@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.4.69 → 0.4.70

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/content-credentials.js

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
 var C = require("./constants");
 var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
+var x509Chain = require("./x509-chain");
 var canonicalJson = require("./canonical-json");
 var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
@@ -1103,7 +1104,7 @@ function attachIdentityAssertion(opts) {
   validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "contentCredentials.attachIdentityAssertion", ContentCredentialsError);
   validateOpts(opts, ["binding", "subject", "referencedAssertions", "privateKeyPem", "audit"],
     "contentCredentials.attachIdentityAssertion");
-  if (typeof opts.binding !== "string" || !IDENTITY_BINDINGS[opts.binding]) {
+  if (typeof opts.binding !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(IDENTITY_BINDINGS, opts.binding)) {
     throw ContentCredentialsError.factory("content-credentials/bad-identity-binding",
       "attachIdentityAssertion: binding must be one of " + Object.keys(IDENTITY_BINDINGS).join(" / "));
   }
@@ -1217,7 +1218,7 @@ function verifyIdentityAssertion(assertion, publicKeyPem, opts) {
     return _fail("public-key-required");
   }
   var sp = assertion.signer_payload;
-  if (!sp || typeof sp !== "object" || typeof sp.binding !== "string" || !IDENTITY_BINDINGS[sp.binding] ||
+  if (!sp || typeof sp !== "object" || typeof sp.binding !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(IDENTITY_BINDINGS, sp.binding) ||
       !Array.isArray(sp.referenced_assertions)) {
     return _fail("signer-payload-shape");
   }
@@ -1334,9 +1335,10 @@ function _verifyIdentityX509Chain(certChainPem, trustAnchorsPem) {
   // only direct-root / self-signed leaves.
   for (var li = 0; li < certs.length - 1; li += 1) {
     var child = certs[li], parent = certs[li + 1];
-    var linked = false;
-    try { linked = child.checkIssued(parent) && child.verify(parent.publicKey); }
-    catch (_eLink) { linked = false; }
+    // issuerValidlyIssued enforces basicConstraints cA:TRUE on the parent in
+    // addition to the issuance + signature linkage — a non-CA cert cannot be
+    // an intermediate issuer (basicConstraints bypass, CVE-2002-0862 class).
+    var linked = x509Chain.issuerValidlyIssued(parent, child);
     if (!linked) { return { ok: false, reason: "broken-chain" }; }
   }
   // The top of the presented chain must chain to (or BE) a trust anchor.
@@ -1347,8 +1349,9 @@ function _verifyIdentityX509Chain(certChainPem, trustAnchorsPem) {
     if (top.fingerprint256 === anchor.fingerprint256) {
       chained = true;   // top of the chain IS the anchor (root-in-chain or self-signed leaf == anchor)
     } else {
-      try { chained = top.checkIssued(anchor) && top.verify(anchor.publicKey); }
-      catch (_eChk) { chained = false; }
+      // issuerValidlyIssued enforces basicConstraints cA:TRUE on the anchor
+      // in addition to issuance + signature (basicConstraints bypass class).
+      chained = x509Chain.issuerValidlyIssued(anchor, top);
     }
     if (chained) {
       if (now < anchor.validFromDate.getTime() || now > anchor.validToDate.getTime()) {
@@ -1427,7 +1430,7 @@ function cacImplicitLabel(opts) {
     throw new ContentCredentialsError("cac-implicit-label/bad-content-id",
       "cacImplicitLabel: contentId must match [A-Za-z0-9._:/-]");
   }
-  if (typeof opts.contentKind !== "string" || !CAC_KIND_ENUM[opts.contentKind]) {
+  if (typeof opts.contentKind !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(CAC_KIND_ENUM, opts.contentKind)) {
     throw new ContentCredentialsError("cac-implicit-label/bad-content-kind",
       "cacImplicitLabel: contentKind must be one of " +
       Object.keys(CAC_KIND_ENUM).join("/"));

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/content-digest.js

@@ -99,9 +99,12 @@ function create(body, opts) {
   if (!Array.isArray(algos) || algos.length === 0) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/bad-arg", "contentDigest.create: opts.algorithms must be a non-empty array");
   var members = algos.map(function (a) {
     var name = String(a).toLowerCase();
-    var nodeAlg = ACTIVE[name];
+    // hasOwnProperty: the algorithm name is operator/caller input; a bracket
+    // lookup lets "constructor"/"toString" inherit a truthy value off the
+    // prototype and pass the support check (proto shadowing).
+    var nodeAlg = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ACTIVE, name) ? ACTIVE[name] : undefined;
     if (!nodeAlg) {
-      if (DEPRECATED[name]) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/insecure-algorithm", "contentDigest.create: '" + name + "' is a deprecated/insecure digest algorithm (RFC 9530 §6); use sha-256 or sha-512");
+      if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DEPRECATED, name)) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/insecure-algorithm", "contentDigest.create: '" + name + "' is a deprecated/insecure digest algorithm (RFC 9530 §6); use sha-256 or sha-512");
       throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/unsupported-algorithm", "contentDigest.create: unsupported digest algorithm '" + name + "'");
     }
     var digest = nodeCrypto.createHash(nodeAlg).update(bytes).digest("base64");
@@ -154,8 +157,12 @@ function verify(fieldValue, body, opts) {
     var kvp = structuredFields.parseKeyValuePiece(m);
     var name = kvp.key;
     var raw = kvp.value.trim();
+    // hasOwnProperty: `name` is the algorithm token from the untrusted inbound
+    // Content-Digest header; a bracket lookup lets "constructor"/"__proto__"
+    // inherit a truthy value off the prototype and reach createHash (proto
+    // shadowing).
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ACTIVE, name)) continue;  // ignore legacy / unknown entries
     var nodeAlg = ACTIVE[name];
-    if (!nodeAlg) continue;                                  // ignore legacy / unknown entries
     if (raw.length < 2 || raw.charAt(0) !== ":" || raw.charAt(raw.length - 1) !== ":") {
       throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/bad-field", "contentDigest.verify: '" + name + "' value is not an RFC 8941 byte sequence (:base64:)");
     }
@@ -172,7 +179,7 @@ function verify(fieldValue, body, opts) {
     if (!Array.isArray(opts.required)) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/bad-arg", "contentDigest.verify: opts.required must be an array");
     for (var r = 0; r < opts.required.length; r++) {
       var req = String(opts.required[r]).toLowerCase();
-      if (!ACTIVE[req]) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/unsupported-algorithm", "contentDigest.verify: required algorithm '" + req + "' is not a modern digest");
+      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ACTIVE, req)) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/unsupported-algorithm", "contentDigest.verify: required algorithm '" + req + "' is not a modern digest");
       if (!seen[req]) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/missing-algorithm", "contentDigest.verify: required digest '" + req + "' is not present");
     }
   }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cookies.js

@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@ function _validateValue(value) {
   // Length cap before the regex test (defense in depth — the regex
   // here is a simple character class, but the same discipline that
   // bounds longer regexes elsewhere applies).
-  if (value.length > MAX_VALUE_LENGTH || FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RE.test(value)) {
+  // Byte length, not value.length (UTF-16 code units): the cap bounds the
+  // on-the-wire Set-Cookie size, and a multibyte value is 2-4x larger in bytes
+  // than chars, so a char-count check under-enforces and a 4096-char value can
+  // emit a ~12 KiB+ header.
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(value, "utf8") > MAX_VALUE_LENGTH || FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RE.test(value)) {
     throw new CookieError("cookies/invalid-value",
       "cookie value is too long or contains forbidden control character (CRLF/NUL/;/,)");
   }
@@ -108,7 +112,11 @@ function _validateValue(value) {
 // header — never trust unscrubbed values reach the wire.
 function _scrubAttr(s) {
   if (typeof s !== "string") return s;
-  return s.replace(/[\r\n\0]/g, "");                                             // allow:duplicate-regex — CR/LF/NUL header-injection rejection appears in cookies / mail / security-headers; each is the boundary primitive for its domain
+  // `;` joins Set-Cookie attributes, so an unscrubbed `;` in Path/SameSite is
+  // attribute injection (e.g. Path=/x; HttpOnly). Domain is regex-validated
+  // upstream; Path/SameSite only flow through here, so strip `;` alongside the
+  // CR/LF/NUL header-injection set.
+  return s.replace(/[\r\n\0;]/g, "");                                            // allow:duplicate-regex — CR/LF/NUL(+;) header-injection rejection appears in cookies / mail / security-headers; each is the boundary primitive for its domain
 
 }
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cose.js

@@ -110,6 +110,24 @@ function _algParamsFor(algId) {
   }
 }
 
+// RFC 9053 §2 binds each ECDSA alg to ONE curve. node:crypto will happily
+// verify a sha512 (ES512-shape) signature against a P-256 key as
+// self-consistent, so without this check a COSE_Sign1 declaring ES512 but
+// carrying a P-256 key passes when ES512 is allowlisted — an alg/curve
+// confusion (the COSE sibling of jwt-external._assertAlgKtyMatch). EdDSA /
+// ML-DSA carry their parameters in the KeyObject and need no binding.
+var _ES_ALG_CURVE = { ES256: "prime256v1", ES384: "secp384r1", ES512: "secp521r1" };
+function _assertEcAlgCurve(algName, key) {
+  var want = _ES_ALG_CURVE[algName];
+  if (want === undefined) return;                                                       // not an ECDSA alg — nothing to bind
+  var got = (key && key.asymmetricKeyDetails && key.asymmetricKeyDetails.namedCurve) || null;
+  if (key.asymmetricKeyType !== "ec" || got !== want) {
+    throw new CoseError("cose/alg-curve-mismatch",
+      "cose: alg '" + algName + "' requires an EC key on " + want +
+      ", got " + (key.asymmetricKeyType === "ec" ? got : key.asymmetricKeyType));
+  }
+}
+
 function _bstr(x) {
   return safeBuffer.toBuffer(x, {
     errorFactory: function (code, msg) { return new CoseError(code, msg); },
@@ -169,6 +187,7 @@ async function sign(payload, opts) {
   var algId = ALG_NAME_TO_ID[opts.alg];
   var params = _algParamsFor(algId);
   var key = _toKeyObject(opts.privateKey, "private");
+  _assertEcAlgCurve(opts.alg, key);                                                      // RFC 9053 alg↔curve binding — refuse e.g. ES512 over a P-256 key
 
   var protMap = new Map();
   protMap.set(HDR_ALG, algId);
@@ -352,6 +371,7 @@ async function verify(coseSign1, opts) {
   var key = opts.publicKey
     ? _toKeyObject(opts.publicKey, "public")
     : _toKeyObject(opts.keyResolver(protMap, unprotected), "public");
+  _assertEcAlgCurve(algName, key);                                                      // RFC 9053 alg↔curve binding
 
   var externalAad = opts.externalAad == null ? Buffer.alloc(0) : _bstr(opts.externalAad);
   var toBeSigned = _toBeSigned(protectedBstr, externalAad, payload);

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/crdt.js

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 
 var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
 var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var CrdtError = defineClass("CrdtError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ function _replicaId(opts) {
   return id;
 }
 function _posInt(n, label) {
-  if (typeof n !== "number" || !isFinite(n) || n < 0 || Math.floor(n) !== n) throw new CrdtError("crdt/bad-value", "crdt: " + label + " must be a non-negative integer");
+  if (!numericBounds.isNonNegativeFiniteInt(n)) throw new CrdtError("crdt/bad-value", "crdt: " + label + " must be a non-negative integer");
   return n;
 }
 function _maxMerge(a, b) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/crypto-field.js

@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ var vaultAad = require("./vault-aad");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
-var frameworkSchema = require("./framework-schema");
 var sql = require("./sql");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 var { sha3Hash, kdf, generateBytes, encryptPacked, decryptPacked, generateToken } = require("./crypto");
@@ -226,14 +225,19 @@ var PER_ROW_KEYS_TABLE = "_blamejs_per_row_keys";   // allow:hand-rolled-sql
 var PER_ROW_KEYS_COLUMN = "wrappedKey";
 var PER_ROW_KEYS_SCHEMA_VERSION = "1";
 
-// The per-row-key registry is read/written against the LOCAL db() / dbHandle
-// handle directly (not clusterStorage), so SQL composed for it uses the
-// RESOLVED name (prefix-aware via frameworkSchema.tableName) and quoteName so
-// b.sql emits the quoted identifier the single-node path expects — the same
-// shape db-query.js's _sqlOpts and db.js's own local-handle b.sql calls use.
+// The per-row-key registry ALWAYS lives in the LOCAL sqlite — reconcile creates
+// it under its RAW schema name, and per-row keys are never dispatched to an
+// external backend (see _kRowOnce's db() fallback). It is read/written against
+// the local db() / dbHandle directly, NOT through clusterStorage, so it must use
+// the RAW table name. frameworkSchema.tableName() resolves to the cluster-mode
+// EXTERNAL prefixed name (the prefix applies only to the external backend, via
+// resolveTables — local DDL stays raw); under a custom tablePrefix that names a
+// table that does not exist locally, which SILENTLY breaks crypto-shred:
+// destroyPerRowKey deletes 0 rows and sealed cells stay decryptable after
+// eraseHard. quoteName so b.sql emits the quoted identifier the local path expects.
 var _PER_ROW_SQL_OPTS = { dialect: "sqlite", quoteName: true };
 function _perRowKeysTableName() {
-  return frameworkSchema.tableName(PER_ROW_KEYS_TABLE);
+  return PER_ROW_KEYS_TABLE;
 }
 
 // Build the canonical AAD parts for a row-secret wrap in
@@ -1271,19 +1275,19 @@ function unsealRow(table, row, actor, dbHandle) {
           unsealed = out[field];
         }
       } catch (e) {
-        // A DB-write attacker who can write `vault:<crafted>` /
-        // `vault.aad:<crafted>` payloads to sealed columns can force
-        // KEM decapsulation / AEAD verify on attacker-controlled
-        // bytes via this read path. Surface the failure as a chain
-        // row so operators alert on burst patterns; null the field
-        // so downstream code sees "no value" instead of crashing the
-        // request. AAD-shape failures additionally indicate cross-
-        // row copy attempts — the audit metadata flags the shape so
-        // operators can write alert rules.
+        // A crypto-shredded (or never-materialized) per-row key is an EXPECTED
+        // absence, not a decryption-oracle attack: the wrapped secret is gone,
+        // so there is no oracle to brute-force. Reading such a row must read as
+        // "no value" WITHOUT counting against the rate cap — otherwise a bulk
+        // read over a table with many erased rows (GDPR eraseHard) trips the
+        // cap and DoS's the live rows (self-DoS, CWE-307 mis-applied). It is
+        // audited under a distinct, non-failure action so operators don't alert
+        // on routine post-erasure reads as forged-ciphertext bursts.
+        var _shredded = e && e.code === "crypto-field/row-key-unavailable";
         try {
           audit().safeEmit({
-            action:   "system.crypto.unseal_failed",
-            outcome:  "failure",
+            action:   _shredded ? "system.crypto.shredded_read" : "system.crypto.unseal_failed",
+            outcome:  _shredded ? "success" : "failure",
             metadata: {
               table:   table,
               field:   field,
@@ -1293,11 +1297,13 @@ function unsealRow(table, row, actor, dbHandle) {
             },
           });
         } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
-        // Default-on rate cap: account this failure against the (actor,
-        // table, column) tuple. When it trips the threshold, arm the
-        // cooldown + emit the distinct rate-exceeded audit once on the
-        // transition. No-op when the cap is disabled.
-        if (_rateNoteFailure(capActor, table, field)) {
+        // Default-on rate cap: account a genuine decryption / AEAD-verify /
+        // AAD-downgrade failure (a possible forged-ciphertext attack) against
+        // the (actor, table, column) tuple. A shredded-key read is exempt (see
+        // above). When the cap trips the threshold, arm the cooldown + emit the
+        // distinct rate-exceeded audit once on the transition. No-op when the
+        // cap is disabled.
+        if (!_shredded && _rateNoteFailure(capActor, table, field)) {
           _emitRateAudit({
             table: table, field: field, actor: capActor, shape: shape,
             threshold: _rateCap.threshold, windowMs: _rateCap.windowMs, cooldownMs: _rateCap.cooldownMs,

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/crypto.js

@@ -963,7 +963,7 @@ var SRI_ALGORITHMS = { "sha256": "sha256", "sha384": "sha384", "sha512": "sha512
 function sri(content, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   var algorithm = (opts.algorithm || "sha384").toLowerCase();
-  if (!SRI_ALGORITHMS[algorithm]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(SRI_ALGORITHMS, algorithm)) {
     throw new Error("crypto.sri: unsupported algorithm '" + algorithm +
       "' (W3C SRI 1.0 §3.2 supports sha256/sha384/sha512)");
   }
@@ -1356,7 +1356,21 @@ function decrypt(ciphertext, privateKeys, opts) {
     opts && opts.raw === true ? { raw: true } : undefined);
 }
 
+// Bounds-checked 2-byte length read — a bare _envU16(packed, pos) on a
+// truncated envelope throws a raw Node RangeError that escapes the documented
+// "Invalid envelope: ..." error contract (untrusted ciphertext must fail with
+// the typed envelope error, not a stack-trace-leaking RangeError).
+function _envU16(buf, at) {
+  if (at + 2 > buf.length) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid envelope: truncated (expected a 2-byte length at offset " + at + ")");
+  }
+  return buf.readUInt16BE(at);
+}
+
 function decryptEnvelope(packed, privateKeys, internalOpts) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(packed) || packed.length < 4) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid envelope: too short (need at least the 4-byte suite header)");
+  }
   var kemId = packed[1], cipherId = packed[2], kdfId = packed[3], pos = 4;
 
   // The legacy 0xE1 envelope predates the FixedInfo / suite-binding
@@ -1372,7 +1386,7 @@ function decryptEnvelope(packed, privateKeys, internalOpts) {
     throw new Error("Invalid envelope: unsupported KDF (only SHAKE256 supported)");
   }
 
-  var kemCtLen = packed.readUInt16BE(pos); pos += 2;
+  var kemCtLen = _envU16(packed, pos); pos += 2;
   var kemCt = packed.subarray(pos, pos + kemCtLen); pos += kemCtLen;
 
   var mlkemPriv = nodeCrypto.createPrivateKey(
@@ -1383,7 +1397,7 @@ function decryptEnvelope(packed, privateKeys, internalOpts) {
   var fixedInfo = omitFixedInfo ? Buffer.alloc(0) : _suiteFixedInfo(kemId, cipherId, kdfId);
 
   if (kemId === C.KEM_IDS.ML_KEM_1024_P384) {
-    var ecEphLen = packed.readUInt16BE(pos); pos += 2;
+    var ecEphLen = _envU16(packed, pos); pos += 2;
     var ecEphDer = packed.subarray(pos, pos + ecEphLen); pos += ecEphLen;
     var ecPrivPem = typeof privateKeys === "string" ? null : privateKeys.ecPrivateKey;
     if (!ecPrivPem) throw new Error("Hybrid KEM requires EC private key");
@@ -1400,7 +1414,7 @@ function decryptEnvelope(packed, privateKeys, internalOpts) {
     // the correct keypair via privateKeys when the envelope was sealed
     // with this algorithm. Same length-prefixed shape as the P-384
     // hybrid: 2-byte ec-eph-len + DER X25519 pubkey + nonce + ct.
-    var x25519EphLen = packed.readUInt16BE(pos); pos += 2;
+    var x25519EphLen = _envU16(packed, pos); pos += 2;
     var x25519EphDer = packed.subarray(pos, pos + x25519EphLen); pos += x25519EphLen;
     var x25519PrivPem = typeof privateKeys === "string" ? null : privateKeys.x25519PrivateKey;
     if (!x25519PrivPem) throw new Error("ML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid envelope requires x25519PrivateKey");

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/csp.js

@@ -416,6 +416,10 @@ function mergeDirectives(base, additions, opts) {
       ? directives[name].slice()
       : (directives["default-src"] ? directives["default-src"].slice() : ["'self'"]);
     var added = additions[name];
+    // A directive value of 'none' MUST stand alone (CSP3 §2.3.1) — appending a
+    // host to it emits the malformed "'none' https://x". When merging real
+    // sources in, the added sources supersede 'none', so drop it first.
+    if (added.length && existing.length === 1 && existing[0] === "'none'") existing = [];
     for (var si = 0; si < added.length; si += 1) {
       if (existing.indexOf(added[si]) === -1) existing.push(added[si]);
     }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/daemon.js

@@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ function _isLivePid(pid) {
 
 function _readPidFile(pidFile) {
   try {
-    var raw = nodeFs.readFileSync(pidFile, "utf8");
+    // Same fd-safe + capped + symlink-refusing read as app-shutdown's lockfile
+    // reader (one shape): a PID file is never a legit symlink mount, so
+    // refuseSymlink is safe; any throw → null ("nothing live there").
+    var raw = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(pidFile, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(1), refuseSymlink: true, encoding: "utf8" });
     var pid = parseInt(String(raw).trim(), 10);
     return isFinite(pid) && pid > 0 ? pid : null;
   } catch (_e) { return null; }

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/data-act.js

@@ -89,6 +89,32 @@ var DESIGNATED_GATEKEEPERS = Object.freeze([
   "booking",
 ]);
 
+// Is `recipient` a designated DMA gatekeeper? Match the gatekeeper token as a
+// DNS LABEL of the recipient's host authority — any position, including the
+// FINAL label. A substring `indexOf(g + ".")` test missed a gatekeeper that is
+// the last label (e.g. "blog.google" / "drive.google" on the real ".google"
+// TLD, or "data.amazon"), letting an Art 32 §1 third-party share through — and
+// also false-flagged a non-gatekeeper whose name merely contained the token
+// ("notgoogle.com"). Label matching closes the bypass and drops the false
+// positive. A bare name ("Google") still matches exactly. URL / userinfo / port
+// forms are normalized to the host authority first.
+function _isGatekeeperRecipient(recipient) {
+  var s = String(recipient).toLowerCase().trim();
+  var scheme = s.indexOf("://");
+  if (scheme !== -1) s = s.slice(scheme + 3);
+  s = s.split("/")[0].split("?")[0].split("#")[0];   // drop path / query / fragment
+  var at = s.lastIndexOf("@");
+  if (at !== -1) s = s.slice(at + 1);                 // drop userinfo
+  s = s.split(":")[0];                                // drop port
+  if (s.length === 0) return false;
+  var labels = s.split(".");
+  return DESIGNATED_GATEKEEPERS.some(function (g) {
+    if (s === g) return true;
+    for (var i = 0; i < labels.length; i++) { if (labels[i] === g) return true; }
+    return false;
+  });
+}
+
 /**
  * @primitive b.dataAct.declareProduct
  * @signature b.dataAct.declareProduct(opts)
@@ -229,10 +255,7 @@ function shareWithThirdParty(opts) {
     acceptGatekeeper: "optional-plain-object",
   }, "dataAct.shareWithThirdParty", DataActError, "dataact/bad-opts");
 
-  var recipientLower = opts.recipient.toLowerCase();
-  var isGatekeeper = DESIGNATED_GATEKEEPERS.some(function (g) {
-    return recipientLower === g || recipientLower.indexOf(g + ".") !== -1;
-  });
+  var isGatekeeper = _isGatekeeperRecipient(opts.recipient);
   if (isGatekeeper) {
     if (!opts.acceptGatekeeper || typeof opts.acceptGatekeeper !== "object" ||
         typeof opts.acceptGatekeeper.reason !== "string" ||

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/db-file-lifecycle.js

@@ -172,8 +172,11 @@ function fileLifecycle(opts) {
     : nodePath.join(opts.dataDir, frameworkFiles.fileName("dbKeyEnc"));
   var flushIntervalMs = opts.flushIntervalMs || DEFAULT_FLUSH_INTERVAL_MS;
   var tmpDir = _resolveTmpDir(opts.tmpDir, opts.allowDiskFallback === true);
-  if (!nodeFs.existsSync(tmpDir)) nodeFs.mkdirSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true });
-  if (!nodeFs.existsSync(opts.dataDir)) nodeFs.mkdirSync(opts.dataDir, { recursive: true });
+  // 0o700 — these hold the DB encryption tmpfs scratch + the data dir
+  // (db.key.enc, the decrypted DB while open); a default-mode mkdir leaves
+  // them group/other-traversable.
+  if (!nodeFs.existsSync(tmpDir)) nodeFs.mkdirSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  if (!nodeFs.existsSync(opts.dataDir)) nodeFs.mkdirSync(opts.dataDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
 
   var dbPath = null;
   var encKey = null;
@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ function fileLifecycle(opts) {
   function _loadOrGenerateKey() {
     if (encKey) return encKey;
     if (nodeFs.existsSync(keyPath)) {
-      var sealedKey = nodeFs.readFileSync(keyPath, "utf8");
+      // Cap + fd-bound. NO refuseSymlink: dbKeyPath may be an operator-absolute
+      // KMS-fronted volume that legitimately symlinks the sealed key.
+      var sealedKey = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(keyPath, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(64), encoding: "utf8" });
       var keyB64;
       try { keyB64 = opts.vault.unseal(sealedKey); }
       catch (e) {
@@ -212,7 +217,10 @@ function fileLifecycle(opts) {
     dbPath = nodePath.join(tmpDir, "blamejs-fl-" + label + "-" +
       generateToken(TMP_NAME_BYTES) + ".db");
     if (nodeFs.existsSync(encPath)) {
-      var packed = nodeFs.readFileSync(encPath);
+      // Cap + fd-bound (deployment-tunable ceiling). NO refuseSymlink: the data
+      // dir may be a symlink-mounted volume (k8s PVC). db.enc is AEAD-checked
+      // downstream, so the cap is the OOM-before-cap defense.
+      var packed = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(encPath, { maxBytes: (opts.maxDbBytes) || C.BYTES.gib(2) });
       if (packed.length < 26) {                                                                  // minimum envelope length
         throw new DbFileLifecycleError("db-file-lifecycle/short-envelope",
           "fileLifecycle: " + encPath + " too short to be a valid envelope (" + packed.length + " bytes)");
@@ -248,7 +256,7 @@ function fileLifecycle(opts) {
       catch (_e) { /* best-effort — operators on read-only handles or pre-init still flush */ }
     }
     if (!nodeFs.existsSync(dbPath)) return null;
-    var plain = nodeFs.readFileSync(dbPath);
+    var plain = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(dbPath, { maxBytes: (opts.maxDbBytes) || C.BYTES.gib(2) });
     var packed = encryptPacked(plain, encKey, _aad(opts.dataDir, label));
     atomicFile.writeSync(encPath, packed);
     _emitAudit("flushed", "success", { label: label, bytes: plain.length });
@@ -269,7 +277,7 @@ function fileLifecycle(opts) {
       throw new DbFileLifecycleError("db-file-lifecycle/no-source",
         "fileLifecycle.snapshot: " + dbPath + " is missing");
     }
-    var plain = nodeFs.readFileSync(dbPath);
+    var plain = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(dbPath, { maxBytes: (opts.maxDbBytes) || C.BYTES.gib(2) });
     return encryptPacked(plain, encKey, _aad(opts.dataDir, label));
   }
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/db-query.js

@@ -1378,12 +1378,62 @@ function _unquoteIdent(s) {
   return s;
 }
 
+// Strip LEADING SQL comments + whitespace so the ^-anchored write-detection
+// regexes see the real statement head. Without this, a residency write smuggled
+// behind a leading "/* x */" or "-- x\n" comment is NOT recognized as a write →
+// the residency gate is skipped entirely (a cross-border-write BYPASS). The
+// executed SQL is unchanged; this normalized copy is only for the gate's parse.
+// Each replace is ^-anchored single-pass; the loop terminates when nothing more
+// is stripped (an unterminated /* leaves the head intact → write still detected
+// or fails closed downstream).
+function _stripLeadingSqlComments(sql) {
+  var s = String(sql), prev;
+  do {
+    prev = s;
+    s = s.replace(/^\s+/, "");                 // allow:regex-no-length-cap — anchored, single leading run
+    s = s.replace(/^--[^\n]*\r?\n?/, "");      // allow:regex-no-length-cap — anchored leading line comment
+    s = s.replace(/^\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//, "");    // allow:regex-no-length-cap — anchored leading block comment (lazy, single scan)
+  } while (s !== prev);
+  return s;
+}
+
+// Non-anchored write-target scan for the writable-CTE / EXPLAIN-prefixed case.
+// A SQLite `WITH c AS (...) INSERT INTO residents ...` / `WITH ... UPDATE residents
+// SET ...` is a real write, but its effective verb is hidden behind the prefix so
+// the ^-anchored _RAW_WRITE_KEYWORD_RE misses it. This matches every INSERT/REPLACE
+// INTO, MERGE INTO, and UPDATE ... SET target token anywhere in the statement and
+// returns the first that names a residency table — so such a write still ENGAGES
+// the residency gate (_assertRawWriteResidency then fails CLOSED: the ^-anchored
+// body parsers can't read a CTE body, so it throws row-residency-raw-unparseable
+// directing the operator to b.db.from().insertOne/.updateOne). DELETE moves no
+// residency value across a border, so it is not a residency write. Linear scan.
+var _CTE_WRITE_TARGET_RE = /(?:\b(?:INSERT|REPLACE)\s+(?:OR\s+[A-Za-z]+\s+)?INTO|\bMERGE\s+INTO)\s+(?:[\x22\x27\x60]?[A-Za-z_]\w*[\x22\x27\x60]?\s*\.\s*){0,3}[\x22\x27\x60]?([A-Za-z_]\w*)[\x22\x27\x60]?|\bUPDATE\s+(?:[\x22\x27\x60]?[A-Za-z_]\w*[\x22\x27\x60]?\s*\.\s*){0,3}[\x22\x27\x60]?([A-Za-z_]\w*)[\x22\x27\x60]?\s+SET\b/ig;  // allow:regex-no-length-cap — alternation, no nested quantifiers; linear
+function _firstResidencyWriteTarget(s) {
+  _CTE_WRITE_TARGET_RE.lastIndex = 0;
+  var m;
+  while ((m = _CTE_WRITE_TARGET_RE.exec(s)) !== null) {  // allow:regex-no-length-cap
+    var t = _unquoteIdent(m[1] || m[2]);
+    if (t && (cryptoField.getPerRowResidency(t) || cryptoField.getColumnResidency(t))) return t;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
 function _rawWriteTable(sql) {
-  // Both regexes are ^-anchored (leading write keyword + table head): they scan
-  // only the statement head, so they are constant-time regardless of SQL length.
-  if (typeof sql !== "string" || !_RAW_WRITE_KEYWORD_RE.test(sql)) return null;  // allow:regex-no-length-cap
-  var m = _RAW_TABLE_RE.exec(sql);  // allow:regex-no-length-cap
-  return m ? _unquoteIdent(m[1] || m[2]) : null;
+  // The ^-anchored regexes scan only the statement head (constant-time). Strip
+  // leading comments first so a commented-out head can't hide the write.
+  if (typeof sql !== "string") return null;
+  var s = _stripLeadingSqlComments(sql);
+  if (_RAW_WRITE_KEYWORD_RE.test(s)) {  // allow:regex-no-length-cap
+    var m = _RAW_TABLE_RE.exec(s);  // allow:regex-no-length-cap
+    return m ? _unquoteIdent(m[1] || m[2]) : null;
+  }
+  // Writable-CTE / EXPLAIN-prefixed write: the effective write verb is hidden
+  // behind the prefix the ^-anchored test misses. If it writes a residency table,
+  // return it so the gate engages and then fails closed on the unparseable body.
+  if (/^\s*(?:WITH|EXPLAIN)\b/i.test(s)) {  // allow:regex-no-length-cap
+    return _firstResidencyWriteTarget(s);
+  }
+  return null;
 }
 
 // Cheap prepare-time pre-check so only writes to a residency table get wrapped.
@@ -1463,17 +1513,23 @@ function _assertRawWriteResidency(sql, boundParams) {
   if (!cryptoField.getPerRowResidency(table) && !cryptoField.getColumnResidency(table)) return;
   boundParams = _flattenRunParams(boundParams);
 
+  // Parse the comment-stripped head: a leading "/* x */" / "-- x" comment must
+  // not hide the INSERT/UPDATE body from the ^-anchored regexes below (that would
+  // let a residency-restricted write through the gate). The executed SQL is
+  // unchanged; this normalized copy is only for residency parsing.
+  var norm = _stripLeadingSqlComments(sql);
+
   // The INSERT/UPDATE body regexes below scan with [\s\S]+; bound the input
   // first and fail CLOSED on an over-long statement - a residency write the
   // framework cannot safely parse must be refused, never let past the gate.
-  if (sql.length > 100000) {
+  if (norm.length > 100000) {
     throw new DbQueryError("db-query/row-residency-raw-unparseable",
       "raw write to residency table '" + table + "' exceeds the parse limit (" +
-      sql.length + " chars) - use b.db.from(\"" + table + "\") so residency is validated", true);
+      norm.length + " chars) - use b.db.from(\"" + table + "\") so residency is validated", true);
   }
 
-  var mi = _RAW_INSERT_RE.exec(sql);  // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input length-capped above
-  var mu = mi ? null : _RAW_UPDATE_RE.exec(sql);  // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input length-capped above
+  var mi = _RAW_INSERT_RE.exec(norm);  // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input length-capped above
+  var mu = mi ? null : _RAW_UPDATE_RE.exec(norm);  // allow:regex-no-length-cap — input length-capped above
   if (!mi && !mu) {
     throw new DbQueryError("db-query/row-residency-raw-unparseable",
       "raw write to residency table '" + table + "' cannot be parsed to validate its " +
@@ -1509,4 +1565,8 @@ module.exports = {
   Query: Query,
   _isRawWriteToResidencyTable: _isRawWriteToResidencyTable,
   _assertRawWriteResidency:    _assertRawWriteResidency,
+  // Shared leading-comment stripper so db.js's storage-low write-gate sees the
+  // real statement head (a `/* x */ INSERT` / WITH-prefixed write must not slip
+  // the ENOSPC gate the way it slipped the residency gate).
+  _stripLeadingSqlComments:    _stripLeadingSqlComments,
 };