@blamejs/core 0.13.15 → 0.13.17

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.13.x
 
+- v0.13.17 (2026-05-27) — **Template engine can render from a string with no views directory — for serverless / read-only filesystems.** b.template.create previously required a viewsDir that exists on disk, and rendering always read the template (and its layout/partials) from that directory — unusable on a read-only or ephemeral serverless filesystem where the templates aren't on disk. The engine now accepts a source string directly: viewsDir is optional, and the returned engine exposes renderString(source, data?, opts?) and compileString(source, opts?) that compile and render from a string with no disk read. {% extends %} and {{> partial}} in a string source resolve through an operator-supplied opts.resolve(name) -> string callback (without it, an extends throws a clear error and a missing partial inlines empty, matching the file path). The same HTML-escaping, expression grammar, and extends/partial-depth caps apply. The file-backed render / compile / precompileAll still work exactly as before when a viewsDir is configured, and now refuse with a clear error when one isn't. **Added:** *`engine.renderString` / `engine.compileString` — render templates from a string, no viewsDir* — `b.template.create({})` (no `viewsDir`) returns a string-only engine; `renderString(source, data?, { resolve })` and `compileString(source, { resolve })` compile and render from a source string with zero filesystem access — the read-only / serverless path. `{% extends %}` and `{{> partial}}` resolve through `opts.resolve(name) -> string`. The HTML escaping, grammar, and depth caps are identical to the file path. When a `viewsDir` IS configured, `render`/`compile`/`precompileAll` behave exactly as before; without one they refuse with `viewsDir not configured`. `renderString(source, { resolve })` may omit the data argument — an opts object carrying a function `resolve` is recognized as opts, not data. **Security:** *Vendored `@simplewebauthn/server` refreshed 13.3.0 → 13.3.1* — The vendored WebAuthn server bundle (`b.auth.passkey`'s registration/authentication verification) is refreshed to the latest upstream patch, with the MANIFEST version, CPE, and SHA-256 integrity hashes updated and the bundle re-verified.
+
+- v0.13.16 (2026-05-27) — **`b.mail.agent` docs now describe the facade accurately, and not-yet-wired verbs point to the primitive to use.** b.mail.agent's module documentation claimed it was "the standardization contract for every mail protocol" that JMAP / IMAP / POP3 all route through — but no protocol server actually dispatches through the agent (the framework's own JMAP EmailSubmission handler composes b.mail.send.deliver directly), and the compose / send / reply / forward, sieve.list / sieve.activate, identity / vacation / mdn.* and export / job / import verbs throw mail-agent/not-implemented. The docs are corrected to describe what the agent is: a mailbox-access facade (RBAC + posture + audit + dispatch around a mail store) whose read surface plus the mailbox-mutation and Sieve-upload methods are wired, with the remaining verbs not yet routed through it. Those verbs' error message now names the underlying primitive to compose directly (b.mail.send.deliver, b.mail.sieve, b.mailMdn, …) instead of citing a version tag that had long passed. The public WIRED_AT export (a method→version map that no longer reflected reality) is replaced by COMPOSE_HINT (a method→primitive-to-compose map). No behaviour change: the same methods are wired or throw exactly as before. **Changed:** *`b.mail.agent` documentation corrected; not-implemented errors point to the primitive to compose* — The `@module` / `@card` no longer claim the agent is the universal protocol-dispatch contract — it's documented as a mailbox-access facade with a wired read + mutation + Sieve-upload surface, and the compose/send/identity/vacation/MDN/export verbs documented as not yet routed through it (compose the underlying primitive directly until a protocol server adopts the agent). The `mail-agent/not-implemented` error now names that primitive (e.g. `b.mail.send.deliver`) rather than a passed version tag. **Removed:** *`b.mail.agent.WIRED_AT` export replaced by `COMPOSE_HINT`* — The `WIRED_AT` export mapped each method to a framework version that was supposed to "light it up" — versions that have all shipped without the wiring, so the map was misleading. It is replaced by `COMPOSE_HINT`, mapping each not-yet-wired method to the primitive an operator composes directly. Operators reading `b.mail.agent.WIRED_AT` should read `b.mail.agent.COMPOSE_HINT` instead (pre-1.0: no compatibility shim).
+
 - v0.13.15 (2026-05-27) — **Corrected more source citations and made deferred/reserved options honest in their docs.** A second accuracy pass over source threat-annotations and option docs. Three citation corrections: the base64url strict-decode guard cited CVE-2022-0235 (which is actually a node-fetch cookie-leak, unrelated) — it now names the weakness class it defends (CWE-347 / CWE-1286 signature canonicalization); the glob consecutive-wildcard ReDoS cap cited the wrong library (the CVE-2026-26996 ReDoS is minimatch, not picomatch — the adjacent picomatch one is CVE-2026-33671); and CVE-2026-32178 is reframed to the CWE-138 header-injection-spoofing class the public record actually documents (and dropped from the end-of-data SMTP-smuggling list, which is a different class). Several options/statuses are now honest about not-yet-implemented surface: b.archive.read.zip.fromTrustedStream is marked experimental (its methods throw and its options aren't honored yet — the example now shows the supported buffer-then-random-access path); b.acme revokeCert's useCertKey / certPrivateKey are marked reserved (the cert-key path throws; account-key signing is the supported default); and a stale message claiming passkey break-glass factors were a future feature is removed (passkeys are a live allowed factor). No runtime behaviour changes beyond message/doc text. **Changed:** *Deferred / reserved surface now documented honestly* — `b.archive.read.zip.fromTrustedStream` is marked `experimental` — its `inspect`/`entries`/`extract` throw and its `bombPolicy`/`audit` options aren't honored yet; the documented example now shows the supported path (buffer the stream, then use the random-access reader). `b.acme` `revokeCert`'s `useCertKey` / `certPrivateKey` options are marked reserved (the cert-key-signed-revocation path throws; account-key signing, the default, covers mainstream CAs). A `b.breakGlass` policy error and comment that called passkey factors a future feature are corrected — passkeys are a live allowed factor. **Fixed:** *Corrected misattributed CVE citations in source threat-annotations* — `b.crypto.fromBase64Url`'s strict-decode guard cited CVE-2022-0235 (a node-fetch header-leak, unrelated to base64/JWT decoding); it now cites the weakness class it actually defends — CWE-347 / CWE-1286 signature canonicalization. `b.guardRegex`'s consecutive-`*` cap attributed CVE-2026-26996 to picomatch; that ReDoS is in minimatch (the picomatch ReDoS it also defends is CVE-2026-33671) — the library name is corrected. CVE-2026-32178 is reframed to the CWE-138 header-injection spoofing class the public advisory documents, and removed from the end-of-data SMTP-smuggling trio (a distinct class). No behaviour change — the defenses are unchanged.
 
 - v0.13.14 (2026-05-27) — **DNSSEC chain validation now bounds KeyTrap (CVE-2023-50387) amplification with hard caps.** b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyChain tried every DNSKEY whose 16-bit key tag matched an RRSIG, with no cap on how many candidates or total signature verifications a single response could drive. A hostile zone publishing many DNSKEYs sharing one key tag (plus matching RRSIGs) could force O(keys x signatures) full public-key verifications from one query — the KeyTrap denial-of-service (CVE-2023-50387). Validation is now bounded by non-configurable caps that match the BIND / Unbound mitigations: at most 4 same-tag candidate keys are tried per RRSIG, at most 64 DNSKEYs per zone link and 16 DS records per delegation are accepted, the chain is at most 128 links deep, and the whole response is held to a signature-validation budget that scales with chain depth (so a legitimate deep delegation is never false-rejected while bounded collisions stay bounded); exceeding any of these refuses the response rather than performing the work. Separately, a domain name that encodes to more than 255 octets is now refused at canonicalization (RFC 1035 §2.3.4), which also bounds the NSEC3 closest-encloser label enumeration, and the NSEC3 iteration ceiling is lowered from 500 to 150 to match the BIND 9.16.33+ / Unbound 1.17.1 fix for the sibling CVE-2023-50868. **Security:** *`verifyChain` caps colliding-key fan-out and total signature validations (KeyTrap / CVE-2023-50387)* — A zone advertising many same-key-tag DNSKEYs and RRSIGs can no longer drive unbounded public-key verifications. New refusals: `dnssec/too-many-colliding-keys` (>4 same-tag candidates per RRSIG), `dnssec/too-many-dnskeys` (>64 DNSKEYs per zone link), `dnssec/too-many-ds` (>16 DS records per delegation), `dnssec/too-many-links` (chain deeper than 128), and `dnssec/validation-budget-exceeded` (signature validations beyond the depth-scaled budget). The caps are intentionally non-configurable — they sit well above any legitimate zone, and the budget scales with chain depth so deep delegations validate normally. · *Domain-name octet cap + lower NSEC3 iteration ceiling* — A name that canonicalizes to more than 255 octets is refused (`dnssec/bad-name`, RFC 1035 §2.3.4), which bounds the per-label NSEC3 closest-encloser enumeration (CVE-2023-50868 class). The default NSEC3 iteration ceiling drops from 500 to 150, matching the BIND 9.16.33+ / Unbound 1.17.1 post-CVE defaults (RFC 9276 recommends 0).

package/lib/mail-agent.js

@@ -7,19 +7,26 @@
  * @featured   true
  *
  * @intro
- *   The standardization contract for every mail protocol blamejs ships.
- *   JMAP (v0.9.27), IMAP (v0.9.28), POP3 (v0.9.29), ManageSieve (v0.9.30),
- *   the inbound MX listener (v0.9.24), and the submission listener
- *   (v0.9.25) all translate their protocol calls into `agent.X(args)`.
- *   The agent owns RBAC, posture enforcement, audit emission,
- *   dispatch, and worker isolation; every protocol on top is a thin
- *   shell.
+ *   A mailbox-access facade that owns RBAC, posture enforcement, audit
+ *   emission, dispatch (local / worker-pool / queue), and worker
+ *   isolation around a mail store, so a protocol server built on top
+ *   can stay a thin shell. It is designed to be the shared dispatch
+ *   layer mail-protocol servers route through; today the read surface
+ *   and the mailbox-mutation + Sieve-upload methods are wired, while the
+ *   compose/send and identity/vacation/MDN/export verbs are not yet
+ *   wired into the facade (see below).
  *
- *   `agent.create()` returns the facade. Methods backed by v0.9.19's
- *   `b.mailStore` run immediately; methods that depend on later slices
- *   throw `mail-agent/not-implemented` with a `wiredAt` tag naming the
- *   version that lights them up (defer-with-condition — operator can
- *   match against the tag to scope their integration).
+ *   `agent.create()` returns the facade. Methods backed by
+ *   `b.mailStore` (folders / fetch / search / move / flag / delete /
+ *   expunge, plus `sieve.put`) run immediately. The remaining verbs —
+ *   compose / send / reply / forward, sieve.list / sieve.activate,
+ *   identity / vacation / mdn.*, export / job / import — throw
+ *   `mail-agent/not-implemented`: they are not yet routed through the
+ *   agent. Until they are, compose the underlying primitive directly
+ *   (`b.mail.send.deliver` for outbound, `b.mail.sieve` for Sieve,
+ *   `b.mailMdn` for MDN, etc.) — which is what the framework's own JMAP
+ *   `emailSubmissionSet` handler does. They wire into the facade when a
+ *   protocol server adopts the agent as its dispatch layer.
  *
  *   ```js
  *   var agent = b.mail.agent.create({
@@ -58,9 +65,11 @@
  *   on every entrypoint.
  *
  * @card
- *   The standardization contract for every mail protocol — JMAP / IMAP /
- *   POP3 all translate into `agent.X(args)`. RBAC + posture + audit +
- *   dispatch owned here; protocols on top are thin shells.
+ *   Mailbox-access facade — RBAC + posture + audit + dispatch around a
+ *   mail store, so a protocol server on top stays a thin shell. Read +
+ *   mailbox-mutation + Sieve-upload methods are wired; compose/send and
+ *   identity/vacation/MDN/export verbs compose the underlying primitive
+ *   directly until a protocol server routes them through the agent.
  */
 
 var lazyRequire        = require("./lazy-require");
@@ -118,25 +127,25 @@ var SCOPE_FOR_METHOD = Object.freeze({
   import:           "mail:import",
 });
 
-// Methods deferred behind a `wiredAt` version. Operator gets a clear
-// error pointing at the slice that lights them up — defer-with-
-// condition per the v1-defensible-scope rule.
-var WIRED_AT = Object.freeze({
-  compose:          "v0.9.25",
-  send:             "v0.9.25",
-  reply:            "v0.9.25",
-  forward:          "v0.9.25",
-  "sieve.list":     "v0.9.26",
-  "sieve.put":      "v0.9.26",
-  "sieve.activate": "v0.9.26",
-  "identity.set":   "v0.9.25",
-  "vacation.set":   "v0.9.25",
-  "mdn.send":       "v0.9.25",
-  "mdn.parse":      "v0.9.25",
-  "mdn.allowList":  "v0.9.25",
-  export:           "v0.9.34a",
-  job:              "v0.9.34a",
-  import:           "v0.9.34",
+// Verbs not yet routed through the agent facade. The error points the
+// operator at the underlying primitive to compose directly (the
+// escape hatch) — defer-with-condition: these wire into the agent when
+// a protocol server adopts it as its dispatch layer.
+var COMPOSE_HINT = Object.freeze({
+  compose:          "b.mail.send.deliver",
+  send:             "b.mail.send.deliver",
+  reply:            "b.mail.send.deliver",
+  forward:          "b.mail.send.deliver",
+  "sieve.list":     "b.mail.sieve",
+  "sieve.activate": "b.mail.sieve",
+  "identity.set":   "your identity store + b.mail.sieve",
+  "vacation.set":   "b.mail.sieve (vacation extension)",
+  "mdn.send":       "b.mailMdn",
+  "mdn.parse":      "b.mailMdn",
+  "mdn.allowList":  "b.mailMdn",
+  export:           "b.mailStore / b.auditTools",
+  job:              "the dispatch queue directly",
+  import:           "b.mailStore",
 });
 
 /**
@@ -653,9 +662,10 @@ function _notImplemented(ctx, method, args) {
   // the slice lights up.
   if (ctx.posture) guardMailQuery.validateActor(args && args.actor, ctx.posture);
   _checkPermission(ctx, method, args);
-  ctx.auditEmit("mail.agent.not_implemented", args && args.actor, { method: method, wiredAt: WIRED_AT[method] });
+  ctx.auditEmit("mail.agent.not_implemented", args && args.actor, { method: method, composeDirectly: COMPOSE_HINT[method] });
   return Promise.reject(new MailAgentError("mail-agent/not-implemented",
-    "agent." + method + ": wired at " + WIRED_AT[method] + " (defer-with-condition)"));
+    "agent." + method + " is not yet routed through the agent facade — compose " +
+    COMPOSE_HINT[method] + " directly"));
 }
 
 // ---- Internals ------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -771,7 +781,7 @@ module.exports = {
   consumer:         consumer,
   MailAgentError:   MailAgentError,
   SCOPE_FOR_METHOD: SCOPE_FOR_METHOD,
-  WIRED_AT:         WIRED_AT,
+  COMPOSE_HINT:     COMPOSE_HINT,
   HEAVY_METHODS:    HEAVY_METHODS,
   // Re-export the guard family so callers can introspect without
   // separate requires.

package/lib/template.js

@@ -105,6 +105,13 @@ var sandboxModule = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./sandbox"); });
 // never hits it, low enough to bound a malicious / misconfigured cycle.
 var MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH = 0x10;
 
+// Byte cap for STRING-sourced templates (compileString / renderString),
+// which accept operator-supplied — potentially untrusted — source. The
+// file path renders trusted files on disk and is uncapped. The cap bounds
+// the tokenizer / parser cost (and any pathological tag stream) on hostile
+// string input; operators override per call with `opts.maxBytes`.
+var DEFAULT_STRING_TEMPLATE_BYTES = require("./constants").BYTES.kib(256);
+
 // ============================================================
 // HTML escape (exported)
 // ============================================================
@@ -176,11 +183,44 @@ function _resolvePartialPath(viewsDir, partialName) {
 // ============================================================
 
 var EXTENDS_RE = /^\s*\{%\s*extends\s+"([^"]+)"\s*%\}\s*/;
-var BLOCK_FULL_RE = /\{%\s*block\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)\s*%\}([\s\S]*?)\{%\s*endblock\s*%\}/g;
+// Block open / endblock as one alternation of two fixed-shape tags (no
+// nested quantifiers, disjoint character classes → linear). The prior
+// single `{% block %}…{% endblock %}` regex used a lazy `[\s\S]*?` span
+// under the global flag, which is polynomial (O(n^2)) on input with many
+// unclosed block-opens — a ReDoS now that `renderString` feeds untrusted
+// string templates through here. Group 1 (the block name) is present only
+// on the open branch, which distinguishes open from close in the walk.
+var BLOCK_TAG_RE = /\{%\s*block\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)\s*%\}|\{%\s*endblock\s*%\}/g;
+
+// Single linear left-to-right pass: pair each {% block NAME %} with the
+// next {% endblock %} (no nesting — the first endblock closes, matching
+// the prior lazy semantics) and replace the span with replacer(name,
+// content). `matchAll` walks the tag stream once; no backtracking.
+function _replaceBlocks(source, replacer) {
+  var out = "";
+  var pos = 0;
+  var openMatch = null;
+  var iter = source.matchAll(BLOCK_TAG_RE);
+  var m = iter.next();
+  while (!m.done) {
+    var tag = m.value;
+    if (tag[1] !== undefined) {           // open tag (block name captured)
+      if (!openMatch) openMatch = tag;    // ignore nested opens until the close
+    } else if (openMatch) {               // close tag with an open pending
+      var contentStart = openMatch.index + openMatch[0].length;
+      out += source.slice(pos, openMatch.index) +
+             replacer(openMatch[1], source.slice(contentStart, tag.index));
+      pos = tag.index + tag[0].length;
+      openMatch = null;
+    }
+    m = iter.next();
+  }
+  return out + source.slice(pos);
+}
 
 function _extractBlocks(source) {
   var blocks = {};
-  var rest = source.replace(BLOCK_FULL_RE, function (_match, name, content) {
+  var rest = _replaceBlocks(source, function (name, content) {
     blocks[name] = content;
     return "";
   });
@@ -188,14 +228,16 @@ function _extractBlocks(source) {
 }
 
 function _substituteBlocks(parentSource, childBlocks) {
-  return parentSource.replace(BLOCK_FULL_RE, function (_match, name, defaultContent) {
+  return _replaceBlocks(parentSource, function (name, defaultContent) {
     return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(childBlocks, name)
       ? childBlocks[name]
       : defaultContent;
   });
 }
 
-function _resolveExtends(viewsDir, source) {
+// `loadView(name)` returns the source string for a parent layout (the
+// file path reads it from viewsDir; the string path calls opts.resolve).
+function _resolveExtends(loadView, source) {
   // Walk UP the extends chain accumulating block overrides. Closer-to-
   // leaf overrides win; each parent's blocks fill in only the names the
   // chain hasn't already set. When the chain hits a template with no
@@ -226,8 +268,10 @@ function _resolveExtends(viewsDir, source) {
         allOverrides[k] = extracted.blocks[k];
       }
     }
-    var parentPath = _resolveViewPath(viewsDir, parentName);
-    current = nodeFs.readFileSync(parentPath, "utf8");
+    current = loadView(parentName);
+    if (typeof current !== "string") {
+      throw new Error("template: {% extends \"" + parentName + "\" %} could not be resolved");
+    }
     depth++;
   }
   return _substituteBlocks(current, allOverrides);
@@ -237,15 +281,18 @@ function _resolveExtends(viewsDir, source) {
 // Partial inlining (post-extends, pre-tokenize)
 // ============================================================
 
-function _inlinePartials(viewsDir, source, depth) {
+// `loadPartial(name)` returns the partial source string, or null/undefined
+// when the partial is absent (the file path resolves <viewsDir>/partials;
+// the string path calls opts.resolve).
+function _inlinePartials(loadPartial, source, depth) {
   if (depth > MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH) {
     throw new Error("template: partial recursion depth exceeded " + MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH +
       " — possible cycle");
   }
   return source.replace(/\{\{>\s*([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)\s*\}\}/g, function (_, name) {
-    var p = _resolvePartialPath(viewsDir, name);
-    if (!p) return "";   // missing partial → silent empty so a stale `{{> name}}` reference doesn't crash the render
-    return _inlinePartials(viewsDir, nodeFs.readFileSync(p, "utf8"), depth + 1);
+    var sub = loadPartial(name);
+    if (typeof sub !== "string") return "";   // missing partial → silent empty so a stale `{{> name}}` reference doesn't crash the render
+    return _inlinePartials(loadPartial, sub, depth + 1);
   });
 }
 
@@ -739,20 +786,28 @@ function _evalBlock(nodes, scopes, escFn) {
  * @since     0.1.0
  * @related   b.template.render, b.template.escapeHtml
  *
- * Builds an engine instance bound to `opts.viewsDir`. The returned
- * object exposes `render(viewName, data?)` for one-shot rendering,
+ * Builds an engine instance. With `opts.viewsDir` the returned object
+ * exposes `render(viewName, data?)` for one-shot rendering,
  * `compile(viewName)` for AST-only access (caches under viewName),
  * `precompileAll()` for boot-time validation of every `.html` file
  * under `viewsDir`, and `reset()` to drop the AST cache (useful in
  * live-reload workflows).
  *
+ * `viewsDir` is optional: an engine created without it serves from a
+ * source STRING via `renderString(source, data?, opts?)` and
+ * `compileString(source, opts?)` — the read-only / serverless path with
+ * no disk read. `{% extends %}` and `{{> partial}}` in a string source
+ * resolve through `opts.resolve(name) -> string` (without it, an extends
+ * throws and a missing partial inlines empty). The file-backed
+ * render/compile/precompileAll refuse when no `viewsDir` is configured.
+ *
  * View names are resolved against `viewsDir`; names containing `..`
  * or NUL are refused, and resolved paths outside `viewsDir` throw.
  * Layout-extends and partial-inclusion recursion are bounded at
  * depth 16 to defend against accidental cycles.
  *
  * @opts
- *   viewsDir:        string,                       // required — absolute or cwd-relative directory of .html templates
+ *   viewsDir:        string,                       // optional — directory of .html templates; omit for string-only (renderString) use
  *   cache:           boolean,                      // default true; set false for live-reload
  *   escapeHtml:      function (value) → string,    // override the default 5-character HTML escape
  *   sandbox:         boolean,                      // when true, sandboxHelpers run through b.sandbox.run
@@ -768,13 +823,16 @@ function _evalBlock(nodes, scopes, escFn) {
 function create(opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   validateOpts(opts, ["viewsDir", "cache", "escapeHtml", "sandbox", "sandboxHelpers", "sandboxOpts"], "b.template");
-  if (!opts.viewsDir) {
-    throw new Error("template.create({ viewsDir }) is required");
-  }
-  if (!nodeFs.existsSync(opts.viewsDir)) {
-    throw new Error("template: viewsDir does not exist: " + opts.viewsDir);
+  // viewsDir is optional: an engine created without it serves string
+  // sources via renderString / compileString (the serverless / read-only-FS
+  // path) — the file-backed render / compile / precompileAll then refuse.
+  var viewsDir = null;
+  if (opts.viewsDir) {
+    if (!nodeFs.existsSync(opts.viewsDir)) {
+      throw new Error("template: viewsDir does not exist: " + opts.viewsDir);
+    }
+    viewsDir = nodePath.resolve(opts.viewsDir);
   }
-  var viewsDir = nodePath.resolve(opts.viewsDir);
   var cacheOn = opts.cache !== false;
   var customEscape = typeof opts.escapeHtml === "function" ? opts.escapeHtml : escapeHtml;
   var astCache = {};
@@ -820,12 +878,23 @@ function create(opts) {
     }
   }
 
+  // File-backed load callbacks for the extends/partial resolvers.
+  function _loadViewFile(name) {
+    return nodeFs.readFileSync(_resolveViewPath(viewsDir, name), "utf8");
+  }
+  function _loadPartialFile(name) {
+    var p = _resolvePartialPath(viewsDir, name);
+    return p ? nodeFs.readFileSync(p, "utf8") : null;
+  }
+
   function compile(viewName) {
+    if (!viewsDir) {
+      throw new Error("template: viewsDir not configured — use renderString/compileString for string sources");
+    }
     if (cacheOn && astCache[viewName]) return astCache[viewName];
-    var viewPath = _resolveViewPath(viewsDir, viewName);
-    var source = nodeFs.readFileSync(viewPath, "utf8");
-    source = _resolveExtends(viewsDir, source);
-    source = _inlinePartials(viewsDir, source, 0);
+    var source = nodeFs.readFileSync(_resolveViewPath(viewsDir, viewName), "utf8");
+    source = _resolveExtends(_loadViewFile, source);
+    source = _inlinePartials(_loadPartialFile, source, 0);
     var tokens = _tokenize(source);
     var ast = _parseTokens(tokens);
     if (cacheOn) astCache[viewName] = ast;
@@ -837,6 +906,68 @@ function create(opts) {
     return _evalBlock(ast.body, [data || {}], customEscape);
   }
 
+  // ---- String-source variants (serverless / read-only FS): compile and
+  // render from a source STRING with no viewsDir disk read. `{% extends %}`
+  // and `{{> partial}}` resolve through an operator-supplied
+  // `sopts.resolve(name) -> string` callback; without it, an extends in
+  // the source throws and a missing partial inlines empty (same as the
+  // file path). No caching — string sources are ad-hoc.
+  function _stringLoaders(sopts, maxBytes) {
+    var resolve = sopts && sopts.resolve;
+    if (resolve !== undefined && typeof resolve !== "function") {
+      throw new Error("template.compileString: opts.resolve must be a function (name) => string");
+    }
+    function _capped(s, what) {
+      if (typeof s === "string" && Buffer.byteLength(s, "utf8") > maxBytes) {
+        throw new Error("template.compileString: " + what + " exceeds maxBytes=" + maxBytes);
+      }
+      return s;
+    }
+    var loadView = function (name) {
+      var s = resolve ? resolve(name) : undefined;
+      if (typeof s !== "string") {
+        throw new Error("template.compileString: {% extends \"" + name +
+          "\" %} needs opts.resolve(name) to return the layout source");
+      }
+      return _capped(s, "resolved layout '" + name + "'");
+    };
+    var loadPartial = function (name) {
+      var s = resolve ? resolve(name) : null;
+      return typeof s === "string" ? _capped(s, "resolved partial '" + name + "'") : null;
+    };
+    return { loadView: loadView, loadPartial: loadPartial };
+  }
+
+  function compileString(source, sopts) {
+    if (typeof source !== "string") {
+      throw new Error("template.compileString(source): source must be a string");
+    }
+    var maxBytes = (sopts && typeof sopts.maxBytes === "number") ? sopts.maxBytes : DEFAULT_STRING_TEMPLATE_BYTES;
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(source, "utf8") > maxBytes) {
+      throw new Error("template.compileString: source exceeds maxBytes=" + maxBytes +
+        " — string templates are bounded against hostile input; raise opts.maxBytes if intentional");
+    }
+    var ld = _stringLoaders(sopts, maxBytes);
+    var resolved = _resolveExtends(ld.loadView, source);
+    resolved = _inlinePartials(ld.loadPartial, resolved, 0);
+    return _parseTokens(_tokenize(resolved));
+  }
+
+  function renderString(source, data, sopts) {
+    // Disambiguate the optional middle arg: `renderString(source, { resolve })`
+    // — a 2nd arg carrying a function-valued `resolve` and no 3rd arg is the
+    // opts object, not render data (template data values are rendered, not
+    // called, so a function `resolve` is unambiguously the resolver). This
+    // lets a layout/partial template with no data omit the data placeholder.
+    if (sopts === undefined && data && typeof data === "object" &&
+        typeof data.resolve === "function") {
+      sopts = data;
+      data = undefined;
+    }
+    var ast = compileString(source, sopts);
+    return _evalBlock(ast.body, [data || {}], customEscape);
+  }
+
   function reset() { astCache = {}; }
 
   // Walk viewsDir, compile every .html file. Surfaces parse errors at
@@ -845,6 +976,9 @@ function create(opts) {
   // a typo like `{% if not foo %}` fails the deploy, not the user.
   // Returns the list of view names compiled.
   function precompileAll() {
+    if (!viewsDir) {
+      throw new Error("template: viewsDir not configured — precompileAll requires a views directory");
+    }
     var compiled = [];
     function walk(dir, prefix) {
       var entries = nodeFs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
@@ -878,6 +1012,8 @@ function create(opts) {
   return {
     compile:        compile,
     render:         render,
+    compileString:  compileString,
+    renderString:   renderString,
     reset:          reset,
     precompileAll:  precompileAll,
     viewsDir:       viewsDir,

package/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
       "hashes": {
         "server": "sha256:5d539dfc9ef47121d4c09bd7256d76448a1f5ac47ee09ac44c78ff6a062af9ab"
       },
-      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-26T19:53:53.034Z"
+      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-27T17:51:05.993Z"
     },
     "@noble/curves": {
       "version": "2.2.0",
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
       "hashes": {
         "server": "sha256:ebf254d5eb56aef8705a1c4af9603f47987b4870a9bb5e657e06907b701e2731"
       },
-      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-26T19:53:53.034Z"
+      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-27T17:51:05.993Z"
     },
     "@noble/post-quantum": {
       "version": "0.6.1",
@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@
       "hashes": {
         "server": "sha256:f9190309daadca4c2e2cc2b76beaa6b96e463429cc3c390bd9f0ceaf7b588c68"
       },
-      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-26T19:53:53.034Z"
+      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-27T17:51:05.993Z"
     },
     "@simplewebauthn/server": {
-      "version": "13.3.0",
+      "version": "13.3.1",
       "license": "MIT",
       "author": "Matthew Miller",
       "source": "https://github.com/MasterKale/SimpleWebAuthn",
@@ -89,12 +89,12 @@
         "server": "lib/vendor/simplewebauthn-server.cjs"
       },
       "bundler": "esbuild --format=cjs --minify --platform=node --external:crypto --external:node:crypto",
-      "bundledAt": "2026-04-26T00:00:00Z",
-      "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:simplewebauthn:server:13.3.0:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
+      "bundledAt": "2026-05-27T00:00:00Z",
+      "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:simplewebauthn:server:13.3.1:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
       "hashes": {
-        "server": "sha256:a9777dca582095d67f17ca24e19a0791de29928555b6b779c2233429175eb3f0"
+        "server": "sha256:f359a782ac57e3ff56ac71083d17f5c082f88ab49d645fc2bede398b47adebdb"
       },
-      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-26T19:53:53.034Z"
+      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-27T17:51:05.993Z"
     },
     "SecLists-common-passwords-top-10000": {
       "version": "10k-most-common (master)",
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
       },
       "runtime_artifact": "lib/vendor/common-passwords-top-10000.data.js",
       "integrity_layers": "sha256 + sha3-512 + SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f signature + in-payload canary (where applicable)",
-      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-26T19:53:53.034Z"
+      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-27T17:51:05.993Z"
     },
     "bimi-trust-anchors": {
       "version": "operator-managed",
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
       },
       "runtime_artifact": "lib/vendor/bimi-trust-anchors.data.js",
       "integrity_layers": "sha256 + sha3-512 + SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f signature + in-payload canary (where applicable)",
-      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-26T19:53:53.034Z"
+      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-27T17:51:05.993Z"
     },
     "publicsuffix-list": {
       "version": "master",
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@
       },
       "runtime_artifact": "lib/vendor/public-suffix-list.data.js",
       "integrity_layers": "sha256 + sha3-512 + SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f signature + in-payload canary (where applicable)",
-      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-26T19:53:53.034Z"
+      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-27T17:51:05.993Z"
     },
     "peculiar-pki": {
       "version": "2.0.0+pkijs-3.4.0",
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
       "hashes": {
         "server": "sha256:9bbc191afaaa2b1e5757f00480457c08134cdc2c55d541df18d9155bba9cbf77"
       },
-      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-26T19:53:53.034Z"
+      "refreshedAt": "2026-05-27T17:51:05.993Z"
     }
   }
 }