@blamejs/core 0.7.43 → 0.7.44

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.7.x
 
+- **0.7.44** (2026-05-05) — `b.guardUuid` — UUID identifier-safety primitive (KIND="identifier"). Validates user-supplied UUID strings per RFC 9562 (May 2024, obsoletes RFC 4122). Threat catalog: shape malformation across the four canonical forms (hyphenated 8-4-4-4-12, hyphenless 32-hex, Microsoft GUID braces `{…}`, `urn:uuid:` prefix); RFC 9562 §4.2 unassigned version digits (only 1-8 are defined); non-RFC 4122 variant bits (only the `10xx` high-bits family is the canonical UUID variant); nil UUID §5.9 / max UUID §5.10 sentinel-leak refuse; format policy enforcement (strict default = `hyphenated-only`); BIDI / zero-width / control / null-byte universal refuse via `lib/codepoint-class.js`. `sanitize` returns canonical lowercase hyphenated form (strips braces / urn prefix). Profiles: `strict` (hyphenated-only, refuse all sentinels and non-canonical forms), `balanced` (accept any form, audit sentinels), `permissive` (universal-refuse class still refused). Postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `soc2` strict overlay; `gdpr` balanced overlay. Auto-registers into `b.guardAll` as a STANDALONE_GUARD; the adaptive integration harness picks it up automatically via the KIND="identifier" dispatcher.
+
 - **0.7.43** (2026-05-05) — `b.guardDomain` — domain-name identifier-safety primitive (KIND="identifier"). Validates user-supplied DNS names destined for allowlists, redirect targets, webhook endpoints, email-domain extraction, and CORS origin checks. Threat catalog: RFC 1035 §2.3.4 length caps (63 octets per label, 253 octets per FQDN), RFC 952 / 1123 LDH-rule violations (no leading/trailing hyphen, no `--` at positions 3-4 except `xn--`), IDN homograph mixed-script confusables (Latin / Cyrillic / Greek / Cherokee / Armenian / Han / Hiragana / Katakana / Hangul / Arabic / Hebrew range tables), BIDI / zero-width / control / null universal refuse via `lib/codepoint-class.js` (CVE-2021-42574 Trojan Source class), Punycode A-label malformation (bare `xn--`, double-encoded), RFC 6761 special-use suffix matching (`.localhost` / `.local` / `.invalid` / `.test` / `.onion` / `.alt` / `.home.arpa` / `.internal`), IPv4-as-domain confusion (CVE-2021-22931 — dotted-decimal / octal / hex / long-decimal forms), IPv6 bracket-literal, single-label / TLD-only refuse, wildcard `*` label refuse at every profile, RFC 8552 underscore-service-label policy, DGA Shannon-entropy heuristic for high-entropy long single labels (Mirai / Conficker C2 shape). Profiles: `strict` (Latin-only scripts, refuse-on-everything), `balanced` (audit Punycode, allow major international scripts, audit DGA), `permissive` (universal-refuse class still refused; everything else audit / allow). Compliance postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `soc2` strict overlay; `gdpr` balanced overlay. Auto-registers into `b.guardAll` as a STANDALONE_GUARD; the adaptive integration harness at `test/layer-5-integration/guard-host-integration.test.js` picks it up automatically. Defer-with-condition: full UTS #46 ToASCII / ToUnicode round-trip and Public-Suffix-List boundary enforcement ship behind operator-supplied callbacks (`opts.idnToAscii`, `opts.publicSuffixList`); re-open conditions are documented in the wiki page.
 
 - **0.7.42** (2026-05-05) — gitleaks allowlist for v0.7.28 CHANGELOG doc-snippet false-positive. The v0.7.28 release-notes entry for `b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519` includes a JS-object-literal code example with a `privateKey: mlkemPrivateKey` field; gitleaks' default `generic-api-key` rule fires on the high-entropy content adjacent to the `privateKey:` token, blocking every release-tag CI run since v0.7.38. Allowlisted by commit + fingerprint per the same pattern as the existing `74e627e` entry — surgical suppression of the documented false positive, no broader rule weakening. Working-tree-only or rule-disabling alternatives were rejected: gitleaks' `git`-history scan is the stricter gate (catches secrets that landed and were later removed) and the documented snippet contains no real secret.

package/index.js

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ var guardXml = require("./lib/guard-xml");
 var guardMarkdown = require("./lib/guard-markdown");
 var guardEmail = require("./lib/guard-email");
 var guardDomain = require("./lib/guard-domain");
+var guardUuid = require("./lib/guard-uuid");
 var guardAll = require("./lib/guard-all");
 var ssrfGuard = require("./lib/ssrf-guard");
 var authHeader = require("./lib/auth-header");
@@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ module.exports = {
   guardMarkdown:    guardMarkdown,
   guardEmail:       guardEmail,
   guardDomain:      guardDomain,
+  guardUuid:        guardUuid,
   guardAll:         guardAll,
   ssrfGuard:        ssrfGuard,
   authHeader:       authHeader,

package/lib/framework-error.js

@@ -257,6 +257,13 @@ var GuardEmailError       = defineClass("GuardEmailError",       { alwaysPermane
 // only strings, wildcard labels, RFC 8552 underscore-label misuse, DGA
 // high-entropy labels. alwaysPermanent.
 var GuardDomainError      = defineClass("GuardDomainError",      { alwaysPermanent: true });
+// GuardUuidError covers UUID identifier violations: shape malformation
+// (non-canonical / non-hex), RFC 9562 §4.2 unassigned version digits,
+// non-RFC 4122 variant bits, nil UUID (§5.9) / max UUID (§5.10) sentinel
+// leakage, urn:uuid: + Microsoft GUID braces forms outside the operator's
+// declared formatPolicy, BIDI / zero-width / control-byte / null-byte
+// universal refuse. alwaysPermanent.
+var GuardUuidError        = defineClass("GuardUuidError",        { alwaysPermanent: true });
 // DoraError covers DORA Article 17 incident-reporting workflow errors
 // (classification refusal, report-shape validation, ESA-template
 // generation, audit-chain integration). Permanent — these are
@@ -317,6 +324,7 @@ module.exports = {
   GuardMarkdownError:     GuardMarkdownError,
   GuardEmailError:        GuardEmailError,
   GuardDomainError:       GuardDomainError,
+  GuardUuidError:         GuardUuidError,
   DoraError:              DoraError,
   ComplianceError:        ComplianceError,
   SmtpPolicyError:        SmtpPolicyError,

package/lib/guard-all.js

@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ var GUARDS = [
 var STANDALONE_GUARDS = [
   require("./guard-filename"),
   require("./guard-domain"),
+  require("./guard-uuid"),
 ];
 
 // Framework-wide profile + posture vocabulary that every guard MUST

package/lib/guard-uuid.js

@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * guard-uuid — UUID identifier-safety primitive (b.guardUuid).
+ *
+ * Validates user-supplied UUID strings per RFC 9562 (May 2024,
+ * obsoletes RFC 4122). KIND="identifier" — consumes ctx.identifier
+ * (or ctx.uuid).
+ *
+ * Threat catalog:
+ *   - Wrong length / shape — UUIDs are 36 chars with hyphens, 32 hex
+ *     without, or 38 with Microsoft GUID braces; anything else is
+ *     malformed and a downstream parser may diverge.
+ *   - Wrong character class — non-hex characters anywhere.
+ *   - Invalid version field (RFC 9562 §4.2) — versions 1-8 are
+ *     defined; 0 and 9-F are reserved/unassigned and indicate
+ *     hand-rolled or attacker-shaped IDs.
+ *   - Variant bits (RFC 9562 §4.1) — only 10xx (RFC 4122/9562
+ *     variant) is the canonical UUID variant; other variants
+ *     (NCS-reserved 0xxx, Microsoft-reserved 110x, future-reserved
+ *     111x) often indicate non-UUID payloads coerced into the slot.
+ *   - Nil UUID (RFC 9562 §5.9 — all zeros) — usually represents
+ *     "no UUID set"; passing through can mask a missing-key bug.
+ *   - Max UUID (RFC 9562 §5.10 — all FF) — sentinel value with the
+ *     same semantic risk as nil.
+ *   - urn:uuid: prefix (RFC 4122 §3) — when not requested by the
+ *     caller, can disguise a UUID inside a URN-shape parser.
+ *   - Microsoft GUID braces `{...}` — disguise a UUID inside a
+ *     COM-style serialization parser.
+ *   - BIDI / zero-width / control / null-byte — universal-refuse.
+ *
+ *   var rv = b.guardUuid.validate("550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
+ *                                 { profile: "strict" });
+ *   var safe = b.guardUuid.sanitize("urn:uuid:550E8400-...",
+ *                                   { profile: "balanced" });
+ *   var g = b.guardUuid.gate({ profile: "strict" });
+ */
+
+var codepointClass = require("./codepoint-class");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var gateContract = require("./gate-contract");
+var C = require("./constants");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
+var { GuardUuidError } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
+void observability;
+
+var _err = GuardUuidError.factory;
+
+// ---- Static patterns ----
+
+// Canonical RFC 9562 form: 8-4-4-4-12 hex chars with dashes.
+var UUID_HYPHENATED_RE = /^([0-9a-f]{8})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{12})$/i;
+
+// Hyphenless 32-hex form (some serializers strip the hyphens).
+var UUID_HYPHENLESS_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{32}$/i;
+
+// Microsoft GUID-with-braces form.
+var UUID_BRACED_RE = /^\{([0-9a-f]{8})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{12})\}$/i;
+
+// urn:uuid: prefix form.
+var UUID_URN_RE = /^urn:uuid:([0-9a-f]{8})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{4})-([0-9a-f]{12})$/i;
+
+var NIL_HEX = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
+var MAX_HEX = "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff";
+
+// ---- Profile presets ----
+
+var PROFILES = Object.freeze({
+  "strict": {
+    bidiPolicy:        "reject",
+    controlPolicy:     "reject",
+    nullBytePolicy:    "reject",
+    zeroWidthPolicy:   "reject",
+    formatPolicy:      "hyphenated-only",   // hyphenated | hyphenless | braced | urn | hyphenated-only | any
+    versionPolicy:     "reject-unassigned", // reject-unassigned | audit | allow
+    variantPolicy:     "reject-non-rfc",    // reject-non-rfc | audit | allow
+    nilPolicy:         "reject",
+    maxPolicy:         "reject",
+    urnPolicy:         "reject",
+    bracedPolicy:      "reject",
+    allowedVersions:   [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8],                                 // allow:raw-byte-literal — UUID version digits
+    maxBytes:          C.BYTES.bytes(64),
+    maxRuntimeMs:      C.TIME.seconds(2),
+  },
+  "balanced": {
+    bidiPolicy:        "reject",
+    controlPolicy:     "reject",
+    nullBytePolicy:    "reject",
+    zeroWidthPolicy:   "reject",
+    formatPolicy:      "any",
+    versionPolicy:     "reject-unassigned",
+    variantPolicy:     "audit",
+    nilPolicy:         "audit",
+    maxPolicy:         "audit",
+    urnPolicy:         "audit",
+    bracedPolicy:      "audit",
+    allowedVersions:   [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8],                                 // allow:raw-byte-literal — UUID version digits
+    maxBytes:          C.BYTES.bytes(64),
+    maxRuntimeMs:      C.TIME.seconds(2),
+  },
+  "permissive": {
+    bidiPolicy:        "reject",                                                 // BIDI refused at every profile
+    controlPolicy:     "reject",                                                 // controls refused at every profile
+    nullBytePolicy:    "reject",                                                 // null refused at every profile
+    zeroWidthPolicy:   "reject",                                                 // zero-width refused at every profile
+    formatPolicy:      "any",
+    versionPolicy:     "audit",
+    variantPolicy:     "allow",
+    nilPolicy:         "allow",
+    maxPolicy:         "allow",
+    urnPolicy:         "allow",
+    bracedPolicy:      "allow",
+    allowedVersions:   null,                                                     // any version
+    maxBytes:          C.BYTES.bytes(64),
+    maxRuntimeMs:      C.TIME.seconds(2),
+  },
+});
+
+var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze(Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
+  mode: "enforce",
+}));
+
+var COMPLIANCE_POSTURES = Object.freeze({
+  "hipaa":   Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
+    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(128),
+  }),
+  "pci-dss": Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
+    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(128),
+  }),
+  "gdpr":    Object.assign({}, PROFILES["balanced"], {
+    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(64),
+  }),
+  "soc2":    Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
+    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(256),
+  }),
+});
+
+function _resolveOpts(opts) {
+  return gateContract.resolveProfileAndPosture(opts, {
+    profiles:           PROFILES,
+    compliancePostures: COMPLIANCE_POSTURES,
+    defaults:           DEFAULTS,
+    errorClass:         GuardUuidError,
+    errCodePrefix:      "uuid",
+  });
+}
+
+function _classifyForm(input) {
+  if (UUID_URN_RE.test(input)) return "urn";                                     // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input bounded by maxBytes
+  if (UUID_BRACED_RE.test(input)) return "braced";                               // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input bounded by maxBytes
+  if (UUID_HYPHENATED_RE.test(input)) return "hyphenated";                       // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input bounded by maxBytes
+  if (UUID_HYPHENLESS_RE.test(input)) return "hyphenless";                       // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input bounded by maxBytes
+  return null;
+}
+
+function _toCanonicalHex(input, form) {
+  // Strips dashes / braces / urn prefix, returns 32-char lowercase hex.
+  var s = input.toLowerCase();
+  if (form === "urn")     s = s.slice("urn:uuid:".length);                       // allow:raw-byte-literal — string-length offset
+  if (form === "braced")  s = s.slice(1, -1);                                    // allow:raw-byte-literal — string-length offset
+  return s.replace(/-/g, "");
+}
+
+function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
+  var issues = [];
+  if (typeof input !== "string") {
+    return [{ kind: "bad-input", severity: "high",
+              ruleId: "uuid.bad-input",
+              snippet: "uuid is not a string" }];
+  }
+  if (input.length === 0) {
+    return [{ kind: "empty", severity: "high",
+              ruleId: "uuid.empty",
+              snippet: "uuid is empty" }];
+  }
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(input, "utf8") > opts.maxBytes) {
+    return [{ kind: "uuid-cap", severity: "high",
+              ruleId: "uuid.uuid-cap",
+              snippet: "uuid input exceeds maxBytes " + opts.maxBytes }];
+  }
+
+  // Codepoint-class threats (universal refuse — runs first).
+  var charThreats = codepointClass.detectCharThreats(input, opts, "uuid");
+  for (var ci = 0; ci < charThreats.length; ci += 1) issues.push(charThreats[ci]);
+
+  // Format classification.
+  var form = _classifyForm(input);
+  if (form === null) {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "uuid-shape", severity: "high",
+      ruleId: "uuid.uuid-shape",
+      snippet: "input does not match any RFC 9562 UUID form " +
+               "(hyphenated / hyphenless / braced / urn:uuid:)",
+    });
+    return issues;
+  }
+
+  // Format-policy enforcement.
+  var formatPolicy = opts.formatPolicy;
+  var formAllowed = (
+    formatPolicy === "any" ||
+    formatPolicy === form ||
+    (formatPolicy === "hyphenated-only" && form === "hyphenated")
+  );
+  if (!formAllowed) {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "uuid-form-disallowed",
+      severity: "high",
+      ruleId: "uuid.uuid-form-disallowed",
+      snippet: "uuid form `" + form + "` not permitted by formatPolicy `" +
+               formatPolicy + "`",
+    });
+  }
+  if (form === "urn" && opts.urnPolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "urn-prefix",
+      severity: opts.urnPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "uuid.urn-prefix",
+      snippet: "uuid carries `urn:uuid:` prefix — would be processed " +
+               "by URN-shape parsers downstream",
+    });
+  }
+  if (form === "braced" && opts.bracedPolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "braced",
+      severity: opts.bracedPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "uuid.braced",
+      snippet: "uuid uses Microsoft GUID braces `{...}` — non-canonical",
+    });
+  }
+
+  var hex = _toCanonicalHex(input, form);
+
+  // Nil / Max sentinel checks.
+  if (hex === NIL_HEX && opts.nilPolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "nil-uuid",
+      severity: opts.nilPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "uuid.nil-uuid",
+      snippet: "uuid is the nil UUID (RFC 9562 §5.9) — sentinel often " +
+               "indicates missing-key bug",
+    });
+  }
+  if (hex === MAX_HEX && opts.maxPolicy !== "allow") {
+    issues.push({
+      kind: "max-uuid",
+      severity: opts.maxPolicy === "reject" ? "high" : "warn",
+      ruleId: "uuid.max-uuid",
+      snippet: "uuid is the max UUID (RFC 9562 §5.10) — sentinel often " +
+               "indicates missing-key bug",
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Version + variant inspection (skip for nil / max — those bypass the
+  // version-bits check by definition).
+  if (hex !== NIL_HEX && hex !== MAX_HEX) {
+    var versionDigit = parseInt(hex.charAt(12), 16);                             // allow:raw-byte-literal — hex digit position 12
+    var variantNibble = parseInt(hex.charAt(16), 16);                            // allow:raw-byte-literal — hex digit position 16
+
+    if (opts.versionPolicy !== "allow") {
+      var allowed = opts.allowedVersions;
+      var versionOk = !allowed || allowed.indexOf(versionDigit) !== -1;
+      if (!versionOk) {
+        issues.push({
+          kind: "version-unassigned",
+          severity: opts.versionPolicy === "reject-unassigned" ? "high" : "warn",
+          ruleId: "uuid.version-unassigned",
+          snippet: "uuid version digit " + versionDigit + " not in " +
+                   "allowedVersions " + JSON.stringify(allowed) +
+                   " (RFC 9562 §4.2 defines 1-8)",
+        });
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (opts.variantPolicy !== "allow") {
+      // RFC 4122 / 9562 variant: high two bits of the variant nibble are
+      // 10xx (i.e. nibble in 8/9/a/b).
+      var isRfcVariant = (variantNibble & 0xC) === 0x8;                          // allow:raw-byte-literal — variant-bit mask
+      if (!isRfcVariant) {
+        issues.push({
+          kind: "variant-non-rfc",
+          severity: opts.variantPolicy === "reject-non-rfc" ? "high" : "warn",
+          ruleId: "uuid.variant-non-rfc",
+          snippet: "uuid variant nibble `" + hex.charAt(16) + "` is not " +    // allow:raw-byte-literal — hex digit position 16
+                   "the RFC 4122 / 9562 variant (10xx — nibble 8-b)",
+        });
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return issues;
+}
+
+function validate(input, opts) {
+  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
+  numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts,
+    ["maxBytes"],
+    "guardUuid.validate", GuardUuidError, "uuid.bad-opt");
+  if (typeof input !== "string") {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      issues: [{ kind: "bad-input", severity: "high",
+                 ruleId: "uuid.bad-input",
+                 snippet: "uuid is not a string" }],
+    };
+  }
+  return gateContract.aggregateIssues(_detectIssues(input, opts));
+}
+
+function sanitize(input, opts) {
+  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
+  if (typeof input !== "string") {
+    throw _err("uuid.bad-input", "sanitize requires string input");
+  }
+  var issues = _detectIssues(input, opts);
+  for (var i = 0; i < issues.length; i += 1) {
+    if (issues[i].severity === "critical" || issues[i].severity === "high") {
+      throw _err(issues[i].ruleId || "uuid.refused",
+        "guardUuid.sanitize: " + issues[i].snippet);
+    }
+  }
+  // Safe transforms: lowercase + strip braces / urn prefix → canonical
+  // hyphenated form.
+  var form = _classifyForm(input);
+  if (!form) return input;
+  var hex = _toCanonicalHex(input, form);
+  return hex.slice(0, 8) + "-" + hex.slice(8, 12) + "-" +                        // allow:raw-byte-literal — UUID hex slice positions
+         hex.slice(12, 16) + "-" + hex.slice(16, 20) + "-" +                     // allow:raw-byte-literal — UUID hex slice positions
+         hex.slice(20);                                                          // allow:raw-byte-literal — UUID hex slice positions
+}
+
+function gate(opts) {
+  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
+  return gateContract.buildGuardGate(
+    opts.name || "guardUuid:" + (opts.profile || "default"),
+    opts,
+    async function (ctx) {
+      var identifier = ctx && (ctx.identifier || ctx.uuid || "");
+      if (!identifier) return { ok: true, action: "serve" };
+      var rv = validate(identifier, opts);
+      if (rv.issues.length === 0) return { ok: true, action: "serve" };
+      var hasCritical = rv.issues.some(function (i) {
+        return i.severity === "critical";
+      });
+      var hasHigh = rv.issues.some(function (i) {
+        return i.severity === "high";
+      });
+      if (!hasCritical && !hasHigh) {
+        return { ok: true, action: "audit-only", issues: rv.issues };
+      }
+      return { ok: false, action: "refuse", issues: rv.issues };
+    });
+}
+
+var buildProfile = gateContract.makeProfileBuilder(PROFILES);
+
+function compliancePosture(name) {
+  return gateContract.lookupCompliancePosture(name, COMPLIANCE_POSTURES,
+    _err, "uuid");
+}
+
+var _uuidRulePacks = gateContract.makeRulePackLoader(GuardUuidError, "uuid");
+var loadRulePack = _uuidRulePacks.load;
+
+module.exports = {
+  // ---- guard-* family registry exports ----
+  NAME:                "uuid",
+  KIND:                "identifier",
+  INTEGRATION_FIXTURES: Object.freeze({
+    kind:              "identifier",
+    benignBytes:       Buffer.from("550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000", "utf8"),
+    hostileBytes:      Buffer.from("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000", "utf8"),
+    benignIdentifier:  "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
+    // Hostile: nil UUID — refused at strict (sentinel-leak class).
+    hostileIdentifier: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
+  }),
+  // ---- primitive surface ----
+  validate:            validate,
+  sanitize:            sanitize,
+  gate:                gate,
+  buildProfile:        buildProfile,
+  compliancePosture:   compliancePosture,
+  loadRulePack:        loadRulePack,
+  PROFILES:            PROFILES,
+  DEFAULTS:            DEFAULTS,
+  COMPLIANCE_POSTURES: COMPLIANCE_POSTURES,
+  GuardUuidError:      GuardUuidError,
+};

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.7.43",
+  "version": "0.7.44",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cyclonedx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:5c9d460f-9bbe-4b28-8506-6d5ecf7f0090",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:2273cc28-4cb1-4b48-8b09-c33dd95383b2",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-05-05T20:56:37.841Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-05-05T21:06:13.872Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.43",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.44",
       "type": "library",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.7.43",
+      "version": "0.7.44",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.7.43",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.7.44",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.43",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.44",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]