@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.13.39 → 0.13.41

package/AGENTS.md

@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ This split costs every consumer the same translation work on every invocation. C
 exceptd collect secrets | exceptd run secrets --evidence -
 ```
 
-The collector library is small and grows as playbooks are touched. Eight reference collectors ship today (`lib/collectors/secrets.js`, `lib/collectors/kernel.js`, `lib/collectors/sbom.js`, `lib/collectors/containers.js`, `lib/collectors/library-author.js`, `lib/collectors/crypto-codebase.js`, `lib/collectors/cred-stores.js`, `lib/collectors/hardening.js`); the rest are written when each playbook needs them. Until a playbook has a collector, the AI/operator owns evidence collection as before.
+The collector library is small and grows as playbooks are touched. Ten reference collectors ship today (`lib/collectors/secrets.js`, `lib/collectors/kernel.js`, `lib/collectors/sbom.js`, `lib/collectors/containers.js`, `lib/collectors/library-author.js`, `lib/collectors/crypto-codebase.js`, `lib/collectors/cred-stores.js`, `lib/collectors/hardening.js`, `lib/collectors/runtime.js`, `lib/collectors/ai-api.js`); the rest are written when each playbook needs them. Until a playbook has a collector, the AI/operator owns evidence collection as before.
 
 ### Precision target for new `look.artifacts[].source` strings
 

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 0.13.41 — 2026-05-20
+
+Tenth reference collector.
+
+### Features
+
+- **`lib/collectors/ai-api.js`** — scans shell rc files (`~/.bashrc`, `~/.bash_profile`, `~/.zshrc`, `~/.zprofile`, `~/.profile`, `~/.config/fish/config.fish`, `~/.config/fish/conf.d/*.fish`) and vendor dotfiles (`~/.openai`, `~/.anthropic`, `~/.config/anthropic`, `~/.config/openai`, `~/.gemini`, `~/.config/google-genai`, `~/.config/azure-openai`) for cleartext AI API key exports — OpenAI `sk-*`, Anthropic `sk-ant-*`, Azure OpenAI, Google / Gemini / Generative AI, HuggingFace `hf_*`, Cohere. Honours `export VAR=value`, `VAR=value`, and fish-style `set -gx VAR value` shapes. Reuses the cred-stores carrier inspection for `long-lived-aws-keys` (any AWS profile with `aws_access_key_id` and no `aws_session_token` sibling), `gcp-service-account-json` (`type: service_account` in ADC JSON), `kubeconfig-with-static-token` (`users[].user.token` non-null, not the `auth-provider.config.access-token` sub-key). Behavioral indicators (`ai-api-egress-from-unexpected-process`, `ai-api-anomalous-volume`, `ai-api-beaconing-cadence`, `base64-or-encoded-payload-in-prompts`) need ss / netstat / auditd / process-list correlation and stay unflipped — the runner returns inconclusive and operator-supplied evidence completes the verdict.
+
+## 0.13.40 — 2026-05-20
+
+Ninth reference collector.
+
+### Features
+
+- **`lib/collectors/runtime.js`** — Linux-only runtime-posture collector. Reads `/etc/sudoers` + `/etc/sudoers.d/*`, `/etc/passwd`, walks trusted-path directories (`/etc`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/usr/local/sbin`, `/opt`, `/usr/bin`, `/usr/sbin`) to depth 2 for world-writable files, and inspects `/proc/<pid>` for orphan-privileged processes. Flips four deterministic indicators: `sudoers-nopasswd-wildcard` (any non-root `NOPASSWD: ALL` or `NOPASSWD: /path/*` wildcard rule), `duplicate-uid-zero` (>1 entry in `/etc/passwd` with UID 0), `world-writable-in-trusted-path` (any file under a trusted root with mode bit `o+w`), `orphan-privileged-process` (UID 0 process with PPID 1, canonical-init parent, executable under `/tmp`, `/dev/shm`, `/var/tmp`, or `/home`). Same unflipped-when-unreadable semantics as the hardening collector — when `/etc/sudoers` / `/etc/passwd` / trusted paths / `/proc` are all unreadable, the indicator stays absent from `signal_overrides` so the runner returns inconclusive rather than asserting a clean posture without evidence. Path overrides via `args.paths` for synthetic-tempdir tests.
+
 ## 0.13.39 — 2026-05-20
 
 Eighth reference collector.

package/data/_indexes/_meta.json

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.1.0",
-  "generated_at": "2026-05-21T05:15:19.319Z",
+  "generated_at": "2026-05-21T05:59:31.155Z",
   "generator": "scripts/build-indexes.js",
   "source_count": 54,
   "source_hashes": {
-    "manifest.json": "0785c4b4b99897d6846d7e324c8a093da8bfdeaa48ca9ab234cd82009d1e04d0",
+    "manifest.json": "baf6b821336ba74ccafa21f09c510e7f581d3157a1aab19ed282f8d975ed8eec",
     "data/atlas-ttps.json": "d296c1d3e71807c9279b731f047e57796e85137f186586743a8cdad214b408f9",
     "data/attack-techniques.json": "49b6010b317edd219def135171ea8f3b1bbf1e00e9c5a08bf7237215ff54e2c3",
     "data/cve-catalog.json": "a09c83af3f9679a7ea73935726a1ff9de2cab94b4ab6321fc017fc147747d7c3",

package/lib/collectors/ai-api.js

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+"use strict";
+
+/**
+ * lib/collectors/ai-api.js
+ *
+ * Companion collector for the `ai-api` playbook. Scans shell rc
+ * files for cleartext AI API key exports, plus the standard
+ * credential carriers (~/.aws, ~/.kube, ~/.config/gcloud) for
+ * long-lived credentials likely to authenticate against AI APIs.
+ *
+ * Non-deterministic indicators (ai-api-egress-from-unexpected-
+ * process, ai-api-anomalous-volume, ai-api-beaconing-cadence,
+ * base64-or-encoded-payload-in-prompts) require ss/netstat/auditd
+ * traces and process-list correlation that fall outside the
+ * stdlib-only collector contract. They stay unflipped — the runner
+ * returns inconclusive and operator-supplied evidence completes
+ * the verdict.
+ *
+ * Interface: see lib/collectors/README.md
+ */
+
+const fs = require("node:fs");
+const path = require("node:path");
+const os = require("node:os");
+
+const COLLECTOR_ID = "ai-api";
+
+function readSafe(full, max = 256 * 1024) {
+  try {
+    const s = fs.statSync(full);
+    if (s.size > max) return null;
+    return fs.readFileSync(full, "utf8");
+  } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+function fileExists(full) {
+  try { return fs.statSync(full).isFile(); } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+// Cleartext AI-API-key export patterns. Matches the standard
+// `export VAR=value` and `VAR=value` shell shapes plus fish-style
+// `set -gx VAR value`.
+const AI_KEY_PATTERNS = [
+  { id: "openai",       re: /(?:^|\n)\s*(?:export\s+|set\s+-gx\s+)?OPENAI_API_KEY\s*[= ]\s*['"]?sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/m },
+  { id: "anthropic",    re: /(?:^|\n)\s*(?:export\s+|set\s+-gx\s+)?ANTHROPIC_API_KEY\s*[= ]\s*['"]?sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/m },
+  { id: "azure",        re: /(?:^|\n)\s*(?:export\s+|set\s+-gx\s+)?AZURE_OPENAI(?:_API)?_KEY\s*[= ]\s*['"]?[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/m },
+  { id: "google",       re: /(?:^|\n)\s*(?:export\s+|set\s+-gx\s+)?(?:GOOGLE_API_KEY|GOOGLE_GENAI_API_KEY|GEMINI_API_KEY)\s*[= ]\s*['"]?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/m },
+  { id: "huggingface",  re: /(?:^|\n)\s*(?:export\s+|set\s+-gx\s+)?(?:HUGGINGFACE_TOKEN|HF_TOKEN)\s*[= ]\s*['"]?hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/m },
+  { id: "cohere",       re: /(?:^|\n)\s*(?:export\s+|set\s+-gx\s+)?COHERE_API_KEY\s*[= ]\s*['"]?[A-Za-z0-9-]{30,}/m },
+];
+
+function scanShellRc(content) {
+  if (!content) return [];
+  const hits = [];
+  for (const p of AI_KEY_PATTERNS) {
+    if (p.re.test(content)) hits.push(p.id);
+  }
+  return hits;
+}
+
+function parseAwsCredentials(content) {
+  if (!content) return { staticProfiles: [] };
+  const lines = content.split(/\r?\n/);
+  const profiles = {};
+  let current = null;
+  for (const raw of lines) {
+    const line = raw.replace(/[#;].*$/, "").trim();
+    if (!line) continue;
+    const sec = line.match(/^\[([^\]]+)\]$/);
+    if (sec) { current = sec[1].trim(); profiles[current] = {}; continue; }
+    if (!current) continue;
+    const kv = line.match(/^([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)\s*=\s*(.*)$/);
+    if (!kv) continue;
+    profiles[current][kv[1].trim().toLowerCase()] = kv[2].trim();
+  }
+  const staticProfiles = [];
+  for (const [name, kv] of Object.entries(profiles)) {
+    // long-lived-aws-keys: aws_access_key_id present AND no
+    // aws_session_token sibling (STS temporary creds carry the
+    // session token; IAM-user long-lived keys do not).
+    if (kv["aws_access_key_id"] && !kv["aws_session_token"]) {
+      staticProfiles.push(name);
+    }
+  }
+  return { staticProfiles };
+}
+
+function parseGcloudAdc(content) {
+  if (!content) return { hasServiceAccount: false };
+  try {
+    const j = JSON.parse(content);
+    return { hasServiceAccount: j?.type === "service_account" };
+  } catch { return { hasServiceAccount: false }; }
+}
+
+function parseKubeStaticToken(content) {
+  if (!content) return false;
+  // Same shape as cred-stores: token under user:, not auth-provider.
+  const userKvRe = /^(\s+)(token|token-data)\s*:\s*(\S[^\n]*)/gm;
+  let staticFound = false;
+  for (const m of content.matchAll(userKvRe)) {
+    const upto = content.slice(0, m.index);
+    const lastUserAt = upto.lastIndexOf("\n  user:");
+    const lastAuthProviderAt = upto.lastIndexOf("auth-provider:");
+    if (lastAuthProviderAt > lastUserAt) continue;
+    const value = m[3];
+    if (!value || value.startsWith("null")) continue;
+    staticFound = true;
+    break;
+  }
+  return staticFound;
+}
+
+function collect({ cwd = process.cwd(), env = process.env, args = {} } = {}) {
+  const errors = [];
+  const startTime = Date.now();
+  const root = path.resolve(cwd);
+  const home = (env && env.HOME) || (env && env.USERPROFILE) || os.homedir();
+
+  // Shell rc + dotfile candidates.
+  const shellRcs = [
+    ".bashrc", ".bash_profile", ".zshrc", ".zprofile", ".profile",
+    path.join(".config", "fish", "config.fish"),
+  ].map(rel => path.join(home, rel));
+  // Glob fish/conf.d/*.
+  try {
+    const fishConfD = path.join(home, ".config", "fish", "conf.d");
+    for (const e of fs.readdirSync(fishConfD)) {
+      if (e.endsWith(".fish")) shellRcs.push(path.join(fishConfD, e));
+    }
+  } catch { /* fish not present */ }
+
+  const dotfileKeys = [
+    ".openai", ".anthropic",
+    path.join(".config", "anthropic"), path.join(".config", "openai"),
+    ".gemini",
+    path.join(".config", "google-genai"),
+    path.join(".config", "azure-openai"),
+  ].map(rel => path.join(home, rel));
+
+  const allKeyCarriers = [...shellRcs, ...dotfileKeys];
+  const cleartextHitsByFile = {};
+  for (const p of allKeyCarriers) {
+    if (!fileExists(p)) continue;
+    const c = readSafe(p);
+    if (c == null) continue;
+    const hits = scanShellRc(c);
+    if (hits.length > 0) {
+      cleartextHitsByFile[path.relative(home, p)] = hits;
+    }
+  }
+  const cleartextAnyHit = Object.keys(cleartextHitsByFile).length > 0;
+
+  // AWS / GCP / kube reuse.
+  const awsCredsPath = path.join(home, ".aws", "credentials");
+  const awsCredsContent = fileExists(awsCredsPath) ? readSafe(awsCredsPath) : null;
+  const awsParsed = parseAwsCredentials(awsCredsContent);
+  const longLivedAws = awsParsed.staticProfiles.length > 0;
+
+  const gcloudAdcPath = path.join(home, ".config", "gcloud", "application_default_credentials.json");
+  const gcloudContent = fileExists(gcloudAdcPath) ? readSafe(gcloudAdcPath) : null;
+  const gcloudParsed = parseGcloudAdc(gcloudContent);
+
+  const kubeCfgPath = (env && env.KUBECONFIG) || path.join(home, ".kube", "config");
+  const kubeContent = fileExists(kubeCfgPath) ? readSafe(kubeCfgPath) : null;
+  const kubeStaticToken = parseKubeStaticToken(kubeContent);
+
+  const signal_overrides = {
+    "cleartext-api-key-in-dotfile": cleartextAnyHit ? "hit" : "miss",
+    "long-lived-aws-keys": longLivedAws ? "hit" : "miss",
+    "gcp-service-account-json": gcloudParsed.hasServiceAccount ? "hit" : "miss",
+    "kubeconfig-with-static-token": kubeStaticToken ? "hit" : "miss",
+  };
+
+  const artifacts = {
+    "shell-rc-files": {
+      value: cleartextAnyHit
+        ? Object.entries(cleartextHitsByFile).map(([f, ids]) => `${f}: ${ids.join(",")}`).join("; ")
+        : `scanned ${shellRcs.length} shell rc + ${dotfileKeys.length} dotfile path(s); no cleartext AI API key exports`,
+      captured: true,
+    },
+    "dotfile-api-keys": {
+      value: dotfileKeys.filter(p => fileExists(p)).map(p => path.relative(home, p)).join(", ") || "no AI vendor dotfile carriers found at the canonical paths",
+      captured: true,
+    },
+    "aws-credentials": awsCredsContent
+      ? { value: `${awsParsed.staticProfiles.length} long-lived profile(s): ${awsParsed.staticProfiles.join(", ") || "none"}`, captured: true }
+      : { value: "~/.aws/credentials absent", captured: true },
+    "gcp-credentials": gcloudContent
+      ? { value: `application_default_credentials.json present; service_account=${gcloudParsed.hasServiceAccount}`, captured: true }
+      : { value: "no gcloud ADC at the canonical path", captured: true, reason: "credentials.db / legacy_credentials/*/adc.json inspection deferred (no stdlib SQLite reader)" },
+    "kube-config": kubeContent
+      ? { value: `kubeconfig present; static_token=${kubeStaticToken}`, captured: true }
+      : { value: "no kubeconfig at the canonical path", captured: true },
+    "ai-sdk-inventory": {
+      value: "skipped — npm/pip global listing deferred to operator/AI evidence",
+      captured: false,
+      reason: "spawning npm ls / pip list out of stdlib collector contract; operator should run those and submit as evidence",
+    },
+    "ai-api-egress-baseline": {
+      value: "skipped — ss/netstat capture deferred to operator/AI evidence",
+      captured: false,
+      reason: "live socket / process correlation needs ss / netstat / auditd traces; operator-supplied evidence completes the verdict",
+    },
+    "process-list": {
+      value: "skipped — ps -ef capture deferred to operator/AI evidence",
+      captured: false,
+      reason: "process-list correlation tied to network egress + behavioral signals out of stdlib collector scope",
+    },
+  };
+
+  return {
+    precondition_checks: {
+      "home-dir-readable": fs.existsSync(home),
+    },
+    artifacts,
+    signal_overrides,
+    collector_meta: {
+      collector_id: COLLECTOR_ID,
+      collector_version: "2026-05-20",
+      platform: process.platform,
+      captured_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      cwd: root,
+      home,
+      duration_ms: Date.now() - startTime,
+    },
+    collector_errors: errors,
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = { playbook_id: COLLECTOR_ID, collect };

package/lib/collectors/runtime.js

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+"use strict";
+
+/**
+ * lib/collectors/runtime.js
+ *
+ * Companion collector for the `runtime` playbook. Linux-only:
+ * walks /etc/sudoers + /etc/sudoers.d/*, parses /etc/passwd for
+ * duplicate UID 0 entries, scans well-known trusted-path
+ * directories for world-writable files, and inspects /proc/<pid>
+ * for orphan-privileged processes. Defers non-deterministic
+ * indicators (non-baseline-suid, listening-socket-unknown-bind,
+ * cron-or-timer-outside-policy) so the runner returns inconclusive.
+ *
+ * Interface: see lib/collectors/README.md
+ */
+
+const fs = require("node:fs");
+const path = require("node:path");
+
+const COLLECTOR_ID = "runtime";
+
+function readFileSafe(p, max = 512 * 1024) {
+  try {
+    const s = fs.statSync(p);
+    if (s.size > max) return null;
+    return fs.readFileSync(p, "utf8");
+  } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+const NOPASSWD_WILDCARD_RE = /\bNOPASSWD:\s*(?:ALL|\/[^,\n]*\*)/;
+
+// Trusted-path roots scanned for world-writable files. The
+// playbook explicitly lists /etc, /usr/local/bin, /usr/local/sbin,
+// /opt. We add /usr/bin and /usr/sbin as common variants but stay
+// shallow (depth 2) so we don't walk arbitrarily deep filesystems.
+const TRUSTED_PATHS = ["/etc", "/usr/local/bin", "/usr/local/sbin", "/opt", "/usr/bin", "/usr/sbin"];
+const TRUSTED_PATH_MAX_DEPTH = 2;
+
+const PARENT_INIT_BINARIES = new Set([
+  "/sbin/init", "/usr/sbin/init", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd",
+  "/lib/systemd/systemd", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-userdbd",
+]);
+const ORPHAN_RISKY_PREFIXES = ["/tmp/", "/dev/shm/", "/var/tmp/", "/home/"];
+
+function parseSudoersForWildcards(content) {
+  if (!content) return [];
+  const hits = [];
+  for (const raw of content.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+    const line = raw.replace(/#.*$/, "").trim();
+    if (!line) continue;
+    if (!NOPASSWD_WILDCARD_RE.test(line)) continue;
+    // Sudoers entries lead with a comma-separated user/group list:
+    //   `<user1>,<user2>,%group  host = (runas) NOPASSWD: cmd*`
+    // Skip ONLY when the user list is exactly `root` (no other
+    // principals). A line like `root,deploy ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`
+    // still grants wildcard sudo to `deploy` and counts as a hit.
+    const userListMatch = line.match(/^([^\s]+)\s/);
+    if (userListMatch) {
+      const principals = userListMatch[1].split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+      if (principals.length === 1 && principals[0] === "root") continue;
+    }
+    hits.push(line);
+  }
+  return hits;
+}
+
+function parsePasswdUidZero(content) {
+  if (!content) return [];
+  const uid0 = [];
+  for (const raw of content.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+    const line = raw.trim();
+    if (!line || line.startsWith("#")) continue;
+    const fields = line.split(":");
+    if (fields.length < 3) continue;
+    if (fields[2] === "0") uid0.push(fields[0]);
+  }
+  return uid0;
+}
+
+function walkShallow(dir, maxDepth) {
+  const out = [];
+  const seen = new Set();
+  function walk(d, depth) {
+    if (depth > maxDepth) return;
+    let entries;
+    try { entries = fs.readdirSync(d, { withFileTypes: true }); }
+    catch { return; }
+    for (const e of entries) {
+      const full = path.join(d, e.name);
+      let real;
+      try { real = fs.realpathSync(full); } catch { continue; }
+      if (seen.has(real)) continue;
+      seen.add(real);
+      if (e.isDirectory()) walk(full, depth + 1);
+      else if (e.isFile()) out.push(full);
+    }
+  }
+  walk(dir, 0);
+  return out;
+}
+
+function isWorldWritable(p) {
+  try {
+    const s = fs.statSync(p);
+    return (s.mode & 0o002) !== 0;
+  } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+function readProcPid(pid, procRoot) {
+  // Returns { pid, ppid, uid, exe } or null.
+  try {
+    const statusPath = path.join(procRoot, String(pid), "status");
+    const status = fs.readFileSync(statusPath, "utf8");
+    const ppidMatch = status.match(/^PPid:\s+(\d+)/m);
+    const uidMatch = status.match(/^Uid:\s+(\d+)/m);
+    if (!ppidMatch || !uidMatch) return null;
+    let exe = null;
+    try {
+      exe = fs.readlinkSync(path.join(procRoot, String(pid), "exe"));
+    } catch { /* no permission to read exe link */ }
+    return {
+      pid,
+      ppid: Number(ppidMatch[1]),
+      uid: Number(uidMatch[1]),
+      exe,
+    };
+  } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+function scanOrphanPrivileged(procRoot) {
+  // Returns { hits, exeReadable }. exeReadable is false when at
+  // least one candidate PID (UID 0, PPID 1) had an unreadable
+  // /proc/<pid>/exe symlink AND PID 1's exe was also unreadable —
+  // in that case the indicator MUST stay unflipped (the caller
+  // converts that to inconclusive). hidepid / ptrace-restrict /
+  // non-root scope all collapse exe readability to zero, and
+  // emitting "miss" there would mask real privileged orphans.
+  let entries;
+  try { entries = fs.readdirSync(procRoot); } catch { return { hits: [], exeReadable: false }; }
+  const hits = [];
+
+  // PID 1's exe is the canonical anchor. If we can't read it, we
+  // can't tell whether the parent is canonical init or a hijacked
+  // PID 1. That's an inconclusive condition.
+  const initProc = readProcPid(1, procRoot);
+  const initExeReadable = !!(initProc && initProc.exe);
+  if (!initExeReadable) return { hits: [], exeReadable: false };
+  if (!PARENT_INIT_BINARIES.has(initProc.exe)) {
+    // PID 1's exe is readable but isn't a canonical init. Treat
+    // as inconclusive — the playbook predicate explicitly says
+    // "parent != systemd/init" is the orphan condition, but
+    // distinguishing a legitimate non-systemd init (e.g. SysV,
+    // BusyBox init) from a hijacked PID 1 needs operator review.
+    return { hits: [], exeReadable: false };
+  }
+
+  // PID 1's exe is canonical init. Now scan candidate PIDs.
+  let anyExeReadable = false;
+  let anyExeUnreadable = false;
+  for (const name of entries) {
+    if (!/^\d+$/.test(name)) continue;
+    const proc = readProcPid(Number(name), procRoot);
+    if (!proc) continue;
+    if (proc.uid !== 0) continue;
+    if (proc.ppid !== 1) continue;
+    if (proc.exe) {
+      anyExeReadable = true;
+      if (ORPHAN_RISKY_PREFIXES.some(p => proc.exe.startsWith(p))) {
+        hits.push({ pid: proc.pid, exe: proc.exe });
+      }
+    } else {
+      anyExeUnreadable = true;
+    }
+  }
+  // If we couldn't read ANY candidate's exe (typical non-root /
+  // hidepid scope), the indicator stays unflipped. If we read at
+  // least one and saw zero risky-path orphans, the miss is
+  // honest. If we saw mixed (some readable, some not), still
+  // report what we found — but only emit a verdict when at least
+  // one exe was readable so we have evidence to back it.
+  const exeReadable = anyExeReadable || (!anyExeUnreadable && entries.length > 0);
+  return { hits, exeReadable };
+}
+
+function collect({ cwd = process.cwd(), env = process.env, args = {} } = {}) {
+  const errors = [];
+  const startTime = Date.now();
+  const root = path.resolve(cwd);
+  const paths = args.paths || {};
+  const P = {
+    sudoers: paths.sudoers || "/etc/sudoers",
+    sudoersD: paths.sudoersD || "/etc/sudoers.d",
+    passwd: paths.passwd || "/etc/passwd",
+    trustedPaths: paths.trustedPaths || TRUSTED_PATHS,
+    procRoot: paths.procRoot || "/proc",
+  };
+  const isLinux = args.forceLinux === true || process.platform === "linux";
+
+  if (!isLinux) {
+    return {
+      precondition_checks: { "linux-platform": false },
+      artifacts: {
+        "sudo-rules": { value: "skipped — non-Linux platform", captured: false, reason: `process.platform=${process.platform}` },
+        "passwd-shadow-baseline": { value: "skipped — non-Linux platform", captured: false, reason: `process.platform=${process.platform}` },
+        "world-writable-paths": { value: "skipped — non-Linux platform", captured: false, reason: `process.platform=${process.platform}` },
+        "process-tree": { value: "skipped — non-Linux platform", captured: false, reason: `process.platform=${process.platform}` },
+      },
+      signal_overrides: {},
+      collector_meta: {
+        collector_id: COLLECTOR_ID,
+        collector_version: "2026-05-20",
+        platform: process.platform,
+        captured_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        cwd: root,
+        duration_ms: Date.now() - startTime,
+      },
+      collector_errors: errors,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Sudo rules: /etc/sudoers + /etc/sudoers.d/*
+  const sudoersBase = readFileSafe(P.sudoers);
+  let sudoersContent = sudoersBase || "";
+  let sudoersReadable = sudoersBase != null;
+  try {
+    const dEntries = fs.readdirSync(P.sudoersD);
+    for (const e of dEntries) {
+      // skip editor backup files (~, .bak, .swp)
+      if (/[~]$/.test(e) || /\.(bak|swp|orig)$/.test(e)) continue;
+      const c = readFileSafe(path.join(P.sudoersD, e));
+      if (c != null) {
+        sudoersContent += "\n" + c;
+        sudoersReadable = true;
+      }
+    }
+  } catch { /* .d not present */ }
+  const sudoersHits = parseSudoersForWildcards(sudoersContent);
+
+  // /etc/passwd UID-zero count
+  const passwdContent = readFileSafe(P.passwd);
+  const uid0 = passwdContent ? parsePasswdUidZero(passwdContent) : null;
+
+  // World-writable files under trusted paths.
+  const worldWritableFiles = [];
+  for (const tp of P.trustedPaths) {
+    for (const f of walkShallow(tp, TRUSTED_PATH_MAX_DEPTH)) {
+      if (isWorldWritable(f)) worldWritableFiles.push(f);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Orphan-privileged process scan. Only meaningful on a real
+  // /proc; on a synthetic tempdir we still walk it the same way.
+  const orphanScan = scanOrphanPrivileged(P.procRoot);
+
+  const signal_overrides = {};
+  if (sudoersReadable) {
+    signal_overrides["sudoers-nopasswd-wildcard"] = sudoersHits.length > 0 ? "hit" : "miss";
+  }
+  if (uid0 !== null) {
+    signal_overrides["duplicate-uid-zero"] = uid0.length > 1 ? "hit" : "miss";
+  }
+  // world-writable-in-trusted-path: only emit a verdict if at least
+  // one trusted path was readable. If every TP was unreadable
+  // (chroot / restricted container), leave the indicator unflipped.
+  const anyTpReadable = P.trustedPaths.some(tp => {
+    try { fs.readdirSync(tp); return true; } catch { return false; }
+  });
+  if (anyTpReadable) {
+    signal_overrides["world-writable-in-trusted-path"] = worldWritableFiles.length > 0 ? "hit" : "miss";
+  }
+  // orphan-privileged-process: only emit when /proc was walkable
+  // AND the scan had enough exe-link visibility to reach a verdict.
+  // hidepid / ptrace-restrict / non-root scope leaves
+  // exeReadable=false; the indicator stays unflipped so the runner
+  // returns inconclusive (codex P1 #80).
+  let procWalkable = false;
+  try { fs.readdirSync(P.procRoot); procWalkable = true; } catch { /* not present */ }
+  if (procWalkable && orphanScan.exeReadable) {
+    signal_overrides["orphan-privileged-process"] = orphanScan.hits.length > 0 ? "hit" : "miss";
+  }
+
+  const artifacts = {
+    "sudo-rules": sudoersReadable
+      ? { value: `${sudoersHits.length} NOPASSWD wildcard rule(s)` + (sudoersHits.length > 0 ? ": " + sudoersHits.slice(0, 3).join("; ") : ""), captured: true }
+      : { value: "/etc/sudoers unreadable", captured: false, reason: "permission denied or absent" },
+    "passwd-shadow-baseline": passwdContent
+      ? { value: `${(uid0 || []).length} UID-0 entr(y/ies): ${(uid0 || []).join(", ") || "none"}`, captured: true }
+      : { value: "/etc/passwd unreadable", captured: false, reason: "permission denied or absent" },
+    "world-writable-paths": anyTpReadable
+      ? { value: worldWritableFiles.length > 0 ? `${worldWritableFiles.length} world-writable file(s): ${worldWritableFiles.slice(0, 5).join("; ")}` : "no world-writable files under trusted paths", captured: true }
+      : { value: "no trusted paths readable from this scope", captured: false, reason: "all trusted paths unreadable (chroot / restricted scope)" },
+    "process-tree": procWalkable
+      ? (orphanScan.exeReadable
+        ? { value: orphanScan.hits.length > 0 ? `${orphanScan.hits.length} orphan-privileged process(es): ` + orphanScan.hits.slice(0, 3).map(p => `pid=${p.pid} exe=${p.exe}`).join("; ") : "no orphan-privileged processes detected", captured: true }
+        : { value: "/proc walkable but /proc/<pid>/exe symlinks unreadable (likely hidepid / ptrace-restrict / non-root scope)", captured: false, reason: "insufficient exe-link visibility to reach a verdict" })
+      : { value: "/proc not walkable", captured: false, reason: "no /proc on this scope" },
+  };
+
+  return {
+    precondition_checks: {
+      "linux-platform": true,
+    },
+    artifacts,
+    signal_overrides,
+    collector_meta: {
+      collector_id: COLLECTOR_ID,
+      collector_version: "2026-05-20",
+      platform: process.platform,
+      captured_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      cwd: root,
+      duration_ms: Date.now() - startTime,
+    },
+    collector_errors: errors,
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = { playbook_id: COLLECTOR_ID, collect };

package/manifest.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "exceptd-security",
-  "version": "0.13.39",
+  "version": "0.13.41",
   "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation",
   "homepage": "https://exceptd.com",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "lXhZgoIrrVloO3XaTvo/43AxZn4mwErstd7DR0O/oVhD3AOGODM4HqrageYEou9WKOdMEGP5mJNTjJsXdP5NDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.230Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.487Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-125",
         "CWE-362",
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "vSVqu4wBm+d68ujZmM6Rto/HzViCkE0gPUcv/MYE/bjFiqamf/s0On4kTOo1KIveV9cOwYNxiItaGEWlVkRFDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.231Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.488Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1039",
         "CWE-1426",
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "RIgXKvolQjgJdnlrDnVOd90IOY1B7VHHZD/YJQRzouL+wUeOLclPrdK/EgEuFyiu7lR4bi+Pl6aGB9G9tOxYCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.232Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.489Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-22",
         "CWE-345",
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "RYOxeq/o3uTwTWq4H7RcdH2Aclg9UyCERfUH9Frwkzncsowg7LgxpaEDc3swTCv73HMEGbU8wVbXguZ4JxHUCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.232Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.489Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "compliance-theater",
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "DneJCPKCPcoe6nQ82XptqSqNfSRdt1orKaO+o7K36YCciDrzwJb+1BuBLusPDtpcdDaGY0y0e+AqiTYJklhBAQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.233Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.489Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "exploit-scoring",
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "NA1hoQycvQhSUoG5rwlXX0mOVmGxoXRVezkELGEA2nZOdGis4gXkHT3O6Sfw7zxE4JuMrsCb65TEeOWk9WEPDg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.233Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.490Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "rag-pipeline-security",
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "XgrzcA2brPhXrSTxrcLnJec0OpgGYJBoSTUlJ10UdePHffxqb9LTVGnfbmEk1ykQifXREZexui2bG7X/+eFfCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.234Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.490Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1395",
         "CWE-1426"
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "9+hZlZOqZdeACUmamQk66L5levZhhwnFXuYRhdT6Mce99eQaKT7wNfWq12hXQztkRcVRKaFH+a01zwJQwsRQCA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.234Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.491Z",
       "d3fend_refs": [
         "D3-CA",
         "D3-CSPP",
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "ciqhVloMWWXEigPZvvwoV2c54tEqsDqsoc+sS/mNTFFJk2H+tz2+XUrgfEPRuYw0FeyNB6/+27pL2NpKHzUqAg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.235Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.491Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1188"
       ]
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "xiHAhhdufm9hCKU8PLiPE0MX65ej2F4OZwtlWLGLCiie9/km+Kiqbt192LcMvr94v83C98pb9wIaqFsFWft6AQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.235Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.491Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "global-grc",
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "oYsSk35N2Uzq7MRofACykylcVwkgPhI4luWZ14vmQT+gUKLyZiKVOUJbe1+7lGl6BYPRN0sUDQ0f7S5Eu5w2Ag==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.235Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.492Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "zeroday-gap-learn",
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "igRqYyU1unRFH40BsPyAR62SPrk8QZv8dPGb8S9O9EvLCNOZAzm3t+HdT/NKqzWHwrpomOzkkkyLfYI/0qTUDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.236Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.492Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "pqc-first",
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "vhc3wuQEro/86s1ro2b/KakUXg8QVnySYTBqA7ebzv9oeR2HYO5bvGEJp3oOHWtL37JDqcCAHYadSN/qxIyCCA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.236Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.492Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-327"
       ],
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "MS35nWm8djfJGn4OOoT0JKJ2aO+Dkbb6wOOWJYvNZlRKT3UGA59o2gxg1JOnD20hb/RwxtkmCujhl2tuYSR+AQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.236Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.493Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "security-maturity-tiers",
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "8Px1s2lDj10/Q6erwEQlXgUHM1+OTruUR8qAHPX7Oo3k/l69N6P9sm0PsafS9wDFtj9l5C/OiLiFgzMlMt6vBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.237Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.493Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1188"
       ]
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "WAu5fRirzSOcnnZsTx2d/JJZwa/LPpXCi+31qATTGLmoNuhyy81k3ooPe9kCM3E0CLMtvTePg9DagYqBninZDQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.237Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.493Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "attack-surface-pentest",
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
         "PTES revision incorporating AI-surface enumeration"
       ],
       "signature": "7eEwCXFd9pDKUw7yCUbRJSjfzozE44dwwwemCQUPm8JBPztLltibD9bL/RszSbYyCrYJmVb5Drncz2cGe62gCw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.237Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.493Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "fuzz-testing-strategy",
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@
         "OSS-Fuzz-Gen / AI-assisted harness generation becoming the default expectation for OSS maintainers"
       ],
       "signature": "Z7ypCUnXx8JpLtgxxB6RHNi39w74AmrGY1N4ofAGCXhkuM2EaFVm1AU0dvl9UQ1bVLfHKEDGqMO/TwlIY7RABg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.238Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.494Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "dlp-gap-analysis",
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@
         "Quebec Law 25, India DPDPA, KSA PDPL enforcement actions naming AI-tool prompt data as in-scope personal information"
       ],
       "signature": "fgxG344JGYBWWWwFXZ1IzGipWKP7EyBhrsvsbsb0CCGXfv/MvNHVNI6G0zQddCsWX1JeQbhZT3Vk8v1uJKDTDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.238Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.494Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "supply-chain-integrity",
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@
         "OpenSSF model-signing — emerging Sigstore-based signing standard for ML model weights; track for production adoption"
       ],
       "signature": "pcLrM98A3vUSZRjwNAk0aZ9umvOwB41XCLLsCOy/IebB2F/06oIrGUKkMHtHwm4pTVPShMMcKdZQQ3jz30FnCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.238Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.494Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "defensive-countermeasure-mapping",
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "gqF8eU3VBrZhO2WnlcqKa7wm1d2mmWtvpbmx0kNCgHojNV+qEt+Ij84RO6bZvaUqhfYPWizWL79Fa4DL0curAQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.239Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.495Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "identity-assurance",
@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "Wv5hGMeHjlaQK1zwicVCA7AvdKgJBgvcjdpGM9Ywahh9tagAKhbkOjybowDQZzu7OZ3bDkbh6pBYc1Sdwr6NAA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.239Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.495Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ot-ics-security",
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "8t5qKHd3yWi57dvG36YQkLN/X9bQWqtEiYjay4IfSmqhJpM/xXPaQVKNGz3wscrO8OLKUZ0OaX7Mj5kzpgBKBQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.239Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.495Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "coordinated-vuln-disclosure",
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 amendments potentially adding explicit CVD program requirements"
       ],
       "signature": "GDGt4UPqBa04PjlpSmpyihGzd3OgfBN7jaAK5tfwp+LRSs3ygKOdbeivUCCHNagTY1hE6hG2Ou40ADfBFuXeAg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.240Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.496Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "threat-modeling-methodology",
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@
         "PASTA v2 updates incorporating AI/ML application threats"
       ],
       "signature": "rFBpOQEJUPpl+v88Lw/WqVJRhTl80vy0VbPAbzQj3Q0suJRRrJg368I9uKu5LXIBKFDvKxnGIcIzbGg9NUtaCA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.240Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.496Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "webapp-security",
@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "ux85YI4t2mVHOyt744Yin1HHy+z11JIFygjKfFfQOBBl5QVV3A267jeIy7utix85irMcpZm/T3yx/ooqiK2tBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.240Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.496Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ai-risk-management",
@@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "IIXnkZ5ZNqFwOto5KfytADTLLZLoyXNZACD1ORZ40P1HUAQxe6u2uyXFzzsfuob4Uy06jNkRGr2FFgCphUH1Cw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.241Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.497Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-healthcare",
@@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "AhF9KF8ZBlDteciV+F8IBSmFVYCvQOn44GmD4rZjgLoPxfIv/QE1/vSkK32zyqDKtHWkLSXExbkkPkxA/V6dDw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.241Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.497Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-financial",
@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@
         "TIBER-EU framework v2.0 alignment with DORA TLPT RTS (JC 2024/40); cross-recognition with CBEST and iCAST"
       ],
       "signature": "HQgZvb4ReziEz5rNFr8i/O8/rJEZR+iHRROT7m/D2QUqhrcNISPkYXENsUZlG8xapzy/Ik92ehkseyj4hdmhCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.242Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.498Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-federal-government",
@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@
         "Australia PSPF 2024 revision and ISM quarterly updates — track for Essential Eight Maturity Level requirements for federal entities"
       ],
       "signature": "linxmsXZiOYtcs71sSWgGCrvb8xQfmxmtTY5PRvZJ0/8FgJulo0tQtejzexYG775s7XhjAmGsDP238BQTQ8ADA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.242Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.498Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-energy",
@@ -1637,7 +1637,7 @@
         "ICS-CERT advisory feed (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/ics-advisories) for vendor CVEs in Siemens, Rockwell, Schneider Electric, ABB, GE Vernova, Hitachi Energy, AVEVA / OSIsoft PI"
       ],
       "signature": "JjBfc0ovta560Clk0x3QGRM5osFJDwcvpy3rT7QEGdCIL827jzE8QCow1C8deXq+4JhY2sA/d7/8IsxikdlkCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:14:23.242Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-21T05:58:40.498Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-telecom",
@@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@
         "O-RAN SFG / WG11 security specifications"
       ],
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@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@
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@@ -2269,7 +2269,7 @@
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package/package.json

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