@blamejs/core 0.14.8 → 0.14.9

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.14.x
 
+- v0.14.9 (2026-05-30) — **Corrects EU AI Act doc paths that named an uncallable namespace, plus source-comment hygiene and two new codebase checks.** A documentation fix and internal hygiene. The `@primitive` / `@signature` / `@example` blocks for the EU AI Act fundamental-rights-impact-assessment and GPAI training-data-summary helpers advertised `b.complianceAiAct.*`, which is undefined — the callable path is `b.compliance.aiAct.*` — so an operator copying the documented call got `undefined is not a function`. The documented paths now match the real surface. Alongside that: a duplicate parser entry in a doc block is removed, version stamps embedded in section-divider comments are stripped, and two codebase checks are added — one that fails the build when a `@primitive` block documents a wholly-unresolvable namespace (the gap that hid the AI Act paths), and one that flags a version stamp left inside a section divider. No exported API, error code, wire format, or runtime behaviour changes. **Changed:** *Source-comment hygiene* — Removed a duplicate `env` entry from the parsers `@module` doc block, and stripped internal version stamps (`vX.Y.Z`) from `// ---- ... ----` section-divider comments across several files, keeping the descriptive label. Comment-only; no behaviour change. **Fixed:** *EU AI Act helper documentation named an uncallable path* — `b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment` and `b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary` were documented as `b.complianceAiAct.*` in their `@primitive` / `@signature` / `@example` blocks (and one returned reference string). `b.complianceAiAct` is undefined, so the documented call failed; the documented paths now match the callable surface. **Detectors:** *`@primitive` reachability covers wrong-namespace paths* — The reachability check previously only flagged a missing leaf on a resolved namespace; a `@primitive` whose entire dotted prefix is unresolvable (the shape that hid the AI Act doc paths) was silently skipped. It now walks each prefix segment and fails the build on any unresolvable one, while preserving the factory-instance-shorthand exemption. · *Version-stamp-in-divider check* — A new check flags a version stamp (`vX.Y.Z`) left immediately after a section divider's dashes (`// ---- vX.Y.Z ...`) — internal release vocabulary that does not belong in shipped source comments — without matching legitimate `@since` tags or prose version references.
+
 - v0.14.8 (2026-05-30) — **Source-comment and codebase-check hygiene, plus a new require-block alignment check; no API or behaviour changes.** Internal lint and comment cleanup with no operator-facing surface change. Several codebase-check comments and one stub helper name that described behaviour the check no longer has are corrected; an unused lint-suppression class and a set of stale duplicate-cluster qualifiers (functions that were since renamed or extracted) are pruned or re-pointed. Fifty-nine `// allow:` markers that named the byte-size or time-literal check on values those checks no longer flag are removed, and twenty self-negating rationales on markers the time check genuinely fires on are rewritten to say why the value coincidentally matches. A new codebase check holds top-of-file require blocks to consistent `=` column alignment, with the files that currently carry drift listed as a migration allowlist. No exported API, error code, wire format, or runtime behaviour changes. **Changed:** *Lint-suppression and codebase-check comment cleanup* — Corrected codebase-check comments that overstated their check's scope (a duplicate-code threshold described as three files when the advisory threshold is two, a narrowed byte-literal check carrying its pre-narrowing description, and a deferred-scan helper named as though it enforced a guarantee it does not yet provide). Removed an unused lint-suppression class and its one dead in-code marker, and pruned or re-pointed stale duplicate-cluster qualifiers that named functions since renamed or extracted into shared helpers. Removed fifty-nine `// allow:` markers that suppressed nothing, and rewrote twenty self-negating marker rationales (which read "not seconds" while sitting on a value the time check fires on) to explain the coincidental match. Source-comment and test hygiene only. **Detectors:** *Require-block `=` alignment check* — A new codebase check flags a top-of-file require block that mixes its `=` column alignment — a fittable line whose `=` drifts off the column the rest of the block shares. Compact single-space blocks are exempt (only blocks that declare alignment intent are checked), as are destructures and long names physically too wide to reach the column, and blank- or comment-separated tiers align independently. The files that currently carry such drift are an explicit migration allowlist, reflowed over time; new code is held to the rule.
 
 - v0.14.7 (2026-05-30) — **Storage and audit-trail hardening: queries are gated to declared columns, raw SQL refuses embedded literals, the database key is bound to its location, sealed-column lookup hashes gain a keyed mode, audit-chain purges can require dual control, and breach deadlines ship a running clock.** This release tightens the data and audit layers against a set of failure modes that were previously reachable. Database queries are now checked against the columns a table declared in its schema: a reference to an undeclared column fails closed by default instead of silently matching nothing, and the `whereRaw` escape hatch refuses an embedded string literal so values bind through placeholders. The database encryption key is sealed with its purpose, data directory, and key path as additional authenticated data, so a key file cannot be relocated to another deployment and unsealed there; an older key without that binding upgrades itself on first load. Sealed-column equality-lookup hashes can now be computed as a keyed MAC (HMAC-SHAKE256) off a per-deployment key, making the lookup hash unforgeable without that key, while the salted-SHA3 default is unchanged. Purging the tamper-evident audit chain can be placed under a two-authorizer dual-control grant so one operator cannot erase it alone, and database credential-rejection audits now record which relation the rejected credential tried to reach. Finally, breach-notification deadlines get a running clock that raises approaching and passed alerts as each regime's window elapses. One behavior change to note: the column gate defaults to reject — if a service issues queries against columns it did not declare in its schema, set `db.init({ columnGate: "warn" })` (audited, allowed) or `"off"` while the schema is reconciled. **Added:** *Column-membership gate on every query* — `b.db.from(table)` now checks each referenced column against the table's declared schema. The mode is set with `db.init({ columnGate: "reject" | "warn" | "off" })` (default `reject`), and `query.allowedColumns([...])` narrows a single query to an explicit allowlist that is always enforced. `b.db.getDeclaredColumns(table)` returns a table's declared column names (or `null` for an unknown table). This is defense in depth against typo'd or caller-influenced column names reaching the SQL layer (CWE-89). · *Keyed mode for sealed-column lookup hashes* — Equality-lookup ("derived") hashes for sealed columns can be computed as `hmac-shake256` — a keyed MAC over a per-deployment key — instead of the default `salted-sha3`. Set it per table with `cryptoField.registerTable(name, { derivedHashMode: "hmac-shake256" })` or per column with `{ from, mode: "hmac-shake256" }`. The keyed hash is unforgeable and un-correlatable without the deployment's MAC key, which raises the bar against offline lookup-table attacks on low-entropy sealed values (CWE-916). `b.vault.getDerivedHashMacKey()` exposes the 32-byte per-deployment key; it is created on first use and re-sealed across key rotation automatically. · *Dual-control gate on audit-chain purge* — `b.auditTools.purge` accepts `dualControlGrant`. When `audit_log` is placed under dual control, a verified archive and `confirm: true` are no longer sufficient: the purge additionally requires a consumed m-of-n grant whose action is bound to the purge, so a grant minted for another operation cannot be replayed and one operator cannot erase the tamper-evident chain alone (NIST SP 800-53 AU-9, separation of duties). · *Running clock for breach-notification deadlines* — `b.incident.report.createDeadlineClock({ notify, approachThresholds })` tracks open incidents and raises `deadline_approaching` and `deadline_passed` alerts as each regime's window elapses (GDPR 72h, DORA, NIS2, and the rest of the registry). Alerts are deduplicated per incident and stage, suppressed once a submission stage is acknowledged, and the clock can run on an interval or be ticked manually. **Changed:** *Queries against undeclared columns now fail closed by default* — The column gate defaults to `reject`: a query that references a column the table did not declare throws rather than silently matching nothing. A service that intentionally queries undeclared columns can set `db.init({ columnGate: "warn" })` to audit and allow, or `"off"` to disable the gate, while its schema is reconciled. Framework-declared columns (including `_id` and derived-hash columns) are always members. **Security:** *Database encryption key bound to its location* — `db.key.enc` is sealed with additional authenticated data over its purpose, resolved data directory, and resolved key path. A sealed key copied to a different deployment or path no longer unseals there — the AEAD authentication fails — which prevents silent key relocation. A legacy key sealed without this binding is detected and re-sealed in the bound format on first load, with no operator action required. · *`whereRaw` refuses embedded string literals* — `whereRaw(sql, params)` and `WhereBuilder.raw(sql, params)` reject a raw fragment containing a string literal (`'...'`); values must bind through the `params` array. A static, operator-controlled literal can opt in with `{ allowLiterals: true }`. This closes a path where a value concatenated into a raw fragment would reintroduce SQL injection (CWE-89). · *Credential-rejection audits record the attempted relation* — A `db.auth.failed` audit row (SQLSTATE 28000 / 28P01 / 42501) now carries `attemptedTable`, the relation the rejected credential tried to reach, extracted defensively from the statement. Triage can scope the blast radius of a credential-abuse event without correlating back to the raw SQL log (CWE-778). **Detectors:** *Audit-purge dual-control gate* — A new check fails the build if a call to `purgeAuditChain` appears in a file that does not also route through the dual-control gate, so a future caller cannot physically delete chain rows without two-authorizer enforcement. · *Raw-SQL literal/interpolation guard* — A new check fails the build on a `whereRaw` / `.raw` call whose SQL argument is built by template interpolation or string concatenation, keeping the bound-params discipline enforceable in framework code. · *Hand-rolled lookup-hash guard* — A new check fails the build if a sealed-column lookup hash is derived from the per-deployment salt outside the canonical helper, so call sites cannot bypass the keyed-mode and per-column mode policy. · *Auth-audit attempted-relation guard* — A new check fails the build if a `db.auth.failed` audit is emitted in a file that does not name `attemptedTable`, so the forensic field cannot be dropped from a future emitter.

package/lib/auth/saml.js

@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       "</md:EntityDescriptor>";
   }
 
-  // ---- v0.10.16 — Single Logout (RFC SAML Bindings §3.4 HTTP-Redirect) ----
+  // ---- Single Logout (RFC SAML Bindings §3.4 HTTP-Redirect) ----
 
   /**
    * @primitive b.auth.saml.sp.buildLogoutRequest
@@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ function create(opts) {
     };
   }
 
-  // ---- v0.10.16 — SLO HTTP-POST binding (SAML Bindings §3.5) ----
+  // ---- SLO HTTP-POST binding (SAML Bindings §3.5) ----
 
   /**
    * @primitive b.auth.saml.sp.buildLogoutRequestPost
@@ -1524,7 +1524,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   };
 }
 
-// ---- v0.10.16 — SAML EncryptedAssertion decrypt (XMLEnc) ----
+// ---- SAML EncryptedAssertion decrypt (XMLEnc) ----
 
 // XMLEnc Algorithm URIs we support.
 //
@@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ function _decryptEncryptedAssertion(encAssertion, spPrivateKeyPem) {
   return clearBytes.toString("utf8");
 }
 
-// ---- v0.10.16 — SAML SLO XMLDSig-Enveloped (HTTP-POST/SOAP) ----
+// ---- SAML SLO XMLDSig-Enveloped (HTTP-POST/SOAP) ----
 
 // PQC SignatureMethod URIs used by the embedded XMLDSig signatures.
 // Standard XMLDSig vocabulary classical signing URIs (W3C XMLDSig
@@ -1936,7 +1936,7 @@ function _verifyEmbeddedXmlDsig(xml, idpVerifyKey, idpVerifyAlg, expectedRootLoc
   }
 }
 
-// ---- v0.10.16 SAML SLO signature-alg dispatch ----
+// ---- SAML SLO signature-alg dispatch ----
 
 function _sigAlgUrn(alg) {
   // PQC signers — framework-private experimental URIs. The `urn:`

package/lib/backup/index.js

@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ module.exports = {
   BUNDLE_ID_RE:              BUNDLE_ID_RE,
 };
 
-// ---- v0.12.7: bundleAdapterStorage ---------------------------------------
+// ---- bundleAdapterStorage ---------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.backup.bundleAdapterStorage
@@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ bundleAdapterStorage.fsAdapter = function (fsOpts) {
   };
 };
 
-// ---- v0.12.13: objectStoreAdapter ----------------------------------------
+// ---- objectStoreAdapter ----------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.backup.bundleAdapterStorage.objectStoreAdapter
@@ -2475,7 +2475,7 @@ bundleAdapterStorage.objectStoreAdapter = function (client, osOpts) {
   };
 };
 
-// ---- v0.12.8: migrate ----------------------------------------------------
+// ---- migrate ----------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.backup.migrate

package/lib/compliance-ai-act.js

@@ -538,8 +538,8 @@ function deployerChecklist(assessment) {
 }
 
 /**
- * @primitive b.complianceAiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment
- * @signature b.complianceAiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment(opts)
+ * @primitive b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment
+ * @signature b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment(opts)
  * @since     0.8.77
  *
  * EU AI Act Article 27 — Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment (FRIA).
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ function deployerChecklist(assessment) {
  *   }
  *
  * @example
- *   var fria = b.complianceAiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment({
+ *   var fria = b.compliance.aiAct.fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment({
  *     systemId: "credit-scoring-v3",
  *     deploymentContext: { purpose: "loan approval", sector: "financial",
  *                          geography: "EU", scale: "1M decisions/year" },
@@ -603,13 +603,13 @@ function fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment(opts) {
     notificationStatus:   "operator-must-notify",
     note:                 "Notify national market-surveillance authority before first use (Art 27(3))",
     auditHook:            "b.audit emission action='aiact.fria.completed' recommended",
-    annexIVReference:     "see b.complianceAiAct.annexIVScaffold for technical documentation",
+    annexIVReference:     "see b.compliance.aiAct.annexIVScaffold for technical documentation",
   };
 }
 
 /**
- * @primitive b.complianceAiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary
- * @signature b.complianceAiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary(opts)
+ * @primitive b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary
+ * @signature b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary(opts)
  * @since     0.8.77
  *
  * EU AI Act Article 53(1)(d) — GPAI training-data summary template
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ function fundamentalRightsImpactAssessment(opts) {
  *   contentProvenance: object,    // { synthIdEmbed, c2paManifestEmbed, watermarkProvider }
  *
  * @example
- *   var summary = b.complianceAiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary({
+ *   var summary = b.compliance.aiAct.gpai.trainingDataSummary({
  *     modelId:        "acme-llm-7b",
  *     modelVersion:   "1.0",
  *     provider:       { name: "Acme AI", address: "1 St", contact: "ai@acme.example" },

package/lib/compliance.js

@@ -107,12 +107,12 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "bsi-c5",          // Germany BSI C5
   "ens-es",          // Spain Esquema Nacional de Seguridad
   "uk-g-cloud",      // UK G-Cloud
-  // ---- v0.8.70 expansion — 2026 effective deadlines ----
+  // ---- 2026 effective deadlines ----
   "modpa",           // Maryland Online Data Privacy Act (effective 2025-10-01) — strict data-min
   "nydfs-500",       // NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 Amendment 2 — financial cybersecurity (multi-factor + asset inventory + governance)
   "hipaa-2026",      // HHS HIPAA Security Rule 2026-Q4 final — extends hipaa with mandatory MFA + asset inventory + 72h restoration testing
   "quebec-25",       // Quebec Law 25 final phase (effective 2026-09-22) — DPIA + automated-decision opt-out
-  // ---- v0.8.77 expansion — US state consumer-privacy postures ----
+  // ---- US state consumer-privacy postures ----
   // Each posture carries per-state cure-period, profiling opt-out
   // and minor-consent metadata via b.dsr.stateRules(state). The
   // generic DSR primitive (b.dsr.submit) covers ~80% of the surface;
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "ct-sb3",          // Connecticut SB 3 Consumer Health Data
   "tx-cubi",         // Texas Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier
   "fl-fdbr",         // Florida Digital Bill of Rights (SB 262, effective 2024-07-01) — narrow scope ($1B+ revenue threshold)
-  // ---- v0.8.81 expansion — AI-governance postures ----
+  // ---- AI-governance postures ----
   // State + sectoral AI regulations crystallizing through 2026. Each
   // posture is a flag that operators pin alongside their base
   // privacy/sectoral posture; the floors enforce audit-chain signing
@@ -153,20 +153,20 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "ca-tfaia",        // California SB 53 — Transparency in Frontier AI Act (effective 2026-01-01)
   "kr-ai-basic",     // South Korea AI Basic Act (effective 2026-01-22)
   "cn-ai-label",     // China Measures for Labelling of AI-Generated Content (effective 2025-09-01)
-  // ---- v0.8.81 expansion — AI management cross-walks ----
+  // ---- AI management cross-walks ----
   "iso-42001",       // ISO/IEC 42001:2023 — AI Management System
   "iso-23894",       // ISO/IEC 23894:2023 — AI Risk Management Guidance
-  // ---- v0.8.81 expansion — content-credentials posture flags ----
+  // ---- content-credentials posture flags ----
   "ca-sb942",        // California SB-942 (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22757) gen-AI disclosure (effective 2026-08-02)             // regulatory identifier + date, not bytes
   "ca-ab853",        // California AB-853 platform-side gen-AI detection (effective 2026-08-02)                                // regulatory identifier + date, not bytes
-  // ---- v0.8.81 expansion — substrate-to-posture cleanup ----
+  // ---- substrate-to-posture cleanup ----
   "eaa",             // EU Accessibility Act / Directive (EU) 2019/882 (effective 2025-06-28)
   "wcag-2-2",        // W3C Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.2 (Oct 2023 Recommendation)
   "eu-data-act",     // EU Data Act / Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 (effective 2025-09-12)
   "hitech",          // Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (2009)
   "ferpa",           // Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. §1232g)
   "dpdp",            // India Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 (rules-pending; cascade tier exists)
-  // ---- v0.8.82 expansion — privacy 2026 sweep ----
+  // ---- privacy 2026 sweep ----
   // US federal child / financial privacy
   "coppa",           // Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §6501)
   "coppa-2025",      // COPPA 2025 Amendment (FTC final 2025-04-22; effective 2026-06-23 — biometric expansion + knowing-collection disclosure)
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "eu-cer",          // EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive (2022/2557; transposition 2024-10-17)
   "eu-cyber-sol",    // EU Cyber Solidarity Act (Regulation 2025/38; effective 2025-02-04)
   "eidas-2",         // eIDAS 2 / EUDI Wallet (Regulation 2024/1183; rollout 2026-2027)
-  // ---- v0.8.86 expansion — sectoral + cybersecurity directives ----
+  // ---- sectoral + cybersecurity directives ----
   "cmmc-2.0",        // US DoD Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 (effective 2025-Q1)
   "cjis-v6",         // FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Security Policy v6.0 (Dec 2024)
   "iso-27001-2022",  // ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — Information Security Management System
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "nist-800-66-r2",  // NIST SP 800-66 Rev 2 — HIPAA Security Rule implementation guidance                                       // NIST publication number, not bytes
   "ehds",            // EU European Health Data Space (Regulation 2025/327; phased 2027-2029)
   "circia",          // US Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (final rule pending)
-  // ---- v0.9.6 expansion — exceptd framework-control-gap closure ----
+  // ---- exceptd framework-control-gap closure ----
   // Postures added to recognise every framework cited in the
   // exceptd 2026-05-11 framework-control-gaps catalog. Each posture
   // either (a) maps to a framework the operator must audit against,
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   "cwe-top-25-2024",             // CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses (2024)
   "cis-controls-v8",             // CIS Controls v8
   "cmmc-2.0-level-2",            // CMMC 2.0 Level 2 (Advanced) — 110 NIST 800-171 Rev 2 controls                                                                                                          // NIST pub number / level, not bytes
-  // ---- v0.9.57 — granular CMMC level distinction ----
+  // ---- granular CMMC level distinction ----
   // CMMC 2.0 maturity levels carry distinct control-mapping
   // expectations: Level 1 = 15 controls (FAR 52.204-21), Level 2 =
   // 110 controls (NIST 800-171 Rev 2), Level 3 = additional NIST
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ var KNOWN_POSTURES = Object.freeze([
   // L1/L2/L3 postures are the recommended pin for new deployments.
   "cmmc-2.0-level-1",            // CMMC 2.0 Level 1 (Foundational) — 15 FAR controls; FCI-only data        // regulatory identifier, not bytes
   "cmmc-2.0-level-3",            // CMMC 2.0 Level 3 (Expert) — NIST 800-172 enhanced controls atop L2       // regulatory identifier, not bytes
-  // ---- v0.12.1 — promote POSTURE_DEFAULTS-only entries into the
+  // ---- promote POSTURE_DEFAULTS-only entries into the
   // canonical KNOWN_POSTURES surface so operators can actually
   // `b.compliance.set(...)` them. Each entry had cascade
   // configuration wired but couldn't be pinned because set()'s
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "ct-sb3":    { name: "Connecticut SB 3 Consumer Health Data",        citation: "Conn. P.A. 23-56 (effective 2023-07-01)", jurisdiction: "US-CT", domain: "health" },
   "tx-cubi":   { name: "Texas Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier", citation: "Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §503.001 (effective 2009-09-01)", jurisdiction: "US-TX", domain: "biometric" },
   "fl-fdbr":   { name: "Florida Digital Bill of Rights",              citation: "Fla. Stat. §501.701 et seq. SB 262 (effective 2024-07-01)", jurisdiction: "US-FL", domain: "privacy" },
-  // ---- v0.8.81 — AI governance ----
+  // ---- AI governance ----
   "co-ai":       { name: "Colorado AI Act",                            citation: "C.R.S. §6-1-1701 et seq. SB24-205 (postponed to 2026-06-30; enforcement stayed)", jurisdiction: "US-CO", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "il-hb3773":   { name: "Illinois HB 3773 — AI in Employment",        citation: "775 ILCS 5 IHRA AI amendment (effective 2026-01-01)", jurisdiction: "US-IL", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "tx-traiga":   { name: "Texas Responsible AI Governance Act",        citation: "Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ch. 552 HB 149 (effective 2026-01-01)", jurisdiction: "US-TX", domain: "ai-governance" },
@@ -766,20 +766,20 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "ca-tfaia":    { name: "California Transparency in Frontier AI Act",  citation: "Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22757.10 et seq. SB 53 (effective 2026-01-01)", jurisdiction: "US-CA", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "kr-ai-basic": { name: "South Korea AI Basic Act",                    citation: "Framework Act on Development of AI (effective 2026-01-22)", jurisdiction: "KR", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "cn-ai-label": { name: "China — Measures for Labelling AI-Generated Content", citation: "CAC + MIIT + Ministry of Public Security + NRTA Order (effective 2025-09-01)", jurisdiction: "CN", domain: "ai-governance" },
-  // ---- v0.8.81 — AI management cross-walks ----
+  // ---- AI management cross-walks ----
   "iso-42001":   { name: "ISO/IEC 42001 — AI Management System",        citation: "ISO/IEC 42001:2023", jurisdiction: "international", domain: "ai-governance" },
   "iso-23894":   { name: "ISO/IEC 23894 — AI Risk Management",          citation: "ISO/IEC 23894:2023", jurisdiction: "international", domain: "ai-governance" },
-  // ---- v0.8.81 — content-credentials posture flags ----
+  // ---- content-credentials posture flags ----
   "ca-sb942":    { name: "California Gen-AI Provenance Disclosure",     citation: "Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22757 SB-942 (effective 2026-08-02)", jurisdiction: "US-CA", domain: "content-credentials" },
   "ca-ab853":    { name: "California Platform Gen-AI Detection",        citation: "Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22757 AB-853 (effective 2026-08-02)", jurisdiction: "US-CA", domain: "content-credentials" },
-  // ---- v0.8.81 — substrate-to-posture cleanup ----
+  // ---- substrate-to-posture cleanup ----
   "eaa":         { name: "EU Accessibility Act",                        citation: "Directive (EU) 2019/882 (effective 2025-06-28)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "accessibility" },
   "wcag-2-2":    { name: "W3C Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.2", citation: "W3C Recommendation (Oct 2023)", jurisdiction: "international", domain: "accessibility" },
   "eu-data-act": { name: "EU Data Act",                                 citation: "Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 (effective 2025-09-12)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "data-sharing" },
   "hitech":      { name: "Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act", citation: "Pub. L. 111-5, Title XIII, Subtitle D (2009)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "health" },
   "ferpa":       { name: "Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act",   citation: "20 U.S.C. §1232g; 34 CFR Part 99", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "student-records" },
   "dpdp":        { name: "Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023",   citation: "Act 22 of 2023 (India; rules pending)", jurisdiction: "IN", domain: "privacy" },
-  // ---- v0.8.82 — privacy 2026 sweep ----
+  // ---- privacy 2026 sweep ----
   // US federal
   "coppa":           { name: "Children's Online Privacy Protection Act",         citation: "15 U.S.C. §§6501-6506; 16 CFR Part 312 (effective 2000-04-21)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "child-privacy" },
   "coppa-2025":      { name: "COPPA 2025 Amendment",                              citation: "FTC final rule (2025-04-22; effective 2026-06-23) — biometric expansion + knowing-collection-13-and-under disclosure", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "child-privacy" },
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "eu-cer":          { name: "EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive",        citation: "Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (transposition 2024-10-17)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "eu-cyber-sol":    { name: "EU Cyber Solidarity Act",                          citation: "Regulation (EU) 2025/38 (effective 2025-02-04)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "eidas-2":         { name: "eIDAS 2 / EUDI Wallet",                            citation: "Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 (rollout 2026-2027)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "identity" },
-  // ---- v0.8.86 — sectoral + cybersecurity directives ----
+  // ---- sectoral + cybersecurity directives ----
   "cmmc-2.0":        { name: "Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0",   citation: "32 CFR Part 170 (DFARS rule effective 2025-Q1)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "cjis-v6":         { name: "FBI CJIS Security Policy v6.0",                    citation: "CJIS Security Policy v6.0 (effective 2024-12)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "law-enforcement" },
   "iso-27001-2022":  { name: "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information Security Management System", citation: "ISO/IEC 27001:2022", jurisdiction: "international", domain: "cybersecurity" },
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "nist-800-66-r2":  { name: "NIST SP 800-66 Rev 2 — HIPAA Security Rule Guidance", citation: "NIST SP 800-66 Rev 2 (Feb 2024)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "health" },
   "ehds":            { name: "European Health Data Space",                        citation: "Regulation (EU) 2025/327 (phased 2027-2029)", jurisdiction: "EU", domain: "health" },
   "circia":          { name: "Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act", citation: "6 U.S.C. §681 et seq. (final rule pending)", jurisdiction: "US", domain: "cybersecurity" },
-  // ---- v0.12.1 — REGIME_MAP backfill for KNOWN_POSTURES without
+  // ---- REGIME_MAP backfill for KNOWN_POSTURES without
   // describe() coverage. Each entry resolves `b.compliance.describe
   // (posture)` → { name, citation, jurisdiction, domain } so admin
   // UI / generated audit reports rendering "running under <name>
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
   "bsi-c5":          { name: "Germany BSI C5 — Cloud Computing Compliance Catalogue", citation: "BSI Cloud Computing Compliance Criteria Catalogue (C5:2020)", jurisdiction: "DE", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "ens-es":          { name: "Spain Esquema Nacional de Seguridad",             citation: "Real Decreto 311/2022",                            jurisdiction: "ES", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "uk-g-cloud":      { name: "UK G-Cloud Framework",                            citation: "UK Crown Commercial Service G-Cloud 14",          jurisdiction: "UK", domain: "cybersecurity" },
-  // ---- v0.9.6 expansion REGIME_MAP backfill (cybersecurity / AI / supply-chain frameworks) ----
+  // ---- REGIME_MAP backfill (cybersecurity / AI / supply-chain frameworks) ----
   "nist-800-53":              { name: "NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 — Security & Privacy Controls", citation: "NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5",                jurisdiction: "US", domain: "cybersecurity" },
   "nist-ai-rmf-1.0":          { name: "NIST AI Risk Management Framework 1.0",  citation: "NIST AI 100-1 (Jan 2023)",                        jurisdiction: "US", domain: "ai" },
   "iso-42001-2023":           { name: "ISO/IEC 42001:2023 — AI Management System", citation: "ISO/IEC 42001:2023",                          jurisdiction: "international", domain: "ai" },
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   "nist-800-66-r2":  Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   "ehds":            Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   "circia":          Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
-  // ---- v0.9.6 — exceptd framework-control-gap closure cascade ----
+  // ---- exceptd framework-control-gap closure cascade ----
   "nist-800-53":             Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   // NIST AI-RMF MANAGE.4.3 / ISO 23894 §6.5 / ISO 42001
   // §A.6 require encrypted backups for AI system state (model
@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   "cmmc-2.0-level-1":        Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: false, auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: false }),
   "cmmc-2.0-level-2":        Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true  }),
   "cmmc-2.0-level-3":        Object.freeze({ backupEncryptionRequired: true,  auditChainSignedRequired: true, tlsMinVersion: "TLSv1.3", requireVacuumAfterErase: true, fipsMode: false }),
-  // ---- v0.10.16 — sectoral catch-up ----
+  // ---- sectoral catch-up ----
   // 42 CFR Part 2 — Substance Use Disorder records confidentiality
   // (HHS final rule 2024-04-16 aligns Part 2 with HIPAA but retains
   // a stricter consent floor; encrypted backups + signed audit chain

package/lib/dsr.js

@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ function dbTicketStore(opts) {
   };
 }
 
-// ---- v0.8.77 — US state-law DSR drift registry -------------------
+// ---- US state-law DSR drift registry -------------------
 //
 // Each US state consumer-privacy law expresses the same DSR core
 // (access / deletion / correction / portability) but with per-state

package/lib/guard-archive.js

@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ module.exports = {
   tarEntryPolicy:      tarEntryPolicy,
 };
 
-// ---- v0.12.7 extensions ---------------------------------------------------
+// ---- extensions ---------------------------------------------------
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.guardArchive.inspect

package/lib/mail-crypto-pgp.js

@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ function _audit(auditHandle, action, outcome, metadata) {
   } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent — audit failures must not crash callers */ }
 }
 
-// ---- v0.10.16 experimental encrypt/decrypt + WKD ----
+// ---- experimental encrypt/decrypt + WKD ----
 //
 // PQC PGP encrypt/decrypt for ML-KEM-1024 recipients shipped under
 // `experimental` namespace (RFC 9580bis PKESK ML-KEM codepoints

package/lib/parsers/index.js

@@ -36,12 +36,6 @@
  *           parsed as `country: false`). Block + flow style;
  *           literal `|` and folded `>` block scalars with chomp
  *           indicators.
- *   env  — .env file loader with size cap + schema validation;
- *           refuses to expand $VAR references; refuses to silently
- *           overwrite existing process.env values unless explicitly
- *           opted in. Dev-tooling — production secrets should still
- *           come through the operator's secrets-management; this is
- *           the local-development convenience.
  *   ini  — INI / .gitconfig / systemd-unit / php.ini / tox.ini parser.
  *           Sections (incl. [parent.child] / [parent "child"] nesting),
  *           ; or # comments (inline + leading), single + double quoting

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.14.8",
+  "version": "0.14.9",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:013c541c-8703-45e9-9154-89bc05b3998c",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:1e3ccafc-71e3-4207-a3d7-5672ad58b137",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-05-30T23:34:15.711Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-05-31T04:50:32.275Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.14.8",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.14.9",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.14.8",
+      "version": "0.14.9",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.14.8",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.14.9",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.14.8",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.14.9",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]