@blamejs/core 0.7.46 → 0.7.48

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.7.x
 
+- **0.7.48** (2026-05-05) — `b.cookies.parseSafe(header, opts)` + `b.middleware.cookies(opts)` — inbound cookie-header threat detection. The existing `b.cookies.parse` is lenient (last-write-wins, silent skip on malformed pairs); `parseSafe` returns `{ jar, issues }` and surfaces every detected anomaly: header-cap (oversized Cookie header), header-control-byte (CR / LF / NUL injected through proxy — header-injection prelude class), pair-malformed (missing `=`), pair-empty-name, name-cap (oversized name), value-cap (oversized value), duplicate-name (cookie-tossing class — same name appearing more than once in one Cookie header indicates an attacker-set parent-domain cookie shadowing the legitimate one). The middleware shape (`b.middleware.cookies({ mode, audit, refuseOnHigh })`) wires `parseSafe` into the request lifecycle: populates `req.cookieJar`, emits one audit row per detected issue, and refuses with HTTP 400 on any high-severity issue when `mode: "enforce"` (default). Existing `b.cookies` invariants (RFC 6265bis token grammar enforcement, `__Host-` / `__Secure-` prefix invariants, SameSite=None requires Secure, `Partitioned` / CHIPS attribute support, length caps on serialize-side) remain unchanged — this slice closes the inbound-detection gap.
+
+- **0.7.47** (2026-05-05) — `b.guardMime` — RFC 6838 media-type identifier-safety primitive (KIND="identifier"). Validates user-supplied media type strings destined for Accept-shape comparison, content-type allowlists, and dispatch routing. Threat catalog: shape malformation (missing `/`, bad type/subtype tokens against RFC 6838 §4.2 restricted-name grammar); parameter validation against the RFC 7231 §3.1.1.1 tchar token grammar (token-only or quoted-string per RFC 7230 §3.2.6); wildcard (`type/subtype` with `*`) outside Accept context refuse; vendor tree (`vnd.*`), personal tree (`prs.*`), and unregistered (`x.*` / `x-*`) namespace audit so operators audit those slots; risky-type refuse list covering executable + script-host content types (`application/x-msdownload`, `application/x-bat`, `application/x-msdos-program`, `application/x-sh`, `application/x-csh`, `application/x-perl`, `application/x-python`, `application/javascript`, `application/x-javascript`, `text/javascript`, `text/x-javascript`, `application/x-shockwave-flash`, `application/x-msi`); BIDI / zero-width / control / null-byte universal refuse. `sanitize` lowercases type/subtype while preserving parameter case (multipart boundary tokens etc. are case-significant). Profiles: `strict` (refuse wildcard + risky-type, audit trees + parameters), `balanced` (audit most things, allow vendor tree), `permissive` (universal-refuse class still refused). Postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `soc2` strict overlay; `gdpr` balanced overlay. Auto-registers into `b.guardAll` as a STANDALONE_GUARD.
+
 - **0.7.46** (2026-05-05) — `b.guardTime` — RFC 3339 / ISO 8601 datetime identifier-safety primitive (KIND="identifier"). Validates user-supplied datetime strings destined for audit timestamps, scheduling, retention windows, query ranges, and cross-system event correlation. Threat catalog: shape malformation against the RFC 3339 §5.6 grammar; year-window overflow (default `[1970, 9999]`); naive datetime (no offset) refuse; non-UTC offset policy (strict requires `Z` / `+00:00`); leap-second `60` field policy (RFC 3339 §5.6 valid but parser-panic prone); excessive fractional precision cap (default 9 digits / nanoseconds); date-only and time-only refuse for full-datetime contexts; structural range violations (month / day-in-month / hour / minute / second); BIDI / zero-width / control / null-byte universal refuse. `sanitize` normalizes a space date/time separator to `T` and uppercases the trailing `z` UTC marker. Profiles: `strict` (refuse all of the above), `balanced` (refuse naive; audit non-UTC + leap + fractional + date/time-only), `permissive` (universal-refuse class still refused). Postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `soc2` strict overlay; `gdpr` balanced overlay. Auto-registers into `b.guardAll` as a STANDALONE_GUARD.
 
 - **0.7.45** (2026-05-05) — `b.guardCidr` — CIDR identifier-safety primitive (KIND="identifier"). Validates user-supplied CIDR notation strings (IPv4 + IPv6) destined for network allowlists, ACLs, security-group rules, and tenant-boundary configuration. Threat catalog: shape malformation, IPv4 octet overflow + leading-zero refuse, IPv6 zero-group ambiguity, mask out-of-range (IPv4 32 / IPv6 128 ceiling), network-address misalignment (host bits set on a non-/32 / non-/128 prefix — common typo class), reserved-range membership covering all the IPv4 RFC 1918 private blocks (`10/8`, `172.16/12`, `192.168/16`) plus loopback `127/8`, link-local `169.254/16`, multicast `224/4`, class-E `240/4`, RFC 5737 documentation `192.0.2/24` + `198.51.100/24` + `203.0.113/24`, benchmarking `198.18/15`, CGNAT `100.64/10`, this-network `0/8`, plus IPv6 loopback `::1`, unspecified `::/128`, ULA `fc00::/7`, link-local `fe80::/10`, multicast `ff00::/8`, documentation `2001:db8::/32`, teredo, deprecated 6to4 `2002::/16`. Includes IPv4-mapped IPv6 dual-stack confusion detection (`::ffff:0:0/96` — CVE-2021-22931 IPv6 variant). Bare-IP-without-mask policy (strict refuses; balanced audits; permissive allows). BIDI / zero-width / control / null-byte universal refuse. Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive`. Postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `soc2` strict overlay; `gdpr` balanced overlay. Auto-registers into `b.guardAll` as a STANDALONE_GUARD.

package/index.js

@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ var guardDomain = require("./lib/guard-domain");
 var guardUuid = require("./lib/guard-uuid");
 var guardCidr = require("./lib/guard-cidr");
 var guardTime = require("./lib/guard-time");
+var guardMime = require("./lib/guard-mime");
 var guardAll = require("./lib/guard-all");
 var ssrfGuard = require("./lib/ssrf-guard");
 var authHeader = require("./lib/auth-header");
@@ -259,6 +260,7 @@ module.exports = {
   guardUuid:        guardUuid,
   guardCidr:        guardCidr,
   guardTime:        guardTime,
+  guardMime:        guardMime,
   guardAll:         guardAll,
   ssrfGuard:        ssrfGuard,
   authHeader:       authHeader,

package/lib/cookies.js

@@ -342,9 +342,126 @@ function create(opts) {
   };
 }
 
+// parseSafe — threat-detecting inbound-cookie parser. Returns
+// { jar, issues } where every detected anomaly surfaces as an issue
+// instead of being silently dropped (as the lenient parse() does).
+//
+// Threat catalog applied to the inbound Cookie header:
+//   - Oversized header — total bytes exceed maxHeaderBytes (default 8 KiB).
+//   - Oversized pair — name + value exceeds NAME_LENGTH + VALUE_LENGTH cap.
+//   - Duplicate cookie name — RFC 6265 last-write-wins is the browser
+//     behavior, but two pairs with the same name in one Cookie header
+//     usually indicates cookie-tossing (attacker-set parent-domain
+//     cookie shadowing the legitimate one).
+//   - Malformed pair — missing `=` or empty name.
+//   - Forbidden chars in raw header — CR / LF / NUL injected through
+//     a downstream proxy.
+//   - Empty / non-string input — operator-misuse signal.
+//
+// Issue shape: { kind, severity: "high"|"warn", snippet, name? }.
+//
+// Operators wire it through `b.middleware.cookies` (the convenience
+// middleware below) or call directly when they want the issues list
+// without imposing a request lifecycle.
+function parseSafe(cookieHeader, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  var maxHeaderBytes = opts.maxHeaderBytes || C.BYTES.kib(8);
+  var maxNameBytes   = opts.maxNameBytes   || MAX_NAME_LENGTH;
+  var maxValueBytes  = opts.maxValueBytes  || MAX_VALUE_LENGTH;
+
+  if (typeof cookieHeader !== "string") {
+    return {
+      jar:    {},
+      issues: [{ kind: "bad-input", severity: "high",
+                 snippet: "cookie header is not a string" }],
+    };
+  }
+  if (cookieHeader.length === 0) return { jar: {}, issues: [] };
+
+  var issues = [];
+  var jar = Object.create(null);
+  var seen = Object.create(null);
+
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(cookieHeader, "utf8") > maxHeaderBytes) {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "header-cap", severity: "high",
+      snippet: "Cookie header " + cookieHeader.length + " bytes exceeds " +
+               "maxHeaderBytes " + maxHeaderBytes,
+    });
+    return { jar: jar, issues: issues };
+  }
+  for (var hi = 0; hi < cookieHeader.length; hi += 1) {
+    var ch = cookieHeader.charCodeAt(hi);
+    if (ch === 0x0D || ch === 0x0A || ch === 0x00) {                             // allow:raw-byte-literal — CR / LF / NUL forbidden in cookie header
+      issues.push({
+        kind: "header-control-byte", severity: "high",
+        snippet: "Cookie header contains CR / LF / NUL — proxy-side " +
+                 "header injection vector",
+      });
+      return { jar: jar, issues: issues };
+    }
+  }
+
+  var pairs = cookieHeader.split(/;\s*/);
+  for (var i = 0; i < pairs.length; i += 1) {
+    var pair = pairs[i];
+    if (!pair) continue;
+    var eq = pair.indexOf("=");
+    if (eq < 0) {
+      issues.push({
+        kind: "pair-malformed", severity: "warn",
+        snippet: "cookie pair " + JSON.stringify(pair) + " missing `=`",
+      });
+      continue;
+    }
+    var k = pair.slice(0, eq).trim();
+    if (!k) {
+      issues.push({
+        kind: "pair-empty-name", severity: "warn",
+        snippet: "cookie pair has empty name",
+      });
+      continue;
+    }
+    var v = pair.slice(eq + 1).trim();
+    if (v.length >= 2 && v.charAt(0) === '"' && v.charAt(v.length - 1) === '"') {
+      v = v.slice(1, -1);
+    }
+    try { v = decodeURIComponent(v); }
+    catch (_e) { /* malformed encoding — keep raw */ }
+
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(k, "utf8") > maxNameBytes) {
+      issues.push({
+        kind: "name-cap", severity: "high", name: k,
+        snippet: "cookie name exceeds maxNameBytes " + maxNameBytes,
+      });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(v, "utf8") > maxValueBytes) {
+      issues.push({
+        kind: "value-cap", severity: "high", name: k,
+        snippet: "cookie `" + k + "` value exceeds maxValueBytes " +
+                 maxValueBytes,
+      });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (seen[k]) {
+      issues.push({
+        kind: "duplicate-name", severity: "high", name: k,
+        snippet: "cookie name `" + k + "` appears more than once — " +
+                 "browser last-write-wins; cookie-tossing class " +
+                 "(parent-domain cookie shadowing the legitimate one)",
+      });
+    }
+    seen[k] = true;
+    jar[k] = v;
+  }
+  return { jar: jar, issues: issues };
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   create:       create,
   parse:        parse,
+  parseSafe:    parseSafe,
   serialize:    serialize,
   CookieError:  CookieError,
 };

package/lib/framework-error.js

@@ -280,6 +280,14 @@ var GuardCidrError        = defineClass("GuardCidrError",        { alwaysPermane
 // refuse, structural range violations (month / day-in-month / hour /
 // minute / second). alwaysPermanent.
 var GuardTimeError        = defineClass("GuardTimeError",        { alwaysPermanent: true });
+// GuardMimeError covers RFC 6838 media-type identifier violations:
+// shape malformation (missing `/`, bad type/subtype tokens), parameter
+// injection (multiple params, bad name/value tokens, malformed quoted-
+// string), wildcard `*/*` outside Accept context, vendor / personal /
+// unregistered tree namespaces, risky-type refuse list (executable +
+// script-host content types), BIDI / zero-width / control / null-byte
+// universal refuse. alwaysPermanent.
+var GuardMimeError        = defineClass("GuardMimeError",        { alwaysPermanent: true });
 // DoraError covers DORA Article 17 incident-reporting workflow errors
 // (classification refusal, report-shape validation, ESA-template
 // generation, audit-chain integration). Permanent — these are
@@ -343,6 +351,7 @@ module.exports = {
   GuardUuidError:         GuardUuidError,
   GuardCidrError:         GuardCidrError,
   GuardTimeError:         GuardTimeError,
+  GuardMimeError:         GuardMimeError,
   DoraError:              DoraError,
   ComplianceError:        ComplianceError,
   SmtpPolicyError:        SmtpPolicyError,

package/lib/guard-all.js

@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ var STANDALONE_GUARDS = [
   require("./guard-uuid"),
   require("./guard-cidr"),
   require("./guard-time"),
+  require("./guard-mime"),
 ];
 
 // Framework-wide profile + posture vocabulary that every guard MUST

package/lib/guard-mime.js

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * guard-mime — Media-type identifier-safety primitive (b.guardMime).
+ *
+ * Validates user-supplied RFC 6838 media type strings destined for
+ * Accept-shape comparison, content-type allowlists, and dispatch
+ * routing. KIND="identifier" — consumes ctx.identifier (or ctx.mime).
+ *
+ * Threat catalog:
+ *   - Shape malformation — not RFC 6838 type/subtype grammar.
+ *   - Bad token characters — RFC 6838 §4.2 restricts type and subtype
+ *     to ALPHA / DIGIT / `!#$&-^_.+`. Spaces / quotes / Unicode reject.
+ *   - Parameter injection — operators sometimes pass through user-
+ *     supplied parameters (`text/plain; charset=...`); the grammar is
+ *     permissive enough to smuggle multiple parameters or bare values.
+ *   - Wildcard `* / *` and `type / *` — only valid in Accept-header
+ *     context; refused as a content-type at strict.
+ *   - Vendor tree without operator opt-in (`application/vnd.<vendor>`)
+ *     — flag at strict so operators audit the vendor namespace.
+ *   - Personal tree (`application/prs.*`) and unregistered (`x.*`) —
+ *     same flag class.
+ *   - Risky types refuse list — `application/x-msdownload`, `.x-bat`,
+ *     `.x-msdos-program`, `.x-sh`, `.x-csh`, `.javascript`,
+ *     `.x-javascript` (when handed off to a script-host).
+ *   - BIDI / zero-width / control / null-byte universal refuse.
+ *
+ *   var rv = b.guardMime.validate("application/json",
+ *                                 { profile: "strict" });
+ *   var safe = b.guardMime.sanitize("Application/JSON; charset=UTF-8",
+ *                                   { profile: "balanced" });
+ *   var g = b.guardMime.gate({ profile: "strict" });
+ */
+
+var codepointClass = require("./codepoint-class");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var gateContract = require("./gate-contract");
+var C = require("./constants");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
+var { GuardMimeError } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
+void observability;
+
+var _err = GuardMimeError.factory;
+
+// RFC 6838 type / subtype grammar. The `restricted-name` allows
+// ALPHA / DIGIT first, then ALPHA / DIGIT / `!#$&-^_.+`. Length cap
+// 127 octets per token.
+var TOKEN_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9!#$&\-^_.+]{0,126}$/;
+
+// Parameter token (RFC 7231 §3.1.1.1): tchar set.
+var PARAM_TOKEN_RE = /^[!#$%&'*+\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]+$/;
+
+// Quoted-string body (between double quotes) per RFC 7230 §3.2.6.
+var QUOTED_STRING_BODY_RE = /^[\t\x20-\x7e]*$/;                                   // allow:raw-byte-literal — printable ASCII range
+
+// Risky-type refuse list (operator-supplied scripts handed to a host).
+var RISKY_TYPES = Object.freeze([
+  "application/x-msdownload",
+  "application/x-bat",
+  "application/x-msdos-program",
+  "application/x-sh",
+  "application/x-csh",
+  "application/x-perl",
+  "application/x-python",
+  "application/javascript",
+  "application/x-javascript",
+  "text/javascript",
+  "text/x-javascript",
+  "application/x-shockwave-flash",
+  "application/x-msi",
+]);
+
+// ---- Profile presets ----
+
+var PROFILES = Object.freeze({
+  "strict": {
+    bidiPolicy:           "reject",
+    controlPolicy:        "reject",
+    nullBytePolicy:       "reject",
+    zeroWidthPolicy:      "reject",
+    wildcardPolicy:       "reject",
+    vendorTreePolicy:     "audit",
+    personalTreePolicy:   "audit",
+    unregisteredTreePolicy: "audit",
+    riskyTypePolicy:      "reject",
+    parameterPolicy:      "audit",
+    maxBytes:             C.BYTES.bytes(255),
+    maxRuntimeMs:         C.TIME.seconds(2),
+  },
+  "balanced": {
+    bidiPolicy:           "reject",
+    controlPolicy:        "reject",
+    nullBytePolicy:       "reject",
+    zeroWidthPolicy:      "reject",
+    wildcardPolicy:       "audit",
+    vendorTreePolicy:     "allow",
+    personalTreePolicy:   "audit",
+    unregisteredTreePolicy: "audit",
+    riskyTypePolicy:      "audit",
+    parameterPolicy:      "audit",
+    maxBytes:             C.BYTES.bytes(255),
+    maxRuntimeMs:         C.TIME.seconds(2),
+  },
+  "permissive": {
+    bidiPolicy:           "reject",                                              // BIDI refused at every profile
+    controlPolicy:        "reject",                                              // controls refused at every profile
+    nullBytePolicy:       "reject",                                              // null refused at every profile
+    zeroWidthPolicy:      "reject",                                              // zero-width refused at every profile
+    wildcardPolicy:       "allow",
+    vendorTreePolicy:     "allow",
+    personalTreePolicy:   "allow",
+    unregisteredTreePolicy: "allow",
+    riskyTypePolicy:      "audit",
+    parameterPolicy:      "allow",
+    maxBytes:             C.BYTES.bytes(255),
+    maxRuntimeMs:         C.TIME.seconds(2),
+  },
+});
+
+var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze(Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
+  mode: "enforce",
+}));
+
+var COMPLIANCE_POSTURES = Object.freeze({
+  "hipaa":   Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
+    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(128),
+  }),
+  "pci-dss": Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
+    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(128),
+  }),
+  "gdpr":    Object.assign({}, PROFILES["balanced"], {
+    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(64),
+  }),
+  "soc2":    Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
+    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(256),
+  }),
+});
+
+function _resolveOpts(opts) {
+  return gateContract.resolveProfileAndPosture(opts, {
+    profiles:           PROFILES,
+    compliancePostures: COMPLIANCE_POSTURES,
+    defaults:           DEFAULTS,
+    errorClass:         GuardMimeError,
+    errCodePrefix:      "mime",
+  });
+}
+
+// ---- Parser ----
+
+function _splitTopLevel(input) {
+  // Returns { typeSubtype, params: [{name, value}], errors: [string] }.
+  // Splits on `;` outside quoted-strings.
+  var parts = [];
+  var inQuote = false;
+  var start = 0;
+  for (var i = 0; i < input.length; i += 1) {
+    var c = input.charAt(i);
+    if (c === '"' && (i === 0 || input.charAt(i - 1) !== "\\")) inQuote = !inQuote;
+    else if (!inQuote && c === ";") {
+      parts.push(input.slice(start, i));
+      start = i + 1;
+    }
+  }
+  parts.push(input.slice(start));
+  parts = parts.map(function (p) { return p.trim(); });
+  return parts;
+}
+
+function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
+  var issues = [];
+  if (typeof input !== "string") {
+    return [{ kind: "bad-input", severity: "high",
+              ruleId: "mime.bad-input",
+              snippet: "mime is not a string" }];
+  }
+  if (input.length === 0) {
+    return [{ kind: "empty", severity: "high",
+              ruleId: "mime.empty",
+              snippet: "mime is empty" }];
+  }
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(input, "utf8") > opts.maxBytes) {
+    return [{ kind: "mime-cap", severity: "high",
+              ruleId: "mime.mime-cap",
+              snippet: "mime input exceeds maxBytes " + opts.maxBytes }];
+  }
+
+  var charThreats = codepointClass.detectCharThreats(input, opts, "mime");
+  for (var ci = 0; ci < charThreats.length; ci += 1) issues.push(charThreats[ci]);
+
+  var parts = _splitTopLevel(input);
+  var typeSubtype = parts[0];
+  var paramParts = parts.slice(1).filter(function (p) { return p.length > 0; });
+
+  // Type/subtype shape.
+  var slashAt = typeSubtype.indexOf("/");
+  if (slashAt === -1) {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "mime-shape", severity: "high",
+      ruleId: "mime.mime-shape",
+      snippet: "missing `/` between type and subtype",
+    });
+    return issues;
+  }
+  var type = typeSubtype.slice(0, slashAt);
+  var subtype = typeSubtype.slice(slashAt + 1);
+
+  // Wildcard policy.
+  if ((type === "*" || subtype === "*") &&
+      opts.wildcardPolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "wildcard",
+      severity: opts.wildcardPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "mime.wildcard",
+      snippet: "wildcard `" + typeSubtype + "` only valid in Accept " +
+               "headers; refused as content-type at strict",
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Token validation per type / subtype.
+  if (type !== "*") {
+    if (!TOKEN_RE.test(type)) {                                                  // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input bounded by maxBytes
+      issues.push({
+        kind: "type-shape", severity: "high",
+        ruleId: "mime.type-shape",
+        snippet: "type `" + type + "` is not a valid RFC 6838 " +
+                 "restricted-name token",
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  if (subtype !== "*") {
+    if (!TOKEN_RE.test(subtype)) {                                               // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input bounded by maxBytes
+      issues.push({
+        kind: "subtype-shape", severity: "high",
+        ruleId: "mime.subtype-shape",
+        snippet: "subtype `" + subtype + "` is not a valid RFC 6838 " +
+                 "restricted-name token",
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Tree-prefix detection.
+  var subtypeLower = subtype.toLowerCase();
+  if (subtypeLower.indexOf("vnd.") === 0 &&
+      opts.vendorTreePolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "vendor-tree",
+      severity: opts.vendorTreePolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "mime.vendor-tree",
+      snippet: "subtype `" + subtype + "` is in the vendor tree " +
+               "(`vnd.*`); audit the vendor namespace",
+    });
+  }
+  if (subtypeLower.indexOf("prs.") === 0 &&
+      opts.personalTreePolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "personal-tree",
+      severity: opts.personalTreePolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "mime.personal-tree",
+      snippet: "subtype `" + subtype + "` is in the personal tree " +
+               "(`prs.*`)",
+    });
+  }
+  if ((subtypeLower.indexOf("x.") === 0 || subtypeLower.indexOf("x-") === 0) &&
+      opts.unregisteredTreePolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "unregistered-tree",
+      severity: opts.unregisteredTreePolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "mime.unregistered-tree",
+      snippet: "subtype `" + subtype + "` is in the unregistered tree " +
+               "(`x.*` / `x-*`)",
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Risky-type refuse list (use lowercased canonical compare).
+  var canonical = (type + "/" + subtype).toLowerCase();
+  if (RISKY_TYPES.indexOf(canonical) !== -1 &&
+      opts.riskyTypePolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "risky-type",
+      severity: opts.riskyTypePolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "mime.risky-type",
+      snippet: "media type `" + canonical + "` is on the risky-type " +
+               "refuse list (executable / script-host class)",
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Parameter validation (all params at once — covers injection class).
+  if (paramParts.length > 0 && opts.parameterPolicy !== "allow") {
+    for (var pi = 0; pi < paramParts.length; pi += 1) {
+      var pp = paramParts[pi];
+      var eqAt = pp.indexOf("=");
+      if (eqAt === -1) {
+        issues.push({
+          kind: "param-shape",
+          severity: opts.parameterPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+          ruleId: "mime.param-shape",
+          snippet: "parameter `" + pp + "` missing `=` value separator",
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
+      var pname = pp.slice(0, eqAt).trim();
+      var pvalue = pp.slice(eqAt + 1).trim();
+      if (!PARAM_TOKEN_RE.test(pname)) {                                         // allow:regex-no-length-cap — name bounded by parameter length within maxBytes
+        issues.push({
+          kind: "param-name",
+          severity: opts.parameterPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+          ruleId: "mime.param-name",
+          snippet: "parameter name `" + pname + "` is not a valid " +
+                   "RFC 7231 §3.1.1.1 tchar token",
+        });
+      }
+      // Value: either a token or a quoted-string.
+      if (pvalue.length === 0) {
+        issues.push({
+          kind: "param-value-empty",
+          severity: opts.parameterPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+          ruleId: "mime.param-value-empty",
+          snippet: "parameter `" + pname + "` has empty value",
+        });
+      } else if (pvalue.charAt(0) === '"' &&
+                 pvalue.charAt(pvalue.length - 1) === '"') {
+        var inner = pvalue.slice(1, -1);
+        if (!QUOTED_STRING_BODY_RE.test(inner)) {                                // allow:regex-no-length-cap — value bounded within maxBytes
+          issues.push({
+            kind: "param-value-shape",
+            severity: opts.parameterPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+            ruleId: "mime.param-value-shape",
+            snippet: "parameter `" + pname + "` quoted-string contains " +
+                     "non-printable bytes (RFC 7230 §3.2.6)",
+          });
+        }
+      } else if (!PARAM_TOKEN_RE.test(pvalue)) {                                 // allow:regex-no-length-cap — value bounded within maxBytes
+        issues.push({
+          kind: "param-value-shape",
+          severity: opts.parameterPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+          ruleId: "mime.param-value-shape",
+          snippet: "parameter `" + pname + "` value `" + pvalue + "` " +
+                   "is not a valid token or quoted-string",
+        });
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return issues;
+}
+
+function validate(input, opts) {
+  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
+  numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts,
+    ["maxBytes"],
+    "guardMime.validate", GuardMimeError, "mime.bad-opt");
+  if (typeof input !== "string") {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      issues: [{ kind: "bad-input", severity: "high",
+                 ruleId: "mime.bad-input",
+                 snippet: "mime is not a string" }],
+    };
+  }
+  return gateContract.aggregateIssues(_detectIssues(input, opts));
+}
+
+function sanitize(input, opts) {
+  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
+  if (typeof input !== "string") {
+    throw _err("mime.bad-input", "sanitize requires string input");
+  }
+  var issues = _detectIssues(input, opts);
+  for (var i = 0; i < issues.length; i += 1) {
+    if (issues[i].severity === "critical" || issues[i].severity === "high") {
+      throw _err(issues[i].ruleId || "mime.refused",
+        "guardMime.sanitize: " + issues[i].snippet);
+    }
+  }
+  // Normalize: lowercase the type/subtype; preserve parameter case
+  // because some parameter values are case-significant (e.g. boundary
+  // tokens in multipart/form-data).
+  var parts = _splitTopLevel(input);
+  var canonical = parts[0].toLowerCase();
+  return parts.slice(1).reduce(function (acc, p) {
+    return acc + "; " + p;
+  }, canonical);
+}
+
+function gate(opts) {
+  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
+  return gateContract.buildGuardGate(
+    opts.name || "guardMime:" + (opts.profile || "default"),
+    opts,
+    async function (ctx) {
+      var identifier = ctx && (ctx.identifier || ctx.mime || "");
+      if (!identifier) return { ok: true, action: "serve" };
+      var rv = validate(identifier, opts);
+      if (rv.issues.length === 0) return { ok: true, action: "serve" };
+      var hasCritical = rv.issues.some(function (i) {
+        return i.severity === "critical";
+      });
+      var hasHigh = rv.issues.some(function (i) {
+        return i.severity === "high";
+      });
+      if (!hasCritical && !hasHigh) {
+        return { ok: true, action: "audit-only", issues: rv.issues };
+      }
+      return { ok: false, action: "refuse", issues: rv.issues };
+    });
+}
+
+var buildProfile = gateContract.makeProfileBuilder(PROFILES);
+
+function compliancePosture(name) {
+  return gateContract.lookupCompliancePosture(name, COMPLIANCE_POSTURES,
+    _err, "mime");
+}
+
+var _mimeRulePacks = gateContract.makeRulePackLoader(GuardMimeError, "mime");
+var loadRulePack = _mimeRulePacks.load;
+
+module.exports = {
+  // ---- guard-* family registry exports ----
+  NAME:                "mime",
+  KIND:                "identifier",
+  INTEGRATION_FIXTURES: Object.freeze({
+    kind:              "identifier",
+    benignBytes:       Buffer.from("application/json", "utf8"),
+    hostileBytes:      Buffer.from("application/x-msdownload", "utf8"),
+    benignIdentifier:  "application/json",
+    // Hostile: risky-type — refused at strict (executable script-host
+    // class).
+    hostileIdentifier: "application/x-msdownload",
+  }),
+  // ---- primitive surface ----
+  validate:            validate,
+  sanitize:            sanitize,
+  gate:                gate,
+  buildProfile:        buildProfile,
+  compliancePosture:   compliancePosture,
+  loadRulePack:        loadRulePack,
+  PROFILES:            PROFILES,
+  DEFAULTS:            DEFAULTS,
+  COMPLIANCE_POSTURES: COMPLIANCE_POSTURES,
+  GuardMimeError:      GuardMimeError,
+};

package/lib/middleware/cookies.js

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.middleware.cookies — inbound cookie-header threat detection.
+ *
+ * Sits in the request lifecycle and runs `b.cookies.parseSafe` against
+ * the inbound `Cookie` header. Threat detection always-on; the gate
+ * either refuses, audits, or logs the detected anomalies based on the
+ * operator's `mode`.
+ *
+ * Threats surfaced (see lib/cookies.js parseSafe):
+ *   - header-cap        — Cookie header exceeds maxHeaderBytes
+ *   - header-control-byte — CR / LF / NUL injected through proxy
+ *   - pair-malformed    — pair missing `=`
+ *   - pair-empty-name   — empty name
+ *   - name-cap          — cookie name exceeds maxNameBytes
+ *   - value-cap         — cookie value exceeds maxValueBytes
+ *   - duplicate-name    — name appears >1 time (cookie-tossing class)
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ *   - req.cookieJar  — populated with the parsed jar (overwriteable)
+ *   - audit emission — one row per detected high-severity issue
+ *   - response       — refused requests get HTTP 400 + JSON body
+ *
+ *   var middleware = b.middleware.cookies({
+ *     mode:           "enforce",     // "enforce" | "audit-only" | "log-only"
+ *     audit:          b.audit,
+ *     maxHeaderBytes: 8 * 1024,
+ *     refuseOnHigh:   true,          // 400 if any high-severity issue
+ *   });
+ */
+
+var cookies = require("../cookies");
+var lazyRequire = require("../lazy-require");
+
+var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../observability"); });
+void observability;
+
+function _emitAudit(audit, action, outcome, metadata) {
+  if (!audit || typeof audit.safeEmit !== "function") return;
+  try {
+    audit.safeEmit({
+      action:   action,
+      actor:    metadata.actor || { kind: "framework", id: "middleware/cookies" },
+      outcome:  outcome,
+      metadata: metadata,
+    });
+  } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent — observability sink */ }
+}
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  var mode = opts.mode || "enforce";
+  var refuseOnHigh = opts.refuseOnHigh !== false && mode === "enforce";
+  var maxHeaderBytes = opts.maxHeaderBytes;
+  var maxNameBytes = opts.maxNameBytes;
+  var maxValueBytes = opts.maxValueBytes;
+  var audit = opts.audit || null;
+
+  return function cookiesMiddleware(req, res, next) {
+    var header = req && req.headers ? req.headers.cookie : "";
+    var rv = cookies.parseSafe(header || "", {
+      maxHeaderBytes: maxHeaderBytes,
+      maxNameBytes:   maxNameBytes,
+      maxValueBytes:  maxValueBytes,
+    });
+    req.cookieJar = rv.jar;
+
+    if (rv.issues.length === 0) return next();
+
+    var hasHigh = false;
+    for (var i = 0; i < rv.issues.length; i += 1) {
+      var iss = rv.issues[i];
+      if (iss.severity === "high") hasHigh = true;
+      _emitAudit(audit, "middleware.cookies.threat-detected",
+        iss.severity === "high" ? "blocked" : "audit", {
+          kind:    iss.kind,
+          name:    iss.name || null,
+          snippet: iss.snippet,
+          mode:    mode,
+        });
+    }
+
+    if (hasHigh && refuseOnHigh) {
+      res.statusCode = 400;
+      res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({
+        error:  "cookie-threat-detected",
+        issues: rv.issues.map(function (i) {
+          return { kind: i.kind, severity: i.severity };
+        }),
+      }));
+      return;
+    }
+    return next();
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = { create: create };

package/lib/middleware/index.js

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ var bearerAuth = require("./bearer-auth");
 var bodyParser = require("./body-parser");
 var botGuard = require("./bot-guard");
 var compression = require("./compression");
+var cookies = require("./cookies");
 var cors = require("./cors");
 var cspNonce = require("./csp-nonce");
 var csrfProtect = require("./csrf-protect");
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ module.exports = {
   bodyParser:       bodyParser.create,
   health:           health.create,
   compression:      compression.create,
+  cookies:          cookies.create,
   cspNonce:         cspNonce.create,
   sse:              sse.create,
   requestLog:       requestLog.create,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.7.46",
+  "version": "0.7.48",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cyclonedx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:2e0e50c0-9f28-4f7f-9a4e-4be5cb7f3707",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:3da7281a-182d-463b-a5eb-166309f6fa76",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-05-05T21:40:55.433Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-05-05T21:55:22.735Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.46",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.48",
       "type": "library",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.7.46",
+      "version": "0.7.48",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.7.46",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.7.48",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.46",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.48",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]