@blamejs/core 0.6.35 → 0.6.36
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +1 -0
- package/lib/db-query.js +71 -40
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/sbom.cyclonedx.json +6 -6
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
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## v0.6.x
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- **0.6.36** (2026-05-02) — `b.db.from("schema.table")` cross-schema chain. **`b.db.from("audit.events")`** — the chainable Query builder now accepts a two-part `schema.table` identifier. Both halves validated separately as SQL identifiers (rejects three-part names, empty parts, identifiers with embedded quotes / SQL keywords); both halves wrapped in `"..."` when interpolated so the generated SQL is `SELECT * FROM "audit"."events" WHERE ...` etc. The bare `b.db.from("users")` form still works unchanged. Sealed-field registry lookup tries the qualified name (`audit.users`) first when schema is set, falls back to the bare table — operators registering `cryptoField.registerTable("audit.users", { sealedFields: ... })` get per-schema sealed columns; existing table-name-only registrations keep working. Use cases: cross-schema joins on Postgres external-db (`public.users` vs `audit.events` from one app), SQLite `ATTACH DATABASE` (per-classification audit / archive databases mounted on the side and queried through the same Query API). **Tests**: 14 layer-0 SQL-shape assertions against a fake DB (verify schema-qualified SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE / count / sub-select-on-rowid all emit `"schema"."table"`; reject three-part / empty / invalid identifiers; bare table name preserved unqualified) + 7 layer-2 end-to-end assertions against a real `ATTACH DATABASE` schema (insert / select / count / update / delete round-trip via `b.db.from("audit.events")`). Smoke 6854 / wiki e2e 178 / per-primitive integration 16 files / wiki integration 32 / shellcheck clean / eslint clean.
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- **0.6.35** (2026-05-02) — `cluster-provider-db` MySQL dialect. **`b.cluster.create({ provider: clusterProviderDb.create({ dialect: "mysql", ... }) })`** — operators on MySQL no longer have to supply their own provider; the framework's default DB-row leader-election provider now speaks all three of postgres / sqlite / mysql. The MySQL acquireLease shape uses `INSERT INTO _blamejs_leader (...) VALUES (...) ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE col = IF(expiresAt < ?, VALUES(col), col), ..., expiresAt = IF(expiresAt < ?, VALUES(expiresAt), expiresAt)` so a still-valid lease is preserved untouched and an expired one is overwritten — atomic at the row level — followed by a `SELECT FROM _blamejs_leader WHERE scope='leader'` to read who holds (MySQL has no `RETURNING`). The expiresAt assignment runs LAST so per-column IF() predicates evaluate against pre-update row state. Renew uses `UPDATE ... SET expiresAt=?, endpoint=? WHERE scope='leader' AND nodeId=? AND leaseId=?` followed by a check-SELECT to surface takeover races as `LEASE_LOST`. Schema generation: `BIGINT` int columns (was `INTEGER` for SQLite), `VARCHAR(64)` for primary-key text columns and `VARCHAR(255)` for body text (MySQL needs explicit lengths on PRIMARY KEY columns), `CHECK (scope = 'leader' / 'state')` constraint dropped on MySQL because some MariaDB / MySQL 5.x versions parse-then-silently-drop CHECK clauses (would surface as version drift); the constant-scope invariant is enforced by application code anyway. Placeholder style auto-flips to `?` for MySQL (Postgres / SQLite continue to use `$1..$N`). **Tests**: 16 layer-1 assertions exercising the MySQL dialect path against a fake mysql-shaped driver (`_makeFakeMysqlDriver` in `test/helpers/drivers.js`) that emulates `INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` with the per-column `IF()` semantics; covers acquire-empty, blocked-while-held, renew-no-fencing-bump, takeover-with-fencing-bump, old-leader-renew-throws-LEASE_LOST, currentLeader, releaseLease — plus a SQL-shape audit (validates VARCHAR primary keys, ON DUPLICATE KEY syntax, ?-placeholders, IF() gating). 14 live integration assertions against the docker MySQL 8.4 container via a docker-exec-based external-db driver shim (no npm mysql client; the framework already requires operator-supplied driver wiring, the shim demonstrates one path) covering ensureSchema, acquireLease, blocked-second-node, currentLeader, renewLease, release, takeover-after-expiry, fencingToken bump, old-leader LEASE_LOST. Smoke 6833 / wiki e2e 178 / per-primitive integration 16 files / wiki integration 32 / shellcheck clean / eslint clean.
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- **0.6.34** (2026-05-02) — distributed pub/sub primitive. **`b.pubsub`** — single API for cross-node fan-out across the framework, with three backends. `local` dispatches in-process to registered handlers (zero coordination overhead for single-node deploys); `cluster` polls a shared `_blamejs_pubsub_messages` table at `pollIntervalMs` (default 100ms) and dispatches new rows past `lastSeenId` from other nodes (publishedBy=self filter prevents loopback); `redis` opens a SUBSCRIBE-mode connection on `lib/redis-client.js` (now with new push-message demultiplexing — server-pushed `["message", channel, payload]` and `["pmessage", pattern, channel, payload]` arrays route through `setOnPushMessage` instead of consuming a pending request slot, while SUBSCRIBE / UNSUBSCRIBE acks still flow through the normal command pipeline). Per-instance nonce stamped on outgoing redis payloads so the SUBSCRIBE socket recognizes its own publishes and skips the loopback (without it every same-instance publish would fire local handlers twice). Operator API: `ps.subscribe(channel, handler) → token`, `ps.subscribePattern(pattern, handler) → token` (glob-style on local + cluster, native PSUBSCRIBE on redis), `ps.unsubscribe(token)`, `await ps.publish(channel, payload) → { local, remote }`, `await ps.close()`. `topicPrefix` opt scopes channel names so independent pubsub instances sharing a backend (cache invalidation + websocket channels + custom) don't collide. Handler errors are caught + logged via the framework's boot logger; they never abort dispatch to other handlers on the same channel. **`lib/websocket-channels.js`** — replaces the inline cluster-poll-and-fan-out logic with `b.pubsub` consumption. The hub now owns one pubsub instance per primitive; cross-node delivery is `pubsub.subscribe` per channel the hub joins, with the hub's `_localDispatch` as the handler. Per-channel pubsub subscription is refcounted by local conn count (subscribe on first conn, unsubscribe on last). The `_blamejs_ws_messages` table is renamed to `_blamejs_pubsub_messages` (column `channel` → `topic`) reflecting the generalization; pre-v1, no compat shim — operators upgrading wipe the previous table (which carried only ephemeral fan-out rows with default 60s retention). **`b.cache.create({ invalidationPubsub })`** — passing a `b.pubsub.create()` instance auto-publishes on every successful `del` / `clear` / `invalidateTag`, and subscribes for the same events so other cache instances on other nodes (or processes sharing the pubsub backend) react locally — primarily useful for the memory backend so stale per-node entries don't survive a global tag wipe. Re-entrancy guard prevents inbound invalidation events from re-publishing (no fan-out loops). Tests: 29 layer-0 assertions covering local + cluster behavior, topicPrefix isolation, pattern subscribe, handler error isolation, post-close error path, end-to-end cache invalidationPubsub fan-out via local pubsub. 10 live integration assertions against the docker redis container covering single-instance round-trip, PSUBSCRIBE pattern, cross-instance fan-out, and cache invalidation through redis PUB/SUB. Smoke 6817 / wiki e2e 178 / per-primitive integration 15 files / wiki integration 32 / shellcheck clean / eslint clean.
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- **0.6.33** (2026-05-02) — log-stream sinks parity sweep. **`b.logStream` syslog sink (RFC 5424)** — first-class `protocol: "syslog"` for `b.logStream.init({ sinks: { ... } })`; new module `lib/log-stream-syslog.js`. URL-driven transport selection: `udp://host:514` / `tcp://host:514` / `tls://host:6514`. UDP is best-effort one-datagram-per-record; TCP / TLS use RFC 6587 octet-counting framing (`<length> <message>`) so collectors that prefer it over the older non-transparent newline framing parse cleanly. TLS is TLS 1.3 minimum; operators with private CAs pass `ca` (PEM string or array) for trust pinning, `servername` for SNI override (auto-suppressed on IP literals per the v0.6.28 redis-client convention). Outgoing records are formatted with PRI = `(facility << 3) | severity`, default facility `local0` (16), severity mapped from the framework's level field (debug=7 / info=6 / warn=4 / error=3); operators override via `facility`, `appName` (default `blamejs`), `procId` (default `process.pid`), `hostname` (default `os.hostname()`), `structuredData` (default `-`). Meta is JSON-encoded into the MSG body so the structured payload survives the wire as a single token. TCP / TLS reconnect with exponential backoff (default 250ms→30s); records buffer during the down window with `bufferLimit`-bounded oldest-drop semantics, replay on reconnect. `close()` waits up to 3s for an in-flight (re)connect to drain the buffer before tearing down — without this the slower TLS handshake raced fire-and-forget shutdown emits and silently dropped records. Operator-supplied `onDrop({reason, batch, error})` surfaces every drop class (`overflow` / `udp-send-error` / `write-error` / `sink-closed`). Removed `syslog` from `DEFERRED_PROTOCOLS`. **`b.logStream` cloudwatch sink: `autoCreate`** — pass `{ autoCreate: true }` to have the framework issue `CreateLogGroup` + `CreateLogStream` on first emit so operators provisioning collectors via env vars / runbooks don't need a separate aws-cli step. Idempotent: AWS's `ResourceAlreadyExistsException` is treated as success on both calls. Hard failures (5xx, AccessDenied, etc.) drop the batch with `onDrop` reason `autocreate-failed`. Default remains `autoCreate: false` so the AWS posture (operator pre-creates via aws / CDK / Terraform) stays the recommended path; `autoCreate` exists for ephemeral / dynamic-stream deployments where pre-provisioning is impractical. **Test suite**: 19 new framework-level cloudwatch assertions cover autoCreate fires both Create calls in order before PutLogEvents, ResourceAlreadyExists doesn't abort the post-create PutLogEvents, hard 5xx during CreateLogGroup drops the batch via `onDrop`, autoCreate=false skips Create calls entirely. Live syslog integration covers UDP / TCP wire delivery against the docker syslog-ng container (`/var/log/blamejs-test.log`) plus an in-process `tls.createServer` receiver that asserts the on-the-wire RFC 6587 octet-counting framing + RFC 5424 PRI / timestamp / structured-data slot the framework emits over TLS. **Test infrastructure fix**: `docker/init/generate-certs.sh` was overwriting an existing CA when re-run with `.complete` removed, invalidating every previously-issued leaf cert; now reuses an existing `(ca.crt, ca.key)` pair across `.complete`-only resets and only generates a fresh CA when neither file is present. Smoke 6790 / wiki e2e 178 / per-primitive integration 14 files (log-stream up from 16→18 checks, cloudwatch suite up from 39→58 assertions) / wiki integration 32 / shellcheck clean / eslint clean.
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package/lib/db-query.js
CHANGED
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@@ -39,31 +39,46 @@ class Query {
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// (parameter placeholders only bind values, not names). Validate at
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// construction so an attacker-controlled name with embedded `"` or
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// SQL keywords can't break out of the wrapping quotes downstream.
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// Cross-schema queries (e.g., Postgres `public.users`) need the
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// schema-qualified API, not a dotted single-identifier — reject `.`
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// here so the failure mode is explicit.
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if (typeof tableName !== "string") {
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throw new TypeError("Query: tableName must be a string, got " + typeof tableName);
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}
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// Cross-schema syntax: "schema.table". Two-part identifier only —
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// three-part (catalog.schema.table) is rejected. Both parts must
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// be valid SQL identifiers and contain no further dots.
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var schema = null;
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var table = tableName;
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if (tableName.indexOf(".") !== -1) {
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-
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"
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var parts = tableName.split(".");
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if (parts.length !== 2 || parts[0].length === 0 || parts[1].length === 0) {
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throw new Error("Query: schema-qualified tableName must be exactly " +
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"'schema.table' (got '" + tableName + "'). Three-part identifiers " +
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"(catalog.schema.table) and empty parts are not supported.");
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}
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schema = parts[0];
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table = parts[1];
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// Validate the schema identifier separately. allowReserved:true
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// because we always wrap in `"..."`.
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safeSql.validateIdentifier(schema, { allowReserved: true });
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}
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this.
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this.
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this.
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this.
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this.
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this.
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safeSql.validateIdentifier(table, { allowReserved: true });
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this._db = database;
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this._schema = schema;
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this._table = table;
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this._qualifiedKey = schema ? schema + "." + table : table;
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this._where = [];
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this._whereParams = [];
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this._select = null;
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this._orderBy = null;
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this._limit = null;
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this._offset = null;
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}
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// Quoted SQL form: `"schema"."table"` if schema-qualified, else `"table"`.
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_quotedTable() {
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return this._schema
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? '"' + this._schema + '"."' + this._table + '"'
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: '"' + this._table + '"';
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}
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// ---- Chainable filters ----
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}
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// Sealed-field translation: rewrite predicate to use derived hash if available
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var lookup = cryptoField.lookupHash(this.
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var lookup = cryptoField.lookupHash(this._cryptoFieldKey(), field, value);
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throw new Error(
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"cannot query sealed column '" + this._cryptoFieldKey() + "." + field +
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"' without a derived hash. Declare derivedHashes: { <name>: { from: '" + field + "' } } " +
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"in the table's schema config."
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);
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}
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_isSealedField(field) {
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var sealed = cryptoField.getSealedFields(this.
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var sealed = cryptoField.getSealedFields(this._cryptoFieldKey());
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return sealed.indexOf(field) !== -1;
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}
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// Sealed-field registry lookup key. Schema-qualified queries first
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// try the qualified name (`audit.users`) so an operator can register
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// per-schema sealed columns; falls back to the bare table when no
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// qualified registration exists. The fall-back lets the existing
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// table-name-only registrations keep working unchanged.
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_cryptoFieldKey() {
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if (!this._schema) return this._table;
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if (cryptoField.getSealedFields(this._qualifiedKey).length > 0) {
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return this._qualifiedKey;
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}
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return this._table;
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}
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// whereRaw — append a parenthesized raw SQL fragment with positional
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// placeholders and the parameter values that fill them. Composes with
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// .where() (AND-joined via the same `_where` array). The fragment
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// ---- Terminal methods (sync) ----
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first() {
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var sql = "SELECT " + this._projection() +
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var sql = "SELECT " + this._projection() + " FROM " + this._quotedTable() +
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this._whereClause() + this._orderLimitOffset() + " LIMIT 1";
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var stmt = this._db.prepare(sql);
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var row = stmt.get.apply(stmt, this._whereParams);
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return row ? cryptoField.unsealRow(this.
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return row ? cryptoField.unsealRow(this._cryptoFieldKey(), row) : null;
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}
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all() {
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var sql = "SELECT " + this._projection() +
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var sql = "SELECT " + this._projection() + " FROM " + this._quotedTable() +
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this._whereClause() + this._orderLimitOffset();
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var stmt = this._db.prepare(sql);
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var rows = stmt.all.apply(stmt, this._whereParams);
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var out = new Array(rows.length);
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var key = this._cryptoFieldKey();
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for (var i = 0; i < rows.length; i++) {
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out[i] = cryptoField.unsealRow(
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out[i] = cryptoField.unsealRow(key, rows[i]);
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}
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return out;
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}
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// operator's pipeline. For large result sets (audit exports, backup
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stream() {
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var sql = "SELECT " + this._projection() + " FROM " + this._quotedTable() +
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var stmt = this._db.prepare(sql);
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var
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try { iter = stmt.iterate.apply(stmt, this._whereParams); }
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catch (e) {
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try {
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var step = iter.next();
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if (step.done) { this.push(null); return; }
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this.push(cryptoField.unsealRow(key, step.value));
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count() {
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withId._id = generateToken(16);
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}
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var sealed = cryptoField.sealRow(this.
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var sealed = cryptoField.sealRow(this._cryptoFieldKey(), withId);
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var cols = Object.keys(sealed);
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var placeholders = cols.map(function () { return "?"; }).join(", ");
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var quotedCols = cols.map(function (c) { return '"' + c + '"'; }).join(", ");
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var values = cols.map(function (c) { return sealed[c]; });
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var sealed = cryptoField.sealRow(this._cryptoFieldKey(), changes);
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// SQLite supports LIMIT on UPDATE only when compiled with SQLITE_ENABLE_UPDATE_DELETE_LIMIT.
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|
323
352
|
// node:sqlite ships without that flag — emulate single-row with a sub-select on rowid.
|
|
324
353
|
var sql;
|
|
354
|
+
var qt = this._quotedTable();
|
|
325
355
|
if (single) {
|
|
326
|
-
sql =
|
|
327
|
-
|
|
356
|
+
sql = "UPDATE " + qt + " SET " + setClause +
|
|
357
|
+
" WHERE rowid = (SELECT rowid FROM " + qt + " WHERE " + whereSql + " LIMIT 1)";
|
|
328
358
|
} else {
|
|
329
|
-
sql =
|
|
359
|
+
sql = "UPDATE " + qt + " SET " + setClause + " WHERE " + whereSql + limit;
|
|
330
360
|
}
|
|
331
361
|
var allParams = setValues.concat(this._whereParams);
|
|
332
362
|
var updStmt = this._db.prepare(sql);
|
|
@@ -348,11 +378,12 @@ class Query {
|
|
|
348
378
|
}
|
|
349
379
|
var whereSql = this._where.join(" AND ");
|
|
350
380
|
var sql;
|
|
381
|
+
var qt = this._quotedTable();
|
|
351
382
|
if (single) {
|
|
352
|
-
sql =
|
|
353
|
-
|
|
383
|
+
sql = "DELETE FROM " + qt +
|
|
384
|
+
" WHERE rowid = (SELECT rowid FROM " + qt + " WHERE " + whereSql + " LIMIT 1)";
|
|
354
385
|
} else {
|
|
355
|
-
sql =
|
|
386
|
+
sql = "DELETE FROM " + qt + " WHERE " + whereSql;
|
|
356
387
|
}
|
|
357
388
|
var delStmt = this._db.prepare(sql);
|
|
358
389
|
var info = delStmt.run.apply(delStmt, this._whereParams);
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
package/sbom.cyclonedx.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
"$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
|
|
3
3
|
"bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
|
|
4
4
|
"specVersion": "1.5",
|
|
5
|
-
"serialNumber": "urn:uuid:
|
|
5
|
+
"serialNumber": "urn:uuid:7c9d3ad1-2719-437a-80c6-0d18fefad8b9",
|
|
6
6
|
"version": 1,
|
|
7
7
|
"metadata": {
|
|
8
|
-
"timestamp": "2026-05-02T20:
|
|
8
|
+
"timestamp": "2026-05-02T20:34:17.304Z",
|
|
9
9
|
"lifecycles": [
|
|
10
10
|
{
|
|
11
11
|
"phase": "build"
|
|
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
|
|
|
19
19
|
}
|
|
20
20
|
],
|
|
21
21
|
"component": {
|
|
22
|
-
"bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.6.
|
|
22
|
+
"bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.6.36",
|
|
23
23
|
"type": "library",
|
|
24
24
|
"name": "blamejs",
|
|
25
|
-
"version": "0.6.
|
|
25
|
+
"version": "0.6.36",
|
|
26
26
|
"scope": "required",
|
|
27
27
|
"author": "blamejs contributors",
|
|
28
28
|
"description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
|
|
29
|
-
"purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.6.
|
|
29
|
+
"purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.6.36",
|
|
30
30
|
"properties": [],
|
|
31
31
|
"externalReferences": [
|
|
32
32
|
{
|
|
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
|
|
|
54
54
|
"components": [],
|
|
55
55
|
"dependencies": [
|
|
56
56
|
{
|
|
57
|
-
"ref": "@blamejs/core@0.6.
|
|
57
|
+
"ref": "@blamejs/core@0.6.36",
|
|
58
58
|
"dependsOn": []
|
|
59
59
|
}
|
|
60
60
|
]
|