@blamejs/core 0.16.12 → 0.16.13

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.16.x
 
+- v0.16.13 (2026-07-11) — **Make SD-JWT VC verification accept a raw JWK issuer key (its own documented common path), and emit the SMTP command-smuggling audit on a NUL-byte injection — two defects found by covering previously-untested verifier and inbound-server branches.** Covering the uncovered verifier and adversarial-input branches of two more subsystems surfaced two genuine defects, now fixed at the root. b.auth.sdJwtVc.verify rejected a valid credential when the issuerKeyResolver returned a raw JWK object — the very path the code's own comment calls the common one — because the JWK was handed straight to node:crypto.verify, which cannot consume a bare JWK, so verification threw a low-level type error instead of validating; the resolver's JWK is now imported to a key object before verification, matching the holder key-binding path. And the inbound SMTP server refused a command line containing a NUL byte (correct) but never emitted the command-smuggling audit event it emits for bare-CR / bare-LF injection, because it checked for the wrong error code; the audit now fires so a NUL-injection attempt is recorded for forensic triage. A misleading comment in the permissions MFA gate that advertised a non-existent no-freshness-window escape hatch is corrected — the freshness window is always enforced by design. **Fixed:** *b.auth.sdJwtVc.verify accepts a raw JWK from issuerKeyResolver* — When the issuerKeyResolver returned a JWK object — described in the code as the common path — the JWK was passed directly to node:crypto.verify, which requires a key object, so a valid credential failed verification with a raw ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE rather than validating. The resolver's JWK is now imported to a public key object (with the existing algorithm/key-type cross-check preserved) before verification, mirroring the holder key-binding JWT path. Verification succeeds for EC and Ed25519 JWK resolvers. · *Corrected a misleading comment in the permissions MFA freshness gate* — A comment in the requireMfa gate described mfaWindowMs: Infinity as an operator escape hatch for a no-freshness-window pass-through. No such escape hatch exists — both the role- and route-level validators reject a non-finite mfaWindowMs, so MFA freshness is always enforced (defaulting to 15 minutes). Enabling it would let a stolen long-lived cookie with a stale mfaAt bypass the gate. The comment now states the freshness window is always enforced; behavior is unchanged. **Security:** *SMTP inbound server records a command-smuggling audit on NUL-byte injection* — The inbound MX server's command handler refused a command line containing a NUL byte with a 500, but the branch meant to emit the mail.server.mx.smtp_smuggling_detected audit checked for the error code guard-smtp-command/nul-byte while the guard actually raises guard-smtp-command/nul. As a result a NUL-injection command was rejected but not recorded, unlike bare-CR / bare-LF smuggling which was audited. The code match is corrected, so a NUL-byte command-smuggling attempt now produces the forensic audit event.
+
 - v0.16.12 (2026-07-11) — **Restore the static server's drive-by-execution defense, stop the retention sweep from aborting on subject-scoped rules, make wss:// connections to IP addresses work, and return a verdict instead of throwing on a malformed OpenPGP signature — four defects found by covering previously-untested error and adversarial branches.** Writing behavioral tests for the uncovered error and adversarial branches of the framework's most under-tested files surfaced four genuine defects, now fixed at the root. The static file server's safeAttachmentForRiskyMimes option — the drive-by-execution defense that forces Content-Disposition: attachment for risky inline types (text/html, image/svg+xml, application/javascript) — was silently inert: it was read from a value bag that only carries known-default keys, and this option has no default entry, so it always evaluated to false and the whole defense was dead code. The retention sweep threw and aborted entirely whenever a retention rule with a subjectField met a row with a subject value, because it called a lazily-required module as if it were already resolved. A wss:// connection to an IP-address host threw synchronously and was unusable, because the client set the TLS SNI to the IP literal, which the TLS stack forbids. And b.mail.crypto.pgp.verify threw on a truncated or malformed signature integer instead of returning its documented { ok: false } verdict, so a consumer iterating over untrusted signatures crashed rather than getting a negative result. A static gate now flags any option read from a defaults-applied value bag when that option has no default entry, so the static-server class cannot recur. **Fixed:** *Retention sweep no longer aborts on subject-scoped rules* — A retention rule declared with a subjectField consults the subject-level legal-hold registry when a candidate row carries a subject value. That path called the legal-hold module as though it were already resolved, but it is a lazily-required getter that must be invoked to load the module — so the call threw a TypeError, which the sweep converted into a SWEEP_FAILED and aborted the entire run. The getter is now invoked correctly, so subject-scoped retention sweeps proceed. · *wss:// connections to an IP-address host work* — Connecting the WebSocket client to a wss:// URL whose host is an IP literal threw ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE synchronously, because the client set the TLS SNI servername to the IP literal, which RFC 6066 and the Node TLS stack forbid. SNI is now sent only for hostname targets and omitted for IP literals; certificate identity is still verified against the address. **Security:** *Static server's safeAttachmentForRiskyMimes drive-by-execution defense works* — b.staticServe's documented safeAttachmentForRiskyMimes option forces Content-Disposition: attachment for risky inline MIME types (text/html, image/svg+xml, application/javascript) so a browser can't execute an operator-hosted file inline. It was read from the option bag produced by applyDefaults, which strips every key absent from the defaults table — and this option is not a defaults key — so it was always undefined and the defense never engaged. It is now read directly from the caller's options, so enabling it forces the attachment disposition as documented. Operators who set it were relying on a defense that did nothing; it is now active. · *b.mail.crypto.pgp.verify returns a verdict on a malformed signature instead of throwing* — verify() threw MailCryptoError('mail-crypto/pgp/bad-mpi') on a truncated or malformed signature integer, unlike every other malformed-signature path (bad armor, packet parse, hash mismatch), which returns { ok: false, code, reason }. A consumer looping over untrusted signatures and branching on .ok would crash on a crafted input rather than receive a negative verdict. Malformed signature integers now route through the same failure path and return { ok: false }. **Detectors:** *applydefaults-dropped-opt* — A static gate flags any option read from the result of applyDefaults(opts, DEFAULTS) when that option is absent from the DEFAULTS table — the exact shape that silently disabled the static server's attachment defense. The result of applyDefaults carries only the defaults' keys, so such a read is always undefined. The fix is to read the option from the caller's opts directly, or to add it to the defaults table.
 
 - v0.16.11 (2026-07-11) — **Fix a TOML parser bug where every double-quoted key decoded to the empty string — which also let a quoted "__proto__" key slip past the prototype-pollution guard — and return a real 201 from SCIM resource creation, both surfaced by covering previously-untested error and adversarial branches.** Writing behavioral tests for the uncovered error, adversarial, and defensive branches of the framework's most under-tested files surfaced two genuine defects, now fixed at the root. b.parsers.toml decoded every double-quoted (basic) key to the empty string: a document like "host" = "db1" parsed to { "": "db1" }, multiple distinct quoted keys collided onto one empty key, and — the security consequence — a quoted "__proto__" or "constructor" key decoded to the empty string and so slipped past the poisoned-key guard that rejects those names. TOML keys are usually written bare, so the bug was latent since the parser shipped. It is fixed to decode quoted keys correctly, and a quoted "__proto__" / "constructor" is now rejected with toml/poisoned-key. Separately, the SCIM server returned an undefined HTTP status instead of 201 Created when creating a User or Group singleton, because it referenced a status constant that did not exist; it now returns 201 with the created representation. **Fixed:** *b.parsers.toml decodes double-quoted keys correctly* — A basic (double-quoted) key with no escape sequence decoded to the empty string — "host" = "db1" became { "": "db1" }, and multiple distinct quoted keys in one table collided onto a single empty key. The decoder now appends the verbatim key run for both quoted-key kinds, so quoted, literal, dotted, and escaped keys all decode to their intended names. · *SCIM resource creation returns 201 Created* — Creating a User or Group via POST returned an undefined HTTP status because the handler referenced a CREATED status constant that was not defined, so the created representation was written with no valid status code. It now returns 201 with the created resource. **Security:** *b.parsers.toml rejects a quoted __proto__ / constructor key* — The double-quoted-key decoder never appended the key's characters for a basic key, so every double-quoted key resolved to the empty string. A quoted "__proto__" = ... or "constructor" = ... therefore decoded to "", which the poisoned-key guard does not flag, letting those names through. Quoted keys now decode to their real value, and a quoted __proto__ / constructor is rejected with toml/poisoned-key. Bare-key documents were unaffected; only double-quoted keys were mis-decoded.

package/lib/auth/sd-jwt-vc.js

@@ -510,6 +510,12 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
       !Buffer.isBuffer(issuerKey) &&
       typeof issuerKey.kty === "string") {
     jwtExternal._assertAlgKtyMatch(alg, issuerKey);
+    // node:crypto.verify cannot consume a bare JWK object — import it to
+    // a KeyObject first, mirroring the holder KB-JWT path below
+    // (bCrypto.importPublicJwk). Without this a resolver that returns a
+    // JWK (the common path per the CVE-2026-22817 note above) rejects a
+    // VALID credential with ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE instead of verifying.
+    issuerKey = bCrypto.importPublicJwk(issuerKey);
   }
   var jwtParsed = _verifyJwt(jwt, issuerKey, alg);
   // Post-verify header compare. Pre-verify we parsed the

package/lib/mail-server-mx.js

@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       } catch (err) {
         if (err.code === "guard-smtp-command/bare-lf" ||
             err.code === "guard-smtp-command/bare-cr" ||
-            err.code === "guard-smtp-command/nul-byte") {
+            err.code === "guard-smtp-command/nul") {
           _emit("mail.server.mx.smtp_smuggling_detected",
             { connectionId: state.id, code: err.code, line: line.slice(0, 200) },                     // audit-log line truncation
             "denied");

package/lib/permissions.js

@@ -572,9 +572,12 @@ function create(opts) {
         // Window floor — when neither route nor role supplies an
         // explicit mfaWindowMs, default to 15 minutes. Without this
         // floor, a stolen long-lived cookie carrying an old `mfaAt`
-        // walks past every requireMfa: true gate. Operators who want
-        // an explicit no-window pass-through must say so via
-        // mfaWindowMs: Infinity (audited reason).
+        // walks past every requireMfa: true gate. There is deliberately
+        // NO no-window opt-out: the role- and route-level validators
+        // reject a non-finite mfaWindowMs, so freshness is always
+        // enforced. (The `!== Infinity` guard below is a defensive
+        // backstop for a hypothetically-injected value, not a supported
+        // config path.)
         if (enforceWindowMs === null) {
           enforceWindowMs = C.TIME.minutes(15);
         }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.16.12",
+  "version": "0.16.13",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:6bed96f9-e949-4536-b328-26e4e3b8964d",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:b90a5fae-dd42-4003-9780-e63a6ebf948e",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-07-11T10:33:50.471Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-07-11T13:08:36.250Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.16.12",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.16.13",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.16.12",
+      "version": "0.16.13",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.16.12",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.16.13",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.16.12",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.16.13",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]