@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.5.2 → 0.5.4

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.5.x
 
+- v0.5.4 (2026-06-27) — **Vendored framework refreshed to 0.15.38 — caller-supplied regexes are screened for ReDoS before they run on request data.** Updates the vendored blamejs framework to 0.15.38. The upstream release closes two ReDoS exposures and strengthens the framework's regex guard: a feature-flag targeting condition (`op: regex`) and an MCP tool's input-schema `pattern` each compiled a caller-supplied regex and matched it against request-controlled input behind only a length cap — which does not bound catastrophic backtracking, so a six-character pattern like `(a+)+$` could pin a CPU. Both now pass through `b.guardRegex` (strict) before compilation, and the nested-quantifier detector was hardened to also catch wrapped forms (`((a)+)+`, `(([a-z]+)*)*`) that previously slipped past — which strengthens every guardRegex caller. This storefront exposes neither MCP tools nor operator-authored regex flag rules on its request path, and its own patterns are static and ReDoS-clean, so there is no runtime or behavior change for it; the hardened framework rides along and no operator action is required. **Changed:** *Vendored framework refreshed to 0.15.38 (caller-supplied regexes screened for ReDoS)* — Refreshes the vendored blamejs framework to 0.15.38. The upstream fix screens an operator-supplied feature-flag targeting regex and an MCP tool input-schema `pattern` through `b.guardRegex` (strict) before they are compiled and matched against request input, so a catastrophic-backtracking shape is refused at validation time instead of pinning a CPU; the nested-quantifier detector also now catches wrapped forms at any group depth, strengthening every guardRegex caller. The shipped storefront does not expose those caller-supplied-regex surfaces and its own patterns are static, so its runtime, public API, and wire format are unchanged; the hardened framework simply rides along.
+
+- v0.5.3 (2026-06-27) — **Vendored framework refreshed to 0.15.37 — non-finite numeric options can no longer silently disable a security check.** Updates the vendored blamejs framework to 0.15.37. The upstream release closes a class of fail-open configuration bugs: several numeric options validated a value only as `typeof === number && >= 0`, which accepts `Infinity`. Where the value is a clock-skew tolerance or a resource cap, an `Infinity` (or `NaN`) silently turned off the very protection it tunes — an `Infinity` CWT / OCSP-staple / ARC clock-skew made the expiry and freshness comparisons unsatisfiable (so an expired token, a replayed pre-revocation OCSP `good` response, or an expired ARC seal would be accepted), and an `Infinity` WebSocket message/frame cap, inbox/flag-cache size cap, or audit-chain fan-out cap disabled the bound. These options now route through the framework's finite-bounds validator, refusing a non-finite value at the entry point (or falling back to the safe default), while options where unbounded is deliberate (reconnect-indefinitely, retain-indefinitely) still accept it. This storefront configures these options with finite values, so there is no runtime or behavior change for it; the hardened framework rides along and no operator action is required. **Changed:** *Vendored framework refreshed to 0.15.37 (non-finite option values rejected)* — Refreshes the vendored blamejs framework to 0.15.37. The upstream fix makes a clock-skew tolerance or resource cap of `Infinity` / `NaN` a rejected value rather than one that silently disables the check it configures — covering the CWT / OCSP-staple / ARC time checks, the WebSocket-client inbound size and handshake caps, and the inbox / flag-cache / audit-chain size and count caps, with deliberately-unbounded options (reconnect/retain indefinitely) unaffected. The shipped storefront passes finite values to these options, so its runtime, public API, and wire format are unchanged; the hardened framework simply rides along.
+
 - v0.5.2 (2026-06-27) — **Vendored framework refreshed to 0.15.36.** Updates the vendored blamejs framework to 0.15.36. The upstream release is internal test-suite tooling only: it re-verifies the guard-suite class that allows a bare comma/semicolon split on token-only RFC header grammars (RRULE, RFC 9421 signature components, TLS-RPT rua, SCIM attribute paths), renames its marker to a descriptive token, and prunes five inert marker comments. No runtime code, public API, or wire format changed upstream, so there is no runtime or behavior change for this storefront and no operator action is required. **Changed:** *Vendored framework refreshed to 0.15.36* — Refreshes the vendored blamejs framework to 0.15.36, an upstream release scoped to test-suite tooling — a guard-suite class re-verified and its marker renamed, plus five inert marker comments removed. The shipped framework runtime, public API, and wire format are unchanged, so no operator action is required.
 
 - v0.5.1 (2026-06-27) — **Vendored framework refreshed to 0.15.35 — Prometheus label-injection fix in the metrics shadow registry.** Updates the vendored blamejs framework to 0.15.35. The upstream release fixes a label-injection in the framework's metrics shadow registry: it built a metric's cardinality key by joining label pairs with commas and re-split that string when rendering the Prometheus exposition, so a comma (or `=`) inside a label VALUE forged additional label pairs in the scrape output — which downstream tenant-scoping filters, authorization selectors, recording rules, and alerting trust as a boundary — and two distinct label sets could collide into one cardinality bucket. The key now uses canonical-JSON of the label set and the render emits the structured labels instead of re-splitting, so a value's commas/equals stay inside the value and a label named `constructor` / `prototype` / `__proto__` is preserved. This storefront does not compose the metrics shadow registry, so there is no runtime change for it; the fix ships in the vendored framework regardless and no operator action is required. **Changed:** *Vendored framework refreshed to 0.15.35 (Prometheus label-injection fix)* — Refreshes the vendored blamejs framework to 0.15.35. The upstream fix stops a comma or `=` in a metric label value from forging extra Prometheus label pairs in the shadow registry's scrape output — the cardinality key is now canonical-JSON of the label set and the render emits the structured labels rather than splitting a joined string, so distinct label sets stay distinct and reserved-name labels survive. The shipped storefront does not expose the metrics shadow registry, so its runtime, public API, and wire format are unchanged; the hardened framework simply rides along.

package/lib/asset-manifest.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "version": "0.5.2",
+  "version": "0.5.4",
   "assets": {
     "css/admin.css": {
       "integrity": "sha384-imfe0otYErcB8rr2h6KLSGTtStirysptpXETSPY4zLv3bZoIT75Lo1dOvkOav+xL",

package/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
   "_about": "blamejs.shop vendors a single framework — blamejs — which itself bundles every server-side crypto/identity dependency. The transitive packages blamejs ships are surfaced in its own MANIFEST.json at lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json — Trivy / Grype rely on that nested data for CVE attribution.",
   "packages": {
     "blamejs": {
-      "version": "0.15.36",
-      "tag": "v0.15.36",
+      "version": "0.15.38",
+      "tag": "v0.15.38",
       "license": "Apache-2.0",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "source": "https://github.com/blamejs/blamejs",
@@ -859,6 +859,8 @@
         "release-notes/v0.15.34.json": "lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.34.json",
         "release-notes/v0.15.35.json": "lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.35.json",
         "release-notes/v0.15.36.json": "lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.36.json",
+        "release-notes/v0.15.37.json": "lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.37.json",
+        "release-notes/v0.15.38.json": "lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.38.json",
         "release-notes/v0.15.4.json": "lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.4.json",
         "release-notes/v0.15.5.json": "lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.5.json",
         "release-notes/v0.15.6.json": "lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.6.json",
@@ -1567,7 +1569,7 @@
         ".npmrc": "sha256:66f104e7d07c496d2d0409988225e8c0e4ceb8d247dbcac3be75b2128d20ce66",
         ".pinact.yaml": "sha256:0213ffda55961dc49b64c0a5dfa3c0567419633b1499d57eaf7c8d842d7da6c7",
         "ARCHITECTURE.md": "sha256:9b1c8d2b1b7a41838eb348b0a008e4b4369718fd72bfe2974b37155f7536d35b",
-        "CHANGELOG.md": "sha256:7b4cf6d91c65bf01fda536a83f26198e722bf97cef6c88f3cfd58436ebc2e43a",
+        "CHANGELOG.md": "sha256:d46b3114be4ce1b16f02a49559affdf7dcf61567153b2a93f1be3d01e90de015",
         "CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md": "sha256:148a281960fff7c2fe6554dab66da572c72245ddeb00b0d14811558397bff386",
         "CONTRIBUTING.md": "sha256:bb4dbdbc8598da31dbce653a8ed322e08ff46560173f2eb67a4d684653948332",
         "GOVERNANCE.md": "sha256:906df6afb1f552b27b9acb50f7f96c47b917a2f1021cd4e987dbf4ee0e0a821b",
@@ -1577,7 +1579,7 @@
         "NOTICE": "sha256:f487fa47a11aca0f89e2615cdd3c713e9842abf7a30d8d328eeeae1c864aa774",
         "README.md": "sha256:3ddcc197b003da0b02db8bdd1aef1e943c94f7eab613c633d6a45bb11d0a80e9",
         "SECURITY.md": "sha256:77d8c2bcc04b425a08ef30e51204cebddbd48954b028a259c7a8412dbfeab40a",
-        "api-snapshot.json": "sha256:204692f40f115ba8cc211fd485feb2a11bfae877b9c013aba085c0729cf267bc",
+        "api-snapshot.json": "sha256:179287667873f052b36735f3473fbce51aa51c9ed26836bbbdfa854e096a6c0c",
         "assets/BlameJS_Logo.png": "sha256:3c65699753c771b48ef9ac7f45bb40815ec19a23afcdd0cd30ef4601bbbe293e",
         "assets/BlameJS_Logo.svg": "sha256:dda44f3fb1343d5de9db6b1fcdb75fc649c57e7a99a8e8239fcf852e3841e1a8",
         "bench/README.md": "sha256:74202f2507fd840bfc1ac6c681975d9273cf36cca6e0f72655f138337304033c",
@@ -1785,7 +1787,7 @@
         "lib/agent-event-bus.js": "sha256:c8b21e11f0b6596ddfc36cd87a7ee26185e41ff59e3bb65c0fb4b02e525ee1e4",
         "lib/agent-idempotency.js": "sha256:dc3f9f82d129a844812a042e6730f167df471fc0792d60b0dc2bb174604d896e",
         "lib/agent-orchestrator.js": "sha256:517f672eefbfc430cabf06f3162ab5fd2212996d17366909d9eff7aa514363b2",
-        "lib/agent-posture-chain.js": "sha256:2e09b38742194b5823d174315c6ae2dd89857d9e662286f37c46c14627243b1a",
+        "lib/agent-posture-chain.js": "sha256:450f0ebe438b4e99d7017a498ae1f705b54c472145111d145348be2ea78490d7",
         "lib/agent-saga.js": "sha256:1a239892fe534d16e5567b731730bebc073057fe7d3bae63e0c49d989648c501",
         "lib/agent-snapshot.js": "sha256:eac77c6c771b31ced5ce01937ee0cab301bc97a5b96d9db949471296029da769",
         "lib/agent-stream.js": "sha256:8e519cba5505ad8e89bfe827483c16fe577ad39742e17f8f01d30b430a4bbf0b",
@@ -1823,7 +1825,7 @@
         "lib/asyncapi-traits.js": "sha256:82ec58b77f0a65ef1b5e8b67ee9555e9cb984de769c3393fe5c6d4d0640546f0",
         "lib/asyncapi.js": "sha256:cd48847ed363023e248cf0fbe275b545b0002b85e93ed91315990ef8a6abe483",
         "lib/atomic-file.js": "sha256:b93b008c121f785d149d4450681467b18785781c3a82b9b001bb2a7d636c3ad1",
-        "lib/audit-chain.js": "sha256:1c9895a2bbf6ce3b4c546b1b3c95ac9d5ed55d82a2b58c0de4e3ecc1947c3c31",
+        "lib/audit-chain.js": "sha256:c8c4bfb7abf0a4f2288b56404f30c1d8311c22f3c71f6c9c3a606a142744f3ea",
         "lib/audit-daily-review.js": "sha256:61cebe47d6e5eeeedcab45515473acfaab623217810a7ab3629b3aeca5028519",
         "lib/audit-emit.js": "sha256:1171699027269e154fd247141a549e65bcdb566e52ed00b993c7dfb9a293ba0f",
         "lib/audit-sign.js": "sha256:b8ddef053fca28c1e6cf265f73ecd254290a9c2e0759250342e926280205342f",
@@ -1920,7 +1922,7 @@
         "lib/crypto.js": "sha256:0884094cdfc52e577c10b51622b940e9acc1ce2ef8dd8996d790e51e80b2f9b5",
         "lib/csp.js": "sha256:b7a4d24f721767edecb7bc0c7a28c7824b7dda596c2edb3be387304684a8698a",
         "lib/csv.js": "sha256:eca5d01409e72f5f73c5a954f3019826ed5da06f72103a5117016aeb0654f17c",
-        "lib/cwt.js": "sha256:1c39f6ea999ecdb2cb119933b497af9cbfd512aeaa73261076f12018f0393e80",
+        "lib/cwt.js": "sha256:b0156f9098c3eb336221949c838b25f2eb9d4f765af6e293df225493f64c12a4",
         "lib/daemon.js": "sha256:9441d845c9a2d4b2808cdd6bf18915d89338a3dd75fa304c4b38c047b9f47a54",
         "lib/dark-patterns.js": "sha256:e54cc6fb591748b937627560ccdfd84da0e84974da5189e15b911e00b3c7e51b",
         "lib/data-act.js": "sha256:9d8f276393bef93e90ddf471f6c424cf95728a9c67fc8416fc5e3ccc99f690ee",
@@ -1947,17 +1949,17 @@
         "lib/error-page.js": "sha256:4ed2e8a118b35d3dc76a072b233713ae1fdaedb54334df68ad081e19f765cb88",
         "lib/events.js": "sha256:b5f0034fda33285f571b9b247db50bff08f632762d9bf69b83784b435eeea75c",
         "lib/external-db-migrate.js": "sha256:990014016e71a818672b3f2c32eaa2ff6815553feb52efafb88ec765df9a570a",
-        "lib/external-db.js": "sha256:d39513c1ef842397374218d8416c62ff0ec36e73ab0e9c507298dcfb9d0bda63",
+        "lib/external-db.js": "sha256:309a6bf0156f609dd3f143eaae1f41eec5a22a49f9d83eaf7c8f6f28d82b2d76",
         "lib/fapi2.js": "sha256:6ae4679931675a629fa3f9e9efba71172fe69251dec2dd5d8c995cfb9dcad8f7",
         "lib/fda-21cfr11.js": "sha256:9256bcea7d526a7280d5d3b1beed5be1daf2402ded2d5a18d602466d01a7884c",
         "lib/fdx.js": "sha256:67a29b140b6d07a767da31d6b55d1db0c2219cdaa780531fdec0fec63a5c551c",
         "lib/fedcm.js": "sha256:4b0f1e3d8e762353a28b2d42e00678c120d6e8ad574ecb9d94d4aa8dead0f7f7",
         "lib/file-type.js": "sha256:158d798f8204cc96038b4fda2a215bb4ba79232476e31195f15d4fee8f790a00",
         "lib/file-upload.js": "sha256:436b763fd928f286fb7faba8e2e9373cd37dcf677cb19e12afee61f00413e420",
-        "lib/flag-cache.js": "sha256:7bf41923bb42df59a41df37f7baa5b8b67172ba9ca71eeab47841dd0e4c9b64f",
+        "lib/flag-cache.js": "sha256:4333ce5105e2a2970b7277fa77f6664d1c6d2e3c6e7c3fa6094c228d305df4dc",
         "lib/flag-evaluation-context.js": "sha256:fa8846a9a97a9d773dc08dd0da664d1d6d3fead4e12dc9982b33fa45b59d47a8",
         "lib/flag-providers.js": "sha256:d85ff62c2d599634c3d2dc9d4e4a8cfcecec8178ce63a2800438434cc365f84a",
-        "lib/flag-targeting.js": "sha256:c2b5096e04dcaa98435c66cfa6b1aae02d0da708ca7e96f810627ef38e669309",
+        "lib/flag-targeting.js": "sha256:70c1d14b672600322a472a6dca6e149cb78428f7f96d7e9733bea5e25ec42ac4",
         "lib/flag.js": "sha256:3eab2c7e2f86fdf0a099d4ba287ec69486ee985c5496077ce79167979f6fccaf",
         "lib/forms.js": "sha256:e8a90aee2497da53d62fed67a674aefda3b4665c75dcee284334ec762753b692",
         "lib/framework-error.js": "sha256:6b707ad3cb0c1f180671165381ef228fa9ceb7187bd7202ff6eec0af03304a28",
@@ -2010,7 +2012,7 @@
         "lib/guard-pdf.js": "sha256:7a739adea96a1d6624858232e9b5991071aee5a25253914bbcc1f51b70e06710",
         "lib/guard-pop3-command.js": "sha256:f4c62cf6e5c4e4ccdaf7f39f8a738b6febeedd2b2ce65abf7d365e7a19fdfa95",
         "lib/guard-posture-chain.js": "sha256:acf47bba9c1e5ad743965a509ff97c067f6fa157fbd08fc57b63965adcc52411",
-        "lib/guard-regex.js": "sha256:7cb10f144f71d76ca0d9606b9153a834cfc9caa0cb687b51780cd754cc529690",
+        "lib/guard-regex.js": "sha256:ef6100d7b68c017166454301d787f7bffc988e97bcc1b0b09981c045b55b0d16",
         "lib/guard-saga-config.js": "sha256:b7e0031f95adea39cc4ac7a9c2487d62b49b833c058ea90e5962d6b0bcea82f3",
         "lib/guard-shell.js": "sha256:2f7948748cb4bac489e973573f4a7b728306eda4d9e308e5c9a40e23b17dcfb3",
         "lib/guard-smtp-command.js": "sha256:a4faf89c1582901a20976950191da8f7ecdeae1a2c47a429147f09f464ece146",
@@ -2040,7 +2042,7 @@
         "lib/iab-mspa.js": "sha256:64d45d2f8b8373efe4daa0584f72b1a50940c9118aeb4f0925c38d3fdb3d64f3",
         "lib/iab-tcf.js": "sha256:c21467eced77bce0bc28ca08a7ef5ea5f7a99b4f3f5fad36c1cb70b773e0f7c3",
         "lib/importmap-integrity.js": "sha256:addabb8fb49c9ce94e768d8f6d32ac05dc096b2c036eff3ad3528ba65b84292b",
-        "lib/inbox.js": "sha256:dd603479a72420288f5aa65d4b50a147f02e135d8e2899a3ac7760cb2af56261",
+        "lib/inbox.js": "sha256:40e662386d56d4f2b3fbad02f1fed8a33f75e88596e12f5f88a7acfff94de588",
         "lib/incident-report.js": "sha256:03729af0dcaba8aadd709c7c3036776c6155b012bd7b80ffc2a13a42609d2a0f",
         "lib/ip-utils.js": "sha256:cc7a40523a25f3732f8f9ce3b52d725a981ca831a973888abd059ef8e5dfa459",
         "lib/jobs.js": "sha256:f8e273bdd25b172cff189a8b5b56748828216fdb5d5f445634477c7b2686e7c2",
@@ -2068,9 +2070,9 @@
         "lib/log.js": "sha256:8268967e7f45bf59b131ba7e651b48a15656850f5585efe98001af4406c7c495",
         "lib/lro.js": "sha256:da9baf47f27c422c32d51495b2896c887ec3ac283875712efcd7528fd396868b",
         "lib/mail-agent.js": "sha256:4ca93408c03873796d285d002067ffa54fa70859ad5437215d6001d90c0f76ea",
-        "lib/mail-arc-sign.js": "sha256:872f31e16321f8629e3af3cac31d3deb460804748b25a7fbb427164a2ad88f84",
+        "lib/mail-arc-sign.js": "sha256:68e71b313e7f44924c60ad668a101897db4c9966222793eed69bc1c868788d59",
         "lib/mail-arf.js": "sha256:47d02905b58c6c0733114e58594034adedd73799de39b93420459dbb04d22050",
-        "lib/mail-auth.js": "sha256:da409e8f2b3bae1308f1d008b6df27f468075a83ceaeae8ee7cda0ab9c4a1027",
+        "lib/mail-auth.js": "sha256:2e7e72ca6dcc5598cb5a27ffb20b2fa43869d5a27aaf95fcf41b170dbafdea8a",
         "lib/mail-bimi.js": "sha256:b22afc5e8ad04503fee7e41f3b34c05c9f0759579436bfbe5f7706180c466155",
         "lib/mail-bounce.js": "sha256:461e885dd2ea0664e9a4af39ae5c36f3a5d9c7dc914dad4c40641b705952fd04",
         "lib/mail-crypto-pgp.js": "sha256:2e94f51d2cb13b92c612e84f73cf96e83eb17843d57b9dc9aef688ce55a1f9b4",
@@ -2107,10 +2109,10 @@
         "lib/markup-escape.js": "sha256:a76e8c77f30ae456caa53c33afeb2dd0b27f7b8799ac857beac86ea038f17d9a",
         "lib/markup-tokenizer.js": "sha256:8aa91d3e173c8d3d4df4dac00e892a359863be7295c5b1846cf322bc7bfc9510",
         "lib/mcp-tool-registry.js": "sha256:df3480e6a0d29a9734bdb19d322f83bff5ebfdd756620f947cf593878dea8776",
-        "lib/mcp.js": "sha256:c65af74fdb3cf30436699aba5051c4d6e8cb972887cbaaecc46250d557599953",
+        "lib/mcp.js": "sha256:b7717a2e3928429c745e049512fa1c91f9ea44eb35c0f4324e2083d2f3fdab28",
         "lib/mdoc.js": "sha256:bc31d38d6fdfac8db8f040dfa4d33ab40405f56340bb4ec978f3ba98e93f6433",
         "lib/metrics.js": "sha256:55d445b738b2cfc8ceb1bfa7a1e69b306497e8065ea86d61e4f4087873acce1b",
-        "lib/middleware/age-gate.js": "sha256:dc8c61a4d41f4a781220c9c97eb475fb2867f5ee444eb2756badcbc5b8411795",
+        "lib/middleware/age-gate.js": "sha256:4d4967beef100e2e58f1565de770e31fb8dd50dab2f04fa8251972fea5607826",
         "lib/middleware/ai-act-disclosure.js": "sha256:6fc62940d85813019b31c586fc86853570329a939565a6947f81052d50977c42",
         "lib/middleware/api-encrypt.js": "sha256:f90210bfc4fe04b50f6d72e14676a140c5759e255ed359567066a1e80ab5fb63",
         "lib/middleware/assetlinks.js": "sha256:bb36f8d53991668b4ae1557d0cab3ec8b479a16f9133c43f9adc07963c8b4750",
@@ -2182,7 +2184,7 @@
         "lib/network-nts.js": "sha256:90ce47584ad58c171e8029eb1d5df8ba4ba130c4038d1fe260109685c34c8f75",
         "lib/network-proxy.js": "sha256:9342c534863f905000d2432b67c26dd7a5ea02be25aaf9ebe05976079e61d4c9",
         "lib/network-smtp-policy.js": "sha256:4d10a339d5c471cdff217c5514038eb2e30f4ecb97a38cb4405165ee0f9dcf7e",
-        "lib/network-tls.js": "sha256:554b64c77389e1c961da8d061c63c806be994960466fb26f2b2268dbec0a369b",
+        "lib/network-tls.js": "sha256:bfd58cf11c307151c98044d8b7ac43f7fefc8f8d36fee61789e88e7435aafbe0",
         "lib/network-tsig.js": "sha256:41dc85a6e816cce1c58c36891dfc6bafc612b68978936107a09a5a553563e0d7",
         "lib/network.js": "sha256:40cb01627bf45741cac22ef79f5985f69323e47732d54cf3ce28c06882830c25",
         "lib/nis2-report.js": "sha256:fa106a4f95dd9301d7da966c5792197bdbebac477a4f1d2fd2ac2481fbd818fd",
@@ -2341,14 +2343,14 @@
         "lib/wiki-concepts.js": "sha256:54789790b950d926cbd0657dd51b32435c4988012b520819615df93673680de5",
         "lib/worker-pool.js": "sha256:fc35b3c9f83a4c72be0981400f5294b566472bfe187df0500775e37dd71afa4c",
         "lib/worm.js": "sha256:f17e24f8ca39295f396f40bd0c4ad1c946f5e41ff646ef1b33e8d50dc8b9435e",
-        "lib/ws-client.js": "sha256:5a854921c96500d504c731d302a7d338d93400b41bbe12056aa1c38494ac7497",
+        "lib/ws-client.js": "sha256:3ac479017e1199f1b69300b81e473f8303f6782161b73e95b17e47cf494ee066",
         "lib/x509-chain.js": "sha256:fdc0ecd264d9de0e039f348e819675fdf3838d61097a97a0e3e119def338722a",
         "lib/xml-c14n.js": "sha256:01a27d20df99ebd6eaefbff0aad933a2231049f65a54ae994236694d4146ce5d",
         "oss-fuzz/projects/blamejs/Dockerfile": "sha256:6c48ec4d81f4b1836a6b43701a2497cf737002413dd0da6a10892be1498b0766",
         "oss-fuzz/projects/blamejs/README.md": "sha256:ae13b7bb79ed8d69b1b3276e5562807a0349fb6e6b7d11cf1f683aad1eafdb4b",
         "oss-fuzz/projects/blamejs/build.sh": "sha256:0ced1cf21782c97be7f8d74faf5e27a308b60b2f858836fb5ca3b8c4e939a8f7",
         "oss-fuzz/projects/blamejs/project.yaml": "sha256:59f2cb83aa622325a175b77416fe155be15b70a9c798bd1a78bba05763b1b03d",
-        "package.json": "sha256:585a646ad04f1afaa7faf4d273a16f5d8c6d530071d20db7b83f045ddaeaff73",
+        "package.json": "sha256:a1c6ea35b2eb0ec3bd7bc2dfb809260f5bad56202962bed60b939b0d1ad01d07",
         "release-notes/v0.0.x.json": "sha256:7a49819f30068ee119000cad7010194882bb8bfaa12acbdab4dfc066efb7982f",
         "release-notes/v0.1.x.json": "sha256:6742a8c17f947c5cb76f69dead7eea86b942d80621d914b774ba5488e09937e5",
         "release-notes/v0.10.x.json": "sha256:fe498045daf88337bd3d987e5964aa42c99a50e1685b6f09e51f698b8687726f",
@@ -2387,6 +2389,8 @@
         "release-notes/v0.15.34.json": "sha256:2a1b36d897d8e9f2cece051c098030f08d9c6ee6bef136800bd19453ad65f188",
         "release-notes/v0.15.35.json": "sha256:e317b2252734aace7a0f734e3ab40c3a0c4ac208d678c0e9834be34eb424d15b",
         "release-notes/v0.15.36.json": "sha256:392c15724efc02fad5825aaf93b3f5dcef90a0cb9909d61f86e777f3061045ec",
+        "release-notes/v0.15.37.json": "sha256:b696debed024bed09c59eaeb467d6dde93d7f30ad33f46af8a37d07534df09d8",
+        "release-notes/v0.15.38.json": "sha256:8a2e21eec92c95173689cdcf6055b9d3375ba0f765692c7cdb1e7313a5010ddc",
         "release-notes/v0.15.4.json": "sha256:6ac7fa0ef1728c27e71b2050d1b07a810f9b4b1440ccddbf28ad56e2f54d8585",
         "release-notes/v0.15.5.json": "sha256:cca1d0edd5d6fc41b512d19d98be224b990dcab41478622c11962f0fcb1bb09a",
         "release-notes/v0.15.6.json": "sha256:0e3b9e5e43b70b61dd258c3003d1b8729cd3c26c62a34dedcca81bbec5d31077",
@@ -2633,7 +2637,7 @@
         "test/layer-0-primitives/cluster-storage.test.js": "sha256:238b3b3db0eba3e6312a863710533178f566347b90e161e564481aa826707647",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/cluster-vault-rotation.test.js": "sha256:3514e9e71d6c39e805248f58ad2f41528d091e196c0f3766a032675677161b2d",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/cms-codec.test.js": "sha256:7e46078ed82be5b69d22c48f22dba37ea5015371c2a8cf5f94fb1a792fb7bb78",
-        "test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js": "sha256:4180fd47eef2c81248ec83433e31f4975eefb0441bb3f3366a25a5a98ce5d0b9",
+        "test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js": "sha256:ae47993e4fb7be4bb52b4c71a178cd47928b853dec9935c6445d8966da04ed4f",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/codepoint-class.test.js": "sha256:19d1b69efa7e0e9f7ef2392ca264167767a5ec5890ee339b2cfd8a7818035d27",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/compliance-ai-act.test.js": "sha256:5ee4ad05d12233cb3c5457ef10a727833710bbc1ce1318838f9f9ef5d2cb8d4b",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/compliance-cascade.test.js": "sha256:ee02cf14541a837a9d7977c6ea6bf7f9210bed293925d93c976e31f270aebec4",
@@ -2676,7 +2680,7 @@
         "test/layer-0-primitives/csp-report.test.js": "sha256:8bb2e54a31fd4317a6a39a4dc3358147a0102dbfa58b71d85a5743008289a2ff",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/csrf-protect.test.js": "sha256:802a8de2fee57c01a03b523cd6701780c181838006356c30a01452b30381225b",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/csv.test.js": "sha256:6a9ed5a3fc6fd315261ad0bf7788047de5323fe09c36bb52d6e599a761b18085",
-        "test/layer-0-primitives/cwt.test.js": "sha256:1e642b69cbd6a5b33b7755df3a17d5cecfb96e071560e4b384437ce05ab25e4d",
+        "test/layer-0-primitives/cwt.test.js": "sha256:74b06a3278eacbaed102ae9e966fac8d43e3fc609c288fde4f535566df78a5ed",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/daemon.test.js": "sha256:a118c7a6d738115ea4590ef1d639e4c06f139732bcaf8545d649452dfdb3979e",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/daily-byte-quota.test.js": "sha256:c4683ef74d205ba8ebabf3c9f0ce60d0e86824cf0c8a0f23c1e6b8c5b5b70f23",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/dane.test.js": "sha256:59d01acff1a81f0d691ecb28920f5c22e30ef416bf84a52c853c1a00e64cf783",
@@ -2737,7 +2741,7 @@
         "test/layer-0-primitives/fido-mds3.test.js": "sha256:91893e57258f91386ea3baedf8727dac08b5c75725a74b74ecdfbc5d99bb4adc",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/file-type.test.js": "sha256:ba6bb725857cbf7b165f4391e3aa126c9fc4286c5afb92d1964ff1d0dfd2b57c",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/file-upload-content-safety-skip-audit.test.js": "sha256:ad13f7f84a33899b4f4e66b74c896f606e070bfe5df769b0acd109cfb7ab38c7",
-        "test/layer-0-primitives/flag.test.js": "sha256:8b58826342b8c28d90e11e4cfe1a7e266c2296615a90558221cad12e9f6ecb4e",
+        "test/layer-0-primitives/flag.test.js": "sha256:e834ee3ae6469ada26eb3783dbba943c8ebce6c34787d8e1e8f9ff4dd07a5176",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/forensic-snapshot.test.js": "sha256:629a8af1ccd0396e2b30f8e46d76fe19eab9f33c156c0db78e3e76649e21030c",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/fsm.test.js": "sha256:7037831083426478ed4efd7d1c17d4b96c3609816a41819b5c9da71d2b6187e8",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/gate-contract-content-gate.test.js": "sha256:d9f8b94231efb0e02a94b7934bf58a3f8e343829ce11346b7302e69e13efd551",
@@ -2798,7 +2802,7 @@
         "test/layer-0-primitives/iab-tcf.test.js": "sha256:34e5f9b2740c0b96e3f84d003fbbf55a4d366f3d08f6baedca0109573eead9b6",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/idempotency-key.test.js": "sha256:0214b68cbb3f50a0c7cbc7fcb92b1edf86a714dd6040c3a1a2be34b31eb9c631",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/importmap-integrity.test.js": "sha256:babd21e2356c7d1d7916ae89fc228105290bf8c99371f0cde68512a62bea45dd",
-        "test/layer-0-primitives/inbox.test.js": "sha256:d0865782d10cb9a72bbf39223c5499d5b1ec50967173e2dfe3cd1bf88b279d8c",
+        "test/layer-0-primitives/inbox.test.js": "sha256:b8c16ba0cd5f2453ef9cc242dfc1af85e88f8d65a361c02ec2209225a0e67b99",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/incident-report.test.js": "sha256:57bc8d037e6a3f84fcefe0a95205e5ac0f83c6dbb8b1f935c3c5184d2456c857",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/ip-utils.test.js": "sha256:0ca865e21be6a8815a5c0dd772497b3e0ab4cedd67e7dbabf9518c82af789132",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/jose-jwe-experimental.test.js": "sha256:fabd155817296fbac7cea4ccaaf5e1740471fe97b431fe46e13e6a30d13784ef",
@@ -2822,7 +2826,7 @@
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-agent.test.js": "sha256:51725784bab6849cb02f1e94e0ba97c2b8e7e101780a26ae7ec19f9d894640ef",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-arf.test.js": "sha256:2279aebee547903a8c1415c9fc1c9c194757b3917e869bfddb43dd0375e68a93",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-auth-dmarc-policy-failclosed.test.js": "sha256:22066c238cdb9c4f84377f56f2d69e387bcb4a601ef384cc874fc55249fbfaa6",
-        "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-auth.test.js": "sha256:4b967c9921ad3e9e84f87eca1a6077d7d089750c4e919ec3ea09e4a11cd06884",
+        "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-auth.test.js": "sha256:36f434e2ddb65b3f4cae76be48a917971254959d2312c1f87a6dfd5144d54560",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-bimi-cert-validity-unparseable.test.js": "sha256:d14d66d801b5767372ce7014617841f8710f7ad95107984da058ade794fd4d8f",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-bimi.test.js": "sha256:3e12e211e1f75f07d1ba43ada69c9adcd205902194f983d8ae24293b1acd1cd5",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-bounce.test.js": "sha256:d4ef09adc71e1c9e336a9fc5b059e6b264d9abcd0c032023bfa7b15a9173a4b7",
@@ -2864,7 +2868,7 @@
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mail-unsubscribe.test.js": "sha256:ffe070b31ae59b1f3cb1582b56f494501dc97a493e89111573a8383fabf1a269",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mail.test.js": "sha256:ef0dafe19c60852542f7cc523dfb0c92347261c43d706eeed58db9934d9f5c50",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mcp-tool-registry.test.js": "sha256:4d9a9a367489d93afcc8e0bca3442e0aefc683e40ddd29e6e2cddbe3a3b8732f",
-        "test/layer-0-primitives/mcp.test.js": "sha256:896a9b55fd9d21a1ec2b0d0753b5796eb045911ad28992ba17338285406ac2f9",
+        "test/layer-0-primitives/mcp.test.js": "sha256:31a29bee340edac7f305e8dc18b44134140dc058c5bdc1dc137f1f18886ad2af",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/mdoc.test.js": "sha256:2fe1086192385e71f858554d676b299b86594d34226e1d774ffefc97b5fa03a4",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/metrics-shadow-registry.test.js": "sha256:a91a9efdb4aa28caed846b969d7c1e5ebfc57067afad85800daa430942d02725",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/metrics-snapshot.test.js": "sha256:aa405be22acb6680b062d1de1aa7ce00029e414218a0e4e521e10a14b2254851",
@@ -3025,7 +3029,7 @@
         "test/layer-0-primitives/time.test.js": "sha256:59f6dcd5753b9bb97508044c30cfca948c4707dd8d107dab5eab53f0dcd91e84",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/tls-exporter.test.js": "sha256:3224b12f18619fa805e933c8eef18356e42f8554d75d7c4e23ebd8b5b993ca6b",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/tls-ocsp-ct.test.js": "sha256:7c98ddde33095683a3be527fee9e868501ca99eac74cc40fe1c56ca6018f1660",
-        "test/layer-0-primitives/tls-ocsp-freshness.test.js": "sha256:0d979ecdbc7d9c62bcb32e0f2594fa5425bed4a25ef3793915ad0890398fabf7",
+        "test/layer-0-primitives/tls-ocsp-freshness.test.js": "sha256:ddf2723551337d3859add255644e322c74d5e55df07be181795484be0835ee2d",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/tls-ocsp-verify.test.js": "sha256:f726bb9387c570cee945a2b927070899bc7ae933ec09ba481c3aa5f0d11d2ba6",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/tls-pinset-drift.test.js": "sha256:6b7c530326a1025819257daec21711d6f889a8523f2766595f7cc28563f5badc",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/tls-preferred-groups.test.js": "sha256:7d3620cbde85289a98a385a3c3ba9d17f0bb2b8e5f5f9398b5641ff9d1e2b181",
@@ -3054,7 +3058,7 @@
         "test/layer-0-primitives/worker-pool-recycle-race.test.js": "sha256:0e9f12256864334bf49de0b0d62b9d4f9cfeb34e9fe598f9299b811dc4ac4719",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/worker-pool.test.js": "sha256:0a3698d862346f64f98eb1c954694ad6a6b4cedbfc569a1f4d93233b7bfa733a",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/worm.test.js": "sha256:0908cfbf7228de39ab68796505c29071d3117571b8a6c07cef7d1fa27d0380b8",
-        "test/layer-0-primitives/ws-client.test.js": "sha256:e604a0ac206825ec307624ae6df59a644c2dde2c51b965a3b51fce05990cfbde",
+        "test/layer-0-primitives/ws-client.test.js": "sha256:004f5f231e7396fd8b32c7f41e7cd36becaa8919584c740497a9b08c242414c8",
         "test/layer-0-primitives/x509-chain-ca-enforcement.test.js": "sha256:8d68ffe4f8655af99682927524ae5a6c5336f32a57eb7c5c78fef5f2d1b2e6e3",
         "test/layer-1-state/api-key.test.js": "sha256:48d641b673a181746adf80dfa995f0ca29187af17aa4735590557fda4350dcb8",
         "test/layer-5-integration/bundler-output.test.js": "sha256:023f0504a5ae60fb39d347d05e8fe7e9d8fee685eb1bb89dd40406cf01691d22",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.15.x
 
+- v0.15.38 (2026-06-27) — **Regex patterns supplied in feature-flag targeting rules and MCP tool input schemas are now screened for catastrophic-backtracking (ReDoS) shapes before compilation, so a pattern matched against request data can't pin a CPU.** Two places compiled a caller-supplied regex pattern and `.test()`'d it against request-controlled input with only a length bound as the stated defense: a feature-flag targeting condition (`op: "regex"`) matched against runtime attribute values, and an MCP tool's input-schema `pattern` matched against tool-call arguments. A length bound is not a ReDoS defense — a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `(a+)+$` is six characters and pins a CPU on a crafted input. Both patterns now pass through `b.guardRegex` (strict profile) before compilation, which refuses nested-quantifier, alternation-with-quantifier, and quantifier-inside-lookaround shapes. A ReDoS-shaped flag pattern is refused when the rules are validated; a ReDoS-shaped MCP schema pattern fails tool-input validation. Patterns built from the framework's own static tables, operator-owned JSON Schema patterns, the Sieve glob translator (which cannot express nested quantifiers), and the I-Regexp translator (linear by dialect) are unchanged. **Security:** *Feature-flag regex targeting conditions are screened for ReDoS before compilation* — A flag targeting rule with `op: "regex"` compiled the operator-supplied pattern and `.test()`'d it against runtime attribute values, guarded only by a 200-character length cap. Length does not bound catastrophic backtracking, so a pattern like `(a+)+$` combined with an attacker-controlled attribute value could pin a CPU during flag evaluation. The pattern is now screened through b.guardRegex (strict) when the rules are validated, and a catastrophic-backtracking shape is refused with a clear error. · *MCP tool input-schema patterns are screened for ReDoS before matching request input* — b.mcp.validateToolInput compiled a tool author's input-schema `pattern` and matched it against tool-call argument values; the 4096-character input cap does not bound backtracking (a `(a+)+$` pattern blows up at roughly forty input characters). The schema pattern is now screened through b.guardRegex (strict) before compilation, so a ReDoS-shaped pattern in a registered tool's schema fails input validation instead of letting hostile arguments hang the validator. · *b.guardRegex now catches wrapped nested-quantifier patterns* — The nested-quantifier detector matched a quantified group whose body contained a quantifier, but its inner match was paren-blind, so wrapping the inner quantifier in an extra group — `((a)+)+`, `(([a-z]+)*)*`, `((a+))+` — slipped past it while remaining catastrophic. A structural scan now tracks group nesting and refuses an unbounded-quantified group whose body itself contains an unbounded quantifier at any depth, so the wrapped forms are rejected alongside the bare `(a+)+`. Bounded repeats (`{n}`, `{n,m}`) are unaffected. This strengthens every b.guardRegex caller, including the flag-targeting and MCP screening above.
+
+- v0.15.37 (2026-06-27) — **Several numeric options that silently accepted a non-finite value — disabling a clock-skew / freshness check or a resource cap — now reject it, so an `Infinity` skew or limit can no longer turn off the protection it configures.** A number of configuration options validated a numeric value with a bare `typeof === "number" && value >= 0` check, which accepts `Infinity`. Where the value is a clock-skew tolerance or a resource cap, an `Infinity` (or `NaN`) silently disabled the very check it tunes: a CWT / OCSP-staple / ARC clock-skew of `Infinity` made the expiry, freshness, and expiration comparisons unsatisfiable (an expired token / a replayed pre-revocation "good" response / an expired ARC seal would be accepted); a WebSocket-client `maxMessageBytes` / `maxFrameBytes` / `handshakeTimeoutMs` of `Infinity` disabled the inbound-OOM and stalled-handshake defenses; and inbox / flag-cache / audit-chain size and count caps of `Infinity` admitted unbounded data. These options now route through the finite-bounds validator: a present non-finite value is refused at the entry point (or falls back to the safe default on the result-returning paths). Options where an unbounded value is a deliberate intent — reconnect "retry indefinitely", inbox "retain indefinitely" — continue to accept `Infinity`. **Security:** *A non-finite clock-skew no longer disables CWT / OCSP / ARC time checks* — b.cwt.verify, the OCSP-staple freshness check in b.network.tls, and b.mail.arc.verify each took an operator clock-skew tolerance validated as `typeof === "number" && >= 0`, which accepts `Infinity`. Because each check is of the form `now > deadline + skew`, a skew of `Infinity` made it unsatisfiable and silently turned the check off: an expired CWT verified, a stale (post-nextUpdate) OCSP "good" response — the exact reply an attacker replays after the certificate is revoked — was accepted, and an expired ARC seal passed. A present clock-skew that is not a non-negative finite integer is now refused (b.cwt.verify throws cwt/bad-clock-skew; the OCSP and ARC paths fall back to their safe default). Regression tests assert an expired token / stale staple / expired ARC seal is still rejected when the skew is `Infinity`. · *WebSocket-client inbound caps can no longer be disabled by an Infinity value* — b.wsClient.connect validated maxMessageBytes, maxFrameBytes, and handshakeTimeoutMs (and the ping/pong keepalive intervals) with a bare numeric check that accepted `Infinity`, which disabled the inbound-message and frame size limits — the defenses against a malicious server sending an unbounded message — and the handshake timeout. A present non-finite value for these is now refused at connect time. The reconnect maxAttempts still accepts `Infinity` (a deliberate "reconnect indefinitely" intent). · *Inbox, flag-cache, and audit-chain caps reject a non-finite limit* — The inbox maxPayloadBytes / messageIdMaxLen / sourceMaxLen caps, the flag-cache ttlMs / maxEntries, and the audit-chain partition fan-out cap each accepted `Infinity`, disabling the cap (unbounded stored payloads, a never-expiring or unbounded cache, unbounded fan-out). These now require a positive finite integer — refused at create time, or clamped to the bounded default on the result-returning verify path. The inbox retentionDays still accepts `Infinity` (retain indefinitely).
+
 - v0.15.36 (2026-06-27) — **Internal test-suite hardening only — the published library's runtime behavior and public API are unchanged (source-comment marker text aside).** The codebase-patterns guard class that allows a bare comma/semicolon split on token-only RFC header grammars was re-verified from scratch and renamed to a descriptive token, with its old name recorded as retired. Each live marked site (RRULE, RFC 9421 component identifiers, TLS-RPT rua, SCIM attribute paths) was re-read and confirmed to split a grammar with no quoted-string members. Five marker comments that suppressed nothing were removed or turned into plain explanatory comments. No runtime code, public API, or wire format changed. **Detectors:** *Bare token-only header-split suppression class re-verified, renamed, and pruned of inert markers* — Each marked bare `.split(",")` / `.split(";")` on an RFC header value was re-read and confirmed to operate on a token-only grammar (no quoted-string members, so a quote-aware splitter is unnecessary): RFC 5545 RRULE, RFC 9421 signature component identifiers, RFC 8460 TLS-RPT rua, and RFC 7644 SCIM attribute paths. The guard class was renamed to a descriptive token and its old name added to the retired-token set. Five marker comments that the detector never actually evaluated (two sat on a date-normalizing `.replace`, three in header parsers the guard intentionally does not scan) were removed or converted to plain comments. This is test-suite tooling plus source-comment text; no shipped framework behavior changed.
 
 - v0.15.35 (2026-06-26) — **`b.metrics` shadow registry no longer lets a comma in a label value forge extra Prometheus label pairs — a label-injection that downstream tenant-scoping or authorization selectors could be tricked by.** The shadow registry serialized a metric's label set into a `name=value,name=value` string key and re-split it on `,` to build the Prometheus exposition. A label VALUE containing a comma therefore split into multiple label pairs, so a single operator-set label could forge additional label pairs in the scrape output (for example turning one `route` label into a `route` plus an attacker-named label), which downstream tenant-scoping filters, authorization selectors, recording rules, and alerting trust as a boundary; two distinct label sets could also collide into one cardinality bucket. The label key now uses canonical-JSON of the string-coerced label set (the same approach the main registry already used) and the render path emits the structured label set kept alongside that key rather than splitting or re-parsing, so a `,` or `=` inside a label value stays inside the value and a label NAMED `constructor`, `prototype`, or `__proto__` (all valid Prometheus label names) is preserved instead of being dropped. Note: the cardinality keys exposed by `shadowRegistry().snapshot()` are now canonical-JSON strings (e.g. `{"route":"/api"}`) rather than `route=/api`. **Changed:** *shadowRegistry().snapshot() cardinality keys are canonical-JSON* — As a consequence of the label-injection fix, the per-series cardinality keys in a shadow-registry snapshot are now canonical-JSON strings (e.g. `{"tenant":"a"}`) instead of the previous `tenant=a` form. Code that reads those keys directly from snapshot() should parse them as JSON; the Prometheus render output is unchanged for conforming label values. **Security:** *Label values can no longer forge extra Prometheus label pairs in the shadow registry* — b.metrics shadowRegistry built a metric's cardinality key by joining `name=value` pairs with commas, then split that string on commas when rendering the Prometheus exposition. A comma (and `=`) in a label value therefore broke one value into several forged label pairs in the scrape output, and two different label sets could collide into the same cardinality bucket. The key is now canonical-JSON of the string-coerced label set and the render emits the structured label set kept alongside that key rather than splitting or re-parsing, so a label value is emitted as a single quoted value with its commas/equals intact, distinct label sets get distinct keys, and a label NAMED `constructor`, `prototype`, or `__proto__` (each a valid Prometheus label name) is preserved rather than dropped. Deterministic regression tests assert a comma-bearing label value produces exactly one label pair and that the reserved-name labels survive render.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/api-snapshot.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "frameworkVersion": "0.15.36",
-  "createdAt": "2026-06-27T07:23:28.597Z",
+  "frameworkVersion": "0.15.38",
+  "createdAt": "2026-06-27T15:30:08.749Z",
   "exports": {
     "a2a": {
       "type": "object",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/agent-posture-chain.js

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   var auditImpl = opts.audit || audit();
   var declaredRegimes = Object.create(null);
   for (var i = 0; i < BUILTIN_REGIMES.length; i += 1) declaredRegimes[BUILTIN_REGIMES[i]] = true;
-  // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — operator opt clamped to [1, DEFAULT_MAX_HOP_COUNT]; bad input falls back to default
+  // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional — operator opt clamped to [1, DEFAULT_MAX_HOP_COUNT] (the `<= DEFAULT_MAX_HOP_COUNT` upper bound rejects Infinity); bad input falls back to default
   var maxHopCount = typeof opts.maxHopCount === "number" && opts.maxHopCount > 0 &&
                     opts.maxHopCount <= DEFAULT_MAX_HOP_COUNT
                       ? Math.floor(opts.maxHopCount)

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/audit-chain.js

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ var canonicalJson = require("./canonical-json");
 var C = require("./constants");
 var clusterStorage = require("./cluster-storage");
 var frameworkSchema = require("./framework-schema");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var sql = require("./sql");
 var safeSql = require("./safe-sql");
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
@@ -305,7 +306,10 @@ async function verifyChain(queryAllAsync, tableName, opts) {
     // coerce so a Postgres INTEGER/BIGINT chainKey is type-stable in the
     // reported break-shape and the per-key WHERE bind, matching SQLite.
     var keyRows = frameworkSchema.coerceRows(await queryAllAsync(keysBuilt.sql, keysBuilt.params));
-    var maxChains = (typeof opts.maxChains === "number" && opts.maxChains > 0) ? opts.maxChains : 100000;   // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — partition fan-out cap; non-number / <=0 falls back to the default
+    // Partition fan-out cap; a non-finite / <= 0 / non-integer value (Infinity
+    // would make the `keyRows.length > maxChains` cap unsatisfiable) falls back
+    // to the bounded default rather than disabling the cap.
+    var maxChains = numericBounds.isPositiveFiniteInt(opts.maxChains) ? opts.maxChains : 100000;
     if (keyRows.length > maxChains) {
       return {
         ok:           false,

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cwt.js

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 var cose = require("./cose");
 var cbor = require("./cbor");
 var C = require("./constants");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 
@@ -191,7 +192,11 @@ async function verify(cwt, opts) {
   }
 
   // Time claims (NumericDate, seconds). Skew tolerance both directions.
-  var skew = (typeof opts.clockSkewSec === "number" && opts.clockSkewSec >= 0) ? opts.clockSkewSec : 60;   // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — clamped non-negative, else default / allow:raw-time-literal — clock-skew in seconds (NumericDate units), not a ms duration
+  // A present clockSkewSec must be a non-negative finite integer — an
+  // Infinity / NaN / negative skew would otherwise make `now > exp + skew`
+  // unsatisfiable and silently disable the expiry / not-before checks.
+  numericBounds.requireNonNegativeFiniteIntIfPresent(opts.clockSkewSec, "cwt.verify: opts.clockSkewSec", CwtError, "cwt/bad-clock-skew");
+  var skew = (typeof opts.clockSkewSec === "number") ? opts.clockSkewSec : 60;   // allow:raw-time-literal — clock-skew in seconds (NumericDate units), not a ms duration
   var now = _nowSec(opts);
   // A present exp / nbf MUST be a well-formed NumericDate — a non-numeric
   // value would otherwise bypass the time check entirely (a token could

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/external-db.js

@@ -1338,8 +1338,9 @@ async function transaction(fn, opts) {
   // (serialization_failure) are transient — retry with capped attempts
   // and a small jittered backoff. Operators tune retries via opts.deadlockRetries (default 3).
   // numeric-bounds doesn't have a non-negative-int helper; use a
-  // direct check with allow marker (zero is permitted to disable
-  // retries entirely).
+  // Explicit isFinite/integer guard (zero is permitted to disable retries
+  // entirely); a non-finite deadlockRetries is refused here, so Math.floor
+  // below only ever sees a validated finite integer.
   if (opts.deadlockRetries !== undefined) {
     if (typeof opts.deadlockRetries !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.deadlockRetries) ||
         opts.deadlockRetries < 0 || (opts.deadlockRetries | 0) !== opts.deadlockRetries) {
@@ -1348,7 +1349,7 @@ async function transaction(fn, opts) {
     }
   }
   var maxRetries = (typeof opts.deadlockRetries === "number")
-    ? Math.floor(opts.deadlockRetries) : 3;                                       // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+    ? Math.floor(opts.deadlockRetries) : 3;
   // Validate the transaction-level residency tag shape at entry (the
   // sessionGucs / deadlockRetries discipline) so an empty-string tag
   // fails before BEGIN rather than at the first statement.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/flag-cache.js

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var lazyRequire  = require("./lazy-require");
 var C            = require("./constants");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 var FlagError = defineClass("FlagError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
 
@@ -36,18 +37,17 @@ function cache(downstream, opts) {
     throw new FlagError("flag/bad-cache",
       "cache: downstream provider must implement .evaluate()");
   }
-  // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — defaults clamped + ttl-floor enforced below
-  var ttlMs = (typeof opts.ttlMs === "number" && opts.ttlMs > 0)
-    ? opts.ttlMs
-    : C.TIME.seconds(30);
+  // A present ttlMs / maxEntries must be a positive finite integer — Infinity
+  // would pass a bare `typeof === "number" && > 0` check and give a
+  // never-expiring entry (ttlMs) or an unbounded cache (maxEntries).
+  numericBounds.requirePositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts.ttlMs, "flag.cache: opts.ttlMs", FlagError, "flag/bad-cache");
+  var ttlMs = (typeof opts.ttlMs === "number") ? opts.ttlMs : C.TIME.seconds(30);
   if (ttlMs < C.TIME.seconds(1)) {
     throw new FlagError("flag/bad-cache",
       "cache: ttlMs must be >= 1000ms - got " + ttlMs);
   }
-  // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — maxEntries default + Math.floor coerce; throws on bad type at config time
-  var maxEntries = (typeof opts.maxEntries === "number" && opts.maxEntries > 0)
-    ? Math.floor(opts.maxEntries)
-    : 10000;                                       // entry-count default
+  numericBounds.requirePositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts.maxEntries, "flag.cache: opts.maxEntries", FlagError, "flag/bad-cache");
+  var maxEntries = (typeof opts.maxEntries === "number") ? opts.maxEntries : 10000;   // entry-count default
   var auditOn = opts.audit === true;            // off by default — too chatty
   var entries = new Map();
   var hits   = 0;

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/flag-targeting.js

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
  */
 
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var guardRegex = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./guard-regex"); });
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 var FlagError = defineClass("FlagError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
 
@@ -171,8 +173,19 @@ function validateRules(rules, label) {
           throw new FlagError("flag/bad-condition",
             clabel + ".value: regex pattern must be <= 200 chars (DoS defense)");
         }
+        // The compiled regex is .test()'d against runtime attribute values, so a
+        // catastrophic-backtracking (ReDoS) pattern is a DoS vector. A length
+        // bound does NOT defend ReDoS (`(a+)+$` is 6 chars); screen the pattern
+        // through b.guardRegex first — it refuses nested-quantifier / alternation-
+        // quantifier / lookaround-quantifier shapes before compilation.
         try {
-          // allow:dynamic-regex — operator-supplied targeting pattern, length-bounded to 200 chars above
+          guardRegex().sanitize(cond.value, { profile: "strict" });
+        } catch (ge) {
+          throw new FlagError("flag/bad-condition",
+            clabel + ".value: regex pattern rejected as unsafe (ReDoS shape) - " + ge.message);
+        }
+        try {
+          // allow:dynamic-regex — operator targeting pattern, ReDoS-screened via guardRegex.sanitize (strict) + length-bounded to 200 chars above
           validatedCond._compiledRegex = new RegExp(cond.value);
         } catch (e) {
           throw new FlagError("flag/bad-condition",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-regex.js

@@ -128,19 +128,68 @@ var DEFAULTS = gateContract.strictDefaults(PROFILES);
 
 var COMPLIANCE_POSTURES = gateContract.compliancePostures(PROFILES, { base: 256 });
 
+// Structural nested-unbounded-quantifier detector. NESTED_QUANT_RE is paren-
+// blind (its `[^()]*` can't span a nested group), so it misses WRAPPED forms
+// like `((a)+)+` / `(([a-z]+)*)*` / `((a+))+` — adding one extra group around
+// the inner quantifier bypasses the regex while the pattern stays catastrophic.
+// This linear scan tracks group nesting and flags an unbounded-quantified group
+// (`)+`, `)*`, `){n,}`) whose body itself contains an unbounded quantifier — the
+// two-nested-unbounded-quantifier ReDoS class — at any group depth. Bounded
+// repeats (`{n}`, `{n,m}`, `?`) are not unbounded, so they don't trip it (the
+// large-bound case is handled separately by maxBoundedRepeat).
+function _hasNestedQuantifier(src) {
+  var stack = [];        // open groups: each { quant } — body has an unbounded quantifier
+  var inClass = false;   // inside a [...] character class
+  var i = 0;
+  var n = src.length;
+  var UNBOUNDED_AFTER_GROUP = /^(?:[*+]\??|\{\d*,\})/;   // )+ )* )+? )*? ){n,}
+  while (i < n) {
+    var c = src.charAt(i);
+    if (c === "\\") { i += 2; continue; }                          // escaped atom — skip both chars
+    if (inClass) { if (c === "]") inClass = false; i += 1; continue; }
+    if (c === "[") { inClass = true; i += 1; continue; }
+    if (c === "(") { stack.push({ quant: false }); i += 1; continue; }
+    if (c === ")") {
+      var grp = stack.pop() || { quant: false };
+      var qm = UNBOUNDED_AFTER_GROUP.exec(src.slice(i + 1));       // allow:regex-no-length-cap — bounded slice of a maxPatternBytes-capped input
+      var closeUnbounded = qm !== null;
+      if (grp.quant && closeUnbounded) return true;               // nested unbounded quantifier → catastrophic
+      // The closing group contributes an unbounded quantifier to its PARENT's
+      // body if its own body had one, or if it is itself unbounded-quantified.
+      if (stack.length && (grp.quant || closeUnbounded)) stack[stack.length - 1].quant = true;
+      i += 1 + (qm ? qm[0].length : 0);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (c === "*" || c === "+") {                                  // unbounded quantifier on the preceding atom
+      if (stack.length) stack[stack.length - 1].quant = true;
+      i += 1; continue;
+    }
+    if (c === "{") {
+      var open = /^\{\d*,\}/.exec(src.slice(i));                  // allow:regex-no-length-cap — bounded slice // {n,} unbounded
+      if (open) { if (stack.length) stack[stack.length - 1].quant = true; i += open[0].length; continue; }
+      var bounded = /^\{\d+(?:,\d+)?\}/.exec(src.slice(i));       // allow:regex-no-length-cap — bounded slice // {n} / {n,m} bounded
+      if (bounded) { i += bounded[0].length; continue; }
+      i += 1; continue;                                            // literal `{`
+    }
+    i += 1;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
 
 function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
   var pre = gateContract.detectStringInput(input, opts, { name: "regex", noun: "regex pattern", cap: { bytes: opts.maxPatternBytes, kind: "pattern-cap", snippet: "regex pattern exceeds maxPatternBytes " + opts.maxPatternBytes } });
   if (pre.done) return pre.issues;
   var issues = pre.issues;
 
-  if (opts.nestedQuantPolicy !== "allow" && NESTED_QUANT_RE.test(input)) {       // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input bounded by maxPatternBytes
+  if (opts.nestedQuantPolicy !== "allow" &&
+      (NESTED_QUANT_RE.test(input) || _hasNestedQuantifier(input))) {            // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input bounded by maxPatternBytes
     issues.push({
       kind: "nested-quantifier", severity: "critical",
       ruleId: "regex.nested-quantifier",
       snippet: "pattern contains nested-quantifier shape (e.g. " +
-               "`(a+)+`) — canonical ReDoS catastrophic-backtracking " +
-               "class (CVE-2024-21538 cross-spawn / CVE-2022-25929)",
+               "`(a+)+` / `((a)+)+`) — canonical ReDoS catastrophic-" +
+               "backtracking class (CVE-2024-21538 cross-spawn / CVE-2022-25929)",
     });
   }
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/inbox.js

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 
 var C = require("./constants");
 var codepointClass = require("./codepoint-class");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
 var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
 var safeSql = require("./safe-sql");
@@ -155,15 +156,17 @@ function create(opts) {
   // The table identifier reaches SQL through b.sql, which validates +
   // quotes it by construction on every emitted statement; _validateTableName
   // above fails fast at create() time on a bad name.
-  var retentionDays  = (typeof opts.retentionDays === "number" && opts.retentionDays > 0)        // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+  var retentionDays  = (typeof opts.retentionDays === "number" && opts.retentionDays > 0)        // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional — Infinity = retain indefinitely, a supported intent
     ? opts.retentionDays : 30;                                                                   // default retention days
   var auditOn        = opts.audit !== false;
-  var maxPayloadBytes = (typeof opts.maxPayloadBytes === "number" && opts.maxPayloadBytes > 0)   // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? opts.maxPayloadBytes : C.BYTES.kib(64);
-  var messageIdMaxLen = (typeof opts.messageIdMaxLen === "number" && opts.messageIdMaxLen > 0)   // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? opts.messageIdMaxLen : 256;                                                                // message-id length cap
-  var sourceMaxLen = (typeof opts.sourceMaxLen === "number" && opts.sourceMaxLen > 0)            // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? opts.sourceMaxLen : 256;                                                                   // source length cap
+  // The byte / length caps must be positive finite integers — Infinity would
+  // disable the cap and admit unbounded stored payloads / identifiers.
+  numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts,
+    ["maxPayloadBytes", "messageIdMaxLen", "sourceMaxLen"],
+    "inbox.create", InboxError, "inbox/bad-opt");
+  var maxPayloadBytes = (typeof opts.maxPayloadBytes === "number") ? opts.maxPayloadBytes : C.BYTES.kib(64);
+  var messageIdMaxLen = (typeof opts.messageIdMaxLen === "number") ? opts.messageIdMaxLen : 256;   // message-id length cap
+  var sourceMaxLen = (typeof opts.sourceMaxLen === "number") ? opts.sourceMaxLen : 256;            // source length cap
 
   function _emitAudit(action, outcome, metadata) {
     if (!auditOn) return;
@@ -346,6 +349,14 @@ function create(opts) {
   }
 
   async function sweep() {
+    // retentionDays: Infinity is the documented "retain indefinitely" intent —
+    // there is no horizon to age past, so sweep deletes nothing. (Computing a
+    // cutoff would otherwise throw: `new Date(Date.now() - Infinity)` is an
+    // Invalid Date, and "Infinity days" is not a valid Postgres interval.)
+    if (!isFinite(retentionDays)) {
+      _emitAudit("inbox.swept", "success", { deleted: 0, retentionDays: retentionDays });
+      return 0;
+    }
     var dialect = _sqlDialect(externalDb);
     var deleted = 0;
     await externalDb.transaction(async function (xdb) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/mail-arc-sign.js

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
 var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
 var dkim = require("./mail-dkim");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
@@ -246,8 +247,11 @@ function sign(opts) {
         "sign: headersToSign[" + hi + "] must be a non-empty string");
     }
   }
-  var timestamp = (typeof opts.timestamp === "number" && opts.timestamp > 0)            // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? Math.floor(opts.timestamp) : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);                       // Unix epoch seconds divisor
+  // A present t= timestamp must be a positive finite integer (NumericDate
+  // seconds) — an Infinity / NaN value would serialize into a malformed t= tag.
+  numericBounds.requirePositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts.timestamp, "arc.sign: opts.timestamp", MailAuthError, "arc-sign/bad-timestamp");
+  var timestamp = (typeof opts.timestamp === "number")
+    ? opts.timestamp : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);                                   // Unix epoch seconds divisor
   var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
 
   var keyObject;

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/mail-auth.js

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ var structuredFields = require("./structured-fields");
 var markupEscape = require("./markup-escape").markupEscape;
 var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
 var C = require("./constants");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var dkim = require("./mail-dkim");
 var mimeParse = require("./mime-parse");
 var safeXml = require("./parsers/safe-xml");
@@ -1575,7 +1576,11 @@ async function arcVerify(rfc822, opts) {
   var anyFail = false;
   // RFC 8617 §5.2 — operator-tunable clock skew on t= (signing
   // timestamp) and x= (expiration) tags. Default 5 min.
-  var arcClockSkewMs = typeof opts.clockSkewMs === "number" && opts.clockSkewMs >= 0           // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — operator-supplied skew, default 5 min
+  // A present clockSkewMs must be a non-negative finite integer; an Infinity /
+  // NaN / negative skew makes `amsX + skewSec < nowSec` (and the t= future
+  // check) unsatisfiable and silently disables the RFC 8617 §5.2 expiry /
+  // future-timestamp gate. Non-finite falls to the default.
+  var arcClockSkewMs = numericBounds.isNonNegativeFiniteInt(opts.clockSkewMs)
     ? opts.clockSkewMs : C.TIME.minutes(5);
   var nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);                                                  // Unix epoch seconds divisor
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/mcp.js

@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
 var requestHelpers = require("./request-helpers");
 var audit = require("./audit");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var guardRegex = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./guard-regex"); });
 var { McpError } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var TOOL_NAME_MAX     = 64;                                                                  // string-length cap, not bytes
@@ -642,8 +644,14 @@ function _validateValueAgainstSchema(value, schema, path) {
       // cost scales with the number of code units the engine scans, so 4096
       // chars is the correct ReDoS bound regardless of UTF-8 byte size.
       if (value.length > 4096) return path + ": value exceeds 4096-char cap before regex test";    // ReDoS char cap (not bytes)
+      // The input-length cap above does NOT bound catastrophic backtracking
+      // (a `(a+)+$` pattern blows up at ~40 input chars). Screen the tool
+      // author's pattern through b.guardRegex so a ReDoS-shaped schema pattern
+      // can't pin a CPU when matched against request input.
+      try { guardRegex().sanitize(schema.pattern, { profile: "strict" }); }
+      catch (_ge) { return path + ": schema pattern rejected as unsafe (ReDoS shape)"; }
       try {
-        var pat = new RegExp(schema.pattern);                                                    // allow:dynamic-regex — schema.pattern from registered tool author, not request input; bounded above
+        var pat = new RegExp(schema.pattern);                                                    // allow:dynamic-regex — schema.pattern is ReDoS-screened via guardRegex.sanitize (strict) above + input length-capped
         if (!pat.test(value)) return path + ": does not match pattern";
       }
       catch (_e) { return path + ": invalid pattern in schema"; }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/middleware/age-gate.js

@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@ function create(opts) {
       "middleware.ageGate: opts.getAge must be a function (req) -> number | null");
   }
   var getAge = opts.getAge;
-  var requireAge = (typeof opts.requireAge === "number" && opts.requireAge > 0)            // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — age is operator domain, not a bytes/time-shaped opt
+  var requireAge = (typeof opts.requireAge === "number" && opts.requireAge > 0)            // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional — age threshold; an Infinity bound is fail-closed (denies everyone), never a bypass
     ? opts.requireAge : null;
-  var consentRequired = (typeof opts.consentRequired === "number" && opts.consentRequired > 0)  // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — age threshold, not a bytes/time-shaped opt
+  var consentRequired = (typeof opts.consentRequired === "number" && opts.consentRequired > 0)  // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional — age threshold; an Infinity bound is fail-closed (classifies everyone below-threshold), never a bypass
     ? opts.consentRequired : null;
   var hasParentalConsent = typeof opts.hasParentalConsent === "function" ? opts.hasParentalConsent : null;
   var skipPaths = Array.isArray(opts.skipPaths) ? opts.skipPaths.slice() : [];

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/network-tls.js

@@ -1204,7 +1204,11 @@ function evaluateOcspResponse(ocspDer, opts) {
   // gets revoked, the attacker keeps presenting the cached "good" and
   // the framework keeps accepting it. requireGood postures depend on
   // freshness — reject expired or future-dated responses outright.
-  var clockSkewMs = typeof opts.clockSkewMs === "number" && opts.clockSkewMs >= 0           // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity — operator-supplied skew, default 5 min if absent or invalid
+  // A present clockSkewMs must be a non-negative finite integer; an Infinity /
+  // NaN / negative skew would make the staleness check `now > nextUpdate + skew`
+  // unsatisfiable and silently disable the freshness window — accepting a
+  // replayed pre-revocation "good" response. Non-finite falls to the default.
+  var clockSkewMs = numericBounds.isNonNegativeFiniteInt(opts.clockSkewMs)
     ? opts.clockSkewMs : C.TIME.minutes(5);
   var now = typeof opts.now === "number" ? opts.now : Date.now();
   // thisUpdate / nextUpdate are already unix-ms NUMBERS (parseOcspResponse →

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/ws-client.js

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ var { EventEmitter } = require("node:events");
 
 var lazyRequire    = require("./lazy-require");
 var validateOpts   = require("./validate-opts");
+var numericBounds  = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var safeAsync      = require("./safe-async");
 var safeBuffer     = require("./safe-buffer");
 var bCrypto        = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./crypto"); });
@@ -217,16 +218,18 @@ function connect(target, opts) {
         "wsClient.connect: subprotocols[" + sp + "] must be a non-empty string");
     }
   }
-  var pingMs = (typeof opts.pingMs === "number" && opts.pingMs > 0)              // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? opts.pingMs : DEFAULT_PING_MS;
-  var pongMs = (typeof opts.pongMs === "number" && opts.pongMs > 0)              // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? opts.pongMs : DEFAULT_PONG_MS;
-  var maxMessageBytes = (typeof opts.maxMessageBytes === "number" && opts.maxMessageBytes > 0)   // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? opts.maxMessageBytes : DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES;
-  var maxFrameBytes = (typeof opts.maxFrameBytes === "number" && opts.maxFrameBytes > 0)         // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? opts.maxFrameBytes : DEFAULT_MAX_FRAME;
-  var handshakeTimeoutMs = (typeof opts.handshakeTimeoutMs === "number" && opts.handshakeTimeoutMs > 0)  // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-    ? opts.handshakeTimeoutMs : DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS;
+  // These are keepalive/timeout intervals and inbound-OOM caps; a present
+  // value must be a positive finite integer. A bare `typeof === "number" && > 0`
+  // check accepts Infinity, which silently disables the cap (a malicious server
+  // could then send an unbounded message/frame, or stall the handshake forever).
+  numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(opts,
+    ["pingMs", "pongMs", "maxMessageBytes", "maxFrameBytes", "handshakeTimeoutMs"],
+    "wsClient.connect", WsClientError, "ws-client/bad-opt");
+  var pingMs = (typeof opts.pingMs === "number") ? opts.pingMs : DEFAULT_PING_MS;
+  var pongMs = (typeof opts.pongMs === "number") ? opts.pongMs : DEFAULT_PONG_MS;
+  var maxMessageBytes = (typeof opts.maxMessageBytes === "number") ? opts.maxMessageBytes : DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES;
+  var maxFrameBytes = (typeof opts.maxFrameBytes === "number") ? opts.maxFrameBytes : DEFAULT_MAX_FRAME;
+  var handshakeTimeoutMs = (typeof opts.handshakeTimeoutMs === "number") ? opts.handshakeTimeoutMs : DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS;
 
   var reconnectOpts = _normaliseReconnect(opts.reconnect);
   var permessageDeflate = opts.permessageDeflate !== false;
@@ -281,14 +284,18 @@ function _normaliseReconnect(input) {
       "wsClient.connect: reconnect must be false / null / object");
   }
   validateOpts(input, ["maxAttempts", "baseMs", "maxMs", "enabled"], "wsClient.connect.reconnect");
+  // baseMs / maxMs are backoff durations; a present value must be a positive
+  // finite integer (an Infinity base would stall the first reconnect forever).
+  numericBounds.requireAllPositiveFiniteIntIfPresent(input, ["baseMs", "maxMs"],
+    "wsClient.connect.reconnect", WsClientError, "ws-client/bad-reconnect-opt");
   return {
     enabled:     input.enabled !== false,
-    maxAttempts: (typeof input.maxAttempts === "number" && input.maxAttempts >= 0)            // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
+    // maxAttempts: Infinity is a deliberate "reconnect indefinitely" intent, so
+    // a non-finite value is accepted here (unlike the bounded caps above).
+    maxAttempts: (typeof input.maxAttempts === "number" && input.maxAttempts >= 0)            // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional — Infinity = reconnect indefinitely, a supported intent
       ? input.maxAttempts : DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
-    baseMs:      (typeof input.baseMs === "number" && input.baseMs > 0)                       // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-      ? input.baseMs : DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BASE_MS,
-    maxMs:       (typeof input.maxMs === "number" && input.maxMs > 0)                         // allow:numeric-opt-Infinity
-      ? input.maxMs : DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_MS,
+    baseMs:      (typeof input.baseMs === "number") ? input.baseMs : DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BASE_MS,
+    maxMs:       (typeof input.maxMs === "number") ? input.maxMs : DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_MS,
   };
 }
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.15.36",
+  "version": "0.15.38",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.37.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
+  "version": "0.15.37",
+  "date": "2026-06-27",
+  "headline": "Several numeric options that silently accepted a non-finite value — disabling a clock-skew / freshness check or a resource cap — now reject it, so an `Infinity` skew or limit can no longer turn off the protection it configures",
+  "summary": "A number of configuration options validated a numeric value with a bare `typeof === \"number\" && value >= 0` check, which accepts `Infinity`. Where the value is a clock-skew tolerance or a resource cap, an `Infinity` (or `NaN`) silently disabled the very check it tunes: a CWT / OCSP-staple / ARC clock-skew of `Infinity` made the expiry, freshness, and expiration comparisons unsatisfiable (an expired token / a replayed pre-revocation \"good\" response / an expired ARC seal would be accepted); a WebSocket-client `maxMessageBytes` / `maxFrameBytes` / `handshakeTimeoutMs` of `Infinity` disabled the inbound-OOM and stalled-handshake defenses; and inbox / flag-cache / audit-chain size and count caps of `Infinity` admitted unbounded data. These options now route through the finite-bounds validator: a present non-finite value is refused at the entry point (or falls back to the safe default on the result-returning paths). Options where an unbounded value is a deliberate intent — reconnect \"retry indefinitely\", inbox \"retain indefinitely\" — continue to accept `Infinity`.",
+  "sections": [
+    {
+      "heading": "Security",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "A non-finite clock-skew no longer disables CWT / OCSP / ARC time checks",
+          "body": "b.cwt.verify, the OCSP-staple freshness check in b.network.tls, and b.mail.arc.verify each took an operator clock-skew tolerance validated as `typeof === \"number\" && >= 0`, which accepts `Infinity`. Because each check is of the form `now > deadline + skew`, a skew of `Infinity` made it unsatisfiable and silently turned the check off: an expired CWT verified, a stale (post-nextUpdate) OCSP \"good\" response — the exact reply an attacker replays after the certificate is revoked — was accepted, and an expired ARC seal passed. A present clock-skew that is not a non-negative finite integer is now refused (b.cwt.verify throws cwt/bad-clock-skew; the OCSP and ARC paths fall back to their safe default). Regression tests assert an expired token / stale staple / expired ARC seal is still rejected when the skew is `Infinity`."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "WebSocket-client inbound caps can no longer be disabled by an Infinity value",
+          "body": "b.wsClient.connect validated maxMessageBytes, maxFrameBytes, and handshakeTimeoutMs (and the ping/pong keepalive intervals) with a bare numeric check that accepted `Infinity`, which disabled the inbound-message and frame size limits — the defenses against a malicious server sending an unbounded message — and the handshake timeout. A present non-finite value for these is now refused at connect time. The reconnect maxAttempts still accepts `Infinity` (a deliberate \"reconnect indefinitely\" intent)."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "Inbox, flag-cache, and audit-chain caps reject a non-finite limit",
+          "body": "The inbox maxPayloadBytes / messageIdMaxLen / sourceMaxLen caps, the flag-cache ttlMs / maxEntries, and the audit-chain partition fan-out cap each accepted `Infinity`, disabling the cap (unbounded stored payloads, a never-expiring or unbounded cache, unbounded fan-out). These now require a positive finite integer — refused at create time, or clamped to the bounded default on the result-returning verify path. The inbox retentionDays still accepts `Infinity` (retain indefinitely)."
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.38.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
+  "version": "0.15.38",
+  "date": "2026-06-27",
+  "headline": "Regex patterns supplied in feature-flag targeting rules and MCP tool input schemas are now screened for catastrophic-backtracking (ReDoS) shapes before compilation, so a pattern matched against request data can't pin a CPU",
+  "summary": "Two places compiled a caller-supplied regex pattern and `.test()`'d it against request-controlled input with only a length bound as the stated defense: a feature-flag targeting condition (`op: \"regex\"`) matched against runtime attribute values, and an MCP tool's input-schema `pattern` matched against tool-call arguments. A length bound is not a ReDoS defense — a catastrophic-backtracking pattern such as `(a+)+$` is six characters and pins a CPU on a crafted input. Both patterns now pass through `b.guardRegex` (strict profile) before compilation, which refuses nested-quantifier, alternation-with-quantifier, and quantifier-inside-lookaround shapes. A ReDoS-shaped flag pattern is refused when the rules are validated; a ReDoS-shaped MCP schema pattern fails tool-input validation. Patterns built from the framework's own static tables, operator-owned JSON Schema patterns, the Sieve glob translator (which cannot express nested quantifiers), and the I-Regexp translator (linear by dialect) are unchanged.",
+  "sections": [
+    {
+      "heading": "Security",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "Feature-flag regex targeting conditions are screened for ReDoS before compilation",
+          "body": "A flag targeting rule with `op: \"regex\"` compiled the operator-supplied pattern and `.test()`'d it against runtime attribute values, guarded only by a 200-character length cap. Length does not bound catastrophic backtracking, so a pattern like `(a+)+$` combined with an attacker-controlled attribute value could pin a CPU during flag evaluation. The pattern is now screened through b.guardRegex (strict) when the rules are validated, and a catastrophic-backtracking shape is refused with a clear error."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "MCP tool input-schema patterns are screened for ReDoS before matching request input",
+          "body": "b.mcp.validateToolInput compiled a tool author's input-schema `pattern` and matched it against tool-call argument values; the 4096-character input cap does not bound backtracking (a `(a+)+$` pattern blows up at roughly forty input characters). The schema pattern is now screened through b.guardRegex (strict) before compilation, so a ReDoS-shaped pattern in a registered tool's schema fails input validation instead of letting hostile arguments hang the validator."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "b.guardRegex now catches wrapped nested-quantifier patterns",
+          "body": "The nested-quantifier detector matched a quantified group whose body contained a quantifier, but its inner match was paren-blind, so wrapping the inner quantifier in an extra group — `((a)+)+`, `(([a-z]+)*)*`, `((a+))+` — slipped past it while remaining catastrophic. A structural scan now tracks group nesting and refuses an unbounded-quantified group whose body itself contains an unbounded quantifier at any depth, so the wrapped forms are rejected alongside the bare `(a+)+`. Bounded repeats (`{n}`, `{n,m}`) are unaffected. This strengthens every b.guardRegex caller, including the flag-targeting and MCP screening above."
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js

@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ var VALID_ALLOW_CLASSES = {
   "list-without-pagination": 1,
   "math-random-noncrypto-jitter-sampling": 1,
   "no-number-money-arithmetic": 1,
-  "numeric-opt-Infinity": 1,
+  "numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional": 1,
   "primitive-unreachable": 1,
   "process-exit-operator-optin": 1,
   "raw-byte-literal": 1,
@@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ var RETIRED_ALLOW_TOKENS = {
   "raw-hash-compare": "renamed to 'raw-hash-compare-nonsecret-tag' (2026-06-26 re-verify pass) — the one site compares a data-residency region tag with ===, not a secret hash; re-verify before reusing",
   "seal-without-aad": "renamed to 'seal-without-aad-by-design' (2026-06-26 re-verify pass) — both sites intentionally seal without AAD (a non-regulated plain-mode table whose AAD is enforced by the posture sealEnvelopeFloor where required, and a throwaway vault-readiness probe sentinel); re-verify before reusing",
   "bare-split-on-quoted-header": "renamed to 'bare-split-on-quoted-header-token-grammar' (2026-06-26 re-verify pass) — every live marker splits an RFC token-only header grammar with no quoted-string members (RRULE / RFC 9421 component-ids / TLS-RPT rua / SCIM attribute paths), so a bare comma/semicolon split is correct; re-verify the grammar before reusing. The re-verify also found 5 markers were inert (detector pre-filter skips their file, or the line is a .replace not a split) and cleared them",
+  "numeric-opt-Infinity": "renamed to 'numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional' (2026-06-27 re-verify pass) — only the markers where Infinity is genuinely SAFE remain: clamped to a max (agent-posture-chain maxHopCount), fail-closed (age-gate requireAge / consentRequired), or a deliberate unbounded intent (inbox retentionDays = retain indefinitely, ws-client reconnect maxAttempts = retry forever). The re-verify found 13 sites where Infinity SILENTLY DISABLED a cap or security check (clock-skew → expiry/OCSP-freshness/ARC-expiry; ws-client maxMessageBytes/maxFrameBytes/handshakeTimeoutMs; inbox/flag-cache/audit-chain caps; mail-arc-sign timestamp) — those now route through numeric-bounds (throw / safe-default on non-finite) and lost the marker. re-verify each remaining site before reusing",
 };
 
 function testNoRetiredAllowTokenReRegistered() {
@@ -694,13 +695,13 @@ function testNoRawTimeLiterals() {
 }
 
 function testNumericOptsValidate() {
-  // class: numeric-opt-Infinity
+  // class: numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional
   var matches = _scan(
     /typeof\s+opts\.\w+\s*===\s*"number"\s*&&\s*opts\.\w+\s*>=?\s*0\b/);
   // numeric-bounds itself contains the helper definitions that look
   // like the pattern.
   matches = matches.filter(function (m) { return m.file !== "lib/numeric-bounds.js"; });
-  matches = _filterMarkers(matches, "numeric-opt-Infinity");
+  matches = _filterMarkers(matches, "numeric-opt-Infinity-intentional");
   _report("numeric opts route through lib/numeric-bounds (or have an allow marker)",
     matches);
 }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/cwt.test.js

@@ -105,6 +105,34 @@ async function testRobustTagAndMalformedClaims() {
   check("verify: malformed (non-numeric) nbf refused", e2 && e2.code === "cwt/malformed-claim");
 }
 
+async function testClockSkewInfinityRejected() {
+  // A non-finite clockSkewSec must be a config error, NOT a silent
+  // expiry-disable: the check is `now > exp + skew`, so skew === Infinity
+  // makes it `now > Infinity` (always false) and ANY expired token would
+  // verify. A present-but-invalid skew (Infinity / NaN / negative /
+  // non-integer) is refused at the entry point.
+  var now = _now();
+  var expired = await b.cwt.sign({ exp: now - 100000 }, { alg: "ES256", privateKey: EC.privateKey });
+  var errInf = null;
+  try {
+    await b.cwt.verify(expired, { algorithms: ["ES256"], publicKey: EC.publicKey, clockSkewSec: Infinity });
+  } catch (e) { errInf = e; }
+  check("verify: clockSkewSec Infinity refused (does not disable expiry)",
+    errInf && errInf.code === "cwt/bad-clock-skew");
+
+  var errNeg = null;
+  try {
+    await b.cwt.verify(expired, { algorithms: ["ES256"], publicKey: EC.publicKey, clockSkewSec: -1 });
+  } catch (e) { errNeg = e; }
+  check("verify: negative clockSkewSec refused", errNeg && errNeg.code === "cwt/bad-clock-skew");
+
+  // Absent skew still applies the default (marginally-expired tolerated),
+  // and a valid finite skew still works — the fix must not regress those.
+  var justExpired = await b.cwt.sign({ exp: now - 30 }, { alg: "ES256", privateKey: EC.privateKey });
+  var ok = await b.cwt.verify(justExpired, { algorithms: ["ES256"], publicKey: EC.publicKey, clockSkewSec: 60 });
+  check("verify: a valid finite skew still tolerates a marginally-expired token", ok.claims.exp === now - 30);
+}
+
 async function testValidation() {
   var bad = null;
   try { await b.cwt.sign({ exp: "not-a-number" }, { alg: "ES256", privateKey: EC.privateKey }); } catch (e) { bad = e; }
@@ -124,6 +152,7 @@ async function run() {
   await testIssuerAudience();
   await testTaggedAndTamper();
   await testRobustTagAndMalformedClaims();
+  await testClockSkewInfinityRejected();
   await testValidation();
 }
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/flag.test.js

@@ -240,6 +240,30 @@ function run() {
     },
     /invalid regex/);
 
+  // ReDoS-shaped pattern (nested quantifier) refused. The compiled regex is
+  // .test()'d against runtime (request) attribute values, so a catastrophic-
+  // backtracking pattern is a DoS vector; the 200-char length bound is NOT a
+  // ReDoS defense (`(a+)+$` is 6 chars). The pattern is screened through
+  // b.guardRegex before compilation.
+  rejects("targeting: ReDoS-shaped regex (nested quantifier) refused",
+    function () {
+      t.validateRules([{ variant: "v", conditions: [{ attribute: "x", op: "regex", value: "(a+)+$" }] }]);
+    },
+    /unsafe|ReDoS|backtrack|quantifier/i);
+  // Wrapping the inner quantified atom in an extra group — `((a)+)+$` — is the
+  // same catastrophic-backtracking class; a paren-blind `[^()]*` detector misses
+  // it. The structural screener must still refuse these nested-group forms.
+  rejects("targeting: wrapped nested-quantifier regex refused",
+    function () {
+      t.validateRules([{ variant: "v", conditions: [{ attribute: "x", op: "regex", value: "((a)+)+$" }] }]);
+    },
+    /unsafe|ReDoS|backtrack|quantifier/i);
+  rejects("targeting: deeper wrapped nested-quantifier regex refused",
+    function () {
+      t.validateRules([{ variant: "v", conditions: [{ attribute: "x", op: "regex", value: "(([a-z]+)*)*$" }] }]);
+    },
+    /unsafe|ReDoS|backtrack|quantifier/i);
+
   // nested attribute path
   var pathRules = t.validateRules([
     { variant: "v1", conditions: [{ attribute: "user.role", op: "eq", value: "admin" }] },
@@ -496,6 +520,12 @@ function run() {
     function () { b.flag.cache({}); }, /must implement/);
   rejects("cache: ttlMs too small",
     function () { b.flag.cache(memProvider, { ttlMs: 100 }); }, /ttlMs/);
+  // A non-finite ttlMs / maxEntries must be refused (Infinity would otherwise
+  // give a never-expiring entry / an unbounded cache, not be clamped).
+  rejects("cache: maxEntries Infinity refused (unbounded cache)",
+    function () { b.flag.cache(memProvider, { ttlMs: 5000, maxEntries: Infinity }); }, /maxEntries|finite/);
+  rejects("cache: ttlMs Infinity refused",
+    function () { b.flag.cache(memProvider, { ttlMs: Infinity }); }, /ttlMs|finite/);
 
   var cachedProvider = b.flag.cache(memProvider, { ttlMs: 5000, maxEntries: 50 });
   check("cache: kind",                           cachedProvider.kind === "cache:memory");

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/inbox.test.js

@@ -118,6 +118,12 @@ async function run() {
   var fake = _makeFakeExternalDb();
   rejects("inbox.create: bad table name",
     function () { b.inbox.create({ externalDb: fake.db, table: "bad-name" }); }, /not a safe SQL identifier/);
+  // A non-finite byte/length cap must be refused — Infinity would disable the
+  // cap and admit unbounded stored payloads / identifiers.
+  rejects("inbox.create: maxPayloadBytes Infinity refused",
+    function () { b.inbox.create({ externalDb: fake.db, table: "t", maxPayloadBytes: Infinity }); }, /maxPayloadBytes|finite/);
+  rejects("inbox.create: messageIdMaxLen Infinity refused",
+    function () { b.inbox.create({ externalDb: fake.db, table: "t", messageIdMaxLen: Infinity }); }, /messageIdMaxLen|finite/);
 
   var inbox = b.inbox.create({
     externalDb: fake.db,
@@ -182,6 +188,16 @@ async function run() {
 
   var deleted = await inbox.sweep();
   check("inbox.sweep: returns deleted count",     typeof deleted === "number");
+
+  // retentionDays: Infinity means "retain indefinitely" — sweep() must be a
+  // no-op (delete nothing), not compute an invalid horizon. Before the fix the
+  // sqlite path threw RangeError on `new Date(now - Infinity).toISOString()`.
+  var foreverInbox = b.inbox.create({
+    externalDb: fake.db, table: "forever_inbox", audit: false, retentionDays: Infinity,
+  });
+  await foreverInbox.declareSchema(fake.xdb);
+  var foreverDeleted = await foreverInbox.sweep();
+  check("inbox.sweep: retentionDays Infinity retains all (no-op, no throw)", foreverDeleted === 0);
 }
 
 module.exports = { run: run };

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/mail-auth.test.js

@@ -367,6 +367,36 @@ async function testArcVerifyBadSignatures() {
         rv.hops[0].asResult !== "pass");
 }
 
+async function testArcInfinityClockSkewDoesNotDisableExpiry() {
+  // RFC 8617 §5.2 — a past x= (expiration) MUST be rejected with operator
+  // skew tolerance. The expiry gate is `amsX + skewSec < nowSec`; a non-finite
+  // clockSkewMs makes skewSec === Infinity, so `amsX + Infinity < nowSec` is
+  // always false and the expiry check is silently disabled. A present
+  // non-finite skew must fall back to the safe default instead. RED before the
+  // fix: the expired x= slips through and amsErrors carries a signature error,
+  // not the x-expired fault.
+  var nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  var expiredX = nowSec - 86400;   // expired a day ago
+  var pastT    = nowSec - 90000;
+  var msg = "ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; d=example.com; s=arc; b=AAAA\r\n" +
+            "ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=example.com; s=arc; t=" + pastT + "; x=" + expiredX + "; bh=AAAA; h=from; b=AAAA\r\n" +
+            "ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; example.com; spf=pass\r\n" +
+            "From: alice@example.com\r\nTo: bob@example.com\r\n\r\nbody\r\n";
+  var dnsLookup = async function (qname) {
+    if (qname === "arc._domainkey.example.com") {
+      var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
+      var pair = nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync("rsa", { modulusLength: 2048 });
+      var spki = pair.publicKey.export({ type: "spki", format: "der" });
+      return [["v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=" + spki.toString("base64")]];
+    }
+    var err = new Error("ENOTFOUND"); err.code = "ENOTFOUND"; throw err;
+  };
+  var rv = await b.mail.arc.verify(msg, { dnsLookup: dnsLookup, clockSkewMs: Infinity });
+  var amsErrs = ((rv.hops && rv.hops[0] && rv.hops[0].amsErrors) || []).join(" ; ");
+  check("ARC Infinity skew: expired x= still enforced (expiry not disabled)",
+        /x-expired/.test(amsErrs));
+}
+
 function _arcHopHeaders(i, cv) {
   // Synthetic ARC headers — signatures are dummy; the cv= edge tests
   // exercise the chain-rule validator, not the signature verifier.
@@ -615,6 +645,10 @@ function testArcSignChain() {
   _rejects("arc.sign: bad instance (0)",
     function () { b.mail.arc.sign({ rfc822: rfc822, instance: 0, authservId: "x", domain: "x", selector: "x", privateKey: arcKeyPem, algorithm: "rsa-sha256", cv: "none", authResults: "spf=pass" }); },
     /instance must be/);
+  // A non-finite t= timestamp must be refused, not floored into a malformed tag.
+  _rejects("arc.sign: timestamp Infinity refused",
+    function () { b.mail.arc.sign({ rfc822: rfc822, instance: 1, authservId: "x", domain: "x", selector: "x", privateKey: arcKeyPem, algorithm: "rsa-sha256", cv: "none", authResults: "spf=pass", timestamp: Infinity }); },
+    /timestamp|finite/);
 }
 
 // ---- DMARCbis (B1) — psd= / np= / org-domain via PSL ----
@@ -1474,6 +1508,7 @@ async function run() {
   await testArcVerifyMissing();
   await testArcVerifyNone();
   await testArcVerifyBadSignatures();
+  await testArcInfinityClockSkewDoesNotDisableExpiry();
   await testArcVerifyDuplicateInstance();
   await testArcVerifyNonContiguous();
   await testArcVerifyTooManyHops();

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/mcp.test.js

@@ -122,6 +122,21 @@ async function run() {
   } catch (e) { threw = /tool-input-invalid/.test(e.code); }
   check("mcp.validateToolInput: schema mismatch refused",            threw);
 
+  // A tool-author schema pattern with a catastrophic-backtracking (ReDoS) shape
+  // is compiled and .test()'d against request input — the 4096-char input cap
+  // does not bound backtracking. The pattern is screened through b.guardRegex
+  // and a ReDoS shape is refused. (`"aaa"` matches `(a+)+$` instantly, so the
+  // pre-fix path does not hang.)
+  threw = false; var redosMsg = "";
+  try {
+    b.mcp.validateToolInput("t", { x: "aaa" }, {
+      type: "object",
+      properties: { x: { type: "string", pattern: "(a+)+$" } },
+      required: ["x"],
+    });
+  } catch (e) { threw = true; redosMsg = e.message || ""; }
+  check("mcp.validateToolInput: ReDoS-shaped schema pattern refused", threw && /unsafe|ReDoS/i.test(redosMsg));
+
   // ---- v0.8.77: assertProtocolVersion / sampling / elicitation ----
   threw = false;
   try { b.mcp.assertProtocolVersion({ headers: {} }); }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/tls-ocsp-freshness.test.js

@@ -175,11 +175,39 @@ function testAcceptsFreshNoNextUpdate() {
   check("no-nextUpdate fresh: certStatus good", rv.certStatus === "good");
 }
 
+// A non-finite clockSkewMs must NOT disable the freshness window. The stale
+// check is `now > nextUpdate + skew`; skew === Infinity makes it `now >
+// Infinity` (always false), so a STALE (past-nextUpdate) response — exactly
+// the pre-revocation "good" reply an attacker replays after the cert is
+// revoked — would be accepted. A present-but-non-finite skew falls back to
+// the safe default instead of being honored. RED before the fix: rv.ok===true.
+function testInfinityClockSkewDoesNotDisableFreshness() {
+  var fx = _buildSignedOcsp({
+    thisUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW - 3 * 86400000,   // 3 days ago
+    nextUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW - 2 * 86400000,   // 2 days ago → STALE
+  });
+  var rv = b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate(fx.der, {
+    issuerPem: fx.issuerPem, serialHex: fx.serialHex, now: FIXED_NOW,
+    clockSkewMs: Infinity,
+  });
+  check("Infinity skew: stale response still rejected (freshness not disabled)", rv.ok === false);
+  check("Infinity skew: rejected for the STALE reason",
+        /nextUpdate|stale/i.test((rv.errors || []).join(" ; ")));
+  // A negative skew is likewise treated as invalid → safe default, so the
+  // stale response stays rejected.
+  var rvNeg = b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate(fx.der, {
+    issuerPem: fx.issuerPem, serialHex: fx.serialHex, now: FIXED_NOW,
+    clockSkewMs: -1,
+  });
+  check("negative skew: stale response still rejected", rvNeg.ok === false);
+}
+
 async function run() {
   testRejectsStaleResponse();
   testAcceptsFreshResponse();
   testRejectsFutureThisUpdate();
   testAcceptsFreshNoNextUpdate();
+  testInfinityClockSkewDoesNotDisableFreshness();
 }
 
 module.exports = { run: run };

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/ws-client.test.js

@@ -205,6 +205,22 @@ async function _runTests() {
     function () { b.wsClient.connect("ws://localhost:1", { reconnect: 42 }); },
     /reconnect must be/);
 
+  // ---- non-finite resource caps ----
+  // maxMessageBytes / maxFrameBytes / handshakeTimeoutMs are inbound-OOM and
+  // hang defenses. An Infinity value passes a bare `typeof === "number" && > 0`
+  // check and silently DISABLES the cap (a malicious server can then send an
+  // unbounded message / frame, or stall the handshake forever). A present
+  // non-finite value is refused at connect time.
+  rejects("connect: maxMessageBytes Infinity refused (OOM cap not disabled)",
+    function () { b.wsClient.connect("ws://localhost:1", { maxMessageBytes: Infinity }); },
+    /maxMessageBytes|finite/);
+  rejects("connect: maxFrameBytes Infinity refused",
+    function () { b.wsClient.connect("ws://localhost:1", { maxFrameBytes: Infinity }); },
+    /maxFrameBytes|finite/);
+  rejects("connect: handshakeTimeoutMs Infinity refused",
+    function () { b.wsClient.connect("ws://localhost:1", { handshakeTimeoutMs: Infinity }); },
+    /handshakeTimeoutMs|finite/);
+
   // ---- happy path: connect + send + echo ----
   var server = await _makeServer({});
   var port = server.address().port;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/blamejs-shop",
-  "version": "0.5.2",
+  "version": "0.5.4",
   "description": "Open-source framework built on blamejs. Vendored stack, zero npm runtime deps, PQC-first crypto, security-on by default.",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
   "scripts": {