@blamejs/core 0.11.6 → 0.11.17

package/lib/audit.js

@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ var log = boot("audit");
 // audit critical path — b.audit.record() must return, emit/safeEmit
 // drains must not stall behind it. On timeout the shadow record is
 // dropped (audit.shadow_timeout observability event) and the
-// framework chain row remains committed. CLAUDE.md rule §5 drop-
-// silent posture for hot-path observability sinks.
+// framework chain row remains committed — audit emission MUST NOT
+// crash or stall the request that triggered it.
 var EXTERNAL_STORE_TIMEOUT_MS = C.TIME.seconds(30);
 
 // External shadow store registered via `b.audit.useStore({ record })`.
@@ -88,11 +88,11 @@ var EXTERNAL_STORE_TIMEOUT_MS = C.TIME.seconds(30);
 // the operator's record receives the fully-formed row (logical fields +
 // `_id` + `recordedAt` + `monotonicCounter` + `prevHash` + `rowHash`).
 //
-// Shadow failures are drop-silent (rule §5 — hot-path observability
-// sinks must not crash the path that emitted them). An audit-shadow
-// failure surfaces via `b.observability` as `audit.shadow_failed`; the
-// framework chain row still committed and downstream verifyChain still
-// works against the framework store.
+// Shadow failures are drop-silent — hot-path observability sinks
+// must not crash the path that emitted them. An audit-shadow
+// failure surfaces via `b.observability` as `audit.shadow_failed`;
+// the framework chain row still committed and downstream
+// verifyChain still works against the framework store.
 var _externalStore = null;
 
 // Per-operation timeout for framework-state SQL. A misbehaving
@@ -481,8 +481,9 @@ async function record(event) {
       var appended = await _chainWriter.append(logical);
       // Operator-registered shadow store: replicate the fully-formed
       // row to an immutable external destination. Drop-silent on
-      // failure (rule §5) — the framework chain is authoritative and
-      // already committed; the shadow is a best-effort archival.
+      // failure — the framework chain is authoritative and already
+      // committed; the shadow is a best-effort archival, and an
+      // unreachable destination must not crash the audit caller.
       // The operator's record receives the SAME object the framework
       // returns to its caller, so external consumers see identical
       // hashes / counters / ids for cross-store reconciliation.
@@ -547,10 +548,10 @@ async function record(event) {
  * or `audit.shadow_timeout` (cap exceeded) with `{ action,
  * monotonicCounter, error, timeoutMs }` metadata, and the framework
  * chain append still succeeds (the row is durable in the framework's
- * own table; the shadow is a best-effort archival). This is the
- * rule §5 drop-silent posture for hot-path observability sinks — an
- * unreachable / hanging shadow MUST NOT crash or stall the request
- * path that triggered the audit attempt.
+ * own table; the shadow is a best-effort archival). Hot-path
+ * observability sinks emit drop-silent — an unreachable / hanging
+ * shadow MUST NOT crash or stall the request path that triggered
+ * the audit attempt.
  *
  * Call this once at boot, BEFORE the first `b.audit.record` /
  * `b.audit.emit` / `b.audit.safeEmit`. Switching stores on a running

package/lib/auth/oid4vci.js

@@ -451,10 +451,11 @@ function create(opts) {
           "exchangePreAuthorizedCode: tx_code required (offer mandates it)");
       }
       var txHash = sha3Hash("oid4vci-tx:" + eopts.txCode);
-      // Constant-time compare on the hashed tx_code (audit 2026-05-11
-      // — was `!==` on fixed-width sha3 hex; per CLAUDE.md rule §5
-      // every framework-internal compare against attacker-controlled
-      // input routes through timingSafeEqual).
+      // Constant-time compare on the hashed tx_code — `===` on a
+      // hex digest leaks per-byte timing under attacker-controlled
+      // input. Every framework compare against attacker-influenced
+      // bytes routes through timingSafeEqual regardless of the
+      // operand length being fixed.
       if (!timingSafeEqual(txHash, entry.txCodeHash)) {
         // Don't consume on failure — wallet may be retrying. Operator
         // attaches their own attempt counter / lockout via b.auth.lockout.

package/lib/compliance.js

@@ -1087,8 +1087,9 @@ var POSTURE_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
   // being certified for the ML-KEM / ML-DSA primitives upstream.
   //
   // Conflict resolution: PQC-first remains the framework default
-  // (CLAUDE.md rule §2 — never weaken security middleware), but
-  // operators in a FedRAMP boundary opt into `fipsMode: true` to
+  // — the framework refuses to weaken security middleware to fit a
+  // posture flag. Operators in a FedRAMP boundary opt into
+  // `fipsMode: true` to
   // switch `b.audit.sign` from SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f to FIPS-validated
   // AES-GCM + SHA-384 for the audit-chain signing path. The runtime
   // emits a `compliance.posture.fips_conflict` audit warning when

package/lib/crypto.js

@@ -52,7 +52,9 @@ var C = require("./constants");
 // Circular: audit imports b.crypto for sha3Hash + envelope sign. Lazy-
 // load the audit module so the legacy-envelope decrypt path can emit
 // `system.crypto.decrypt.allow_legacy` events without an inline
-// require() inside setImmediate (top-of-file requires per rule §3).
+// require() inside setImmediate. (The framework's convention is
+// top-of-file require() except where a documented circular-load
+// reason forces lazy-load; this is one of those reasons.)
 var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
 var audit       = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
 // safe-buffer hosts the canonical hasCrlf(s) helper used by every

package/lib/safe-decompress.js

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ function safeDecompress(input, opts) {
   return out;
 }
 
-// Drop-silent audit emission per rule §5: refuse-emit is best-effort,
+// Drop-silent audit emission — refuse-emit is best-effort,
 // failures here don't crash the operator's path. Then throw the typed
 // error so the caller's catch block decides downstream.
 function _refuse(opts, code, message, originalError) {
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ function _refuse(opts, code, message, originalError) {
           reason:    message,
         },
       });
-    } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent per rule §5 */ }
+    } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent — observability is itself hot-path */ }
   }
   var err = new SafeDecompressError(code, message);
   if (originalError) err.cause = originalError;

package/lib/safe-mount-info.js

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
  *   Composes:
  *     - lib/safe-decompress / lib/audit — operator-supplied audit
  *       handle receives `system.safe_mount_info.refused` events on
- *       read-failed and parse-failed (drop-silent per rule §5).
+ *       read-failed and parse-failed (drop-silent — observability emission must not crash the hot path that emitted the event).
  *
  * RFC / kernel-doc citations:
  *   - [Linux Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst §3.5 — /proc/<pid>/mountinfo](https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt)
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ function _refuseEmit(opts, code, message) {
         outcome:  "denied",
         metadata: { code: code, reason: message },
       });
-    } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent per rule §5 */ }
+    } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent — observability emission must not crash the hot path that emitted the event */ }
   }
 }
 

package/lib/subject.js

@@ -634,9 +634,9 @@ function _subjectHash(subjectId) {
 }
 
 function _writeAudit(action, subjectId, outcome, metadata) {
-  // recordSafe — audit failure must not roll back the subject mutation
-  // that already touched the database. Drop-silent per CLAUDE.md rule
-  // §5 (hot-path audit sinks): swallow any throw from audit.emit so a
+  // recordSafe — audit failure must not roll back the subject
+  // mutation that already touched the database. Hot-path audit
+  // sinks are drop-silent: swallow any throw from audit.emit so a
   // misconfigured sink doesn't crash a partially-committed subject
   // mutation. Errors surface via the audit sink's own logger.
   try {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.11.6",
+  "version": "0.11.17",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 {
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
-  "specVersion": "1.6",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:47f41007-66d3-47f2-ba7e-e47db1d7370f",
+  "specVersion": "1.5",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:977499c0-aee7-4197-9b4d-c7af9fd7fda5",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-05-20T00:03:39.026Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-05-20T16:28:06.450Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.11.6",
-      "type": "library",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.11.17",
+      "type": "application",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.11.6",
+      "version": "0.11.17",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.11.6",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.11.17",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.11.6",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.11.17",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]
-}
+}