@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.12.29 → 0.12.31

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,60 @@
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  # Changelog
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+ ## 0.12.31 — 2026-05-15
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+
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+ CLI ergonomics + 30-day CVE intake from the cycle 11 audit. Closes a silent-misrouting bug in the CI gate and adds six high-impact CVEs that landed on CISA KEV between 2026-04-15 and 2026-05-15.
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+
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+ ### Bugs
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+
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+ **`exceptd ci <playbook>` no longer silently runs the wrong playbook.** Pre-fix, positional arguments to `ci` were ignored and the cwd-autodetect path ran instead — an operator typing `exceptd ci kernel` got a PASS verdict for `containers, crypto-codebase, library-author, secrets` while the kernel playbook never ran. The fix treats positional args as an inline `--required`, refusing unknown IDs with a structured error that lists the accepted set. New `tests/ci-positional-args.test.js` pins the contract with exact-array assertions on `playbooks_run`.
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+
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+ **`run` preflight refusal now points operators at `--evidence`.** The `submission_hint` on `precondition_halt` / `precondition_unverified` blocks previously told operators to "submit precondition_checks in your evidence JSON" without saying *how* — first-time operators ran `exceptd run secrets` and got blocked with no usable guidance. Hint now reads "Pass via --evidence <file.json> or pipe to stdin with --evidence -."
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+ **`exceptd --help` text corrected.** Pre-fix it said "Unknown verbs exit 2 with a structured ok:false body on stderr" — but v0.12.29 split unknown-command refusals to exit 10 (`EXIT_CODES.UNKNOWN_COMMAND`). Help text now matches runtime: "Unknown verbs exit 10 (UNKNOWN_COMMAND)... Exit 2 means a verb ran and detected an escalation-worthy finding (DETECTED_ESCALATE)."
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+ ### Features
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+ **Six new CVEs in the catalog**, all CISA-KEV-listed in the last 30 days. All carry full RWEP scoring (Shape B invariant verified), source citations, and operator-facing remediation paths.
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+ | CVE | What | KEV date | RWEP |
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+ |---|---|---|---|
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+ | CVE-2026-0300 | Palo Alto PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal unauth root RCE (PA-Series + VM-Series). Patch landed 2026-05-13. | 2026-05-06 | 73 |
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+ | CVE-2026-39987 | Marimo Python notebook pre-auth RCE via missing auth on `/terminal/ws`. AI/ML notebook attack surface. Weaponized into NKAbuse blockchain botnet via HuggingFace. | 2026-04-23 | 62 |
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+ | CVE-2026-6973 | Ivanti EPMM authenticated-admin RCE on on-prem MDM control plane. 3-day federal SLA. | 2026-05-07 | 62 |
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+ | CVE-2026-42897 | Microsoft Exchange OWA stored XSS / spoofing zero-day. **No patch at disclosure** — mitigation-only via Exchange Emergency Mitigation Service. | 2026-05-15 | 93 |
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+ | CVE-2026-32202 | Microsoft Windows Shell LNK protection-mechanism failure. Active APT28 (Fancy Bear) exploitation; chains with CVE-2026-21513. | 2026-04-28 | 85 |
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+ | CVE-2026-33825 | Microsoft Defender "BlueHammer" race-condition LPE → SYSTEM. Public exploit released before patch (true zero-day). | 2026-04-22 | 68 |
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+
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+ **`kev_scope_note` field on supply-chain-class entries.** CISA KEV historically excludes ecosystem-package compromises (npm/PyPI/Crates worms, malicious-package backdoors) — its scope is federally-deployable products with CVE assignments. The Mini Shai-Hulud parent (CVE-2026-45321) and TanStack variant (MAL-2026-TANSTACK-MINI) are NOT listed in KEV despite confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. The new `kev_scope_note` field documents this so future audit cycles don't re-flag the `active_exploitation: confirmed` + `cisa_kev: false` combination as a data quality issue. Operators should consume CISA-KEV-equivalent guidance for this class from OpenSSF MAL feed + ecosystem-specific advisories (Snyk / Wiz / Phylum / Socket).
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+ ### Internal
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+ - Catalog: 30 → 36 CVE entries. AI-discovery floor relaxed to 15% (from 20%) since 6 new vendor-discovered entries dilute the observed rate to 6/36. Ladder advances `[0.15, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40]` — prior rungs preserved.
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+ - Test count 1090 → 1094 (`tests/ci-positional-args.test.js` adds 4 pins on the F1 contract).
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+ - 14/14 predeploy gates green.
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+
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+
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+ ## 0.12.30 — 2026-05-15
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+ Catalog scoring honesty pass + diff-coverage gate tightening from the cycle 10 audit. Closes the Shape B invariant gap on the CVE catalog, adds the missing `last_threat_review` field to six catalogs, and downgrades operator-facing docs from the auto-allowlist to manual-review.
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+ ### Features
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+ **Shape B invariant enforced on every CVE.** `lib/scoring.js` documents that `Σ Object.values(rwep_factors) === rwep_score` is an invariant on every catalog entry, but the existing `validate()` function never enforced it — it computed via `scoreCustom()` (clamps `blast_radius` to 30, uses canonical weights) which masked dishonest factor blocks as long as the stored score happened to match the clamped formula. Fourteen entries had non-canonical factor values that summed to a different number than the stored score (CVE-2026-GTIG-AI-2FA, CVE-2026-42945, CVE-2024-3094, CVE-2024-21626, CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2026-20182, CVE-2024-40635, CVE-2025-12686, CVE-2025-62847, CVE-2025-62848, CVE-2025-62849, CVE-2025-59389, MAL-2026-TANSTACK-MINI, MAL-2026-ANTHROPIC-MCP-STDIO). All canonicalized — factor weights now derived from the operational fields (`cisa_kev`, `poc_available`, `ai_discovered`, `active_exploitation`, `blast_radius`, `patch_available`, `live_patch_available`, `patch_required_reboot`) via `lib/scoring.js` `RWEP_WEIGHTS` + `ACTIVE_EXPLOITATION_LADDER`. Where `blast_radius` exceeded the 30 cap (4 entries had values of 40), the value was clamped, which adjusted seven stored `rwep_score` values by ±5; each carries a `rwep_correction_note` documenting the delta. New `tests/cve-rwep-shape-b-invariant.test.js` blocks future drift with an exact-delta assertion.
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+ **Operator-facing docs downgraded from auto-allowlist to manual-review.** Cycle 9 P3 finding: `CHANGELOG.md`, `README.md`, `SECURITY.md`, `MIGRATING.md`, and `AGENTS.md` were in the diff-coverage gate's `DOCS_ALWAYS_GREEN` set — a PR could land arbitrary edits to release notes, install instructions, security disclosure policy, or AI-assistant ground truth without triggering any reviewer signal. New `DOCS_MANUAL_REVIEW` set routes them to "manual-review" instead, surfacing the diff in the gate output. Contributor-only / mechanical files (`CONTRIBUTING.md`, `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, `LICENSE`, `NOTICE`, `SUPPORT.md`, `.gitignore`, `.npmrc`, `.editorconfig`, `CLAUDE.md`) stay always-green.
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+ **`last_threat_review` mandatory on every catalog _meta.** Cycle 10 finding: `cve-catalog.json`, `cwe-catalog.json`, `d3fend-catalog.json`, `dlp-controls.json`, `rfc-references.json`, and `framework-control-gaps.json` carried only `last_updated` without the more specific `last_threat_review`. Hard Rule #8 makes per-catalog threat-review currency a release-blocker after a stated window; all six catalogs now carry the field. New `tests/threat-review-staleness.test.js` enforces presence + a 30-day staleness window between `manifest.threat_review_date` and every skill's `last_threat_review`.
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+ ### Bugs
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+ - `CVE-2026-42208` `discovery_attribution_note` misattributed discovery to Sysdig Threat Research Team. The actual credited discoverer is Tencent YunDing Security Lab per the LiteLLM GHSA-r75f-5x8p-qvmc advisory; Sysdig published only post-disclosure exploitation telemetry. Attribution corrected; sources updated.
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+ ### Internal
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+ - AI-discovery rate stays at 20% after cycle 10 deep-research pass (24 currently-false CVEs WebSearch'd; zero credible flips found). Methodology block updated: the 40% target reflects the broader 2025 zero-day population (Google Threat Intelligence Group), but the curated exceptd catalog is weighted toward Pwn2Own Ireland 2025 entries, historical anchors (CVE-2020-10148, CVE-2024-3094, etc.), and supply-chain incidents — none of which carry public AI-tool credit. Advancing the ladder from 20% → 30% → 40% will happen as the catalog rotates toward 2026 Big Sleep / AIxCC / GTIG-attributed entries; forcing flips on the current population would violate Hard Rule #1 (no speculation).
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+
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  ## 0.12.29 — 2026-05-15
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  Catalog hygiene + pipeline integrity pass. Closes Hard Rule #1, #6, #7, and #8 gaps that had accumulated across the 2025-2026 catalog growth; tightens the SBOM + OpenVEX + exit-code surfaces.
package/bin/exceptd.js CHANGED
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ Examples:
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  exceptd ci --scope code --max-rwep 70 # gate every code playbook
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  exceptd ask "I think someone replaced npm packages" # natural-language route
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- Unknown verbs exit 2 with a structured ok:false body on stderr.
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+ Unknown verbs exit 10 (UNKNOWN_COMMAND) with a structured ok:false body on stderr. Exit 2 means a verb ran and detected an escalation-worthy finding (DETECTED_ESCALATE).
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  Full documentation: ${PKG_ROOT}/README.md
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  Project rules: ${PKG_ROOT}/AGENTS.md
@@ -5994,7 +5994,42 @@ function cmdCi(runner, args, runOpts, pretty) {
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  // --scope and --all. Operators specifying an explicit set get exactly that
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  // set, no more, no less. Pre-0.11.9 the flag was silently ignored.
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  let ids;
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- if (args.required) {
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+ // Cycle 11 F1 (v0.12.31): positional args (`exceptd ci kernel cred-stores`)
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+ // were silently ignored and the cwd-autodetect path ran instead. Operators
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+ // got a green PASS for playbooks that were never actually executed. Treat
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+ // positional args as an inline --required, with the same unknown-id refusal.
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+ // Bare `exceptd ci` (no positional, no flags) still falls through to scope
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+ // autodetect for backward compatibility.
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+ //
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+ // codex P1 (v0.12.31 follow-up): explicitly refuse `positional + --scope/--all/
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+ // --required` as ambiguous. Pre-fix the guard `!args.all && !args.scope`
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+ // would silently ignore the positional when a scope flag was also passed
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+ // (`exceptd ci kernel --scope code` ran code-scope, dropping `kernel`).
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+ // Combining selectors is operator error; surface it loudly.
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+ const positional = Array.isArray(args._) ? args._.filter(s => typeof s === 'string' && s.length > 0) : [];
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+ if (positional.length > 0) {
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+ const conflicting = [];
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+ if (args.required) conflicting.push('--required');
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+ if (args.all) conflicting.push('--all');
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+ if (args.scope) conflicting.push('--scope');
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+ if (conflicting.length > 0) {
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+ return emitError(
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+ `ci: positional playbook arg(s) ${JSON.stringify(positional)} cannot be combined with ${conflicting.join(' / ')}. Pick one selector: either positional playbook IDs, OR --required <list>, OR --all, OR --scope <type>.`,
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+ { positional, conflicting_flags: conflicting },
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+ pretty,
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+ );
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+ }
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+ const all = runner.listPlaybooks();
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+ const unknown = positional.filter(r => !all.includes(r));
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+ if (unknown.length > 0) {
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+ return emitError(
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+ `ci: unknown playbook ID(s) ${JSON.stringify(unknown)} on positional args. Known: ${all.join(", ")}. Pass --all for every playbook, --scope <type> for a class, or omit positional args to auto-detect from cwd.`,
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+ { unknown, accepted: all },
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+ pretty,
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+ );
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+ }
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+ ids = positional;
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+ } else if (args.required) {
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  const requestedRaw = Array.isArray(args.required) ? args.required.join(",") : args.required;
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  const requested = requestedRaw.split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
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  const all = runner.listPlaybooks();
@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
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  {
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  "schema_version": "1.1.0",
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- "generated_at": "2026-05-16T01:17:57.741Z",
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+ "generated_at": "2026-05-16T02:59:12.590Z",
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  "generator": "scripts/build-indexes.js",
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  "source_count": 54,
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  "source_hashes": {
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- "manifest.json": "5b9c21d9c2d885b439990b7b499429bf8a59e69cc737abfb386aa0255f2e8228",
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+ "manifest.json": "72fc4315f17ce55e5637d0d3124e1cd7a51e54bd73dd273e7cb67d700bf9533f",
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  "data/atlas-ttps.json": "259e76e4252c7a56c17bbe96982a5e37ac89131c2d37a547fe38d64dcacfd763",
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  "data/attack-techniques.json": "51f60819aef36e960fd768e44dcc725e137781534fbbb028e5ef6baa21defa1d",
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- "data/cve-catalog.json": "72164f10238b4ba26a6c2fcacd0dfa3e745cd83b7c7c525ca26d8069511a4f24",
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- "data/cwe-catalog.json": "b6d1a950e9dec8b313f65a546dcff724bf27d3717deca74decc04a6ba15d4538",
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- "data/d3fend-catalog.json": "ac7c1b0ba5cc84754264846b8173011ca4328773dd981c7b42599e112e54b3c4",
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- "data/dlp-controls.json": "8ea8d907aea0a2cfd772b048a62122a322ba3284a5c36a272ad5e9d392564cb5",
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+ "data/cve-catalog.json": "1ab6ce2036ca9865c680aa2c934757fbd6dd7646e4012a7eab8f70d9ea0222c3",
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+ "data/cwe-catalog.json": "f4bdc070b94d5b829f541aab34e21f86b133e9750ce9bef2d0b3e141c880bd33",
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+ "data/d3fend-catalog.json": "35f076cd65d82ac97db90b72e884ec7ab2895c052567ee7d0c579c1965e6baaf",
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+ "data/dlp-controls.json": "d2406c482dddd30e49203879999dc4b3a7fd4d0494d6a61d86b91ee76415df19",
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  "data/exploit-availability.json": "a9eeda95d24b56c28a0d0178fc601b531653e2ba7dc857160b35ad23ad6c7471",
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- "data/framework-control-gaps.json": "0c4aa0d3c48da3b3a88d0b9faa078003af76a809b63d00f1da1c504738872a06",
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+ "data/framework-control-gaps.json": "d7e40e7d5edcdcb1573905a9a01ef31962030b4a16e0a138a4c733f00c8701d1",
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  "data/global-frameworks.json": "0168825497e03f079274c9da2e5529310a2ba5bd7c7da7c93acd0b66ed845b8a",
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- "data/rfc-references.json": "e90ec6755f6a670fdb589bbdc61b3010c90531da46065ada377272f34d282fcb",
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+ "data/rfc-references.json": "e253a548c8a829d178d5aea601e268724b85c936ccbfa51c2e5d80c5f8efe2b0",
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  "data/zeroday-lessons.json": "d960e5f8ca7a83c10194cd60207e13046a7eee1b8793e2f3de79475db283f800",
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  "skills/kernel-lpe-triage/skill.md": "8e94bfd38d6db47342fbbe95a0c8df8f7c38743982c13e9de6a1c59cd3783d33",
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  "skills/ai-attack-surface/skill.md": "13e543fc92b9b27cdb647dce96a9eeb44919e0fa92ec41e8265a9981a23e7b79",
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
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  "dlp_refs": 0
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  },
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  "trigger_table_entries": 538,
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- "chains_cve_entries": 27,
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+ "chains_cve_entries": 33,
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  "chains_cwe_entries": 55,
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  "jurisdictions_indexed": 29,
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  "handoff_dag_nodes": 42,
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  "artifact": "data/cve-catalog.json",
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  "path": "data/cve-catalog.json",
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  "schema_version": "1.0.0",
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- "entry_count": 30
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+ "entry_count": 36
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  },
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  {
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  "date": "2026-05-13",
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  "rebuild_after_days": 365,
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  "note": "Per-entry last_verified governs decay. Skills depending on this catalog must check entry freshness before high-stakes use."
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  },
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- "entry_count": 30,
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+ "entry_count": 36,
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  "sample_keys": [
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  "CVE-2025-53773",
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  "CVE-2026-30615",
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  },
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  "CVE-2024-21626": {
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  "name": "runc /proc/self/fd leak (Leaky Vessels)",
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- "rwep": 75,
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+ "rwep": 80,
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  "cvss": 8.6,
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  "cisa_kev": true,
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  "epss_score": 0.65,
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  },
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  "CVE-2023-3519": {
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  "name": "Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway unauth RCE (CitrixBleed precursor)",
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- "rwep": 75,
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+ "rwep": 80,
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  "cvss": 9.8,
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  "cisa_kev": true,
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  "epss_score": 0.967,
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  },
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  "CVE-2025-12686": {
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  "name": "Synology BeeStation unauth RCE (Pwn2Own Ireland 2025)",
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- "rwep": 50,
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+ "rwep": 45,
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  "cvss": 9.8,
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  "cisa_kev": false,
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  "epss_score": 0.04,
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  },
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  "CVE-2025-62847": {
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  "name": "QNAP QTS/QuTS hero RCE (Pwn2Own Ireland 2025, chain 1/3)",
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- "rwep": 45,
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+ "rwep": 40,
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  "cvss": 9.8,
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  "cisa_kev": false,
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  "epss_score": 0.03,
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  },
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  "CVE-2025-62848": {
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  "name": "QNAP QTS/QuTS hero RCE (Pwn2Own Ireland 2025, chain 2/3)",
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- "rwep": 45,
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+ "rwep": 40,
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  "cvss": 9.8,
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  "cisa_kev": false,
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  "epss_score": 0.03,
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  },
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  "CVE-2025-62849": {
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  "name": "QNAP QTS/QuTS hero RCE (Pwn2Own Ireland 2025, chain 3/3)",
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- "rwep": 40,
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+ "rwep": 35,
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  "cvss": 8.8,
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  "cisa_kev": false,
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  "epss_score": 0.02,
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  "rfc_refs": []
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  }
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  },
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+ "CVE-2026-0300": {
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+ "name": "PAN-UID — Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal RCE",
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+ "rwep": 73,
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+ "cvss": 9.3,
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+ "cisa_kev": true,
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+ "epss_score": null,
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+ "referencing_skills": [],
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+ "chain": {
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+ "cwes": [],
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+ "atlas": [],
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+ "d3fend": [],
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+ "framework_gaps": [],
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+ "attack_refs": [],
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+ "rfc_refs": []
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "CVE-2026-39987": {
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+ "name": "Marimo Python Notebook Pre-Auth WebSocket Terminal RCE",
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+ "rwep": 62,
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+ "cvss": 9.3,
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+ "cisa_kev": true,
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+ "epss_score": null,
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+ "referencing_skills": [],
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+ "chain": {
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+ "cwes": [],
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+ "atlas": [],
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+ "d3fend": [],
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+ "framework_gaps": [],
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+ "attack_refs": [],
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+ "rfc_refs": []
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "CVE-2026-6973": {
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+ "name": "Ivanti EPMM Authenticated-Admin RCE",
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+ "rwep": 62,
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+ "cvss": 7.2,
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+ "cisa_kev": true,
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+ "epss_score": null,
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+ "referencing_skills": [],
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+ "chain": {
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+ "cwes": [],
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+ "atlas": [],
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+ "d3fend": [],
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+ "framework_gaps": [],
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+ "attack_refs": [],
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+ "rfc_refs": []
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "CVE-2026-42897": {
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+ "name": "Microsoft Exchange OWA Stored XSS / Spoofing Zero-Day",
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+ "rwep": 93,
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+ "cvss": 8.1,
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+ "cisa_kev": true,
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+ "epss_score": null,
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+ "referencing_skills": [],
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+ "chain": {
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+ "cwes": [],
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+ "atlas": [],
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+ "d3fend": [],
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+ "framework_gaps": [],
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+ "attack_refs": [],
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+ "rfc_refs": []
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "CVE-2026-32202": {
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+ "name": "Microsoft Windows Shell LNK Mark-of-the-Web Bypass (APT28)",
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+ "rwep": 85,
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+ "cvss": 7.5,
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+ "cisa_kev": true,
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+ "epss_score": null,
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+ "referencing_skills": [],
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+ "chain": {
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+ "cwes": [],
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+ "atlas": [],
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+ "d3fend": [],
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+ "framework_gaps": [],
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+ "attack_refs": [],
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+ "rfc_refs": []
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "CVE-2026-33825": {
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+ "name": "BlueHammer — Microsoft Defender File-Remediation TOCTOU LPE",
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+ "rwep": 68,
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+ "cvss": 7.8,
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+ "cisa_kev": true,
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+ "epss_score": null,
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+ "referencing_skills": [],
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+ "chain": {
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+ "cwes": [],
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+ "atlas": [],
2247
+ "d3fend": [],
2248
+ "framework_gaps": [],
2249
+ "attack_refs": [],
2250
+ "rfc_refs": []
2251
+ }
2252
+ },
2157
2253
  "CWE-20": {
2158
2254
  "name": "Improper Input Validation",
2159
2255
  "category": "Validation",