@blamejs/core 0.12.47 → 0.12.48

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.12.x
 
+- v0.12.48 (2026-05-25) — **`b.network.dns.dnssec` — local DNSSEC signature verification (RFC 4035).** Verify a DNS answer's RRSIG signature yourself instead of trusting the upstream resolver's AD bit. b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset reconstructs the RFC 4034 §3.1.8.1 signed data — the RRSIG RDATA without the signature, followed by the RRset in canonical form (owner names lowercased, RRs ordered by canonical RDATA, the RRSIG's Original TTL) — and checks the signature against the DNSKEY, enforcing the inception / expiration window. Supports RSA/SHA-256 (alg 8), ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 (13), ECDSA P-384/SHA-384 (14), and Ed25519 (15) — the modern deployed set. verifyDs checks a delegation-signer digest against a DNSKEY (SHA-256 / SHA-384) and keyTag computes the RFC 4034 Appendix B key tag. The verification core is what a chain-walker composes; it defends against a compromised or on-path resolver that lies about authentication. **Added:** *`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset(opts)`* — Verifies an RRSIG over a canonicalised RRset against a DNSKEY. `opts` carries the owner `name`, the RR `type`, the wire-format `rdatas`, the parsed `rrsig` (algorithm / labels / originalTtl / inception / expiration / keyTag / signerName / signature), and the `dnskey` (algorithm + raw public key). The signed data is rebuilt per RFC 4034 §3.1.8.1: the RRSIG prefix (type covered | algorithm | labels | original TTL | expiration | inception | key tag | canonical signer name) followed by each RR in canonical form (lowercased owner | type | class | original TTL | rdlen | rdata), sorted by `Buffer.compare` on the RDATA. The validity window is enforced against `opts.at` (defaults to now; an invalid Date is refused, not treated as now). An RRSIG whose algorithm disagrees with the DNSKEY is refused before any key is built. RR types that embed domain names in their RDATA (NS, CNAME, SOA, MX, SRV, …) need RDATA-internal name-lowercasing this version does not perform, so they are refused with `dnssec/uncanonicalizable-type` rather than mis-validated; the security-critical DNSKEY / DS and the name-free address / text types (A, AAAA, TXT, CAA, TLSA, …) are fully supported. · *`b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs(opts)` / `b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag(dnskeyRdata)`* — `verifyDs` confirms a delegation-signer record matches a DNSKEY: it checks the key tag, then compares the DS digest (SHA-256 type 2 / SHA-384 type 4) against the digest computed over the canonical owner name and the DNSKEY RDATA, constant-time. `keyTag` computes the RFC 4034 Appendix B 16-bit key tag from a DNSKEY's full RDATA — the identifier an RRSIG or DS uses to select the signing key. Together with `verifyRrset` these are the per-RRset building blocks a recursive chain-walk (root → TLD → zone) composes; the chain-walk itself, NSEC / NSEC3 denial-of-existence, and the bundled IANA root trust anchor are not part of this core.
+
 - v0.12.47 (2026-05-25) — **`b.cose.mac0` / `b.cose.macVerify0` — COSE_Mac0 (RFC 9052 §6.2).** Completes the COSE message-type set (COSE_Sign1 / COSE_Encrypt0 / COSE_Mac0) with single shared-key MACs. b.cose.mac0 produces a tagged COSE_Mac0 over a payload using HMAC-SHA-256/384/512 (the COSE-standard MAC algorithms; HMAC is symmetric, so its post-quantum strength is preserved). b.cose.macVerify0 recomputes the tag over the MAC_structure and compares it in constant time, with a mandatory algorithm allowlist. Use when both parties hold a shared key — e.g. an ECDH-derived key — and a non-repudiable signature is not wanted; detached payloads are supported (the proximity mdoc device-MAC variant and MACed CWTs are the consumers). Composes b.cbor + the framework's constant-time compare; no new runtime dependency. **Added:** *`b.cose.mac0(payload, opts)` / `b.cose.macVerify0(coseMac0, opts)`* — `mac0` emits a tagged COSE_Mac0 (tag 17) with `alg` (`HMAC-256/256` | `HMAC-384/384` | `HMAC-512/512`) in the protected header and the HMAC tag computed over the MAC_structure `["MAC0", protected, external_aad, payload]`; `detached: true` emits a nil payload. `macVerify0` reads the algorithm from the protected header (must be in the required `opts.algorithms` allowlist), recomputes the tag, and compares it constant-time — a wrong key, tampered tag, or `external_aad` mismatch is refused with `cose/bad-tag`; a detached payload is supplied via `opts.externalPayload`. `external_aad` binds context into the tag.
 
 - v0.12.46 (2026-05-25) — **`b.mdoc.verifyDeviceAuth` — ISO 18013-5 mdoc device authentication.** Completes mdoc verification with the holder-binding half (ISO 18013-5 §9.1.3, signature variant). verifyIssuerSigned proves the data is issuer-signed; verifyDeviceAuth proves the presenter controls the device key the issuer bound into the MSO, so a captured issuer-signed document cannot be replayed by anyone else. The device's COSE_Sign1 (deviceSigned.deviceAuth.deviceSignature) is verified over the detached DeviceAuthentication structure ["DeviceAuthentication", SessionTranscript, DocType, DeviceNameSpacesBytes] using the device key from verifyIssuerSigned().deviceKey (now surfaced) and the operator-supplied SessionTranscript that binds the proof to this exact exchange (the presentation protocol — e.g. OpenID4VP — defines the transcript). Composes the v0.12.45 b.cose detached-payload verify + importKey. The MAC variant (deviceMac / COSE_Mac0, used in proximity flows with a reader ephemeral key) is deferred and refused with mdoc/device-mac-unsupported. No new runtime dependency. **Added:** *`b.mdoc.verifyDeviceAuth(opts)` + `deviceKey` on the verifyIssuerSigned result* — `verifyDeviceAuth({ deviceKey, deviceSigned, docType, sessionTranscript, algorithms })` imports the device key (a COSE_Key via `b.cose.importKey`, or a KeyObject), reconstructs the detached `DeviceAuthentication` payload, and verifies the `deviceSignature` COSE_Sign1 against the mandatory algorithm allowlist — a mismatched `sessionTranscript` or `docType` fails the signature. `verifyIssuerSigned` now returns `deviceKey` (the MSO `deviceKeyInfo.deviceKey`) so the two checks chain. The MAC variant (`deviceMac`) is refused with `mdoc/device-mac-unsupported` pending COSE_Mac0 + reader-key support.

package/README.md

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ The framework bundles the surface a typical Node app reaches for. Every primitiv
   - In-process CIDR fence (`b.middleware.networkAllowlist`)
   - `Cache-Control: no-store` on every 401 from `requireAuth` / `requireAal` / `requireStepUp` per RFC 9111 §5.2.2.5
 - **Outbound HTTP client** — HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 with SSRF gate (cloud-metadata IPs hard-denied; private / loopback / link-local overridable per call); scheme + userinfo + per-host destination allowlist; redirects, multipart, interceptors, progress, encrypted cookie jar (`b.httpClient`, `b.ssrfGuard`, `b.safeUrl`)
-- **Network configurability (`b.network`)** — env-driven NTP / NTS (RFC 8915), IPv4/IPv6 NTP, DNS with IPv6 / DoH / DoT (private-CA pinning) / cache / lookup timeout; outbound HTTP proxy (`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY`); runtime DPI trust-store CA additions; application-level heartbeats; TCP socket defaults
+- **Network configurability (`b.network`)** — env-driven NTP / NTS (RFC 8915), IPv4/IPv6 NTP, DNS with IPv6 / DoH / DoT (private-CA pinning) / cache / lookup timeout; local DNSSEC signature verification (RFC 4035 — `b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset` over a canonicalised RRset against RSA / ECDSA P-256·P-384 / Ed25519 DNSKEYs, plus DS-digest + key-tag) so a resolver client can verify an answer instead of trusting the upstream AD bit; outbound HTTP proxy (`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY`); runtime DPI trust-store CA additions; application-level heartbeats; TCP socket defaults
 - **Error pages** — operator-rendered, no app-frame leakage (`b.errorPage`)
 ### Defensive parsers
 

package/lib/network-dnssec.js

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * @module b.network.dns.dnssec
+ * @nav    Network
+ * @title  DNSSEC validation
+ *
+ * @intro
+ *   Local DNSSEC signature verification (RFC 4033–4035 / 6605 / 8080) —
+ *   the cryptographic core that lets a resolver client verify a DNS
+ *   answer itself instead of trusting the upstream resolver's AD bit.
+ *   <code>b.network.dns.resolver</code> checks the AD flag; this module
+ *   verifies the actual RRSIG signature over the canonicalised RRset,
+ *   defending against a compromised or on-path resolver.
+ *
+ *   <code>verifyRrset</code> reconstructs the RFC 4034 §3.1.8.1 signed
+ *   data (the RRSIG RDATA without the signature, followed by the RRset
+ *   in canonical form — owner names lowercased, RRs ordered by canonical
+ *   RDATA, the RRSIG's Original TTL) and verifies it with the DNSKEY,
+ *   enforcing the signature's inception / expiration window. The DNSKEY
+ *   algorithms are RSA/SHA-256 (8), ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 (13), ECDSA
+ *   P-384/SHA-384 (14), and Ed25519 (15) — the modern, deployed set.
+ *   <code>verifyDs</code> checks a delegation-signer digest against a
+ *   DNSKEY (SHA-256 / SHA-384), and <code>keyTag</code> computes the
+ *   RFC 4034 Appendix B key tag.
+ *
+ *   <strong>Scope.</strong> This is the verification core. RR types that
+ *   carry domain names in their RDATA (NS, CNAME, SOA, MX, SRV, …) need
+ *   name-lowercasing inside the RDATA (RFC 4034 §6.2) that this version
+ *   does not perform, so they are refused with
+ *   <code>dnssec/uncanonicalizable-type</code> rather than mis-validated
+ *   — the security-critical DNSKEY / DS and the name-free address /
+ *   text types (A, AAAA, TXT, …) are fully supported. The recursive
+ *   chain-walk (root → TLD → zone), NSEC / NSEC3 denial-of-existence,
+ *   and the IANA root trust-anchor bundle are deferred: these primitives
+ *   are the per-RRset building blocks a chain-walker composes.
+ *
+ * @card
+ *   Local DNSSEC verification (RFC 4035) — verify an RRSIG over a
+ *   canonicalised RRset against a DNSKEY (RSA / ECDSA P-256·P-384 /
+ *   Ed25519), plus DS-digest + key-tag. Don't trust the upstream AD bit;
+ *   verify the signature. Name-bearing RR types are refused, not
+ *   mis-validated; chain-walk + NSEC3 deferred.
+ */
+
+var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
+var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var DnssecError = defineClass("DnssecError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
+
+// DNSSEC algorithm numbers (IANA DNSSEC Algorithm Numbers) → verify params.
+var ALGS = {
+  8:  { name: "RSASHA256",        kind: "rsa",   hash: "sha256" },                          // allow:raw-byte-literal — IANA DNSSEC algorithm number
+  13: { name: "ECDSAP256SHA256",  kind: "ec",    hash: "sha256", crv: "P-256", coord: 32 },   // allow:raw-byte-literal — P-256 coordinate size
+  14: { name: "ECDSAP384SHA384",  kind: "ec",    hash: "sha384", crv: "P-384", coord: 48 },   // allow:raw-byte-literal — P-384 coordinate size
+  15: { name: "ED25519",          kind: "okp",   hash: null,     crv: "Ed25519" },
+};
+
+// DS digest algorithms (IANA) → node hash.
+var DS_DIGESTS = { 2: "sha256", 4: "sha384" };
+
+// RR types whose RDATA contains NO embedded domain name, so the wire
+// RDATA is already in canonical form (RFC 4034 §6.2 needs no rewrite).
+// Name-bearing types are refused rather than silently mis-canonicalised.
+// (type numbers IANA): A 1, AAAA 28, TXT 16, DNSKEY 48, DS 43, CAA 257,
+// TLSA 52, SSHFP 44, HINFO 13, CDS 59, CDNSKEY 60, OPENPGPKEY 61, SMIMEA 53.
+var NAME_FREE_TYPE_NUMS = [1, 28, 16, 48, 43, 257, 52, 44, 13, 59, 60, 61, 53];          // allow:raw-byte-literal allow:raw-time-literal — IANA DNS type numbers (no embedded names)
+var TYPE_NUM = {
+  A: 1, NS: 2, CNAME: 5, SOA: 6, PTR: 12, MX: 15, TXT: 16, AAAA: 28, SRV: 33,
+  DS: 43, SSHFP: 44, RRSIG: 46, DNSKEY: 48, TLSA: 52, SMIMEA: 53, CDS: 59, CDNSKEY: 60, // allow:raw-byte-literal allow:raw-time-literal — IANA DNS type numbers
+  OPENPGPKEY: 61, CAA: 257, HINFO: 13,
+};
+
+function _bytes(x, what) {
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(x)) return x;
+  if (x instanceof Uint8Array) return Buffer.from(x);
+  throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-bytes", "dnssec: " + what + " must be a Buffer");
+}
+
+// Canonical wire form of a domain name (RFC 4034 §6.2): each label
+// length-prefixed, ASCII lowercased, terminated by the root label.
+function _canonicalName(name) {
+  if (typeof name !== "string") throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-name", "dnssec: name must be a string");
+  var n = name.replace(/\.$/, "");
+  if (n === "") return Buffer.from([0]);
+  var labels = n.split(".");
+  var parts = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < labels.length; i++) {
+    var lab = Buffer.from(labels[i].toLowerCase(), "ascii");
+    if (lab.length === 0 || lab.length > 63) {                                          // allow:raw-byte-literal — DNS label length cap (RFC 1035)
+      throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-name", "dnssec: invalid label in '" + name + "'");
+    }
+    parts.push(Buffer.from([lab.length]), lab);
+  }
+  parts.push(Buffer.from([0]));
+  return Buffer.concat(parts);
+}
+
+function _u16(n) { return Buffer.from([(n >> 8) & 0xff, n & 0xff]); }                    // allow:raw-byte-literal — 16-bit big-endian split
+function _u32(n) {
+  var b = Buffer.alloc(4);
+  b.writeUInt32BE(n >>> 0, 0);
+  return b;
+}
+function _typeNumber(type) {
+  if (typeof type === "number") return type;
+  var t = TYPE_NUM[String(type).toUpperCase()];
+  if (t === undefined) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/unknown-type", "dnssec: unknown RR type '" + type + "'");
+  return t;
+}
+
+// DNSKEY public-key RDATA → JWK (kty/crv allowlisted; RFC 3110 RSA,
+// RFC 6605 ECDSA, RFC 8080 Ed25519). publicKey is the key bytes after
+// the DNSKEY flags/protocol/algorithm fields.
+function _dnskeyToKey(algId, publicKey) {
+  var alg = ALGS[algId];
+  if (!alg) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/unsupported-alg", "dnssec: unsupported DNSKEY algorithm " + algId);
+  var pk = _bytes(publicKey, "dnskey publicKey");
+  if (alg.kind === "rsa") {
+    // RFC 3110: exponent length is 1 byte, or (if that byte is 0) the
+    // next 2 bytes; then exponent, then modulus.
+    var off = 0, explen = pk[0];
+    off = 1;
+    if (explen === 0) { explen = (pk[1] << 8) | pk[2]; off = 3; }                        // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 3110 3-byte exponent length
+    if (explen === 0 || off + explen >= pk.length) {
+      throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-key", "dnssec: malformed RSA DNSKEY public key");
+    }
+    var exponent = pk.slice(off, off + explen);
+    var modulus = pk.slice(off + explen);
+    return _jwkKey({ kty: "RSA", n: modulus.toString("base64url"), e: exponent.toString("base64url") });
+  }
+  if (alg.kind === "ec") {
+    if (pk.length !== alg.coord * 2) {
+      throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-key", "dnssec: " + alg.crv + " key must be " + (alg.coord * 2) + " bytes (x||y)");
+    }
+    return _jwkKey({ kty: "EC", crv: alg.crv, x: pk.slice(0, alg.coord).toString("base64url"), y: pk.slice(alg.coord).toString("base64url") });
+  }
+  // Ed25519
+  if (pk.length !== 32) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-key", "dnssec: Ed25519 key must be 32 bytes");   // allow:raw-byte-literal — Ed25519 key size
+  return _jwkKey({ kty: "OKP", crv: "Ed25519", x: pk.toString("base64url") });
+}
+function _jwkKey(jwk) {
+  try { return nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: "jwk" }); }
+  catch (e) { throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-key", "dnssec: could not import DNSKEY: " + ((e && e.message) || e)); }
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag
+ * @signature b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag(dnskeyRdata)
+ * @since     0.12.48
+ * @status    stable
+ * @related   b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs, b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset
+ *
+ * Compute the RFC 4034 Appendix B key tag of a DNSKEY from its full
+ * RDATA (flags || protocol || algorithm || public key) — the 16-bit
+ * identifier an RRSIG / DS references to select the signing key.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var tag = b.network.dns.dnssec.keyTag(dnskeyRdata);
+ */
+function keyTag(dnskeyRdata) {
+  var rd = _bytes(dnskeyRdata, "dnskeyRdata");
+  var acc = 0;
+  for (var i = 0; i < rd.length; i++) {
+    acc += (i & 1) ? rd[i] : (rd[i] << 8);                                               // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 4034 App B key-tag accumulation
+  }
+  acc += (acc >> 16) & 0xffff;                                                           // allow:raw-byte-literal — App B fold
+  return acc & 0xffff;                                                                   // allow:raw-byte-literal — App B 16-bit tag
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs
+ * @signature b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs(opts)
+ * @since     0.12.48
+ * @status    stable
+ * @related   b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset
+ *
+ * Verify a DS (Delegation Signer) record against a child DNSKEY — the
+ * link that lets a parent zone vouch for a child's key. The DS digest
+ * (SHA-256 / SHA-384) is recomputed over the owner name plus the DNSKEY
+ * RDATA and compared to the DS, with the key tag and algorithm checked.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   {
+ *     ownerName:    string,   // the child zone name (the DNSKEY owner)
+ *     dnskeyRdata:  Buffer,   // full DNSKEY RDATA (flags||protocol||alg||publicKey)
+ *     ds: { keyTag, algorithm, digestType, digest: Buffer },  // the parent DS
+ *   }
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs({ ownerName: "example.com", dnskeyRdata: ksk, ds: parentDs });
+ */
+function verifyDs(opts) {
+  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "dnssec.verifyDs", DnssecError);
+  validateOpts(opts, ["ownerName", "dnskeyRdata", "ds"], "dnssec.verifyDs");
+  var ds = opts.ds;
+  if (!ds || typeof ds !== "object") throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-ds", "dnssec.verifyDs: opts.ds is required");
+  var hashName = DS_DIGESTS[ds.digestType];
+  if (!hashName) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/unsupported-digest", "dnssec.verifyDs: unsupported DS digest type " + ds.digestType);
+  var rd = _bytes(opts.dnskeyRdata, "dnskeyRdata");
+  if (keyTag(rd) !== ds.keyTag) {
+    throw new DnssecError("dnssec/keytag-mismatch", "dnssec.verifyDs: DNSKEY key tag does not match the DS");
+  }
+  var digestInput = Buffer.concat([_canonicalName(opts.ownerName), rd]);
+  var expected = nodeCrypto.createHash(hashName).update(digestInput).digest();
+  var actual = _bytes(ds.digest, "ds.digest");
+  if (!bCrypto.timingSafeEqual(expected, actual)) {
+    throw new DnssecError("dnssec/ds-mismatch", "dnssec.verifyDs: DS digest does not match the DNSKEY");
+  }
+  return { ok: true, keyTag: ds.keyTag, digestType: ds.digestType };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset
+ * @signature b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset(opts)
+ * @since     0.12.48
+ * @status    stable
+ * @compliance soc2
+ * @related   b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyDs, b.network.dns.resolver.create
+ *
+ * Verify an RRSIG over an RRset against a DNSKEY (RFC 4035 §5.3). The
+ * signed data is reconstructed in canonical form — the RRSIG RDATA
+ * without the signature, then the RRset's records ordered by canonical
+ * RDATA with the RRSIG Original TTL — and the signature is verified with
+ * the DNSKEY (RSA/SHA-256, ECDSA P-256/384, Ed25519). The signature's
+ * inception / expiration window is enforced against <code>opts.at</code>.
+ * RR types carrying embedded domain names are refused
+ * (<code>dnssec/uncanonicalizable-type</code>) rather than mis-validated.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   {
+ *     name:    string,    // owner name of the RRset
+ *     type:    string|number, // RR type (e.g. "DNSKEY", "A")
+ *     class?:  number,    // default 1 (IN)
+ *     rdatas:  Buffer[],  // each record's wire-format RDATA
+ *     rrsig: {            // the RRSIG covering the RRset
+ *       algorithm, labels, originalTtl, expiration, inception, keyTag,
+ *       signerName: string, signature: Buffer,
+ *     },
+ *     dnskey: { algorithm, publicKey: Buffer },  // the signing DNSKEY (publicKey = bytes after flags/proto/alg)
+ *     at?:     Date,      // validity instant (default now); must be a valid Date
+ *   }
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   b.network.dns.dnssec.verifyRrset({ name: "example.com", type: "DNSKEY", rdatas: keys, rrsig: sig, dnskey: ksk });
+ */
+function verifyRrset(opts) {
+  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "dnssec.verifyRrset", DnssecError);
+  validateOpts(opts, ["name", "type", "class", "rdatas", "rrsig", "dnskey", "at"], "dnssec.verifyRrset");
+  var rrsig = opts.rrsig;
+  var dnskey = opts.dnskey;
+  if (!rrsig || typeof rrsig !== "object") throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-rrsig", "dnssec.verifyRrset: opts.rrsig is required");
+  if (!dnskey || typeof dnskey !== "object") throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-key", "dnssec.verifyRrset: opts.dnskey is required");
+  if (!Array.isArray(opts.rdatas) || opts.rdatas.length === 0) {
+    throw new DnssecError("dnssec/empty-rrset", "dnssec.verifyRrset: opts.rdatas must be a non-empty array");
+  }
+  var alg = ALGS[rrsig.algorithm];
+  if (!alg) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/unsupported-alg", "dnssec.verifyRrset: unsupported algorithm " + rrsig.algorithm);
+  if (dnskey.algorithm !== rrsig.algorithm) {
+    throw new DnssecError("dnssec/alg-mismatch", "dnssec.verifyRrset: DNSKEY algorithm does not match the RRSIG");
+  }
+
+  var typeNum = _typeNumber(opts.type);
+  if (NAME_FREE_TYPE_NUMS.indexOf(typeNum) === -1) {
+    throw new DnssecError("dnssec/uncanonicalizable-type",
+      "dnssec.verifyRrset: RR type " + typeNum + " carries embedded names; RDATA-name canonicalisation is not supported (refused, not mis-validated)");
+  }
+
+  // Validity window (fail closed on a bad opts.at).
+  var atMs;
+  if (opts.at !== undefined && opts.at !== null) {
+    if (!(opts.at instanceof Date) || !isFinite(opts.at.getTime())) {
+      throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-at", "dnssec.verifyRrset: opts.at must be a valid Date");
+    }
+    atMs = opts.at.getTime();
+  } else {
+    atMs = Date.now();
+  }
+  var nowSec = Math.floor(atMs / 1000);                       // allow:raw-time-literal — ms→NumericDate seconds (RRSIG inception/expiration are seconds since epoch, RFC 4034 §3.1.5)
+  if (nowSec < (rrsig.inception >>> 0)) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/not-yet-valid", "dnssec.verifyRrset: RRSIG inception is in the future");
+  if (nowSec > (rrsig.expiration >>> 0)) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/expired", "dnssec.verifyRrset: RRSIG has expired");
+
+  var klass = typeof opts.class === "number" ? opts.class : 1;
+  var ownerWire = _canonicalName(opts.name);
+  var ttl = _u32(rrsig.originalTtl);
+
+  // Canonical RRset (RFC 4034 §6.3): order records by canonical RDATA.
+  var rdatas = opts.rdatas.map(function (r, i) { return _bytes(r, "rdatas[" + i + "]"); });
+  var sorted = rdatas.slice().sort(Buffer.compare);
+  var rrParts = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < sorted.length; i++) {
+    rrParts.push(ownerWire, _u16(typeNum), _u16(klass), ttl, _u16(sorted[i].length), sorted[i]);
+  }
+
+  // RRSIG RDATA without the signature (RFC 4034 §3.1.8.1).
+  var rrsigPrefix = Buffer.concat([
+    _u16(typeNum), Buffer.from([rrsig.algorithm & 0xff, rrsig.labels & 0xff]),           // allow:raw-byte-literal — single-octet alg + labels fields
+    _u32(rrsig.originalTtl), _u32(rrsig.expiration), _u32(rrsig.inception),
+    _u16(rrsig.keyTag), _canonicalName(rrsig.signerName),
+  ]);
+  var signedData = Buffer.concat([rrsigPrefix].concat(rrParts));
+
+  var key = _dnskeyToKey(dnskey.algorithm, dnskey.publicKey);
+  var signature = _bytes(rrsig.signature, "rrsig.signature");
+  var ok;
+  try {
+    if (alg.kind === "okp") {
+      ok = nodeCrypto.verify(null, signedData, key, signature);
+    } else if (alg.kind === "ec") {
+      ok = nodeCrypto.verify(alg.hash, signedData, { key: key, dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" }, signature);
+    } else {
+      ok = nodeCrypto.verify(alg.hash, signedData, key, signature);
+    }
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new DnssecError("dnssec/verify-threw", "dnssec.verifyRrset: signature verification threw: " + ((e && e.message) || e));
+  }
+  if (!ok) throw new DnssecError("dnssec/bad-signature", "dnssec.verifyRrset: RRSIG signature did not verify");
+  return { ok: true, algorithm: alg.name, keyTag: rrsig.keyTag, signerName: rrsig.signerName };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  verifyRrset: verifyRrset,
+  verifyDs:    verifyDs,
+  keyTag:      keyTag,
+  ALGORITHMS:  ALGS,
+  DnssecError: DnssecError,
+};

package/lib/network.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ var ntpCheck = require("./ntp-check");
 var nts      = require("./network-nts");
 var networkDns = require("./network-dns");
 networkDns.resolver = require("./network-dns-resolver");
+networkDns.dnssec = require("./network-dnssec");
 var networkProxy = require("./network-proxy");
 var networkTls = require("./network-tls");
 var heartbeat = require("./network-heartbeat");

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.12.47",
+  "version": "0.12.48",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:4b602bbd-c8e6-4e4a-8b26-b0c570144b86",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:230d6fb7-7a35-40e7-990b-d931f5a43248",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-05-25T11:11:40.479Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-05-25T12:11:44.437Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.12.47",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.12.48",
       "type": "application",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.12.47",
+      "version": "0.12.48",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.12.47",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.12.48",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.12.47",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.12.48",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]