@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.4.82 → 0.4.84

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.4.x
 
+- v0.4.84 (2026-06-22) — **Payment idempotency and analytics cache keys now use the framework's canonical-JSON encoder.** Internal consistency change with no configuration to apply. The Stripe idempotency replay-protection hash and the subscription-analytics cache key each carried their own copy of a sorted-key JSON serializer; both now compose the framework's canonical-JSON encoder, so a single serializer — with one set of key-ordering, string-escaping, and number-format rules — backs every replay and cache hash. Idempotency replays issued across the upgrade keep working: a request hash written by the prior release is still recognized for the row's lifetime, so a payment retried across the upgrade boundary replays its cached response rather than being refused as a mismatch. Upgrade to pick it up. **Changed:** *Replay and cache hashes share one canonical-JSON encoder* — Payment idempotency-key replay protection and the subscription-analytics cache key now build their hashes with the framework's canonical-JSON encoder instead of a locally maintained serializer. The encoder emits object members in one stable key order, so two requests — or two analytics queries — that differ only in member order resolve to the same hash, and the order is now stable even for integer-like keys, which the previous serializer reordered. Idempotency rows written by the prior release are still matched for their lifetime, so a payment retried across the upgrade boundary replays its cached response and is never refused as a false mismatch; the compatibility path expires with those rows.
+
+- v0.4.83 (2026-06-22) — **Downloading a subject-access export now requires the customer-write grant, not just read access.** Closes an access-control gap on the data-subject-request surface. Downloading a fulfilled subject-access export streams the customer's full personal-data bundle, but the download route was gated as a plain read, so a read-only operator (a viewer with no customers-write grant) could pull the entire PII bundle. The download now gates on the customers-write capability — the same grant fulfilling, dispatching, and erasing a request already require — so a read-only viewer is refused on the verb and the denial is recorded in the operator audit log, on both the API and browser paths. No configuration changes; upgrade to pick it up. **Security:** *Subject-access export download requires customers-write* — The DSR export-download route streams a customer's full PII bundle, so it is a customers-write-class capability like fulfilling, dispatching, or erasing a request — not a read. It now gates on customers-write on both the bearer-API and cookie/browser paths, so a read-only viewer can no longer download the bundle; the refused attempt is chained through the operator audit log like the other DSR write denials. Viewing the DSR queue (a read) is unchanged.
+
 - v0.4.82 (2026-06-22) — **Return-authorization and shipping-label state transitions are exactly-once under concurrency.** Two fulfillment surfaces gain the atomic-claim discipline the refund path already uses. Approving, receiving, and rejecting a return authorization now gate the transition on the observed status inside the UPDATE, so two operators (or a double-clicked action) acting on the same return can no longer both apply — exactly one transition wins and the other is refused, instead of a read-then-write letting both pass last-write-wins. Likewise, recording a shipping label as purchased, voided, or used is now a single guarded claim, so two concurrent broker callbacks for the same label can't both record (which previously left conflicting tracking numbers and costs last-write-wins). The losing caller gets the same transition-refused error a sequential illegal transition already produced. No configuration changes; upgrade to pick them up. **Fixed:** *Return-authorization transitions are atomic claims* — returns approve, markReceived, and reject now fold the expected source status into the UPDATE (approve from pending, markReceived from approved, reject from pending or approved) and treat the row count as the claim signal, matching the refund path. Two concurrent transitions on the same return — two operators, or a double-submit — can no longer both write last-write-wins; exactly one wins and the loser is refused with the same transition-refused error, mapped to a 409. Sequential not-found and illegal-transition errors are unchanged. · *Shipping-label transitions are atomic claims* — shipping-labels markPurchased, voidLabel, and markUsed now gate on the observed status inside the UPDATE. Two concurrent broker callbacks marking the same pending label purchased (a worker-drain double-fire) can no longer both record, leaving conflicting tracking numbers and costs by last-write-wins — exactly one records and the other is refused. The void 30-day window and not-found / wrong-status refusals are unchanged.
 
 - v0.4.81 (2026-06-22) — **Notification transitions are atomic, a missing insurance policy no longer crashes claim approval, and a returns summary no longer zeroes its refund totals under a status filter.** Three correctness fixes on the fulfillment surface. Notification status transitions (mark-sent / mark-failed / mark-read) are now single atomic claims that fold the expected status into the write, so two concurrent delivery callbacks can't both stamp the row last-write-wins, a mark-failed can't clobber a mark-sent, and two concurrent mark-failed calls each count once (the retry counter is incremented in the database rather than read-then-written). Approving a shipping-insurance claim whose parent policy row is missing now returns a clear typed error instead of dereferencing null and throwing an opaque crash. And the operator returns summary builds its refund-value totals from a status-free base filter, so supplying a status filter (e.g. to view rejected returns) no longer collapses the refunded and pending payout totals to zero through a self-contradictory query. No configuration changes; upgrade to pick them up. **Fixed:** *Notification status transitions are atomic claims* — mark-sent, mark-failed, and mark-read now gate the transition on the observed status inside the UPDATE and treat the row count as the claim signal, instead of checking status in a prior read and writing unconditionally. Concurrent delivery callbacks therefore can't both transition one notification last-write-wins, a mark-failed can't overwrite a mark-sent, and the retry counter is incremented in the database (count + 1) so two simultaneous failures can't lose an increment. mark-sent now applies only to a pending notification: a failed delivery is a durable failure record (the scheduler only re-dispatches pending notifications), so a stale or duplicate success callback can no longer flip a failed notification to sent and clear its error — retrying a failed notification is an explicit re-queue. · *Approving an insurance claim with a missing parent policy fails cleanly* — shipping-insurance claim approval now refuses with a typed not-found error when the claim's parent insurance row can't be loaded, matching the null-guard the rest of the module already applies, instead of dereferencing a null row while computing the payout ceiling. · *A returns summary keeps its refund totals when a status filter is applied* — The operator returns summary computes its refunded and pending payout totals from a base filter scoped only to the date window, so they pin their own status independently of the caller's status filter. Previously, supplying a status filter grafted a second, conflicting status predicate onto the payout queries (for example status = 'rejected' AND status = 'refunded'), silently zeroing both rollups; the per-status counts were always correct and remain so.

package/lib/admin.js

@@ -5682,8 +5682,16 @@ function mount(router, deps) {
     // streams header-first; status can't change mid-stream). The route
     // re-reads the readers rather than re-running fulfillRequest (which would
     // re-flip status on every download).
+    // Downloading the export streams the customer's full PII bundle, so it is
+    // a customers.write-class capability like the rest of the DSR surface
+    // (fulfill / dispatch / delete) — NOT a plain read. Wrapping the JSON
+    // handler in W("customer.dsr_download", ...) gates BOTH paths: the bearer
+    // JSON path via _wrap's permission check, and the cookie/browser path via
+    // _pageOrApi reading the _adminWriteAction tag. A read-only viewer is
+    // refused on the verb (and the denial is chained through the operator audit
+    // log) rather than able to exfiltrate a customer's PII.
     router.get("/admin/dsr/:id/export.json", _pageOrApi(true,
-      R(async function (req, res) {
+      W("customer.dsr_download", async function (req, res) {
         var row = await _dsrOr404(req, res, true); if (!row) return;
         if (row.request_kind !== "export" || (row.status !== "fulfilled" && row.status !== "delivered")) {
           return _problem(res, 404, "dsr-export-not-ready");

package/lib/asset-manifest.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "version": "0.4.82",
+  "version": "0.4.84",
   "assets": {
     "css/admin.css": {
       "integrity": "sha384-imfe0otYErcB8rr2h6KLSGTtStirysptpXETSPY4zLv3bZoIT75Lo1dOvkOav+xL",

package/lib/payment.js

@@ -364,28 +364,73 @@ async function _stripeCall(opts, method, path, params, idempotencyKey) {
 // through b.crypto.namespaceHash (SHA3-512). Arrays preserve order
 // (their order is semantically meaningful — `items[]` in a Stripe
 // subscription is an ordered list of line items).
-function _canonicalise(v) {
+// Drop undefined object members recursively. Idempotency treats an undefined
+// member as omitted — two requests that differ only by an explicit `undefined`
+// must hash the same — and the vendored canonical primitive would otherwise
+// emit `undefined` as `null` (b.safeJson.canonical throws outright). Array
+// order is preserved (an `items[]` list is semantically ordered). This is a
+// SEMANTIC pre-filter only; the canonical sort + escaping + number format is
+// delegated to the canonical-JSON primitive below, not hand-rolled.
+function _dropUndefinedMembers(v) {
   if (v === null || typeof v !== "object") return v;
   if (Array.isArray(v)) {
     var out = [];
-    for (var i = 0; i < v.length; i += 1) out.push(_canonicalise(v[i]));
+    for (var i = 0; i < v.length; i += 1) out.push(_dropUndefinedMembers(v[i]));
     return out;
   }
-  var keys = Object.keys(v).sort();
+  var keys = Object.keys(v);
   var obj  = {};
   for (var k = 0; k < keys.length; k += 1) {
     var val = v[keys[k]];
     if (val === undefined) continue;
-    obj[keys[k]] = _canonicalise(val);
+    obj[keys[k]] = _dropUndefinedMembers(val);
   }
   return obj;
 }
 
 function _canonicalHash(obj) {
-  var canonical = JSON.stringify(_canonicalise(obj == null ? {} : obj));
+  // Compose the vendored canonical-JSON primitive (RFC-8785-style sorted-key
+  // emission) for deterministic bytes, replacing the hand-rolled key sort.
+  var canonical = b.canonicalJson.stringify(_dropUndefinedMembers(obj == null ? {} : obj));
   return b.crypto.namespaceHash(IDEMPOTENCY_NAMESPACE, canonical);
 }
 
+// Pre-primitive request-hash encoding, retained ONLY to recognise idempotency
+// rows that an earlier release wrote with the hand-rolled canonicaliser. The
+// request_hash column is persisted and compared on replay, so without this a
+// same-key retry issued across the upgrade boundary would be refused as a
+// false collision until the row's 1-day TTL elapsed. New rows always store the
+// primitive-composed _canonicalHash; this fallback is compare-only and is safe
+// to delete once a full IDEMPOTENCY_TTL_MS has elapsed after deploy (by then
+// every legacy-encoded row has expired).
+function _legacyCanonicalise(v) {
+  if (v === null || typeof v !== "object") return v;
+  if (Array.isArray(v)) {
+    var out = [];
+    for (var i = 0; i < v.length; i += 1) out.push(_legacyCanonicalise(v[i]));
+    return out;
+  }
+  var keys = Object.keys(v).sort();
+  var obj  = {};
+  for (var k = 0; k < keys.length; k += 1) {
+    var val = v[keys[k]];
+    if (val === undefined) continue;
+    obj[keys[k]] = _legacyCanonicalise(val);
+  }
+  return obj;
+}
+
+function _legacyCanonicalHash(obj) {
+  return b.crypto.namespaceHash(IDEMPOTENCY_NAMESPACE, JSON.stringify(_legacyCanonicalise(obj == null ? {} : obj)));
+}
+
+// A stored request_hash matches when it equals the current primitive-composed
+// hash OR (transition fallback) the legacy encoding's hash for the same body.
+function _requestHashMatches(storedHash, requestObj) {
+  if (storedHash === _canonicalHash(requestObj)) return true;
+  return storedHash === _legacyCanonicalHash(requestObj);
+}
+
 function _assertIdempotencyKey(k) {
   if (typeof k !== "string" || k.length < 8 || k.length > 255) {
     throw new TypeError("payment: idempotency_key must be a string between 8 and 255 characters");
@@ -418,7 +463,7 @@ async function _runIdempotent(state, operation, key, requestObj, doCall) {
   )).rows[0];
 
   if (existing) {
-    if (existing.request_hash !== requestHash) {
+    if (!_requestHashMatches(existing.request_hash, requestObj)) {
       // Same key, different body — refuse. Stripe itself would reject
       // this on its own idempotency cache, but we surface a typed
       // application error so the caller doesn't have to ship the
@@ -462,7 +507,7 @@ async function _runIdempotent(state, operation, key, requestObj, doCall) {
       "FROM payment_idempotency WHERE idempotency_key = ?1 LIMIT 1",
       [key],
     )).rows[0];
-    if (winner && winner.request_hash !== requestHash) {
+    if (winner && !_requestHashMatches(winner.request_hash, requestObj)) {
       throw new TypeError("payment: idempotency_key collision (different inputs)");
     }
     if (winner) {
@@ -1147,6 +1192,7 @@ module.exports = {
   _formEncode:               _formEncode,
   _verifyWebhook:            _verifyWebhook,
   _canonicalHash:            _canonicalHash,
+  _legacyCanonicalHash:      _legacyCanonicalHash,
   // Exposed for the checkout webhook mirror + admin refund normalization —
   // exact decimal-string ↔ minor-unit conversion sharing one zero-decimal
   // currency table.

package/lib/subscription-analytics.js

@@ -316,24 +316,10 @@ function _churnKind(value) {
 
 // ---- canonical JSON for cache keys -------------------------------------
 //
-// Two cache lookups with the same arguments in a different key order
-// must hit the same row. JSON.stringify isn't order-stable across
-// engines, so the primitive sorts keys before hashing.
-
-function _canonicalJson(value) {
-  if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return JSON.stringify(value);
-  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
-    var parts = [];
-    for (var i = 0; i < value.length; i += 1) parts.push(_canonicalJson(value[i]));
-    return "[" + parts.join(",") + "]";
-  }
-  var keys = Object.keys(value).sort();
-  var pairs = [];
-  for (var k = 0; k < keys.length; k += 1) {
-    pairs.push(JSON.stringify(keys[k]) + ":" + _canonicalJson(value[keys[k]]));
-  }
-  return "{" + pairs.join(",") + "}";
-}
+// Two cache lookups with the same arguments in a different key order must
+// hit the same row. JSON.stringify isn't order-stable across engines, so the
+// cache key is built from the vendored canonical-JSON primitive, which emits
+// members in sorted-key order before hashing.
 
 // ---- cadence normalization ---------------------------------------------
 //
@@ -410,7 +396,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   // ---- cache helpers --------------------------------------------------
 
   function _cacheKey(scope, args) {
-    return b.crypto.namespaceHash(CACHE_NAMESPACE, _canonicalJson(args || {}));
+    return b.crypto.namespaceHash(CACHE_NAMESPACE, b.canonicalJson.stringify(args || {}));
   }
 
   async function _cacheRead(scope, args, periodFrom, periodTo, ttlMs) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/blamejs-shop",
-  "version": "0.4.82",
+  "version": "0.4.84",
   "description": "Open-source framework built on blamejs. Vendored stack, zero npm runtime deps, PQC-first crypto, security-on by default.",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
   "scripts": {