@blamejs/core 0.18.53 → 0.18.55

package/lib/mail-server-mx.js

@@ -75,12 +75,14 @@
  *   - `mail.server.mx.rbl_refused`       — connecting IP on a DNS blocklist (zones)
  *   - `mail.server.mx.greylist_deferred` — (ip, from, rcpt) first-seen 450 deferral
  *   - `mail.server.mx.data_refused`      — refusal reason + SMTP code (5xx vs 4xx)
- *   - `mail.server.mx.envelope_verdict`  — DATA-phase SPF/DKIM/DMARC results + action (accept / quarantine / reject / defer) + gate mode
+ *   - `mail.server.mx.envelope_verdict`  — DATA-phase SPF/DKIM/DMARC/ARC results + action (accept / quarantine / reject / defer) + gate mode
  *   - `mail.server.mx.envelope_error`    — DATA-phase authentication pipeline failure or timeout (disposition follows onTemperror)
  *   - `mail.server.mx.delivered`         — agent.handoff ack
  *   - `mail.server.mx.tls_handshake_failed` — handshake error
  *   - `mail.server.mx.smtp_smuggling_detected` — CRLF.CRLF injection class
  *   - `mail.server.mx.relay_refused`     — open-relay attempt
+ *   - `mail.server.mx.recipient_refused` — recipientPolicy said the mailbox is unavailable (550 5.1.1)
+ *   - `mail.server.mx.recipient_policy_threw` — recipientPolicy failed; the recipient is deferred (451 4.7.1)
  *
  *   ## What v1 does NOT ship
  *
@@ -114,11 +116,25 @@
  *   `opts.helo` (HELO identity) evaluates at HELO/EHLO; `opts.rbl`
  *   (connecting-IP DNS blocklist, evaluated once per connection) and
  *   `opts.greylist` ((ip, from, rcpt) first-seen deferral) evaluate at
- *   RCPT TO and surface their verdicts on the `rcpt_to` event. The
+ *   RCPT TO and surface their verdicts on the `rcpt_to` event.
+ *
+ *   `opts.recipientPolicy` decides whether a mailbox on a local domain
+ *   exists, and is the only way to answer "no such user" the way RFC
+ *   5321 §3.3 asks. It runs at RCPT TO, so the refusal costs one command
+ *   rather than a whole message body: `{ ok: false, reason }` becomes
+ *   550 5.1.1 with the reason, and a throw becomes 451 4.7.1 (a
+ *   directory that cannot be reached is not a verdict about the
+ *   mailbox). Refusals charge the same per-IP recipient-failure budget
+ *   as a relay refusal, because the 250-vs-550 difference is a
+ *   mailbox-existence oracle. Unwired, every syntactically valid
+ *   recipient on a local domain is accepted and the agent handoff is
+ *   the operator's last chance to reject. The
+
  *   message-authentication gate (`opts.guardEnvelope`) runs at DATA
  *   completion through `b.mail.inbound.verify` — SPF (RFC 7208) on the
  *   envelope identity, DKIM (RFC 6376) on the message bytes, DMARC
- *   (RFC 9989) policy + alignment on the From-header domain — and in
+ *   (RFC 9989) policy + alignment on the From-header domain, ARC
+ *   (RFC 8617) on any chain a forwarder left behind — and in
  *   enforce mode refuses before the agent handoff: 550 5.7.26
  *   (RFC 7372) when the sender's published policy says reject, 550
  *   5.7.1 on the RFC 9989 §5.3.1 multi-From spoofing shape, 451 4.7.0
@@ -142,7 +158,6 @@
 var net   = require("node:net");
 var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
 var C         = require("./constants");
-var bCrypto   = require("./crypto");
 var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var safeAsync = require("./safe-async");
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
@@ -307,12 +322,14 @@ function _stripForgedAuthResults(messageBuf, authservId) {
  *   agent:             b.mail.agent,    // optional delivery handoff
  *   relayAllowedFor:   [{ cidr, scope }],  // operator-explicit relay allowlist; default [] = MX-only
  *   localDomains:      [string],        // RCPT TO local-domain allowlist (refuse non-local with 550 5.7.1)
+ *   recipientPolicy:   function (ctx) → { ok } | { ok: false, reason },  // optional RCPT-time mailbox check; refuses 550 5.1.1, defers 451 when it throws
  *   maxLineBytes:      number,          // default 1 KiB — per-command line cap
  *   maxMessageBytes:   number,          // default 50 MiB — DATA body cap
  *   maxRcptsPerMessage: number,         // default 100 — per RFC 5321 §4.5.3.1.8
  *   idleTimeoutMs:     number,          // default 5 minutes — RFC 5321 §4.5.3.2.7
+ *   maxConnections:    number,          // default 1024 — listener-wide ceiling
  *   profile:           "strict" | "balanced" | "permissive",  // gate posture cascade
- *   guardEnvelope:     true | {        // optional gate — DATA-phase SPF/DKIM/DMARC via b.mail.inbound.verify
+ *   guardEnvelope:     true | {        // optional gate — DATA-phase SPF/DKIM/DMARC/ARC via b.mail.inbound.verify
  *     mode?:          "enforce" | "monitor",   // default: enforce (monitor when profile is permissive)
  *     onTemperror?:   "defer" | "accept",      // DNS temperror disposition; default "defer" (451 4.7.5)
  *     authservId?:    string,                  // RFC 8601 authserv-id; default localDomains[0]
@@ -348,12 +365,20 @@ function create(opts) {
       "output directly. Cert provisioning lives in b.acme (RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI).");
   }
   numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts,
-    ["maxLineBytes", "maxMessageBytes", "maxRcptsPerMessage", "idleTimeoutMs"],
+    ["maxLineBytes", "maxMessageBytes", "maxRcptsPerMessage", "idleTimeoutMs", "maxConnections"],
     "mail.server.mx.", MailServerMxError, "mail-server-mx/bad-bound");
-  if (opts.localDomains !== undefined &&
-      (!Array.isArray(opts.localDomains) || opts.localDomains.length === 0)) {
+  // An EMPTY array is accepted and means "this server hosts no domains", which
+  // is a real state — a first boot before the first domain is added — and the
+  // only honest thing to do with it is refuse every recipient. Refusing it at
+  // construction left the operator with one spelling that started a server
+  // (omitting the option), and that spelling used to skip the relay check
+  // entirely, so the only way to get a listener was to get one that accepted
+  // everything. An allowlist that disappears when it is empty is a firewall
+  // rule set that opens when the last rule is deleted.
+  if (opts.localDomains !== undefined && !Array.isArray(opts.localDomains)) {
     throw new MailServerMxError("mail-server-mx/bad-opts",
-      "mail.server.mx.create: localDomains must be a non-empty array if provided");
+      "mail.server.mx.create: localDomains must be an array of domain strings " +
+      "(an empty array means this server hosts no domains and refuses every recipient)");
   }
   if (opts.relayAllowedFor !== undefined && !Array.isArray(opts.relayAllowedFor)) {
     throw new MailServerMxError("mail-server-mx/bad-opts",
@@ -542,15 +567,17 @@ function create(opts) {
   function _handleConnection(socket) {
     // 421 4.7.0 — transient refusal; sender retries elsewhere or later.
     // RFC 5321 §3.8 + §4.5.4.2 (transient negative completion).
-    var remoteAddress = mailServerNet.admitConnection(socket, rateLimit, _emit, {
+    var accepted = mailServerNet.acceptConnection(socket, {
+      rateLimit:    rateLimit,
+      connections:  connections,
+      emit:         _emit,
       refusedEvent: "mail.server.mx.rate_limit_refused",
       refusalLine:  "421 4.7.0 Too many connections from your IP\r\n",
+      idPrefix:     "mxconn-",
     });
-    if (remoteAddress === null) return;
-    socket.once("close", function () { rateLimit.releaseConnection(remoteAddress); });
-
-    var connectionId = "mxconn-" + bCrypto.generateToken(8);                                          // connection-id length
-    connections.add(socket);
+    if (accepted === null) return;
+    var remoteAddress = accepted.remoteAddress;
+    var connectionId  = accepted.connectionId;
 
     // Backpressure observer — `_writeReply` flips `_bpEmitted` after
     // the first audit emission per socket to bound the audit volume.
@@ -580,6 +607,15 @@ function create(opts) {
     // message. Decode to string only for the per-command line parse.
     var lineBuffer = Buffer.alloc(0);
     var bodyCollector = null;
+    // Watches the DATA body for its terminator and the smuggling shape as bytes
+    // arrive, so neither screen re-reads what it has already seen. Lives exactly
+    // as long as bodyCollector.
+    var bodyScanner = null;
+    // The slow-loris byte-rate floor, measured over bounded windows so an early
+    // burst cannot buy credit for a slow tail.
+    var bodyRateWindow = mailServerNet.createBodyRateWindow(rateLimit);
+    // Every byte this connection has received, counted once at the wire funnel.
+    var wireBytes = 0;
     var inDataBody = false;
     // Async command pump: gates (HELO / RBL / greylist / envelope /
     // DMARC) may await DNS or a store, so command handling is async.
@@ -604,10 +640,9 @@ function create(opts) {
       _closeConnection(socket);
     });
 
-    socket.on("close", function () {
-      connClosed = true;
-      connections.delete(socket);
-    });
+    // The set entry and the rate-limit slot are released by trackConnection;
+    // this handler carries only the per-transaction flag the drain reads.
+    socket.on("close", function () { connClosed = true; });
 
     _emit("mail.server.mx.connect", {
       connectionId:  state.id,
@@ -630,6 +665,12 @@ function create(opts) {
     // 421 path. `activeSock` is whichever socket is current (plaintext or
     // TLS) so the 421/close lands on the right transport.
     function _feedChunk(activeSock, chunk) {
+      // Every wire byte, counted once, on the single funnel both the plaintext
+      // and the post-STARTTLS socket feed. The rate window takes its baseline
+      // from this, so the measurement is "bytes since the transfer opened"
+      // rather than "bytes the body parser happened to see" — the distinction
+      // that let the sibling listener's count go flat across a window roll.
+      wireBytes += chunk.length;
       pumpChain = pumpChain.then(function () {
         if (connClosed) return undefined;
         return _ingestBytes(state, activeSock, chunk);
@@ -648,6 +689,27 @@ function create(opts) {
 
     // ---- Byte-level ingestion --------------------------------------------
     async function _ingestBytes(state, socket, chunk) {
+      // The body-rate floor is enforced HERE, on every inbound byte, rather
+      // than inside the DATA handler below. A check reached only from a body
+      // handler is one the peer chooses whether to reach: on the sibling
+      // listener the same floor was skipped first by using BDAT, then by a
+      // zero-length chunk, then by interleaving NOOP, each of which resets the
+      // socket idle timer without passing through a body handler. What a peer
+      // cannot do is hold the connection without sending bytes, and every byte
+      // arrives here.
+      if (inDataBody && bodyRateWindow.starved(wireBytes, Date.now())) {
+        _emit("mail.server.mx.data_refused",
+          { connectionId: state.id, reason: "body-rate-below-floor",
+            minBytesPerSecond: rateLimit.minBytesPerSecond() }, "denied");
+        _writeReply(socket, REPLY_421_SERVICE_NOT_AVAIL,
+          "4.7.0 Message body arriving below the minimum rate; closing connection");
+        _resetTransaction(state);
+        inDataBody = false;
+        bodyCollector = null;
+        bodyScanner = null;
+        _closeConnection(socket);
+        return;
+      }
       if (inDataBody) {
         // DATA body — accumulate via boundedChunkCollector, watch for
         // canonical "\r\n.\r\n" terminator only. Bare-LF dot terminator
@@ -662,13 +724,25 @@ function create(opts) {
           _resetTransaction(state);
           inDataBody = false;
           bodyCollector = null;
+          bodyScanner = null;
           return;
         }
-        var collected = bodyCollector.result();
-        // Smuggling detector — bare LF dot-line in body before the
-        // CRLF dot terminator. Refuse the whole transaction; emit
-        // smuggling-detected audit.
-        if (guardSmtpCommand.detectBodySmuggling(collected)) {
+        // Scanned INCREMENTALLY — only this chunk plus a four-byte overlap.
+        // Re-deriving the whole accumulated body per chunk (`result()` is a
+        // fresh concat of everything received so far) and scanning it twice
+        // made acceptance quadratic in the message size. The byte cap bounds
+        // BYTES, not processor time, so a message well inside maxMessageBytes
+        // still cost 4949 ms at 8 MiB against 143 ms at 1 MiB — and on this
+        // listener that is reachable unauthenticated. `result()` is now called
+        // ONCE, when the terminator is found.
+        //
+        // The slow-loris floor is NOT applied here — it runs at the top of
+        // _ingestBytes, where every inbound byte passes whatever command it
+        // belongs to.
+        var seen = bodyScanner.push(chunk);
+        // Smuggling detector — bare LF dot-line in body before the CRLF dot
+        // terminator. Refuse the whole transaction; emit a smuggling audit.
+        if (seen.smuggling) {
           _emit("mail.server.mx.smtp_smuggling_detected",
             { connectionId: state.id, mailFrom: state.mailFrom, rcptCount: state.rcpts.length },
             "denied");
@@ -677,14 +751,15 @@ function create(opts) {
           _resetTransaction(state);
           inDataBody = false;
           bodyCollector = null;
+          bodyScanner = null;
           return;
         }
         // Canonical \r\n.\r\n terminator?
-        var endIdx = safeSmtp.findDotTerminator(collected);
-        if (endIdx !== -1) {
-          var body = collected.subarray(0, endIdx);
+        if (seen.terminatorAt !== -1) {
+          var body = bodyCollector.result().subarray(0, seen.terminatorAt);
           inDataBody = false;
           bodyCollector = null;
+          bodyScanner = null;
           await _finalizeDataBody(state, socket, body);
         }
         return;
@@ -851,6 +926,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       // shared upgradeSocket helper (b.mail.server.tls.upgradeSocket).
       lineBuffer    = Buffer.alloc(0);
       bodyCollector = null;
+      bodyScanner   = null;
       inDataBody    = false;
       mailServerTls.upgradeSocket({
         plainSocket:   socket,
@@ -986,17 +1062,21 @@ function create(opts) {
       }
       // Local-domain check — refuse non-local recipients unless the
       // operator explicitly allowed relay for this scope.
-      if (localDomains.length > 0) {
-        if (localDomains.indexOf(rcptDomain) === -1 &&
-            !_isRelayAllowed(state.remoteAddress, rcpt)) {
-          rateLimit.noteRcptFailure(state.remoteAddress);
-          _trackRefusedRcpt(state, rcpt, "relay-denied");
-          _emit("mail.server.mx.relay_refused",
-            { connectionId: state.id, mailFrom: state.mailFrom, rcptTo: rcpt,
-              remoteAddress: state.remoteAddress }, "denied");
-          _writeReply(socket, REPLY_550_MAILBOX_UNAVAIL, "5.7.1 Relaying denied");
-          return;
-        }
+      //
+      // Run UNCONDITIONALLY. This used to sit inside `if (localDomains.length
+      // > 0)`, so a server hosting no domains ran no check at all and accepted
+      // every recipient. An empty hosted set now refuses everything naturally,
+      // which is what an empty allowlist has to mean; `relayAllowedFor` is
+      // still the way to permit a scope deliberately.
+      if (localDomains.indexOf(rcptDomain) === -1 &&
+          !_isRelayAllowed(state.remoteAddress, rcpt)) {
+        rateLimit.noteRcptFailure(state.remoteAddress);
+        _trackRefusedRcpt(state, rcpt, "relay-denied");
+        _emit("mail.server.mx.relay_refused",
+          { connectionId: state.id, mailFrom: state.mailFrom, rcptTo: rcpt,
+            remoteAddress: state.remoteAddress }, "denied");
+        _writeReply(socket, REPLY_550_MAILBOX_UNAVAIL, "5.7.1 Relaying denied");
+        return;
       }
       // RBL gate (b.mail.rbl) — DNS blocklist check on the connecting
       // IP. The verdict is per-connection, so it's evaluated once and
@@ -1035,6 +1115,60 @@ function create(opts) {
           return;
         }
       }
+      // Operator-supplied recipient policy — the only place a listener can
+      // answer "no such mailbox" the way RFC 5321 §3.3 asks. Without it, a
+      // local domain accepted every local part and the application first met
+      // the recipient at agent.handoff, after 354 and after the whole message:
+      // from there the choices were 250 (tell the peer it arrived, then owe a
+      // DSN) or 451 (tell a peer holding a permanent condition to retry
+      // forever). Neither is a refusal. Same shape as the submission
+      // listener's hook: `{ ok: true }` accepts, `{ ok: false, reason }`
+      // refuses. Unwired, every syntactically valid recipient on a local
+      // domain is accepted, exactly as before.
+      if (typeof opts.recipientPolicy === "function") {
+        var rcptVerdictPolicy;
+        try {
+          rcptVerdictPolicy = await opts.recipientPolicy({
+            mailFrom:      state.mailFrom,
+            rcptTo:        rcpt,
+            connectionId:  state.id,
+            remoteAddress: state.remoteAddress,
+            tls:           state.tls,
+            heloName:      state.heloName || null,
+          });
+        } catch (policyErr) {
+          // The operator's directory being unreachable is not a verdict about
+          // this mailbox. A 550 here would permanently reject mail for a
+          // legitimate recipient because a lookup failed, so it defers.
+          _emit("mail.server.mx.recipient_policy_threw",
+            { connectionId: state.id, rcptTo: rcpt,
+              error: (policyErr && policyErr.message) || String(policyErr) }, "failure");
+          _writeReply(socket, REPLY_451_LOCAL_ERROR,
+            "4.7.1 Recipient policy temporarily unavailable");
+          return;
+        }
+        if (!rcptVerdictPolicy || rcptVerdictPolicy.ok !== true) {
+          // The 250-vs-550 difference is a mailbox-existence oracle, so a
+          // policy refusal charges the same per-IP recipient-failure budget
+          // the relay refusal does. Without that, wiring this hook would hand
+          // a scanner a free enumeration channel the listener did not have.
+          rateLimit.noteRcptFailure(state.remoteAddress);
+          _trackRefusedRcpt(state, rcpt, "recipient-policy");
+          _emit("mail.server.mx.recipient_refused",
+            { connectionId: state.id, mailFrom: state.mailFrom, rcptTo: rcpt,
+              reason: (rcptVerdictPolicy && rcptVerdictPolicy.reason) || "policy-refused",
+              remoteAddress: state.remoteAddress }, "denied");
+          // The reason goes onto a line-oriented reply, and a directory wrapper
+          // routinely quotes the address it looked up — which the peer chose.
+          // A CR or LF in it would end the 550 early and let the remainder be
+          // read as a second, forged reply. The refusal still happens; only the
+          // prose falls back.
+          _writeReply(socket, REPLY_550_MAILBOX_UNAVAIL,
+            "5.1.1 " + mailServerNet.replyTextOrFallback(
+              rcptVerdictPolicy && rcptVerdictPolicy.reason, "Mailbox unavailable"));
+          return;
+        }
+      }
       state.rcpts.push(rcpt);
       _emit("mail.server.mx.rcpt_to",
         { connectionId: state.id, rcptTo: rcpt, rcptCount: state.rcpts.length,
@@ -1060,6 +1194,8 @@ function create(opts) {
         sizeCode:    "mail-server-mx/body-too-large",
         sizeMessage: "DATA body exceeded maxMessageBytes (" + maxMessageBytes + ")",
       });
+      bodyScanner    = safeSmtp.createBodyScanner();
+      bodyRateWindow.start(Date.now(), wireBytes);
     }
 
     async function _finalizeDataBody(state, socket, body) {
@@ -1143,6 +1279,12 @@ function create(opts) {
             spf:          inboundVerdict.spf.result,
             dkim:         dkimSummary,
             dmarc:        inboundVerdict.dmarc.result,
+            arc:          inboundVerdict.arc && inboundVerdict.arc.chainStatus,
+            // The status alone cannot tell an operator reading the audit
+            // whether a chain failed because a seal was bad or because a
+            // resolver was down — the two want opposite responses.
+            arcReason:    inboundVerdict.arc && inboundVerdict.arc.reason,
+            arcTransient: !!(inboundVerdict.arc && inboundVerdict.arc.transient),
             action:       envAction,
             mode:         envelopeGate.mode,
           }, (envAction === "reject" || envAction === "defer") ? "denied" : "success");
@@ -1185,6 +1327,16 @@ function create(opts) {
             spf:        inboundVerdict.spf,
             dkim:       inboundVerdict.dkim,
             dmarc:      inboundVerdict.dmarc,
+            // The ARC chain sits beside the other three because it was
+            // computed with them. It used to reach the delivered message as an
+            // `arc=` token and the audit event as a status, and stop there —
+            // so a consumer wanting to act on it re-parsed a header the
+            // pipeline had just written. The header is also lossier than the
+            // verdict: RFC 8601 has one `arc=fail` token, while the verdict
+            // separates a chain that is structurally incomplete from one whose
+            // seal did not verify, and only the second says anything about the
+            // sender.
+            arc:        inboundVerdict.arc,
             from:       inboundVerdict.from,
             action:     envAction,
             mode:       envelopeGate.mode,
@@ -1298,6 +1450,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   // explicit 0 (only an OMITTED port falls back to the default).
   var _tcpListener = mailServerNet.createTcpListener(net, {
     defaultPort:      25,                                                                             // SMTP MX port (IANA)
+    maxConnections:   opts.maxConnections,
     handleConnection: _handleConnection,
     errorFactory:     function (code, message) { return new MailServerMxError("mail-server-mx/" + code, message); },
     emit:             _emit,