@blamejs/core 0.17.5 → 0.17.7

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.17.x
 
+- v0.17.7 (2026-07-17) — **A histogram exemplar's label name can no longer forge a line into the metrics scrape, the CSP report endpoint bounds how many reports one request can carry, and a cron field of the form N/step now fires on the whole repeating series instead of once.** A histogram exemplar's label VALUES were scrubbed before rendering but its label NAMES were written verbatim into the OpenMetrics exposition, and a Prometheus label name -- unlike a value -- cannot be quoted or escaped, so a name containing a newline forged an entire metric line into every /metrics scrape (the label-name sibling of the exemplar value injection already closed). The CSP report endpoint processed an unbounded number of reports per request: a single unauthenticated POST within the body-size cap could pack well over a thousand tiny reports, each driving a full audit-chain append and report hook, an amplification vector now bounded by a per-request report cap. And the shared cron parser mis-read a field of the form N/step -- e.g. 5/15 -- as the single value N instead of the standard N, N+step, ... through the field maximum, so a job scheduled that way fired once per period instead of on the intended repeating series; a recurring queue job also silently dropped its configured retry limit when it re-enqueued the next occurrence. **Fixed:** *A cron field of the form N/step fires on the full repeating series* — The shared cron parser read a field of the form N/step -- a bare number followed by a step, such as 5/15 in the minute field -- as the single value N, dropping the step entirely, instead of the standard Vixie-cron meaning N, N+step, ... up to the field maximum (5/15 in minutes is 5, 20, 35, 50, the same way */15 is 0, 15, 30, 45). A schedule written that way therefore fired once per period instead of on the intended repeating series -- and a job that runs less often than intended (a rotation, a cleanup, a scan) is a silent operational-safety gap. The parser now anchors the range at the field maximum whenever a step is present, so N/step expands to the full series; a bare number with no step is still the single value N. The cron-recurring queue backends (local and Redis) parse through this shared code and inherit the fix. · *A recurring queue job keeps its configured retry limit across occurrences* — A cron-recurring queue job re-enqueues itself for its next firing time and carried its priority, classification, and trace id forward -- but silently dropped the operator's configured maxAttempts, so every occurrence after the first reverted to the enqueue default retry budget rather than the one the operator set. Both queue backends now carry maxAttempts forward (guarded to a positive finite value, falling back to the enqueue default only when it is unset), so a recurring job's retry limit is stable across every occurrence. **Security:** *Metrics exemplar label names cannot inject a line into the scrape* — b.metrics histogram exemplars carry their own label set, stored through the same redaction step the regular labels use -- but that step scrubbed only the label VALUES (for credential shapes) and passed every label NAME through verbatim to the shared exposition renderer. A regular label name is validated against the Prometheus name grammar at registration and refused if undeclared, but the exemplar path had no equivalent gate, and because a label name cannot be quoted or escaped in the OpenMetrics wire format, an exemplar label name containing a newline (or a quote or brace) forged a complete, attacker-shaped metric line into every /metrics scrape -- reachable wherever an operator routes request-derived data into an exemplar label name (CWE-93). The exemplar redaction step now drops any label name that is not a valid Prometheus label name (length-bounded so a hostile oversized name cannot itself become a denial of service), matching the gate regular labels already get; valid names such as trace_id are unaffected. This closes the label-name sibling of the exemplar value injection fixed earlier. · *CSP report endpoint bounds the number of reports per request* — b.middleware.cspReport accepts a batch of reports in one POST (the Reporting API delivers them batched). The body-size cap bounded the request bytes but not the number of reports inside it, so a single unauthenticated request could carry well over a thousand small report objects, and the handler drove a full audit-chain append (a hash, a seal, and a serialized database insert) plus an operator report hook for every one of them -- a per-request amplification denial-of-service against an endpoint that is public by design. The endpoint now caps the batch length at a configurable maxReports (default 100, generous for a real browser batch): an over-cap batch is refused with 413 and the documented too-many-reports rejection reason, processing none of its reports, so the amplification is bounded while a normal browser report is unaffected.
+
+- v0.17.6 (2026-07-17) — **PDF disarm now refuses JavaScript, launch actions, and polyglots even when an operator opt says allow, a renewed cluster lease no longer stretches its own expiry into the future, and a credential-issuance proof is refused when its replay nonce is absent.** b.guardPdf.sanitize is documented to strip a PDF down to inert content and to refuse -- under every profile -- the JavaScript, launch-action, and polyglot classes it cannot safely neutralize. But its forced-reject override pinned only the exfiltration and encryption policies, omitting the JavaScript, launch-action, and polyglot policies; those default to reject, so the gap was invisible until an operator passed an explicit permissive opt, which then let sanitize hand back a live PDF still carrying JavaScript or a launch action. b.clusterProviderDb.renewLease computed a lease's time-to-live as the span between its acquire time and its expiry, but on renewal advanced only the expiry and left the acquire time frozen, so each renewal re-derived an ever-larger TTL and pushed the expiry unboundedly into the future -- a dead leader's lease then never lapsed and no follower could take over. And b.auth.oid4vci's issuer skipped the credential-proof replay/holder-binding nonce check when the expected nonce was null, the miss sentinel that a Redis-, Map-, or SQL-backed nonce store commonly returns, so a forged proof could mint a credential bound to an attacker-chosen key. **Security:** *PDF disarm refuses active content even against a permissive operator opt* — b.guardPdf.sanitize is the disarm-by-refusal primitive: it guarantees it never returns a PDF that still carries JavaScript, a launch/open action, an embedded file, or encryption, and that the JavaScript, launch-action, and polyglot classes are refused under every profile. To hold that guarantee regardless of the operator's configuration, sanitize builds a forced override that pins the relevant policies to reject -- but the override pinned only the embedded-file, open-action, magic, and encryption policies and omitted the JavaScript, launch-action, and polyglot policies. Because those three already default to reject in every shipped profile, the omission was invisible in normal use; an operator who passed an explicit permissive opt (javascriptPolicy, launchActionPolicy, or polyglotPolicy set to allow or audit) turned that opt back on inside sanitize and received a live PDF still carrying JavaScript or a launch action -- exactly the remote-code-execution and polyglot classes the primitive promises to refuse. The forced override now pins all three, so sanitize refuses them unconditionally; the overridable validate and gate entry points, which document these policies as operator-tunable, are unchanged. · *Cluster lease renewal keeps a bounded expiry so a dead leader can be taken over* — b.clusterProviderDb models a leader lease as a sliding window whose span -- expiry minus acquire time -- equals the configured lease TTL. renewLease recovered the TTL from that span but then advanced only the expiry while leaving the acquire time frozen at the original acquisition, so the next renewal measured a span that had grown by one renewal interval and re-derived an ever-larger TTL, pushing the expiry unboundedly into the future. A leader that renewed even a few times and then died left a lease whose expiry was far beyond the configured TTL, so it never lapsed within the takeover window and no follower could steal it -- the cluster could stall with no active leader. renewLease now slides both ends of the window forward on every renewal (acquire time and expiry both move to now and now-plus-TTL), keeping the span at the configured TTL so a lapsed leader's lease expires on schedule and bounded takeover works. · *Credential-issuance proof is refused when its replay nonce is absent* — b.auth.oid4vci's issuer verifies the wallet's key-binding proof against the c_nonce it minted with the access token -- the challenge that binds the proof to this issuance and prevents replay. The verifier treated three states of the expected nonce differently: a string was compared, an undefined value (the miss sentinel b.cache returns) was refused, and a null value was treated as no check required. But a nonce store fronting Redis, a Map, or a SQL row -- all accepted through the documented store option -- commonly signals a miss with null, which fell straight through the comparison and disabled the replay and holder-binding defense entirely: after the short-lived c_nonce expired (while the access token was still valid, in batch issuance), an attacker holding that token could submit a proof signed by an arbitrary key with any nonce and have a credential minted bound to that attacker-controlled key. The verifier now requires the expected nonce to be a non-empty string and fails closed on any other value, so an absent or expired nonce is refused regardless of the store's miss sentinel.
+
 - v0.17.5 (2026-07-17) — **A tampered or over-filtered backup can no longer silently wipe the live data directory on restore, DNSSEC-strict resolution stays enforced when a stale answer is served, and a family of guards that matched a name against a lookup table now reject a prototype-member name instead of misclassifying it.** Restoring a backup whose manifest lists zero files -- because a tampered unsigned bundle stripped every entry, or an opts.filter matched nothing -- extracted an empty staging directory and swapped it over the live data directory: a silent, full data-directory wipe reported to the operator as a successful restore. The manifest validator now refuses an empty file list, and the restore path refuses to swap a zero-file extract over a non-empty data directory. Separately, b.network.dns.resolver's validate: true DNSSEC gate was skipped on the serve-stale path, so an upstream outage could downgrade a DNSSEC-strict lookup (including DANE TLSA resolution) to unauthenticated stale data; the gate now holds on the stale path too. And a group of guards resolved a host, scheme, tag, method, or agent name against a plain-object lookup table with a truthiness read, so a name colliding with an inherited object member (constructor) was misclassified -- over-rejected as reserved/forbidden, or, for the mail-server method catalogue, passed the catalogue gate unregistered. All now match against the table's own keys. **Security:** *Restore refuses a zero-file backup instead of wiping the data directory* — b.backupManifest.validate accepted a manifest with an empty files array. The bundle writer never emits one, but the validator is the single guard the restore path parses an untrusted manifest through, so a tampered unsigned bundle that stripped every file entry (while keeping the still-valid wrapped vault key, which needs no passphrase knowledge) parsed cleanly, extracted an empty staging directory, and had the atomic swap move that empty directory over the live data directory -- a silent, destructive wipe of every file, reported to the operator as a successful restore with a file count of zero. The validator now refuses an empty file list (fixing every consumer -- parse, create, serialize -- at once), so a tampered manifest is rejected before extraction. As defense in depth, b.restore.run now also refuses to swap a zero-file extract over a non-empty data directory, which additionally catches an opts.filter that matched no manifest entry; the swap is refused with the data directory left intact rather than destroyed. · *DNSSEC-strict resolution stays enforced on the serve-stale path* — b.network.dns.resolver's validate: true option refuses a response that is not DNSSEC-authenticated (AD=0), but the RFC 8767 serve-stale short-circuit returned a cached stale answer before that gate ran. An attacker who can force an upstream outage (denying the DoH endpoint) could therefore downgrade a DNSSEC-strict lookup -- including b.network.dns.resolver.queryTlsa for DANE, queryDs, or a CNAME chase -- to unauthenticated stale data cached earlier at AD=0, with the caller seeing a success rather than the documented validate-failed refusal. The AD-bit gate now applies on the serve-stale path too (the DNSSEC verdict is per-response), so a stale answer that was not authenticated is refused rather than served to a validating caller. · *Name-lookup guards reject a prototype-member name instead of misclassifying it* — A group of guards tested whether a caller- or peer-supplied name was in a fixed table -- a reserved-HELO-name set, a reserved-local-host set, a dangerous-URL-scheme denylist, a reserved agent-name set, a Tiny-PS forbidden-element set, an HTML void-element set, and the mail-server method catalogue -- with a plain-object truthiness read (TABLE[name]) that walks the prototype chain. A name that collides with an inherited object member -- constructor is the one that survives a lowercased key -- read the inherited value as truthy and was misclassified: over-rejected as reserved or forbidden (b.mail.helo, b.guardListUnsubscribe, b.guardAgentRegistry, b.mailBimi, b.htmlBalance), or, for the mail-server method catalogue, passed the catalogue gate as if it were a registered method (a fail-open at registration). Every site now matches against the table's own keys with an own-property check, so a prototype-member name is treated as any other unknown name; supported names are unaffected.
 
 - v0.17.4 (2026-07-17) — **Three fail-open holes closed: a raw cross-border write could evade the data-residency gate by wedging a comment or eliding whitespace, safe decompression returned undecompressed bytes for an unknown algorithm name, and the shared anti-replay helper admitted a replay when its store signalled a duplicate with a non-boolean value.** A raw SQL write submitted through b.db.runSql / b.db.prepare().run() could slip past the cross-border data-residency gate: the gate's write-detection matched tokens on whitespace boundaries, but SQL lets tokens abut with no whitespace when a comment or a quoted identifier sits between them, so INSERT/**/INTO, an INSERT whose quoted table name abuts INTO, and UPDATE/**/table all executed while the gate never engaged -- landing or moving a row across a residency boundary under a regulated posture. b.safeDecompress resolved its algorithm allowlist with a truthiness lookup, so an algorithm name that collides with an inherited object member (constructor, toString) reached the dispatch and returned the input undecompressed instead of refusing the unknown algorithm -- a fail-open for any caller that maps a client Content-Encoding onto the algorithm. And b.nonceStore.enforceReplay -- the anti-replay helper JWT and DPoP verification use -- detected a replay only when its store returned a literal false, so a store signalling a duplicate with another falsy value (a Redis SETNX null, a SQL INSERT rowcount of 0) let the replayed token through. **Added:** *b.safeSql.normalizeForScan* — A parse-only SQL normalizer that produces a copy whose token boundaries are real whitespace, so a scanner built with whitespace-anchored patterns cannot be evaded by a comment or a quoted-identifier boundary that lets two tokens abut. It collapses line and block comments to a single space and inserts a separating space where a quoted string or identifier follows a word character, in the same quote- and comment-aware single pass as the existing b.safeSql placeholder scanners (a comment marker inside a string literal is preserved, never collapsed). The executed SQL is never derived from this copy -- it only feeds a scanner. **Security:** *Data-residency gate catches a raw write that hides behind a comment or elided whitespace* — The cross-border data-residency gate that guards raw SQL writes (b.db.runSql, b.db.prepare().run()) detected the write and extracted its target table with regexes that assume tokens are separated by whitespace. SQL does not require whitespace between tokens when a comment or a quoted-identifier boundary separates them, so three forms that every engine executes as ordinary writes slipped the detection entirely and the gate never engaged: an INSERT whose double-quoted table name abuts INTO with no space, an INSERT with a block comment wedged between INSERT and INTO, and the same for UPDATE and its table. Under a regulated residency posture a row could therefore be inserted or moved across a residency boundary with no tag check (CWE-863; a GDPR Chapter V transfer-restriction bypass). The gate now normalizes a parse-only copy of the statement through the new b.safeSql.normalizeForScan before matching -- collapsing comments to a space and inserting a boundary where a quoted token abuts a word character -- so every write is detected and gated regardless of how its tokens are spaced. The executed SQL is unchanged. · *Safe decompression refuses an unknown algorithm instead of returning the input undecompressed* — b.safeDecompress resolved opts.algorithm against its allowlist of supported codecs (gzip, deflate, deflate-raw, brotli) with a truthiness lookup on a plain object. An algorithm name that names an inherited object member -- constructor, toString, valueOf -- read back a truthy inherited value, slipped the unsupported-algorithm refusal, and reached the dispatch, where invoking the inherited member returned the raw input buffer. The primitive therefore silently returned undecompressed bytes with no error, contrary to its contract that any algorithm outside the allowlist is refused -- a fail-open for a consumer that maps a client-supplied Content-Encoding token onto the algorithm, which also sidesteps the decompression-bomb size and ratio caps. The allowlist is now resolved with an own-property check, so any unsupported name -- however it collides with a built-in member -- is refused. · *Shared anti-replay helper fails closed on a non-boolean store result* — b.nonceStore.enforceReplay is the anti-replay helper that b.auth.jwt and b.auth.dpop route their replay defense through; it calls the store's checkAndInsert and treated the result as a replay only when it was the literal false. The recommended stores signal a duplicate with a different falsy value -- a Redis SET ... NX returns null and a SQL INSERT ... ON CONFLICT returns a rowcount of 0 -- so a store using either would have its duplicate signal missed and the replayed nonce admitted (a replay-protection bypass for a JWT or DPoP proof). enforceReplay now admits a nonce only on a truthy first-seen confirmation and treats every other result as a replay, matching the fail-closed check the framework's inline anti-replay consumers already use.

package/lib/auth/oid4vci.js

@@ -190,26 +190,29 @@ async function _verifyProofJwt(proofJwt, expectedAud, expectedCNonce, expectedCl
     throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/wrong-proof-aud",
       "credential issuance: proof JWT aud \"" + payload.aud + "\" mismatch (expected \"" + expectedAud + "\")");
   }
-  // c_nonce expectation has three states the caller distinguishes:
-  //   null      → no nonce check expected (caller deliberately skips it).
-  //   string    → the c_nonce the wallet must echo (compared below).
-  //   undefined → a nonce WAS expected but the store missed/expired it
-  //               (cNonceStore.get returns undefined on miss/expiry, and
-  //               the c_nonce TTL is shorter than the access token's).
-  //               Refuse with a typed code — comparing against undefined
-  //               would otherwise throw a raw TypeError from timingSafeEqual.
-  if (expectedCNonce === undefined) {
+  // The c_nonce is the OID4VCI proof replay + holder-binding challenge
+  // (§7.2.1.1). Every access token is minted with a c_nonce in
+  // exchangePreAuthorizedCode, so a missing value at /credential means the
+  // c_nonce TTL elapsed (shorter than the access token's) — it MUST refuse
+  // and force the wallet to fetch a fresh one. There is NO issuance mode
+  // that legitimately skips the compare, so `expectedCNonce` is required to
+  // be a non-empty string. Fail closed on ANY other shape: a conforming
+  // b.cache signals a miss with `undefined`, but a store fronting Redis /
+  // a Map / a SQL row commonly signals a miss with `null`; the prior
+  // `!== null` guard let that null fall THROUGH the nonce compare entirely,
+  // silently disabling the replay defense (a forged proof with any nonce
+  // was then accepted). Treating undefined / null / non-string uniformly
+  // as "expired" closes that store-shape fail-open.
+  if (typeof expectedCNonce !== "string" || expectedCNonce.length === 0) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/c-nonce-expired",
       "credential issuance: c_nonce expected but missing/expired — wallet must request a fresh c_nonce (the /token response's c_nonce TTL elapsed before /credential was called)");
   }
-  if (expectedCNonce !== null) {
-    // Constant-time c_nonce compare — secret-shaped value vs
-    // attacker-controlled wallet payload.
-    if (typeof payload.nonce !== "string" ||
-        !timingSafeEqual(payload.nonce, expectedCNonce)) {
-      throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/wrong-proof-nonce",
-        "credential issuance: proof JWT nonce mismatch (replay defense — wallet must use the c_nonce from the most recent issuer response)");
-    }
+  // Constant-time c_nonce compare — secret-shaped value vs
+  // attacker-controlled wallet payload.
+  if (typeof payload.nonce !== "string" ||
+      !timingSafeEqual(payload.nonce, expectedCNonce)) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/wrong-proof-nonce",
+      "credential issuance: proof JWT nonce mismatch (replay defense — wallet must use the c_nonce from the most recent issuer response)");
   }
   if (typeof payload.iat !== "number") {
     throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/no-proof-iat",

package/lib/cluster-provider-db.js

@@ -244,7 +244,17 @@ function create(config) {
   async function renewLease(lease, opts) {
     if (!lease || !lease.leaseId) throw _err("INVALID_LEASE", "lease required", true);
     var nowMs = Date.now();
-    var newExpiresAt = nowMs + (lease.expiresAt - lease.acquiredAt);
+    // A lease is a sliding window: the span (expiresAt - acquiredAt) equals
+    // the configured TTL at acquire time, and every renewal must slide BOTH
+    // ends forward so the span stays that TTL. Advancing only expiresAt
+    // (leaving acquiredAt frozen at the original acquisition) re-derives an
+    // ever-growing TTL on the next renewal, so the expiry drifts unboundedly
+    // into the future: a dead leader's row then never lapses within leaseTtl
+    // and no follower can steal it, breaking bounded takeover. Refresh
+    // acquiredAt alongside expiresAt to keep the span invariant.
+    var ttlMs = lease.expiresAt - lease.acquiredAt;
+    var newAcquiredAt = nowMs;
+    var newExpiresAt = nowMs + ttlMs;
     // opts.endpoint, when provided, refreshes the stored endpoint so
     // operators who hot-update their config see the discovery row catch
     // up. Default = preserve whatever was stored at acquire time.
@@ -261,7 +271,7 @@ function create(config) {
       // MySQL has no RETURNING — UPDATE then read back, with a takeover
       // detected when the read-back row no longer carries our leaseId.
       var rvBuilt = sql().update(LEADER_TABLE, { dialect: dialect })
-        .set({ expiresAt: newExpiresAt, endpoint: endpoint })
+        .set({ acquiredAt: newAcquiredAt, expiresAt: newExpiresAt, endpoint: endpoint })
         .where("scope", "leader").where("nodeId", lease.nodeId).where("leaseId", lease.leaseId)
         .toSql();
       var rv = await _q(clusterStorage().placeholderize(rvBuilt.sql, dialect), rvBuilt.params);
@@ -283,7 +293,7 @@ function create(config) {
       row = sel.rows[0];
     } else {
       var result = await _run(sql().update(LEADER_TABLE, { dialect: dialect })
-        .set({ expiresAt: newExpiresAt, endpoint: endpoint })
+        .set({ acquiredAt: newAcquiredAt, expiresAt: newExpiresAt, endpoint: endpoint })
         .where("scope", "leader").where("nodeId", lease.nodeId).where("leaseId", lease.leaseId)
         .returning(renewCols));
       if (!result.rows || result.rows.length === 0) {

package/lib/guard-pdf.js

@@ -372,13 +372,21 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
   // Force the active-content / exfil / encryption policies to reject, then
   // refuse anything the validate chain flags. The object graph can't be
   // edited without a parser, so disarm collapses to "refuse if not already
-  // inert" — never a silent passthrough of a live action.
+  // inert" — never a silent passthrough of a live action. Every active-content
+  // policy is pinned to "reject" here so an operator-supplied permissive opt
+  // (javascriptPolicy / launchActionPolicy / polyglotPolicy: "allow" | "audit")
+  // cannot make disarm hand back a live PDF — the RCE / polyglot classes the
+  // guard "refuses to negotiate" on must be pinned exactly as the exfil /
+  // encryption ones are, or the override is only half-applied.
   var strict = Object.assign({}, resolved, {
     magicPolicy:             "reject",
+    javascriptPolicy:        "reject",
+    launchActionPolicy:      "reject",
     openActionPolicy:        "reject",
     embeddedFilePolicy:      "reject",
     embeddedFileCountPolicy: "reject",
     encryptedPolicy:         "reject",
+    polyglotPolicy:          "reject",
   });
   var issues = _detectIssues(input, strict);
   gateContract.throwOnRefusalSeverity(issues,

package/lib/metrics.js

@@ -223,7 +223,21 @@ function _redactLabelMap(labelObj) {
   var out = {};
   if (!labelObj || typeof labelObj !== "object") return out;
   var keys = Object.keys(labelObj);
-  for (var i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) out[keys[i]] = _validateLabelValue(labelObj[keys[i]]);
+  for (var i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
+    var k = keys[i];
+    // Exemplar label NAMES are rendered verbatim into the OpenMetrics
+    // exposition by _renderLabels — and a label name (unlike a value) cannot
+    // be quoted or escaped in the Prometheus wire format. Regular label keys
+    // are gated (LABEL_NAME_RE at registration + _resolveLabels' undeclared
+    // refusal), but the exemplar path had no such gate, so a key carrying a
+    // newline / quote / brace forged a metric line into every scrape (CWE-93,
+    // the exemplar-KEY sibling of the already-fixed exemplar-VALUE injection).
+    // Drop any key that isn't a valid Prometheus label name; the length bound
+    // keeps a hostile multi-megabyte key from turning the regex test into a
+    // DoS, exactly as _validateLabelName caps the config-time path.
+    if (k.length > MAX_METRIC_NAME_LEN || !LABEL_NAME_RE.test(k)) continue;
+    out[k] = _validateLabelValue(labelObj[k]);
+  }
   return out;
 }
 

package/lib/middleware/csp-report.js

@@ -39,6 +39,15 @@ var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../audit"); });
 
 var DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES = C.BYTES.kib(64);
 var SAMPLE_TRUNCATE = 200;
+// A single POST may carry a batch of reports (Reporting API). The byte
+// cap bounds the body, but NOT the number of reports inside it — a
+// 64 KiB body of ~40-byte report objects is ~1600 reports, and each one
+// drives a full audit-chain append (SHA3 hash + seal + DB insert) plus an
+// onReport hook. On an unauthenticated endpoint that is a per-request
+// amplification vector, so the batch length is capped independently. A
+// real browser batch is a handful; 100 is generous headroom. Operators
+// raise or lower it via opts.maxReports.
+var DEFAULT_MAX_REPORTS = 100;
 
 function _truncate(value) {
   if (typeof value !== "string") return value;
@@ -108,16 +117,25 @@ function _normalizeOne(reportLike) {
  * alerting use as `onReport`: a flood of 413s signals a misconfigured
  * `Reporting-Endpoints` URL or a report-bomb. It receives
  * `(req, res, { status, reason })` where `reason` is one of
- * `method-not-allowed` / `payload-too-large` / `invalid-json`. Invoked
- * after the rejection response is written; a throwing hook is swallowed
- * so a broken metrics sink can't crash the endpoint.
+ * `method-not-allowed` / `payload-too-large` / `too-many-reports` /
+ * `invalid-json`. Invoked after the rejection response is written; a
+ * throwing hook is swallowed so a broken metrics sink can't crash the
+ * endpoint.
+ *
+ * A single POST may batch multiple reports; the batch length is capped
+ * at `maxReports` (default 100) independently of the byte cap so an
+ * unauthenticated caller can't force one audit-chain append + `onReport`
+ * hook per entry across a body packed with thousands of tiny reports. A
+ * batch over the cap is refused whole with HTTP 413 + `onReject`
+ * `too-many-reports`.
  *
  * @opts
  *   {
- *     onReport: function(report): void,
- *     onReject: function(req, res, { status, reason }): void,
- *     maxBytes: number,    // default 64 KiB
- *     audit:    boolean,   // default true
+ *     onReport:   function(report): void,
+ *     onReject:   function(req, res, { status, reason }): void,
+ *     maxBytes:   number,    // default 64 KiB
+ *     maxReports: number,    // default 100 — batch length cap
+ *     audit:      boolean,   // default true
  *   }
  *
  * @example
@@ -132,14 +150,17 @@ function _normalizeOne(reportLike) {
  */
 function create(opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, ["audit", "onReport", "onReject", "maxBytes"], "middleware.cspReport");
+  validateOpts(opts, ["audit", "onReport", "onReject", "maxBytes", "maxReports"], "middleware.cspReport");
   if (opts.onReject !== undefined && opts.onReject !== null &&
       typeof opts.onReject !== "function") {
     throw new TypeError("middleware.cspReport: opts.onReject must be a function");
   }
   validateOpts.optionalPositiveInt(opts.maxBytes, "middleware.cspReport: maxBytes");
+  validateOpts.optionalPositiveInt(opts.maxReports, "middleware.cspReport: maxReports");
   var maxBytes = (opts.maxBytes === undefined || opts.maxBytes === null)
     ? DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES : opts.maxBytes;
+  var maxReports = (opts.maxReports === undefined || opts.maxReports === null)
+    ? DEFAULT_MAX_REPORTS : opts.maxReports;
   var auditOn  = opts.audit !== false;
   var onReport = (typeof opts.onReport === "function") ? opts.onReport : null;
   var onReject = (typeof opts.onReject === "function") ? opts.onReject : null;
@@ -177,6 +198,17 @@ function create(opts) {
       return;
     }
     var reports = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];
+    // Fail closed on a report-bomb: a batch whose length exceeds maxReports
+    // is refused whole (413) rather than driving one audit-chain append +
+    // onReport hook per entry. This bounds the per-request work an
+    // unauthenticated caller can force. A throwing/absent audit or hook is
+    // unaffected — nothing is processed on this path.
+    if (reports.length > maxReports) {
+      res.writeHead(413);                                                         // HTTP 413 status
+      res.end();
+      _emitReject(req, res, 413, "too-many-reports");
+      return;
+    }
     for (var i = 0; i < reports.length; i++) {
       var normalized = _normalizeOne(reports[i]);
       if (!normalized) continue;

package/lib/queue-local.js

@@ -467,7 +467,8 @@ function create(config) {
     // dispatches both calls to the same backend.
     var rowBuilt = _select()
       .columns(["_id", "queueName", "payload", "repeatCron", "repeatTimezone",
-                "flowId", "flowChildName", "priority", "classification", "traceId"])
+                "flowId", "flowChildName", "priority", "classification", "traceId",
+                "maxAttempts"])
       .where("_id", jobId)
       .toSql();
     var rowRes = await store.execute(rowBuilt.sql, rowBuilt.params);
@@ -503,6 +504,11 @@ function create(config) {
         var unsealedRow = cryptoField.unsealRow(SEAL_TABLE, row);
         var cron = scheduler.parseCron(unsealedRow.repeatCron);
         var nextMs = scheduler.nextCronFire(cron, new Date(nowMs), unsealedRow.repeatTimezone || null);
+        // Carry the operator's maxAttempts forward: the next occurrence must
+        // keep the same retry budget the operator configured, not silently
+        // reset to the enqueue default. A non-positive / non-finite value
+        // falls back to undefined so enqueue applies its own default.
+        var repeatMax = Number(unsealedRow.maxAttempts);
         await enqueue(unsealedRow.queueName,
           unsealedRow.payload ? safeJson.parse(unsealedRow.payload, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(64) }) : null,
           {
@@ -514,6 +520,7 @@ function create(config) {
             availableAt:     nextMs,
             repeat:          { cron: unsealedRow.repeatCron, timezone: unsealedRow.repeatTimezone },
             priority:        Number(unsealedRow.priority) || 0,
+            maxAttempts:     (isFinite(repeatMax) && repeatMax > 0) ? repeatMax : undefined,
             classification:  unsealedRow.classification || null,
             traceId:         unsealedRow.traceId || null,
           });

package/lib/queue-redis.js

@@ -532,12 +532,17 @@ function create(opts) {
         var cron = scheduler.parseCron(unsealed.repeatCron);
         var nextMs = scheduler.nextCronFire(
           cron, new Date(nowMs), unsealed.repeatTimezone || null);
+        // Carry the operator's maxAttempts forward so the next occurrence keeps
+        // the configured retry budget instead of silently resetting to the
+        // enqueue default (mirrors queue-local's cron-repeat).
+        var repeatMax = Number(unsealed.maxAttempts);
         await enqueue(unsealed.queueName,
           unsealed.payload ? safeJson.parse(unsealed.payload) : null,
           {
             availableAt:     nextMs,
             repeat:          { cron: unsealed.repeatCron, timezone: unsealed.repeatTimezone },
             priority:        Number(unsealed.priority) || 0,
+            maxAttempts:     (isFinite(repeatMax) && repeatMax > 0) ? repeatMax : undefined,
             classification:  unsealed.classification || null,
             traceId:         unsealed.traceId || null,
           });

package/lib/scheduler.js

@@ -135,7 +135,14 @@ function _parseCronField(text, range) {
       hi = parseInt(seg[1], 10);
     } else {
       lo = parseInt(part, 10);
-      hi = lo;
+      // A bare number followed by a step (`N/step`) is the Vixie-cron
+      // shorthand for `N-max/step` (e.g. `5/15` in minutes = 5,20,35,50,
+      // matching crontab.guru and `*/15` = 0,15,30,45). Without a step a
+      // bare number is the single value {N}. Anchoring `hi` at range.max
+      // when a step is present is what turns the step into a repeat; keeping
+      // hi = lo silently collapsed the schedule to a single fire — the same
+      // silent-under-firing class rejected for over-range steps above.
+      hi = (stepIdx !== -1) ? range.max : lo;
     }
     if (!Number.isFinite(lo) || !Number.isFinite(hi) || lo > hi ||
         lo < range.min || hi > range.max) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.17.5",
+  "version": "0.17.7",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:360eade5-cc2d-4f7b-b52b-9e326e021f8a",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:f2295071-6b95-4865-918b-7e76ba9682ea",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-07-17T13:58:58.122Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-07-17T18:09:14.590Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.17.5",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.17.7",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.17.5",
+      "version": "0.17.7",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.17.5",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.17.7",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.17.5",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.17.7",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]