@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.4.87 → 0.4.88

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/tls-ocsp-freshness.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate — OCSP response FRESHNESS enforcement
+ * (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.1). Regression coverage for the dead staleness gate:
+ * evaluateOcspResponse called Date.parse() on thisUpdate/nextUpdate, but
+ * those fields are already unix-ms NUMBERS (parseOcspResponse → _parseTime
+ * returns Date.UTC(...)). Date.parse(<number>) coerces to a bare-integer
+ * string → NaN, so the !isFinite guard rejected EVERY signature-valid
+ * response (fresh or stale) with a misleading "missing thisUpdate", leaving
+ * the real future-thisUpdate / past-nextUpdate window checks as unreachable
+ * dead code (the past-nextUpdate branch latently fail-open).
+ *
+ * No existing test built a full SIGNED `successful` BasicOCSPResponse — every
+ * prior OCSP test short-circuited before the freshness gate — which is why
+ * the dead check shipped. This builds a real ECDSA-SHA256-signed response and
+ * drives the consumer path, asserting:
+ *   - a STALE response (past nextUpdate) is REJECTED for the stale reason
+ *     (RED before the fix: rejected, but with "missing thisUpdate");
+ *   - a FRESH response is ACCEPTED (RED before the fix: rejected as "missing
+ *     thisUpdate" — the bug cannot tell fresh from stale);
+ *   - a FUTURE-thisUpdate response is rejected for the future reason.
+ *
+ * Run standalone: node test/layer-0-primitives/tls-ocsp-freshness.test.js
+ */
+
+var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
+var helpers = require("../helpers");
+var b       = helpers.b;
+var check   = helpers.check;
+var asn1    = require("../../lib/asn1-der");
+
+// A fixed reference time so the test is wall-clock independent (passed to
+// evaluate as opts.now). All thisUpdate/nextUpdate are offsets from this.
+var FIXED_NOW = 1750000000000;   // 2025-06-15T...Z, a stable ms value
+
+function _pad(n, width) {
+  var s = String(n);
+  while (s.length < width) s = "0" + s;
+  return s;
+}
+
+// unix-ms → GeneralizedTime "YYYYMMDDhhmmssZ" (the on-the-wire shape
+// _parseTime accepts; it truncates to whole seconds, which is fine — the
+// offsets here are minutes/days, far from the second boundary).
+function _genTime(ms) {
+  var d = new Date(ms);
+  return asn1.writeNode(0x18, Buffer.from(
+    _pad(d.getUTCFullYear(), 4) + _pad(d.getUTCMonth() + 1, 2) + _pad(d.getUTCDate(), 2) +
+    _pad(d.getUTCHours(), 2) + _pad(d.getUTCMinutes(), 2) + _pad(d.getUTCSeconds(), 2) + "Z",
+    "ascii"));
+}
+
+// Build a complete, validly-signed OCSP "successful" response (certStatus
+// good) for a given serial, with the supplied thisUpdate/nextUpdate ms.
+// Returns { der, issuerPem, serialHex }.
+function _buildSignedOcsp(opts) {
+  var kp = nodeCrypto.generateKeyPairSync("ec", { namedCurve: "prime256v1" });
+  var issuerPem = kp.publicKey.export({ type: "spki", format: "pem" });
+
+  var serial = Buffer.from([0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78]);
+  var serialHex = serial.toString("hex");
+
+  // certID = SEQ { AlgId{sha1,NULL}, issuerNameHash OCTET(20), issuerKeyHash OCTET(20), serial INT }
+  // (the evaluator only reads the serial from certID; the two hashes are not
+  // checked, so fixed 20-byte fillers are fine.)
+  var hashAlg = asn1.writeSequence([asn1.writeOid("1.3.14.3.2.26"), asn1.writeNull()]);  // sha1
+  var nameHash = asn1.writeOctetString(Buffer.alloc(20, 0xaa));
+  var keyHash  = asn1.writeOctetString(Buffer.alloc(20, 0xbb));
+  var certId = asn1.writeSequence([hashAlg, nameHash, keyHash, asn1.writeInteger(serial)]);
+
+  // certStatus good = [0] IMPLICIT NULL (empty primitive context tag).
+  var certStatusGood = asn1.writeContextImplicit(0, Buffer.alloc(0));
+
+  // SingleResponse = SEQ { certID, certStatus, thisUpdate, [0] EXPLICIT nextUpdate }
+  var singleResponseChildren = [
+    certId,
+    certStatusGood,
+    _genTime(opts.thisUpdateMs),
+  ];
+  if (typeof opts.nextUpdateMs === "number") {
+    singleResponseChildren.push(asn1.writeContextExplicit(0, _genTime(opts.nextUpdateMs)));
+  }
+  var singleResponse = asn1.writeSequence(singleResponseChildren);
+
+  // ResponseData (tbs) = SEQ { responderID [2] EXPLICIT KeyHash, producedAt, responses SEQ-OF }
+  var responderId = asn1.writeContextExplicit(2, asn1.writeOctetString(Buffer.alloc(20, 0xcc)));
+  var producedAt  = _genTime(FIXED_NOW);
+  var responses   = asn1.writeSequence([singleResponse]);
+  var tbs = asn1.writeSequence([responderId, producedAt, responses]);
+
+  // Sign the tbsResponseData DER (header + value) — exactly the bytes the
+  // verifier slices and checks. node emits a DER ECDSA-Sig-Value, which the
+  // verifier accepts for OID 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2.
+  var sig = nodeCrypto.sign("sha256", tbs, kp.privateKey);
+
+  var sigAlg = asn1.writeSequence([asn1.writeOid("1.2.840.10045.4.3.2")]);  // ecdsa-with-SHA256
+  var basic = asn1.writeSequence([tbs, sigAlg, asn1.writeBitString(sig)]);
+
+  // responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT SEQ { id-pkix-ocsp-basic, OCTET(basic) }
+  var responseBytesInner = asn1.writeSequence([
+    asn1.writeOid("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.1"),
+    asn1.writeOctetString(basic),
+  ]);
+  var responseBytes = asn1.writeContextExplicit(0, responseBytesInner);
+
+  // OCSPResponse = SEQ { responseStatus ENUMERATED(0 successful), responseBytes }
+  var responseStatus = asn1.writeNode(0x0a, Buffer.from([0]));
+  var der = asn1.writeSequence([responseStatus, responseBytes]);
+
+  return { der: der, issuerPem: issuerPem, serialHex: serialHex };
+}
+
+// A STALE response (nextUpdate well in the past) MUST be rejected — and for
+// the STALE reason, not the misleading "missing thisUpdate" the dead gate
+// produced. RED before the fix: ok:false but errors=["...missing thisUpdate..."].
+function testRejectsStaleResponse() {
+  var fx = _buildSignedOcsp({
+    thisUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW - 3 * 86400000,   // 3 days ago
+    nextUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW - 2 * 86400000,   // 2 days ago → STALE
+  });
+  var rv = b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate(fx.der, {
+    issuerPem: fx.issuerPem, serialHex: fx.serialHex, now: FIXED_NOW,
+  });
+  check("stale: rejected (ok=false)", rv.ok === false);
+  check("stale: signature still verified (proves we reached the freshness gate)",
+        rv.signatureValid === true);
+  var errs = (rv.errors || []).join(" ; ");
+  check("stale: rejected for the STALE reason, not 'missing thisUpdate'",
+        /nextUpdate|stale/i.test(errs) && !/missing thisUpdate/i.test(errs));
+}
+
+// A FRESH response (thisUpdate just past, nextUpdate in the future) MUST be
+// accepted. RED before the fix: rejected as "missing thisUpdate" (the bug
+// cannot distinguish fresh from stale — both wrongly ok:false).
+function testAcceptsFreshResponse() {
+  var fx = _buildSignedOcsp({
+    thisUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW - 3600000,        // 1 hour ago
+    nextUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW + 86400000,       // +1 day → FRESH
+  });
+  var rv = b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate(fx.der, {
+    issuerPem: fx.issuerPem, serialHex: fx.serialHex, now: FIXED_NOW,
+  });
+  check("fresh: accepted (ok=true)", rv.ok === true);
+  check("fresh: certStatus good", rv.certStatus === "good");
+  check("fresh: signature verified", rv.signatureValid === true);
+  check("fresh: no errors", Array.isArray(rv.errors) && rv.errors.length === 0);
+}
+
+// A FUTURE-dated thisUpdate (clock skew / replay) MUST be rejected for the
+// future reason — proves the future-window check is live, not dead.
+function testRejectsFutureThisUpdate() {
+  var fx = _buildSignedOcsp({
+    thisUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW + 2 * 86400000,   // 2 days in the future
+    nextUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW + 3 * 86400000,
+  });
+  var rv = b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate(fx.der, {
+    issuerPem: fx.issuerPem, serialHex: fx.serialHex, now: FIXED_NOW,
+  });
+  check("future: rejected (ok=false)", rv.ok === false);
+  check("future: rejected for the FUTURE reason",
+        /future/i.test((rv.errors || []).join(" ; ")));
+}
+
+// A fresh response with NO nextUpdate (optional field absent) MUST be
+// accepted — guards the typeof-guard's null→NaN handling of the optional
+// nextUpdate branch.
+function testAcceptsFreshNoNextUpdate() {
+  var fx = _buildSignedOcsp({
+    thisUpdateMs: FIXED_NOW - 3600000,        // 1 hour ago, no nextUpdate
+  });
+  var rv = b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate(fx.der, {
+    issuerPem: fx.issuerPem, serialHex: fx.serialHex, now: FIXED_NOW,
+  });
+  check("no-nextUpdate fresh: accepted (ok=true)", rv.ok === true);
+  check("no-nextUpdate fresh: certStatus good", rv.certStatus === "good");
+}
+
+async function run() {
+  testRejectsStaleResponse();
+  testAcceptsFreshResponse();
+  testRejectsFutureThisUpdate();
+  testAcceptsFreshNoNextUpdate();
+}
+
+module.exports = { run: run };
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  run().then(
+    function () { console.log("OK — " + helpers.getChecks() + " checks passed"); },
+    function (e) { console.error("FAIL:", e && e.stack || e); process.exit(1); }
+  );
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/vendor-currency-classify.test.js

@@ -45,6 +45,39 @@ function testVersionFallbackWhenNoCommit() {
   check("no COMMIT, matching VERSION -> current via version", same.stale === false && same.basis === "version");
 }
 
+function testTimestampDirectionalNewerLocalNotStale() {
+  // The CDN-serves-an-older-edge case. publicsuffix.org is CDN-served and
+  // different edges can return an OLDER cached copy than the one we vendored.
+  // Our bundle is NEWER, so it is NOT stale — but the old exact commit/version
+  // inequality flagged it stale (commits differ) and failed the release gate
+  // non-deterministically. With a parseable VERSION timestamp on both sides the
+  // comparison is directional: only a bundle OLDER than upstream is stale.
+  // RED on the old logic (basis "commit", stale true); GREEN now.
+  var v = cur._classifyContentCurrency(
+    _doc("9186eee", "2026-06-13_21-47-18_UTC"),   // upstream edge: older, different commit
+    _doc("27a7b5d", "2026-06-22_11-46-12_UTC"),   // our bundle: newer
+    PSL);
+  check("local timestamp NEWER than upstream -> not stale (stale CDN edge)",
+        v.stale === false && v.basis === "version-timestamp");
+}
+
+function testTimestampDirectionalOlderLocalStale() {
+  // Genuine drift: upstream advanced past our bundle -> stale (gate fires).
+  var v = cur._classifyContentCurrency(
+    _doc("27a7b5d", "2026-06-22_11-46-12_UTC"),   // upstream: newer
+    _doc("9186eee", "2026-06-13_21-47-18_UTC"),   // our bundle: older
+    PSL);
+  check("local timestamp OLDER than upstream -> stale", v.stale === true && v.basis === "version-timestamp");
+}
+
+function testTimestampDirectionalEqualNotStale() {
+  var v = cur._classifyContentCurrency(
+    _doc("27a7b5d", "2026-06-22_11-46-12_UTC"),
+    _doc("27a7b5d", "2026-06-22_11-46-12_UTC"),
+    PSL);
+  check("equal timestamps -> not stale", v.stale === false && v.basis === "version-timestamp");
+}
+
 function testNoIdentifierThrows() {
   // Neither side yields a comparable id (e.g. upstream format changed) —
   // must throw so the caller reports registry-error, never a silent pass.
@@ -66,6 +99,9 @@ function run() {
   testCommitMatchIsCurrent();
   testCommitDifferIsStale();
   testVersionFallbackWhenNoCommit();
+  testTimestampDirectionalNewerLocalNotStale();
+  testTimestampDirectionalOlderLocalStale();
+  testTimestampDirectionalEqualNotStale();
   testNoIdentifierThrows();
   testGateConfigLockedIn();
   console.log("[vendor-currency-classify] OK — " + helpers.getChecks() + " checks passed");

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/blamejs-shop",
-  "version": "0.4.87",
+  "version": "0.4.88",
   "description": "Open-source framework built on blamejs. Vendored stack, zero npm runtime deps, PQC-first crypto, security-on by default.",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
   "scripts": {