@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.5.20 → 0.5.21

package/lib/reviews.js

@@ -50,9 +50,9 @@ var REVIEW_ORDER_KEY   = ["created_at:desc", "id:desc"];
 var CUSTOMER_ORDER_KEY = ["created_at:desc", "id:desc"];
 
 var ALLOWED_STATUSES   = ["pending", "published", "rejected"];
-var CONTROL_BYTE_RE    = /[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]/;
 
 var b = require("./vendor/blamejs");
+var textGuard = require("./text-guard");
 
 // ---- validators ---------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -75,9 +75,7 @@ function _title(s) {
   if (s.length > MAX_TITLE_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("reviews: title must be <= " + MAX_TITLE_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("reviews: title contains control bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "reviews: title");
   return s;
 }
 
@@ -89,9 +87,7 @@ function _body(s) {
   if (s.length > MAX_BODY_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("reviews: body must be <= " + MAX_BODY_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("reviews: body contains control bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "reviews: body");
   return s;
 }
 
@@ -288,9 +284,7 @@ function create(opts) {
         if (reason.length > MAX_REJECT_REASON_LEN) {
           throw new TypeError("reviews.reject: reason must be <= " + MAX_REJECT_REASON_LEN + " characters");
         }
-        if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(reason)) {
-          throw new TypeError("reviews.reject: reason contains control bytes");
-        }
+        textGuard.freeText(reason, "reviews.reject: reason");
       }
       var ts = _now();
       var existing = (await query("SELECT id, status FROM reviews WHERE id = ?1", [id])).rows[0];

package/lib/robots-config.js

@@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ var MAX_CRAWL_DELAY     = 86400;     // 24 h — anything larger is a typo
 var MAX_PRIORITY        = 1000000;
 var MAX_RULE_ID_LEN     = 80;
 
-var CONTROL_BYTE_RE = /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/;
 
 var b = require("./vendor/blamejs");
+var textGuard = require("./text-guard");
 
 // ---- predefined templates ---------------------------------------------
 //
@@ -183,9 +183,7 @@ function _userAgent(s) {
       "robotsConfig: user_agent must be a string 1.." + MAX_USER_AGENT_LEN + " chars"
     );
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("robotsConfig: user_agent must not contain control bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "robotsConfig: user_agent", { singleLine: "reject" });
   // robots.txt is a colon-delimited key/value format — a colon in the
   // user-agent value would shift the parser onto a different key.
   if (s.indexOf(":") !== -1) {
@@ -200,7 +198,7 @@ function _pathEntry(s, label) {
       "robotsConfig: " + label + " entry must be a string 1.." + MAX_PATH_LEN + " chars"
     );
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError("robotsConfig: " + label + " entry must not contain control bytes");
   }
   // robots.txt path entries are /-rooted absolute paths. Wildcards
@@ -258,9 +256,7 @@ function _ruleId(s) {
       "robotsConfig: rule_id must be a string 1.." + MAX_RULE_ID_LEN + " chars"
     );
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("robotsConfig: rule_id must not contain control bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "robotsConfig: rule_id", { singleLine: "reject" });
   return s;
 }
 
@@ -270,9 +266,7 @@ function _sitemapUrl(u) {
       "robotsConfig: sitemap url must be a string 1.." + MAX_SITEMAP_URL_LEN + " chars"
     );
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(u)) {
-    throw new TypeError("robotsConfig: sitemap url must not contain control bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(u, "robotsConfig: sitemap url", { singleLine: "reject" });
   // robots.txt only carries the URL itself, so the path-rooted form
   // promo-banners accepts isn't meaningful here — every crawler treats
   // the Sitemap: value as an absolute URL. https-only protects against
@@ -293,9 +287,7 @@ function _hostDirective(s) {
       "robotsConfig: host must be a string 1.." + MAX_HOST_LEN + " chars"
     );
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("robotsConfig: host must not contain control bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "robotsConfig: host", { singleLine: "reject" });
   // The host directive is a bare hostname (optionally with :port) —
   // no scheme, no path. Refuse anything that looks like a URL so an
   // operator can't accidentally paste the full origin URL in.

package/lib/sales-tax-filings.js

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@
  */
 
 var b = require("./vendor/blamejs");
+var textGuard = require("./text-guard");
 var C = b.constants;
 
 // ---- constants ----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -122,7 +123,6 @@ var DEFAULT_LIMIT          = 50;
 var MAX_LIMIT              = 500;
 var MAX_DAYS_AHEAD         = 365;
 
-var CONTROL_BYTE_RE        = /[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]/;
 
 // FSM transition map. The keys are (from_status, action) → to_status.
 // Defined as a table so a misuse surfaces with the actual current
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ function _shortText(s, label, max) {
     throw new TypeError("salesTaxFilings: " + label +
                         " must be a non-empty string <= " + max + " chars");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s)) {
     throw new TypeError("salesTaxFilings: " + label + " must not contain control bytes");
   }
   return s;

package/lib/search-facets.js

@@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ var ALLOWED_KINDS  = ["categorical", "numeric_range", "boolean"];
 var ALLOWED_COLS   = ["field", "kind", "buckets_json", "display_limit", "active"];
 
 // Refuse C0 control bytes + DEL on every operator-supplied string.
-var CONTROL_BYTE_RE = /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/;
 
 // Operator-chosen identifier shape — lowercase alnum + hyphen +
 // underscore, must start with a letter. Same shape the rest of the
@@ -118,6 +117,7 @@ var KEY_RE   = /^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*$/;
 var FIELD_RE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*$/;
 
 var b = require("./vendor/blamejs");
+var textGuard = require("./text-guard");
 
 // ---- validators ---------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ function _label(s, fnLabel) {
   if (s.length > MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": bucket label must be <= " + MAX_LABEL_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": bucket label must not contain control bytes");
   }
   return s;
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ function _appliedFilters(input, fnLabel) {
       if (s.length > MAX_VALUE_LEN) {
         throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": applied_filters['" + k + "'][" + j + "] must be <= " + MAX_VALUE_LEN + " characters");
       }
-      if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
+      if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject" })) {
         throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": applied_filters['" + k + "'][" + j + "] must not contain control bytes");
       }
       values.push(s);
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ function _value(raw, fnLabel) {
   if (s.length > MAX_VALUE_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": value must be <= " + MAX_VALUE_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": value must not contain control bytes");
   }
   return s;
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ function _sessionId(s, fnLabel) {
   if (s.length > 256) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": session_id must be <= 256 characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": session_id must not contain control bytes");
   }
   return s;

package/lib/search-ranking.js

@@ -121,12 +121,9 @@ var SIGNAL_RE             = /^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*$/;
 // which covers SKU notation across every common upstream system
 // without opening the door to control bytes or whitespace.
 var PRODUCT_ID_RE         = /^[A-Za-z0-9._:/-]+$/;
-var CONTROL_BYTE_RE       = /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/;
-var ZERO_WIDTH_RE         = new RegExp(
-  "[\\u200B-\\u200F\\u202A-\\u202E\\u2060-\\u2064\\u2066-\\u2069\\uFEFF\\u061C]"
-);
 
 var b = require("./vendor/blamejs");
+var textGuard = require("./text-guard");
 
 // ---- monotonic clock ---------------------------------------------------
 //
@@ -175,7 +172,7 @@ function _name(s, fnLabel) {
   if (s.length > MAX_NAME_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": name must be <= " + MAX_NAME_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s) || ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": name contains control / zero-width bytes");
   }
   return s;
@@ -226,7 +223,7 @@ function _normalizeQuery(s, fnLabel) {
   if (s.length > MAX_QUERY_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": query must be <= " + MAX_QUERY_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s) || ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": query contains control / zero-width bytes");
   }
   var normalized = s.toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
@@ -270,7 +267,7 @@ function _sessionIdRaw(s, fnLabel) {
   if (s.length > MAX_SESSION_ID_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": session_id must be <= " + MAX_SESSION_ID_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s) || ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": session_id contains control / zero-width bytes");
   }
   return s;

package/lib/search-synonyms.js

@@ -102,18 +102,6 @@ var MAX_QUERY_LEN            = 500;
 var ALLOWED_KINDS         = ["bidirectional", "directional"];
 var ALLOWED_GROUP_COLS    = ["kind", "terms_json"];
 
-// Refuse C0 control bytes + DEL. Tokens are single-line search terms;
-// any newline / tab in a synonym entry would either be malformed
-// operator input or an attempt to smuggle separator-confusion payload
-// into the search log.
-var CONTROL_BYTE_RE = /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/;
-// Zero-width + direction-override family — same defense as
-// `supportTickets`. Spelled with \u escapes so the file stays
-// ESLint no-irregular-whitespace clean.
-var ZERO_WIDTH_RE   = new RegExp(
-  "[\\u200B-\\u200F\\u202A-\\u202E\\u2060-\\u2064\\u2066-\\u2069\\uFEFF\\u061C]"
-);
-
 // Slug shape — operator-chosen identifier on synonym groups. Same
 // shape the rest of the shop uses: lowercase alnum + hyphen, must
 // start with a letter, 1..MAX_SLUG_LEN.
@@ -126,6 +114,7 @@ var TOKEN_SPLIT_RE = /[^a-z0-9-]+/g;
 
 // Framework handle (the vendored blamejs); index.js re-exports this as .framework.
 var b = require("./vendor/blamejs");
+var textGuard = require("./text-guard");
 
 // ---- validators ---------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -166,10 +155,10 @@ function _term(s, label, fnLabel) {
   if (trimmed.length > MAX_TERM_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": " + label + " must be <= " + MAX_TERM_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(trimmed)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(trimmed, { singleLine: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": " + label + " contains control bytes");
   }
-  if (ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(trimmed)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(trimmed, { zeroWidth: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError(fnLabel + ": " + label + " contains zero-width / direction-override characters");
   }
   return trimmed;
@@ -247,13 +236,10 @@ function _queryString(s, fnLabel) {
 // give attackers a denial-of-search vector against legitimate
 // shoppers who happened to paste a stray BOM.
 function _sanitiseQuery(s) {
-  return s
-    .replace(/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/g, " ")
-    .replace(
-      // Zero-width + direction-override family — see ZERO_WIDTH_RE.
-      new RegExp("[\\u200B-\\u200F\\u202A-\\u202E\\u2060-\\u2064\\u2066-\\u2069\\uFEFF\\u061C]", "g"),
-      ""
-    );
+  // Controls become a SPACE, not nothing: deleting them outright would weld
+  // the words on either side into one token. The invisible characters do get
+  // deleted — they sit inside a word rather than between two.
+  return textGuard.scrubInvisible(s.replace(/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/g, " "));
 }
 
 function _tokenise(s) {

package/lib/security-middleware.js

@@ -527,26 +527,6 @@ var _SCOPED_DIRECTIVES = {
 //   default-src 'self', object-src 'none',
 //   require-trusted-types-for 'script', frame-ancestors 'none', base-uri 'self'
 
-// Parse the vendored default CSP into an ordered directive map ONCE at
-// module load. The default is a `name a b; name c;` string; split on `;`,
-// the first token of each clause is the directive name, the rest its
-// source list.
-function _parseCsp(cspString) {
-  var order = [];
-  var map = {};
-  String(cspString).split(";").forEach(function (clause) {
-    var trimmed = clause.trim();
-    if (!trimmed) return;
-    var parts = trimmed.split(/\s+/);
-    var name = parts[0];
-    order.push(name);
-    map[name] = parts.slice(1);
-  });
-  return { order: order, map: map };
-}
-
-var _DEFAULT_CSP_PARSED = _parseCsp(_vendoredSecurityHeaders.DEFAULT_CSP);
-
 /**
  * Build a route-scoped CSP string from the vendored strict default plus the
  * named providers' hosts. `keys` is an array of CSP_HOSTS keys
@@ -565,40 +545,51 @@ var _DEFAULT_CSP_PARSED = _parseCsp(_vendoredSecurityHeaders.DEFAULT_CSP);
  * which fails safe (the SDK is refused, not admitted too broadly).
  */
 function scopedCsp(keys) {
-  // Clone the parsed default so the per-call mutation never leaks into the
-  // module-level snapshot.
-  var order = _DEFAULT_CSP_PARSED.order.slice();
-  var map = {};
-  _DEFAULT_CSP_PARSED.order.forEach(function (name) {
-    map[name] = _DEFAULT_CSP_PARSED.map[name].slice();
-  });
-
+  // Collect the hosts each named provider needs, per directive. Unknown keys
+  // fall out here, which is what keeps a mistyped key on the strict default
+  // rather than throwing mid-render.
+  var additions = {};
   if (Array.isArray(keys)) {
     keys.forEach(function (key) {
       var hostSet = CSP_HOSTS[key];
       if (!hostSet) return;
       Object.keys(_SCOPED_DIRECTIVES).forEach(function (directive) {
-        var subKey = _SCOPED_DIRECTIVES[directive];
-        var hosts = hostSet[subKey];
+        var hosts = hostSet[_SCOPED_DIRECTIVES[directive]];
         if (!hosts || !hosts.length) return;
-        if (!map[directive]) {
-          // The default omits frame-src (it relies on the default-src /
-          // fenced-frame-src pair); create it from 'self' so admitting a
-          // provider frame doesn't accidentally open it to everything.
-          map[directive] = ["'self'"];
-          order.push(directive);
-        }
-        hosts.forEach(function (h) {
-          if (map[directive].indexOf(h) === -1) map[directive].push(h);
-        });
+        additions[directive] = (additions[directive] || []).concat(hosts);
       });
     });
   }
 
-  return order.map(function (name) {
-    var srcs = map[name];
-    return srcs.length ? (name + " " + srcs.join(" ")) : name;
-  }).join("; ") + ";";
+  // b.csp.mergeDirectives owns the merge: append-and-dedupe per directive,
+  // seed a directive the base omits rather than leaving it wide open, and
+  // validate only what was added so the trusted default round-trips
+  // untouched. It replaces a CSP parser written here, which had to be kept
+  // in step with whatever shape the vendored default took.
+  //
+  // The primitive throws on a directive or source it will not accept. This
+  // runs per response while rendering a payment page, and the documented
+  // contract is that a bad input degrades to the strict default rather than
+  // failing the render — so a refusal is caught and answered with exactly
+  // that. Failing closed here means the provider is refused, never admitted
+  // more broadly than asked.
+  // The refusal is recorded rather than swallowed: it means a host in
+  // CSP_HOSTS is one the primitive will not accept, which is an operator
+  // configuration problem that would otherwise show up only as a payment SDK
+  // silently failing to load.
+  try {
+    return b.csp.mergeDirectives(undefined, additions);
+  } catch (e) {
+    b.audit.safeEmit({
+      action:   "shop.security.scopedCsp.refused",
+      outcome:  "failure",
+      metadata: {
+        keys:   Array.isArray(keys) ? keys.join(",") : String(keys),
+        reason: (e && e.message) || "unknown",
+      },
+    });
+    return _vendoredSecurityHeaders.DEFAULT_CSP;
+  }
 }
 
 // ---- route-scoped Permissions-Policy (payment + passkey surfaces) --------
@@ -645,7 +636,10 @@ function scopedCsp(keys) {
 // top-level same-origin document). Quote-wrapped per RFC 9651 structured
 // fields. Single source — every page that enables the payment feature names
 // it here.
-var _PAYMENT_ALLOWLIST = 'payment=(self "https://js.stripe.com" "https://pay.google.com")';
+// Allowlist VALUES, without the `feature=` prefix — that is the shape
+// b.csp.mergePermissionsPolicy takes, and it keeps the feature name in exactly
+// one place (the registry key) rather than repeated inside its own value.
+var _PAYMENT_ALLOWLIST = '(self "https://js.stripe.com" "https://pay.google.com")';
 
 // WebAuthn assertion / attestation run in the page's OWN top-level document
 // (the islands call navigator.credentials.get / .create directly, never from
@@ -655,8 +649,8 @@ var _PAYMENT_ALLOWLIST = 'payment=(self "https://js.stripe.com" "https://pay.goo
 // still cannot drive WebAuthn. Single source — every passkey page names the
 // feature → allowlist mapping here.
 var _PASSKEY_FEATURE_ALLOWLIST = {
-  "publickey-credentials-get":    "publickey-credentials-get=(self)",
-  "publickey-credentials-create": "publickey-credentials-create=(self)",
+  "publickey-credentials-get":    "(self)",
+  "publickey-credentials-create": "(self)",
 };
 
 // Feature name → its scoped allowlist token. The pay surface relaxes
@@ -697,12 +691,25 @@ function scopedPermissionsPolicy(opts) {
       overrides[name] = _SCOPED_FEATURE_OVERRIDES[name];
     }
   });
-  return _vendoredSecurityHeaders.DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS.map(function (entry) {
-    var feature = entry.split("=")[0];
-    return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(overrides, feature)
-      ? overrides[feature]
-      : entry;
-  }).join(", ");
+
+  // b.csp.mergePermissionsPolicy applies the overrides onto the vendored
+  // denylist, replacing a map-and-rejoin over that list here. The registry
+  // filter above still runs first, so an unnamed feature cannot be relaxed and
+  // an unknown one is dropped rather than passed to a primitive that refuses
+  // it — which preserves the documented never-throw behaviour on a render
+  // path. A refusal is still possible if a registry VALUE is malformed, and
+  // that is an operator configuration error worth surfacing rather than
+  // hiding behind a silently strict header.
+  try {
+    return b.csp.mergePermissionsPolicy(undefined, overrides);
+  } catch (e) {
+    b.audit.safeEmit({
+      action:   "shop.security.scopedPermissionsPolicy.refused",
+      outcome:  "failure",
+      metadata: { features: features.join(","), reason: (e && e.message) || "unknown" },
+    });
+    return _vendoredSecurityHeaders.DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS.join(", ");
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -759,7 +766,7 @@ function botGuardOpts() {
       // directory (e.g. /.well-known/apple-...-association/anything), re-opening
       // the guard on routes that aren't the single static association file.
       .concat(PUBLIC_WELL_KNOWN_PATHS.map(function (p) {
-        return new RegExp("^" + p.replace(/[-/\\^$*+?.()|[\]{}]/g, "\\$&") + "$");
+        return new RegExp("^" + b.codepointClass.escapeRegExp(p) + "$");
       }))
       .concat([/^\/admin(\/|$)/]),
   };
@@ -772,6 +779,28 @@ function _hasPrefix(pathname, prefixes) {
   return false;
 }
 
+// Skip matchers for the request-lifecycle guards, built once.
+//
+// b.requestHelpers.makeSkipMatcher takes the REQUEST rather than a pathname
+// the caller derived, which removes three copies of `req.pathname || req.url
+// || "/"` and keeps the exemption correct if a guard is ever mounted somewhere
+// the router has not already set `req.pathname` — the matcher strips the query
+// string itself rather than trusting the caller to have done it.
+//
+// Two matchers because the semantics differ: a webhook path is a PREFIX (the
+// processor may append to it) while the health path is EXACT (`/_/healthz`
+// must not inherit the exemption).
+var _skipWebhookPath = b.requestHelpers.makeSkipMatcher(
+  { skipPaths: WEBHOOK_PATHS.slice() }, "securityMiddleware.webhookSkip");
+var _skipHealthPath = b.requestHelpers.makeSkipMatcher(
+  { skipPaths: [HEALTH_PATH], exact: true }, "securityMiddleware.healthSkip");
+
+// Both guards exempt the same set: a server-to-server webhook authenticated by
+// its own signature, and the liveness probe.
+function _isUnguardedPath(req) {
+  return _skipWebhookPath(req) || _skipHealthPath(req);
+}
+
 /**
  * Mount the per-route tight rate limiters + the fetch-metadata gate on
  * the router inside the operator's `routes(r)` chain. Call AFTER the
@@ -830,7 +859,7 @@ function mountRouteGuards(r) {
   });
   r.use(function csrfGuard(req, res, next) {
     var pathname = req.pathname || req.url || "/";
-    if (_hasPrefix(pathname, WEBHOOK_PATHS) || pathname === HEALTH_PATH) return next();
+    if (_isUnguardedPath(req)) return next();
     if (isEdgeExemptPath(pathname)) return next();
     return csrfGate(req, res, next);
   });
@@ -852,8 +881,7 @@ function mountRouteGuards(r) {
     allowedNavigate: true,
   });
   r.use(function fetchMetadataGuard(req, res, next) {
-    var pathname = req.pathname || req.url || "/";
-    if (_hasPrefix(pathname, WEBHOOK_PATHS)) return next();
+    if (_skipWebhookPath(req)) return next();
     return fmGate(req, res, next);
   });
 
@@ -907,7 +935,7 @@ function mountRouteGuards(r) {
   r.use(function tightRateGuard(req, res, next) {
     var pathname = req.pathname || req.url || "/";
     // Never throttle the webhook or health paths.
-    if (_hasPrefix(pathname, WEBHOOK_PATHS) || pathname === HEALTH_PATH) return next();
+    if (_isUnguardedPath(req)) return next();
     if (!_hasPrefix(pathname, TIGHT_PREFIXES)) return next();
     // `/products/`, `/gift-cards`, and `/orders/` carry GET reads (PDP,
     // balance page render, order confirmation page) that a shopper hits

package/lib/seller-signup.js

@@ -129,12 +129,9 @@ var MIME_RE                   = /^[A-Za-z0-9!#$&^_.+\-]{1,127}\/[A-Za-z0-9!#$&^_
 // the shape vendors / purchase-orders use. Operator-rendered fields
 // refuse these to keep downstream dashboards / KYC printouts safe
 // from header-injection + visual-spoofing attacks.
-var CONTROL_BYTE_RE           = /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/;
-var ZERO_WIDTH_RE = new RegExp(
-  "[\\u200B-\\u200F\\u202A-\\u202E\\u2060-\\u2064\\u2066-\\u2069\\uFEFF\\u061C]"
-);
 
 var b = require("./vendor/blamejs");
+var textGuard = require("./text-guard");
 
 // ---- validators ---------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -157,12 +154,7 @@ function _businessName(s) {
   if (s.length > MAX_BUSINESS_NAME_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: business_name must be <= " + MAX_BUSINESS_NAME_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("seller-signup: business_name contains control bytes");
-  }
-  if (ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("seller-signup: business_name contains zero-width / direction-override bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "seller-signup: business_name", { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" });
   return s;
 }
 
@@ -219,9 +211,7 @@ function _businessAddress(value) {
   if (encoded.length > MAX_ADDRESS_JSON_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: business_address JSON must be <= " + MAX_ADDRESS_JSON_LEN + " characters serialised");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(encoded) || ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(encoded)) {
-    throw new TypeError("seller-signup: business_address contains control / zero-width bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(encoded, "seller-signup: business_address", { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" });
   return encoded;
 }
 
@@ -260,7 +250,7 @@ function _categoryFocus(value) {
     if (typeof value[i] !== "string" || !value[i].length) {
       throw new TypeError("seller-signup: category_focus[" + i + "] must be a non-empty string");
     }
-    if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(value[i]) || ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(value[i])) {
+    if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(value[i], { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" })) {
       throw new TypeError("seller-signup: category_focus[" + i + "] contains control / zero-width bytes");
     }
   }
@@ -305,9 +295,7 @@ function _referencesJson(value) {
   if (encoded.length > MAX_REFERENCES_JSON_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: references_json must be <= " + MAX_REFERENCES_JSON_LEN + " characters serialised");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(encoded) || ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(encoded)) {
-    throw new TypeError("seller-signup: references_json contains control / zero-width bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(encoded, "seller-signup: references_json", { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" });
   return encoded;
 }
 
@@ -325,12 +313,10 @@ function _instructions(s) {
   if (s.length > MAX_INSTRUCTIONS_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: instructions must be <= " + MAX_INSTRUCTIONS_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s.replace(/[\t\n\r]/g, ""))) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s)) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: instructions contains control bytes");
   }
-  if (ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("seller-signup: instructions contains zero-width / direction-override bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "seller-signup: instructions", { zeroWidth: "reject" });
   return s;
 }
 
@@ -341,12 +327,10 @@ function _rejectReason(s) {
   if (s.length > MAX_REJECT_REASON_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: reason must be <= " + MAX_REJECT_REASON_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s.replace(/[\t\n\r]/g, ""))) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s)) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: reason contains control bytes");
   }
-  if (ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("seller-signup: reason contains zero-width / direction-override bytes");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "seller-signup: reason", { zeroWidth: "reject" });
   return s;
 }
 
@@ -357,7 +341,7 @@ function _operatorId(s, label) {
   if (s.length > MAX_OPERATOR_ID_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: " + label + " must be <= " + MAX_OPERATOR_ID_LEN + " characters");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_RE.test(s) || ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError("seller-signup: " + label + " contains control / zero-width bytes");
   }
   return s;

package/lib/sidebar-widgets.js

@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
  */
 
 var b = require("./vendor/blamejs");
+var textGuard = require("./text-guard");
 
 // ---- constants ----------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -125,11 +126,6 @@ var PAGE_KEY_RE   = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9:._\/-]{0,119}$/;
 var BADGE_SLUG_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,79}$/;
 var SEGMENT_RE    = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,79}$/;
 
-var CONTROL_BYTE_LINE_RE  = /[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/;
-var CONTROL_BYTE_BLOCK_RE = /[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]/;
-var ZERO_WIDTH_RE = new RegExp(
-  "[\\u200B-\\u200F\\u202A-\\u202E\\u2060-\\u2064\\u2066-\\u2069\\uFEFF\\u061C]"
-);
 
 var ALLOWED_PATCH_COLUMNS = Object.freeze([
   "title",
@@ -176,12 +172,7 @@ function _title(s) {
   if (typeof s !== "string" || !s.length || s.length > MAX_TITLE_LEN) {
     throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: title must be a non-empty string <= " + MAX_TITLE_LEN + " chars");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_LINE_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: title must not contain control bytes (incl. CR/LF)");
-  }
-  if (ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
-    throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: title must not contain zero-width / direction-override characters");
-  }
+  textGuard.freeText(s, "sidebarWidgets: title", { singleLine: "reject", zeroWidth: "reject" });
   return s;
 }
 
@@ -260,10 +251,10 @@ function _line(s, label, maxLen) {
   if (typeof s !== "string" || !s.length || s.length > maxLen) {
     throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: " + label + " must be a non-empty string <= " + maxLen + " chars");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_LINE_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { singleLine: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: " + label + " must not contain control bytes (incl. CR/LF)");
   }
-  if (ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { zeroWidth: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: " + label + " must not contain zero-width / direction-override characters");
   }
   return s;
@@ -273,10 +264,10 @@ function _block(s, label, maxLen) {
   if (typeof s !== "string" || !s.length || s.length > maxLen) {
     throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: " + label + " must be a non-empty string <= " + maxLen + " chars");
   }
-  if (CONTROL_BYTE_BLOCK_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s)) {
     throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: " + label + " must not contain control bytes");
   }
-  if (ZERO_WIDTH_RE.test(s)) {
+  if (textGuard.hasCodepointThreat(s, { zeroWidth: "reject" })) {
     throw new TypeError("sidebarWidgets: " + label + " must not contain zero-width / direction-override characters");
   }
   return s;