@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.10.0 → 0.10.1

package/data/playbooks/crypto.json

@@ -10,11 +10,20 @@
         "date": "2026-05-11",
         "summary": "Initial seven-phase PQC-readiness playbook. Inventories OpenSSL/LibreSSL/BoringSSL versions, sshd_config KEX/MAC/cipher suites, TLS 1.3 hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768 support, certificate store hygiene (algorithm + expiry + cross-signing). Frames HNDL as the present threat surface. Full GRC closure mapping to NIS2/DORA/EU CRA/NIST PQC migration obligations.",
         "cves_added": [],
-        "framework_gaps_updated": ["nist-800-53-SC-8", "nist-800-53-SC-13", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.25", "pci-dss-4-3.6", "dora-art9", "nis2-art21-2h"]
+        "framework_gaps_updated": [
+          "nist-800-53-SC-8",
+          "nist-800-53-SC-13",
+          "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24",
+          "iso-27001-2022-A.8.25",
+          "pci-dss-4-3.6",
+          "dora-art9",
+          "nis2-art21-2h"
+        ]
       }
     ],
     "owner": "@blamejs/platform-security",
     "air_gap_mode": false,
+    "scope": "service",
     "preconditions": [
       {
         "id": "filesystem-read",
@@ -41,26 +50,47 @@
       }
     ]
   },
-
   "domain": {
     "name": "Post-quantum cryptography exposure",
     "attack_class": "pqc-exposure",
     "atlas_refs": [],
-    "attack_refs": ["T1040", "T1557", "T1573"],
+    "attack_refs": [
+      "T1040",
+      "T1557",
+      "T1573"
+    ],
     "cve_refs": [],
-    "cwe_refs": ["CWE-327", "CWE-326", "CWE-310"],
-    "d3fend_refs": ["D3-FE", "D3-MENCR"],
+    "cwe_refs": [
+      "CWE-327",
+      "CWE-326",
+      "CWE-310"
+    ],
+    "d3fend_refs": [
+      "D3-FE",
+      "D3-MENCR"
+    ],
     "frameworks_in_scope": [
-      "nist-800-53", "nist-csf-2", "iso-27001-2022",
-      "soc2", "pci-dss-4", "nis2", "dora",
-      "uk-caf", "au-ism", "au-essential-8",
-      "sg-mas-trm", "jp-nisc", "in-cert", "ca-osfi-b10",
-      "hipaa", "cmmc", "nerc-cip", "eu-cra"
+      "nist-800-53",
+      "nist-csf-2",
+      "iso-27001-2022",
+      "soc2",
+      "pci-dss-4",
+      "nis2",
+      "dora",
+      "uk-caf",
+      "au-ism",
+      "au-essential-8",
+      "sg-mas-trm",
+      "jp-nisc",
+      "in-cert",
+      "ca-osfi-b10",
+      "hipaa",
+      "cmmc",
+      "nerc-cip",
+      "eu-cra"
     ]
   },
-
   "phases": {
-
     "govern": {
       "jurisdiction_obligations": [
         {
@@ -69,7 +99,11 @@
           "obligation": "maintain_cryptographic_inventory",
           "window_hours": 720,
           "clock_starts": "manual",
-          "evidence_required": ["cryptographic_asset_inventory", "pqc_migration_plan", "algorithm_sunset_tracking"]
+          "evidence_required": [
+            "cryptographic_asset_inventory",
+            "pqc_migration_plan",
+            "algorithm_sunset_tracking"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "jurisdiction": "EU",
@@ -77,7 +111,11 @@
           "obligation": "submit_cryptographic_resilience_evidence",
           "window_hours": 720,
           "clock_starts": "manual",
-          "evidence_required": ["cryptographic_resilience_assessment", "key_management_attestation", "pqc_readiness_status"]
+          "evidence_required": [
+            "cryptographic_resilience_assessment",
+            "key_management_attestation",
+            "pqc_readiness_status"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "jurisdiction": "EU",
@@ -85,7 +123,11 @@
           "obligation": "notify_regulator",
           "window_hours": 24,
           "clock_starts": "detect_confirmed",
-          "evidence_required": ["confirmed_hndl_exposure", "affected_data_sensitivity_horizon", "interim_mitigation_record"]
+          "evidence_required": [
+            "confirmed_hndl_exposure",
+            "affected_data_sensitivity_horizon",
+            "interim_mitigation_record"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "jurisdiction": "US",
@@ -93,7 +135,10 @@
           "obligation": "maintain_pqc_migration_inventory",
           "window_hours": 8760,
           "clock_starts": "manual",
-          "evidence_required": ["federal_pqc_inventory", "annual_migration_progress_report"]
+          "evidence_required": [
+            "federal_pqc_inventory",
+            "annual_migration_progress_report"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "jurisdiction": "AU",
@@ -101,7 +146,10 @@
           "obligation": "notify_regulator",
           "window_hours": 72,
           "clock_starts": "validate_complete",
-          "evidence_required": ["materiality_assessment", "remediation_completed_evidence"]
+          "evidence_required": [
+            "materiality_assessment",
+            "remediation_completed_evidence"
+          ]
         }
       ],
       "theater_fingerprints": [
@@ -109,31 +157,48 @@
           "pattern_id": "fips-140-as-pqc-evidence",
           "claim": "We use FIPS 140-validated cryptographic modules, therefore our crypto posture is compliant and current.",
           "fast_detection_test": "FIPS 140-3 validation lists only classical algorithms today (FIPS 203/204/205 add to the catalog but a module's validation cert lists specific algorithm modes). Read the actual FIPS 140-3 certificate for the module — if it lists only AES, RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, SHA-2/3 and no ML-KEM/ML-DSA/SLH-DSA, the module is fully compliant AND fully vulnerable to HNDL. The FIPS sticker tells you nothing about PQC readiness.",
-          "implicated_controls": ["nist-800-53-SC-13", "fips-140-3"]
+          "implicated_controls": [
+            "nist-800-53-SC-13",
+            "fips-140-3"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "pattern_id": "tls-1-3-as-future-proof",
           "claim": "We're on TLS 1.3 across the fleet — our transport encryption is modern.",
           "fast_detection_test": "TLS 1.3 with classical-only key exchange (X25519, P-256, P-384) is HNDL-vulnerable today. Run: openssl s_client -connect <host>:443 -tls1_3 -groups X25519MLKEM768 — if the server does not negotiate the hybrid group, the org is recording-decrypt-later vulnerable regardless of TLS version. Reality: modern TLS version without modern key exchange = theater.",
-          "implicated_controls": ["nist-800-53-SC-8", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24", "pci-dss-4-4.2.1"]
+          "implicated_controls": [
+            "nist-800-53-SC-8",
+            "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24",
+            "pci-dss-4-4.2.1"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "pattern_id": "policy-mentions-pqc",
           "claim": "Our cryptographic policy mentions post-quantum cryptography migration — we have a PQC program.",
           "fast_detection_test": "Diff the policy against the cryptographic asset inventory. If the policy names PQC but the inventory lacks per-asset (a) current algorithm, (b) sensitivity horizon, (c) PQC migration target, (d) sunset date for the classical algorithm — the policy is a document, not a program. The inventory is the program; without it the policy is theater.",
-          "implicated_controls": ["nist-800-53-SC-13", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24", "nis2-art21-2h"]
+          "implicated_controls": [
+            "nist-800-53-SC-13",
+            "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24",
+            "nis2-art21-2h"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "pattern_id": "openssl-version-as-pqc-readiness",
           "claim": "We're on OpenSSL 3.x, therefore we can support PQC when needed.",
           "fast_detection_test": "OpenSSL 3.0/3.1/3.2 do not include native ML-KEM. OpenSSL 3.5 ships native ML-KEM/ML-DSA/SLH-DSA. Run: openssl list -kem-algorithms — if ML-KEM-768 (or ML-KEM-512/1024) is absent, the binary cannot negotiate the hybrid group regardless of how recent it sounds. Major-version label without the algorithm in -kem-algorithms = theater.",
-          "implicated_controls": ["nist-800-53-SC-13", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24"]
+          "implicated_controls": [
+            "nist-800-53-SC-13",
+            "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "pattern_id": "ssh-config-modern-without-curve-audit",
           "claim": "Our sshd_config uses modern KEX algorithms (curve25519-sha256).",
           "fast_detection_test": "curve25519-sha256 is classical. sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com is the OpenSSH 9.0+ hybrid PQC group. Read sshd -T | grep -i kexalg — if sntrup761x25519 or mlkem768x25519-sha256 is not present in KexAlgorithms, all SSH session keys are HNDL-recordable today.",
-          "implicated_controls": ["nist-800-53-SC-8", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24"]
+          "implicated_controls": [
+            "nist-800-53-SC-8",
+            "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24"
+          ]
         }
       ],
       "framework_context": {
@@ -190,9 +255,14 @@
           }
         ]
       },
-      "skill_preload": ["pqc-first", "framework-gap-analysis", "compliance-theater", "global-grc", "policy-exception-gen"]
+      "skill_preload": [
+        "pqc-first",
+        "framework-gap-analysis",
+        "compliance-theater",
+        "global-grc",
+        "policy-exception-gen"
+      ]
     },
-
     "direct": {
       "threat_context": "PQC landscape mid-2026: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), 204 (ML-DSA), 205 (SLH-DSA) finalized 2024-08-13 — production-ready for 21 months. OpenSSL 3.5 (released Q1 2025) ships native ML-KEM/ML-DSA/SLH-DSA; OpenSSH 9.0+ ships sntrup761x25519-sha512 KEX since 2022; Chrome (since v124, 2024) negotiates X25519MLKEM768 with compatible servers. The deployment gap is not technical readiness — it is operator inertia. NSA CNSA 2.0 mandates PQC for NSS by 2030; NIST IR 8547 (draft, 2024) sets the federal transition timeline. EU ENISA's PQC transition mandate is advancing toward binding Member State implementation through 2027-2028. HNDL is operational reality, not a future concern: state-level adversaries are recording encrypted traffic at scale and have been since 2013 (publicly known). Any data with a sensitivity window of 10+ years currently protected by classical asymmetric crypto is decryptable in the 2030s by an adversary that captured the ciphertext today. Aggressive academic CRQC estimates now appear in peer-reviewed cryptanalysis literature in the 5-8 year horizon (from mid-2026), with conservative estimates 12-15 years. Either horizon makes today's classical-only TLS handshakes already-exfiltrated.",
       "rwep_threshold": {
@@ -202,11 +272,33 @@
       },
       "framework_lag_declaration": "Every framework in scope is structurally insufficient for HNDL. NIST 800-53 SC-8/SC-13, ISO 27001:2022 A.8.24/A.8.25, PCI DSS 4.0 §3.6/§4.2.1, NIS2 Art.21(2)(h), DORA Art.9, EU CRA Annex I all permit fully-classical cryptographic posture as 'strong cryptography'. NIST itself is the exception: FIPS 203/204/205 are finalized, NIST IR 8547 is a published migration roadmap, OMB M-23-02 mandates federal PQC inventory — but the 800-53 control catalog is unchanged. ISO 27001:2022 was published before PQC finalization and has no scheduled amendment. PCI Council and EU regulators are publicly aware but have not amended binding controls. Lag = ~180 days behind operational readiness (PQC has been production-ready since 2024-08-13) and 4-8+ years behind the CRQC horizon that drives the harvest-now-decrypt-later attack. Compensating controls (crypto-agility, hybrid algorithms, layered encryption envelopes) must close this gap before SLA-only compliance can be accepted.",
       "skill_chain": [
-        { "skill": "pqc-first", "purpose": "Enumerate TLS library versions, sshd KEX/MAC/cipher posture, certificate algorithms, OpenSSL kem-algorithms list. Test for ML-KEM-768/ML-DSA/SLH-DSA availability and configuration.", "required": true },
-        { "skill": "framework-gap-analysis", "purpose": "Map each detected classical-only configuration to the specific framework controls that permit it and the operational threat that exploits it.", "required": true },
-        { "skill": "compliance-theater", "purpose": "Run the five theater tests in govern.theater_fingerprints; emit verdict for each.", "required": true },
-        { "skill": "global-grc", "purpose": "Cross-walk findings to per-jurisdiction obligations and notification clocks.", "skip_if": "jurisdiction_obligations.length == 0", "required": false },
-        { "skill": "policy-exception-gen", "purpose": "Generate auditor-ready exception language for assets that cannot reach hybrid PQC in this cycle.", "skip_if": "close.exception_generation.trigger_condition == false", "required": false }
+        {
+          "skill": "pqc-first",
+          "purpose": "Enumerate TLS library versions, sshd KEX/MAC/cipher posture, certificate algorithms, OpenSSL kem-algorithms list. Test for ML-KEM-768/ML-DSA/SLH-DSA availability and configuration.",
+          "required": true
+        },
+        {
+          "skill": "framework-gap-analysis",
+          "purpose": "Map each detected classical-only configuration to the specific framework controls that permit it and the operational threat that exploits it.",
+          "required": true
+        },
+        {
+          "skill": "compliance-theater",
+          "purpose": "Run the five theater tests in govern.theater_fingerprints; emit verdict for each.",
+          "required": true
+        },
+        {
+          "skill": "global-grc",
+          "purpose": "Cross-walk findings to per-jurisdiction obligations and notification clocks.",
+          "skip_if": "jurisdiction_obligations.length == 0",
+          "required": false
+        },
+        {
+          "skill": "policy-exception-gen",
+          "purpose": "Generate auditor-ready exception language for assets that cannot reach hybrid PQC in this cycle.",
+          "skip_if": "close.exception_generation.trigger_condition == false",
+          "required": false
+        }
       ],
       "token_budget": {
         "estimated_total": 21000,
@@ -221,7 +313,6 @@
         }
       }
     },
-
     "look": {
       "artifacts": [
         {
@@ -319,14 +410,33 @@
         }
       ],
       "fallback_if_unavailable": [
-        { "artifact_id": "openssl-kem-algorithms", "fallback_action": "use_compensating_artifact", "confidence_impact": "medium" },
-        { "artifact_id": "tls-server-handshake", "fallback_action": "use_compensating_artifact", "confidence_impact": "medium" },
-        { "artifact_id": "certificate-store", "fallback_action": "mark_inconclusive", "confidence_impact": "low" },
-        { "artifact_id": "sshd-config-effective", "fallback_action": "mark_inconclusive", "confidence_impact": "medium" },
-        { "artifact_id": "openssl-version", "fallback_action": "escalate_to_human", "confidence_impact": "high" }
+        {
+          "artifact_id": "openssl-kem-algorithms",
+          "fallback_action": "use_compensating_artifact",
+          "confidence_impact": "medium"
+        },
+        {
+          "artifact_id": "tls-server-handshake",
+          "fallback_action": "use_compensating_artifact",
+          "confidence_impact": "medium"
+        },
+        {
+          "artifact_id": "certificate-store",
+          "fallback_action": "mark_inconclusive",
+          "confidence_impact": "low"
+        },
+        {
+          "artifact_id": "sshd-config-effective",
+          "fallback_action": "mark_inconclusive",
+          "confidence_impact": "medium"
+        },
+        {
+          "artifact_id": "openssl-version",
+          "fallback_action": "escalate_to_human",
+          "confidence_impact": "high"
+        }
       ]
     },
-
     "detect": {
       "indicators": [
         {
@@ -419,24 +529,73 @@
         "not_detected": "ML-KEM-768 available in TLS library AND sshd accepts sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com (or mlkem768x25519-sha256) AND all long-retention-sensitivity certs use hybrid (classical+PQC) signatures AND a cryptographic asset inventory exists with sunset dates for classical algorithms."
       }
     },
-
     "analyze": {
       "rwep_inputs": [
-        { "signal_id": "ml-kem-absent", "rwep_factor": "active_exploitation", "weight": 25, "notes": "HNDL is operational — state-level recording is documented. Active exploitation in the recording sense, not yet decryption sense." },
-        { "signal_id": "ml-kem-absent", "rwep_factor": "blast_radius", "weight": 25, "notes": "Affects all TLS-protected flows; blast radius proportional to data sensitivity horizon." },
-        { "signal_id": "sshd-no-pqc-kex", "rwep_factor": "blast_radius", "weight": 20, "notes": "SSH session keys = bastion + lateral movement creds + tunneled traffic." },
-        { "signal_id": "rsa-2048-cert-long-life", "rwep_factor": "blast_radius", "weight": 20, "notes": "Certificate chain compromise on CRQC day collapses authentication for long-retention data." },
-        { "signal_id": "openssl-pre-3-5", "rwep_factor": "patch_available", "weight": -10, "notes": "Upgrade path is available; patch_available reduces RWEP." },
-        { "signal_id": "ml-kem-absent", "rwep_factor": "ai_weaponization", "weight": 5, "notes": "AI-accelerated cryptanalysis tooling exists (CRQC simulation), making the CRQC timeline less speculative." }
+        {
+          "signal_id": "ml-kem-absent",
+          "rwep_factor": "active_exploitation",
+          "weight": 25,
+          "notes": "HNDL is operational — state-level recording is documented. Active exploitation in the recording sense, not yet decryption sense."
+        },
+        {
+          "signal_id": "ml-kem-absent",
+          "rwep_factor": "blast_radius",
+          "weight": 25,
+          "notes": "Affects all TLS-protected flows; blast radius proportional to data sensitivity horizon."
+        },
+        {
+          "signal_id": "sshd-no-pqc-kex",
+          "rwep_factor": "blast_radius",
+          "weight": 20,
+          "notes": "SSH session keys = bastion + lateral movement creds + tunneled traffic."
+        },
+        {
+          "signal_id": "rsa-2048-cert-long-life",
+          "rwep_factor": "blast_radius",
+          "weight": 20,
+          "notes": "Certificate chain compromise on CRQC day collapses authentication for long-retention data."
+        },
+        {
+          "signal_id": "openssl-pre-3-5",
+          "rwep_factor": "patch_available",
+          "weight": -10,
+          "notes": "Upgrade path is available; patch_available reduces RWEP."
+        },
+        {
+          "signal_id": "ml-kem-absent",
+          "rwep_factor": "ai_weaponization",
+          "weight": 5,
+          "notes": "AI-accelerated cryptanalysis tooling exists (CRQC simulation), making the CRQC timeline less speculative."
+        }
       ],
       "blast_radius_model": {
         "scope_question": "If an adversary records this host's TLS/SSH traffic today and decrypts it on the CRQC day (mid-2030s), what scope of compromise is the host realistically delivering?",
         "scoring_rubric": [
-          { "condition": "host handles only ephemeral data with < 1-year sensitivity horizon (e.g. transient CI worker, dev sandbox)", "blast_radius_score": 1, "description": "Data is stale by CRQC day; recorded handshake yields nothing valuable." },
-          { "condition": "host handles internal corporate data, 1-3 year sensitivity horizon", "blast_radius_score": 2, "description": "Some recorded data valuable on CRQC day; embarrassment + competitive cost." },
-          { "condition": "host handles personal data (GDPR / HIPAA / PCI), 3-10 year retention", "blast_radius_score": 3, "description": "Recorded PII / PHI / cardholder data decryptable on CRQC day → notification obligations on a delayed clock that the framework does not yet contemplate." },
-          { "condition": "host handles financial transaction logs, long-retention healthcare records, IP/trade secrets, 10-25 year sensitivity", "blast_radius_score": 4, "description": "Massive long-tail decryption event; significant material loss + regulatory action." },
-          { "condition": "host handles classified, state-sensitive, biometric template, or generational sensitivity data (25+ year horizon)", "blast_radius_score": 5, "description": "Strategic compromise on CRQC day; loss is irreversible and category-defining." }
+          {
+            "condition": "host handles only ephemeral data with < 1-year sensitivity horizon (e.g. transient CI worker, dev sandbox)",
+            "blast_radius_score": 1,
+            "description": "Data is stale by CRQC day; recorded handshake yields nothing valuable."
+          },
+          {
+            "condition": "host handles internal corporate data, 1-3 year sensitivity horizon",
+            "blast_radius_score": 2,
+            "description": "Some recorded data valuable on CRQC day; embarrassment + competitive cost."
+          },
+          {
+            "condition": "host handles personal data (GDPR / HIPAA / PCI), 3-10 year retention",
+            "blast_radius_score": 3,
+            "description": "Recorded PII / PHI / cardholder data decryptable on CRQC day → notification obligations on a delayed clock that the framework does not yet contemplate."
+          },
+          {
+            "condition": "host handles financial transaction logs, long-retention healthcare records, IP/trade secrets, 10-25 year sensitivity",
+            "blast_radius_score": 4,
+            "description": "Massive long-tail decryption event; significant material loss + regulatory action."
+          },
+          {
+            "condition": "host handles classified, state-sensitive, biometric template, or generational sensitivity data (25+ year horizon)",
+            "blast_radius_score": 5,
+            "description": "Strategic compromise on CRQC day; loss is irreversible and category-defining."
+          }
         ]
       },
       "compliance_theater_check": {
@@ -497,51 +656,87 @@
         }
       ],
       "escalation_criteria": [
-        { "condition": "blast_radius_score >= 4 AND ml-kem-absent == true", "action": "raise_severity" },
-        { "condition": "rwep >= 75 AND data_sensitivity_horizon_years >= 10", "action": "page_on_call" },
-        { "condition": "blast_radius_score >= 4", "action": "trigger_playbook", "target_playbook": "framework" },
-        { "condition": "compliance_theater_check.verdict == 'theater' AND jurisdiction_obligations contains 'EU'", "action": "notify_legal" }
+        {
+          "condition": "blast_radius_score >= 4 AND ml-kem-absent == true",
+          "action": "raise_severity"
+        },
+        {
+          "condition": "rwep >= 75 AND data_sensitivity_horizon_years >= 10",
+          "action": "page_on_call"
+        },
+        {
+          "condition": "blast_radius_score >= 4",
+          "action": "trigger_playbook",
+          "target_playbook": "framework"
+        },
+        {
+          "condition": "compliance_theater_check.verdict == 'theater' AND jurisdiction_obligations contains 'EU'",
+          "action": "notify_legal"
+        }
       ]
     },
-
     "validate": {
       "remediation_paths": [
         {
           "id": "openssl-upgrade-to-3-5",
           "description": "Upgrade OpenSSL to >= 3.5 (or install oqsprovider on 3.x). Enable ML-KEM-768 in default TLS groups.",
-          "preconditions": ["distro_package_for_openssl_3_5_available == true OR oqsprovider_packageable == true", "system_libssl_upgrade_safe == true"],
+          "preconditions": [
+            "distro_package_for_openssl_3_5_available == true OR oqsprovider_packageable == true",
+            "system_libssl_upgrade_safe == true"
+          ],
           "priority": 1,
-          "compensating_controls": ["pin classical-only group fallback for legacy peers via per-service override"],
+          "compensating_controls": [
+            "pin classical-only group fallback for legacy peers via per-service override"
+          ],
           "estimated_time_hours": 3
         },
         {
           "id": "enable-hybrid-tls-groups",
           "description": "Configure each TLS-serving process to prefer X25519MLKEM768 (or X25519Kyber768Draft00 if oqsprovider). Set ssl_ecdh_curve nginx / SSLOpenSSLConfCmd apache / ssl-default-bind-curves haproxy.",
-          "preconditions": ["openssl_supports_ml_kem == true", "ops_authorization_for_service_restart == true"],
+          "preconditions": [
+            "openssl_supports_ml_kem == true",
+            "ops_authorization_for_service_restart == true"
+          ],
           "priority": 2,
-          "compensating_controls": ["client_compat_canary_for_each_service", "monitoring_for_negotiation_failures"],
+          "compensating_controls": [
+            "client_compat_canary_for_each_service",
+            "monitoring_for_negotiation_failures"
+          ],
           "estimated_time_hours": 2
         },
         {
           "id": "ssh-add-hybrid-kex",
           "description": "Update sshd_config KexAlgorithms to prepend sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com (and mlkem768x25519-sha256 on OpenSSH >= 9.6).",
-          "preconditions": ["openssh_>=_9_0", "operator_authorized_for_sshd_change == true"],
+          "preconditions": [
+            "openssh_>=_9_0",
+            "operator_authorized_for_sshd_change == true"
+          ],
           "priority": 3,
-          "compensating_controls": ["bastion_session_recording_for_legacy_kex_fallback", "monitoring_for_kex_negotiation_downgrades"],
+          "compensating_controls": [
+            "bastion_session_recording_for_legacy_kex_fallback",
+            "monitoring_for_kex_negotiation_downgrades"
+          ],
           "estimated_time_hours": 1
         },
         {
           "id": "reissue-long-life-certs-hybrid",
           "description": "For every cert with > 10-year data-sensitivity horizon: re-issue with hybrid signature (ML-DSA or SLH-DSA + ECDSA) using publicly-trusted CA hybrid root or internal CA with hybrid cross-signing.",
-          "preconditions": ["ca_supports_hybrid_signatures == true OR internal_ca_can_be_extended == true"],
+          "preconditions": [
+            "ca_supports_hybrid_signatures == true OR internal_ca_can_be_extended == true"
+          ],
           "priority": 4,
-          "compensating_controls": ["legacy_chain_for_pre-PQC_client_compat", "transparency_log_entries_for_hybrid_certs"],
+          "compensating_controls": [
+            "legacy_chain_for_pre-PQC_client_compat",
+            "transparency_log_entries_for_hybrid_certs"
+          ],
           "estimated_time_hours": 16
         },
         {
           "id": "establish-crypto-inventory",
           "description": "Build a per-asset cryptographic inventory with sensitivity horizon, current algorithm, PQC migration target, sunset date. Satisfies NIS2 Art.21(2)(h) maintenance obligation.",
-          "preconditions": ["asset_inventory_baseline_exists == true"],
+          "preconditions": [
+            "asset_inventory_baseline_exists == true"
+          ],
           "priority": 5,
           "compensating_controls": [],
           "estimated_time_hours": 40
@@ -549,9 +744,16 @@
         {
           "id": "policy-exception",
           "description": "If a specific asset cannot reach hybrid PQC in this cycle (legacy hardware, embedded HSM without PQC firmware, vendor SaaS): generate auditor-ready policy exception with crypto-agility roadmap.",
-          "preconditions": ["remediation_paths[1..5] blocked for the specific asset", "ciso_acceptance_obtainable == true"],
+          "preconditions": [
+            "remediation_paths[1..5] blocked for the specific asset",
+            "ciso_acceptance_obtainable == true"
+          ],
           "priority": 6,
-          "compensating_controls": ["network_segmentation_to_limit_handshake_exposure", "vpn_pqc_tunnel_overlay", "shortened_retention_for_classical-protected_data"],
+          "compensating_controls": [
+            "network_segmentation_to_limit_handshake_exposure",
+            "vpn_pqc_tunnel_overlay",
+            "shortened_retention_for_classical-protected_data"
+          ],
           "estimated_time_hours": 8
         }
       ],
@@ -597,47 +799,91 @@
         "risk": "Even with hybrid PQC enabled, legacy peers may downgrade to classical groups during compatibility windows; certain assets (vendor SaaS, embedded HSM, legacy protocols) may not be migratable in this cycle and remain HNDL-recordable.",
         "why_remains": "PQC migration is multi-year. Hybrid KEX is the only configuration where the encrypted material is safe against the CRQC adversary; classical-fallback paths preserve interop but reopen the recording window. Some assets have no PQC migration path until vendor firmware lands. Crypto-agility (the ability to swap algorithms without re-architecting) is an org-wide investment, not a single fix.",
         "acceptance_level": "ciso",
-        "compensating_controls_in_place": ["network_segmentation_for_classical-only_assets", "shortened_retention_where_feasible", "transparency_monitoring_of_handshake_negotiation_for_downgrade_detection", "annual_crypto-agility_program_review"]
+        "compensating_controls_in_place": [
+          "network_segmentation_for_classical-only_assets",
+          "shortened_retention_where_feasible",
+          "transparency_monitoring_of_handshake_negotiation_for_downgrade_detection",
+          "annual_crypto-agility_program_review"
+        ]
       },
       "evidence_requirements": [
         {
           "evidence_type": "scan_report",
           "description": "TLS handshake test results showing hybrid group negotiated on each production TLS endpoint; sshd KEX negotiation showing PQC hybrid; openssl list -kem-algorithms output.",
           "retention_period": "7_years",
-          "framework_satisfied": ["nist-800-53-SC-8", "nist-800-53-SC-13", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24", "pci-dss-4-4.2.1", "nis2-art21-2h", "dora-art9"]
+          "framework_satisfied": [
+            "nist-800-53-SC-8",
+            "nist-800-53-SC-13",
+            "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24",
+            "pci-dss-4-4.2.1",
+            "nis2-art21-2h",
+            "dora-art9"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "evidence_type": "config_diff",
           "description": "Before/after diffs of openssl.cnf, sshd_config, nginx/apache/haproxy ssl config showing hybrid group preference, plus change-management approval reference.",
           "retention_period": "7_years",
-          "framework_satisfied": ["nist-800-53-CM-3", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.32"]
+          "framework_satisfied": [
+            "nist-800-53-CM-3",
+            "iso-27001-2022-A.8.32"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "evidence_type": "attestation",
           "description": "Cryptographic asset inventory snapshot (signed) showing per-asset current algorithm, sensitivity horizon, PQC migration target, classical sunset date.",
           "retention_period": "7_years",
-          "framework_satisfied": ["nis2-art21-2h", "dora-art9", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24", "us-omb-m-23-02"]
+          "framework_satisfied": [
+            "nis2-art21-2h",
+            "dora-art9",
+            "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24",
+            "us-omb-m-23-02"
+          ]
         },
         {
           "evidence_type": "scan_report",
           "description": "Certificate-store audit report identifying long-retention certs and their signature algorithms before and after hybrid re-issuance.",
           "retention_period": "audit_cycle",
-          "framework_satisfied": ["nist-800-53-SC-12", "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24"]
+          "framework_satisfied": [
+            "nist-800-53-SC-12",
+            "iso-27001-2022-A.8.24"
+          ]
         }
       ],
       "regression_trigger": [
-        { "condition": "new_openssh_release == true", "interval": "on_event" },
-        { "condition": "new_openssl_release == true", "interval": "on_event" },
-        { "condition": "FIPS_203_or_204_or_205_amendment", "interval": "on_event" },
-        { "condition": "new_NIST_PQC_standard_published", "interval": "on_event" },
-        { "condition": "quarterly", "interval": "90d" }
+        {
+          "condition": "new_openssh_release == true",
+          "interval": "on_event"
+        },
+        {
+          "condition": "new_openssl_release == true",
+          "interval": "on_event"
+        },
+        {
+          "condition": "FIPS_203_or_204_or_205_amendment",
+          "interval": "on_event"
+        },
+        {
+          "condition": "new_NIST_PQC_standard_published",
+          "interval": "on_event"
+        },
+        {
+          "condition": "quarterly",
+          "interval": "90d"
+        }
       ]
     },
-
     "close": {
       "evidence_package": {
         "bundle_format": "csaf-2.0",
-        "contents": ["scan_report", "config_diff", "attestation", "framework_gap_mapping", "compliance_theater_verdict", "residual_risk_statement"],
+        "contents": [
+          "scan_report",
+          "config_diff",
+          "attestation",
+          "framework_gap_mapping",
+          "compliance_theater_verdict",
+          "residual_risk_statement"
+        ],
         "destination": "local_only",
         "signed": true
       },
@@ -649,42 +895,66 @@
           "framework_gap": "NIST 800-53 has not amended SC-8/SC-13 with PQC sub-controls despite FIPS 203/204/205 finalization in 2024-08. ISO 27001:2022 (pre-PQC) has no PQC language and no scheduled amendment. PCI Council and EU regulators publicly aware but have not amended binding controls. Lag = ~180 days behind PQC operational readiness and 4-8+ years behind the CRQC horizon.",
           "new_control_requirement": "Add a 'cryptographic algorithm currency' sub-control across SC-8, SC-13, A.8.24, §3.6, §4.2.1, Art.21(2)(h), Art.9 requiring: (a) per-asset cryptographic inventory with sensitivity horizon, (b) hybrid PQC mandatory for new deployments protecting data with horizon > 5 years, (c) algorithm sunset dates documented per asset, (d) crypto-agility built into design (algorithm swap without re-architecting), (e) annual review against current NIST PQC publication state."
         },
-        "feeds_back_to_skills": ["pqc-first", "framework-gap-analysis", "compliance-theater", "global-grc", "zeroday-gap-learn"]
+        "feeds_back_to_skills": [
+          "pqc-first",
+          "framework-gap-analysis",
+          "compliance-theater",
+          "global-grc",
+          "zeroday-gap-learn"
+        ]
       },
       "notification_actions": [
         {
           "obligation_ref": "EU/NIS2 Art.21(2)(h) 720h",
           "deadline": "computed_at_runtime",
           "recipient": "internal_legal",
-          "evidence_attached": ["cryptographic_asset_inventory", "pqc_migration_plan", "algorithm_sunset_tracking"],
+          "evidence_attached": [
+            "cryptographic_asset_inventory",
+            "pqc_migration_plan",
+            "algorithm_sunset_tracking"
+          ],
           "draft_notification": "NIS2 Art.21(2)(h) cryptographic inventory submission: ${entity_name} maintains a cryptographic asset inventory dated ${inventory_date}. PQC migration plan with timelines and per-asset sunset dates is attached. Current state: ${total_assets} cryptographic assets inventoried; ${hybrid_pqc_count} hybrid PQC enabled; ${classical_only_count} classical-only with documented sunset dates. Re-attestation cadence: ${cadence}."
         },
         {
           "obligation_ref": "EU/DORA Art.9 720h",
           "deadline": "computed_at_runtime",
           "recipient": "internal_legal",
-          "evidence_attached": ["cryptographic_resilience_assessment", "key_management_attestation", "pqc_readiness_status"],
+          "evidence_attached": [
+            "cryptographic_resilience_assessment",
+            "key_management_attestation",
+            "pqc_readiness_status"
+          ],
           "draft_notification": "DORA Art.9 cryptographic resilience submission: ${entity_name} (financial entity) attests cryptographic resilience per Art.9. PQC readiness: ${pqc_readiness_summary}. Key management: ${km_summary}. HNDL exposure: ${hndl_exposure_summary}; remediation ETA: ${remediation_eta}."
         },
         {
           "obligation_ref": "EU/NIS2 Art.23 24h",
           "deadline": "computed_at_runtime",
           "recipient": "internal_legal",
-          "evidence_attached": ["confirmed_hndl_exposure", "affected_data_sensitivity_horizon", "interim_mitigation_record"],
+          "evidence_attached": [
+            "confirmed_hndl_exposure",
+            "affected_data_sensitivity_horizon",
+            "interim_mitigation_record"
+          ],
           "draft_notification": "NIS2 Art.23 24-hour early warning (where applicable): Confirmed HNDL exposure detected on ${affected_systems}. Data sensitivity horizon: ${horizon_years} years. Interim mitigation: ${mitigation_status}. Note: HNDL is a delayed-decryption threat; the breach realisation event is CRQC, not detection. This notification is precautionary."
         },
         {
           "obligation_ref": "US/OMB M-23-02 8760h",
           "deadline": "computed_at_runtime",
           "recipient": "internal_legal",
-          "evidence_attached": ["federal_pqc_inventory", "annual_migration_progress_report"],
+          "evidence_attached": [
+            "federal_pqc_inventory",
+            "annual_migration_progress_report"
+          ],
           "draft_notification": "OMB M-23-02 annual PQC migration inventory: ${federal_entity} reports ${total_assets} cryptographic assets inventoried, ${hybrid_pqc_count} migrated to PQC, ${migration_eta_summary}. Per CNSA 2.0 binding deadline of 2030, current trajectory: ${on_track_or_off_track}."
         },
         {
           "obligation_ref": "AU/APRA CPS 234 72h",
           "deadline": "computed_at_runtime",
           "recipient": "regulator_email",
-          "evidence_attached": ["materiality_assessment", "remediation_completed_evidence"],
+          "evidence_attached": [
+            "materiality_assessment",
+            "remediation_completed_evidence"
+          ],
           "draft_notification": "APRA CPS 234 notification (where remediation deemed material): cryptographic exposure remediation completed for ${affected_systems}. Materiality determination: ${materiality_justification}. Remediation summary: ${remediation_summary}."
         }
       ],
@@ -693,7 +963,14 @@
         "exception_template": {
           "scope": "Asset(s) ${asset_list} cannot reach hybrid PQC posture within this remediation cycle. Blocking factors: ${blocking_factors} (e.g. legacy HSM firmware lacking PQC, vendor SaaS without PQC support, embedded device firmware end-of-life).",
           "duration": "until_vendor_patch",
-          "compensating_controls": ["network_segmentation_isolating_classical-only_handshake_from_long-retention_data_flows", "vpn_pqc_tunnel_overlay_for_traffic_to/from_affected_assets", "shortened_retention_policy_for_data_protected_only_by_classical_crypto", "transparency_monitoring_of_handshake_negotiation_alerting_on_downgrade", "annual_crypto-agility_review", "vendor_pqc_roadmap_tracking"],
+          "compensating_controls": [
+            "network_segmentation_isolating_classical-only_handshake_from_long-retention_data_flows",
+            "vpn_pqc_tunnel_overlay_for_traffic_to/from_affected_assets",
+            "shortened_retention_policy_for_data_protected_only_by_classical_crypto",
+            "transparency_monitoring_of_handshake_negotiation_alerting_on_downgrade",
+            "annual_crypto-agility_review",
+            "vendor_pqc_roadmap_tracking"
+          ],
           "risk_acceptance_owner": "ciso",
           "auditor_ready_language": "Pursuant to ${framework_id} ${control_id} (Cryptographic Protection / Use of Cryptography / Cryptographic Resilience), the organization documents a time-bound risk acceptance for asset(s) ${asset_list} that cannot reach hybrid post-quantum cryptography posture within the current remediation cycle. The accepted risk class is harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL): adversaries with traffic-recording capability today may decrypt recorded handshakes on the cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) date, currently estimated at 2030-2035 per aggressive academic cryptanalysis and 2035-2040 per conservative industry assessment. The organization accepts that current framework controls (NIST 800-53 SC-8/SC-13, ISO 27001:2022 A.8.24/A.8.25, PCI DSS 4.0 §3.6/§4.2.1, NIS2 Art.21(2)(h), DORA Art.9, EU CRA Annex I) define 'strong cryptography' against a classical threat model and do not require PQC, that this gap is documented in ${exceptd_framework_gap_mapping_ref}, and that the organization's compensating controls during the exception window are: ${compensating_controls}. Crypto-agility roadmap: ${crypto_agility_roadmap}. Risk accepted by ${ciso_name} on ${acceptance_date}. Time-bound until ${duration_expiry} (vendor PQC firmware publication, sensitivity-horizon expiry of protected data, OR ${default_180d_expiry}, whichever is first). Re-evaluation triggers: vendor publishes PQC support, NIST issues PQC amendment to 800-53, new CRQC estimate published in peer-reviewed cryptanalysis literature, OR scheduled expiry."
         }
@@ -705,22 +982,27 @@
       }
     }
   },
-
   "directives": [
     {
       "id": "all-crypto-pqc-readiness",
       "title": "Full PQC readiness audit across TLS libraries, SSH, certificate store, and cryptographic policy",
-      "applies_to": { "always": true }
+      "applies_to": {
+        "always": true
+      }
     },
     {
       "id": "hndl-active-recording-investigation",
       "title": "HNDL active-recording threat investigation (T1040 / T1557)",
-      "applies_to": { "attack_technique": "T1040" }
+      "applies_to": {
+        "attack_technique": "T1040"
+      }
     },
     {
       "id": "tls-encrypted-channel-pqc",
       "title": "T1573 — Encrypted Channel readiness against CRQC adversary",
-      "applies_to": { "attack_technique": "T1573" }
+      "applies_to": {
+        "attack_technique": "T1573"
+      }
     }
   ]
 }