@blamejs/core 0.7.39 → 0.7.41
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +10 -6
- package/lib/mail-auth.js +119 -19
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/sbom.cyclonedx.json +6 -6
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -8,17 +8,21 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
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## v0.7.x
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- **0.7.
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- **0.7.41** (2026-05-05) — wiki primitive-validator BACKLOG sweep: 50 of 101 entries pruned. Audited every entry in `examples/wiki/test/validate-primitive-sections.js`'s `UNDOCUMENTED_BACKLOG` map against the actual wiki page bodies; primitives that already have signature-form headings (`b.X.Y(...)`) discovered by the validator no longer need a BACKLOG entry suppressing them. Removed entries: `consent`, `websocketChannels`, `ssrfGuard`, `htmlBalance`, `csv`, `uuid`, `time`, `mailBounce`, `archive`, `breakGlass`, `forms`, `render`, `errorPage`, `cluster`, `safeBuffer`, `safeSql`, `safeUrl`, `retry`, `fileType`, `scheduler`, `jobs`, `backup`, `restore`, `i18n`, `cache`, `crypto`, `createApp`, `fileUpload`, `mtlsCa`, `pqcGate`, `pqcAgent`, `permissions`, `apiKey`, `webhook`, `notify`, `credentialHash`, `queue`, plus the 11-guard family (`guardEmail` through `guardAll`). The remaining 51 entries fall into three real classes: namespace-level entries with method-only headings (vault primitives, audit chain, etc.), pages structured around backend-builder patterns instead of flat methods (`objectStore`, `backupBundle`, etc.), and internal helpers that aren't part of the operator surface (`cli`, `boot`, `dev`, `protocolDispatcher`). The shrunk BACKLOG narrows the gap operators see between "covered by the parent's wiki page" and "actually drift waiting to be fixed."
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- **0.7.
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- **0.7.40** (2026-05-05) — RFC 8617 ARC chain-validity hardening: duplicate-instance refusal, gap detection, hop ceiling, per-hop `cv=` rule enforcement. Closes a class of chain-injection holes the prior `arcVerify` would silently accept. **Duplicate instance** — two `ARC-Seal` (or AMS / AAR) headers at the same `i=N` now fail with `reason: "duplicate-instance"` instead of silently letting the second header overwrite the first signer's record (the latter is a known forwarder-injection attack). **Non-contiguous chain** — gap detection (`i=1, i=3` with no `i=2`) now correctly fails with `reason: "incomplete-or-non-contiguous"`. The prior `.some()` check skipped sparse-array empty slots and let the gap through. **Hop ceiling** — RFC 8617 §5.1.2 caps the chain at 50 sets; verifier now refuses with `reason: "too-many-hops"`. **Per-hop `cv=` rules** — i=1 MUST be `cv=none` (no upstream chain to validate); i≥2 MUST be `cv=pass` or `cv=fail` (cv=none invalid past hop 1); a downstream `cv=pass` after an upstream `cv=fail` is invalid (a hop can't claim chain-pass when an earlier hop saw it fail). Each violation surfaces with a structured `reason` field. **Result shape gains** `perHopCv: [string|null,...]` (one entry per hop) and `reason: string` when `chainStatus === "fail"` so operators can distinguish "signature failed" from "chain rules violated" without parsing free-text errors.
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- **0.7.
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- **0.7.39** (2026-05-05) — RFC 8954 OCSP nonce extension default-on, plus persistent-log reliability fix in the smoke runner. **`b.network.tls.ocsp.buildRequest(opts)`** (NEW) — constructs a DER-encoded OCSPRequest for a single (`leafCertDer`, `issuerCertDer`) pair. The RFC 8954 nonce extension is **on by default** (security-defaults-on rule); operators talking to responders that ignore nonces opt out via `nonce: false`. Default nonce length is 16 bytes (RFC 8954 §2.1 floor 1, ceiling 32 — `nonceLen` overrides). CertID hashes are SHA-1 per RFC 6960 §4.1.1 (the universally-supported algorithm; SHA-256 in OCSP requests is §4.3 optional and many responders reject). Returns `{ requestDer, nonce }`. Operators send `requestDer` to the OCSP responder URL via `b.httpClient` (Content-Type: `application/ocsp-request`) and pass the returned `nonce` Buffer to `evaluate(responseDer, { issuerPem, expectedNonce })` — defends against replay attacks where an attacker captures a "good" OCSP response and replays it after the cert is revoked. **DER writer surface added to `lib/asn1-der.js`** — `writeNode` / `writeSequence` / `writeOctetString` / `writeInteger` / `writeNull` / `writeOid` / `writeContextExplicit` (minimal, ~80 lines, X.690 short + long-form length encoding). **`evaluate(der, opts)` accepts `expectedNonce`** — when supplied, the response's nonce extension MUST match (else `tls/ocsp-nonce-mismatch`). Result shape gains a `nonce` field: `"matched"` / `"present-not-checked"` / `"n/a"`. **Smoke-runner persistent log reliability fix** — the `.test-output/smoke.log` tee was using `fs.createWriteStream` (async); when the runner threw on a test failure the buffer didn't flush before `process.exit`, so the failure detail never reached the log. Replaced with synchronous `fs.writeSync` against an open fd — every byte hits disk before exit. Surface change for diagnosing future failures: the log now ALWAYS captures the failure stack instead of truncating mid-run.
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- **0.7.
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- **0.7.38** (2026-05-05) — RFC 6698 + RFC 7672 DANE certificate-chain verification, plus smoke-runner LPT scheduling and a wiki failure-detail bugfix. **`b.network.smtp.dane.verifyChain(certChain, tlsaRecords, opts?)`** (NEW) — walks the peer cert chain (leaf-first DER buffers — typically `sock.getPeerCertificate(true).raw`) and confirms at least one TLSA record matches per the record's usage / selector / mtype. SMTP outbound (RFC 7672) only honors `DANE-TA` (2) and `DANE-EE` (3); `PKIX-TA` (0) and `PKIX-EE` (1) require a full PKIX path validator + CA-bundle and are refused unless the operator opts in via `allowPkixModes`. Selector `Cert` (0) compares the full DER; selector `SPKI` (1) compares the SubjectPublicKeyInfo bytes (extracted via the framework ASN.1 walker). Matching types: `Full`, sha-two-family at the short-digest length, sha-two-family at the long-digest length. Returns `{ ok, matches: [{ tlsaIndex, certIndex, usage, mtype }], errors }`. **ASN.1 walker** — `lib/asn1-der.js` `readNode` now surfaces a `.raw` field on each node (header + value bytes from the source buffer) so SPKI extraction can return the exact wire bytes for byte-identical TLSA matching. **Smoke-runner LPT scheduling** — `test/smoke.js` parallel mode now uses Longest-Processing-Time-first scheduling with a continuous worker queue. Per-test durations persist under `.test-output/smoke-timings.json` keyed by `process.platform` (so host win32/darwin and Linux container don't pollute each other's medians) with a 5-run history per test. Replaces the prior batched `Promise.all(slice(i, i + PARALLEL))` scheduling that left workers idle when one batch contained the long-tail test. **Wiki failure-detail bugfix** — `examples/wiki/test/e2e.js` was printing the per-example failure list AFTER the assert that throws on failure → operators only saw "1 of 178 failed" without WHICH example. Reordered so failure detail prints first.
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- **0.7.
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- **0.7.37** (2026-05-05) — RFC 8460 TLS-RPT submission transport: `b.network.smtp.tlsRpt.fetchPolicy` + `submit`. The previous `recordShape` only generated the JSON; operators had to wire submission themselves. **`b.network.smtp.tlsRpt.fetchPolicy(domain, opts)`** (NEW) — reads the RFC 8460 §3 `_smtp._tls.<domain>` TXT record and returns `{ version, rua: [string,...] }` where `rua` is the comma-separated list of report URIs (`https://` and `mailto:`) the recipient publishes. Returns `null` when no record is published. `opts.dnsLookup` is operator-supplied so the call composes with `b.network.dns` (DoH / DoT) without a hard dep; falls back to `node:dns/promises.resolveTxt`. **`b.network.smtp.tlsRpt.submit(report, opts)`** (NEW) — submits a TLS-RPT report to the published rua endpoints. `https://` URIs receive an HTTPS `POST` with `Content-Type: application/tlsrpt+gzip` and a gzip-compressed JSON body per RFC 8460 §6.2. `mailto:` URIs return a prepared `{ to, subject, contentType, encoding, body }` object so operators hand it to `b.mail` with their configured relay (the framework doesn't bake an SMTP relay in — operators wire transport per their environment). Per-endpoint result records carry `{ uri, kind, ok, status, error }` so a failure on one rua doesn't cascade. Routes through `b.httpClient` so SSRF + DNS-pin + retry policy come for free.
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- **0.7.
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- **0.7.36** (2026-05-05) — RFC 7633 must-staple enforcement: `b.network.tls.ocsp.inspectMustStaple` + `requireMustStaple` predicate. The TLS Feature extension (OID `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24`) is the cert-side contract that says "every connection MUST carry an OCSP staple"; clients that ignore the extension defeat its purpose. **`b.network.tls.ocsp.inspectMustStaple(rawDer)`** (NEW) — walks the X.509 cert DER and reads the TLS Feature extension. Returns `{ mustStaple, features }` where `mustStaple === true` when status_request (5) is in the feature list. Tolerant of malformed cert input (returns `{ mustStaple: false, features: [] }` rather than throwing). **`b.network.tls.ocsp.requireMustStaple(opts)`** (NEW) — operator predicate `(peerCert, ctx) → Error|null`. Refuses connections where the cert advertises must-staple but `ctx.ocspBytes` is empty/missing per RFC 7633 §4.2.3. `opts.enforceUnconditional: true` extends the policy to refuse staple-less responses on certs that don't carry must-staple — operator-stricter-than-RFC posture. Error codes: `tls/ocsp-no-cert` / `tls/ocsp-must-staple-violated` / `tls/ocsp-staple-required`.
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- **0.7.35** (2026-05-05) — DKIM verify hardening: process-local key cache + RSA modulus-size enforcement + `l=` warning. **Process-local DKIM key cache** — `_fetchDkimKey` now caches each successful TXT lookup keyed by `<selector>._domainkey.<domain>` for 5 minutes (TTL-bounded; rotated keys propagate within minutes). LRU-ish eviction at 1024 entries. Mailing-list fan-out and bulk-replay scenarios that previously hammered DNS for the same selector now hit the cache. **RSA modulus-size enforcement** — RSA keys < 1024 bits hard-fail per RFC 8301 §3.1; keys < 2048 bits emit a `rsa-key-weak` warning so operators can quarantine while transitioning. Reads `keyObj.asymmetricKeyDetails.modulusLength` from `node:crypto`. **`l=` body-length warning on verify** — the framework refuses `l=` at SIGN-time per v0.7.18 (M³AAWG / Gmail / Microsoft 365 guidance). On VERIFY of inbound mail, an `l=` tag now surfaces as `l-tag-present: append-after-signature exposure (RFC 6376 §8.2)` in the result's `warnings` array. The verifier still honors the cap so legitimate senders that use `l=` don't break, but operators see the exposure. Verify-result shape gains a `warnings` field on `pass` / `fail` results (alongside the existing `errors` array).
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- **0.7.34** (2026-05-05) — `b.network.tls.ct.verifyScts` with real RFC 6962 / 9162 Signed Certificate Timestamp signature verification, plus `b.network.tls.ct.parseScts` ASN.1 walker. The honest counterpart to v0.7.31's `requireScts` rename: previous behavior was OID-presence detection only; the new implementation walks the X.509 cert, extracts the SCT-list extension, parses each SCT into `{ version, logIdHex, timestamp, extensions, sigAlg, sigHashAlg, signature }`, reconstructs the RFC 6962 §3.2 signed entry (cert without SCT extension), and verifies each SCT's ECDSA signature against operator-supplied log public keys. **`b.network.tls.ct.parseScts(rawDer)`** (NEW) — full ASN.1 walk; returns `[{ version, logIdHex, timestamp, signature, ... }]` or `[]` when no SCT extension present (tolerant of malformed cert input — returns empty rather than throwing). **`b.network.tls.ct.verifyScts(rawDer, opts)`** (NEW) — full verification. `opts.logKeys` maps log_id (hex SHA-256 of the log's pubkey) → PEM public key; operators populate from the Chrome CT log list (the framework doesn't bake log keys in — they rotate). Returns `{ ok, verifiedCount, totalScts, reason, scts: [{ logIdHex, verified, ... }] }`. **`b.network.tls.ct.requireScts({ minScts, logKeys })`** (UPGRADED) — was OID-presence-only; now performs full signature verification. Reason-prefixed error codes: `tls/ct-no-cert` / `tls/ct-no-sct-extension` / `tls/ct-insufficient-verified` / `tls/ct-not-verified`. **Breaking — `network.tls.ct.APPROVED_LOGS` removed**. The hardcoded log-list instance was always a stand-in; CT logs rotate keys and add/remove entries on the order of months. Operators now pass `logKeys` per call. Pre-v1, no compat shim.
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- **0.7.33** (2026-05-05) — `b.network.tls.ocsp.requireGood` with real signature verification, plus a focused ASN.1 DER walker for the framework's narrow cryptographic uses. **`lib/asn1-der.js`** (NEW) — minimal DER walker exposing `readNode` / `readSequence` / `readOid` / `readOctetString` / `readUnsignedInt` / `readBitString` / `unwrapExplicit`. Refuses BER indefinite-length encoding (DER-only). Throws `Asn1Error` with stable error codes (`asn1/short` / `asn1/bad-length` / `asn1/oid-malformed` / `asn1/wrong-tag` / etc.). **`b.network.tls.ocsp.parseResponse(der)`** — RFC 6960 OCSPResponse parser. Returns `{ status, basic: { tbsResponseDataDer, signatureAlgorithmOid, signature, responses[] } }`. Each response carries `{ certIdSerialHex, certStatus, thisUpdate, nextUpdate }`. **`b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate(der, { issuerPem, serialHex? })`** — full verification: parse + signature-verify against the operator-supplied issuer cert (rsa-sha256/384/512 + ecdsa-sha256/384/512) + certStatus check. Returns `{ ok, status, certStatus, thisUpdate, nextUpdate, signatureValid, errors }`. **`b.network.tls.ocsp.requireGood(opts)`** (NEW) — connect + parse + signature-verify + certStatus check in one call. Throws `tls/ocsp-not-good` when the OCSP response is malformed, unsigned, signed-by-wrong-key, or carries `certStatus=revoked/unknown`. The honest counterpart to v0.7.31's `requireStapled` rename: `requireStapled` checks presence only (existing wrapper), `requireGood` does the full RFC 6960 validation. Smoke 8580 → 8602 / wiki e2e 178 / Linux container smoke 8602 / Linux container wiki e2e 178 / eslint clean / api-snapshot baseline refreshed.
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package/lib/mail-auth.js
CHANGED
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@@ -376,6 +376,10 @@ function _parseHeaderLines(headerSection) {
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return unfolded;
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}
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// RFC 8617 §5.1.2 caps the chain at 50 sets to bound verifier work and
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// limit how far an attacker can push junk headers.
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var ARC_MAX_HOPS = 50; // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 8617 §5.1.2 chain ceiling
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async function arcVerify(rfc822, opts) {
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if (typeof rfc822 !== "string" || rfc822.length === 0) {
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throw new MailAuthError("mail-auth/arc-bad-input",
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opts = opts || {};
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var headers = _parseHeaderLines(_splitHeaders(rfc822));
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var hops = [];
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var seenSlot = {}; // {`<instance>:<name>`: true} — duplicate detection
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// 1. Index ARC headers by instance number. Refuse duplicates: a single
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// hop has exactly one ARC-Seal / ARC-Message-Signature /
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// ARC-Authentication-Results. A second copy at the same instance is
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// a malformed chain (per RFC 8617 §5.1 implicit, and a known
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// injection vector — a forwarder that re-signs with a duplicate
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// instance would silently overwrite the original signer).
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var duplicate = false;
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var maxInstanceSeen = 0;
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for (var i = 0; i < headers.length; i += 1) {
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var line = headers[i];
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var colonAt = line.indexOf(":");
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name !== "arc-authentication-results") continue;
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var iMatch = value.match(/(?:^|[;,\s])i=(\d+)/); // allow:regex-no-length-cap — header bounded by RFC 5322 998
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var inst = iMatch ? parseInt(iMatch[1], 10) : null;
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if (inst === null) continue;
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if (inst === null || !isFinite(inst) || inst < 1) continue;
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if (inst > maxInstanceSeen) maxInstanceSeen = inst;
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var slotKey = inst + ":" + name;
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if (seenSlot[slotKey]) { duplicate = true; continue; }
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seenSlot[slotKey] = true;
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if (!hops[inst - 1]) hops[inst - 1] = { instance: inst };
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hops[inst - 1][name] = value;
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}
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return { chainStatus: "none", hopCount: 0, hops: [] };
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}
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if (duplicate) {
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return {
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chainStatus: "fail",
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reason: "duplicate-instance",
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hopCount: hops.filter(Boolean).length,
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hops: hops.filter(Boolean).map(function (h) {
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return { instance: h.instance,
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hasSeal: !!h["arc-seal"],
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hasMessageSignature: !!h["arc-message-signature"],
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hasAuthenticationResults: !!h["arc-authentication-results"],
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amsResult: "skipped", asResult: "skipped" };
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}),
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};
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}
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if (maxInstanceSeen > ARC_MAX_HOPS) {
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return {
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chainStatus: "fail",
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reason: "too-many-hops",
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hopCount: maxInstanceSeen,
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hops: [],
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};
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}
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// 2. Structural check — every hop must carry all three headers AND
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// the chain must start at i=1 with no gaps. RFC 8617 §5.1 requires
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// instances to form a contiguous 1..N sequence. Indexed loop (not
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// .some) because sparse arrays skip empty slots in callbacks —
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// a non-contiguous chain ([hop1, , hop3]) would silently pass.
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var structuralFail = false;
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for (var sci = 0; sci < hops.length; sci += 1) {
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var sch = hops[sci];
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if (!sch || !sch["arc-seal"] || !sch["arc-message-signature"] ||
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!sch["arc-authentication-results"]) {
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structuralFail = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (structuralFail) {
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return {
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chainStatus: "fail",
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reason: "incomplete-or-non-contiguous",
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hopCount: hops.filter(Boolean).length,
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hops: hops.filter(Boolean).map(function (h) {
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return { instance: h.instance,
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if (amsResult.result !== "pass" || asResult.result !== "pass") anyFail = true;
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}
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// 4. Chain Validation per §5.2
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//
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// 4. Chain Validation per RFC 8617 §5.2.
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//
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// Per-hop cv= self-attestation rules:
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// i=1 — cv=none REQUIRED (no upstream chain to validate)
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// i>=2 — cv=pass or cv=fail; cv=none is invalid at i>=2
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//
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// Once any hop's AS reports cv=fail, the chain is permanently
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// broken — downstream cv=pass claims after an upstream cv=fail
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// are malformed (a hop can't claim the chain validates when it
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// knows an earlier hop saw it fail).
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var perHopCv = [];
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var hopRuleViolation = null;
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var sawFail = false;
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for (var hi = 0; hi < hops.length; hi += 1) {
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var as = hops[hi]["arc-seal"];
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var hopCvMatch = as.match(/(?:^|[;,\s])cv=(none|pass|fail)/);
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var hopCv = hopCvMatch ? hopCvMatch[1] : null;
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perHopCv.push(hopCv);
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if (hopCv === null) {
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hopRuleViolation = "missing-cv-at-i=" + (hi + 1);
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break;
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}
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|
+
if (hi === 0 && hopCv !== "none") {
|
|
530
|
+
hopRuleViolation = "i=1-cv-must-be-none-got-" + hopCv;
|
|
531
|
+
break;
|
|
532
|
+
}
|
|
533
|
+
if (hi >= 1 && hopCv === "none") {
|
|
534
|
+
hopRuleViolation = "i=" + (hi + 1) + "-cv=none-invalid-after-hop-1";
|
|
535
|
+
break;
|
|
536
|
+
}
|
|
537
|
+
if (hopCv === "fail") sawFail = true;
|
|
538
|
+
if (hopCv === "pass" && sawFail) {
|
|
539
|
+
hopRuleViolation = "i=" + (hi + 1) + "-cv=pass-after-upstream-fail";
|
|
540
|
+
break;
|
|
541
|
+
}
|
|
542
|
+
}
|
|
462
543
|
|
|
463
|
-
var
|
|
464
|
-
|
|
465
|
-
|
|
466
|
-
|
|
544
|
+
var lastCv = perHopCv[perHopCv.length - 1];
|
|
545
|
+
var chainStatus;
|
|
546
|
+
var reasonOut = null;
|
|
547
|
+
if (hopRuleViolation) {
|
|
548
|
+
chainStatus = "fail";
|
|
549
|
+
reasonOut = hopRuleViolation;
|
|
550
|
+
} else if (anyFail) {
|
|
551
|
+
chainStatus = "fail";
|
|
552
|
+
reasonOut = "signature-verification-failed";
|
|
553
|
+
} else if (lastCv === "fail") {
|
|
554
|
+
chainStatus = "fail";
|
|
555
|
+
reasonOut = "last-as-cv=fail";
|
|
556
|
+
} else if (hops.length === 1 && lastCv === "none") {
|
|
557
|
+
chainStatus = "pass";
|
|
558
|
+
} else if (hops.length > 1 && lastCv === "pass") {
|
|
559
|
+
chainStatus = "pass";
|
|
560
|
+
} else {
|
|
561
|
+
chainStatus = "fail";
|
|
562
|
+
reasonOut = "unexpected-cv-state";
|
|
563
|
+
}
|
|
467
564
|
|
|
468
|
-
|
|
565
|
+
var out = {
|
|
469
566
|
chainStatus: chainStatus,
|
|
470
567
|
hopCount: hops.length,
|
|
471
|
-
cv:
|
|
568
|
+
cv: lastCv,
|
|
569
|
+
perHopCv: perHopCv,
|
|
472
570
|
hops: perHop,
|
|
473
571
|
};
|
|
572
|
+
if (reasonOut) out.reason = reasonOut;
|
|
573
|
+
return out;
|
|
474
574
|
}
|
|
475
575
|
|
|
476
576
|
// Verify a single AMS or AS within the chain by reconstructing the
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
package/sbom.cyclonedx.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
"$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
|
|
3
3
|
"bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
|
|
4
4
|
"specVersion": "1.5",
|
|
5
|
-
"serialNumber": "urn:uuid:
|
|
5
|
+
"serialNumber": "urn:uuid:133bf37c-6b3d-4650-85be-95672ffff590",
|
|
6
6
|
"version": 1,
|
|
7
7
|
"metadata": {
|
|
8
|
-
"timestamp": "2026-05-05T19:17:
|
|
8
|
+
"timestamp": "2026-05-05T19:17:17.538Z",
|
|
9
9
|
"lifecycles": [
|
|
10
10
|
{
|
|
11
11
|
"phase": "build"
|
|
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
|
|
|
19
19
|
}
|
|
20
20
|
],
|
|
21
21
|
"component": {
|
|
22
|
-
"bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.
|
|
22
|
+
"bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.41",
|
|
23
23
|
"type": "library",
|
|
24
24
|
"name": "blamejs",
|
|
25
|
-
"version": "0.7.
|
|
25
|
+
"version": "0.7.41",
|
|
26
26
|
"scope": "required",
|
|
27
27
|
"author": "blamejs contributors",
|
|
28
28
|
"description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
|
|
29
|
-
"purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.7.
|
|
29
|
+
"purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.7.41",
|
|
30
30
|
"properties": [],
|
|
31
31
|
"externalReferences": [
|
|
32
32
|
{
|
|
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
|
|
|
54
54
|
"components": [],
|
|
55
55
|
"dependencies": [
|
|
56
56
|
{
|
|
57
|
-
"ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.
|
|
57
|
+
"ref": "@blamejs/core@0.7.41",
|
|
58
58
|
"dependsOn": []
|
|
59
59
|
}
|
|
60
60
|
]
|