@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.13.47 → 0.13.49

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,35 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 0.13.49 — 2026-05-21
+
+`discover` covers four previously-invisible collectors. CLI UX cleanup across welcome banner, help text, attestation warning.
+
+### Bugs
+
+- **`discover` recommends `cicd-pipeline-compromise`, `mcp`, `ai-api`, and `crypto`.** Before, the cwd-aware recommender only knew about 9 of the 13 collectors — `discover` from a repo with `.github/workflows/` never surfaced the CI/CD posture playbook; `mcp` / `ai-api` were invisible even when the operator had MCP client config or shell rc files in their home; `crypto` was absent from the Linux branch alongside `hardening` / `runtime`. New probes: `.github/workflows/*.yml` for CI/CD, `~/.cursor/mcp.json` + `~/.config/claude` + `~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json` + `~/.gemini/settings.json` for MCP clients, `~/.bashrc` + `~/.zshrc` + `~/.profile` for shell rc, plus `crypto` always on Linux.
+- **`discover` reason text drops the misleading "node lockfile" claim.** A `package.json`-only repo (no `package-lock.json`) used to receive the recommendation reason "git repo + node lockfile" even though the lockfile didn't exist. The reason now says "node project" (and similarly "python project" / "rust project" / "go project"), which is accurate for the broad manifest-OR-lockfile trigger.
+- **`exceptd run --scope code` next-step suggestion is omitted from `discover` when no code-scope playbooks were recommended.** Previously, discover from an empty cwd suggested `exceptd run --scope code` even though no code playbooks applied — operators following the suggestion got every code-scope playbook running against an empty tree and a multi-hundred-KB JSON dump. Now the next-steps list shows `--scope code` only when at least one code-scope recommendation fired.
+- **`exceptd help` section header drops the stale `v0.12.0 canonical surface` pin.** The surface evolves with each release; the header now reads `Canonical verbs` without a frozen version label.
+
+### Features
+
+- **Welcome banner enumerates the playbook starting set by trigger rather than by abstract category** (`git repos:`, `GitHub Actions:`, `Linux hosts:`, `AI assistants:`, `containers:`). Each row names the artifact that triggers the recommendation, and the banner explicitly points at `exceptd discover` as the authoritative recommender.
+- **Attestation unsigned warning shrinks to a single line on consumer installs.** Previously every `exceptd run` from a globally-installed package (e.g. `npm install -g`) emitted a 4-line warning prescribing `exceptd doctor --fix` — but consumer installs land the package under `node_modules/` where `.keys/` typically isn't writable by the operator. The collector now detects consumer-install layout (PKG_ROOT under `node_modules/` OR parent dir is `@blamejs`) and prints `[attest] writing unsigned attestation (consumer install — signing is contributor-only).` instead. Contributor checkouts still see the full nudge.
+
+## 0.13.48 — 2026-05-21
+
+Collector predicate tightening across `secrets`, `library-author`, `crypto-codebase`, and `cred-stores`.
+
+### Bugs
+
+- **`secrets` collector demotes hits scoped exclusively to test / fixture / example paths.** Previously a JWT literal in `fulcio_test.go` or a private-key block in `cosign-test.key` flipped `jwt-token-with-secret-context` / `ssh-private-key-block` to `hit`. The collector now splits hits into production-scope vs. test-scope (segments `/test/` `/tests/` `/spec/` `/fixtures/` `/examples/` `/samples/` `/demo/` `/testdata/`, plus `*.test.<ext>` / `*.spec.<ext>` / `*_test.<ext>` / `*-test[-.]*` filename conventions). The indicator fires only when at least one production-scope hit exists. Test-only hits stay visible in the `secret-regex-scan-text-files` artifact for operator inspection but don't trip the signal. Mirrors the existing `crypto-codebase` demotion pattern.
+- **`library-author` recognises container-native publish workflows.** The previous heuristic only matched npm / pypi / cargo / goreleaser / softprops-action-gh-release publish paths. Workflows using `ko publish` / `cosign sign(-blob)` / `crane push` / `oras push` / `docker push` / `docker/build-push-action` were missed, which falsely flipped `publish-workflow-no-id-token-write` on projects (e.g. sigstore/cosign) that use `id-token: write` for OIDC-based publishing. Now those workflows are recognized as publish-related, AND any workflow declaring `id-token: write` inside a `permissions:` block with executable `steps:` is treated as publish context.
+- **`crypto-codebase` test-path demotion now covers Go's `_test.go` convention.** The previous regex matched only `*.test.<ext>` / `*.spec.<ext>` (dot-separated). Go convention is `foo_test.go` (underscore-separated); those test files were not demoted and false-positive'd indicators like `weak-hash-import` (md5 in a Go test using a "token" variable). Added `(?:^|[\\/])[^\\/]+_test\.[a-z]+$` to the demotion regex.
+
+### Features
+
+- **`cred-stores` surfaces a `credentials-file-perms-check` artifact** documenting whether the POSIX-mode-bit check ran (`captured: true` on Linux / macOS) or was skipped (`captured: false, reason: "...skipped on win32..."` on Windows). Previously the `credentials-file-bad-perms` signal was silently absent from `signal_overrides` on Windows, indistinguishable from "indicator not catalogued". Mirrors the `secrets` collector's `world-writable-secret-files` skip pattern.
+
 ## 0.13.47 — 2026-05-21
 
 `cicd-pipeline-compromise` collect | run pipe now produces a verdict when the operator opts in to the CI-fleet ownership attestation.

package/bin/exceptd.js

@@ -334,9 +334,14 @@ If you know what you want:
   exceptd ci --scope code    # CI gate against every code-scoped playbook
 
 Common starting playbooks
-  code repos:    secrets, sbom, library-author, crypto-codebase
-  Linux hosts:   kernel, hardening, runtime, cred-stores
-  AI / service:  ai-api, mcp, crypto
+  git repos:      secrets, sbom, library-author, crypto-codebase
+  GitHub Actions: cicd-pipeline-compromise (.github/workflows/ present)
+  Linux hosts:    kernel, hardening, runtime, cred-stores, crypto
+  AI assistants:  mcp (MCP client config), ai-api (shell rc + AI key exports)
+  containers:     containers (Dockerfile / docker-compose)
+
+\`exceptd discover\` is the authoritative recommender — it inspects your
+cwd + host and only suggests the playbooks that actually apply.
 
 Full reference: exceptd help
 Per-verb help:  exceptd <verb> --help
@@ -349,8 +354,8 @@ function printHelp() {
 Usage: exceptd <command> [args]
        npx @blamejs/exceptd-skills <command> [args]
 
-v0.12.0 canonical surface
-─────────────────────────
+Canonical verbs
+───────────────
 
   brief [playbook]           Unified info doc — jurisdictions + threat context
                              + preconditions + artifacts + indicators. Replaces
@@ -4275,18 +4280,28 @@ function maybeSignAttestation(filePath) {
   // Operators who set `.keys/private.pem` get tamper-evident attestations;
   // operators without the keypair get a single nudge per session telling them
   // exactly how to enable signing.
+  //
+  // Consumer installs (`npm install -g`) land PKG_ROOT under
+  // node_modules/ where the operator typically can't write to
+  // .keys/. For those installs the multi-line nudge prescribes a
+  // remediation (doctor --fix) the operator doesn't own — surface a
+  // single-line marker so the unsigned attestation isn't silent, but
+  // skip the call-to-action that doesn't apply.
   if (!fs.existsSync(privKeyPath) && !process.env.EXCEPTD_UNSIGNED_WARNED) {
-    // Cycle 20 A P2 (v0.12.40): operator-facing verb `exceptd doctor --fix`
-    // calls sign.js generate-keypair under the hood. Pre-fix the message
-    // hinted at a node-internal script path that's not on PATH after
-    // `npm install -g`. Surface the doctor route first; cite the lib
-    // script only as the contributor / non-npm-installed fallback.
-    process.stderr.write(
-      "[attest] attestation will be written UNSIGNED (no private key at .keys/private.pem). " +
-      "Operators reading the attestation later can verify the SHA-256 hash but not authenticity. " +
-      "Enable Ed25519 signing: `exceptd doctor --fix` (or for contributor checkouts: `node $(exceptd path)/lib/sign.js generate-keypair`). " +
-      "Suppress this notice: export EXCEPTD_UNSIGNED_WARNED=1.\n"
-    );
+    const pkgRootSegments = PKG_ROOT.split(/[\\/]/);
+    const isConsumerInstall =
+      pkgRootSegments.includes("node_modules") ||
+      path.basename(path.dirname(PKG_ROOT)) === "@blamejs";
+    if (isConsumerInstall) {
+      process.stderr.write("[attest] writing unsigned attestation (consumer install — signing is contributor-only).\n");
+    } else {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        "[attest] attestation will be written UNSIGNED (no private key at .keys/private.pem). " +
+        "Operators reading the attestation later can verify the SHA-256 hash but not authenticity. " +
+        "Enable Ed25519 signing: `exceptd doctor --fix` (or for contributor checkouts: `node $(exceptd path)/lib/sign.js generate-keypair`). " +
+        "Suppress this notice: export EXCEPTD_UNSIGNED_WARNED=1.\n"
+      );
+    }
     process.env.EXCEPTD_UNSIGNED_WARNED = "1";
   }
   try {
@@ -5535,17 +5550,60 @@ function cmdDiscover(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
   // Build recommendation set. Dedup by playbook id so multi-trigger rules
   // don't double-list.
   const isRepo = detected.includes(".git/");
-  const hasNode = detected.includes("package.json") || detected.includes("package-lock.json")
+  const hasNodeManifest = detected.includes("package.json");
+  const hasNodeLockfile = detected.includes("package-lock.json")
     || detected.includes("yarn.lock") || detected.includes("pnpm-lock.yaml");
+  const hasNode = hasNodeManifest || hasNodeLockfile;
   const hasPython = detected.includes("pyproject.toml") || detected.includes("requirements.txt")
     || detected.includes("Pipfile");
   const hasRust = detected.includes("Cargo.toml");
   const hasGo = detected.includes("go.mod");
-  const hasLockfile = hasNode || hasPython || hasRust || hasGo;
+  const hasProject = hasNode || hasPython || hasRust || hasGo;
   const hasContainers = detected.includes("Dockerfile") || detected.includes("docker-compose.yml")
     || detected.includes("docker-compose.yaml");
   const isLinux = hostPlatform === "linux";
 
+  // .github/workflows/ directory probe — surfaces the CI/CD posture
+  // playbook when present.
+  let hasGithubWorkflows = false;
+  try {
+    const wfDir = path.join(cwd, ".github", "workflows");
+    if (fs.existsSync(wfDir) && fs.statSync(wfDir).isDirectory()) {
+      const entries = fs.readdirSync(wfDir).filter(f => /\.(ya?ml)$/i.test(f));
+      if (entries.length > 0) hasGithubWorkflows = true;
+    }
+  } catch { /* swallow */ }
+
+  // Home-resident MCP client config probe — surfaces the `mcp`
+  // playbook when at least one supported client is configured on
+  // this host. Best-effort: silently skip if home isn't readable.
+  let hasMcpClientConfig = false;
+  const homeForProbe = process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || null;
+  if (homeForProbe) {
+    const mcpProbes = [
+      path.join(homeForProbe, ".cursor", "mcp.json"),
+      path.join(homeForProbe, ".config", "claude"),
+      path.join(homeForProbe, ".claude"),
+      path.join(homeForProbe, ".codeium", "windsurf", "mcp_config.json"),
+      path.join(homeForProbe, ".gemini", "settings.json"),
+    ];
+    for (const p of mcpProbes) {
+      try { if (fs.existsSync(p)) { hasMcpClientConfig = true; break; } } catch { /* swallow */ }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Shell rc presence — proxy signal for "user has a shell-driven
+  // workflow that might export AI API keys". The ai-api collector
+  // checks rc files + vendor dotfiles regardless; surface the
+  // recommendation when at least one rc file exists.
+  let hasShellRc = false;
+  if (homeForProbe) {
+    const rcProbes = [".bashrc", ".bash_profile", ".zshrc", ".zprofile", ".profile"];
+    for (const f of rcProbes) {
+      try { if (fs.existsSync(path.join(homeForProbe, f))) { hasShellRc = true; break; } } catch { /* swallow */ }
+    }
+  }
+
   const recs = [];
   const seen = new Set();
   function recommend(id, reason) {
@@ -5554,22 +5612,32 @@ function cmdDiscover(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
     recs.push({ id, reason });
   }
 
-  if (isRepo && hasLockfile) {
+  if (isRepo && hasProject) {
     const langs = [hasNode && "node", hasPython && "python", hasRust && "rust", hasGo && "go"]
       .filter(Boolean).join("/");
-    recommend("secrets", `git repo + ${langs} lockfile → check for committed credentials`);
-    recommend("sbom", `git repo + ${langs} lockfile → SBOM + supply-chain integrity`);
-    recommend("library-author", `git repo + ${langs} lockfile → publisher-side audit`);
-    recommend("crypto-codebase", `git repo + ${langs} lockfile → cryptographic primitive review`);
+    recommend("secrets", `git repo + ${langs} project → check for committed credentials`);
+    recommend("sbom", `git repo + ${langs} project → SBOM + supply-chain integrity`);
+    recommend("library-author", `git repo + ${langs} project → publisher-side audit`);
+    recommend("crypto-codebase", `git repo + ${langs} project → cryptographic primitive review`);
   }
   if (hasContainers) {
     recommend("containers", "Dockerfile / docker-compose present → container security review");
   }
+  if (hasGithubWorkflows) {
+    recommend("cicd-pipeline-compromise", ".github/workflows/ present → CI/CD posture (fork-PR / OIDC / floating-tag)");
+  }
+  if (hasMcpClientConfig) {
+    recommend("mcp", "MCP client config present in home → MCP supply-chain audit");
+  }
+  if (hasShellRc) {
+    recommend("ai-api", "shell rc present in home → AI API key + cred-carrier audit");
+  }
   if (isLinux) {
     recommend("kernel", "Linux host detected → kernel LPE / privilege escalation triage");
     recommend("hardening", "Linux host detected → system hardening review");
     recommend("runtime", "Linux host detected → runtime behavior review");
     recommend("cred-stores", "Linux host detected → credential store review");
+    recommend("crypto", "Linux host detected → host crypto posture (OpenSSL / sshd PQC readiness)");
   }
   // Always include cross-cutting framework correlation.
   recommend("framework", "cross-cutting: framework correlation always applicable");
@@ -5587,12 +5655,19 @@ function cmdDiscover(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
     rec.collect_cmd = hasCollector ? `exceptd collect ${rec.id}` : null;
   }
 
+  // Next-step suggestions are conditional on what discover detected.
+  // From an empty / no-code-detected cwd, suggesting `run --scope code`
+  // would silently run every code-scope playbook against an empty tree
+  // and produce a multi-hundred-KB JSON dump for no useful reason.
+  const recHasCodeScope = recs.some(r => ["secrets", "sbom", "library-author", "crypto-codebase", "containers", "cicd-pipeline-compromise"].includes(r.id));
   const nextSteps = [
     "exceptd brief <playbook>       # learn what a playbook checks",
     "exceptd run <playbook>          # run it",
-    "exceptd run --scope code        # run all code-scoped playbooks (auto-detected)",
-    "exceptd ci --scope code         # CI-gate against all code-scoped playbooks",
   ];
+  if (recHasCodeScope) {
+    nextSteps.push("exceptd run --scope code        # run all code-scoped playbooks (those applicable to this cwd)");
+    nextSteps.push("exceptd ci --scope code         # CI-gate against all code-scoped playbooks");
+  }
 
   const out = {
     verb: "discover",

package/data/_indexes/_meta.json

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.1.0",
-  "generated_at": "2026-05-21T16:44:49.627Z",
+  "generated_at": "2026-05-21T17:42:36.651Z",
   "generator": "scripts/build-indexes.js",
   "source_count": 54,
   "source_hashes": {
-    "manifest.json": "e206a4bf8b7e84f787bdc8af0b7ca6d41d5a08c3f9a91d612f65e2f29c9c2269",
+    "manifest.json": "188c660ebfd03913aafe0a2d8fc7975081b6a1c786eb0201338e62985b2f51c7",
     "data/atlas-ttps.json": "d296c1d3e71807c9279b731f047e57796e85137f186586743a8cdad214b408f9",
     "data/attack-techniques.json": "49b6010b317edd219def135171ea8f3b1bbf1e00e9c5a08bf7237215ff54e2c3",
     "data/cve-catalog.json": "a09c83af3f9679a7ea73935726a1ff9de2cab94b4ab6321fc017fc147747d7c3",

package/lib/collectors/cred-stores.js

@@ -439,6 +439,24 @@ function collect({ cwd = process.cwd(), env = process.env, args = {} } = {}) {
       captured: false,
       reason: "secret-tool / security dump-keychain require interactive auth or platform-specific binaries; out of stdlib collector scope",
     },
+    // Surface the POSIX-mode-bit skip on Windows so operators see the
+    // indicator was considered but skipped, mirroring the secrets
+    // collector's world-writable-secret-files skip artifact. Without
+    // this, credentials-file-bad-perms silently absent from
+    // signal_overrides looks indistinguishable from "indicator not
+    // catalogued".
+    "credentials-file-perms-check": isPosix
+      ? {
+          value: permViolations.length > 0
+            ? `${permViolations.length} carrier(s) with mode != expected: ${permViolations.map(v => `${v.id}=${v.mode_octal}`).join(", ")}`
+            : "all checked carriers at expected mode",
+          captured: true,
+        }
+      : {
+          value: "skipped on win32 — POSIX mode bits not load-bearing",
+          captured: false,
+          reason: "Windows uses ACLs, not POSIX mode bits; credentials-file-bad-perms indicator left to operator-supplied evidence on this platform",
+        },
   };
 
   if (permViolations.length > 0) {

package/lib/collectors/crypto-codebase.js

@@ -59,7 +59,10 @@ function isTestPath(rel) {
   for (const seg of TEST_PATH_SEGMENTS) {
     if (norm.includes(seg)) return true;
   }
+  // `foo.test.js`, `bar.spec.py` (dot-separated)
   if (/\.(test|spec)\.[a-z]+$/i.test(rel)) return true;
+  // `foo_test.go` (Go convention), `_test.py` (some Python projects)
+  if (/(?:^|[\\/])[^\\/]+_test\.[a-z]+$/i.test(rel)) return true;
   return false;
 }
 

package/lib/collectors/library-author.js

@@ -66,9 +66,17 @@ function walkWorkflows(root) {
 }
 
 function looksLikePublishWorkflow(name, content) {
-  // Heuristic: filename starts with `release`/`publish`/`deploy` OR
-  // the workflow body mentions `npm publish` / `pypi-publish` /
-  // `cargo publish` / `goreleaser` somewhere.
+  // Heuristic: filename starts with `release`/`publish`/`deploy`, OR
+  // the workflow body invokes a known publish/release tool (npm /
+  // pypi / cargo / goreleaser / ko / cosign / crane / oras / docker /
+  // GitHub releases / sigstore-action). The container-native shapes
+  // matter because projects that publish via `ko publish` / `cosign
+  // sign-blob` (sigstore-style) DO use `id-token: write`, and the
+  // narrower npm/pypi/cargo matcher missed those workflows entirely.
+  // Filename `build.*` deliberately omitted — many projects use it
+  // for ordinary CI (lint / test / typecheck), not publishing.
+  // Cosign-style `build.yaml` is still recognized via its body
+  // content (cosign / id-token: write / etc.).
   const lower = name.toLowerCase();
   if (/^(release|publish|deploy)/.test(lower)) return true;
   if (/\bnpm\s+publish\b/.test(content)) return true;
@@ -76,6 +84,19 @@ function looksLikePublishWorkflow(name, content) {
   if (/\bcargo\s+publish\b/.test(content)) return true;
   if (/goreleaser/.test(content)) return true;
   if (/softprops\/action-gh-release/.test(content)) return true;
+  // Container + sigstore release tooling.
+  if (/\bko\s+(?:publish|build|apply|resolve)\b/.test(content)) return true;
+  if (/\bcosign\s+sign(?:-blob)?\b/.test(content)) return true;
+  if (/sigstore\/cosign-installer/.test(content)) return true;
+  if (/\bcrane\s+(?:push|copy|append)\b/.test(content)) return true;
+  if (/\boras\s+(?:push|copy)\b/.test(content)) return true;
+  // GitHub Container Registry / generic docker push paths.
+  if (/docker\/build-push-action/.test(content)) return true;
+  if (/\bdocker\s+push\b/.test(content)) return true;
+  // Sigstore OIDC token issuance is the canonical signal that a
+  // workflow is publishing artifacts — id-token: write inside a
+  // permissions block + the workflow runs more than a test job.
+  if (/id-token:\s*write/.test(content) && /\bsteps:/.test(content)) return true;
   return false;
 }
 

package/lib/collectors/secrets.js

@@ -30,6 +30,34 @@ const DEFAULT_EXCLUDES = new Set([
   "target", ".idea", ".vscode",
 ]);
 
+// Path segments that denote test / fixture / example material. Hits
+// scoped exclusively to these paths are downgraded — a private-key
+// block in `cosign-test.key` or a JWT literal in `_test.go` is
+// expected test material, not a real secret. If at least one hit
+// exists outside these paths, the indicator still fires. Mirrors
+// the crypto-codebase collector's isTestPath shape.
+const TEST_PATH_SEGMENTS = [
+  "/test/", "/tests/", "/spec/", "/specs/", "/__tests__/",
+  "/fixtures/", "/fixture/", "/examples/", "/example/",
+  "/sample/", "/samples/", "/demo/", "/demos/",
+  "/testdata/", "/test-data/", "/test_data/",
+];
+
+function isTestPath(rel) {
+  const norm = "/" + rel.replace(/\\/g, "/").toLowerCase() + "/";
+  for (const seg of TEST_PATH_SEGMENTS) {
+    if (norm.includes(seg)) return true;
+  }
+  // foo.test.js / bar.spec.py — dot-separated convention.
+  if (/\.(test|spec)\.[a-z]+$/i.test(rel)) return true;
+  // foo_test.go (Go) / bar_test.py (some Python) — underscore convention.
+  if (/(?:^|[\\/])[^\\/]+_test\.[a-z]+$/i.test(rel)) return true;
+  // Files whose name itself includes the substring "test" before a
+  // key extension (e.g. cosign-test.key, github-test-token.json).
+  if (/-test[-.][^\\/]*$/i.test(rel)) return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
 const ENV_FILE_PREDICATE = (name) => {
   if (name === ".env" || name === ".envrc") return true;
   if (name.startsWith(".env.")) return true;
@@ -235,14 +263,32 @@ function collect({ cwd = process.cwd(), env = process.env, args = {} } = {}) {
     }
   }
 
+  // Split hits into production vs test-path. The indicator fires
+  // only when at least one PROD hit exists. Test-only hits stay in
+  // the artifact for operator inspection but don't flip the signal.
   const hitsByIndicator = {};
+  const prodHitsByIndicator = {};
   for (const h of allHits) {
     (hitsByIndicator[h.indicator_id] = hitsByIndicator[h.indicator_id] || []).push(h);
+    if (!isTestPath(h.file)) {
+      (prodHitsByIndicator[h.indicator_id] = prodHitsByIndicator[h.indicator_id] || []).push(h);
+    }
   }
+  // Same split for the file-presence indicators (ssh-private-keys
+  // artifact backs the ssh-private-key-block content scan AND the
+  // ssh-key-bad-perms posture check below). Filter out test-named
+  // private-key files (e.g. cosign-test.key) for the signal too.
+  const prodSshPrivateKeys = sshPrivateKeys.filter(f => !isTestPath(f.rel));
+
   const signal_overrides = {};
   for (const p of INDICATOR_PATTERNS) {
-    signal_overrides[p.id] = hitsByIndicator[p.id] && hitsByIndicator[p.id].length > 0 ? "hit" : "miss";
+    signal_overrides[p.id] = prodHitsByIndicator[p.id] && prodHitsByIndicator[p.id].length > 0 ? "hit" : "miss";
   }
+  // ssh-private-key-block is also flipped by file presence (a private
+  // key file with the matching magic bytes counts even without a
+  // content scan match — e.g. binary-only key formats). Re-flip when
+  // any non-test private-key file was discovered.
+  if (prodSshPrivateKeys.length > 0) signal_overrides["ssh-private-key-block"] = "hit";
   // world-writable-env-file predicate (per data/playbooks/secrets.json):
   //   restricted to env-files artifact entries
   //   any .env / .env.* / .envrc with mode 0666 or 0664 (group/world writable)

package/manifest.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "exceptd-security",
-  "version": "0.13.47",
+  "version": "0.13.49",
   "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation",
   "homepage": "https://exceptd.com",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
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@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
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@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
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@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@
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@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@
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@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@
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@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@
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@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@
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@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@
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@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@
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@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@
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@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.765Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.097Z"
     },
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@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
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       "name": "fuzz-testing-strategy",
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@
         "OSS-Fuzz-Gen / AI-assisted harness generation becoming the default expectation for OSS maintainers"
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.766Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.098Z"
     },
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       "name": "dlp-gap-analysis",
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@
         "Quebec Law 25, India DPDPA, KSA PDPL enforcement actions naming AI-tool prompt data as in-scope personal information"
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       "signature": "fgxG344JGYBWWWwFXZ1IzGipWKP7EyBhrsvsbsb0CCGXfv/MvNHVNI6G0zQddCsWX1JeQbhZT3Vk8v1uJKDTDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.766Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.098Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "supply-chain-integrity",
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@
         "OpenSSF model-signing — emerging Sigstore-based signing standard for ML model weights; track for production adoption"
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.766Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.099Z"
     },
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       "name": "defensive-countermeasure-mapping",
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.767Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.099Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "identity-assurance",
@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.767Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.099Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ot-ics-security",
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.768Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.100Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "coordinated-vuln-disclosure",
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 amendments potentially adding explicit CVD program requirements"
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.768Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.100Z"
     },
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       "name": "threat-modeling-methodology",
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.768Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.100Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "webapp-security",
@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "ux85YI4t2mVHOyt744Yin1HHy+z11JIFygjKfFfQOBBl5QVV3A267jeIy7utix85irMcpZm/T3yx/ooqiK2tBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.769Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.101Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ai-risk-management",
@@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.769Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.101Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-healthcare",
@@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.770Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.102Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-financial",
@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@
         "TIBER-EU framework v2.0 alignment with DORA TLPT RTS (JC 2024/40); cross-recognition with CBEST and iCAST"
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.770Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.102Z"
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     {
       "name": "sector-federal-government",
@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@
         "Australia PSPF 2024 revision and ISM quarterly updates — track for Essential Eight Maturity Level requirements for federal entities"
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.771Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.103Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-energy",
@@ -1637,7 +1637,7 @@
         "ICS-CERT advisory feed (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/ics-advisories) for vendor CVEs in Siemens, Rockwell, Schneider Electric, ABB, GE Vernova, Hitachi Energy, AVEVA / OSIsoft PI"
       ],
       "signature": "JjBfc0ovta560Clk0x3QGRM5osFJDwcvpy3rT7QEGdCIL827jzE8QCow1C8deXq+4JhY2sA/d7/8IsxikdlkCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.771Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.103Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-telecom",
@@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@
         "O-RAN SFG / WG11 security specifications"
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.771Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.103Z"
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@@ -1792,7 +1792,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.772Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.104Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "cloud-security",
@@ -1873,7 +1873,7 @@
         "CISA KEV additions for cloud-control-plane CVEs (IMDSv1 abuses, federation token mishandling, cross-tenant boundary failures); CISA Cybersecurity Advisories for cross-cloud advisories"
       ],
       "signature": "/DV3pmZwrRySrk1OCbyI+0BQESacjupJfUX3eC2NGtXuYOBro0vndIP+z27heFxumnjU3a9sfla7/U9X+pqnDw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.772Z"
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     },
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@@ -1935,7 +1935,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.772Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.104Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "mlops-security",
@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@
         "MITRE ATLAS v5.6.0 (released February 2026) shipped the AML.T0010 sub-technique expansion this forecast tracked plus new techniques (\"Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool\", \"Escape to Host\"); inventory now 16 tactics, 84 techniques, 56 sub-techniques. Forward watch: ATLAS v5.5 / v6.0 — track next-cadence updates to agentic-AI TTPs and MLOps-pipeline-specific techniques"
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.773Z"
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     },
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@@ -2068,7 +2068,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.17 amendments tightening ransom-payment 24h disclosure operationalization"
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       "signature": "FkZQerh3VHVJAwIcCktDyMRh5KE2+Em/i0ek8zEz7JG/PXtQx8ujHWTh3VjZbOLhPNtdB2qxgXOIAYIofaVOAQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.773Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.105Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ransomware-response",
@@ -2148,7 +2148,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.774Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.105Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "email-security-anti-phishing",
@@ -2201,7 +2201,7 @@
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       "signature": "rK+WnuS+9tqEABmwc0jO/PEmxcLjG1/tmUb897HsClQeKzf+TQOlwBE+OsbtuKxpjYNwur62Xxs3TxObkwm8Cw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.774Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.106Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "age-gates-child-safety",
@@ -2269,7 +2269,7 @@
         "US state adult-site age-verification laws — 19+ states by mid-2026 (TX HB 18 upheld by SCOTUS June 2025 in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton); track ongoing challenges in remaining states"
       ],
       "signature": "+OO0RhQ303RJV7kaH38IuZpLeQbapep6Ds4Re/WEZu0FHBwKSlwvF7jbtP7KQ57xldJYn/xZm2jaszyOacMfDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.775Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T17:36:00.106Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "cloud-iam-incident",
@@ -2349,7 +2349,7 @@
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     {
       "name": "idp-incident-response",
@@ -2430,11 +2430,11 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T16:32:59.775Z"
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+    "signature_base64": "fh1K2ANMsPzZTwxkm31oVK6WRuY7P0h/LpomKgFhakAA4qDAfTVAy6lk1PcaqIMgX6okxOwMgcdKQFHC0XQuBw=="
   }
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/exceptd-skills",
-  "version": "0.13.47",
+  "version": "0.13.49",
   "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation. 42 skills, 10 catalogs (312 CVEs / 171 CWEs / 805 ATT&CK + ICS / 170 ATLAS / 468 D3FEND / 7476 RFCs), 34 jurisdictions, 10-class catalog gap detector + budget gate, real XML parser + canonical-form diff + content-pattern regression detection, Ed25519-signed.",
   "keywords": [
     "ai-security",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 {
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.6",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:251fa007-6fc7-4558-bcc4-079d9d52c351",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:3d203982-8322-49a5-9822-36f3e578614d",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2045-09-26T16:12:55.000Z",
+    "timestamp": "2058-07-01T11:14:10.000Z",
     "tools": [
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         "vendor": "blamejs",
         "name": "scripts/refresh-sbom.js",
-        "version": "0.13.47"
+        "version": "0.13.49"
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "pkg:npm/@blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.13.47",
+      "bom-ref": "pkg:npm/@blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.13.49",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "@blamejs/exceptd-skills",
-      "version": "0.13.47",
+      "version": "0.13.49",
       "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation. 42 skills, 10 catalogs (312 CVEs / 171 CWEs / 805 ATT&CK + ICS / 170 ATLAS / 468 D3FEND / 7476 RFCs), 34 jurisdictions, 10-class catalog gap detector + budget gate, real XML parser + canonical-form diff + content-pattern regression detection, Ed25519-signed.",
       "licenses": [
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@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
           }
         }
       ],
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.13.47",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/exceptd-skills@0.13.49",
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           "alg": "SHA-256",
-          "content": "e97a2a2d55c00e8699dc0ba5d2b785e67d6de04ad7ee47707c5a6cf388b0952d"
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       "externalReferences": [
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           "type": "distribution",
-          "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills/v/0.13.47"
+          "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@blamejs/exceptd-skills/v/0.13.49"
         },
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@@ -116,11 +116,11 @@
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@@ -281,11 +281,11 @@
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@@ -926,11 +926,11 @@
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@@ -941,11 +941,11 @@
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@@ -1001,11 +1001,11 @@
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@@ -1061,11 +1061,11 @@
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@@ -1661,11 +1661,11 @@
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-          "content": "e206a4bf8b7e84f787bdc8af0b7ca6d41d5a08c3f9a91d612f65e2f29c9c2269"
+          "content": "188c660ebfd03913aafe0a2d8fc7975081b6a1c786eb0201338e62985b2f51c7"
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           "alg": "SHA3-512",
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