@blamejs/core 0.15.32 → 0.15.34

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.15.x
 
+- v0.15.34 (2026-06-26) — **`b.mail.crypto.pgp.verify` now accepts every valid RSA OpenPGP signature — one whose value happened to have a high zero byte (about 1 in 256) was being rejected.** An OpenPGP RSA signature is an integer modulo the key's modulus, and ~1 in 256 signatures have a value that begins with a zero byte. The MPI encoding strips those leading zero bytes (RFC 9580 §3.2), but b.mail.crypto.pgp.verify passed the stripped value straight to the RSA verification, which requires a signature exactly the modulus byte length — so a perfectly valid signature was intermittently reported invalid. The signature is now left-padded back to the modulus width before verification, exactly as the Ed25519 path already pads its components. Verification of every valid RSA signature is now reliable, including signatures produced by other OpenPGP implementations. Also includes internal test-tooling: two more guard-suite suppression classes were re-verified and their tokens retired. **Fixed:** *RSA OpenPGP signatures with a high zero byte now verify reliably* — b.mail.crypto.pgp.verify read the RSA signature MPI (whose leading zero bytes the OpenPGP wire format strips) and handed it to the RSA verification without restoring the stripped bytes. Node's RSA verify requires the signature to be exactly the modulus byte length, so a signature whose value had one or more high zero bytes — about 1 in 256 of all signatures, for any key — was rejected as invalid even though it was correct. The signature is now left-padded to the modulus width before verification (the same correction the Ed25519 verification path already applied to its R/S components). This affects signatures the framework produces and signatures from other OpenPGP implementations alike. A deterministic regression test searches for a short-MPI signature and asserts it verifies. **Detectors:** *Two more suppression-marker classes re-verified and their tokens retired* — The raw-hash-compare and seal-without-aad guard classes were re-read and confirmed (a data-residency region tag compared with === — not a secret; and two intentional non-AEAD-bound seals — a non-regulated plain-mode column whose AAD is enforced by the posture seal-envelope floor where it matters, and a throwaway vault-readiness probe), then renamed to descriptive tokens with their old names added to the retired-token set. Test-suite tooling only.
+
+- v0.15.33 (2026-06-26) — **Internal test-suite hardening only — the published library's runtime behavior and public API are unchanged (source-comment marker text aside).** Three more suppression classes in the codebase-patterns guard suite were re-verified from scratch and renamed to descriptive tokens, with their old names recorded as retired and their in-source marker comments updated to match. No runtime code, public API, or wire format changed. **Detectors:** *Three more suppression-marker classes re-verified and their tokens retired* — Continuing the re-verification pass: each marked site for the math-random-noncrypto, raw-new-url, and dynamic-require guard classes was re-read and confirmed (non-security jitter/sampling; URL parsing for shape/origin inspection or behind the safe wrapper; operator-supplied module loads), then the class was renamed to a descriptive token and its old name added to the retired-token set. This is test-suite tooling; no shipped framework behavior changed.
+
 - v0.15.32 (2026-06-26) — **Internal test-suite hardening only — the published library's runtime behavior and public API are unchanged (source-comment marker text aside).** Three more suppression classes in the codebase-patterns guard suite were re-verified from scratch and renamed to descriptive tokens, with their old names recorded as retired so the prior approval cannot be silently resurrected and their in-source marker comments updated to match. No runtime code, public API, or wire format changed. **Detectors:** *Three more suppression-marker classes re-verified and their tokens retired* — Continuing the re-verification pass: each marked site for the process-exit, hand-rolled buffer-collect, and raw-outbound-http guard classes was re-read and confirmed (operator-opt-in exits; bounded protocol-framing / TLV assembly; framework-routed outbound calls), then the class was renamed to a descriptive token and its old name added to the retired-token set. This is test-suite tooling; no shipped framework behavior changed.
 
 - v0.15.31 (2026-06-26) — **Internal test-suite hardening only — the published library's runtime behavior and public API are unchanged (source-comment marker text aside).** The codebase-patterns guard suite gains a gate that retires a renamed suppression-marker token: once a suppression class is re-verified and renamed, its old token cannot be silently re-registered, so a later suppression has to be re-examined under the new name instead of inheriting a stale approval. Eight suppression classes were re-verified and renamed to descriptive tokens this release, and their in-source marker comments were updated to match. No runtime code, public API, or wire format changed. **Detectors:** *Re-verification gate retires a renamed suppression-marker token* — A new guard refuses to re-register a retired suppression-marker token, and the orphan check points a stale marker at its current name. When a suppression class is re-verified, it is renamed to a descriptive token and the old name is recorded as retired, so the old approval cannot be quietly resurrected — a future suppression must be re-examined and re-stamped under the new name. This is test-suite tooling; no shipped framework behavior changed.

package/lib/acme.js

@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ function create(opts) {
         // Non-crypto: RFC 9773 §4.2 fleet-scheduling jitter inside the
         // CA-suggested renewal window. Predictability is not a threat
         // here; uniform distribution across the window is the goal.
-        renewAtMs = jLo + Math.floor(Math.random() * (jHi - jLo + 1));   // allow:math-random-noncrypto — RFC 9773 fleet jitter, predictability not a threat
+        renewAtMs = jLo + Math.floor(Math.random() * (jHi - jLo + 1));   // allow:math-random-noncrypto-jitter-sampling — RFC 9773 fleet jitter, predictability not a threat
       } else {
         // Past-window — renew immediately, no jitter.
         renewAtMs = nowMs;

package/lib/agent-trace.js

@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ function _shouldSample(globalRate, perMethod, method, traceId) {
   // No trace-id supplied — start of a new trace. Operators wire
   // shouldSample(method, ctx.traceId) on every downstream hop so
   // children inherit the decision deterministically.
-  return Math.random() < rate;                                                                          // allow:math-random-noncrypto — start-of-trace seed only; downstream hops pass traceId for deterministic propagation
+  return Math.random() < rate;                                                                          // allow:math-random-noncrypto-jitter-sampling — start-of-trace seed only; downstream hops pass traceId for deterministic propagation
 }
 
 function _formatAttributes(info) {

package/lib/auth/oauth.js

@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ function _validateUrl(url, allowHttp, label) {
   // global flag.
   var isLocalhostHttp = false;
   try {
-    var parsed = new URL(url);                                                                  // allow:raw-new-url — RFC 9700 §4.1.1 localhost-exception lookup; safeUrl re-validates below for non-localhost paths
+    var parsed = new URL(url);                                                                  // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — RFC 9700 §4.1.1 localhost-exception lookup; safeUrl re-validates below for non-localhost paths
     // Strip trailing root-zone dot before the localhost compare.
     // RFC 1034 §3.1 — `localhost.` resolves identically to `localhost`;
     // without the strip, an attacker who registers `evil.com` as a
@@ -2168,7 +2168,7 @@ function create(opts) {
         "parseFrontchannelLogoutRequest: req with url required");
     }
     var u;
-    try { u = new URL(req.url, "http://placeholder.invalid"); }                                  // allow:raw-new-url — req.url is the framework-normalized path; placeholder base provides a synthetic origin for relative-path parse
+    try { u = new URL(req.url, "http://placeholder.invalid"); }                                  // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — req.url is the framework-normalized path; placeholder base provides a synthetic origin for relative-path parse
     catch (_e) {
       throw new OAuthError("auth-oauth/bad-frontchannel-logout-url",
         "parseFrontchannelLogoutRequest: malformed request URL");

package/lib/cli.js

@@ -455,11 +455,11 @@ function _resolveTargetModule(modulePath, ctx) {
   // code never reaches this nodePath.
   if (!modulePath) {
     var root = nodePath.resolve(__dirname, "..");
-    return require(nodePath.join(root, "index.js"));   // allow:dynamic-require — operator-extensibility entry point
+    return require(nodePath.join(root, "index.js"));   // allow:dynamic-require-operator-module — operator-extensibility entry point
   }
   var abs = nodePath.isAbsolute(modulePath) ? modulePath : nodePath.resolve(ctx.cwd, modulePath);
   delete require.cache[require.resolve(abs)];
-  return require(abs);                              // allow:dynamic-require — operator-extensibility entry point
+  return require(abs);                              // allow:dynamic-require-operator-module — operator-extensibility entry point
 }
 
 function _runApiSnapshot(args, ctx) {

package/lib/cluster.js

@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ async function _heartbeat() {
   // budget is in `leaseTtl - heartbeatMs`, not in the jitter
   // window).
   if (!lease) {
-    var jitterMs = Math.floor(Math.random() * (heartbeatMs * 0.4));            // allow:math-random-noncrypto — heartbeat jitter, not security-bearing
+    var jitterMs = Math.floor(Math.random() * (heartbeatMs * 0.4));            // allow:math-random-noncrypto-jitter-sampling — heartbeat jitter, not security-bearing
     if (jitterMs > 0) {
       await safeAsync.sleep(jitterMs);
     }

package/lib/crypto-field.js

@@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ function sealRow(table, row, opts) {
       out[field] = vaultAad.seal(_encodeTyped(out[field]),
         _aadParts(s, table, field, out));
     } else {
-      // allow:seal-without-aad — plain-mode legacy table; operator
+      // allow:seal-without-aad-by-design — plain-mode legacy table; operator
       // opts into AAD via registerTable({aad:true})
       out[field] = vault.seal(_encodeTyped(out[field]));
     }

package/lib/db-schema.js

@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ function runMigrations(database, migrationDir) {
       // Operator-supplied migration file — by definition not statically
       // require-able by a bundler. Anyone bundling this surface into SEA
       // accepts that runtime migration loading won't resolve.
-      mig = require(fullPath);   // allow:dynamic-require — operator-supplied migration
+      mig = require(fullPath);   // allow:dynamic-require-operator-module — operator-supplied migration
     } catch (e) {
       throw new Error("migration '" + file + "' failed to load: " + e.message);
     }

package/lib/external-db.js

@@ -1709,7 +1709,7 @@ function _crossBorderRegulated(posture) {
 
 function _residencyCompatible(primaryTag, replicaTag) {
   if (!primaryTag || !replicaTag) return true;
-  if (primaryTag === replicaTag) return true; // allow:raw-hash-compare — residency tag string, not a secret hash
+  if (primaryTag === replicaTag) return true; // allow:raw-hash-compare-nonsecret-tag — residency tag string, not a secret hash
   if (primaryTag === "unrestricted" || replicaTag === "unrestricted") return true;
   return false;
 }

package/lib/gate-contract.js

@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ function canaryGate(gate, opts) {
     name: opts.name || "canary",
     check: async function (ctx) {
       var d = await gate.check(ctx);
-      if (d.action === "refuse" && Math.random() > rate) {       // allow:math-random-noncrypto — canary sampling, non-security
+      if (d.action === "refuse" && Math.random() > rate) {       // allow:math-random-noncrypto-jitter-sampling — canary sampling, non-security
         return Object.assign({}, d, { ok: true, action: "warn" });
       }
       return d;

package/lib/json-schema.js

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ function _resolveUri(ref, base) {
   // RFC 3986 relative→absolute resolution of a schema $id/$ref (operator-
   // trusted schema text, not request data); safeUrl.parse intentionally
   // rejects the relative refs and non-http schemes schemas legitimately use.
-  try { return new URL(ref, base).href; }   // allow:raw-new-url — schema $id/$ref URI resolution, not request-data URL handling
+  try { return new URL(ref, base).href; }   // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — schema $id/$ref URI resolution, not request-data URL handling
   catch (_e) {
     // Relative resolution against a non-URL base (e.g. "urn:..." or a
     // bare name). Fall back to fragment-aware concatenation.
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ function _checkFormat(format, value, type) {
       if (/\s/.test(value)) return false;                       // raw whitespace is not a valid URI
       if (/%(?![0-9A-Fa-f]{2})/.test(value)) return false;      // malformed percent-escape
       if (!/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*:/.test(value)) return false;   // absolute URI requires a scheme   // allow:regex-no-length-cap — linear scheme prefix
-      try { new URL(value); return true; } catch (_e) { return false; }   // allow:raw-new-url — string-shape check, no fetch / SSRF surface
+      try { new URL(value); return true; } catch (_e) { return false; }   // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — string-shape check, no fetch / SSRF surface
     }
     case "uuid": return /^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$/.test(value);   // allow:regex-no-length-cap — fixed-width UUID
     case "ipv4": return /^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/.test(value) && value.split(".").every(function (o) { return Number(o) <= 255; });   // allow:regex-no-length-cap — bounded dotted-quad

package/lib/mail-crypto-pgp.js

@@ -865,11 +865,22 @@ function verify(opts) {
   var ok;
   if (parsed.pubAlg === PUB_ALG_RSA) {
     var rsaMpi = _readMpi(parsed.sigMpisBytes, 0);
+    // The signature is an integer in [0, n); when its value has one or more
+    // high zero bytes (~1/256 of signatures) the OpenPGP MPI encoding strips
+    // them (RFC 9580 §3.2), but node's RSA verify requires a signature exactly
+    // the modulus byte length. Left-pad the stripped MPI back to the modulus
+    // width — the same correction the Ed25519 branch applies to its R/S
+    // components below — or a valid signature is rejected.
+    var rsaSigBytes = rsaMpi.value;
+    var modLen = rsaPub.n.length;
+    if (rsaSigBytes.length < modLen) {
+      rsaSigBytes = Buffer.concat([Buffer.alloc(modLen - rsaSigBytes.length), rsaSigBytes]);
+    }
     try {
       ok = nodeCrypto.verify(hashName, hashInput, {
         key: publicKey,
         padding: nodeCrypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING,
-      }, rsaMpi.value);
+      }, rsaSigBytes);
     } catch (e) {
       return _fail("mail-crypto/pgp/verify-error",
         "RSA verify threw: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));

package/lib/mcp.js

@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ function _toolResultSanitize(result, opts) {
     } else if (block.type === "image" || block.type === "resource_link" || block.type === "audio") {
       var url = block.url || (block.resource && block.resource.uri);
       if (typeof url === "string" && url.length > 0 && allowedHosts.length > 0) {
-        var u; try { u = new URL(url); } catch (_e) { u = null; }                                // allow:raw-new-url — operator-supplied tool URL; allowlist enforced below
+        var u; try { u = new URL(url); } catch (_e) { u = null; }                                // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — operator-supplied tool URL; allowlist enforced below
         if (!u || allowedHosts.indexOf(u.host) === -1) {
           issues.push({ kind: "off-allowlist-url", index: i, url: url });
           if (posture === "sanitize") continue;                                                  // drop the block in sanitize mode

package/lib/middleware/csrf-protect.js

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ function _checkOriginAllowed(req, allowedOrigins, isHttpsFn, requireOrigin) {
 
   function _originOf(rawUrl) {
     try {
-      var u = new URL(rawUrl);                                                   // allow:raw-new-url — origin-shape inspection (NOT outbound). Intentionally tolerates file:// / data: which safeUrl.parse refuses.
+      var u = new URL(rawUrl);                                                   // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — origin-shape inspection (NOT outbound). Intentionally tolerates file:// / data: which safeUrl.parse refuses.
       return u.origin;                                                           // "https://host:port" — no path / query / fragment
     } catch (_e) { return null; }
   }

package/lib/middleware/idempotency-key.js

@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ function dbStore(opts) {
   var sealEnabled = false;
   if (sealReq) {
     try {
-      // allow:seal-without-aad — vault-readiness probe; throwaway
+      // allow:seal-without-aad-by-design — vault-readiness probe; throwaway
       // sentinel value, not row-bound data
       vault.seal("__idempotency_seal_probe__");
       sealEnabled = true;

package/lib/module-loader.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * operator-supplied module file (a migration or a seed) by path.
  *
  * Operator modules execute arbitrary code on `require`, so the dynamic
- * `require()` lives here behind ONE `allow:dynamic-require` marker rather
+ * `require()` lives here behind ONE `allow:dynamic-require-operator-module` marker rather
  * than scattered across every host-CLI loader (`b.migrations`,
  * `b.seeders`, `b.externalDb.migrate`). The require cache is busted first
  * so a dev / test rewriting a fixture between calls picks up the new
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 function requireFresh(absPath, onLoadError) {
   try { delete require.cache[require.resolve(absPath)]; } catch (_e) { /* not yet cached */ }
   try {
-    return require(absPath);   // allow:dynamic-require — operator-supplied module (migration / seed)
+    return require(absPath);   // allow:dynamic-require-operator-module — operator-supplied module (migration / seed)
   } catch (e) {
     throw onLoadError(e);
   }

package/lib/retry.js

@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ function backoffDelay(attempt, opts) {
   // 30-50K randomInt/sec under a retry storm without any security
   // payoff. Math.random's PRNG is the right tool for
   // thundering-herd avoidance.
-  var jitter = capped * opts.jitterFactor * Math.random();                                           // allow:math-random-noncrypto — jitter for thundering-herd, not a confidentiality primitive
+  var jitter = capped * opts.jitterFactor * Math.random();                                           // allow:math-random-noncrypto-jitter-sampling — jitter for thundering-herd, not a confidentiality primitive
   return Math.floor(capped - jitter);
 }
 

package/lib/safe-url.js

@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ function format(url) {
     }
     // Constructing URL() is the path that surfaces the IDN-crash on
     // older Node — wrap so the listener never crashes.
-    var u = new URL(url);   // allow:raw-new-url — safeUrl.format wraps URL ctor for CVE-2026-21712; this IS the safe wrapper.
+    var u = new URL(url);   // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — safeUrl.format wraps URL ctor for CVE-2026-21712; this IS the safe wrapper.
     return u.href;
   } catch (e) {
     if (e && e.isSafeUrlError) throw e;

package/lib/ssrf-guard.js

@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ function createAllowlist(opts) {
   }
   async function assertUrl(url) {
     var parsed;
-    try { parsed = new URL(url); }                                                 // allow:raw-new-url — local URL parse for hostname extraction
+    try { parsed = new URL(url); }                                                 // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — local URL parse for hostname extraction
     catch (_e) {
       throw new SsrfError("invalid URL", "ssrf-guard/bad-url", { url: url });
     }

package/lib/vendor-data.js

@@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ function _loadAndVerify(name) {
     throw new VendorDataError("vendor-data/module-missing",
       "vendorData: '" + name + "' .data.js module not statically " +
       "require'd by lib/vendor-data.js. Add the literal-string require " +
-      "to the _MODULES table at the top of the file — dynamic " +    // allow:dynamic-require — diagnostic message text
-      "require(variable) breaks SEA / esbuild bundling.");           // allow:dynamic-require — diagnostic message text
+      "to the _MODULES table at the top of the file — dynamic " +    // allow:dynamic-require-operator-module — diagnostic message text
+      "require(variable) breaks SEA / esbuild bundling.");           // allow:dynamic-require-operator-module — diagnostic message text
   }
 
   // Module-shape gate

package/lib/websocket.js

@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ function isOriginAllowed(req, origins) {
     var host = (req.headers || {}).host;
     if (!host) return false;
     var originHost;
-    try { originHost = new URL(origin).host; }                                   // allow:raw-new-url — comparing browser-supplied Origin header against Host; safeUrl.parse adds policy filtering that isn't appropriate for exact host comparison
+    try { originHost = new URL(origin).host; }                                   // allow:raw-new-url-parse-only — comparing browser-supplied Origin header against Host; safeUrl.parse adds policy filtering that isn't appropriate for exact host comparison
     catch (_e) { return false; }
     return originHost === host;
   }

package/lib/ws-client.js

@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ class WsClient extends EventEmitter {
     this._reconnectAttempt += 1;
     var attempt = Math.min(this._reconnectAttempt, 30);                                   // clamp 2^attempt overflow
     var ceiling = Math.min(rOpts.maxMs, rOpts.baseMs * Math.pow(2, attempt - 1));
-    var delay   = Math.floor(Math.random() * ceiling);                                    // allow:math-random-noncrypto — backoff jitter, not security
+    var delay   = Math.floor(Math.random() * ceiling);                                    // allow:math-random-noncrypto-jitter-sampling — backoff jitter, not security
     var self = this;
     this._reconnectTimer = setTimeout(function () {
       self._reconnectTimer = null;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.15.32",
+  "version": "0.15.34",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:c545cdae-c805-48ed-bc85-5ab5c993961a",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:4006bc32-7ae3-4f18-bad1-057410956255",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-06-26T20:40:06.256Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-06-27T01:06:19.602Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.15.32",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.15.34",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.15.32",
+      "version": "0.15.34",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.15.32",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.15.34",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.15.32",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.15.34",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]