jz30FnCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.454Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.153Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "defensive-countermeasure-mapping",
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "G5q5elh7Q7eu2xcwTVQJGDTGfvZR0OGQaLSLJPb2wjzCHFF8PWuZfCHZdjjqisiRzRWPyLlzgfHeMJqOdy7cBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.454Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.154Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "identity-assurance",
@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "Wv5hGMeHjlaQK1zwicVCA7AvdKgJBgvcjdpGM9Ywahh9tagAKhbkOjybowDQZzu7OZ3bDkbh6pBYc1Sdwr6NAA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.455Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.154Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ot-ics-security",
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "8t5qKHd3yWi57dvG36YQkLN/X9bQWqtEiYjay4IfSmqhJpM/xXPaQVKNGz3wscrO8OLKUZ0OaX7Mj5kzpgBKBQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.455Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.154Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "coordinated-vuln-disclosure",
@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 amendments potentially adding explicit CVD program requirements"
       ],
       "signature": "GDGt4UPqBa04PjlpSmpyihGzd3OgfBN7jaAK5tfwp+LRSs3ygKOdbeivUCCHNagTY1hE6hG2Ou40ADfBFuXeAg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.455Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.155Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "threat-modeling-methodology",
@@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@
         "PASTA v2 updates incorporating AI/ML application threats"
       ],
       "signature": "rFBpOQEJUPpl+v88Lw/WqVJRhTl80vy0VbPAbzQj3Q0suJRRrJg368I9uKu5LXIBKFDvKxnGIcIzbGg9NUtaCA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.456Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.155Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "webapp-security",
@@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "ux85YI4t2mVHOyt744Yin1HHy+z11JIFygjKfFfQOBBl5QVV3A267jeIy7utix85irMcpZm/T3yx/ooqiK2tBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.456Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.155Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "NGINX Rift CVE-2026-42945 (disclosed 2026-05-13, source depthfirst) — KEV-watch predicted CISA KEV listing by 2026-05-29; AI-assisted discovery angle; track for active-exploitation confirmation and patch advisory affecting front-door web app deployments"
       ]
@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "IIXnkZ5ZNqFwOto5KfytADTLLZLoyXNZACD1ORZ40P1HUAQxe6u2uyXFzzsfuob4Uy06jNkRGr2FFgCphUH1Cw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.456Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.156Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-healthcare",
@@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "AhF9KF8ZBlDteciV+F8IBSmFVYCvQOn44GmD4rZjgLoPxfIv/QE1/vSkK32zyqDKtHWkLSXExbkkPkxA/V6dDw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.457Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.156Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-financial",
@@ -1560,7 +1560,7 @@
         "TIBER-EU framework v2.0 alignment with DORA TLPT RTS (JC 2024/40); cross-recognition with CBEST and iCAST"
       ],
       "signature": "HQgZvb4ReziEz5rNFr8i/O8/rJEZR+iHRROT7m/D2QUqhrcNISPkYXENsUZlG8xapzy/Ik92ehkseyj4hdmhCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.457Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.156Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-federal-government",
@@ -1629,7 +1629,7 @@
         "Australia PSPF 2024 revision and ISM quarterly updates — track for Essential Eight Maturity Level requirements for federal entities"
       ],
       "signature": "linxmsXZiOYtcs71sSWgGCrvb8xQfmxmtTY5PRvZJ0/8FgJulo0tQtejzexYG775s7XhjAmGsDP238BQTQ8ADA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.458Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.157Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-energy",
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@
         "ICS-CERT advisory feed (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/ics-advisories) for vendor CVEs in Siemens, Rockwell, Schneider Electric, ABB, GE Vernova, Hitachi Energy, AVEVA / OSIsoft PI"
       ],
       "signature": "JjBfc0ovta560Clk0x3QGRM5osFJDwcvpy3rT7QEGdCIL827jzE8QCow1C8deXq+4JhY2sA/d7/8IsxikdlkCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.458Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.157Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-telecom",
@@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@
         "O-RAN SFG / WG11 security specifications"
       ],
       "signature": "JWVxKFoKrbX4d+Tko1d4OBdwyg25MfFFKn4CT6E/CzH+YwnU3T6Y76uBQIKg3+gIGTvPduqyvQwQQ5FxKDuPBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.458Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.157Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "api-security",
@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "BmCRCestWqr55+fCynEhtAl5NWLT+xLTkpwS0Icp3SaoZOw/ce3Y6TtqjHRSKn4CBJq7YDiLRWxmhO3MStvOAA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.458Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.158Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "NGINX Rift CVE-2026-42945 (disclosed 2026-05-13, source depthfirst) — KEV-watch predicted CISA KEV listing by 2026-05-29; track for active-exploitation confirmation and patch advisory affecting API gateway / reverse-proxy deployments",
         "Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — LiteLLM 3-bug SSRF + Code Injection chain by k3vg3n; LLM-proxy API surface; track upstream patch and CVE assignments",
@@ -1935,7 +1935,7 @@
         "CISA KEV additions for cloud-control-plane CVEs (IMDSv1 abuses, federation token mishandling, cross-tenant boundary failures); CISA Cybersecurity Advisories for cross-cloud advisories"
       ],
       "signature": "/DV3pmZwrRySrk1OCbyI+0BQESacjupJfUX3eC2NGtXuYOBro0vndIP+z27heFxumnjU3a9sfla7/U9X+pqnDw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.459Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.158Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "container-runtime-security",
@@ -1997,7 +1997,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "E2UGSf9ATyYgzBr8uM/0ubOUmDqo1jVA7f9mVxv6LHfWGCNuQNXDyuNou9VAmUCeeXEeUYIi3AFjXkJqpOkxDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.459Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.158Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "Pwn2Own Berlin 2026 (disclosed 2026-05-14, embargo ends 2026-08-12) — NVIDIA Container Toolkit container escape ($50K award) by chompie / IBM X-Force XOR; high-severity container/hypervisor boundary break; track patch and KEV add post-embargo"
       ]
@@ -2071,7 +2071,7 @@
         "MITRE ATLAS v5.6.0 (released May 2026) shipped the AML.T0010 sub-technique expansion this forecast tracked plus new techniques (\"Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool\", \"Escape to Host\"); inventory now 16 tactics, 84 techniques, 56 sub-techniques. Forward watch: subsequent ATLAS minor and major releases — track next-cadence updates to agentic-AI TTPs and MLOps-pipeline-specific techniques"
       ],
       "signature": "IL+DlRCDJN/p08iiJCFkasKcoyjcB0uWrJ6ORLjQcS1HrUa5Xt62QxVjYPHzaevlm5y36ZdmfESqsZJmzK3lCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.460Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.159Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "incident-response-playbook",
@@ -2133,7 +2133,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.17 amendments tightening ransom-payment 24h disclosure operationalization"
       ],
       "signature": "MmjLjlmOMLjhJJ4ZfR8MYlHam+ZB+eSqfh6Nv+DecaG4O5zeo9DBP/iL3cbyDVZxmhnhivgJild2ccYeWTeZAg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.460Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.159Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ransomware-response",
@@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-22",
       "signature": "ssueL03g9fWlhXpTe+IiY5l7RqQkunN4DTN5QETKE+VOX+qggdjAR8PONxk77ol4xWYmHrM/VcH8CNtXUEvgBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.460Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.160Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "email-security-anti-phishing",
@@ -2266,7 +2266,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-18",
       "signature": "rK+WnuS+9tqEABmwc0jO/PEmxcLjG1/tmUb897HsClQeKzf+TQOlwBE+OsbtuKxpjYNwur62Xxs3TxObkwm8Cw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.461Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.160Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "age-gates-child-safety",
@@ -2334,7 +2334,7 @@
         "US state adult-site age-verification laws — 19+ states by mid-2026 (TX HB 18 upheld by SCOTUS June 2025 in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton); track ongoing challenges in remaining states"
       ],
       "signature": "Rgho5TOFUL1txOzcVR0kASCNdovSU4yt99JlGilJlJRyg0A+BdeeQYrZrhPF6Vx2reUAVG0BeHfcZtSbi+cwCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.461Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.160Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "cloud-iam-incident",
@@ -2414,7 +2414,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "e/kij7GtKaytROyIj7V5RH+FC9WtmVFzrmG2kIlNDNn29ep/CRNlIQKwXLpzo/81AIf634pmdr1qy/+vwIuUDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.461Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.161Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "AWS IAM Identity Center session-policy refresh and step-up-on-admin enforcement (anticipated 2026-H2 release)",
         "GCP Workload Identity Federation principal-set attribute mapping tightening (post-2026 Q3 Federation hardening guide)",
@@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
       "signature": "ew9Kglc9fAZzbn0ZIfGP7WSK/j4eV2VhSvpy+s5bEfNEVYIMa2kZjnGBapgUsyGDLes9H9K2ovjQyX17+GKiBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T12:58:49.462Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-25T13:29:06.161Z",
       "forward_watch": [
         "Entra ID conditional access evolution post-Midnight Blizzard — Microsoft's 2025-2026 commitments on legacy-tenant MFA enforcement and OAuth-app consent gating",
         "Okta IPSIE (Interoperability Profile for Secure Identity in the Enterprise) OpenID Foundation working-group output and adoption timeline",
@@ -2526,6 +2526,6 @@
   ],
   "manifest_signature": {
     "algorithm": "Ed25519",
-    "signature_base64": "d/BP9u9Hv9u4jiijm+yvszaLRoWWN/hCezTYoDZR5GDuAHQ8axchgrbYWoYXtwpuB984QvvXBpB8c00DEiuXAA=="
+    "signature_base64": "OX1pHjgYAYOrjL5iHeFI7gLhEldySUwMkJBXqiyziYV5VmTcuX+KE0FBJ9RYMdKeNjBOyNgs+qUr+vgPvo6FDA=="
   }
 }