@blamejs/core 0.9.40 → 0.9.41

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package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
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  ## v0.9.x
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+ - v0.9.41 (2026-05-15) — **Operator-friction ergonomic helpers surfaced from downstream-consumer gap audit.** Three small additive surfaces, no behavior change for existing callers. (1) **`b.storage.listBackends()`** now surfaces `rootDir` for local-protocol backends, sourced from the live backend (with config-reload propagation) so downstream path-traversal guards + scratch-dir derivation read the canonical path directly from the framework instead of re-deriving from operator-supplied opts. Remote protocols (sigv4 / gcs / azure-blob / http-put) don't carry a rootDir; the field stays absent for those. (2) **`b.problemDetails.send(res, fields)`** — bare wire-shape emit shortcut that lets routes migrate incrementally from inline `res.status(400).json({ error: ... })` to RFC 9457 problem-details without restructuring the handler around an error throw. Equivalent to `respond(res, create(fields))` in one call; same `application/problem+json` content type + `Cache-Control: no-store`. (3) **`b.mail.send` CR/LF/NUL refusal** confirmed already in place at `lib/mail.js:275` / `:309` / `:1808` per RFC 5321 §2.3.8 + RFC 5322 §3.2.5 header-injection defense — operators with inline `validateEmailAddr` wrappers can retire them. No new API, just confirmation that the existing primitive already covers the wire-protocol injection class (CVE-2026-32178 .NET System.Net.Mail header injection defended at the framework boundary).
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  - v0.9.40 (2026-05-15) — **`b.guardListId` — RFC 2919 List-Id header validator.** Companion to v0.9.39 `b.guardListUnsubscribe`; gates outbound mailing-list mail so the List-Id carries a well-formed identifier downstream filters + bulk-sender pipelines reliably route on. (1) **`b.guardListId.validate(headerValue, opts?)`** — parses bracketed (`<my-list.example.com>`), phrase-prefixed (`My Newsletter <my-list.example.com>`), and bare-identifier forms per RFC 2919 §2. Returns `{ action, listId, label, namespace, phrase, reason }`. Action one of `accept` / `refuse`. (2) **RFC 2919 §3 caps + ABNF** — list-id capped at 255 octets; header value capped at RFC 5322 §2.1.1 line cap (998 bytes); per-label shape per RFC 5322 §3.2.3 dot-atom-text. (3) **Phrase-smuggling defense** — phrase MUST NOT contain `<` / `>` (would smuggle a second bracketed identifier through the parser). Trailing content after `>` refused. Nested or unmatched brackets refused. (4) **CRLF / NUL / C0 / DEL refusal** — header-injection defense per RFC 5322 §3.2.5 + CVE-2026-32178 wire-protocol surface class. (5) **`localhost` namespace handling** (RFC 2919 §3) — strict requires the recommended 32-hex random component in the label (the SHOULD becomes operator-strict for HIPAA / PCI / GDPR / SOC2 postures); balanced / permissive accept without. (6) **FQDN namespace enforcement** under strict / balanced — list-id with single-label namespace (e.g. `mylist.test`) refused unless permissive. (7) Heuristic label / namespace split — last 2 dot-segments → namespace (matches typical DNS delegation); consumers needing PSL-accurate org-domain extraction compose `b.publicSuffix.organizationalDomain`. Three profiles + posture cascade (hipaa / pci-dss / gdpr / soc2 → strict). Fuzz harness ships in `fuzz/guard-list-id.fuzz.js`. Registered as standalone guard with `KIND="list-id"`. Threat-model: List-Id forging (RFC 2919 §8 explicitly notes the identifier is NOT an authentication signal; operators wanting authentication compose b.mail.auth.dmarc / arc.verify), bulk-sender bucket-drop (Gmail 2024 keys on List-Id presence for Precedence: list / 5000+ daily-send mail).
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  - v0.9.39 (2026-05-15) — **`b.guardListUnsubscribe` — RFC 2369 + RFC 8058 List-Unsubscribe / List-Unsubscribe-Post validator.** Gates the outbound submission path so messages carrying a List-Id (or any mailing-list shape) emit headers Gmail / Yahoo / Outlook one-click unsubscribe machinery actually accepts. (1) **`b.guardListUnsubscribe.validate({ listUnsubscribe, listUnsubscribePost }, opts?)`** — returns `{ action, reason, uris, hasHttpsUri, hasMailtoUri, postHeaderOk, oneClickReady }`. (2) **Gmail / Yahoo bulk-sender 2024 enforcement** — under strict requires at least one `https://` URI in the header (mailto: alone refused) + the paired `List-Unsubscribe-Post: List-Unsubscribe=One-Click` value EXACTLY (case-sensitive — Gmail silently fails one-click on mixed-case variants). (3) **Always-refused schemes** — `javascript:` / `data:` / `file:` / `vbscript:` / `blob:` refused regardless of profile (XSS / file-read class in mail-client rendering). (4) **`http://` refused under strict / balanced** — one-click endpoint MUST be TLS per RFC 8058 §2. Permissive accepts http for audit-only legacy use. (5) **Header-injection defense** — CRLF, NUL, C0 controls, DEL refused at validate time (RFC 5322 §3.2.5). (6) **Bounded surface** — per-URI byte cap (2 KiB strict / 4 KiB permissive), URI-count cap (4 / 8 / 16), header total byte cap (4 / 4 / 8 KiB). RFC 3986 §3.1 scheme shape; RFC 2369 §3.1 angle-bracket URI list. HTTPS URIs validated through `b.safeUrl.parse` with the framework's HTTPS allowlist. Three profiles + posture cascade (hipaa / pci-dss / gdpr / soc2 → strict). Fuzz harness ships in `fuzz/guard-list-unsubscribe.fuzz.js`. Registered as a standalone guard with KIND="list-unsubscribe". Threat-model coverage: unsubscribe-link injection via AI-generated newsletter templates, open-redirect via List-Unsubscribe (operator validates target host downstream via own safeRedirect allowlist), mail-client mishandling (Outlook's mailto: auto-fetch history).
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  - v0.9.38 (2026-05-15) — **Re-publish bundle: prefix npm tarball path with `./` so npm doesn't mis-classify it as a git spec.** v0.9.30 and v0.9.37 publish workflow runs both failed at exit 128 — npm 10+ interprets a relative tarball path containing `/` (`dist/blamejs-core-0.9.X.tgz`) as a git spec and attempts `git ls-remote ssh://git@github.com/dist/...tgz`, which the runner's SSH credentials can't auth against. v0.9.29-v0.9.37 never reached npm as a result; v0.9.28 remained the latest published version on the registry. v0.9.38 ships only the workflow path fix (no operator-facing primitive change vs v0.9.37) — operators upgrading from v0.9.28 see the full bundled surface delivered by v0.9.29-v0.9.37: agent.trace + agent.snapshot (v0.9.29 / v0.9.30), safeDns + network.dns.resolver (v0.9.31), guardSmtpCommand (v0.9.32), mail.rbl (v0.9.33), mail.greylist + lib/ip-utils (v0.9.34), mail.helo (v0.9.35), guardEnvelope (v0.9.36), guardDsn (v0.9.37).
@@ -358,6 +358,48 @@ function respond(res, problem) {
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  res.end(body);
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * @primitive b.problemDetails.send
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+ * @signature b.problemDetails.send(res, fields)
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+ * @since 0.9.41
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+ * @status stable
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+ * @related b.problemDetails.create, b.problemDetails.respond
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+ *
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+ * Build + emit a problem-details response in one call. Equivalent
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+ * to `respond(res, create(fields))` but lets routes migrate
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+ * incrementally from inline `res.status(400).json({ error: "..." })`
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+ * shapes without restructuring the handler around an error throw.
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+ *
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+ * The same RFC 9457 §3 `application/problem+json` content type +
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+ * `Cache-Control: no-store` are written; status code defaults to
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+ * 500 when omitted.
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+ *
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+ * @opts
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+ * status: number, // HTTP status code (100..599); default 500
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+ * title: string, // operator-supplied short title
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+ * detail: string, // operator-supplied human-readable explanation
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+ * type: string, // problem-type URI (defaults to "about:blank")
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+ * instance: string, // optional per-occurrence URI
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+ * extensions: object, // operator-specific extension fields
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+ *
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+ * @example
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+ * // Migrating from inline JSON-error shape:
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+ * // res.status(400).json({ error: "Missing 'name' field" });
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+ * // to RFC 9457 problem-details:
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+ * b.problemDetails.send(res, {
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+ * status: 400,
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+ * title: "Missing required field",
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+ * detail: "Body field 'name' is required",
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+ * });
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+ */
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+ function send(res, fields) {
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+ if (!fields || typeof fields !== "object" || Array.isArray(fields)) {
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+ throw new ProblemDetailsError("problem-details/bad-fields",
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+ "send: fields must be a non-null object", true);
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+ }
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+ return respond(res, create(fields));
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+ }
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+
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  /**
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  * @primitive b.problemDetails.validate
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  * @signature b.problemDetails.validate(doc)
@@ -431,6 +473,7 @@ module.exports = {
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  create: create,
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  fromError: fromError,
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  respond: respond,
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+ send: send,
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  validate: validate,
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  RESERVED_FIELDS: RESERVED_FIELDS,
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  ProblemDetailsError: ProblemDetailsError,
package/lib/storage.js CHANGED
@@ -577,13 +577,23 @@ function listBackends() {
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  _requireInit();
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  var out = [];
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  for (var name in backends) {
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- out.push({
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+ var entry = {
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  name: name,
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  protocol: backends[name].protocol,
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  classifications: backends[name].classifications.slice(),
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  residencyTag: backends[name].residencyTag,
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  breakerState: backends[name].breaker.getState(),
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- });
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+ };
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+ // Surface the resolved local rootDir so downstream operators
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+ // building path-traversal guards or scratch-dir layouts read the
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+ // live path (with config-reload propagation) directly from the
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+ // backend rather than re-deriving from operator-supplied opts.
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+ // Remote protocols (sigv4 / gcs / azure-blob / http-put) don't
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+ // have a rootDir; the field stays absent for those.
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+ if (backends[name].protocol === "local" && backends[name].raw && typeof backends[name].raw.rootDir === "string") {
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+ entry.rootDir = backends[name].raw.rootDir;
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+ }
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+ out.push(entry);
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  }
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  return out;
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  }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@blamejs/core",
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- "version": "0.9.40",
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+ "version": "0.9.41",
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  "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
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  "license": "Apache-2.0",
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  "author": "blamejs contributors",
package/sbom.cdx.json CHANGED
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
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  "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
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  "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
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  "specVersion": "1.6",
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- "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:414de146-e066-4e4d-aa72-85cc18e385d6",
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+ "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:2ba814f6-24ab-4017-914e-f9ddba6c50ef",
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  "version": 1,
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  "metadata": {
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- "timestamp": "2026-05-15T11:24:02.385Z",
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+ "timestamp": "2026-05-15T14:40:55.638Z",
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  "lifecycles": [
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  {
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  "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
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  }
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  ],
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  "component": {
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- "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.9.40",
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+ "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.9.41",
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  "type": "library",
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  "name": "blamejs",
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- "version": "0.9.40",
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+ "version": "0.9.41",
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  "scope": "required",
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  "author": "blamejs contributors",
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  "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
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- "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.9.40",
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+ "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.9.41",
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  "properties": [],
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  "externalReferences": [
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  {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
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  "components": [],
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  "dependencies": [
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  {
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- "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.9.40",
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+ "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.9.41",
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  "dependsOn": []
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  }
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  ]