@blamejs/core 0.18.54 → 0.18.55

package/lib/mail-server-pop3.js

@@ -52,9 +52,10 @@
  *     `authFailuresPerIpPer15Min` cap applies to USER+PASS / APOP /
  *     AUTH refusals.
  *
- *   - **Slow-loris on RETR / TOP** — per-connection `idleTimeoutMs`
- *     bounds dead connections; `b.mail.server.rateLimit.minBytesPerSecond`
- *     bounds trickle-receive class.
+ *   - **Slow-loris** — per-connection `idleTimeoutMs` bounds a peer that
+ *     stops making progress, in either direction: a client that sends no
+ *     further command, and one that stops taking a RETR / TOP response.
+ *     `maxLineBytes` bounds a command line that never ends.
  *
  *   ## Audit lifecycle
  *
@@ -107,7 +108,6 @@
 var net = require("node:net");
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
 var C = require("./constants");
-var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
 var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var guardPop3Command = require("./guard-pop3-command");
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ var ERR_CLAMP = 200;
  *   greeting:          string,                   // default "blamejs POP3"
  *   maxLineBytes:      number,                   // default 1024
  *   idleTimeoutMs:     number,                   // default 10 min
+ *   maxConnections:    number,                   // default 1024 — listener-wide ceiling
  *   commitTimeoutMs:   number,                   // default 30 s (UPDATE-state mailStore.commitPop3Drop cap)
  *   profile:           "strict" | "balanced" | "permissive",
  *   auth: {
@@ -189,7 +190,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       "getMessage/listMessages/markDelete; compose b.mailStore.create or operator-supplied backend)");
   }
   numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts,
-    ["maxLineBytes", "idleTimeoutMs", "commitTimeoutMs"],
+    ["maxLineBytes", "idleTimeoutMs", "commitTimeoutMs", "maxConnections"],
     "mail.server.pop3.", MailServerPop3Error, "mail-server-pop3/bad-bound");
 
   var greeting        = opts.greeting        || DEFAULT_GREETING_VENDOR;
@@ -239,23 +240,18 @@ function create(opts) {
   var _emit = auditEmit.emit;
 
   function _handleConnection(rawSocket) {
-    var remoteAddress = mailServerNet.admitConnection(rawSocket, rateLimit, _emit, {
+    var accepted = mailServerNet.acceptConnection(rawSocket, {
+      rateLimit:    rateLimit,
+      connections:  connections,
+      emit:         _emit,
       refusedEvent: "mail.server.pop3.rate_limit_refused",
       refusalLine:  "-ERR Too many connections from your IP\r\n",
+      idPrefix:     "pop3conn-",
     });
-    if (remoteAddress === null) return;
-    var connectionId = "pop3conn-" + bCrypto.generateToken(8);                                       // connection-id length
-    var socket = rawSocket;
-    connections.add(socket);
-    // Single close handler covers BOTH operator-driven `_close(socket)`
-    // and client-initiated disconnects (TCP FIN / RST without a
-    // server-side close call) — releases the rate-limit slot AND
-    // removes the socket from the tracking set so it can't accumulate
-    // stale entries across long-lived deployments.
-    rawSocket.once("close", function () {
-      rateLimit.releaseConnection(remoteAddress);
-      connections.delete(socket);
-    });
+    if (accepted === null) return;
+    var remoteAddress = accepted.remoteAddress;
+    var connectionId  = accepted.connectionId;
+    var socket        = accepted.socket;
 
     var state = {
       id:            connectionId,
@@ -900,6 +896,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   // ---- Lifecycle ----------------------------------------------------------
   return mailServerNet.createStoreServer(net, {
     defaultPort:      110,                                                                            // RFC 1939 POP3 port (IANA)
+    maxConnections:   opts.maxConnections,
     handleConnection: _handleConnection,
     errorClass:       MailServerPop3Error,
     errorCodePrefix:  "mail-server-pop3/",

package/lib/mail-server-rate-limit.js

@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@
  *     trickling one byte per minute to hold a connection for hours
  *     within the idle window.
  *
+ *     It measures bytes ARRIVING, so it applies to the two listeners
+ *     that take a message body: `b.mail.server.mx` and
+ *     `b.mail.server.submission`. A peer that stops taking a response
+ *     is a different condition, and idleTimeoutMs is what bounds it.
+ *
  *   ## What this module is NOT
  *
  *   - **Not an HTTP rate-limiter.** `b.middleware.rateLimit` covers
@@ -114,6 +119,14 @@ var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
 });
 
 var CONNECTION_RATE_WINDOW_MS = C.TIME.minutes(1);
+// How long a DATA body is given before its byte rate is judged. Below this the
+// measurement means nothing: the first chunk arrives with almost no elapsed
+// time, so any rate computed from it is noise, and a sender that pauses briefly
+// to read from its own spool would be cut off for it. Ten seconds at the
+// default 100 B/s floor means a peer must have delivered a kilobyte before it
+// is asked to justify itself, which no real MTA fails and a one-byte-per-minute
+// trickler cannot reach.
+var BODY_RATE_GRACE_MS = C.TIME.seconds(10);
 var AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS    = C.TIME.minutes(15);
 var RCPT_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS    = C.TIME.minutes(1);
 
@@ -294,8 +307,45 @@ function create(opts) {
   }
 
   function minBytesPerSecond() { return cfg.disabled ? 0 : cfg.minBytesPerSecond; }
+
+  // How long one body-rate window must run before a verdict from it means
+  // anything, and therefore how often the caller rolls its window forward.
+  //
+  // It lives on the limiter because the limiter is what decides when a
+  // measurement is old enough to judge. A caller holding its own number would
+  // ask a limiter with a longer interval only ever before it can answer, and
+  // that limiter's protection would be off while appearing to be wired.
+  function bodyRateWindowMs() { return BODY_RATE_GRACE_MS; }
   function isDisabled() { return cfg.disabled; }
 
+  // Is a DATA body arriving below the configured floor?
+  //
+  // The module has documented this floor since it shipped and nothing enforced
+  // it: the value was validated, defaulted and exposed as a getter that no
+  // listener ever called. `idleTimeoutMs` cuts a fully stalled connection, but
+  // a peer trickling a byte every few seconds resets that timer forever and
+  // holds a connection — and its slot in the per-address cap — for as long as
+  // it likes. This is the check that ends it.
+  //
+  // Both listeners reach it, so the policy lives here with the number rather
+  // than in two copies that can drift. Nothing is stored, so a connection needs
+  // no teardown to release it.
+  //
+  // `bytes` and `elapsedMs` describe ONE WINDOW, not the whole transfer. The
+  // difference is the whole defence: measured across the lifetime of a body, an
+  // early burst pays for an arbitrarily slow tail — at the default floor an
+  // 8 MiB burst buys about a day and 50 MiB buys six. The caller owns the
+  // window because the window is per-connection state and this limiter is
+  // shared across every connection; b.mail.server.net's createBodyRateWindow is
+  // what both listeners use to keep those windows identical.
+  function bodyRateStarved(bytes, elapsedMs) {
+    if (cfg.disabled) return false;
+    if (cfg.minBytesPerSecond <= 0) return false;
+    if (!(elapsedMs >= BODY_RATE_GRACE_MS)) return false;   // too early to judge
+    var seconds = elapsedMs / C.TIME.seconds(1);
+    return (bytes / seconds) < cfg.minBytesPerSecond;
+  }
+
   return {
     admitConnection:    admitConnection,
     releaseConnection:  releaseConnection,
@@ -304,6 +354,8 @@ function create(opts) {
     checkRcptAdmit:     checkRcptAdmit,
     noteRcptFailure:    noteRcptFailure,
     minBytesPerSecond:  minBytesPerSecond,
+    bodyRateStarved:    bodyRateStarved,
+    bodyRateWindowMs:   bodyRateWindowMs,
     isDisabled:         isDisabled,
   };
 }
@@ -316,20 +368,61 @@ function create(opts) {
  * @related   b.mail.server.rateLimit.create
  *
  * Resolve a rate-limit `spec` into a limiter. `false` disables limiting
- * (a disabled limiter that always admits), an already-built limiter — one
- * exposing `admitConnection` — passes through unchanged, and anything else
- * is treated as `create()` options. Every mail server (IMAP / POP3 / SMTP
- * MX / Submission / ManageSieve) composes this at the top of its `create()`
- * so the spec contract is identical across protocols.
+ * (a disabled limiter that always admits), an already-built limiter passes
+ * through unchanged, and anything else is treated as `create()` options.
+ * Every mail server (IMAP / POP3 / SMTP MX / Submission / ManageSieve)
+ * composes this at the top of its `create()` so the spec contract is
+ * identical across protocols.
+ *
+ * A custom limiter is recognised by `admitConnection` and must implement the
+ * whole interface the listeners call — `admitConnection`, `releaseConnection`,
+ * `checkAuthAdmit`, `noteAuthFailure`, `checkRcptAdmit`, `noteRcptFailure`,
+ * `minBytesPerSecond`, `bodyRateStarved`, `bodyRateWindowMs` — or resolve
+ * refuses at config time
+ * and names what is missing. A partial object used to be accepted here and
+ * fail later from inside a connection handler, on whichever request first
+ * reached a method it did not have. The supported way to customise part of the
+ * behaviour is to build `create({...})` and override what you want to change,
+ * so a method added in a later release cannot silently go unimplemented.
  *
  * @example
  *   var b = require("blamejs");
  *   var rl = b.mail.server.rateLimit.resolve(false);   // disabled
  *   // → a limiter whose admitConnection always admits
  */
+// What a listener actually calls on a limiter. `admitConnection` alone used to
+// be the whole sniff, so an operator-supplied object carrying only that was
+// accepted here and then failed later, from inside a connection handler, on the
+// first request that reached one of the other calls — a TypeError mid-request
+// rather than an error at boot. `releaseConnection` has been called on every
+// socket close for as long as the listeners have tracked connections, so an
+// incomplete limiter was already breaking before the body-rate floor was added;
+// the floor only made it break sooner and more visibly.
+//
+// Config-time refusal naming the gap is the right tier for this: the operator
+// learns at boot, not from a message that died mid-transaction.
+var LIMITER_INTERFACE = Object.freeze([
+  "admitConnection", "releaseConnection",
+  "checkAuthAdmit", "noteAuthFailure",
+  "checkRcptAdmit", "noteRcptFailure",
+  "minBytesPerSecond", "bodyRateStarved", "bodyRateWindowMs",
+]);
+
 function resolve(spec) {
   if (spec === false) return create({ disabled: true });
-  if (spec && typeof spec.admitConnection === "function") return spec;
+  if (spec && typeof spec.admitConnection === "function") {
+    var missing = LIMITER_INTERFACE.filter(function (m) {
+      return typeof spec[m] !== "function";
+    });
+    if (missing.length > 0) {
+      throw new MailServerRateLimitError("mail-server-rate-limit/incomplete-limiter",
+        "mail.server.rateLimit.resolve: a custom limiter must implement the whole " +
+        "interface the listeners call; missing: " + missing.join(", ") + ". Wrap " +
+        "b.mail.server.rateLimit.create({...}) and override the parts you want to " +
+        "change, so a method added later cannot silently go unimplemented.");
+    }
+    return spec;
+  }
   return create(spec || {});
 }
 
@@ -338,4 +431,9 @@ module.exports = {
   resolve:                      resolve,
   MailServerRateLimitError:     MailServerRateLimitError,
   DEFAULTS:                     DEFAULTS,
+  // How long a body-rate measurement must run before it means anything.
+  // Exported because the listener side owns the WINDOW — this limiter answers
+  // "is this rate below the floor", and the caller decides which stretch of
+  // the transfer to ask about.
+  BODY_RATE_GRACE_MS:           BODY_RATE_GRACE_MS,
 };

package/lib/mail-server-submission.js

@@ -106,7 +106,6 @@
 var net   = require("node:net");
 var nodeTls   = require("node:tls");
 var C         = require("./constants");
-var bCrypto   = require("./crypto");
 var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var safeAsync = require("./safe-async");
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
@@ -251,6 +250,7 @@ function _actorDomain(actor, mailFrom) {
  *   maxMessageBytes: number,       // default 50 MiB
  *   maxRcptsPerMessage: number,    // default 100
  *   idleTimeoutMs:   number,       // default 5 minutes
+ *   maxConnections:  number,       // default 1024 — listener-wide ceiling
  *   profile:         string,       // "strict" | "balanced" | "permissive"; default "strict"
  *
  * @example
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       "create: opts.tenantScope requires opts.agentTenantId");
   }
   numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts,
-    ["maxLineBytes", "maxMessageBytes", "maxRcptsPerMessage", "idleTimeoutMs"],
+    ["maxLineBytes", "maxMessageBytes", "maxRcptsPerMessage", "idleTimeoutMs", "maxConnections"],
     "mail.server.submission.", MailServerSubmissionError, "mail-server-submission/bad-bound");
 
   var profile = opts.profile || "strict";
@@ -384,21 +384,26 @@ function create(opts) {
 
   function _handleConnection(rawSocket) {
     // 421 4.7.0 — transient; sender retries elsewhere.
-    var remoteAddress = mailServerNet.admitConnection(rawSocket, rateLimit, _emit, {
+    var accepted = mailServerNet.acceptConnection(rawSocket, {
+      rateLimit:    rateLimit,
+      connections:  connections,
+      emit:         _emit,
       refusedEvent: "mail.server.submission.rate_limit_refused",
       refusalLine:  "421 4.7.0 Too many connections from your IP\r\n",
-    });
-    if (remoteAddress === null) return;
-    rawSocket.once("close", function () { rateLimit.releaseConnection(remoteAddress); });
-
-    var connectionId = "submitconn-" + bCrypto.generateToken(8);                                      // connection-id length
-    var socket = implicitTls
+      idPrefix:     "submitconn-",
       // Certificate compression is configured on the secure CONTEXT by
       // b.mail.server.tls.context — a TLSSocket wrapping a pre-built context
       // ignores the option, so setting it here would be inert.
-      ? new nodeTls.TLSSocket(rawSocket, { isServer: true, secureContext: opts.tlsContext })
-      : rawSocket;
-    connections.add(socket);
+      wrap: implicitTls
+        ? function (raw) {
+            return new nodeTls.TLSSocket(raw, { isServer: true, secureContext: opts.tlsContext });
+          }
+        : null,
+    });
+    if (accepted === null) return;
+    var remoteAddress = accepted.remoteAddress;
+    var connectionId  = accepted.connectionId;
+    var socket        = accepted.socket;
 
     var state = {
       id:            connectionId,
@@ -424,6 +429,13 @@ function create(opts) {
     // string only for the per-command parse.
     var lineBuffer = Buffer.alloc(0);
     var bodyCollector = null;
+    // Watches the DATA body for its terminator and the smuggling shape as bytes
+    // arrive, so neither screen re-reads what it has already seen. Lives exactly
+    // as long as bodyCollector.
+    var bodyScanner = null;
+    // The slow-loris byte-rate floor, measured over bounded windows so an early
+    // burst cannot buy credit for a slow tail.
+    var bodyRateWindow = mailServerNet.createBodyRateWindow(rateLimit);
     var inDataBody = false;
     // RFC 3030 CHUNKING — state for the BDAT command. `bdatCollector`
     // accumulates the message body across multiple BDAT chunks; it lives
@@ -432,6 +444,15 @@ function create(opts) {
     // bytes still owed by the current BDAT chunk; `bdatIsLast` flags
     // whether the current chunk is the terminator.
     var inBdatChunk    = false;
+    // Whether the rate window has been opened for the BDAT sequence in flight.
+    // Explicit rather than inferred from the byte count, because a sequence of
+    // zero-length chunks leaves that count at zero.
+    var bdatRateStarted = false;
+    // Every byte this connection has received, counted once at the wire. The
+    // rate window takes its baseline from this rather than from a per-transfer
+    // counter, so nothing the parser does downstream — including re-feeding a
+    // chunk's tail through itself — can credit a byte twice.
+    var wireBytes = 0;
     var bdatRemaining  = 0;
     var bdatIsLast     = false;
     var bdatCollector  = null;
@@ -447,7 +468,6 @@ function create(opts) {
         { connectionId: state.id, code: (err && err.code) || "unknown" }, "warning");
       _closeConnection(socket);
     });
-    socket.on("close", function () { connections.delete(socket); });
 
     _emit("mail.server.submission.connect", {
       connectionId:  state.id,
@@ -458,18 +478,67 @@ function create(opts) {
 
     _writeReply(socket, REPLY_220_READY, greeting + " ready");
 
-    socket.on("data", function (chunk) {
-      try { _ingestBytes(state, socket, chunk); }
+    // The one funnel both transports feed. Counted HERE and nowhere else:
+    // _ingestBytes re-feeds the tail of a chunk through itself when a BDAT
+    // payload and the next command arrive in one packet, so a counter kept
+    // inside it credits those bytes twice — a peer pipelining a one-byte
+    // payload with its next command would draw roughly double the rate it was
+    // really sending.
+    //
+    // `activeSock` is whichever socket is current, because STARTTLS replaces
+    // it. Counting on the plaintext `data` listener alone stopped counting the
+    // moment a connection upgraded, which is the moment it becomes the shape
+    // operators actually deploy: the reading froze, and after the grace period
+    // a client sending well above the floor was judged to have sent nothing.
+    function _feedChunk(activeSock, chunk) {
+      wireBytes += chunk.length;
+      try { _ingestBytes(state, activeSock, chunk); }
       catch (err) {
         _emit("mail.server.submission.handler_threw",
           { connectionId: state.id, error: (err && err.message) || String(err) }, "failure");
-        try { _writeReply(socket, REPLY_421_SERVICE_NOT_AVAIL, "4.3.0 Server error"); }
+        try { _writeReply(activeSock, REPLY_421_SERVICE_NOT_AVAIL, "4.3.0 Server error"); }
         catch (_e) { /* socket already gone */ }
-        _closeConnection(socket);
+        _closeConnection(activeSock);
       }
-    });
+    }
+
+    socket.on("data", function (chunk) { _feedChunk(socket, chunk); });
 
     function _ingestBytes(state, socket, chunk) {
+      // The body-rate floor is enforced HERE, on every inbound byte, rather
+      // than inside the DATA and BDAT handlers.
+      //
+      // A check reached only from a body handler is one the peer chooses
+      // whether to reach. Enforced on the DATA path, a client used BDAT; moved
+      // onto BDAT payloads, a client used `BDAT 0`; keyed off the byte count, a
+      // client interleaved NOOP, which resets the socket idle timer without
+      // ever passing through a body handler. Each fix closed the path it was
+      // written for and left the next one open, because the peer picks the
+      // command stream.
+      //
+      // What the peer CANNOT do is hold the connection without sending bytes:
+      // stop sending and idleTimeoutMs cuts it. So every byte is measured, from
+      // the moment a body transfer opens until it closes, whatever the bytes
+      // happen to spell. No timer, and nothing to leak on teardown.
+      if (bdatRateStarted || inDataBody) {
+        // Read, never incremented: the wire handler owns the counter. The
+        // window measures against the baseline it took when the transfer
+        // opened, so this is "every byte since then", command bytes included.
+        // Counting only BODY bytes made the number go flat — and, with an
+        // interleaved command, backwards — across a window roll, which reads as
+        // no progress and refuses a client that is in fact sending steadily.
+        if (bodyRateWindow.starved(wireBytes, Date.now())) {
+          _emit("mail.server.submission.data_refused",
+            { connectionId: state.id, reason: "body-rate-below-floor",
+              minBytesPerSecond: rateLimit.minBytesPerSecond() }, "denied");
+          _writeReply(socket, REPLY_421_SERVICE_NOT_AVAIL,
+            "4.7.0 Message body arriving below the minimum rate; closing connection");
+          _resetTransaction(state);
+          inDataBody = false; bodyCollector = null; bodyScanner = null;
+          _closeConnection(socket);
+          return;
+        }
+      }
       // RFC 3030 — when a BDAT chunk is in progress we consume exactly
       // `bdatRemaining` bytes off the wire, no dot-stuffing, no end-of-
       // data marker. Any excess bytes in the chunk after the BDAT
@@ -507,6 +576,7 @@ function create(opts) {
             var bdatBody = bdatCollector.result();
             bdatCollector = null;
             bdatTotalBytes = 0;
+            if (_refuseSmuggledBdatBody(state, socket, bdatBody)) return;
             _finalizeAcceptedBody(state, socket, bdatBody, "BDAT");
           } else {
             // Non-final chunk — per-chunk acknowledgement only.
@@ -530,27 +600,37 @@ function create(opts) {
           _writeReply(socket, REPLY_552_SIZE_EXCEEDED,
             "5.3.4 Message size exceeds fixed maximum (" + maxMessageBytes + " bytes)");
           _resetTransaction(state);
-          inDataBody = false; bodyCollector = null;
+          inDataBody = false; bodyCollector = null; bodyScanner = null;
           return;
         }
-        var collected = bodyCollector.result();
-        if (guardSmtpCommand.detectBodySmuggling(collected)) {
+        // Scanned INCREMENTALLY — only this chunk plus a four-byte overlap.
+        // Re-deriving the whole accumulated body per chunk (`result()` is a
+        // fresh concat of everything received) and scanning it twice made
+        // acceptance quadratic in the message size: the byte cap still held,
+        // but a message inside the cap cost 4949 ms at 8 MiB against 143 ms at
+        // 1 MiB. `result()` is now called ONCE, when the terminator is found.
+        //
+        // The slow-loris floor is NOT applied here. It lives at the top of
+        // _ingestBytes, where every inbound byte passes regardless of which
+        // command it belongs to — a check reached only from this handler is one
+        // a peer skips by sending anything else.
+        var seen = bodyScanner.push(chunk);
+        if (seen.smuggling) {
           _emit("mail.server.submission.smtp_smuggling_detected",
             { connectionId: state.id, mailFrom: state.mailFrom, rcptCount: state.rcpts.length },
             "denied");
           _writeReply(socket, REPLY_554_TRANSACTION_FAILED,
             "5.7.0 Bare-LF in DATA body refused (RFC 5321 §2.3.8; CVE-2023-51764 SMTP smuggling)");
           _resetTransaction(state);
-          inDataBody = false; bodyCollector = null;
+          inDataBody = false; bodyCollector = null; bodyScanner = null;
           return;
         }
-        var endIdx = safeSmtp.findDotTerminator(collected);
-        if (endIdx !== -1) {
-          var body = collected.subarray(0, endIdx);
+        if (seen.terminatorAt !== -1) {
+          var body = bodyCollector.result().subarray(0, seen.terminatorAt);
           // DATA path dot-unstuffs here; BDAT path skips this step.
           var dedotted = safeSmtp.dotUnstuff(body);
           _finalizeAcceptedBody(state, socket, dedotted, "DATA");
-          inDataBody = false; bodyCollector = null;
+          inDataBody = false; bodyCollector = null; bodyScanner = null;
         }
         return;
       }
@@ -705,12 +785,13 @@ function create(opts) {
       // body collector AND strip the plain-socket "data" listener
       // before wrapping in TLSSocket so bytes the peer pipelined
       // pre-handshake cannot reach the post-TLS state machine.
-      lineBuffer = Buffer.alloc(0); bodyCollector = null; inDataBody = false;
+      lineBuffer = Buffer.alloc(0); bodyCollector = null; bodyScanner = null; inDataBody = false;
       // BDAT-side state cleared on STARTTLS upgrade too — same threat
       // model as CVE-2021-38371 (Exim) / CVE-2021-33515 (Dovecot):
       // pre-handshake bytes the peer pipelined MUST NOT reach the
       // post-TLS state machine via the BDAT collector either.
       inBdatChunk = false; bdatRemaining = 0; bdatCollector = null; bdatTotalBytes = 0;
+      bdatRateStarted = false;
       mailServerTls.upgradeSocket({
         plainSocket:   socket,
         secureContext: opts.tlsContext,
@@ -723,12 +804,9 @@ function create(opts) {
           // tradeoff acknowledged.
         },
         onData: function (tlsSocket, chunk) {
-          try { _ingestBytes(state, tlsSocket, chunk); }
-          catch (err) {
-            _emit("mail.server.submission.handler_threw",
-              { connectionId: state.id, error: (err && err.message) || String(err) }, "failure");
-            _closeConnection(tlsSocket);
-          }
+          // Through the SAME funnel as the plaintext path, so the byte count
+          // the rate window measures against does not stop at the upgrade.
+          _feedChunk(tlsSocket, chunk);
         },
         onError: function (err) {
           _emit("mail.server.submission.tls_handshake_failed",
@@ -1133,6 +1211,32 @@ function create(opts) {
         sizeCode:    "mail-server-submission/body-too-large",
         sizeMessage: "DATA body exceeded maxMessageBytes (" + maxMessageBytes + ")",
       });
+      bodyScanner    = safeSmtp.createBodyScanner();
+      bodyRateWindow.start(Date.now(), wireBytes);
+    }
+
+    // The DATA branch's smuggling screen, for the BDAT paths. Both BDAT exits
+    // — the sized LAST chunk and the zero-length LAST that terminates a
+    // previous one — reach the agent, so both need it, and both call HERE
+    // rather than carrying a copy. A screen that exists on one framing and not
+    // its sibling is what this fixes; a second copy is how that happens again.
+    //
+    // BDAT counts its octets, so a dot-line cannot end THIS transfer early. It
+    // matters because the body is relayed onward and the next hop is usually
+    // DATA, where it can. The question is what the body CONTAINS, not how it
+    // arrived: framing changes downstream, content does not.
+    //
+    // Returns true when the transaction was refused and the caller must stop.
+    function _refuseSmuggledBdatBody(state, socket, body) {
+      if (!guardSmtpCommand.detectBodySmuggling(body)) return false;
+      _emit("mail.server.submission.smtp_smuggling_detected",
+        { connectionId: state.id, mailFrom: state.mailFrom,
+          rcptCount: state.rcpts.length, framing: "BDAT" },
+        "denied");
+      _writeReply(socket, REPLY_554_TRANSACTION_FAILED,
+        "5.7.0 Bare-LF in BDAT body refused (RFC 5321 §2.3.8; CVE-2023-51764 SMTP smuggling)");
+      _resetTransaction(state);
+      return true;
     }
 
     function _finalizeAcceptedBody(state, socket, dedotted, source) {
@@ -1279,6 +1383,21 @@ function create(opts) {
         });
       }
       state.stage   = "bdat";
+      // Open the rate window on the FIRST BDAT of a sequence, the way the DATA
+      // prompt opens it on that path, and judge EVERY BDAT command against it —
+      // including a zero-length one.
+      //
+      // Keyed on an explicit flag rather than on the byte count: `BDAT 0`
+      // without LAST leaves the count at zero, so a count-based test restarted
+      // the window on every command while the zero-length path returned before
+      // reaching any measurement. One such command before each idle timeout
+      // then held the connection indefinitely without ever meeting the floor —
+      // the same slow-loris this check exists to stop, wearing a different
+      // command.
+      if (!bdatRateStarted) {
+        bodyRateWindow.start(Date.now(), wireBytes);
+        bdatRateStarted = true;
+      }
       bdatRemaining = sizeN;
       bdatIsLast    = isLast;
       // size=0 + LAST is a valid sequence — finalises the message
@@ -1288,8 +1407,13 @@ function create(opts) {
       // _finalizeAcceptedBody for size=0 LAST.
       if (sizeN === 0) {
         if (isLast) {
+          // NOT necessarily empty: this carries everything the prior chunks
+          // accumulated, so it needs the same screen as the sized-LAST path
+          // above. A smuggled body sent as chunk one and terminated with
+          // `BDAT 0 LAST` reaches the agent through here.
           var emptyBody = bdatCollector ? bdatCollector.result() : Buffer.alloc(0);
           bdatCollector = null; bdatTotalBytes = 0;
+          if (_refuseSmuggledBdatBody(state, socket, emptyBody)) return;
           _finalizeAcceptedBody(state, socket, emptyBody, "BDAT");
         } else {
           _writeReply(socket, REPLY_250_OK, "2.0.0 0 octets received");
@@ -1312,6 +1436,10 @@ function create(opts) {
       bdatIsLast     = false;
       bdatCollector  = null;
       bdatTotalBytes = 0;
+      // A new transaction opens a new rate window rather than inheriting the
+      // last one's elapsed time, which would refuse the first chunk of a
+      // perfectly fast sender that happened to follow a slow one.
+      bdatRateStarted = false;
     }
   }
 
@@ -1321,6 +1449,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   // listening event reports implicitTls so an operator can confirm the wire mode.
   var _tcpListener = mailServerNet.createTcpListener(net, {
     defaultPort:      implicitTls ? 465 : 587,                                                        // RFC 8314 implicit-TLS / RFC 6409 submission ports
+    maxConnections:   opts.maxConnections,
     handleConnection: _handleConnection,
     errorFactory:     function (code, message) { return new MailServerSubmissionError("mail-server-submission/" + code, message); },
     emit:             _emit,

package/lib/mail-server-tls.js

@@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
+// Lazy — network-tls pulls the posture machinery, and only the context build
+// needs it.
+var networkTls = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./network-tls"); });
 
 var MailServerTlsError = defineClass("MailServerTlsError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
 
@@ -144,6 +147,44 @@ var DEFAULT_POLL_MS = C.TIME.seconds(30);
  *   // ... later, on shutdown:
  *   tls.stop();   // clears the poll timer
  */
+
+// The createSecureContext options, assembled in ONE place so the live build and
+// the test hook cannot diverge. Module scope is what makes that claim true: a
+// copy nested inside context() is unreachable from the hook, which then has no
+// way to answer the question except by re-deriving the options itself — and a
+// re-derivation agrees with the build right up until someone changes one.
+//
+// The key-agreement preference comes from `b.network.tls.keyAgreementGroups`,
+// which is where the framework's PQC-first policy lives — the ML-KEM hybrids
+// with a classical X25519 fallback — along with the reasoning about which key
+// node reads it under: a `groups` key is accepted and silently ignored while a
+// malformed `ecdhCurve` throws, so the list has to land under `ecdhCurve`. This
+// built `{ cert, key }` and set no group list at all, so the listener that
+// speaks STARTTLS to the public internet negotiated whatever the runtime
+// defaulted to, and an `ecdhCurve` a consumer passed was accepted and dropped —
+// a failed attempt to set a policy looked exactly like a successful one.
+//
+// RFC 8879 certificate compression belongs here too, on the CONTEXT: a
+// TLSSocket wrapping a pre-built context ignores the option, so setting it at
+// the wrap site is inert and the server keeps writing the full uncompressed
+// chain. A mail certificate is the same ML-DSA-87 chain as the HTTP listener's,
+// and the same dominant share of the handshake.
+//
+// Deliberately NOT `applyToContext`: that also merges the framework trust store
+// into the context, and a `ca` list on a SERVER context changes how it treats
+// client certificates. This listener asked for a group policy, not a
+// verification posture.
+function _contextOptions(sourceOpts, certPem, keyPem) {
+  var base = { cert: certPem, key: keyPem };
+  var groups = networkTls().keyAgreementGroups(
+    sourceOpts ? sourceOpts.ecdhCurve : undefined,
+    "b.mail.server.tls.context: opts.ecdhCurve");
+  if (groups) base.ecdhCurve = groups;
+  var certCompression = C.TLS_CERT_COMPRESSION();
+  if (certCompression.length > 0) base.certificateCompression = certCompression;
+  return base;
+}
+
 function context(opts) {
   validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "b.mail.server.tls.context",
     MailServerTlsError, "mail-server-tls/bad-opts");
@@ -227,9 +268,7 @@ function context(opts) {
       // it at the wrap site is inert and the server keeps writing the full
       // uncompressed chain. A mail certificate is the same ML-DSA-87 chain as
       // the HTTP listener's and the same dominant share of the handshake.
-      var ctxOpts = { cert: certPem, key: keyPem };
-      var certCompression = C.TLS_CERT_COMPRESSION();
-      if (certCompression.length > 0) ctxOpts.certificateCompression = certCompression;
+      var ctxOpts = _contextOptions(opts, certPem, keyPem);
       ctx = nodeTls.createSecureContext(ctxOpts);
     } catch (e) {
       throw new MailServerTlsError("mail-server-tls/secure-context-failed",
@@ -569,4 +608,10 @@ module.exports = {
   upgradeSocket:       upgradeSocket,
   upgradeLineProtocol: upgradeLineProtocol,
   MailServerTlsError:  MailServerTlsError,
+  // Test hook: the resolved createSecureContext options, so the group-policy
+  // assertions read what the context is actually built with rather than
+  // re-deriving it.
+  _contextOptionsForTest: function (opts) {
+    return _contextOptions(opts, "<cert>", "<key>");
+  },
 };