@blamejs/core 0.15.12 → 0.15.14

package/lib/guard-graphql.js

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ var codepointClass = require("./codepoint-class");
 var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
 var gateContract = require("./gate-contract");
 var C = require("./constants");
-var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
+var pick = require("./pick");
 var { GuardGraphqlError } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
@@ -100,10 +100,7 @@ var PROTO_POISON_QUERY_RE = /[\s,({:]\$?(?:__proto__|constructor|prototype)\b/;
 
 var PROFILES = Object.freeze({
   "strict": {
-    bidiPolicy:                 "reject",
-    controlPolicy:              "reject",
-    nullBytePolicy:             "reject",
-    zeroWidthPolicy:            "reject",
+    ...gateContract.CHAR_THREATS_REJECT_ALL,
     introspectionPolicy:        "reject",
     persistedQueryPolicy:       "audit",
     operationNamePolicy:        "audit",
@@ -120,10 +117,7 @@ var PROFILES = Object.freeze({
     maxRuntimeMs:               C.TIME.seconds(2),
   },
   "balanced": {
-    bidiPolicy:                 "reject",
-    controlPolicy:              "reject",
-    nullBytePolicy:             "reject",
-    zeroWidthPolicy:            "reject",
+    ...gateContract.CHAR_THREATS_REJECT_ALL,
     introspectionPolicy:        "audit",
     persistedQueryPolicy:       "audit",
     operationNamePolicy:        "audit",
@@ -140,10 +134,7 @@ var PROFILES = Object.freeze({
     maxRuntimeMs:               C.TIME.seconds(2),
   },
   "permissive": {
-    bidiPolicy:                 "reject",                                        // BIDI refused at every profile
-    controlPolicy:              "reject",                                        // controls refused at every profile
-    nullBytePolicy:             "reject",                                        // null refused at every profile
-    zeroWidthPolicy:            "reject",                                        // zero-width refused at every profile
+    ...gateContract.CHAR_THREATS_REJECT_ALL,
     introspectionPolicy:        "allow",
     persistedQueryPolicy:       "allow",
     operationNamePolicy:        "allow",
@@ -161,35 +152,6 @@ var PROFILES = Object.freeze({
   },
 });
 
-var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze(Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
-  mode: "enforce",
-}));
-
-var COMPLIANCE_POSTURES = Object.freeze({
-  "hipaa":   Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
-    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(512),
-  }),
-  "pci-dss": Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
-    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(512),
-  }),
-  "gdpr":    Object.assign({}, PROFILES["balanced"], {
-    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(256),
-  }),
-  "soc2":    Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
-    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(1024),
-  }),
-});
-
-function _resolveOpts(opts) {
-  return gateContract.resolveProfileAndPosture(opts, {
-    profiles:           PROFILES,
-    compliancePostures: COMPLIANCE_POSTURES,
-    defaults:           DEFAULTS,
-    errorClass:         GuardGraphqlError,
-    errCodePrefix:      "graphql",
-  });
-}
-
 // _measureQueryShape — walks the query string and computes
 // brace-depth + per-selection-set alias counts using simple paren
 // counting. Not a full GraphQL parser (operator runs the schema-
@@ -333,9 +295,7 @@ function _detectIssues(req, opts) {
   var pVar = req.variables;
   var pHas = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
   var pName = (pVar && typeof pVar === "object" && !Array.isArray(pVar) &&
-    (pHas.call(pVar, "__proto__")   ? "__proto__"   :
-     pHas.call(pVar, "constructor") ? "constructor" :
-     pHas.call(pVar, "prototype")   ? "prototype"   : null));
+    pick.POISONED_KEYS.find(function (pk) { return pHas.call(pVar, pk); })) || null;
   if (pName) {
     issues.push({
       kind: "variable-prototype-poison", severity: "critical",
@@ -500,14 +460,11 @@ function _detectIssues(req, opts) {
  *   var ok = b.guardGraphql.validate(benign, { profile: "strict" });
  *   ok.ok;                                              // → true
  */
-function validate(input, opts) {
-  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
-  numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts,
-    ["maxBytes", "maxQueryBytes", "maxVariableBytes",
-     "maxDepth", "maxAliasesPerSelection", "maxBatchSize"],
-    "guardGraphql.validate", GuardGraphqlError, "graphql.bad-opt");
-  return gateContract.aggregateIssues(_detectIssues(input, opts));
-}
+// validate is assembled by gateContract.defineGuard from `detect`
+// (_detectIssues) below — `validate(input, opts) = aggregateIssues(detect(
+// input, resolveOpts(opts)))`, with the byte / depth / alias / batch caps
+// declared via `intOpts`. The @primitive block above documents the
+// resulting public ABI.
 
 /**
  * @primitive  b.guardGraphql.sanitize
@@ -539,10 +496,11 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *     e.code;                                           // → "graphql.introspection"
  *   }
  */
-function sanitize(input, opts) {
-  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
-  var issues = _detectIssues(input, opts);
-  gateContract.throwOnRefusalSeverity(issues, { errorClass: GuardGraphqlError, codePrefix: "graphql" });
+// _sanitizeTransform — the guard-specific normalize applied by defineGuard's
+// generated sanitize AFTER resolve → detect → throw-on-refusal. GraphQL
+// request bundles can't be partially repaired; once detection passes with no
+// critical/high issue, the input is returned unchanged.
+function _sanitizeTransform(input) {
   return input;
 }
 
@@ -583,25 +541,19 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *   rv.issues[0].ruleId;                                // → "graphql.alias-bomb"
  */
 function gate(opts) {
-  opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
+  opts = _guard.resolveOpts(opts);
   return gateContract.buildGuardGate(
     opts.name || "guardGraphql:" + (opts.profile || "default"),
     opts,
     async function (ctx) {
       var req = ctx && (ctx.graphqlRequest || ctx.gql);
       if (!req) return { ok: true, action: "serve" };
-      var rv = validate(req, opts);
-      if (rv.issues.length === 0) return { ok: true, action: "serve" };
-      var hasCritical = rv.issues.some(function (i) {
-        return i.severity === "critical";
-      });
-      var hasHigh = rv.issues.some(function (i) {
-        return i.severity === "high";
-      });
-      if (!hasCritical && !hasHigh) {
-        return { ok: true, action: "audit-only", issues: rv.issues };
-      }
-      return { ok: false, action: "refuse", issues: rv.issues };
+      // validate is assembled by defineGuard (from `detect` below) and lives
+      // on the frozen module.exports; the gate is only invoked at runtime,
+      // after the export is assigned. Behaviour is identical to the prior
+      // local validate (resolve → intOpts → aggregateIssues(detect)).
+      var rv = module.exports.validate(req, opts);
+      return gateContract.severityDisposition(rv.issues);
     });
 }
 
@@ -636,15 +588,16 @@ var INTEGRATION_FIXTURES = Object.freeze({
 // surface (validate / sanitize / bespoke gate) passed through verbatim.
 // The custom KIND ("graphql-request") is accepted because the bespoke
 // gate reads its own ctx fields (ctx.graphqlRequest / ctx.gql).
-module.exports = gateContract.defineGuard({
+var _guard = module.exports = gateContract.defineGuard({
   name:        "graphql",
   kind:        "graphql-request",
   errorClass:  GuardGraphqlError,
   profiles:    PROFILES,
-  defaults:    DEFAULTS,
-  postures:    COMPLIANCE_POSTURES,
+  base:        512,
   integrationFixtures: INTEGRATION_FIXTURES,
-  validate:    validate,
-  sanitize:    sanitize,
+  detect:            _detectIssues,
+  sanitizeTransform: _sanitizeTransform,
+  intOpts:           ["maxBytes", "maxQueryBytes", "maxVariableBytes",
+                      "maxDepth", "maxAliasesPerSelection", "maxBatchSize"],
   gate:        gate,
 });

package/lib/guard-html-wcag.js

@@ -82,6 +82,19 @@ var _TAG_RE = tagwalk.TAG_RE;
 var _parseAttrs = tagwalk.parseAttrs;
 var _lineColAt = tagwalk.lineColAt;
 
+// Strip every HTML tag for plain-text measurement. Re-runs the tag regex
+// until the string is stable so nested-bracket residue (e.g. `<scr<x>ipt>`)
+// cannot survive a single pass. Output is used only for text-length / content
+// checks, never re-emitted as HTML.
+function _stripTags(s) {
+  var prev;
+  do {
+    prev = s;
+    s = s.replace(/<[^>]+>/g, "");
+  } while (s !== prev);
+  return s;
+}
+
 function _innerText(html, tagOpenEnd, tagName) {
   var lower = tagName.toLowerCase();
   var closeRe = new RegExp("</\\s*" + lower + "\\s*>", "i");                       // allow:dynamic-regex — `lower` is a tag name from the framework's static SC registry, not operator input; `\\s*` and tag name are RegExp-safe (no special chars)
@@ -89,7 +102,7 @@ function _innerText(html, tagOpenEnd, tagName) {
   var m = closeRe.exec(html);
   if (!m) return "";
   var raw = html.slice(tagOpenEnd, m.index);
-  return raw.replace(/<[^>]+>/g, "").replace(/&[a-z]+;|&#\d+;/gi, "").trim();
+  return _stripTags(raw).replace(/&[a-z]+;|&#\d+;/gi, "").trim();
 }
 
 // ---- Per-element checks ----
@@ -270,7 +283,7 @@ function _checkPageTitle(html, report, opts) {
     });
     return;
   }
-  var title = m[1].replace(/<[^>]+>/g, "").trim();
+  var title = _stripTags(m[1]).trim();
   if (title.length === 0) {
     var pos2 = _lineColAt(html, m.index);
     _addFinding(report, {

package/lib/guard-html.js

@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@
  */
 
 var codepointClass = require("./codepoint-class");
+var markupTokenizer = require("./markup-tokenizer");
+var markupEscape = require("./markup-escape").markupEscape;
 var guardHtmlWcag = require("./guard-html-wcag");
 var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
 var gateContract = require("./gate-contract");
@@ -105,7 +107,6 @@ var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability");
 void observability;
 
 var _err = GuardHtmlError.factory;
-var HEX_RADIX = 16;                                                 // base-16 radix, not byte size
 
 // ---- Codepoint catalog (shared via lib/codepoint-class) ----
 
@@ -179,16 +180,14 @@ var URL_ATTRS = Object.freeze([
 ]);
 
 // Always-allowed schemes (every profile).
-var SAFE_SCHEMES = Object.freeze(["http", "https", "mailto", "tel"]);
+var SAFE_SCHEMES = gateContract.SAFE_URL_SCHEMES;
 
 // Schemes denied by default. `data` is dangerous globally except in
 // image context (data:image/*) which is the only data: payload that
 // can't directly script the page; the per-attribute check below honours
 // that exception when allowImageData=true and the host tag is <img>.
-var DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = Object.freeze([
-  "javascript", "vbscript", "livescript", "mocha", "ecmascript",
-  "file", "mhtml", "jar", "intent", "view-source", "feed", "data",
-]);
+// Markup-attribute scheme denylist — the shared XSS / dangerous-resource set.
+var DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = gateContract.DANGEROUS_URL_SCHEMES;
 
 // CSS dangerous tokens — case-insensitive match against attribute
 // value content.
@@ -291,54 +290,12 @@ var PROFILES = Object.freeze({
   },
 });
 
-var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze(Object.assign({}, PROFILES["strict"], {
-  mode:          "enforce",
+var DEFAULTS = gateContract.strictDefaults(PROFILES, {
   maxRuntimeMs:  C.TIME.seconds(30),
-}));
-
-var COMPLIANCE_POSTURES = Object.freeze({
-  "hipaa": {
-    allowedTags:      STRICT_ALLOWED_TAGS,
-    bidiPolicy:       "reject",
-    controlPolicy:    "reject",
-    nullBytePolicy:   "reject",
-    cssPolicy:        "reject",
-    domClobberPolicy: "reject",
-    mxssHintPolicy:   "reject",
-    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(256),
-  },
-  "pci-dss": {
-    allowedTags:      STRICT_ALLOWED_TAGS,
-    bidiPolicy:       "reject",
-    controlPolicy:    "reject",
-    nullBytePolicy:   "reject",
-    cssPolicy:        "reject",
-    domClobberPolicy: "reject",
-    mxssHintPolicy:   "reject",
-    urlSchemes:       SAFE_SCHEMES,
-    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(256),
-  },
-  "gdpr": {
-    allowedTags:      BALANCED_ALLOWED_TAGS,
-    bidiPolicy:       "strip",
-    controlPolicy:    "strip",
-    cssPolicy:        "strip",
-    domClobberPolicy: "strip",
-    mxssHintPolicy:   "audit",
-    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(128),
-  },
-  "soc2": {
-    allowedTags:      STRICT_ALLOWED_TAGS,
-    bidiPolicy:       "reject",
-    controlPolicy:    "reject",
-    nullBytePolicy:   "reject",
-    cssPolicy:        "reject",
-    domClobberPolicy: "reject",
-    mxssHintPolicy:   "reject",
-    forensicSnippetBytes: C.BYTES.bytes(512),
-  },
 });
 
+var COMPLIANCE_POSTURES = gateContract.compliancePostures(PROFILES, { base: 256 });
+
 // ---- Internal helpers ----
 
 function _resolveOpts(opts) {
@@ -372,12 +329,7 @@ function _resolveOpts(opts) {
  */
 function escapeText(value) {
   var s = value == null ? "" : String(value);
-  return s
-    .replace(/&/g, "&amp;")
-    .replace(/</g, "&lt;")
-    .replace(/>/g, "&gt;")
-    .replace(/"/g, "&quot;")
-    .replace(/'/g, "&#39;");
+  return markupEscape(s, { apos: "&#39;" });
 }
 
 /**
@@ -401,12 +353,9 @@ function escapeText(value) {
  */
 function escapeAttr(value) {
   var s = value == null ? "" : String(value);
-  return s
-    .replace(/&/g, "&amp;")
-    .replace(/</g, "&lt;")
-    .replace(/>/g, "&gt;")
-    .replace(/"/g, "&quot;")
-    .replace(/'/g, "&#39;")
+  // Base markup chars + apostrophe via markupEscape; the backtick + "="
+  // escapes are the IE attribute-injection hardening unique to this escaper.
+  return markupEscape(s, { apos: "&#39;" })
     .replace(/`/g, "&#96;")
     .replace(/=/g, "&#61;");
 }
@@ -440,14 +389,11 @@ var NAMED_ENTITY_ASCII = {
 // scheme. Returns "" if no scheme.
 function _extractScheme(rawUrl) {
   var s = String(rawUrl || "").trim();
-  // Decode HTML numeric entities just enough to expose hidden schemes
-  // like &#x6A;avascript:... or &#106;avascript:...
-  s = s.replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);/gi, function (_m, h) {
-    return String.fromCharCode(parseInt(h, HEX_RADIX));
-  });
-  s = s.replace(/&#(\d+);/g, function (_m, d) {
-    return String.fromCharCode(parseInt(d, 10));
-  });
+  // Decode HTML numeric entities (hex &#x..; and decimal &#..;, semicolon
+  // OPTIONAL) just enough to expose hidden schemes like &#x6A;avascript: or
+  // the browser-decoded no-semicolon form &#106avascript:. Shared decoder so
+  // guard-html / guard-svg / guard-markdown can't drift (see codepoint-class).
+  s = codepointClass.decodeNumericEntities(s);
   // Decode HTML5 named entities that browsers honor inside URL
   // contexts. Without this, payloads like `java&Tab;script:alert(1)`
   // bypass the scheme allowlist (the literal `&Tab;` between `java`
@@ -511,9 +457,10 @@ function _isCssDangerous(value) {
 
 function _tokenize(input, maxBytes) {
   var s = String(input || "");
-  if (s.length > maxBytes) {
+  var nb = Buffer.byteLength(s, "utf8");
+  if (nb > maxBytes) {
     throw _err("html.too-large",
-      "input " + s.length + " bytes exceeds maxBytes " + maxBytes);
+      "input " + nb + " bytes exceeds maxBytes " + maxBytes);
   }
   var tokens = [];
   var len = s.length;
@@ -531,9 +478,11 @@ function _tokenize(input, maxBytes) {
 
     // Comment / CDATA / doctype
     if (s.startsWith("<!--", lt)) {
-      var endC = s.indexOf("-->", lt + 4);
+      // WHATWG comment end (covers "--!>" + abrupt "<!-->" / "<!--->"), not
+      // only "-->", so a smuggled element after an early terminator is split
+      // out as a live token instead of hidden inside the comment (mXSS).
+      var endC = markupTokenizer.htmlCommentEnd(s, lt);
       if (endC === -1) endC = len;
-      else endC += 3;
       tokens.push({ type: "comment", raw: s.slice(lt, endC), start: lt, end: endC });
       pos = endC; continue;
     }
@@ -567,28 +516,15 @@ function _tokenize(input, maxBytes) {
 
     // Start tag — find the matching `>`, but skip over `>` inside
     // quoted attribute values.
-    var p = lt + 1;
-    var inQuote = "";
-    while (p < len) {
-      var ch = s.charAt(p);
-      if (inQuote) {
-        if (ch === inQuote) inQuote = "";
-      } else {
-        if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") inQuote = ch;
-        else if (ch === ">") break;
-      }
-      p += 1;
-    }
+    var p = markupTokenizer.scanToTagEnd(s, lt + 1, len);
     var endT = p < len ? p + 1 : len;
     var raw = s.slice(lt, endT);
     var inner = raw.slice(1, raw.charAt(raw.length - 1) === ">" ? raw.length - 1 : raw.length);
     if (inner.endsWith("/")) inner = inner.slice(0, inner.length - 1);
 
-    var nameMatch = inner.match(/^([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9:-]*)/);
-    var tagName = nameMatch ? nameMatch[1].toLowerCase() : "";
-    var attrSrc = nameMatch ? inner.slice(nameMatch[0].length) : "";
-
-    var attrs = _parseAttrs(attrSrc);
+    var htmlParts = markupTokenizer.splitTagNameAttrs(inner, /^([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9:-]*)/);
+    var tagName = htmlParts.tagName;
+    var attrs = _parseAttrs(htmlParts.attrSrc);
     tokens.push({
       type: "tag", name: tagName, attrs: attrs,
       raw: raw, start: lt, end: endT,
@@ -643,7 +579,7 @@ function _parseAttrs(src) {
 function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
   var s = String(input || "");
   // 1. Whole-input bidi / null-byte / control char threats.
-  var issues = codepointClass.detectCharThreats(s, opts, "html");
+  var issues = codepointClass.detectCharThreats(s, opts, "html", "warn");
 
   var tokens;
   try { tokens = _tokenize(s, opts.maxBytes); }
@@ -712,7 +648,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
       for (var ai = 0; ai < attrs.length; ai += 1) {
         var a = attrs[ai];
         var an = a.name.toLowerCase();
-        if (a.value && a.value.length > opts.maxAttrValueBytes) {
+        if (a.value && Buffer.byteLength(a.value, "utf8") > opts.maxAttrValueBytes) {
           issues.push({
             kind: "attr-value-too-large", severity: "high",
             ruleId: "html.attr-size",
@@ -814,9 +750,10 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
 
 function _sanitize(input, opts) {
   var s = String(input || "");
-  if (s.length > opts.maxBytes) {
+  var nb = Buffer.byteLength(s, "utf8");
+  if (nb > opts.maxBytes) {
     throw _err("html.too-large",
-      "input " + s.length + " bytes exceeds maxBytes " + opts.maxBytes);
+      "input " + nb + " bytes exceeds maxBytes " + opts.maxBytes);
   }
   codepointClass.assertNoCharThreats(s, opts, _err, "html");
   s = codepointClass.applyCharStripPolicies(s, opts);
@@ -884,7 +821,7 @@ function _sanitize(input, opts) {
       if (EVENT_HANDLER_RE.test(an)) continue;
       if (DANGEROUS_ATTRS.indexOf(an) !== -1) continue;
       if (Object.keys(allowedAttrs).length > 0 && !allowedAttrs[an]) continue;
-      if (a.value && a.value.length > opts.maxAttrValueBytes) continue;
+      if (a.value && Buffer.byteLength(a.value, "utf8") > opts.maxAttrValueBytes) continue;
       if (_isUrlAttr(an)) {
         var scheme = _extractScheme(a.value);
         if (scheme && DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.indexOf(scheme) !== -1) {
@@ -1061,39 +998,47 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *   rv.ok;       // → false
  *   rv.action;   // → "refuse"
  */
+// Disposition of each html finding = what the operator's policy for that class
+// selected. The configurable classes (CSS injection / DOM-clobbering / mXSS
+// hint) and the bidi / null / control char threats follow their policies
+// (sanitize under `strip`, refuse under `reject`, audit under `audit`). The
+// always-dangerous denylist (dangerous tag / event handler / dangerous attr /
+// dangerous URL scheme) refuses — stripping a script-equivalent is not a
+// provable repair (an mXSS / parser-differential vector can survive); a
+// non-allowlisted but otherwise-benign tag / scheme sanitizes (the allowlist
+// sanitizer drops it); structural caps and a tokenizer failure refuse.
+// Exhaustive over every kind the detection pass emits.
+function _gateDispositionFor(issue, opts) {
+  var shared = gateContract.charThreatDisposition(issue, opts);
+  if (shared) return shared;
+  switch (issue.kind) {
+    case "css-injection":             return gateContract.policyDisposition(opts.cssPolicy);
+    case "dom-clobber":               return gateContract.policyDisposition(opts.domClobberPolicy);
+    case "mxss-hint":                 return gateContract.policyDisposition(opts.mxssHintPolicy);
+    case "non-allowlisted-tag":
+    case "non-allowlisted-url-scheme": return "sanitize";
+    case "dangerous-tag":
+    case "event-handler":
+    case "dangerous-attr":
+    case "dangerous-url-scheme":      return "refuse";
+    case "tokenize-failed":
+    case "ie-conditional-comment":
+    case "depth-cap":
+    case "attr-count-cap":
+    case "attr-value-too-large":      return "refuse";
+    default:                          return null;
+  }
+}
+
 function gate(opts) {
   opts = _resolveOpts(opts);
-  return gateContract.buildGuardGate(
-    opts.name || "guardHtml:" + (opts.profile || "default"),
-    opts,
-    async function (ctx) {
-      var text = gateContract.extractBytesAsText(ctx);
-      if (!text) return { ok: true, action: "serve" };
-      var rv = validate(text, opts);
-      if (rv.issues.length === 0) return { ok: true, action: "serve" };
-      var hasCritical = rv.issues.some(function (i) {
-        return i.severity === "critical" || i.severity === "high";
-      });
-      if (!hasCritical) return { ok: true, action: "audit-only", issues: rv.issues };
-
-      // Sanitize attempt — only when no policy says reject.
-      if (opts.bidiPolicy !== "reject" &&
-          opts.controlPolicy !== "reject" &&
-          opts.nullBytePolicy !== "reject" &&
-          opts.cssPolicy !== "reject" &&
-          opts.domClobberPolicy !== "reject" &&
-          opts.mxssHintPolicy !== "reject") {
-        try {
-          var clean = sanitize(text, opts);
-          return {
-            ok: true, action: "sanitize",
-            sanitized: Buffer.from(clean, "utf8"),
-            issues: rv.issues,
-          };
-        } catch (_e) { /* fall through */ }
-      }
-      return { ok: false, action: "refuse", issues: rv.issues };
-    });
+  return gateContract.buildContentGate({
+    name:     opts.name || "guardHtml:" + (opts.profile || "default"),
+    opts:     opts,
+    validate: validate,
+    dispositionFor: _gateDispositionFor,
+    produceSanitized: function (text, o) { return sanitize(text, o); },
+  });
 }
 
 // buildProfile / compliancePosture / loadRulePack are assembled by
@@ -1135,6 +1080,7 @@ module.exports = gateContract.defineGuard({
   sanitize:    sanitize,
   gate:        gate,
   extra: {
+    _gateDispositionForTest: _gateDispositionFor,
     escapeText:              escapeText,
     escapeAttr:              escapeAttr,
     DANGEROUS_TAGS:          DANGEROUS_TAGS,

package/lib/guard-idempotency-key.js

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 var gateContract = require("./gate-contract");
+var codepointClass = require("./codepoint-class");
 
 var GuardIdempotencyKeyError = defineClass("GuardIdempotencyKeyError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
 
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ function validate(value, opts) {
   // C0 / DEL / slash refusal.
   for (var i = 0; i < value.length; i += 1) {
     var c = value.charCodeAt(i);
-    if (c < 0x20 || c === 0x7F) {                                                                     // C0 + DEL refusal
+    if (codepointClass.isForbiddenControlChar(c, { forbidTab: true })) {                              // C0 + DEL refusal
       throw new GuardIdempotencyKeyError("idempotency-key/control-char",
         "guardIdempotencyKey.validate: control char 0x" + c.toString(16) + " at offset " + i);
     }