@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.12.32 → 0.12.33

package/data/zeroday-lessons.json

@@ -1832,5 +1832,113 @@
     "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
     "ai_discovery_date": "2026-04-22",
     "ai_assist_factor": "low"
+  },
+  "MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER": {
+    "name": "node-ipc credential-stealer (expired-domain account-recovery compromise)",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-15",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "Novel supply-chain account-recovery abuse via expired maintainer email domain. The `atlantis-software.net` domain — registered as the contact email for the legitimate node-ipc maintainer npm account — lapsed and was re-registered by an attacker on 2026-05-07 via Namecheap PrivateEmail. The attacker then invoked the npm password-reset flow; the reset link was delivered to the now-attacker-controlled mailbox; the attacker took over the publish-enabled account without ever holding a leaked credential. Three malicious versions (node-ipc 9.1.6, 9.2.3, 12.0.1) were published 2026-05-14 with an 80 KB obfuscated IIFE appended to `node-ipc.cjs`. The payload fires on every `require('node-ipc')` — NOT via a postinstall hook — so consumer-side `npm install --ignore-scripts` does NOT mitigate. Exfiltration covers AWS / GCP / Azure credentials, SSH private keys, Kubernetes kubeconfig, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Claude AI configs, and Kiro IDE configs via DNS TXT queries to an Azure-lookalike spoofed domain. Class: registry-side account-recovery abuse mediated by DNS lifecycle, distinct from token-compromise (Shai-Hulud) and typosquat-orphan-commit (elementary-data) precedents.",
+      "privileges_required": "downstream consumer runs `npm install` resolving to one of the three malicious versions; payload fires automatically on `require('node-ipc')`",
+      "complexity": "low for downstream consumers (automatic on require); low for the maintainer-account takeover itself (any attacker monitoring maintainer-email-domain expirations can reproduce)",
+      "ai_factor": "Not AI-discovered, not AI-built. The novelty is structural — expired-domain → npm password-reset → publish — not algorithmic."
+    },
+    "defense_chain": {
+      "prevention": {
+        "what_would_have_worked": "(1) Continuous WHOIS-expiry monitoring on the email domains of every critical-path package maintainer. (2) Registry-side mandatory MFA on publish-enabled maintainer accounts (npm policy gap as of 2026-05-15). (3) Lockfile pinning to versions published before 2026-05-14T00:00Z, combined with `npm ci` (which refuses lockfile drift) rather than `npm install`. (4) Registry-side hold-period on first-publish-from-recently-recovered-account (npm has no such control today).",
+        "was_this_required": false,
+        "framework_requiring_it": null,
+        "adequacy": "WHOIS-expiry monitoring is novel — no current standard treats expired-domain → account-recovery as a distinct supply-chain attack class. `--ignore-scripts` (the canonical npm-supply-chain mitigation since Shai-Hulud) does NOT mitigate this payload because it ships in the main module, not in a postinstall hook. Lockfile pinning works only if the lockfile predates 2026-05-14 AND `npm ci` is used."
+      },
+      "detection": {
+        "what_would_have_worked": "DNS-resolver telemetry on developer / CI hosts — the payload's DNS TXT exfiltration channel is invisible to HTTP egress filtering but recordable at any DNS resolver (Resolved, Cloudflare DNS, internal Unbound). File-read telemetry on credential-store paths (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.kube/config, ~/.vault-token, ~/.config/Claude/, ~/.kiro/) within the lifetime of a Node process is a near-deterministic IoC for any credential-stealer in the Node ecosystem.",
+        "was_this_required": false,
+        "framework_requiring_it": null,
+        "adequacy": "DNS-layer telemetry is the only channel that proves successful exfiltration; HTTP-egress monitoring will miss this class entirely. Most developer endpoints and CI runners do not retain DNS logs."
+      },
+      "response": {
+        "what_would_have_worked": "npm yanked the three malicious versions on 2026-05-14. Full credential rotation for every account whose material was reachable from any host that resolved a malicious version during the exposure window — AWS access keys, GCP service-account keys, Azure tokens, SSH private keys, kubeconfig, Vault tokens. Lockfile audit + republication of any downstream package the affected host had npm-publish rights on.",
+        "was_this_required": false,
+        "framework_requiring_it": null,
+        "adequacy": "Yank closes new consumer exposure but does not retroactively un-harvest credentials already exfiltrated via DNS. The DNS exfil channel is one-shot; rotation is the only operational response."
+      }
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-218-SSDF": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Reused-OSS-component control assumes maintainer-account integrity; does not address maintainer-email-domain expiry as a supply-chain risk class."
+      },
+      "EU-CRA-Art13": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "SBOM requirement does not address freshness-of-published-version OR maintainer-account-recovery integrity — pinning to a malicious version is SBOM-compliant."
+      },
+      "NIS2-Art21-supply-chain": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Generic supply chain controls without npm-ecosystem-specific guidance (maintainer-domain-expiry monitoring, registry-account MFA enforcement, main-module-vs-postinstall payload distinction)."
+      },
+      "SLSA-v1.0-Build-L3": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Build provenance attestations assert who built the artifact, not whether `who` is still the legitimate maintainer post-account-recovery."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-5-Federated": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Authenticator-management control covers operator-side credentials only; does not extend to upstream-maintainer-account recovery flow on third-party package registries."
+      },
+      "ANY-FRAMEWORK": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No current standard treats `expired maintainer email domain → registry-side account recovery → malicious publish` as a distinct supply-chain attack class. NEW-CTRL-047 is the headline novel control this lesson generates."
+      }
+    },
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-047",
+        "name": "PACKAGE-MAINTAINER-DOMAIN-EXPIRY-MONITORING",
+        "description": "Every organization that depends on a critical-path open-source package must continuously monitor the WHOIS expiry date of the email domain associated with each upstream maintainer account on npm / PyPI / Crates / RubyGems. Alert on any maintainer-domain WHOIS expiry within 90 days. Concurrently, require dual-factor account recovery on the consuming organization's own registry accounts (no email-only password reset) — and treat the absence of registry-enforced MFA on upstream maintainers as a supply-chain risk to be tracked in the SBOM / VEX surface.",
+        "evidence": "MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER — the `atlantis-software.net` domain lapsed on or before 2026-05-07 and was re-registered by the attacker via Namecheap PrivateEmail; npm's email-based password-reset flow then delivered publish rights to the attacker without any credential leak. No current framework treats expired-domain → account-recovery as a distinct supply-chain attack class.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-218-SSDF",
+          "NIS2-Art21-supply-chain",
+          "EU-CRA-Art13",
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-5-Federated",
+          "ANY-FRAMEWORK"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-048",
+        "name": "NPM-MAINTAINER-MFA-ENFORCEMENT",
+        "description": "npm (and equivalent registries) must enforce mandatory MFA on publish-enabled maintainer accounts for any package above a download-volume threshold (e.g. >= 100K weekly downloads). Pending registry-side enforcement, consuming organizations should require — via SLA or contractual surface — that critical-path maintainers attest to MFA-on-publish, and refuse to upgrade packages where attestation is absent.",
+        "evidence": "MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER — node-ipc carries approximately 3.35M monthly downloads; npm did not require MFA on the publish-enabled maintainer account at compromise time, so the password-reset-via-recovered-email flow succeeded without a second factor.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-218-SSDF",
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-5-Federated",
+          "NIS2-Art21-supply-chain"
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-049",
+        "name": "LOCKFILE-INTEGRITY-VERIFIED-AT-CI-BOOT",
+        "description": "CI pipelines must use `npm ci` (or `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`, `yarn install --immutable`) rather than `npm install`. The strict-lockfile command refuses to resolve any version not already pinned in the lockfile, catching a maintainer-swap-induced version drift before the malicious tarball is fetched. Additionally, verify tarball integrity hashes against a known-good cache snapshot at CI boot for every dependency in critical-path packages.",
+        "evidence": "MAL-2026-NODE-IPC-STEALER — consumers whose lockfile predated 2026-05-14 were safe only if they used a strict-lockfile install command; `npm install` would have happily upgraded within the declared semver range and pulled the malicious version. The strict-lockfile gate catches the swap even after a successful registry-side publish.",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-218-SSDF",
+          "EU-CRA-Art13",
+          "SLSA-v1.0-Build-L3"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 95,
+      "basis": "Maintainer-domain-expiry monitoring is not a recognized control in any major framework; near-100% of audit-passing organizations have zero coverage of this risk class. Even organizations with strong npm hygiene (lockfile pinning, `npm ci`, `--ignore-scripts` defaults) are exposed because the payload ships in the main module — `--ignore-scripts` does not mitigate, and lockfile pinning only helps if the lockfile predates the malicious publish AND the consumer uses a strict-lockfile install command.",
+      "theater_pattern": "maintainer_account_integrity_assumed_without_evidence"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "vendor_research",
+    "ai_discovery_date": "2026-05-14",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "low"
   }
 }

package/manifest-snapshot.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "_comment": "Auto-generated by scripts/refresh-manifest-snapshot.js — do not hand-edit. Public skill surface used by check-manifest-snapshot.js to detect breaking removals.",
-  "_generated_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.840Z",
+  "_generated_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:41.122Z",
   "atlas_version": "5.4.0",
   "skill_count": 42,
   "skills": [

package/manifest-snapshot.sha256

@@ -1 +1 @@
-9c01b58f0f9e5ceb3070bbfab781ced453d5a8fd0c4a20a883ecbf011004b12c  manifest-snapshot.json
+390cd070a918bbdb2e6656f60b6c85d47497d8ea6ef47e64a15a4e6d2d3d7dca  manifest-snapshot.json

package/manifest.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "exceptd-security",
-  "version": "0.12.32",
+  "version": "0.12.33",
   "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation",
   "homepage": "https://exceptd.com",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.521Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.742Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-125",
         "CWE-362",
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
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       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "Xen6ojQGzT4AZUN/WtuQon+gT2UrJyX50nrZwEdxLw5aiz8gDaeMkWo/Bic+h4NFEF7MRd7uDTm0dvKgWnlRBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.523Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.744Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1039",
         "CWE-1426",
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
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       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "IDhdamTvyWfnz7SvIMrVMz2cwLuiP2/Iw2iYHFNbI1O302XnrGyIVsJcoKZa5QFClBYPiABVt+yI5HEuLxMCBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.523Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.745Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-22",
         "CWE-345",
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "cPRRTsNQT1MYR3cE5O3KdC4MB037EMc0fsMIbOyfOv16sR+DkiXmAhQOjlIC47HngHz3vhLI+rbqItN91VWpBg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.524Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.745Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "compliance-theater",
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@
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       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "79NrFMRsqGsipWeE5ETQSVICGO4BjTJYgyir+PSaNVFpkLqLcwZd8Dr1V7iwX0H0fXFL3WpPz35gtrYCEG32BQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.524Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.745Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "exploit-scoring",
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
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       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
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-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.524Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.745Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "rag-pipeline-security",
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "ai6ebp9pz7dBigm2rQvQ0SklhDZtHqP3exKtolbEBiN0shQScypJfDBaQN2J3aoOC4dZjjTgIZvGfWLmBxrxBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.525Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.746Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1395",
         "CWE-1426"
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@
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       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "BkDjyCF53MAATVfzERmIhEhi474eWloxD0qyw9Gvw+VFE8aH3pOi+yeCpc0kq0vHAVmAEszwxBKEcuLkJbmSBg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.525Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.746Z",
       "d3fend_refs": [
         "D3-CA",
         "D3-CSPP",
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "DxfXhSyoAGUo1emHh0uIIcg324ZreBYxmFdBDVAKOOuPmMlfN4RqNc/JGDSfVmMv5CjgYCUcSmkcYB0A5lk0Cg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.526Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.747Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1188"
       ]
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "rFQ82v+1oAHWixWcGwokKhjZHfXUf6N7EfSgldhQ5Jrbiy3kv5CIbnOCsI6zPWyErSnpKVeBFTabJXnzLrzDCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.526Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.747Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "global-grc",
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "7yVjZkanFMKDQqXdX4B/7oLc2Rz72xHC1zscYd8F/+e5UAbR7ikK8Bn5EKZt3aBEOhHPAviSQNCMxpZD9U00CA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.527Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.748Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "zeroday-gap-learn",
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "VlPR7yY39hEwDJYYKPgHAOeax9LU0X7eIrR8L7zMFJWS0SdKTalOXXJtD9GppByftnkYAAdryZ8tHQ/KWLtaBQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.527Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.748Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "pqc-first",
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "V+qn5FqUlETfsEjvvi6jZGuQdqLFtFejfgPA6KSYxSlBXBTbOBXP3BGk5S+ba9akIzgbKh1j9VGB1MqsIt56DA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.527Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.748Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-327"
       ],
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@
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       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "WCNz19186cER1eEhCophTIbnL3ltS3FC98I1rfv463aRnuVxPB3sUlD9xHTbxTM2rUABhqKijhdkWiMh2uKxCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.527Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.748Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "security-maturity-tiers",
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-01",
       "signature": "zjq6ACAHD46xvhvQJKlrCPh5xDCuBuIWBI+QJB8RxcudpC7p7I1pqv+BY8DZdsAgU4tquCU8KC+xlduMIk3/DQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.528Z",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.749Z",
       "cwe_refs": [
         "CWE-1188"
       ]
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@
       "framework_gaps": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "/lGgWehCMQUXjI6w4FUa+5wrbyRnct+txvVcXA+D2/ZEkoJKh+J/psO3j5HPf7Hpv+Y5SmkH71CoO+9qilyVDQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.528Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.749Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "attack-surface-pentest",
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
         "PTES revision incorporating AI-surface enumeration"
       ],
       "signature": "RqQMwOKK7xjG9e/Ls4986NOrDwKz/nQmpw1DwNJwV2nlOztyo7MgxUG3kTuLbuW3qCrrkO+CbpBA5nGS1cmKBQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.528Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.749Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "fuzz-testing-strategy",
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@
         "OSS-Fuzz-Gen / AI-assisted harness generation becoming the default expectation for OSS maintainers"
       ],
       "signature": "+ELdD+1AY5DymBitH7wU65CS60NY1nDoLowJAFn7cE5Gr/5jy9BTkyxsm7PEXaSlXWMOkTf/HQ+uyzyxUVD/Bw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.529Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.749Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "dlp-gap-analysis",
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@
         "Quebec Law 25, India DPDPA, KSA PDPL enforcement actions naming AI-tool prompt data as in-scope personal information"
       ],
       "signature": "vL5XeQOk7vwX0sLMuKghj6XLnXsqKcGpCUNMui9HwqnWyNQwgSRGu+JFqP7ZqpP3SUYRZHcVlWhXeTJHyOtiAA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.529Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.750Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "supply-chain-integrity",
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@
         "OpenSSF model-signing — emerging Sigstore-based signing standard for ML model weights; track for production adoption"
       ],
       "signature": "jp3MxKukV7zW47eX3VcAIMG5WxypMDcfHqwYDodI9YQgTxEojCrRcMSApaoZHTdD3yTQC1JtkXeKxU6K3C5NCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.529Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.750Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "defensive-countermeasure-mapping",
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "XZigwq8X/csfrdG10O6Q1V5q0zUqSQGd3QrjRKkZ4fkaodG4mZahYuIQqxc8rU9jjtGAm9LtBXYB+I5csqj9Bw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.530Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.750Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "identity-assurance",
@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "k0HrsZMBxiPWB1jl4dRwhv/R5IsqbZ+SLDv1Jx3/sRl51JyXjtm8vyogTNhSwsl5/IkaRakqIPJFRFRl5h/9CQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.530Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.751Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ot-ics-security",
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "oHxjumOhk8y86WcwhAX8sSWIlPzt60KfTMn4DCJLeRrrQd5+i54fVADKAdZ3vOqfDN+DexO0uX4f5dLPtacRCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.530Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.751Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "coordinated-vuln-disclosure",
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 amendments potentially adding explicit CVD program requirements"
       ],
       "signature": "UCiNjncvhkZItmLQA/Sm1/NCsOiLMwdCjfUw+067v4NIxhaMMaqRrAeD3KgMyEtov7m2Hq2kfwYSt5+DQsYDCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.530Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.751Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "threat-modeling-methodology",
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@
         "PASTA v2 updates incorporating AI/ML application threats"
       ],
       "signature": "V9kl8Cf8UMjNFyn3D/fSyhWHLeXWlx3WV/jT9jdF9SrjfDqymimuTt2o91cZ2FOEJndAH9V0JGXB13Ohz8K4CQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.531Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.752Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "webapp-security",
@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "ENSL4MJSNXhriKsTVBjg2jTc7JTtb6mxqbfBw/SVVajPMkLMcLBk4Gem9LhZWZ8DSqyWLnFO2d6hlz5q8bjuCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.531Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.752Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ai-risk-management",
@@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "8E82UwKFNraXV/MKAbiUV6gUryYuN+Ff/kiv1aW4/XtriShdTyt/UgRuQJ8LXGXl0jMH8hRJ/xTAV8LOJqexDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.531Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.752Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-healthcare",
@@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "BDuLcpTeFp2BNSf1q4rYOhYKNhlgd3o5RZ0Uw9xW5olyYxPbZSgqekQ+6Ggaec09s7y6sqR37GS0vuAMdbrdDQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.532Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.753Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-financial",
@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@
         "TIBER-EU framework v2.0 alignment with DORA TLPT RTS (JC 2024/40); cross-recognition with CBEST and iCAST"
       ],
       "signature": "w12QqGBlRDaDVYug9uQVmEbxR7+gX23rOKZSjlt3XcszYDHBCRiP4cBRKMuEguu44DCaQsg+Btu4vAVMlss9Dg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.532Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.753Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-federal-government",
@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@
         "Australia PSPF 2024 revision and ISM quarterly updates — track for Essential Eight Maturity Level requirements for federal entities"
       ],
       "signature": "nMsyJ+rp5fM8/VjC7zsZyDjOC4hpxB+noT1VX7W0HBlq5t3SY56cwOGApwES/kBcCuf4qexKY376OxUr93zvCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.532Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.753Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-energy",
@@ -1637,7 +1637,7 @@
         "ICS-CERT advisory feed (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/ics-advisories) for vendor CVEs in Siemens, Rockwell, Schneider Electric, ABB, GE Vernova, Hitachi Energy, AVEVA / OSIsoft PI"
       ],
       "signature": "L1moEqEGkBkqY/3ohJcfqrlJn40UurDCyb2MOP/IwTAeZD+QbVZ17/drdsydkJ6qSXPiyiE6u8HDfZsDS13NBQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.533Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.754Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "sector-telecom",
@@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@
         "O-RAN SFG / WG11 security specifications"
       ],
       "signature": "VKLuoRkFq7lNXqySipwzPSaiHaqemHQ2cReemF/Xy9hUpD9orQaTVZWClOA4lzoF6d2eQ/CeS///Jjnj4g9dCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.533Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.754Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "api-security",
@@ -1792,7 +1792,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "JHGu5OI35payaFR1At3XZIX4HnflgF3lI9vk/XsHpu0loWHtbTiA/SrNzTuWO+be8aIfd36uNz7WnJNwBTCHDA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.534Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.755Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "cloud-security",
@@ -1873,7 +1873,7 @@
         "CISA KEV additions for cloud-control-plane CVEs (IMDSv1 abuses, federation token mishandling, cross-tenant boundary failures); CISA Cybersecurity Advisories for cross-cloud advisories"
       ],
       "signature": "UEn0305KAEqIfYOdzadLBdPG/PJ+3sJ/8ubvPFNcXfqXp2uOWTfqGUqY65PApA992VEEa1RBQt5R7Nyhd/OjDQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.534Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.755Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "container-runtime-security",
@@ -1935,7 +1935,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "lPd9tHAskNapjrWwFWhsb8ntAL0xovDCIGElsOCyjcafzby4ArwRw5Lq28sfNloJZAhMN+AWj+lDdFytiUQHCQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.534Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.755Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "mlops-security",
@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@
         "MITRE ATLAS v5.2 — track AML.T0010 sub-technique expansion and any new MLOps-pipeline-specific TTPs"
       ],
       "signature": "U+HyElcP007FIblXUE/nFpj/rZ5z3VohsvxRCWEuuJDLdOnsXYEadb7ccr3X7S4aRG2MC4T2KtVtgbKIuO5QDw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.535Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.756Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "incident-response-playbook",
@@ -2068,7 +2068,7 @@
         "NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500.17 amendments tightening ransom-payment 24h disclosure operationalization"
       ],
       "signature": "XB3TVjNRBlqqbIhatFoYtTJHTS51nVt9k7DVrb2roUflLDjbCnaTbrpztA2oqJyyxwgnLlX+K7NW8oYOYEMeCg==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.535Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.756Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "ransomware-response",
@@ -2147,8 +2147,8 @@
         "SCOTUS or circuit-court rulings on ransomware payment, sanctions liability, and insurance-policy enforcement"
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
-      "signature": "ChZ8EWZFfrQYLNH6gJBdcRrayROvcQfiPOpb4H+0rio99OZS0AmQgWQjlWfrF1K5KPEYsLjDqtp2i5P7xLfyBw==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.535Z"
+      "signature": "ossJwdH0ZQcu2S/Sy1j5s/PqAll/M9yYuF6oxxKl5GrVPueE4Ecxe+X4oIZ41yIG7Z1Ih1cgq8Sw8JwnaktzBA==",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.756Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "email-security-anti-phishing",
@@ -2201,7 +2201,7 @@
       "d3fend_refs": [],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-11",
       "signature": "RiCryJEd66T2NNcSo/mZTd3sGWDycE3C37guLJanLdVL5co35DrPFmIl8qy3ZM/y+Wzg5vpny8VKgr1//1/bCA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.536Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.757Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "age-gates-child-safety",
@@ -2269,7 +2269,7 @@
         "US state adult-site age-verification laws — 19+ states by mid-2026 (TX HB 18 upheld by SCOTUS June 2025 in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton); track ongoing challenges in remaining states"
       ],
       "signature": "MMWvg3lIf5ygm31zyf1E43t3W9MfRbMBBPrqlj1wOa8AxVJL8LICnAXfmyJ/TNJXwpF+rfZeDdoxXkql8wmtBA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.536Z"
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.757Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "cloud-iam-incident",
@@ -2348,8 +2348,8 @@
         "D3-CAA"
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
-      "signature": "03brHySNWPVnrfZwGBZH5rKLh20DQxVNln0w30fhdcMXtaHQYRuCfhhvqbHVHHoLEogMfsixQX1YtbiqOojsAQ==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.536Z"
+      "signature": "BST7fWHHxtYrB8L79RqMsQT3NuidigkPVkIZK2Ps43PgF9SMa117ltobk5954vEb1B7kgiWPa3DurLRLdUmGBg==",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.757Z"
     },
     {
       "name": "idp-incident-response",
@@ -2429,12 +2429,12 @@
         "D3-IOPR"
       ],
       "last_threat_review": "2026-05-15",
-      "signature": "EMdSANZrYCCWZ3+PL8CGKiXM7gQVsPBfj7BNMzNlEkjMIc+OccHUSjNEIWLgVZH6H5So1Le4JQSePqLq/nPABA==",
-      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:00:15.537Z"
+      "signature": "n9d4fdaSHCMieXRDkBz88kITsUFFlngr2gn2IvGFqJLH+xOEDp4ohS62Vk/zq4+Mhi4QEVKSu3mONOAk3nsYBQ==",
+      "signed_at": "2026-05-16T04:39:40.758Z"
     }
   ],
   "manifest_signature": {
     "algorithm": "Ed25519",
-    "signature_base64": "ytsFGsqVF15vRS2uJZVIGQ2PMYI6N27u+nfE7srYof22+hGW24KNikRD4Q8hXuTyiqzX59TNlJyFuYrkGpX0BA=="
+    "signature_base64": "8VWCymUVv6BXXAP2waRxy7QmYGXXpZYaRqalHQ4FmwzdFx1P6lFR0Wwyntqopx2FAEgDroLgEpeFVNIk7fOqBA=="
   }
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/exceptd-skills",
-  "version": "0.12.32",
+  "version": "0.12.33",
   "description": "AI security skills grounded in mid-2026 threat reality, not stale framework documentation. 42 skills, 10 catalogs, 34 jurisdictions, pre-computed indexes, Ed25519-signed.",
   "keywords": [
     "ai-security",